

WORKERS
OF THE
WORLD.
UNITE

THE MILITANT



Weekly Organ of the Communist League of America [Opposition]

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Hail the Anniversary of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution! Fifteen Years

4 YEARS OF THE MILITANT

At this moment there is a new and perceptibly growing wave of sympathy and support to the Left Opposition in America. It is taking on a form distinct from the past slow process of winning a worker here and there who became convinced by individual propaganda. Those who have followed **The Militant** attentively will also have noticed that, in entering the fourth year of its existence, its contents begin more directly to reflect the struggle toward revolutionary developments in the country. That itself is a material expression of the growing support coming in the direction of the Left Opposition.

The reasons, of course, lie in the very conditions of the working class movement. The economic crisis is producing a new orientation. It is generally speaking a Leftward one. A working class force is beginning to emerge in the United States. It is emerging slowly, painfully, with much stumbling and with many bitter experiences in its course. But for the actual proof of its emerging one needs only to cast a glance at the election campaign just concluded. Willy-nilly, of the main contenders, the capitalist parties, the working class issues forced themselves to the fore. The conditions created are also beginning to put the various working class and revolutionary currents more definitely to their test. This, however, will be far more marked in the coming period of more intense struggles. But already now there is evidence that the Left Opposition is commencing to find its place on the solid grounds of the class struggle. And we can say today that an estimate of the significance of this new wave of support quite decisively indicates our future much greater role.

Some Examples of Growth

We have at this moment a series of new contact established, which are becoming included within our active ranks. A new branch of the League is organized in Davenport, Iowa. Branches are in formation in Des Moines, Iowa, in Pittsburgh, Pa., and in New Castle, Pa. Our existing branches with but few exceptions, are in the process of growth.

The enormous advantage of a correct theoretical foundation—a Marxian foundation—belongs to the Left Opposition. But we are compelled to carry on by the most primitive means, made so by the isolated position from which we began and by our sadly limited physical resources. Every step toward our objectives therefore of necessity had to be modest ones.

In both respects, both in regard to a correct theoretical foundation as well as in regard to our limited means the four years history of **The Militant**, furnishes eloquent proof to our contention. But while the latter is apparent, it is the former, which in terms more convincing than we could possibly utter, has attested to its enormous advantage. Just look at the healthy contrast between four years ago and today.

Then we had a handful of comrades coming forward with an unshakable conviction, having from the past received a certain preparation for their position, but also carrying over remnants from the past which still caused some uncertainty and lack of experience in applying the International Left Opposition platform to America. We made some mistakes; we must, of course, record shortcomings. Yet we are justified in giving emphasis to the healthy transformation which has taken place. We are justified in taking (Continued on page 6)

The October revolution is finishing its fifteenth year. This simple figure gives evidence to the entire world of the gigantic force which exists in the proletarian state. No one, not even the most optimistic among us, foresaw such vitality. And that is not surprising; the optimism of such a prediction would have had to fear within it pessimism with regard to the international revolution.

The leaders and the masses saw in the October upheaval only the first stage of the world revolution. The thought of an independent building-up of Socialism in isolated Russia was, in the year 1917, neither defended nor sustained nor clearly formulated by anybody. In the following years, too, the economic construction was conceived by the entire party without exception as the substructure of a material basis under the dictatorship of the proletariat, as the preservation of the economic bond (smychka) between city and country, and finally as the creation of points of support for the coming Socialist society which could only be built up on an international basis.

The ways of the world revolution have shown themselves to be immeasurably longer and more tortuous than we hoped and expected fifteen years ago. To the external difficulties, of which the historic rôle of reformism showed itself to be the most important, came the internal ones, above all, the policies of the epigones of Bolshevism, false in their foundation and fatal in their consequences. The bureaucracy of the first Workers' State does everything decisively—unconsciously, but that is no excuse—to prevent the birth of a second Workers' State. The knots tied by the bureaucracy must be untied or broken to give a free road to the revolution.

If the delay in the development has gone beyond the framework which we had sketched, still we have accurately

estimated the fundamental moving forces and their laws. This also applies completely to the problem of the economic development of the Soviet Union. Modern productive forces will not let themselves be confined within national limits by any resolution or any exorcism. Autarchy is the ideal of Hitler, not of Marx nor of Lenin. Socialism and national separatism are mutually exclusive. Today as well as fifteen years ago, the program of a Socialist society in a single country is utopian and reactionary.

The economic successes of the Soviet Union are very traditions and its difficulties have taken on a threatening sharpness. Delays, interruptions and disproportions bear witness in the first instance to a wrong leadership. But that is not all. They recall that building up of a harmonious society is possible only through an uninterrupted experience extending over decades and not otherwise than on an international basis. The technical and cultural obstacles—the break between city and country, the difficulties of import and export trade—all prove that the October demands an international continuation. Internationalism is not a ritual convention but a question of life or death.

There will be no lack of jubilee speeches and articles. The majority of them will come from those who were, in October, the intransigent adversaries of the proletarian insurrection. We Bolshevik-Leninists will be called "counter-revolutionists" by these gentlemen. It is not the first time that history permits itself such jokes and we have nothing against it on that account. Even if it is with confusion and slowly, history does its work.

And we too, we will do ours!

Prinkipo, October 13, 1932

—L. TROTSKY.

Roosevelt's Victory

Protest Vote of Middle Class and Labor Hits Republicans

The returns from the elections throws considerable light upon the class reaction to the crisis. The capitalist press is hailing Roosevelt as the victor of a "tidal wave", of a "landslide" that has wiped the Republicans out of office. The victory of Roosevelt and Garner has carried with it complete control of the House and Senate. Throughout the country their "landslide" has carried with it many state and local tickets. Not since the last world war has the Democratic wing of the capitalist reactionary parties gained such a favorable position.

The Democrats have full control and will have no "excuse" for not carrying out their program and election promises. Roosevelt made lots of promises, just as Hoover did in 1928. Roosevelt was forced to give these promises because he had to straddle different layers of classes and rally the mass discontent from the effects of the crisis in order to gain office.

Teddy Roosevelt started out by "trust busting" and ended with the greatest service rendered to the monopolists. F. D. Roosevelt with his "forgotten man" and his "new deal" will end in the same way. With a clear majority in Democratic hands the blind protest vote will expect immediate action and since the Democrats will carry out the imperialists will the "victory vote" will turn to its opposite, providing the Communists are able to take advantage of the favorable developments.

Roosevelt rode to power on the sup-

port of a big section of financiers, like Young and Taylor, jingoist and big navy advocates like Hearst and Baker, progressive republicans, confused middle class elements, "liberals", the solid reactionary Jim-Crow south and discontented and confused workers.

The protest vote of the middle class and misled workers will be a good cover under which Roosevelt will be able to speed up and carry out the imperialist program. Under cover of the "fight" to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment the Democrats will hide their real activity for Wall Street and use this at a critical moment as crumbs for the hungry, discontented masses.

The crisis with its effects of bankruptcy and ruin for large sections of the middle class, with drastic wage cuts, lower living standards and mass unemployment for the workers, has piled up a tremendous blind protest vote of discontent. Roosevelt's material base rests in Wall Street but his votes rest in the discontented middle class and the large layers of the working class who are not yet class conscious. Such was Roosevelt's victory.

To the Left of this Roosevelt vote is the real and decisive significance of the election for our class—the demand of the reformist party, the socialist party, for a place in the sun and against the Communist Party of Revolution. The complete returns of the socialist and Communist vote are not in but we have sufficient information for the main outlines of this problem.

The socialist party has piled up a large vote. The skeleton party of American social reformism has taken on form. Contrary to the Stalinist analysis of the past—that the base of reformism has been narrowed and therefore we will not have a period of reform in America—that we are heading toward a period of revolutionary upsurges and the struggle of class against class—we find reformism growing. The editorial of the **Daily Worker** of Nov. 10 (City Edition) dismisses the socialist vote as unimportant and, as stated in the last issue of the **Militant**, mechanically compares the Communist vote of today with the previous elections. The Stalinists leave unanswered the question of the new relationship of class forces; the relationship of the party of reform and revolution; and the question of what the future holds in store for the reformers.

Our position on the question of a "period" of reformism for America has been dealt with at different times in the **Militant**. For the moment we want to take up just one phase of the problem and we will later return to it for further consideration on the basis of developments.

In New York, Hillquit, socialist candidate for mayor, polled 250,000 votes, the largest ever polled in New York by the socialists. Thomas obtained 120,000 votes. Thomas' votes were basically socialist votes of small shopkeepers and misled workers while Hillquit's vote had the additional protest vote of the middle class, the "good government" and "cheap government" vote against Tammany Hall.

The national vote of Thomas will be far above his 1928 figure of 275,000 votes. In fact indications are, from partial returns, that it will be close to or larger than the Debs vote of 1920 of nearly a million votes. Many of the basic central and western states as well as eastern industrial states are giving Thomas a fair vote.

The New York **American** of Nov. 10, in listing the elected members of the House presented the names of seven socialist candidates where the results of the election were still in doubt. The New York **Times** of the same date had already eliminated the socialist names. No doubt socialists and Communists were elected to local office here and there, only to be counted out, mainly the Communists, by capitalist democracy.

A Shift to the Left

One thing can be said upon the incomplete returns. The socialist vote, in relation to reaction, shows a shift of a layer of workers to the Left. In relation to the class struggle it shows the party of reform has checked Leftward shift of the workers. The socialist party vote shows that they have done their job well as a stone wall between the parties of reaction and the Communist party of revolution in slowing down and holding up the process of workers joining the Communists ranks.

The only returns of our vote we have are New York City. Foster and Ford obtained 24,018 votes compared to 15,500 in 1930 when he ran for Mayor. This is an indication of an increase of even greater proportions because so many of the workers are disfranchised. In spite of the favorable gains made by the Communists the gains in relation to the socialist party gives the reformers an advantage in the present stage of the struggle of the reformists and the revolutionists for ideological (Continued on page 8)

9 Scottsboro Boys Win Victory Illusions Now Greatest Danger

The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing the lower courts in setting aside the trial and appeal verdicts in the Scottsboro case, is a triumph for the nine prisoners and the entire working class. It is a victory militantly won by the party in the face of great terror and repression. It is a vindication of the fighting methods of the Communists who placed the struggle on a class basis and fought it that way.

But no illusions! The fight is not yet won. The end we are fighting for is not yet. The boys are still in prison. They are to be tried again in March, thus far, by the same judge, in the same court in which they were railroaded a little more than a year and a half ago. The statement has been made that at this forthcoming trial there will be greater need than before for the militia. All this means that the Supreme Court has left the door wide open for a repetition of the death sentences. In fact it has indicated how this is to be done. All that its strictures mean is that if its august solemnity is to be invoked to sanction this kind of butchery all the fine technicalities of the law must be complied with.

The need for a fighting movement of the working class for the unconditional freedom of these victims of capitalist class justice is greater than it was before. What we have already accomplished most be the stimulus to yet greater efforts. We cannot stop until we have forced the bourbon tiger of the south to open his jaws and let our

class brothers go. This we can do.

Now is the time to organize the fight. Objectively the situation stands essentially as it did before. Only a militant class fight can free the boys. The working class must be united around this one issue. To do this we need organizational forms broad and democratic enough to allow all conflicting and contradictory tendencies in the labor movement to meet in a common struggle on this concrete issue. We need a united front of the entire working class.

The N. A. A. C. P. which stood in the way of a militant class defense, the Socialist party which speared slander at the I. L. D. at the height of the fight, the trade union bureaucracy of the A. F. of L. which is still hamstringing the Mooney defense, the middle-headed liberals of the New Republic stripe will not issue the call for this united front movement. They have no interest in such a unity of the workers. Only the revolutionary party of the proletariat can unite the ranks and organize the movement.

That is why we say to the party: Call the united front conferences! We are with you with all our resources. We will help.

OPEN FORUM

The Meaning of the German Elections

Speaker:

MAX SHACHTMAN

Friday, November 18, 1932

126 East 16 Street,
near Irving Place

ADMISSION: 15c

Auspices:

N. Y. Br. Communist League of America
(Opposition)

DANCING
REFRESHMENTS
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Entertainment

Saturday, Nov. 19 - 8 p. m.

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Leftward Shift in German Vote Parliamentary Gains Turn Heads of the Stalinist Leadership

While exact details as to the composition of the vote cast in last Sunday's German elections are not yet at hand, the total figures afford us the opportunity to compile the results and draw conclusions adequate for the moment.

As compared with the elections of last July 31, the social democracy lost approximately three-quarters of a million votes; an almost identical number of votes was gained by the Communist party. The Hitlerites, for the first time, lost the substantial number of more than two million votes, although they remain by far the largest party in the country; the Nationalist party, in turn, picked up close to a million additional vote. The other bourgeois parties revealed no decisive change in strength; the Centrists and their Bavarian co-religionists lost a few hundred thousand votes; the old People's party gained a few hundred thousand; the rest of the vote, slightly less in total than three months ago, was scattered.

From these bare figures, the following situation may be deduced:

The Nazi Setback

For the first time in their recent years of uninterrupted and sensational growth, the Nazis have suffered a distinct setback. As we have pointed out previously in these columns, the Hitlerites cannot hope to arrive in power by the smooth parliamentary train. The preceding election already indicated that, so far as elections are concerned, the Nazi social reservoir of voting strength was well-nigh exhausted. Not a parliamentary movement in the ordinary bourgeois sense, the Fascists must strive to fulfill

their aims by the violent seizure of power and the more violent extirpation of all proletarian movements and institutions. Or, if the necessity for such a step is obviated by the collapse of the proletarian movement—as happened in October 1923—the bourgeois saves itself the expense of the inevitably ensuing sanguinary conflict, a period of "stabilization" sets in, and the Fascist movement begins to decompose. And with it, the revolutionary proletarian party.

From this it does not follow that the Fascist danger to the German proletariat is now eliminated, or even definitively on the decline. Such a conclusion can be drawn only by those for whom the class struggle begins at the ballot box and ends with a parliamentary mandate.

The heavy decline in the social democratic vote is another repayment made by the socialist workers for the base treachery of their leaders which could not be committed with impunity. That some 700,000 socialist workers deserted their traditional party, surmounted the barriers artificially erected against them by the Stalinists, and voted the Communist slate—is at one and the same time an arraignment of the reactionary role of the social democratic leadership and of that obdurate stupidity of the Stalinists whose course, in the first place, prevented masses of others from rallying to the banner of revolution, and in the second place, still deters the vast numbers of discontented socialist workers from moving any closer to the organized Communist movement than is necessary for the casting of a red ballot. (Continued on page 5)

STALINISTS TAKE MEASURES

The Expulsion of Zinoviev

The Lessons of the Second Expulsion of the Capitulators

Wireless and telegraph have flashed news to the entire world of the expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev from the party, and along with them of more than a score of Bolsheviks. According to the official communication, those who are expelled were, presumably, striving to reestablish capitalism in the Soviet Union. The political import of this new repression is imposing in itself. Its symptomatic significance is tremendous.

