In October 1962, in what is widely known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington pushed the world to the brink of nuclear war. The events brought to a head the drive by the U.S. rulers to launch a direct invasion of Cuba and overthrow the revolutionary government there. In the face of the U.S. government’s threats, Cuban working people mobilized in their millions to defend their revolution, staying Washington’s hand (see accompanying box).

Released on the 40th anniversary of these events, the Pathfinder book October 1962: The ‘Missile’ Crisis as Seen from Cuba, by Cuban author Tomás Diez Acosta, tells the story of what really happened.

The Militant has been printing excerpts from the new book. The one below is from the chapter titled "The brilliant yet sad days of the crisis." The chapter details the steps taken by the U.S. government between October 22 and 28, 1962--the high point of the crisis--toward launching a war against Cuba. It also describes the political and military moves taken by Cuba’s revolutionary government to counteract these threats and aggression, as well as the positions taken by top Soviet leaders.

Copyright © 2002 by Pathfinder Press, reprinted by permission. Subheadings are by the Militant.

Click here for Background to 1962 ‘missile’ crisis in Cuba
 

The military measures taken by the United States were directed not only against Cuba but also against the USSR. These steps included putting the Strategic Air Command (SAC) on maximum alert, ordering nuclear submarines armed with Polaris missiles to leave their bases and take up attack positions, and placing in a state of combat readiness the ring of U.S. bases, with all their troops and equipment, that encircled the Soviet Union from Turkey to Japan. For its part, the Soviet Union made its strategic missile forces combat-ready and put its entire armed forces on maximum alert. In Europe the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact armies took similar measures.

The stance taken by the superpowers created worldwide turmoil. Starting on October 23 there were demonstrations in many countries against these actions, which threatened peace and endangered all humanity. Public opinion on the gravity of the events was expressed in various ways around the world. However, political conditions were not favorable for the protests to directly condemn the actions of the U.S. rulers, given the way in which the Soviet Union had deployed the missiles in Cuba and Kennedy’s adroit manipulation of public opinion.  
 
Seven days on the brink of nuclear war
Cuba was not caught off guard. Noting the increase in U.S. military actions in the Caribbean, the Cuban government had already begun taking action to meet the threat. Cuban intelligence units were kept on alert. Increasingly alarming reports poured in to the General Staff of the armed forces.

On October 21 it was learned that the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo had been reinforced with additional troops and matériel. Information was also obtained--through a secret channel--that in the early morning hours of October 22 the base commander had ordered the evacuation of civilian families of troops stationed at Guantánamo. In accordance with Operational Directive no. 1, and in light of the political-military situation, orders began going out to Cuban combat units.¹

At noon on October 22, news arrived that the White House press secretary, Pierre Salinger, had reserved time that evening on all U.S. radio stations and TV channels for President Kennedy’s address to the nation. From then on, the news media started to report on all meetings held in the presidential office.

Cuban authorities concluded that the flurry of activity in the U.S. capital had to do with discovery of the Soviet missile sites. Although they could not predict exactly what military action the U.S. would launch or where it would strike, they were certain that an attack was imminent. At 3:50 p.m. that day Prime Minister Fidel Castro, in his capacity as commander in chief, placed the armed forces on combat alert. Shortly afterward, at 5:35 p.m.--nearly an hour and a half before Kennedy spoke--a state of combat alarm was decreed for the entire country.²

That evening, Foreign Minister Raúl Roa instructed the Cuban ambassador to the United Nations, Mario García Incháustegui, to request an emergency session of the Security Council because--as Roa stated in his instructions--the naval blockade against Cuba announced by the U.S. president constituted "an act of war carried out behind the backs of international organizations, with absolute disdain for the Security Council, creating an imminent danger of war."

Cuba’s plans for wartime defense of the island involved organizing the military and political command structure into three operational regions based on the mountain ranges--eastern, central, and western. Each was headed by an authoritative commander who could lead the struggle and armed resistance independently. Commander Raúl Castro, minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, assumed command of Oriente province and its army. Commander Juan Almeida headed up the central provinces, with his headquarters in Santa Clara. Commander Ernesto Guevara, based in Pinar del Río, led the western region. Fidel Castro remained in Havana, at the head of the nation....  
 
Soviet forces placed on full combat alert
Early on the morning of October 23, Marshal Malinovsky reported on the military actions by the United States, and proposed to put the Soviet armed forces on full combat alert. Khrushchev, on the other hand, called for caution, for projecting an image of calm, and for not rushing to make decisions that might touch off a war. At the same time, Krushchev gave instructions that the submarine fleet, antiaircraft defense, and strategic missile units cancel all leaves and put on hold retirements based on age until further notice.

Faced with the threat of war, Warsaw Pact countries ordered similar military measures. The TASS news agency ran a statement by the Soviet government denouncing the naval blockade as a serious threat to peace and a step toward unleashing thermonuclear war. It also warned the United States not to implement the measures Kennedy had announced against Soviet ships headed toward Cuba, and requested that the UN Security Council be convened promptly.

