Russian Revolution changed social, property relations

Writings of Leon Trotsky (1929) is one of Pathfinder’s Books of the Month for April. Alongside V.I. Lenin, Trotsky was a central leader of the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, just months after the overthrow of the czarist monarchy in February. It was the first time that the working class took and held political power, governing through workers councils known as soviets. After Lenin’s death in 1924, Trotsky led a fight to continue the Bolsheviks’ communist course, in opposition to the political counterrevolution led by a privileged bureaucratic caste headed by Joseph Stalin. Trotsky was eventually forced into exile, and was assassinated in Mexico in 1940 by Stalin’s secret police. This excerpt is from the article “Is Parliamentary Democracy Likely to Replace the Soviets?” written from Turkey in February 1929. Copyright © 1975 by Pathfinder Press. Reprinted by permission.

BY LEON TROTSKY
When people counterpose democracy to the Soviets, what they usually have in mind is simply the parliamentary system. They forget about the other side of the question, the decisive one at that — namely, that the October Revolution cleared the path for the greatest democratic revolution in human history. The confiscation of the landed estates, the total elimination of the traditional class privileges and distinctions of Russian society, the destruction of the czarist bureaucratic and military apparatus, the introduction of national equality and national self-determination — all this was the elementary democratic work that the February revolution barely even addressed itself to before leaving it, almost untouched, for the October Revolution to inherit. It was precisely the bankruptcy of the liberal-socialist coalition, its incapacity for this work, that made possible the Soviet dictatorship, based on an alliance of the workers, peasants, and oppressed nationalities. The very same causes that prevented our weak and historically belated democracy from carrying out its elementary historical task will also prevent it in the future from placing itself at the head of the country. For in the intervening time, the problems and difficulties have grown greater and democracy weaker.

The Soviet system is not simply a form of government that can be compared abstractly with the parliamentary form. Above all it is a new form of property relations. What is involved at bottom is the ownership of the land, the banks, the mines, the factories, the railroads. The working masses remember very well what the aristocrat, the big landowner, the official, the loan shark, the capitalist, and the boss were in czarist Russia. Among the masses there undoubtedly exists much highly legitimate dissatisfaction with the present situation in the Soviet state. But the masses do not want the landowner, the official, or the boss back. One must not overlook these “trifles” in intoxicating oneself with commonplaces about democracy. Against the landowner’s return, the peasants will fight today just as they did ten years ago, to the last drop of blood. The great proprietor can return to his estate from emigration only astride a cannon, and he would have to spend his nights out on the cannon as well. It is true that the peasants could reconcile themselves more easily to the return of the capitalist, since state industry thus far has provided the peasants with industrial products on less favorable terms than the merchant used to earlier. This, we should note in passing, is at the root of all the internal difficulties. But the peasants remember that the landowner and capitalist were the Siamese twins of the old regime, that they withdrew from the scene together, that during the civil war they fought against the Soviets together, and that in the territories occupied by the Whites the factory owner took back the factory, and the landowner, the land. The peasant understands that the capitalist would not come back alone, but with the landlord. That is why the peasant wants neither of them. And that is a mighty source of strength, even though in negative form, for the Soviet regime. …

The Soviet system with its nationalized industry and monopoly of foreign trade, in spite of all its contradictions and difficulties, is a protective system for the economic and cultural independence of the country. This was understood even by many democrats who were attracted to the Soviet side not by socialism but by a patriotism which had absorbed some of the elementary lessons of history. To this category belong many of the forces of the native technical intelligentsia, as well as the new school of writers who for want of a more appropriate name I have called the fellow travelers.

There is a handful of impotent doctrinaires who would like to have democracy without capitalism. But the serious social forces that are hostile to the Soviet regime want capitalism without democracy. This applies not only to the expropriated property owners but to the well-to-do peasantry as well. Insofar as this peasantry turned against the revolution, it always served as a support for Bonapartism.

Soviet power arose as the result of tremendous contradictions on the international and domestic scene. It is hopeless to think that democratic safety switches of a liberal or socialist type could withstand these contradictions, which during the past quarter century have built up to their highest tension; or that they could “regulate” the thirst for revenge and restoration that inspires the ousted ruling classes. These elements are stretched out in a long line, with the merchant and industrialist holding onto the kulak, the landlord holding onto the merchant, the monarchy tagging along behind them, and the foreign creditors bringing up the rear. And all of them are straining to take first place in the country in the event of their victory.

Napoleon correctly summed up the dynamics of the revolutionary age, dominated as it is by extremes, when he said, “Europe will be either Republican or Cossack.” Today one may say with far more justification, “Russia will be either Soviet or Bonapartist.”

What I have just said should indicate that I am not about to assert the existence of absolute guarantees for the permanent stability of Soviet power. If the Opposition thought that, there would be no sense in the struggle we are waging against the danger of Bonapartism. I am even less inclined to claim that the solidity of the Soviet system can remain unaffected by the particular policies of the present Soviet government. The bitterness of our internal struggle shows full well how dangerous we think Stalin’s zigzag policies are for Soviet power. But the very fact of our struggle testifies also that we are far removed from the so-called attitude of pessimism.

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