In the course of many years, Zinoviev and Kamenev were the closest pupils and collaborators of Lenin. Better than any one else, Lenin knew their weak traits; but he was also able to utilize their strong sides. In his "Testament", so cautions in tone, wherein both praise and censure are equally modulated in order not to strengthen some too much and weaken others, Lenin deemed it urgent to remind the party that the behavior of Zinoviev and Kamenev in October was "not accidental". Subsequent events confirmed these words all too clearly. But no more accidental was also that role which Zinoviev and Kamenev played in the Leninist party. And their present

expulsion brings to mind their old and unaccidental role.

Zinoviev and Kamenev were members of the Politbureau, which in Lenin's time was directly in charge of the fate of the party and of the revolution. Zinoviev was the chairman of the Communist International. Together with Rykov and Tsiurupa, Kamenev was Lenin's alternate, during the final period of Lenin's life, for the office of chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars. After Lenin's death Kamenev presided over the Politbureau and the Soviet of Labor and Defense, the highest economic organ of land.

In 1923, Zinoviev and Kamenev launched a campaign against Trotsky. At the beginning of the struggle, they took very poor account of its consequences, which, of course does not testify to their political far-sightedness. Zinoviev was primarily an agitator, exceptionally talented, but almost exclusively an agitator. Kamenev—"a wise politician" in Lenin's estimation, but lacking great will power and too easily inclined to ad- (Continued on page 2)

LEON TROTSKY

Soviet Economy in Danger

The Situation on the Eve of the Second Five Year Plan

The successes of the first two years of the Five Year Plan demonstrated to the bourgeoisie of the entire world that the proletarian revolution was a much more serious business than was apparent in the beginning. The interest in the Soviet "experiment" grew apace. Conspicuous groups of eminent bourgeois publications in diverse countries began printing comparatively objective economic information.

At the same time the international Communist press played up the most optimistic estimates of the Soviet press, exaggerating them crudely, presumably in the interests of propaganda, and transforming them into an economic legend.

Petty bourgeois democrats, who were not at all in a hurry to form an opinion about so complex a fact as the October revolution, welcomed with glee the possibility to discover support for their belated sympathies in the statistics of the Five Year Plan. Magnanimously, at last, they "recognized" the Soviet Republic in reward for its economic and cultural attainments. This act of moralism provided many of them with an

opportunity to take an interesting trip at reduced rates.

It is infinitely more deserving, forsooth, to defend the socialist construction of the first workers' state than to sustain the pretensions of Wall Street or of the City. But one can take as little stock in the lukewarm sympathies of this gentry toward the Soviet government as in the antipathies of the Amsterdam Congress toward militarism.

People, after the type of the Webbs (and they are not the worst of this lot) are, naturally, not at all inclined to break their heads over the contradictions of Soviet economy. Without in any manner committing themselves, they strive chiefly to utilize the conquests of Soviets in order thus to shame or urge ahead the ruling circles of their land. A foreign revolution serves them as a subordinate weapon for their reformism. For this purpose, as well as for their personal peace of mind, "the Friends of the U. S. S. R.", together with the international Communist bureaucracy, require a picture of the successes in U. S. (Continued on page 6)

The Expulsion of Zinoviev

(Continued from page 1)

apt himself to the intellectual, cultural middle class and bureaucratic milieu. Stalin's role in this struggle bore a much more organic character. The spirit of petty-bourgeois provincialism, the absence of theoretical preparation, narrowness of vision—that is what characterizes Stalin, notwithstanding his Bolshevism. His enmity toward "Trotskyism" had roots much deeper than that of Zinoviev and Kamenev, and for a long time previously it had sought for its political expression. Incapable himself of theoretical generalizations, Stalin urged on in turn Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bucharin and picked out from their speeches and articles whatever seemed to him most appropriate for his own aims.

The struggle of the majority of the Politbureau against Trotsky, which began, to a considerable degree, as a personal conspiracy disclosed all too quickly its political content. It was neither simple nor homogeneous. The Left Opposition included within itself, around its authoritative Bolshevik kernel, many of the organizers of the October overturn, militant participants of the Civil War, and a considerable stratum of Marxists from out of the student youth. But in the wake of this vanguard, during the first stages, there dragged along the tail-end of all sorts of dissatisfied, ill-equipped and even chagrined careerists. Only the arduous development of the subsequent struggles liberated the Opposition from its accidental and unwelcome fellow way-farers.

Under the banner of the "troika"—Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin—were united many "old Bolsheviks" particularly those, who, as Lenin advised as early as April 1917, should have been relegated to the archives; but there also were many serious underground members, strong party organizers, who sincerely believed that there was impending the danger of Leninism being displaced by Trotskyism. However, the further matters progressed the more solidly and cohesively, the growing and intrenching bureaucracy rose up against "the permanent revolution". And it was this that subsequently guaranteed Stalin's preponderance over Zinoviev and Kamenev.

The fight within the "Troika", beginning in a considerable measure also as a personal fight—politics are made by people and through people, and nothing that is human is foreign to politics—soon, in its own turn, disclosed its content of principle. Zinoviev, the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, and Kamenev, chairman of the Moscow Soviet, sought the support of the workers of the two capitals. Stalin's chief support was in the provinces and in the apparatus; in the backward provinces the apparatus became all-powerful sooner than in the capitals. Zinoviev, chairman of the Comintern, cherished his international position. Stalin looked down with contempt upon the Communist parties of the West. He found the formula for his nationalistic limitations in 1924; socialism in one country. Zinoviev and Kamenev counterposed against him their doubts and refutations. But as it turned out, it was sufficient for Stalin to depend upon those forces which were mobilized by the "troika" against Trotskyism in order automatically to overwhelm Zinoviev and Kamenev.

Zinoviev's and Kamenev's past, the years of their joint work with Lenin, the international school of emigration—all this must needs have counterposed them inimically to that wave of self-dependency that threatened, in the last analysis, to sweep away the October revolution. The result of the new fight on top came to many as absolutely astounding; two of the most violent instigators of the hue and cry against "Trotskyism", ended up in the camp of the "Trotskyists".

In order to facilitate the bloc, the Left Opposition—against the objections and warnings of the author of these lines—modulated isolated formulations of their platform, and temporarily refrained from making official replies to the most acute theoretical questions. This was hardly correct. But the Left Opposition of 1923 still did not take

to the path of making concessions in essence. We remained true to ourselves. Zinoviev and Kamenev came to us. There is no need to recapitulate the degree to which the coming over to the side of the Opposition of 1923, of the sworn enemies of yesterday strengthened the assurance of our ranks and our conviction in our historical correctness.

However, Zinoviev and Kamenev, on this occasion as well, did not foresee all the political consequences of their step. In 1923 they had hoped, by means of a few agitational campaigns and organizational maneuvers, to free the party from the "hegemony of Trotsky", pushing all other things aside, and now it seemed to them that, allied with the Opposition of 1923, they would quickly cope with the apparatus and reestablish both their own personal positions, and the Leninist course of the party.

Once again they were mistaken. Personal antagonisms and groupings within the party had already become completely the tools of anonymous social forces, strata and classes. There was its own inner lawfulness in the reaction against the October overturn, and it was impossible to skip over its ponderous rhythm by means of combinations and maneuvers.

Sharpening from day to day, the struggle between the Opposition bloc and the bureaucracy reached its final limits.

Mill as a Stalinist Agent

The Left Opposition is placed, from an organizational point of view, in unusually difficult circumstances; not a single revolutionary party has ever before had to work under such persecution. Apart from the reprisals of the capitalist police of all countries, the Left Opposition is exposed to the blows to the Stalinist bureaucracy, which shrinks from nothing. We repeat, from nothing.

Naturally, the Russian section has the greatest difficulties. Everybody remembers that Blumkin, who tried to establish a connection between Trotsky and his adherents in Soviet Russia, was shot to death. To find a Russian Bolshevik-Leninist abroad, even to fulfill only technical functions, is extremely difficult.

Thus and only thus is the fact to be explained that Mill was for a time in the Administrative Secretariat of the Left Opposition: a man was needed who knew the Russian language and was capable of carrying out the duties of a secretary. Mill had been at one time a member of the official party and in this sense could claim a degree of confidence.

His work in the Secretariat, however, soon revealed his utter practical incompetence, not to speak of the lack of any political schooling. In the latter respect Mill incidentally was a typical represen-

The matter now, no longer concerned discussion, even if under the whip, but a break with the official Soviet apparatus, i. e., the perspective of an arduous struggle for a number of years—a struggle surrounded by great dangers and the issue of which could not be foretold.

Zinoviev and Kamenev recoiled. As in 1917, on the eve of October, they had become frightened at a break with the petty bourgeois democracy, so ten years later they became frightened of a break with the Soviet bureaucracy. And this was all the more "not accidental" since the Soviet bureaucracy was three-quarters composed of those same elements which in 1917 scared the Bolsheviks with the inevitable flop of the October "adventure".

The capitulation of Zinoviev and Kamenev, before the XVth congress, at the moment of the organized extirpation of Bolshevik-Leninists, was accepted by the Left Opposition as an act of monstrous perfidy. Such it was in its essence. Still, even in this capitulation there was its measure of lawfulness, not only psychological, but political. On a series of fundamental questions of Marxism—the proletarian and the peasantry, "democratic dictatorship", permanent revolution—Zinoviev and Kamenev stood between the Stalinist bureaucracy and the Left Opposition. Theoretical amorphousness avenged itself inexorably, as it always does, in practice.

(To be Continued)
Prinkipo, October 1932. —L. TROTSKY.

tative of the great and small bureaucracy formed by Stalin.

With these qualities were associated certain negative traits of a personal, or more correctly, of a moral character. After having reached, in the absence of a wide choice, a responsible even if technical post, Mill felt himself to occupy the role of a "leader". With respect to a number of French comrades who are ten heads greater in stature than himself, he began to assert ridiculous claims. Under the mask of the offended Stalinist who had passed himself off as an "Oppositionist" appeared the personality of a little petty bourgeois from a distant small town of old Czarist Russia. Mill quickly went into opposition with the Parisian comrades, who in his opinion did not manifest sufficient respect to him—and this must be added—allegedly did not "attend" sufficiently to his welfare. These offenses were enough for the little Philistine to try to enter into a bloc with Rosmer and others, against whom he had—literally—only the day before carried on a bitter "principled" struggle. This unworthy, personally-motivated political turn, led to Mill's removal from the Administrative Secretariat. The sections, above all the Russian, corrected the mistake which had been committed,

which they had had forced on them to a great extent, as said before, by difficult objective conditions. In the course of the last nine months Mill stood entirely outside of the ranks of the Left Opposition.

But this was by no means the end of his career. As the irritation over inadequate support had driven him to Rosmer, so his removal from the Secretariat led to his negotiations with the Stalinists: he handed in an official application for employment in Charkov, where his relatives live.

In the course of these tempting negotiations, Mill proposed his services to the Left Opposition, evidently already in the course of his new political functions. Now Mill is preparing to "unmask" the Left Opposition: that will in fact actually constitute his employment in Charkov or Moscow.

There is no reason to fear that the little Philistine, who was expelled from the midst of the Bolshevik-Leninists with a discourteous shove, will play any role in the fight against the Left Opposition. The truth is not dangerous for us. And in the field of lying, the Stalinists have broken all and sundry records before Mill.

In one respect we can say the situation is becoming normal again: the Stalinist, somehow irritated by the other Stalinists, who temporarily fastened himself to the Left Opposition and was expelled from its ranks, comes back to the Stalinists. There he will be quite in his place. —G. G.

Marx-Lenin School Opens in Chicago

Following the establishment in New York of the International Workers School, the Chicago branch of the Communist League has opened up the Marx-Lenin School, with headquarters at 2011 W. North Avenue, and a series of three courses which have already begun their enrollments.

The first course, which opened on October 26, and continues every Wednesday night, is instructed by comrade John Edwards on "Fundamentals of Marxism". There will be eight sessions, beginning with "The Capitalist System of Society" and ending with "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat".

A more advanced class began on October 27, and runs for ten sessions every Thursday night. It is a course on "Imperialism and the Proletarian Revolution", instructor comrade Albert Glotzer.

Glotzer will also conduct a course every Monday night, beginning November 20, on "The History of the International Youth Movement", of special importance and interest to the young militants.

The fee for any of the three courses is only \$1.50 and all workers interested are urged to get in touch with the director of the School at the address given above.

DAVENPORT MILITANT JOINS OPPOSITION

I, Betty Rowland, wish to make application to join the Communist League (Left Opposition). I have made a study of the Communist movement and its various groups and I have come to the conclusion that the Left Opposition course is the only course that will lead to the development of a real Communist party which will be able to assume the burden of the class struggle in this country.

Up until a few months ago I was a sympathizer of the Proletarian party, but now I realize that it is impossible to build up a separate national movement or a party that is disconnected from the international working class. And to my opinion there is no room for two Communist parties in the United States, as all the energy must be put into one party.

Then I do not agree with the theory of socialism in one country and all its harmful effects, which the leadership of the Proletarian party accepts and endorses.

—BETTY ROWLAND.

MILITANT BUILDERS

Our Club Plan

THE WINNER

As our comrades will remember, we offered a copy of the "Proletarian Revolution in Russia" by Lenin and Trotsky to the **Militant Builder** who stood highest in the staff in our anniversary issue. We are very happy to announce that the comrade is a newcomer in these lists. He hails from the Smoky City. Together with other local comrades and comrade Gordon who has gone there from New York he has been scouring the city for **Militant** subs. The comrade is P. Vomas.

Not far behind him are comrades Morgenstern from the down-town city, Philadelphia; and Dunne from Minneapolis. And right on their heels, stepping fast are two comrades from across the line, H. Nash from Montreal and W. Krehm from Toronto. The other comrades and the records of all are listed below. It's a very good performance.

KEEP UP THE RACE

Now suppose we keep right on with this race. We've got a flying start and it shouldn't be difficult to step it up considerably. Suppose we set the first of the year as the next lap of the race. We'll keep right on with these records. And to the leader at the first of the year we'll give a copy of "My Life" by comrade Trotsky.

MINNEAPOLIS IN FIRST PLACE

If Pittsburgh gave us Vomas, Minneapolis still stands at the head of the list of cities. And Chicago and Pittsburgh are in a tie for second place. Boston and Toronto are tied for four place with Philadelphia in sixth place. We are sure that before we reach the first of the year all of our branches will have entered their names in this list and New York which got away to a slow start will move up toward the head of the list.