At the same time, the Soviet Foreign Ministry gave U.S. ambassador Kohler a copy of the official statement and a message from Khrushchev to Kennedy, which repeated that the weapons in Cuba were defensive and called the actions announced the previous day outrageous interference in the affairs of the Republic of Cuba as well as a provocative act against the Soviet Union. The Soviet premier also sent a letter to Fidel Castro, calling the U.S. actions piratical, perfidious, and aggressive. Khrushchev told Castro that he had given instructions to the Soviet military representatives in Cuba to take all necessary measures to be completely combat-ready.

This message was interpreted by the Cuban leadership as a clear sign of Soviet determination not to give in to U.S. demands. Years later, Fidel exclaimed: "The idea of retreating never entered my mind."

Coincidentally, on the morning of October 23 the Soviet ship Aleksandrovsk docked at the Cuban port of Isabela de Sagua, carrying on board the remaining nuclear missile warheads, without being detected by U.S. intelligence. This was very significant militarily, since it meant that the so-called quarantine announced by Kennedy had no strategic value. Politically, it was a powerful deterrent for the Soviets to use in negotiations to end the conflict. But this advantage was never utilized or even mentioned.

In the morning, after giving the necessary instructions, Fidel Castro went to the central command post to get the latest reports on the state of mobilization. There he learned that U.S. warplanes were making low-altitude flights over Cuba--a dangerous military escalation.

That night the Cuban prime minister appeared on radio and television to refute charges made by the U.S. president the day before. Fidel made it clear that he had no obligation to explain anything to the U.S. government, and he rejected the idea that the United States had the right to decide what kind of weapons or how many weapons Cuba should or should not have. He warned categorically that "appropriate measures to resist and...repel any direct aggression" had been taken. The Cuban leader also opposed the U.S. demand to inspect the island, because "we will never renounce our sovereign prerogatives. Within our borders we are the ones who rule, and we are the ones who will do the inspecting--nobody else."

One by one, Fidel refuted Kennedy’s arguments for imposing the blockade. He denounced U.S. violations of the standards of conduct among nations, such as its repeated trespassing into Cuban airspace and territorial waters. In another part of his speech, he stated that the government of Cuba was always willing to resolve its differences with the United States--under conditions of equality.

At the same time, the prime minister asserted that Cuba was in favor of dismantling all military bases and not stationing any foreign troops in the territory of another country. "If the United States desires disarmament, magnificent!" he said. "Let us all support a policy for the dismantling of bases, of troops throughout the world.... But we are not in agreement with a policy that calls for disarming ourselves in the face of the aggressors."

Meanwhile, in the United States the press and other media were spreading alarming news that frightened the population. People stocked up on food and all kinds of supplies. Some well-to-do families in the South began moving north for fear of a nuclear strike in their region.

In Washington, as part of U.S. maneuvers to obtain international backing for its actions and demands, Secretary of State Rusk was assigned to pressure OAS members to approve a resolution of support....

At UN headquarters in New York, the Security Council was convened the afternoon of October 23 to hear representatives of the United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. The first to speak was Adlai Stevenson. He delivered a long speech seeking to present the blockade as an act of self-defense. He accused Cuba of receiving strategic weapons, and denounced the USSR for not making public the decision to provide them. He insisted that those weapons systems had altered the "precarious balance of forces" in the world. He also asserted that the Cuban government had allowed the Soviet Union to establish a beachhead and base of operations in the Western Hemisphere, inviting a foreign power to infiltrate the American family.  
 
No inspections on Cuban territory
Cuban representative García Incháustegui spoke next, refuting Stevenson’s assertions. He stated that Cuba had been compelled to arm itself due to repeated acts of aggression by the United States in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and inter-American agreements. He criticized the U.S. stance of adopting military actions first and later calling on the council, since the UN Charter obligates its members to settle differences through peaceful negotiations before resorting to such extreme measures.

He commented on the striking contradiction that the United States was the only country that maintained a military base in Cuba--against Cuba’s will--while at the same time it denounced Cuba for allowing the deployment of friendly troops from the Soviet Union. In conclusion, he presented the principled position of not allowing any kind of inspection of Cuban territory, because "the first thing that ought to be inspected are the U.S. bases from which invasions are launched. We do not accept observers of any kind in matters that fall under our internal jurisdiction."

Soviet representative Valerian Zorin analyzed the pretexts and sophisms used by the U.S. government to justify its aggression, and denounced its actions as having no legal basis. He pointed out that the United States "has endangered maritime shipping of several countries--including its own allies--which do not accept such a foolish policy toward Cuba." He also denounced the diplomatic maneuver by the United States in the OAS, which "openly violates the prerogatives of the Security Council--the only body that can authorize any acts of force." After his statement the session was recessed.

While these debates were taking place in the Security Council, representatives of forty-five nations, mostly members of the Nonaligned Movement from Asia and Africa, met at the United Nations to discuss ways of resolving the crisis. They agreed to ask the UN acting secretary-general, U Thant, to act as mediator and to convene a meeting of the General Assembly if the Security Council was not able to agree on a solution.

