The Militant (logo)  
   Vol.66/No.31           August 19, 2002  
 
 
Bosses and government knew about
safety problems at flooded Quecreek mine
(front page)
 
BY TONY LANE  
SOMERSET, Pennsylvania--In the days following the rescue of nine miners from the flooded Quecreek mine near here July 28, attention has shifted toward what government and company officials knew before the accident.

The crew had become trapped 78 hours earlier when some 50 million to 60 million gallons of water rushed into the mine. The flood occurred as the crew was cutting coal with a continuous mining machine and water poured in from the adjacent abandoned Saxman mine. Newspaper accounts of their ordeal report that their effort to flee the wall of water was blocked by the water level reaching the roof of the mine in advance of their escape. A second nine-man crew was warned with enough time to make their way out of the mine through the floodwaters. All of the underground portions of the mine were flooded out into the pit where the mine entrances are located. One area of the pit was flooded 18 feet high.

The lack of oxygen in the air threatened the lives of the Quecreek miners before rescuers were able to drill a hole down to where they were trapped and start pumping in fresh air. The rising water continued to endanger the miners even in the high area they retreated to.

The Pittsburgh Tribune Review reported that miners at Saxman and other area mines were advised to never "mine up"--excavating coal by following a seam up in elevation--because of the danger of piercing an old mine holding back water that would drown workers. The Quecreek mine was 100 feet below the flooded Saxman mine and the escape routes for the trapped miners were even lower.

The Quecreek mine was operated by Black Wolf Coal for PBS Coals, which is the state’s largest strip mine operator. The Quecreek mine is nonunion as are all underground mines in Somerset and neighboring Cambria County.  
 
State, federal investigations launched
Both state and federal safety agencies are now mounting investigations into the flooding. The state government is also appointing a separate commission to investigate the disaster.

A document from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) shows that both state safety and company officials knew in 1999 that "unmapped mine voids were encountered near the southern permit boundary." The issue arose at a permit hearing where the company was granted permission to expand its mining operation from an area of 272 acres to 3,666 acres.

This information contradicts claims by company spokespeople, state officials, and the news media, all of whom blame bad mine maps.

John Weir, a spokesman for PBS Coals, said that years ago the mine was not properly mapped. "Back then they didn’t keep computerized maps and surveys that are done today," he said. "A lot of it was just penciled on the back of a lunch bag." DEP secretary David Hess said that the mine maps "apparently were wrong." President of the Pennsylvania Coal Association George Ellis concurred, saying, "Obviously the maps were wrong."

Problems with water in the abandoned Saxman mine were well known. Retired miner Mike Zanoni explained that this was one of the reasons why the mine had stopped operating. Another retired Saxman miner, Joe Jasienski, said, "Everyone knew that mine was flooded. Heck, we used it as our drinking water. And it was higher up than where the nine miners were. A lot higher."

Jeffrey Bender, a local resident, said, "What’s frustrating for us is that we warned DEP and they seemed to be on the side of the mine, not us. But we knew, we knew." Bender filed one of 41 complaints against the proposed mine in 1999. In a letter sent to the DEP at the time, he said, "Obviously the firm preparing to mine hasn’t researched the area very well at all."

Hydrology reports in the 1999 state permit showed wells sunk near the proposed mine were flooded with water 50 to 95 feet above the Quecreek mine. Eleven test holes were drilled before mining but none closer than 800 feet from the old Saxman works. The section of Quecreek that flooded was closest to and heading directly toward the old Saxman mine. The company claims there was a 300 foot pillar of coal separating the new mine from the old workings.

A former DEP attorney, Robert Ging, stated, "A little bit of prudence could have avoided this incident. It’s just unbelievable. If you want to protect the mine workers, you verify where the coal pillar is."

Considering the unreliability of the old maps, Ging blames the DEP for issuing the permit without ordering more tests near the Saxman mine. "It’s sloppy work by the DEP and it’s sloppy work by the engineers," he said.