MINERS' SUBS

We hope you haven't forgotten about our campaign for subs for the miners. We're still pushing it with results. This past week comrade Ross of Minneapolis sent in two dollars with a club plan blank with just one name on it. He asked us to fill in the names of three miners. We did with the result that a miner in Springfield, one in Taylorville and one in Hillsboro will receive the **Militant** regularly now for twenty-six weeks.

Comrade Carmody who has just returned from the Illinois coal fields tells us that the **Militant** is very well received there. He says that as soon as the miners get some work many of them will subscribe. But, he adds, they need help now; political guidance and a friendly word. This is our opportunity to sink roots among the miners. Here, if anywhere, redeem the prestige of Communism so far as we are able. One way to do it, and not the least, is to get subs for the miners. Use the club plan. Collect two dollars for four half-year subs. Or do what comrade Ross did. Get only one, or get two names, or even three. Send them in with two dollars and we will bring the names up to four from our list of miners who are awaiting for the paper. Step lively.

THE STAFF

V. Vomas	12
B. Morgenstern	8
V. R. Dunne	8
H. Nash	7
W. Krehm	6
H. A.	4
J. Hamilton	4
W. Konikow	4
O. Coover	4
S. Lessin	4
J. Sifakis	4
A. Joel	4
E. McMillen	4
A. Miller	4
J. Weber	4
J. Ross	4
Chicago Friends of the	
Militant Club	4
C. Shechet	2

Notice the frequency of names from Minneapolis. They don't depend on one man up there for their subs. Everybody

goes after them. That's the way to do it. And notice the name of McMillen of St. Louis. If the past means anything here is a hustler come to life. Look out for Mac. Those who know say that when he gets started you can't see him for dust. We're waiting to see.

THE RECORD BY CITIES

Minneapolis	20
Pittsburgh	16
Chicago	16
Toronto	16
Boston	10
Philadelphia	8
Montreal	7
St. Louis	4
New York	4

New York is in the cellar but it won't be for long. On your toes everybody. We're coming up.

Next week the second phase of the club plan.

Pioneer Publishers Notes

REVOLUTIONARY LESSONS

We are just now in receipt of another shipment from England of that invaluable pamphlet by Lenin, "Revolutionary Lessons." Our comrades in England inform us that it is very difficult to get and they may not be able to get your copy if you don't get it now. The price stands at which it was \$2.5. There is no discount.

LENIN'S SPEECHES

In the same shipment we got eight copies of a cloth bound volume of speeches made by Lenin in 1917, 1918 and 1921. They include: We Must Have Peace. The Land to the Tillers of the Soil, The Nationalization of the Banks, The Dispersion of the Constituent Assembly, The Causes of the World War, From Nep to Socialist Russia, and—but we have whetted your appetite.

Remember that there are only eight and it will be first come, first served. The price is \$5.00 plus postage.

TWO NEW PAMPHLETS

In a week or so we are going to start work on two new pamphlets. One deals with the unemployment question and is written by comrade Arne Swaback; and the other deals with the question of the nature and role of the Left Opposition. Both are much needed pamphlets. They will sell for very little, five or ten cents at the most. We will print them in large quantities. In the next issue we will be able to give more and accurate details. Watch for it.

LEON TROTSKY

Problems of the Development of the U.S.S.R.

Just as timely now as when first written. This is the thesis of the International Left Opposition on the Russian question drafted by our comrades and adopted by the League as its position at its second national conference a little more than a year ago.

The pamphlet deals with the Economic Contradictions of the Transition Period. The Party in the System of the Dictatorship, Dangers and Possibilities of a Counter Revolutionary Upheaval. The Left Opposition and the U. S. S. R.

48 pages \$1.15 plus postage

\$1.00 in bundles of ten or more

PIONEER PUBLISHERS

84 East 10th Street

New York, N. Y.

Bound Vols.

In connection with the celebration of the fourth anniversary of the **Militant** we got together 13 files of all the issues of the old format. This means that there are seventy-one issues of the **Militant** in every one of these files. They run from Volume One, Number One, November 15, 1929 to Volume 4, Number 12, June 15, 1931, the last issue of the old format.

These files constitute a priceless historic record. Anyone familiar with the early days of the League, with its uphill battle for the ideas of revolutionary internationalism against slander, calumny, and physical repression need not be told that it is all set down, in all significance in the columns of the **Militant**.

As times pass these files become even more priceless if we can put it that way. More than that, it becomes well nigh impossible to get them together. Comrades who want a file—and who does not?—should order at once. Money must accompany the order. There is no credit on these files. Orders will be filled strictly as they are received. Remember, comrades, this is probably your last opportunity to get a file.

PRICE: \$10.00

The Burning Question of Thermidor and Bonapartism

(Continued from previous issue)

The systematic crushing of the leading party of the proletariat, without which the dictatorship cannot be exercised in a revolutionary sense, not only accentuates the danger of Thermidor in the Soviet Union but, at a given point, also the threat of Bonapartism. On the road of degeneration which leads to the counter-revolutionary triumph, Thermidor and Bonapartism do not present stages differing in their class foundation. In the Great French revolution, Bonapartism swiftly succeeded the 9th of Thermidor and the Directory. But this succession is as little ordained and inevitable as is the certainty of counter-revolution altogether; a fusion of the two stages, a modification of one or the other under the conditions of a new social epoch—these and many other possibilities are quite conceivable. Throughout the early years, Lenin kept reminding the party of the lessons of the French revolution and strove to overcome the forces which threatened the Russian revolution with a similar fate. Even more so today is it necessary to arouse the vigilance of the revolutionary movement so that it may perceive in time, distinguish the dangers at every stage and adopt the measures necessary to cope with them.

It has been pointed out that the Right wing in the Russian party had its strength essentially in the classes and not in the ranks, more specifically, not in the apparatus, of the party. The Right

wing was so easily crushed on a party scale because it was not prepared to make an open appeal for support to the class interests it represented: the kulak, and the Nepman dependent upon him. The victory by the Stalinist center over the Right wing triumvirate halted, for the time being, the advance of the Thermidorian forces, of those dark and backward agrarian interests which had been whipped up and nurtured in the reactionary years of struggle against the Left Opposition. Only, this victory did not result in eliminating other, and more acute, phases of the counter-revolutionary danger.

While both the Right and the Left wings of the party in the Soviet Union represent well-defined class forces and interests, the same cannot be said of the Centrist apparatus. Classic petty bourgeois force, the graph of its policy reveals a broken line of leaps to the Left and to the Right which become shorter and more frequent with the aggravation of the crisis. It leans now upon the proletarian core of the country, as during the campaign against the Right wing, now upon the reactionary forces, as during the fight against the Left. It cannot find for itself a firm class foundation from which to operate; the closest it came to such a base was during the period of the idealization by the Stalin faction of the "middle peasant", a shifty social stratum which, far from serving as a solid class foundation, requires one

itself.

The Stalin faction, however, has its strength in the party bureaucracy; it is the party bureaucracy. In the process of watering down the party until it is a bloated, shapeless mass, the apparatus has at the same time raised itself above the party to an unapproachable level and constituted itself as a bureaucratic caste. The diffused party mass is unable to reach this caste in order to change it, or to have it reflect the interests of the mass itself. The apparatus, on the other hand, after having strangled the party, must stifle all life within itself. We say "must" because it cannot refer any disputes in its ranks to the party mass below for fear of unleashing a force that is inherently inimical to it. The whole bureaucratic system, consequently, moves inexorably to a condition where a decreasing number of individuals decide and speak for all; the number of these individuals today, to all practical purposes, is one, and his name is Stalin. What are still formally party organizations, in the words of Marx, "appear as reversed Schlemihls, as shadows the bodies of which have been lost." In its turn, the apparatus becomes a shadowy projection of the omnipotent Secretariat, or more accurately, of the General Secretary.

Devoid of a class basis, the apparatus is permeated principally with the desire for self-preservation and self-perpetuation. Its policies, in all their increasing feverish zig-zags, are subordinated essentially to this aim. The sickening Byzantine flattery of Stalin which is compulsory for every official, the conversion of the army and particularly of the G. P. U. into an instrument with which the Secretariat operates even more exclusively—combined with the suppression of workers' democracy in general and

party democracy in particular, that is, of the principal guarantees against a degeneration of the proletarian dictatorship—these are the signs of the present period in the Soviet Union. They reveal "the pre-conditions of the Bonapartist regime in the country."

Tacking desperately between the various classes and social strata, the apparatus satisfies none of them. In this fact lies the danger that the mounting discontentment of all sections of the population, and above all of the peasantry, will explode the very foundations of the Soviet power, that is, of the proletarian dictatorship. If the crisis breaks out into the open and reveals that the proletariat and its party have been so weakened that they cannot act decisively and victoriously then the counter-revolution will not likely assume the form of Bonapartism, of the iron man, or men "standing above the classes" and apparently mediating between the contending forces, resting for the time being upon the strength of the military forces and the experienced cohesion of the bureaucratic apparatus. It is this prospect which reveals the Stalinist faction as the potential reservoir of the Bonapartist danger.

Superficial examination alone permits one to exclude this possibility, as well as the possibility of a Thermidorian overturn, on the ground of the so-called "liquidation of the kulak". If this were actually the case, the danger would undoubtedly be considerably diminished, although even then, not eliminated. But a more careful scrutiny will reveal that the "liquidated kulak" is still a substantial force, more threatening in this respect, that his present activities and progress are not only concealed behind the administratively established collective

farms but are facilitated by the rupture of the relations between town and country, worker and peasant, rendered inevitable by the whole course of the Stalin bureaucracy.

The French farmers, wrote Marx in his classic study of Bonapartism, "are unable to assert their class interests in their own name, be it by a parliament or by convention. They cannot represent one another, they must themselves be represented. Their representative must at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an unlimited governmental power, that protects them from above, bestows rain and sunshine upon them. Accordingly, the political influence of the allotment farmer finds its ultimate expression in an executive power that subjugates the commonwealth to its own autocratic will."

Such an executive power is present in embryonic form in the bureaucratic apparatus of the party and the Soviets. For it to be fully fledged as a Bonapartist ruling machine, it must first receive baptism in the blood shed by a civil war, that inevitable concomitant to the overthrow of the proletarian dictatorship which the reaction cannot hope to avert. The overthrow itself, however can be averted, but only by restoring the party of the proletariat, the crushing of which has made possible the accumulation of all the internal contradictions and the maturing of the counter-revolutionary factors. It is to achieve this restoration, to bring closer the day of its attainment, that the strength and activities of the Left Opposition are dedicated.

—SHACHTMAN.

THE MILITANT IS \$2 A YEAR, SUBSCRIBE NOW.

The Fight in the Party for a Bolshevik Government . . . For the Policy of Lenin and Trotsky!

The question is posed of the expulsion from the party of A. V. Lunatcharsky*. J. G. Fenigstein-Daletsky** is opposed. The proposition is put to the vote. The expulsion is rejected.

The present situation: Reporter, J. G. Fenigstein.

J. G. FENIGSTEIN

By chance, it is I who am the reporter. Perhaps someone else will make the report? (Rejected).

Objective: How to coordinate the work in the immediate future. It is a question of the agreement with the other socialist parties (Mensheviks and Social Revolutionists). The considerations on the "spilled blood" and the lassitude of the workers should not predominate. For a political party that wants to make history, these facts should not constitute an obstacle. Task: what to do to satisfy the just demands of the workers and the peasants? What was the second revolution? It was inevitable. The class contradictions have grown. We have pointed this out. The revolution was not exclusively political. It brought with it a series of alterations in the economic and social domain. A great process has been accomplished. Illusions have disappeared. The state of mind of the Soviets and the popular masses has changed; they have lost their (collaborationist) illusions. Everybody has reached the conclusion of the necessity of the existence of the Soviet power. In the presence of this slogan we have developed ourselves and have grown. We have elaborated a series of slogans on the economic struggle, etc. Our party has grown. We have had the support of the masses.

LENIN.

I cannot make a report but I will make known to you a question which interests everybody a great deal. It is the question of the crisis in the party which broke out openly at the moment when it was already in power.

For all those who follow the life of the party, the polemic which was unfolded in the Rabotchi Put and my interventions against Kamenev and Zinoviev constitute nothing new. It was said in Dielo Naroda that the Bolsheviks would be afraid to seize the power. This compelled me to take up the pen to show all the inconsistency and unfathomable stupidity of the Socialist Revolutionists. I wrote "Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power"? The question of armed intervention was posed at the Central Committee session of October 1. I was afraid of seeing opportunism on the part of the Internationalist-Unionists; but this fear disappeared. Whereas, in our party, certain (former) members of the Central Committee were not in agreement with us. This grieved me. Thus the question of power has been posed for a long time. Just the same we could not give it up now because of the disagreement of Zinoviev and Kamenev. The insurrection is "objectively" necessary; comrades Zinoviev and Kamenev began to make an agitation against the insurrection; we began to consider them as strikebreakers. I even addressed myself in writing to the Central Committee to propose to expel them from the party.

I came out violently in the press when Kamenev came forward in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets*. I would not want (now, after the victory) to be severe with them. I regarded with friendliness Kamenev's parleys in the Central Executive Committee on the subject of the agreement, for we are not opposed to it from the point of view of principles***.

However, when the Socialist Revolutionists abandoned the power, I understood that they did it after Kerensky had begun the (armed) resistance. In Moscow (that is, on the subject of the conquest of power in Moscow), matters dragged out for a long time. Our Right wingers sank into pessimism. Moscow allegedly cannot take the power, etc. And it is then that the question of the agreement arose among them.

* Lunacharsky had come forward in favor of the coalition with the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionists; he resigned from the government because of the (imagined) destruction of the Cathedral of Basil the Benevolent in Moscow. The proposal to expel Lunacharsky was presented on the initiative of Lenin.

** At the present time the manager of the Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS).

***On August 4-17, 1917 Kamenev came forward during a session of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets on the occasion of his arrest, as well as on August 6-19, on the subject of the International Socialist Conference of Stockholm which the social-collaborationists aimed to convene during the summer of 1917, in order to conclude as quickly as possible a peace by exercising a pressure of the socialist parties upon the governments of their countries. Kamenev spoke on August 6-19 in favor of participation in this Conference, in spite of the fact that the Central Committee of the party had decided not to participate.

*** Neither Lenin nor Trotsky, in the beginning, had raised objection to parleys with the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionists concerning the coalition, on condition of having a solid majority for the Bolsheviks, and that the parties recognize the Soviet power, the decrees on peace and the land, etc. It was certain that these parleys would yield nothing, but a lesson by example was necessary.