On the morning of October 24, Fidel--in his capacity as commander in chief of the armed forces--met with a group of commanders and officers at the General Staff headquarters to analyze the implementation of military measures to defend the country. The chief of intelligence, Captain Manuel de Jesús Quiñones (Pedro Luis), estimated that in case of an invasion of Cuba, the United States would use five or six divisions, and that transporting them would require 120 or 130 ships and take at least six days. He pointed out there was no evidence that such an invasion was imminent. He said, however, that if the 82nd Airborne Division were activated, the first stage of the invasion could be carried out in five or six hours, although the increase in communications traffic and the number of aircraft involved would mean the operation could be quickly detected and pinpointed. He thought the most likely action was an air strike.

Fidel Castro put special emphasis on antiaircraft defense, and he insisted the reserve batteries based in Havana had to be in a position to move quickly if necessary. Therefore, he ordered at least twenty-four of these batteries to be deployed at three points on the outskirts of the city, clustered in such a way that they could rapidly be moved to any location.  
 
U.S. planes violate Cuban airspace
During the meeting it was reported that the previous day ten enemy aircraft had violated Cuban air space, flying over Cuba at an altitude of 100 meters and then climbing sharply once they crossed the coastline. These aircraft could not be allowed to fly with impunity, Castro said. He proposed an investigation of the places where antiaircraft defense needed to be strengthened, so that such flights into Cuban airspace could be shot down. "There is no political reason whatsoever why we shouldn’t shoot down an aircraft flying 300 feet over our heads," Fidel said.

In closing the meeting, Fidel explained the military and political considerations that led to ordering the mobilization of October 22. He said that the Cuban leadership had indications an attack was being organized and therefore decided to put troops on alert and order a full mobilization, because "the harm done by taking precautions that later turned out to be unnecessary was preferable to the consequences of being caught by a surprise enemy attack." The subsequent course of events fully justified such a decision.

That afternoon Castro visited a unit of Soviet surface-to-air missiles northeast of the capital. There he became aware how vulnerable they were to attack by low-flying aircraft,³ since they had only one 14.5-mm. zpu-2 double-barreled antiaircraft machine gun. He ordered that fifty antiaircraft batteries from the reserves be immediately deployed to protect those positions and the mid-range missile sites.

As expected, the U.S. naval blockade was put into effect in the waters surrounding the Cuban archipelago at 10:00 a.m. that same morning, October 24, and aircraft raids--above all low-altitude flights--increased. Meanwhile, at the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Gen. Thomas Powers, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), to put all his units on full-alert status, DEFCON-2, for the first and only time in the SAC’s history. Then Powers, on his own initiative, decided to broadcast the orders to SAC commanders through uncoded messages, stressing that the operation was fully prepared and the alert process was proceeding smoothly. As General Powers himself commented, he felt it "important that [the Soviets] knew the state of combat readiness of SAC." The military situation was becoming more and more dangerous to world peace.

² During the night of October 22 and early morning of October 23, hundreds of thousands of Cubans were mobilized, with their weapons, and moved to their battle posts. A total of fifty-four infantry divisions, four brigades (one of tanks, and three of artillery), seventeen independent battalions, six artillery groups (multiple rocket launchers), three independent 120-mm. mortar groups, twenty units of the Revolutionary Navy, one hundred and eighteen antiaircraft batteries, and forty-seven warplanes were mobilized. A total of 269,203 people were mobilized, including 169,561 reservists and 99,612 on the active-duty rosters of the FAR. See "Draft Report Analyzing Experiences of the Recently Concluded Mobilization." Operations Directorate, Havana, December 19, 1962. CID-FAR Archives, Military Unit 1081 Collection, Inventory 1, Record 28, File 4.

³As noted in Chapter 4, these antiaircraft missiles were not effective against targets flying below 1,000 meters (3,270 feet).  

After Cuban workers and farmers overthrew a U.S.-backed dictatorship and began a deep-going revolution in 1959, Washington took increasingly aggressive actions to try to overthrow the new revolutionary power. In April 1961, Cuba’s revolutionary militias and armed forces crushed a U.S.-organized mercenary invasion at the Bay of Pigs.

In the spring and summer of 1962, in face of escalating preparations by Washington for a full-scale invasion of Cuba, the revolutionary government signed a mutual defense pact with the Soviet Union. In October U.S. president John Kennedy demanded removal of Soviet nuclear missiles installed on the island. Washington imposed a naval blockade of Cuba, stepped up preparations for an armed assault, and placed its armed forces on nuclear alert.

In face of the mobilization of Cuban workers and farmers to defend their national sovereignty and revolutionary gains, the U.S. government backed off its invasion plans. Following an exchange of communications between Washington and Moscow, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, without consulting Cuba, announced his decision to remove the missiles on October 28.
 
 
Related articles:
Russians, Cubans, Americans relive 1962 ‘Missile’ Crisis
Book ‘vividly captures’ Cuban victory at Bay of Pigs  
 
 
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