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Vol. 71/No. 35      September 24, 2007

 
Stalin’s role in defeat
of 1927 Chinese revolution
(Books of the Month column)
 
From Lenin to Stalin is one of Pathfinder’s Books of the Month in September. It is a vivid account of the early years of the Soviet Union under V.I. Lenin’s leadership—and of the political counterrevolution by a privileged social layer headed by Joseph Stalin. The excerpt below sheds light on Stalin’s betrayal of the 1927 Chinese revolution. Serge was a member of the executive committee of the Communist International and editor of its magazine. He was arrested and imprisoned several times as a supporter of the communist opposition to Stalin. He left the Soviet Union in 1936. Copyright © 1937, 1973 by Pathfinder Press. Reprinted by permission.

BY VICTOR SERGE  
There had been six large parties in the Third International: those of France, Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Since the defeat of the proletarian revolution in Finland, Hungary, Germany, and Italy (1918-1922), the International had been able to raise the question of power in Germany and in Bulgaria; but these attempts had led to disaster without bloodshed in Germany, with dreadful massacres in Bulgaria. The cause of the proletarian revolution in the West seemed lost for many years to come. And now an immense light was rising in the East; the Chinese masses had been stirred from their apathy, and were advancing from victory to victory. Hong Kong was blockaded by Canton, a revolutionary republic was formed in south China, with Soviet advisers and instructors, Borodin in the Cabinet, Galen (that is, Bluecher, the former guerrilla chief of the Urals) in Chiang Kai-shek’s new-formed army, Voitinsky in Peking. Lenin was growing as popular as Sun Yat-Sen. Galen-Bluecher led Chiang Kai-shek’s army northward, the trade unions took possession of Shanghai and Hankow. Everyone wondered what revolutionary power would arise out of the victory of a workers’ and peasants’ revolution throughout the extent of the yellow continent. The destinies of Eurasia were changing, and with them the destiny of our times. Yet we knew the inside of these victories; with our own eyes we saw the workers of Shanghai, Canton, Hankow, and Nanking led into ambush by our bureaucrats.

By this time the bureaucracy has, in actual fact, driven the workers from power in the USSR. Of the dictatorship of the proletariat only the name remains. In the key positions, revolutionists have been replaced by functionaries. Policies are no longer inspired by the general interests of the Russian and international proletariat, but by the functionaries’ wish not to be bothered. Stalin becomes their idol. They fear the victory of the Chinese Revolution even more than they pretend to desire it. They never dare when the hour for daring has struck. Their entire tactics consist in maneuvers to avoid complications. This leads to worse complications, but then it is too late.

We know that Chiang Kai-shek is preparing the open betrayal of the unions and his communist allies. We know that he is preparing a coup against the proletariat of Shanghai, which has accomplished one of the finest insurrections in modern history. We are not permitted to speak. And Stalin takes the floor in Moscow before thousands of workers and solemnly assures them that we have nothing to fear from Chiang Kai-shek. “We shall break him after having made use of him.” This speech had not yet been published when, on the following day, the wires informed us of the event we had predicted: the massacre of the workers of Shanghai (1927). Stalin has the text and the proofs of his unfortunate speech removed from the office of Pravda; they will never be seen again. He is reduced to stealing his own speech.

On all this I shall quote only one document of the time, the report delivered at the Fifteenth Party Congress by Chitarov, a Russian communist who had been sent to China. Stalin uses it to condemn those who, in China, had faithfully executed his orders… .

“For twenty days there was in Shanghai a people’s government in which the communists had the majority… . This government was inactive although a military coup was expected at any moment… because the government of Wuhan had not confirmed it in its power (this government included two communist ministers)… . Hsueh Yoh, the leader of the first division, came to the comrades and informed them of the preparations for the coup … he was ready to join us with his troops against the military. The leaders of the CP replied that they knew about the plot but did not wish to break with Chiang Kai-shek prematurely; they ordered Hsueh Yoh to go to the front or to resign by way of proving his loyalty to the general. The first division left the city; the second replaced it; and two days later the workers of Shanghai were shot down en masse… .

“[I]n Hunan the counterrevolution triumphed on the twenty-first and twenty-second of May (1927) under circumstances which are hardly credible. There were 1,700 troops in the capital and 20,000 organized and armed peasants in the environs. However, the officers succeeded in taking power, in shooting the peasant leaders and establishing their dictatorship… . The peasants were on the point of taking possession of the city, which they could have done without difficulty, when they received a message from the Central Committee of the CP ordering them to avoid an armed conflict and to pose the question through governmental channels. The provincial committee sent the Red detachments the order to retreat. Two detachments did not receive the order on time; they attacked, and were surrounded and exterminated.”  
 
 
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