Introduction to the Minutes of the Petrograd Committee, November 7, 1917

We publish here the minutes of the historic session of the Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik party which took place November 1-14, 1917. The power was already conquered, at least in the most important centers of the country. But the struggle inside the party concerning the question of power was far from having ceased. It had simply passed into a new phase. Up to October 25, the representatives of the Right wing (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, Kalinin, Lunatcharsky, etc.), demonstrated that the insurrection was premature and that it would end in a defeat. After the triumph of the insurrection they took up the job of proving that the Bolshevik party was incapable of maintaining itself in power without coalescing with the other socialist parties, that is, with the Social Revolutionists and the Mensheviks. In this new stage, the struggle of the Right wingers became exceptionally harsh and terminated with the resignation of the representatives of this wing from the Council of People's Commissars and from the Central Committee of the party. It should be recalled that this crisis took place a few days after the conquest of power.

What was the conduct, in this question, of those who are at present the Centrists, particularly Stalin? At bottom he was already then a Centrist, in so far as he was obliged to take a position by himself or to express his own opinion, but he was a Centrist who was afraid of Lenin. That is why at the most critical moments of the ideological struggle (beginning with April 4, 1917 and up to the illness of Lenin) Stalin scarcely existed from the political point of view. He existed less than ever during 1917. After his arrival in Petrograd, coming from Atchinsk with Kamenev, when he had taken possession of the editorial board of Pravda with Kamenev and the former deputy Muranov, Stalin followed a vulgarly democratic, semi-national-defensist line of conduct, a line which Kamenev formulated, all things considered, in more sensible and complete terms. After Lenin's arrival, Kamenev continued to defend his attitude and applied it in his manner all through October and November 1917. As for Stalin, he hushed up immediately and retired within himself. His activity in Pravda during the month of March, when he removed the revolutionary elements from the editorial board, was still present in the memory of all. From the psychological and political point of view,

The work of the insurrection is a new work; other forces, other qualities are needed. In Moscow, for example, in many cases the Junkers (cadets) gave proof of cruelty, shot prisoners, etc. The Junkers, sons of the bourgeoisie, understood that with the advent of the power of the people comes to an end that of the bourgeoisie, for already, even at the conference, we had taken a series of measures like the confiscation of the banks, etc. To the contrary, the Bolsheviks were frequently too soft. Now if the bourgeoisie had triumphed, it would have acted as in 1848 and in 1871. Who believed therefore that we would not run foul of the sabotage of the bourgeoisie? It was clear even for a nursing. And we must apply force: arrest the bank directors, etc. The detention, even brief, of these people has already yielded very good results. That hardly surprises me; I know how little capable they are of doing any of their fighting themselves; the essential thing for them is to hold on their warm little spot. In Paris, they guillotined, while we will do nothing but deprive of their food cards those who do not receive them from their trade union. In this manner we will fulfill our duty. And at such a moment, while we are in power, the split appears! Zinoviev and Kamenev say that we will not get possession of the power "in the whole country". I am in no mood to listen to this calmly. I regard this as treason. What do they want? The launching of a spontaneous battle, with dagger blows? The proletariat alone can bring the country out of this.... as for the agreement....

I cannot even speak seriously of this. Trotsky has said long ago that the union is impossible. Trotsky has understood this and since then there has not been a better Bolshevik.

Zinoviev says that we are not the power of the Soviets, that, allegedly, we are the Bolsheviks all alone, that the Socialist Revolutionists and the Mensheviks have quit, etc. But it is not our fault. We are elected by the congress of the Soviets. It is a new organization. Those who want to fight, enter it. It is not the people, it is a vanguard which draws in the mass. We are marching with the active masses and not with those who are tired. To refrain now from unfolding the insurrection (is to capitulate) before the fatigued masses, as for us we are with the vanguard. The Soviets are determined (in the struggle). The Soviets are the vanguard of the proletarian masses. Now we are invited to espouse the Municipal Duma: it's nonsense.

We are told that we want to "introduce" socialism: that's nonsense. We do not want to make a peasant socialism. We are told that we must "stop". But it is impossible. It is even said that we are not the power of the Soviets. Then what are we? However, we are not going to fuse with the Duma! Perhaps it will still be proposed that we conclude an agreement with the Room-

a complete turn-about face in 24 hours and adopt an active attitude in Lenin's camp against the opportunist wing, of which he, Stalin, had been one of the leaders before Lenin's arrival. That's why you can find hardly a single question in which, during this period, Stalin adopted a clear position which he defended openly.

As these minutes prove, the revolutionary line of the party was defended in common by Lenin and Trotsky. But that is just why the document we publish was not included in the collection of minutes of the Petrograd Committee edited under the title: "The First Legal Petrograd Committee of the Bolshevik Party in 1917" (State Publishing House, 1927). Yet, in saying this, we do not express ourselves with sufficient preciseness. The minutes of the November 1 session were part of the first project of the book; they were set up and the proofs were carefully looked over. As proof of this, we have the photograph of a part of the proofs. But the report of this historic session was in too flagrant contradiction, by far too unbearable, to the falsification of the history of October, executed under the not very qualified but zealous direction of Yaroslavsky. What was to be done? Lenin-grad interrogated Moscow, the Central Historical Section of the party questioned the Secretariat of the Central Committee. The latter gave the following directions: Eliminate the minutes from the book in such a manner that not a trace is left of them. They had to set up in haste a new table of contents and to change the arrangement of the pages. But nevertheless, the book itself retains clues. The session of October 29 concludes by setting the next session for Wednesday (November 1). However, according to the book, the next session "took place on November 2". But a much more important trace was preserved outside of the book, in the form of the proofs already mentioned, bearing corrections and annotations by the hand of the book's editor, P. F. Kudelli.

As the official motive for the dissimulation of the most important minutes of the Petrograd Committee for 1917, Kudelli marked the following note on the proofs: "The speech of V. I. Lenin was recorded by the secretary of the session of the Petrograd Committee with great lacunae and with abbreviations of certain words and phrases. In some places it was impossible to decipher the notes;

cherod, the Vikzhel, etc.* That's horse-trading. Perhaps also with general Kaledin? To come to an understanding with the collaborationists who later on will throw a wrench in the spokes! It would be miserable horse-trading and not the power of the Soviets. At the conference that's just the way we must pose the question. Ninety-nine percent of the workers are for us.

If there must be a split, let it come! If they're the ones who have the majority, let them take the power in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and let them act; as for us, we will go to the sailors.

We are in power. Who is capable at present of passing over to Novaya Zhizn**? Hesitators, unprincipled people: one day with us, the next with the Mensheviks. They say that by ourselves we will not maintain power, etc. But we are not alone. We have all Europe before us. We must begin: at present, only the socialist revolution is possible. All these hesitations, these doubts (agreements), they are nonsense. When I said (at a popular meeting), we will fight (the saboteurs) with the bread cards, the faces of the soldiers lit up. (The Right wingers) asserted that the soldiers are incapable of fighting. But the speakers who spoke before the masses tell us that they have never seen such enthusiasm. Only we shall be able to create a plan of revolutionary work. Only we are fit for the struggle, etc. And the Mensheviks? They will not follow us. There you are, at the coming conference we must put the question of the future socialist revolution. We have Kaledin before us; we have not yet triumphed (completely). When we are told (Vikzhel the saboteurs, etc.) that there is "no power", then it is necessary to imprison, and we will do it. And let them task us on this subject of the horrors of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Why, to arrest the Vikzhel people, that I understand. Let them scream about the arrests! The delegate from Tver said to the Congress of the Soviets: "Arrest them all!" That I understand; he has a certain comprehension of what the dictatorship of the proletariat is. Our present slogan is: no agreements, for a homogeneous Bolshevik government!

* Roomcherod: Joint Executive Committee of the Soldiers' Soviets on the Rumanian front, the banks of the Black Sea and the Odessa Garrison. Vikzhel: All-Russian Executive Committee of Railroad Workers. These two organizations were in the hands of the social-collaborationists.

** Novia Zhizn (New Life), Gorky's paper, where the Right wingers, (Lunacharsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rykov, etc.) came out against the Central Committee.

***The Tver delegate, a peasant, demanded during the Soviet Congress on October 25 (November 7), the arrest of Aleksievlev and the other collaborationist chiefs of the Peasants' League of that period.

accordingly, so as not to distort this speech, it is not published."

It is quite true that the recording of the minutes is not perfect, that they contain not a few lacunae and obscure passages. But that applies entirely and completely to all the minutes of the Petrograd Committee of 1917. The session of November 1 was perhaps better recorded than certain others. As is known, Lenin's speeches were in general difficult to take down, even stenographically, because of the peculiarities of his methods of oratorical exposition: the extreme rapidity of speech, the complicated construction of the phrases, abrupt and brutal parentheses, etc. Nevertheless, the essential sense of Lenin's speech of November 1-14 is perfectly clear. Lunatcharsky's speech and the two speeches of Trotsky are reported in an entirely satisfactory manner. The motive for the elimination from the minutes is quite a different one. It is not hard to find. It is underlined in the margin of the proofs with a thick stroke and a huge question mark, right opposite the following words of the text:

"I cannot even speak seriously of this (of the agreement with the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionists). Trotsky has said long ago that the union is impossible. Trotsky has understood this and since then there has not been a better Bolshevik."

It is this phrase which finally upset the equilibrium of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and called forth the re-making of the whole book, which is vexing enough as it is, for, even in its present censored form, it constitutes a murderous document against the falsifiers. It will suffice to say, for instance, that the point of view of the Central Committee, when it was presented in the meetings, was called the "point of view of Lenin and Trotsky" (see page 345). But Yaroslavsky himself, in spite of his assiduity, cannot attend to everything....

In this connection, it would be very interesting to reconstruct the contribution in the realm of ideas made in 1917 by this incompetent compiler and odious falsifier. We hope to devote a few pages to it in our archives. Here, let us simply recall a little known or forgotten fact. After the February revolution, Yaroslavsky, together with the Mensheviks, published at Yakutsk a review, the Social Democrat, which was a model of the acme of political triviality and converged upon the bourne separating Menshevism from rotten-borough liberalism. Yaroslavsky was then at the head of the

LUNATCHARSKY.

I would like to have you know my impressions about the masses who have fought. I have heard with astonishment the speech of Vladimir Illich about Kamenev allegedly not recognizing the socialist revolution. Yet, who is now in power? The Bolsheviks: that already speaks for itself. Kamenev, as far as I know, has not a Menshevik point of view. Our influence is growing. The masses are coming over to our side. The city worker also understands that the question of the land is not a matter of indifference to him. We adopt as the basis for the decree on the land the resolution of the Social Revolutionists. We introduce it into the program of our activity; we can also introduce it into the nomination of the government*. We, the Right wing Opposition, have dwelled on the necessity of a homogeneous socialist government. We say: not a single place to the Cadets!

We have, furthermore, pointed out the necessity of workers' control, of the regulation of production by the shop and factory committees; the other parties consent to that. We will oblige everybody to admit it. That is what our program consists of, plus the power of the Soviets. Does this mean that we abandon the Municipal Dumas? It is our people who are seated in them. If the Dumas want to take the power, we will demolish them. Does that mean that we give the Dumas a part of the power? No. Simply representation (in the Soviet government). And should we really continue the civil war because of that? No, we shouldn't. To have new elections to the Dumas, that is another matter. Here it is eight days that we are in power. But we do not know if the decree on peace has been brought to the attention of the people? What is the reason for it? The technical apparatus, which is bourgeois or petty bourgeois. It sabotages us. If the Municipal Duma demanded that the principal line of conduct be changed, that would be another matter; but if it only wants representation in the power, there is nothing to talk about. Only, we will settle nothing. The famine will begin. If those who sabotage, that is, the technical apparatus, are not with us, nobody will know about our agitation beyond the frontier, and we will settle nothing. We can, of course, act by means of the terror, but why, towards what end?

We will endeavor to obtain an agreement, but if they grab us by the hands, we are resolute people, capable of resisting . . . At present we must, first of all, take possession of the whole apparatus. This means to act by following the line of least resistance and not by

* Lunacharsky's idea is the following: If the Bolsheviks have introduced into their decree on the land the demands of the peasants, permeated with a Social Revolutionary spirit, the Bolsheviks must also share the power with the Social Revolutionists.

Conciliation Chamber of Yakutsk in order to protect the splendors of the democratic revolution from the conflicts between workers and capitalists. All the articles of the review edited by Yaroslavsky were penetrated with the same spirit. The other collaborators, who did not jar with the spirit of this publication, were Ordjonikidze and Petrovsky, the present president of the Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Soviets. In a leading article, which might seem incredible were it not printed black on white, Petrovsky shed tears of emotion over 50 rubles contributed by some official or other for charitable works and expressed the conviction that the revolution would really bloom from the moment when the possessing classes would follow the example of the noble honorary—and perhaps even Court—Councillor. It is these rigorously consistent "Marxists", these inflexible "revolutionists" who now edit Lenin and seek to remodel all history. They write with assurance on the proofs of the minutes of the session of November 1: "Throw away the composition." That's it precisely: the history of the October revolution, "Throw away the composition!" Lenin, "Throw away the composition!" Set up all over again the history of Russia for a third of a century. Yaroslavsky, author, corrector and compositor of the new Stalinist history.

But, alas for Yaroslavsky, there have been some "leaks" this time too. He has not succeeded in "throwing away the composition". It cannot be done without making use of living people. The proofs, with all the annotations, immediately made their way into the hands of the Opposition. It is not the only document of this type!

As for the correction of the text we publish, we have applied in general and on the whole the rules which were used also by the editors of the collection of the Petrograd minutes mentioned above. In cases where the sense of the phrase left no doubt, we have corrected the grammar or the syntax, taking into account the interest of the reader. In spite of all the defects of recording, the general procedure of the whole session and of the tendencies and groups which were represented there, appears without leaving room for any dispute and carries a conviction which penetrates to the very depths of the mind. In publishing the present document, we are saving for history a living portion, not without its importance, of the October revolution.

—Archives of the Opposition.

taking every station by assault. Otherwise we will not be able to do anything. That is the first stage. We must take possession of the first point in order to be able to go forward. Such leaps cannot be made. We must pass gradually through all the steps*. We must consolidate our position in the most rapid manner. We must put a stop to the whole State apparatus and then go forward. Whoever pulls the cord too tightly will break it. It will be broken. At present the (party) representative in the Sailors' Committee says: The majority of the sailors are now in such a state of mind that they are ready to come to Smolny to declare that they are not disposed to conduct a civil war in order that the Bolsheviks should have more power or less. This exceptional situation cannot last long. To drag it out is to lose blood, lacking support from the technical apparatus.

I am surprised at the words pronounced by Vladimir Illich on the subject of the parleys with General Kaledin**, because he would be a genuine force, whereas the Mensheviks are not. But this unreal force can shift troops from the front, provoke a battle under Vinitsa and not permit the Lettish light infantry to arrive here. Technically, we can do nothing on the positions we have occupied. We have begun to love war too much, as if we were not workers but soldiers, a military party. It is necessary to create and we are doing nothing. We polemize in the party, and we will continue to do it, and there will remain: a single dictator***.