Joe Main, health and safety administrator for the UMWA, pointed out, "Sometimes following the law isn’t good enough. We’re calling on all deep mine operators out there to heed this advice. Any prudent operator should be backing up their boundaries and testing for water in abandoned mines."

There have been four other flooding incidents since June 1999 in southwestern Pennsylvania, although none on the scale of Quecreek. They occurred at RoxCoal’s Longview mine, RAG’s Cumberland mine in Greene County, Consol Energy’s Mine No. 84 in Washington County, and Dunmire Resources’ Barbara mine in Somerset County.

Two state lawmakers have called for a grand jury investigation into the actions of the DEP and the coal operator, making the request of state attorney general and Republican gubernatorial candidate Michael Fisher. The call pointed to the compliance record of PBS Coals, which has been cited for at least 90 federal mine safety violations in the last two years, a third of which were classified as "serious and substantial." Their letter also noted that PBS or its subsidiaries have been involved with two other mines--Diamond T mine and RoxCoal’s Longview mine--that flooded within the last five years. They said that the department "should have been more diligent" and "given the record of the mining company and its parent," it should have "exercised more caution in allowing these mining activities to proceed."  
 
Triple the accident rate
PBS Coals has disputed reports on its safety violations. Safety officer John Matsko said his company has "a superb safety record.... Our violation rate is one of the lowest in the nation." In addition to the violations, MSHA records show that the accident rate at PBS Coals Mine No. 1 for the first three months of this year was almost triple the rate for similar mines across the country. The company’s Shade Creek processing plant accounted for a third of the violations. In December 2000, coal truck driver Gary Kerley was crushed and killed at the plant. MSHA blamed the accident in part on PBS’s failure to properly train Kerley and another truck driver.

The Quecreek mine had 26 violations since March 2001, nine of which were listed as "serious and substantial." In October 2001 a 40-foot by 30-foot section of the roof fell, burying a roof bolting machine.

While many big-business commentators talked about this incident in the context of small mines and companies with limited resources, the facts tell a different story of a substantial mining operation and a complex corporate structure. The owner of Quecreek, PBS Coals, cuts 2.5 million tons of coal a year. PBS Coals is a division of Mincorp Inc., which also operates Quecreek Mining and an underground mine division, RoxCoal.  
 
Interlocking companies
Mincorp director Tim Phillips said they have no connection with the operator of the mine, Black Wolf Coal. PBS officials describe Black Wolf as a contract miner, but the firm lists some of the same officers as Quecreek.

Ed Yankovich, president of UMWA District 2, said forming interlocking companies in the mining industry is not unusual. He said that companies are structured that way to prevent smaller mines from unionizing and to keep subsidiaries at an arm’s length from the parent company to avoid pension and environmental liabilities. "That’s common even in union mines," Yankovich said. The use of contractors and contract labor has expanded in the past decade and the safety record of contractors has been worse than the industry as a whole.  
 
Government cuts mine safety budget
The disaster occurs in the context of government budget cuts to mine safety, a rise in the number of fatal accidents, and questions about the functioning of MSHA in the wake of the mine explosion in Brookwood, Alabama, in September 2001, which took the lives of 13 workers. Last year 42 mine workers were killed on the job, as the fatality rate climbed for the third straight year. So far this year, 17 miners have been killed.

MSHA’s 2003 budget calls for a $4.7 million cut in its coal enforcement program along with a reduction of 65 full-time employees. "We thought you need to look at other tools beyond just enforcement," MSHA director David Lauriski said.

Both state and federal safety officials have taken the occasion of the recent flood to praise the safety levels of the mining industry. DEP spokesman Lasher said, "The technology is improving and we’re continuing to enforce safety regulations. The industry has done a good job complying with those regulations."

However, more coal is being mined with fewer fatal accidents today as a result of a major increase in productivity. Over the last 20 years, the percentage of miners injured or killed on the job has remained unchanged, while the number of miners has decreased from 149,000 in 1990 to 77,000 today.

Tony Lane is a member of UMWA Local 1248 at the Maple Creek mine in southwestern Pennsylvania.
 
 
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