We will not succeed in triumphing by arrests, the technical apparatus cannot be attacked, it is too big. The people reason like this: our program must be realized while retaining the arms in the

* We have here, from the lips of Lunacharsky, the formula which constitutes the leit-motif of all Stalin's activity. In defending for Germany (1923), China, England, the same policy of collaborationism which Lunacharsky defended at the end of 1917, Stalin invariably repeated: we must not leap over stages; we must gradually follow each step.

** Lenin had undoubtedly said: "If it were really a question of conducting negotiations in order to liquidate the civil war, it would be necessary to undertake them with Kaledin and not with the Mensheviks." The official editorial board of the Bureau of Party History, as its annotation shows, did not at all understand this purely Leninist argumentation.

* After these words, applause was heard (see further on an indication on this point in the speech of Trotsky). It appears that during the negotiations on the coalition government of the Soviet parties, the collaborationists put at the top the demand to "cease" the civil war, to attain that aim, to eliminate from the government Lenin and Trotsky. At times, they spoke only of Lenin. The Right wingers agreed to this.

hands of the workers. We can count upon that up to a certain point. Nevertheless, we cannot work at present for we have no apparatus. It will not last a long time like this. We must show that we can build up as realists, and not simply say: "Fight, fight", and clear a road for ourselves with bayonets; that will lead to nothing. It is easier to compel people working badly to do it better than to coerce the idle to work by force. In the face of all these difficulties, I consider that it would be desirable to reach an agreement. None of your proofs about the Mensheviks can convince the masses. I know well that it is not possible to work as it is being done now. It is not possible from the principled point of view and also because we cannot risk a number of lives.

Do not give forth to divergences of views (they exist already); the masses regard that nervously.

TROTSKY.

We are told that we are incapable of building up. But in that case we should quite simply give up the power to those who were right in the fight against us. But we have already done a great work. It is said that we cannot support ourselves upon bayonets. But neither can we exist without bayonets. We need the bayonets there in order to be able to sit here. All the experience we have gone through should already teach us something. There have been battles in Moscow; yes, there were serious combats there against the Junkers. But in the end, they did not submit either to the Mensheviks or to the Vikzhel; the agreement with the latter will not make the struggle against the Junkers' detachments of the bourgeoisie disappear. No, in the future a cruel class struggle will continue to be conducted against us. All this petty bourgeois rabble which, for the moment, is in no position to take a stand on one side or the other—when it will know that our power is strong, it will be with us, and with it, the Vikzhel.... Because we crushed Krasnov's Cossacks under Petersburg, we received a mass of telegrams of sympathy the next day. The petty bourgeois mass seeks the force to which it should submit itself. Whoever does not understand that understands nothing in the world, much less the apparatus of the State. Back in 1871, Karl Marx said that the new class cannot simply utilize the old apparatus. It has its interests and its customs which cause resistance. We must break it and renew it; it is only then that we can work.

If that were not so, if the former Czarist apparatus suited our new aims, the whole revolution would not be worth a blown egg. We must create an apparatus which can, in reality, proclaim that the general interests of the popular masses are higher than the particular interests of the apparatus itself.

The question of the classes and of their struggle has remained purely book stuff for many of our circles. When they felt the revolutionary reality, they spoke differently (of agreement and not of struggle).

What we are living through at present is one of the deepest social crises. At present the proletariat is demolishing the apparatus of the power and replacing it. Its resistance is a reflection of the process of our growth. No word will be able to moderate their hatred against us. It is said that we have the same program as they. Give them a few seats and that will be all. Then why do they help Kaledin if they have the same program as we? No, the bourgeoisie is against us out of all its class interests. What will we accomplish against that by an agreement with the Vikzhel people? Against us is rising armed violence; how shall we beat it? Also by violence. Lunacharsky says that blood is flowing. Then what should be done? Perhaps we should not have begun? Then recognize that the greatest mistake was committed, not so much in October but at the end of February when the arena of the future civil war was opened.

It is said that an agreement with the Vikzhel would help us against Kaledin. But why, then, don't they support us if they are closer to us? They understand that bad as the counter-revolution is for them, it will give more to the upper strata of the Vikzhel than the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the moment they are preserving a neutrality which is not friendly to us. They are letting the shock troops and the partisans of Krasnov approach. I was personally forbidden at the Vikzhel from communicating by direct wire with Moscow in order to say that our affairs are going well in the struggle against Krasnov, because that might, so they said, "improve the morale there"; but the Vikzhel people, you see, are neutral. To come to an understanding is to continue the policy of Gotz, of Dan and the others.

We are told: we have neither cotton nor oil, that is why the agreement is necessary. But I ask for the thousand and first time: how can the agreement with Gotz and Dan give us oil?

Why are the Tchernovs against us? They protest out of their entirely bourgeois psychology. They are not capable of applying serious measures against the bourgeoisie. They are hostile to us just because we are applying brutal measures against it. Nobody yet knows what rigorous measures we shall still be compelled to have executed. All that the Tchernovs are capable of introducing into our work are hesitations. But in the struggle against the enemy, hesitations will kill our authority in the eyes of the masses.

What does the agreement with Tch-

(Continued on page 4)

Lenin's Report on the Russian Revolution to the 4th Congress of the C.I.

We present here the most important extracts from Lenin's speech.

Lenin: Comrades, I was put down as principal speaker on the list, but you will understand that after my prolonged illness I am not in a position to make a lengthy report. I can only give the introduction to some of the more important questions. My remarks will have to be quite brief. The theme of "Five Years of the Russian Revolution, and the Perspectives of World Revolution" is altogether too comprehensive and too big for one speaker to exhaust in one speech. I therefore will pick out only a small part of the subject, namely, the question of the New Economic Policy. I choose solely this small part, not only in order to introduce this matter, which is—at least to me—the most important of all, because I am engaged on it just now. I will therefore speak on the subject of how we started the New Economic Policy and what results we have achieved by it, by confining myself to this question I hope to be in a position to give you a general survey and a general conception of the subject.

To begin the story of how we started the New Economic Policy, I must recall to you an article written by me in 1918. In that year, in discussing the subject, I touched upon the question of how we would have to tackle the problem of State Capitalism. I wrote then:

"Compared with the present economic policy of the Soviet Republic—i. e. the economic situation of that time, State Capitalism represents a step forward. If we could, for instance, introduce State Capitalism here in the course of half a year, it would be a tremendous success and the best guarantee that within a year socialism will be strong and invincible in this country."

This was said at a time, of course when we were much more foolish than now, but not so foolish as to be unable to tackle such problems.

In a word, in 1918 I was of the opinion that State Capitalism represented a step forward in comparison with the economic situation of the Soviet Republic at the time. This sounds rather strange, and perhaps contradictory, for at that time our Republic was a Socialist Republic, at that time we carried out day by day, in rapid succession—perhaps in far too rapid succession—all kinds of new economic measures which we could not term otherwise than socialist. And yet I declared at that time that State Capitalism would be a step forward compared with the then prevailing situation of the Soviet Republic. I therefore found it necessary to illustrate my point by enumerating the elements of the economic structure of Russia. These elements I represented then as follows: (1) A patriarchal that is an exceedingly primitive system of land tenure (2) Petty production of commodities. To this group belonged the majority of the peasants who deal in grain. (3) Private capitalism. (4) State Capitalism. (5) Socialism. All these economic elements were represented in Russia at that time. I took the trouble of explaining the correlation between these elements, suggesting that we might perhaps put a higher value on the non-socialist element, namely on State Capitalism, than on socialism. I repeat that it sounds rather strange to declare a non-socialist element of greater value than socialism in a Republic which had declared itself socialist. But it becomes quite conceivable, if we bear in mind, that the economic situation in Russia at that time could only by no means be considered as uniform and of high standing. On the contrary we were quite aware of the fact that in Russia we had a patriarchal system of agriculture, i. e., the most primitive form and parallel with it a socialist form of agriculture. What part was State Capitalism to play under those circumstances? I asked myself again, which of these elements predominates. It is clear that in a petty bourgeois environment the petty bourgeois element would be on top. The question as I put it then—it was in connection with special discussion that has nothing to do with the present question—was this: What is our attitude towards State capitalism? And I promptly replied: State capitalism, although not a socialist form, would be more favorable for us and for Russia than the present form. What does it mean? It means that we do not overestimate the basis and structure of socialist economy, although we have already accomplished the social revolution. Already at that time we had, to a certain degree, come to the conclusion that it would be better for us to establish first State capitalism and through it to march on to socialism.

At all events there was already a general and vague idea of the retreat. And I believe that also we, as a Communist International, and not only as a country that was and has remained backward by its economic structure, must take that into consideration, particularly the comrades in the advanced countries of Western Europe. Just now, for instance, we are busy with the construction of a program. I for one believe that it would be the wisest action on our part if we discuss all these programs in a general way, if we take something like a first reading of them and have them all printed, but not in order to have the programme finally established this year. Why? First of all, because I think that we have hardly examined them all. Secondly, because we have as yet given almost no consideration to the idea of the retreat and making the retreat secure. Yet this is a question which merits our utmost attention in dealing with so great a change of the world as the overthrow of capitalism and the building up of the socialist system. It is not enough for us to be merely conscious of how we are to assume the offensive in order to be victorious. In revolutionary times this is not at all

difficult. In the course of the revolution there will always be moments when the enemy loses his head. If we attack him at such moments, we may score an easy victory. But such a victory would not be decisive, because the enemy after calm consideration, after due concentration of his forces, etc., may very easily provoke us into a premature attack in order to throw us back for many years to come. I therefore think the idea of the necessity of preparing for the emergency of a retreat to be of supreme importance, and that not only from the theoretical standpoint. From a practical standpoint also all the parties that are contemplating an offensive against capitalism in the near future, should right now think of how to make the retreat secure. I believe that this lesson, in conjunction with all the other lessons of our revolution, will surely do us no harm and most probably a vast amount of good in many instances.

Having thus emphasized that already in 1918 we considered State Capitalism as a possible way of retreat, I will pass to a review the results of our New Economic Policy. I repeat at that time it was still a very vague idea. Yet in 1921, after having emerged victoriously from the most important stages of the civil war, Soviet Russia came face to face with a great—I believe the greatest—internal political crisis which caused disaffection not only of the huge masses of the peasantry, but also of large numbers of workers. It was the first, and I hope the last, time in the history of Soviet Russia that we had the great masses of the peasantry arrayed against us, not consciously, but instinctively, as a sort of political mood. What was the cause of this unique, and for us, naturally disagreeable situation? It was caused by the fact that we had gone too far with our economic measures, that we had not made our base secure, that the masses were already sensing what we had not yet properly formulated although we had to acknowledge it a few weeks afterwards: namely that the direct transition to pure socialist economy, to pure socialist distribution of wealth, was far beyond our resources; and that if we could not make a successful and timely retreat, if we could not confine ourselves to easier tasks, we would go under. I believe that the crisis set in February, 1921. Already in the spring of that year we unanimously resolved—we had no considerable differences on that score—to pass to the New Economic Policy. Today, after a lapse of a year and a half, at the end of 1922, we are in a position to draw comparisons. What are the results. Has the retreat benefited and really saved us, or has it failed, and the results indefinite. This is the principal question I put to myself, and I believe that this question is also of supreme importance to all the Communist parties, because if the answer should be in the negative, then we shall all go under. I believe that we can in good conscience give the answer to the question in the affirmative, namely in the sense that in the course of eighteen months that have elapsed we have

positively and absolutely demonstrated that we have successfully passed the examination....

Now as to the heavy industries. Here I must say that the situation is still difficult. Nevertheless some small improvement has taken place between 1921 and 1922. This entitles us to the hope of improvement in the near future. The means to that end we partly possess already. In a capitalist country the improvement of the situation of the heavy industries would absolutely necessitate the borrowing of hundreds of millions without which no improvement could be thought of. The economic history of capitalist countries tells us that the upbuilding of heavy industries in a backward country can be accomplished only by means of long-term loans of hundreds of millions of dollars or gold roubles. So far we have received no loans of this kind. All that has been written so far about concessions and such like remains almost entirely on paper. Much has been written about these things lately, particularly about the Urquhart concession. Nevertheless it seems to me that our concession policy is an excellent one. At the same time it ought to be taken into consideration that we have not yet arranged for any real big concession. Hence the situation of the heavy industries is for our backward country a really very difficult question, since we cannot count on any loans from the wealthy states. In spite of all this, we see perceptible improvement. We also find that our trading activity has already brought us some capital. This also is of rather modest dimensions amounting to no more than twenty million gold roubles, but a start has been made. Our trading yields us the means which we can apply to the upbuilding of the heavy industries.

At the present moment, however, our heavy industries are still in a very difficult position. But I believe that we can already afford to spare something for this purpose, and this we will continue to do even if we have to do it frequently at the expense of the population. We must be thrifty now. We are endeavouring to cut down State expenditure by curtailing the machinery of the State. As to that I will say a few words later on. At all events we must diminish State expenditure, and affect economy as far as possible. Thus we are saving on every thing, even on schools. This has to be done, because we know that without the saving and reconstruction of the heavy industries we cannot hope to upbuild any industry, and without them we cannot hope to exist as a self-sustaining country. This we know quite well. The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest for her peasantry, nor in the good condition of light industries which cater for the requirements of the peasantry, but we need also the heavy industries. But the reconstruction of the heavy industries will require the work of many years.

Heavy industry requires subsidies from the State. Unless we have them, then, merely as a civilized country (to say nothing of a socialist country) we are

foredoomed to perish. In this matter we have now taken the decisive step. We have obtained the means requisite for putting heavy industry upon its own feet. The sum that we have hitherto obtained, is, indeed, less than 20 million gold roubles—but we have it; it will be definitely applied to raising the level of our heavy industry....

Herein consisted the most important question for us, the economic preparation of the socialist economy. We could not prepare this in direct fashion, but we had to do it indirectly. The State capitalism we have established is a peculiar form of State Capitalism. It does not correspond to the ordinary conception of State Capitalism. We have all authority in our hands; we have the land, which belongs to the state. This is of immense importance, although our opponents are apt to declare, falsely, that it is of no importance at all. From the economic outlook, the ownership of the land by the State is of great importance; it has immense practical significance from the economic point of view. We have achieved this, and I must emphasize that our further activities must lie within this framework. We have already ensured that the peasants are satisfied with us, and that industry and commerce are on the upgrade.

I have already pointed out that our State capitalism is distinguished from State capitalism in the literal sense of the term, inasmuch as we not only have all the land in the hands of the Proletarian State, but also the important departments of industry. Above all: while we have farmed out a certain amount of small-scale and medium-scale industry, the rest of the industry remains in our hands. Regarding commerce, I should like to insist upon the point that we are endeavoring to establish, and indeed have already established, mixed companies, that is to say, companies in which part of the capital belongs to private (foreign) capitalists, while the rest belongs to us. In the first place we learn in this way how to carry on commerce and retain the possibility of dissolving the company whenever we think it necessary, so that we may be said to incur practically no risk. But from the private capitalists we are learning, and we are seeing how we are to work our way upward and what mistakes we are making. I think I have said enough about these matters....

I have said that we have committed a large number of follies. But I must in this connection say something concerning our opponents. When these read us a lecture, saying: Lenin himself recognizes that the Bolsheviks have committed an enormous number of follies! I should like to answer them thus: "But you ought to know that our follies are of an essentially different kind from yours. We have just begun to learn, and we are learning systematically that we are satisfied with our progress. When our opponents, I mean the capitalists and the heroes of the 2nd International, insist that we have committed follies, I should like to make a comparison, mod-

ifying slightly the words of a celebrated Russian writer so as to give them the following aspect: When the Bolsheviks commit follies, this amounts to saying that the Bolsheviks say 2 and 2 equals 5; but when our opponents i. e. the capitalists and the heroes of the Second International, commit follies, this amounts to saying that they declare 2 and 2 equals a wax candle. That is not difficult to prove....

Here is another example, an even more telling one, that of the Versailles Treaty. What have the victorious powers done? How can they find any issue for the present confusion? I do not think that I exaggerate when I repeat that our follies are as nothing in comparison with the follies committed by the capitalist States, the capitalist world, and the Second International in conjunction. That is why I think that the prospects of the world revolution (this is a theme upon which I propose to touch briefly) are good, and in certain conditions are likely to become even better. It is upon these conditions that I propose to say a few words.

At the Third Congress of 1921, we adopted a resolution concerning the organisational upbuilding of the Communist parties, and concerning the method and the substance of their work. It was a good resolution. But the resolution is almost exclusively Russian: it was wholly derived for a study of Russian developments. That is the good side of the resolution, but it is also the bad side. It is the bad side of the resolution because hardly any foreigner (I have read the resolution over again before expressing my conviction) is able to read it. In the first place, it is too long, for it contains 50 or more paragraphs. Foreigners are apt to find it impossible to read anything of this sort. In the next place, even if a foreigner should manage to read it through, it is too Russian. I do not mean because it was written in the Russian language, for there are excellent translations into the various tongues, but because it is permeated with the Russian spirit. Thirdly, if by a rare chance a foreigner could understand it, he could not possibly carry it out. That is the third defect.

I have talked matters over with some of the delegates and I hope that in the later course of the Congress I shall find it possible (not at the Congress itself, for in that I am unfortunately not able to participate) to talk matters over in full detail with a larger number of delegates from various lands. My impression is that we made a great mistake in the matter of this resolution, thereby blocking our own advance.

Let me repeat, it is an excellent resolution. I myself endorse every one of its 50 or more paragraphs. But we did not really know what we were about when we turned to foreigners with our Russian experience. Everything in the resolution has remained a dead letter. If we fail to understand why, we shall make no progress.

I think the most important for us all, Russians and foreigners alike is that

after 5 years of the Russian revolution, we should set ourselves to school. Now for the first time we have the possibility of learning. I do not know how long the capitalist powers will give us the opportunity of learning in peace and quietude. But we must utilize every moment in which we are free from war, that we may learn, and learn from the bottom up.

The whole Party, and Russians at large, show by their hunger for culture, that they are aware of this. The aspiration for culture proves that our most important task consists in this to learn and to go on learning. But foreigners too, must learn, though not in the sense in which we have to learn namely, to read, to write, and to understand what is read. This is our lack. There is much dispute as to whether such things belong to proletarian culture or to bourgeois culture. I leave the question open. This much is certain that our first task must be to learn reading and writing and understanding what is read. In foreign lands this is no longer necessary.

Foreigners need something different. They need something higher. First of all they have to learn how to understand all that we have written about the organisational upbuilding of the Communist parties, which they have subscribed without reading it, or without understanding it. You foreign comrades must make this your first duty. This resolution must be carried into effect: these things cannot be done between one day and the next, it is absolutely impossible. The resolution is too Russian; it is a reflection of Russian experience; that is why it cannot be understood by foreigners, and why foreigners are not content to treat this resolution as a miraculous picture which they are to hang on the wall and to pray to. That sort of attitude will not help us forward. You will have to make a portion of Russian experience your own. How can it be done. I do not know. Perhaps the Fascists in Italy will do us a good turn by showing the Italians how, after all, they are not so highly cultured that the development of Black Hundreds in Italy has become impossible. This may have a good effect. We Russians must also look for means of explaining to foreigners the elements of this reason. Otherwise it will be absolutely impossible for them to carry it out.

I am confident that in this sense (we have to say, not only for the Russians, but for foreigners as well), that the most important thing for us all in the period now opening, is to learn. We Russians have to learn in the general sense. You have to learn in the special sense that you may gain a genuine understanding of the organization, structure, method, and substance of revolutionary work. If you do this, I am confident that the prospects for the world revolution are not merely favourable, but splendid.

(Loud and long-continued applause. A general acclamation, "Long Live Comrade Lenin").

The Fight in the Party for a Bolshevik Government and the Lenin-Trotsky Line

(Continued from page 3)

ernov mean? It does not mean; to speak frankly with him once and stop there. No, it means: to line up according to Tchernov. This would be treason for which we would all deserve to be shot immediately.

I have heard here with bitterness the applause given (Lunatcharsky) a propos of the phrase on the dictatorship of a single person. Why, for what reason, do they want to decapitate the party by removing Lenin, this party which has taken possession of the power in the battle where blood was spilled? Milinukov was driven from the government, for example, but when? When the proletariat put its foot on the belly of the Cadets. And now? Who is walking on our belly? Nobody. It is only eight days that we are in power. We establish our tactics by basing them on the revolutionary vanguard of the masses. We were told in defense of collaborationism that without it the Baltic fleet will not give the smallest of its vessels. This has not been verified. We were frightened with the assertion that no worker would march. Nevertheless the Red Guard is dying valiantly. No, there is no longer any return to the intermediate policy, to collaborationism. We will introduce the dictatorship of the proletariat in reality. We will compel people to work. How does it happen that society existed, that the masses worked under the former terror of the minority? Here, it is no longer such a terror, it is the organization of the class violence of the workers against the bourgeoisie.

How do they want to scare us now? In the same way that the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionists sought to scare us yesterday. They said that as we approach the socialist revolution, we shall see the Junkers fire, the blood flow, the bourgeoisie conspire, the functionaries sabotage, the army committees resist. Naturally! But all this is what happens at the top. If the bourgeoisie was with us, there would not be a civil war, it is even superfluous to say it.

The army committees are hated by the mass of the soldiers, but frequently they cannot yet do anything against them. Still, in a whole series of units, Revolutionary Military Committees have been elected; the officers, the old committees, all the inferior officers have been arrested. That has been effected in about one-fourth of the army. To fraternize with the army committees would be to raise against us the masses of soldiers. Lunatcharsky's prejudices are a herit-

age of the petty bourgeois psychology. Naturally, that is also, in part, inherent in the masses, it is a residue of their slavery of yesterday. But if the counter-revolution threatens us, the mass, even the backward mass, will take up arms. At the base, they are in such a position that they will come forward with arms in hand. It is otherwise with the Vikzhel, the army committees, the Social Revolutionists, the Mensheviks and other summits.

Lunatcharsky says: We must stop.... No, we must clear away in order to go forward. When you come out against us at the moment of the bitter struggle, you are weakening us. An agreement with Tchernov would not give us a thing. We need organization. That is what we should drive for. Tchernov is afraid that the people are pressing the bourgeoisie too much, that they are carrying off money plundered from the bourgeoisie. He will merely weaken us by his petty bourgeois hesitations.

We must say clearly and plainly to the workers that it is not a coalition with the Mensheviks and others that we want to establish, that it is not a question of that, but rather of a program of action. We already have a coalition: with the peasants, with the soldiers who are now fighting for the power of the Bolsheviks, for the All-Russian Soviet Congress has handed the power to a well-defined party. You forget that.

Should we share the power with the elements who, already before this, sabotaged the Soviets and who now fight the power of the proletariat from without? All those who consent to it forget to ask themselves if those with whom they want to share the power are capable of realizing our program. They do not speak of this. Are the collaborationists capable of conducting a policy of economic terror? No. If we are incapable of realizing our program after having taken the power, we should go to the soldiers and the workers and acknowledge that we have failed. But it will not do any good to leave in the coalition government only a few Bolsheviks. We have taken the power, we must also take the responsibilities.

It is proposed to limit the speaking time to 15 minutes.

NOGIN*.

The question of knowing what revolu-

* Negin, old Bolshevik, former textile worker, who played a great role in the party. Died in 1925.

tion we have settled, and we have no need to talk about it now that our party has arrived in power. But can it be like this, can we shed blood together and govern separately? Can we refuse the power to the soldiers? The civil war will last for years. One can hardly get very far with the peasants by supporting himself upon bayonets. Towards capitalist industry, that's one thing; but another tactic is needed with regard to the peasants.

The word "collaboration" has become too repugnant to the comrades. It is not a question of collaboration, but of resolving the question: how shall we act if we repulse all the other parties? The Social Revolutionists have quit the Soviets after the revolution, the Mensheviks too. But this means that the Soviets are going to break down. Such a situation, given the complete disorganization of the country, will terminate in a short time with the failure of our party. We should not waste our powder and shot. The famine conditions will create a favorable terrain for Kaledin who is now marching against us. In launching the dispatch to the employees of the railroads that we intend to deprive them of bread cards, we would create the basis for a powerful protest.

GLEBOV*.

The situation is serious, not because the shock troops are approaching. The power is in our hands, we can triumph. But there is sabotage which is beginning inside the party, as well as an almost official split. That must not be. The force of sabotage exists in the measure that, by our line of conduct, we are marching towards an agreement with it. As long as I looked for an agreement, the functionaries ridiculed me; but as soon as I took a resolute road, a lot of things were straightened out. From the point of view of Posts and Telegraphs, it is already important that they have pronounced themselves in our favor in their resolution. They must take us into account. At Ivanovo-Voznesensk, the proletariat has adopted a resolute decision. It arrested the saboteurs and put them in prison; they came out like lambs. We should say to the hesitant comrades: "Get out, don't thwart our activity; if not, by hesitating, we shall lose everything."

We are told: "The power will be responsible to the parliament." But what will this parliament be? Will it not be made on the model of the Pre-Parliament?

** Glebov-Avilov, former worker, belonged for a long time to the Vpered (Forward) group; after the October revolution, People's Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs. Took part in the Zinoviev Opposition and capitulated with it.

ment? No, we are for the Soviets. It is impossible for it to be otherwise. It is not a question of the seats we should reserve for the other parties, but that they would not apply our policy. There is no other way out than to say: "Get out."

SLUTSKY.

The question has been sufficiently illuminated by Trotsky and Lenin. During the days of June 3-5, when it seemed that the counter-revolution had beaten us, in reality it was we who had won. The days of the insurrection showed that we were fused with the masses. The peasants and the workers have cohesion.

But the hammer of the revolution, which gave this cohesion to the masses, separated from it the Mensheviks, the defenders of the fatherland, the Social Revolutionists; we have seen that it was the collaborationists who created the lack of cohesion. Now that we have vanquished, they want to lead us into this path of collaborationism. The agreement with them is the masked road to the abandonment of the power. Previously, at the helm of the power were the parties of the agreement with the bourgeoisie; now it is we who are there without this agreement. The words of comrade Lunatcharsky, asking what harm there would be in granting the Municipal Dumas fifty seats in the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets appear to me superfluous. What does this mean, to grant fifty seats? It is not to use the furniture that we take them. We are for the power of the Soviets. Then I want to ask: how will the oil flow to us through such taps as Kamkov? How will the doors to fertile places open up before us, thanks to the Social Revolutionists? There is in all this a complete lack of principle: why not sixty seats, why not twenty-five or thirty-five? The revolutionary mass will not follow this appeal.

BOKY*.

Conference has been spoken of here many times. This name is too high-sounding. It is hard to convocate a general assembly for tomorrow. Let us convocate for tomorrow at seven o'clock, here, a meeting of the committee, enlarged to the representatives of the wards.

TROTSKY.

Before the insurrection, there were in our party, in the Central Committee and in the broad circles of the party, divergences of views reaching a considerable depth. The same thing was said, in the same terms as today, against the insur-

* One of the leaders of the Left Socialist Revolutionists.

** Old Bolsheviks worked later on in the Cheka.

rection, because it was supposed not to hold out any hope. The old arguments are now reproduced, after the triumph of the uprising, but in favor of the coalition. It is said that there will be no technical apparatus. The darkest colors were used to terrify, to prevent the proletariat from exploiting its success. It is true that the apparatus does not belong to us. It is for this reason that we dalled so long with Kerensky's pitiable detachments, because we had no technical apparatus. Nevertheless, we created one, superb under the given conditions, and at present we have triumphed here and in Moscow. Petrograd is now guaranteed against any surprises of a military nature.

I repeat, we cannot draw in the petty bourgeoisie except by showing that we have in our hands a material fighting force. We cannot vanquish the bourgeoisie except by beating it. It is a law of the class struggle. There lies the guarantee of our victory. It is only then that the Vikzhel people will follow us. As much can be said about the other technical domains. The apparatus will be at our disposal only when it will see that we are a force.

The revolution of the October days does not consist in putting the old apparatus into running condition again. Our task is to reconstruct it completely, from top to bottom. In order to carry into life our proletarian tasks, we need an apparatus which is flesh of the flesh of our class. We have created one of this type against Kerensky and Krasnov under Petrograd. You cannot base yourself upon bayonets, we are told once more; but so that we might discuss here with you it was necessary to have bayonets at Tsarskoye Selo.

All power is violence and not agreement. Our power is the violence of the majority of the people against the minority. It is inevitable. It is the alphabet of Marxism. They did not let me communicate to Moscow the news of our success by the telegraphic line belonging to the railroads, and then, they let the shock troops pass. They betray us at the acutest moment of the struggle; when we have triumphed they propose to us to introduce them into the fortress of the power.

Proposal: to limit the speaking time to 10 minutes.

NOGIN.

We Bolsheviks have already recognized that the revolution is ours and not the bourgeoisie's. However, we did not triumph alone, but together with the peasants. There is why what we succeed in getting thanks to the blood of the workers and the soldiers, the power, should be their common wealth. Our party should be the most disciplined.

The session is adjourned.

The Bolsheviks Take Over Power!

The session opens at 2:35 P. M. Trotsky is alone at the presiding table.

DECLARATION OF TROTSKY

In the name of the Revolutionary Military Committee, I declare: the Provisional Government is no longer. (Applause). Ministers have been arrested. (Hurrahs!). The others will be arrested in a few days or a few hours. (Applause). The revolutionary garrison, which is at the disposal of the R. M. C., has dissolved the meeting of the Preliminary Parliament. (Loud applause, cries of: "Long live the R. M. C.!")

We were told that the uprising of the garrison at this time would provoke a massacre and drown the revolution in torrents of blood. Up to the present moment no blood has been spilled. We do not know of a single victim. In all history I do not know of a single example of a revolutionary movement where such vast masses have taken part and which was accomplished without the spilling of blood.

The power of the Provisional Government presided over by Kerensky was a corpse and awaited only the sweep of broom of history to throw it out of existence.

We must underline the heroism and abnegation of the soldiers and workers of Petrograd. We stayed awake all through the night here at the telephone observing how the detachments of the revolutionary soldiers and workers accomplished their task noiselessly. The inhabitants slept peacefully and did not know that at this moment a new power was being substituted for the old.

The railroad stations, the post-office, the telegraph, the Petrograd Telegraphic Agency, the State Bank, are occupied. (Loud Applause).

The Winter Palace has not yet been taken, but its fate will be decided in a few minutes.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of Petrograd may well be proud of the soldiers and workers who support it, whom it has led to the battle and to the glorious victory.

The characteristic of bourgeois and semi-bourgeois governments is to deceive the people. We are going—we, the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies—to undertake a unique experience in history, to found a government which has no other aim than to satisfy the needs of the soldiers, the workers and the peasants.

The state must become the instrument of the masses in the struggle for their liberation from all servitude.

The work cannot be done without the influence of the Soviets. The best representatives of bourgeois science will understand that the conditions created by the Soviets of W. S. and P. Deputies are the best conditions for their labors.

It is necessary to establish a control over production. The peasants, the workers and the soldiers must feel that the national domain is their domain.

This is the essential principle for the establishment of the power.

The institution of an obligatory labor service is one of the first tasks of the revolutionary government.

Trotsky announces that on the order of the day are still the report of the R. M. C. and the report on the duties of the Soviet government. On the second question, comrade Lenin will be the reporter. (Thunderous applause.)

Comrade Trotsky communicates that the political offenders are liberated, and that many of them are already fulfilling the functions of revolutionary commissars.

Comrade Zinoviev, declares comrade Trotsky, will again be the host of the Petrograd Soviet at this session.

In the name of the Petrograd Soviet

Meeting of Petrograd Soviet The Day After the Insurrection

a circular telegram has been sent to inform Russia of the real state of affairs.

To the active army forces have been sent radiograms announcing the fall of the old power and the imminent formation of a new power. The first acts of the new power should be: the immediate armistice on every front; the handing over of the land to the peasants; the speediest possible convocation of a genuinely democratic Constituent.

The residence of the presiding minister, Kerensky, is unknown, but we believe that it will soon be known to all. To the question: what is the attitude of the front in face of the events, Trotsky replies:

We have sent our telegrams. There has not yet been a reply. But we have frequently heard here the representatives of the front who reproached us for not yet having undertaken decisive action.

At this point, Lenin enters the hall. The assembly acclaims him noisily. Trotsky continues:

In our midst is Vladimir Ilitch Lenin who, as a result of circumstances, was unable to appear among us until now. Trotsky characterizes the role of Lenin in the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia and shouts:

"Long live comrade Lenin who has returned to us!"

The assembly gives a new and lengthy ovation to Lenin.

LENIN'S SPEECH

Comrades, the revolution of the workers and peasants, the need for which the Bolsheviks proclaimed incessantly, has been accomplished!

What does it signify, this revolution of the workers and peasants? Above all, this revolution gives us a Soviet government, our own organ of power without the slightest participation of the bourgeoisie. The oppressed masses themselves will constitute the power. The old apparatus will be shattered to its foundations, and a new administrative apparatus will be founded under the form of Soviet organizations.

A new era is opening up in the history of Russia, and this third Russian revolution must lead in its development to the triumph of socialism.

One of our first tasks is the need of putting an immediate end to the war. But in order to end this war, intimately bound up with the whole capitalist regime, it is necessary—that is clear to all of us—to vanquish capital itself.

By that we will aid the world labor movement which is already beginning to develop in Italy, in England and in Germany.

The equitable and immediate peace which we shall offer to the international democracy, will everywhere find a hearty echo in the masses of the international proletariat. In order to con-

solidate this confidence of the proletariat, it is necessary immediately to publish all the secret treaties.

In Russia, a large section of the peasants said to themselves: enough playing with the capitalists, we will march with the workers. We will gain the confidence of the peasants by a decree which will abolish landed property of the gentry. The peasants will understand that their only salvation lies in the alliance with the workers.

We are going to institute an effective workers' control of production.

Now you have learned how to work together; the revolution which has just taken place is witness to that. We have this force of the organization of the masses which will vanquish everything, and which will lead the proletariat to the world revolution.

In Russia we must set about immediately with the construction of a socialist proletarian state.

Long live the world socialist revolution. (Loud applause.)

♦ ♦ ♦

The assembly decides not to open up

Left Shift in German Vote

(Continued from page 1)

The dissatisfaction of the socialist ranks is deep and widespread. It is fighting against that organized inertia and conservatism induced by decades of steady growth of the party and its institutions, and their integration with the apparatus of the ruling class—a dead-weight force which has proved to be stronger than many of us ever conceived it could be. The Stalinist theory of "social-fascism," the adornment of the party's platform and policies with nationalist finery borrowed from Hitlerism, have served to strengthen the hand of the social democratic leadership—from the Left. The hundreds of thousands of socialist leaders who are deeply discontented with their own leaders, are still dubious, to put it mildly, about the Stalinist leadership of the Communist party.

This explains, essentially, why they protest against their leaders and express their sympathy for the revolution by casting such a large vote for the Communists; while, at the same time, they express their doubts or distrust concerning the Communist party's policy by refraining from joining the party or even from following its calls for extra-parliamentary action under the C. P. banner alone, that is, from following it on the only decisive field.

The Communist Vote

The increase in the Communist vote is a source of great jubilation for every class conscious militant, and above all for the Left Opposition position, whose cause is advanced by every advance of the movement. But between jubilation

the discussion on the report of Lenin. The members of the R. M. C. being engaged, the information report is postponed. Trotsky reappears at the tribune.

DECLARATION BY TROTSKY

One of the immediate tasks of the R. M. C. is the dispatch of a delegation to the front to inform it of the revolution which has just taken place in Petrograd.

The Petrograd Soviet must choose from its midst commissars to be sent to the front. The R. M. C., its members, cannot make a report because they are engaged in urgent work. I can tell you that a telegram has been received announcing that the troops from the front are advancing in the direction of Petrograd. The dispatch of commissars is indispensable, it would be a crime on our part not to send revolutionary commissars throughout the country to explain to the masses of the people the revolutions (A few voices: You are anticipating the decision of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets). The will of the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets has been anticipated by the resounding fact of the uprising of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd which took place last night. There now remains for us only to develop our victory.

and the mandarin intoxication of the self-satisfied official, revelling in a trough of ballots, lies a gap that cannot be bridged. The parliamentary victory of the party in Germany is being trumpeted about by the Stalinists as a vindication of the "line" which nothing can vindicate. This "line" which failed to bring to the streets of struggle a single important group of workers in response to the general strike call issued three months ago by the party to protest against the coup d'Etat of von Papen, the "line" which has resulted in the virtually complete isolation of the Communists in the trade union movement in Germany; the "line" which has failed to produce a national, organized mass movement of resistance to Fascism or to the von Papen regime, a movement of workers' councils or shop committees or labor cartels or any similar movement that might constitute the nucleus for a workers' power; the "line" which has left the social democratic hierarchy with millions of workers still in its ranks and following—however sullenly—its leadership, despite the presence (for how many years now, according to the Stalinist analyses?) of the "stormy revolutionary upsurge"—this "line" is now supposed to have received its incontestable confirmation by a gain of 700,000 votes in an election! If this is not parliamentary cretinism, what significance has the term?

The two-for-a-cent scribes of the *Daily Worker* and the *Freiheit* roar with vicarious pride over the party's gains in Germany as if the loss of two million Fascist votes and almost a million socialist votes, has settled the whole problem. And what about the Bonapartist regime of the von Papen-von Hindenburg camarilla? This little "trifle" emerges from the whole ineffectual balloting farce—still master of the situation! More definitely than three months ago, this election has eliminated the possibility of a Reichstag government. Only a Hitler-Centrist-Nationalist combination could produce a working majority—and that combination is too fantastic for any practical political possibility. The autocratic regime of presidential decree is to continue in power, with a Reichstag suspended helplessly in mid-air, and a proletariat still too crippled by disunity to offer any effective resistance.

The Government Is Deposed!

(The following historical announcement was printed as a leaflet and posted, or thrown from the automobiles of the Petrograd Revolutionary Military Committee, in the streets of the city during the early hours of the afternoon.)

"THE GOVERNMENT IS DEPOSED"

The Provisional Government is deposed. The power has passed into the hands of the Revolutionary Military Committee, organ of the Petrograd Soviet, which is at the head of the proletariat and the garrison of Petrograd.

The cause for which the people have fought: immediate offer of a democratic peace, the abolition of the ownership of the land of the big landlords, workers' control of production, the creation of a Soviet power—the triumph of this case is guaranteed. Long live the revolution of the workers, soldiers and peasants!

The Revolutionary Military Committee of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of Petrograd.

Petrograd, October 25 (November 7), 10 A. M.

JAPAN

Its Rise from Feudalism to Capitalist Imperialism and the Development of the Proletariat

By Jack Weber

The absolute and continuous control of governmental power by the military oligarchy, and the geographic position occupied by Japan in the backward East, have permitted unhampered sway to the policy of Japanese imperialism. This policy presents an intense singleness of purpose throughout the era of capitalist economy. The latent conflict between capitalists and feudal landed aristocracy (that might have "disturbed" Japan) for ultimate supremacy, long since liquidated in the more advanced capitalist countries in favor of industrialism, has not yet reached the point of open conflict, although the economic bases for this conflict are already present (high land rent and dear food as against the capitalist need of cheap labor). Hence the ruling classes act in complete harmony in foreign policy; government, banks, industrialists, business men give their fullest cooperation in the process of expansion and penetration, "peaceful" or militant.

The Tanaka Document

The ultimate aims and the methods of the expansionist policy are given singularly candid if not laudable expression in the notorious Tanaka document. These aims, like those of the other imperialist powers, are based on the need for markets, for sources of raw material, and on military considerations of defense and offense. For military purposes Japan is completely dependent on keeping the road to China open as she depends on China for foodstuffs, oil, coal, iron and steel. Modern warfare is fought in the factories at home, a fact emphasized by the statistics of the last years of the campaign on the Western Front when one ton of ammunition was

spent for every German destroyed or permanently disabled. Japanese militarism feels lost without a firm base in China. Furthermore Japan exports 30 p. c. of her entire production of manufactured goods, six times the percentage exported by the U. S. Says Tanaka: "When we remember that the Chinese are our only purchasers, we must fear that day when China unites and her industry begins to flourish—We must from now onwards pursue our own military ends and seize the heart of Manchuria and Mongolia by divers ways, in order to be able on the one hand to destroy the military, political and economical development of China—".

The Formula of Conquest

The Japanese rulers learned more quickly than anything else from the West the cunning methods of imperialism. A generation after the forcing of extraterritoriality on Japan by the Powers, she in turn, even while protesting against this same extra-territoriality at home, forced Korea to grant extra-territoriality to the Japs. The Japs protest violently against the closing of the door to Jap immigration by the U. S. in 1924, but Japan has consistently shut out the Chinese from free entry to Japan for exactly the same reason avowed by U. S. capitalism, protection of the standard of living. But above all Japan learned the formula of imperialist expansion in backward regions. In 1875 France "recognized" the independence of Annam from China. Following this in the same year Japan granted Korea "recognition". In both cases China refused to grant such recognition but she was coerced into acceptance of the fait accompli in 1885 when Annam became a "protectorate"

and Korea became "neutral" due to Russian opposition to Japan. In 1903 Baron Komura, Minister for Foreign Affairs, warned Czarist Russia in a secret note: "The unconditional and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and interests of Japan...if Russia were established on the flank of Korea, it would be a constant menace to the separate existence of that empire, or at least would make Russia the dominant power in Korea. Korea is an important outpost in Japan's line of defense." In the Russo-Japanese War that followed this warning, Japan established complete hegemony over the Sea of Japan, making it an inland sea, impregnable from attack by sea.

The military oligarchy has learned at home how to control government through a puppet emperor and this same method has become the formula of Japanese imperialism. In Korea the Crown Prince of Korea became the puppet with actual powers in the hands of an "adviser", or governor-general. Complete control of finance, foreign affairs, concessions and foreign commerce was taken over by the Japs. Diplomatic matters were transferred completely to Tokyo, pressure being successfully applied to cause the withdrawal from Seoul of the various ministers, the first to go being that of the U. S. In 1910 Korea was finally annexed formally to Japan. Precisely the same formula is now being applied to Manchuria.

Japan and China

Japan's aggressions in China followed a plan based on recognition that China cannot be subdued and forced into colonial status simply by military conquest. The plan had the twofold aim of securing control of China's trade outlets and of gradually seizing the strategic cities and the railroads for final military conquest. Japan everywhere placed herself between the ports seized by the Europeans and the ocean, so as to "starve" these ports....In 1915 Japan presented the infamous 21 demands to China, great emphasis being placed in these demands

on control of railroads. Among the secret clauses of the 21 demands, meant to place China in the early position of Korea, were that the Chinese government should employ "influential Jap advisers" in political, financial and military affairs; that Japanese hospitals, temples and schools in China should be granted the right to own land (no foreigner is allowed to own land in Japan except through a Japanese corporation); that the police departments of various cities be "jointly" administered with Japs; that China must purchase 50 p. c. of her munitions from a Japanese arsenal to be established in China; that Japan be given first right to make all loans. In 1918 Premier Teruchi proposed that China issue gold notes on the strength of gold held in Japan. The Japanese aim in all her relations with China is clear: to make China her colony, to hinder Chinese development until she does fall into the hands of Japanese militarism.

Meantime Japan encroaches on the material resources she requires in China, particularly the coal and iron mines. By a loan made in 1890 to the Hanyang Iron Works, Japan obtained payment in ore from Tsyeh on the Yangtze and coal from Pinghsiang. This arrangement, involving practically the entire output of these mines, has been a constant source of conflict due to Japan's use of it to hinder the growth of the Hanyeh Ping Co. In January 1928 the Japs prevented the Nationalists from seizing this company. Again in 1929 Hupeh Province was forced to relinquish this company, one of the largest iron and steel companies in China.

Japan has over one and one quarter billion dollars invested in Chinese railroads, warehouses, banks, spinning and weaving plants, mining companies. This investment is used for imperialist purposes, but it is at the same time the effort of Japanese capitalists to utilize the cheaper Chinese labor, the nearness to raw materials, the closeness to the market, and the avoidance of Chinese tariffs.

Greetings to the Militant

Spartacus Youth Club of New York
We greet the Fifteenth Anniversary of the victorious Russian Revolution and the Fourth Anniversary of the Militant.

FROM BRANCHES, ETC.

Kansas City Branch

Boston Branch

St. Louis Branch

Newark Branch

Minneapolis Branch ..

New Haven Branch

The members of the New Haven Branch of the Communist League of America (Opposition) greet the Militant on its fourth anniversary, hoping that it will continue the fight for the Marxist-Leninist principles in the Comintern.

S. Gendelman, Secy.
G. Duell, Treasurer.

Chicago Branch
Hail the 4 Year of the life of the Militant, the only Bolshevik paper in the English language. We promise to help build it into a mighty organ of revolution in America. J. Giganti, Org.-Secy.

The Newly Organized
Greek Workers Club
"PROTOMAGLIA"
Greet the Fourth Anniversary of the Vanguard of the Working Class
THE MILITANT

FROM INDIVIDUALS

YOUNGSTOWN

J. D.

M. Koehler

C. Udell

J. Green

S. Feldman

P. Altman

F. Cheloff

S. Frank

D. Ostash

CHICAGO

F. Buckley

J. Harris

F. Martin

A. Borenstein

S. Solomon

Mr. & Mrs. Rice

J. Ritz

M. Ritz

B. Lazaroff

A. Stein

G. Herman

J. Ruby

H. Mashow

J. Mashow

J. Gorfinkel

A. Solomon

A. Friend

S. Baker

H. Dreeblin

A. Friend

S. Howard

NEW YORK

H. Norman

H. Pollock

J. Berman

T. Christie

N. Christie

R. Haviland

V. Tpanos

C. Christie

A. Friend

A. Friend

M. Sterling

W. Herman

M. Neuman

A. Weaver

N. Berman

I. Plotkin

I. Dvorkin

H. Grossman

A. Orland

A. Friend

H. Capelis

G. Krokofsky

A. Friend

T. Katsikis

T. Miller

A. Friend

T. Drobny, So. Bend

L. Adler, Newark

ST. LOUIS OPEN FORUM

Crumden Branch Library Auditorium
14th Street and Cass Ave.
November 17, 1932
"The Fascist, Socialist and Communist Parties and the German Workers"

South Africans Ban Trotsky China Book

The sun never sets upon the British Empire, nor, apparently, upon the suppression or prohibition of the works of comrade Trotsky. Following the example set by their Canadian partners in the great bandits' enterprise known as the British Empire, the customs authorities of the Union of South Africa have just prohibited the entry of "The Problems of the Chinese Revolution" by Leon Trotsky, recently published here by the Pioneer Publishers. The bundle of copies sent to a dealer in Cape Town were confiscated. The official letter of notification reads as follows:

Z. 14.
In antwoord gelieve te refereer na
In reply please quote
No. 372
Unie Van Suid-Africa—Union of
South Africa
Kantoor van die—Office of the
Collector of Customs and Excise,
P. O. Box 5. Cape Town.
24th August 1932.

Mr. Manuel Lopes,
152 Longmarket Street
Cape Town.

One Packet Containing Books

Sir,
I am advised by the Commissioner of Customs and Excise that three books entitled "Problems of the Chinese Revolution" contained in a packet addressed to you is regarded an objectionable within the meaning of Section 23 (c) of Act 9 of 1913 and are seized as forfeited under Section 25 of that Act.

I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant.
(Signature)
Collector of Customs and Excise.

The dissemination of the ideas of the Left Opposition in South Africa will undoubtedly be rendered more difficult by the arbitrary act of the white ruling class there in prohibiting entry to comrade Trotsky's work. But these futile police measures will not halt our progress. In spite of the difficulties, even the remote parts of the world are echoing the march of our movement. The recent adherence to the banner of the Left Opposition of a large group of native Negro revolutionists is testimony which the governmental martlets of British imperialism may well ponder.

Soviet Economy in Danger

(Continued from page 1)

S. R., as plain, as homogeneous and as comforting as possible. Whoever disturbs this picture is none other than an enemy and a counter-revolutionist.

A crude and detrimental idealization of the transitional regime has particularly entrenched itself in the international Communist press during the last two years, i. e., during that period in which the contradictions and disproportions of Soviet economy have already found their way into the pages of the official Soviet press.

There is nothing so precarious as sympathies that are based on legends and fiction. There is no depending on people who require fabrications for their sympathies. The impending crisis of Soviet economy will inevitably, and within the rather near future, crumple the sugary legend, and, we have no reason to doubt will scatter many dead, beat friends into the bypaths of indifference, if not of enmity.

What is much worse and much more serious is that the Soviet crisis will catch the European workers, and chiefly the Communists, utterly unprepared, and render them receptive to social democratic criticism, which is absolutely inimical to the Soviets and to socialism.

In this question, as in all others, the proletarian revolution requires the truth, and only the truth. Within the scope of this brief pamphlet, I have deemed it necessary to present in all their acuteness the contradictions of Soviet economy, the incompleteness and the precariousness of many of its conquests, the coarse errors of the leadership and the dangers that stand in the path of socialism. Let our petty bourgeois friends lavishly apply their pink and baby-blue colorations. We deem it more correct to mark with a heavy black line the weak and indefensible points whence the enemy threatens to break through. The clamor about our enmity to the Soviet Union is so absurd as to bear within itself its own antidote. The nearest future will bring with it a new confirmation of our correctness. The Left Opposition teaches the workers to foresee dangers and not to lose themselves when they impend.

He who accepts the proletarian revolution not otherwise than with all the conveniences and life-long guarantees cannot continue on the road with us. We accept the workers' state as it is and we assert, "This is our state." Despite its heritage of backwardness, despite starvation and sluggishness, despite the bureaucratic mistakes and even abomina-

tions, the workers of the entire world must defend tooth and nail their future socialist fatherland which is within this state.

First and foremost we serve the Soviet republic in that we tell the workers the truth about it and thereby teach them to lay the road for a better future. *Prinkipo*, October 22, 1932.

The Art of Planning

The prerequisites for socialist planning were first laid by the October overturn and by the fundamental laws of the Soviet state. In the course of a number of years state organs of centralized management of economy were created and put in operation. Great creative work was performed. What was destroyed by the imperialist and the civil war has been re-established. New grandiose enterprises were created, new industries, entire branches of industry. The capacity of the proletariat organized into a state to direct economy by new methods and to create material values in tempos unheard of hitherto has been demonstrated in actuality. All this was achieved against the background of decaying world capitalism. Socialism, as a system, for the first time demonstrated its title to historic victory not on the pages of "Das Kapital" but by the praxis of hydroelectric plants and blast-furnaces. Marx, it goes without saying, would have preferred this method of demonstration.

However, light-minded assertions to the effect that the U. S. S. R. has already entered into socialism are criminal. The achievements are great. But there still remains a very long and arduous road to the factual victory over economic anarchy, to the surmounting of disproportions, to the guarantee of the harmonious character of economic life.

Even though the first Five Year Plan took into consideration all possible angles, by the very nature of things it could not be anything but a first and a rough hypothesis, doomed beforehand to fundamental reconstruction in the process of the work. It is impossible to create *a priori* a complete system of economic harmony. The planning hypothesis could not but include old disproportions and the inevitability of the development of new ones. Centralized management implies not only great advantages but also the danger of centralizing the mistakes, i. e., of elevating them to an excessively high degree. Only continuous regulation of the plan in the process of its fulfillment, its reconstruction in part and as a whole, can guarantee its economic effectiveness.

The art of socialist planning does not drop from heaven nor is it presented full-blown into one's hands with the conquest of power. This art may be attained only by struggle, step by step, not by units but by millions as an integral part of the new economy and culture. There is nothing either astonishing or disheartening in the fact that at the 15th anniversary of the October revolution the art of economic management still remains on a very low plane. The newspaper, *For the Industrialization* deems it possible to announce, "Our operative planning has neither hands nor feet" (September 12, 1932). And in the meantime, the crux of the matter is precisely in operative planning.

We have stressed more than once that, "under incorrect planning or, what is more important, under incorrect regulation of the plan in the process of its fulfillment, a crisis may develop toward the very end of the Five Year Plan and may create insurmountable difficulties for the utilization and development of its indubitable successes" (*Bulletin of the Opposition*, No. 23, July 15, 1931). It is precisely for this reason that we considered the hasty and purely fortuitous "translation of the Five Year Plan into four years was an act of light-minded adventurism" (*idem*). Both our fears and our warnings have been unfortunately fully confirmed.

The Preliminary Totals of the Five Year Plan

At the present moment there cannot even be a discussion about the actual completion of the Five Year Plan in four years (or more exactly, four years and three months). The most frantic lashing and spurring ahead in the course of the final two months will have no effect any longer on the general totals. It is as yet impossible to determine the actual percentage, i. e., measured in terms of economy—the fulfillment of the preliminary program. The data published in the press take on more a formally statistical than an exact economical character. Should the construction of a new plant be accomplished up to 90 percent of its completion and then the work be stopped because of the obvious lack of raw material, then from a formally statistical viewpoint one may enter the plan as fulfilled 90 percent. But from the point of view of economy the expenses accrued must simply be entered under the column of losses. The balance sheet of the actual effectiveness (the useful functioning) of plants constructed or in the process of construction, from the viewpoint of the national economic balance, still belongs entirely to the future.

(To be continued)

—L. TROTSKY.

Four Years of the Existence of The Militant

(Continued from page 1)

pride in the accomplishments. The *Militant* reflects today an organization small in numbers but functioning actively in the endeavor to attain a Marxian platform not only by theoretical discussion but also in the realities of the life of the class struggle.

Some Trade Union Experiences

We have mentioned our organizational growth, yet it is such experiences as those recorded in the Illinois mine field which begin to indicate both substance and form to our organization. We do not at all boast of control of the movement there or any section of it—a contention which we are repeatedly accused of by the scribes of the official *Lewis*. Walker organ and which they so hypocritically curse as a shield under which to continue their nefarious schemes of regaining control in the only sense understood by them—in the sense of autocratic domination. We did not contest the official party for control. But we did contest it in the struggle for correct policies and if anything then more definitely so do we in this sense contest the reactionary forces at work within the new union. We have in the past, we do today, and we will continue tomorrow, to counterpose our views to theirs and will seek further, on the basis of practical experiences, to convince the miners that they should follow these views.

In this sense we have achievements to record which will multiply in the future because they indicate already today certain substantial proofs of the correctness of our views. This is first of all measured by the actual results. And here we can definitely record the fact that the only force fighting directly for a Left wing union position at the Gillespie convention were those delegates who supported the views of the Left Opposition. They had earned the right to do so by their past record of struggle and by their leadership given to the strike. Numerically this force represented only four actual delegates. Thus it will be seen that our beginning is modest from the point of view of numbers but significant in political content.

The Working Class Orientation

Proceeding from this the important question occurs as to what it signifies for the future. The Leftward orientation within the working class ranks flows today in two main directions. It is away from the capitalist ideology and toward both the Communist and the so-called latter has so far gained the most.

It is well to remember the definite contrast between the two. Communism is based upon the proletarian revolution and struggle to achieve this goal. Reformism has no such objective and therefore lands in the position of avoidance of actual and serious struggle. Within the Communist movement contradictions from false policies come quicker to a head. This is so because of its decisively marked out objectives and the heavier class pressure upon it. This has in the past, and it inevitably will in the future also, cause disappointment within the ranks and result in members leaving the party while others are repelled

before becoming members. But, as particularly the recent experiences have proven, this also offers additional possibilities of clarification with the result that the actual revolutionists turn toward the Left Opposition. Within the social reformist camp, however, the most decisive disillusionments are still to come and at an accelerated tempo in future struggles.

That there will be such struggles in the period we are now entering is clearly indicated by all developments to date. Is it to be assumed that Centrism, which is a basic phenomenon and not a mere chance one produced by a certain situation, can change and avoid its contradictions of false policies? On the contrary. As the class struggle develops in intensity it will become the more deeply involved in these contradictions with a cumulative effect. On the other hand, when we pose the question of the party to extricate itself from Centrism, that, of course, is an entirely different matter which cannot be decided in advance. This is not a question merely of individuals but of a system of leadership. Thus it has its important relations not only to the members now within the party ranks but also to the workers who are coming in the direction of Communism.

On Future Contacts

It follows from this, that is provided

we continue to pursue a correct course, that our future contacts will be recruited much more directly from the class struggle. That itself presupposes that we become an ever more important factor within it. In this respect the experiences from the Illinois coal fields should furnish important material for study. But that also, aside from the general conclusions at which we will arrive therefrom, points to the importance of the role that the trade unions will play in the future struggle. Hence it is so much more significant that one of the milestones in our most recent development of growth is so closely connected with the realities of the trade union question. But from this the further steps must lead in the direction of much deeper penetration into the trade unions.

At this time of the fourth anniversary we see the road of the Left Opposition clearly marked out. We have attained a basis. A modest one but a significant one. While we do not forget the fact that the international revolutionary developments work in our direction with accelerated speed, it is nevertheless correct to say that our future growth and developments will be achieved at a pace corresponding to the degree with which we more actively engage ourselves in the class struggle.

—ARNE SWABECK.

Roosevelt's Victory

(Continued from page 1)

control of the American workers. To inflate our own success and to minimize the reformers' gains against us is to lure our party to sleep to the real danger confronting us in the immediate period of the struggle between reform and revolution.

The 1932 opportunist election program, the inability to carry out the Leninist united front tactic outside the parliamentary plane for a solid class foundation upon a Marxian program, created internal shortcomings within the Communist party election activity, that on the one hand played into the hands of the socialists, because the program of Communism, of revolution, was blurred with opportunist blunders, making it difficult for the worker to see the difference between the parties of reform and revolution, and on the other hand where we won votes on the basis of the opportunist program and confuse this vote and consider the WHOLE vote as representing a clear cut revolutionary vote against a reformist vote. Facts remain, that a Communist party with an opportunist election program will obtain many reformist votes labeled Communist. When we have detail reports of the socialist and Communist votes, of reform and revolution, we will return to this problem.

The Democratic party of reaction with a "liberal" cloak has full power—next March. But the problems confronting the imperialists cannot wait until March. These problems are on top of the capitalists now and must be answered

to their class interests. The real rulers are making provisions for this now. While Hoover hangs on and Roosevelt waits they have instructed that a working agreement be reached. Indications are that this agreement has been reached. The imperialists through this "coalition" government until March will be able to move faster. The crisis with its problem of unemployment and reorganization and the international problem of debts and markets will demand more drastic steps. Roosevelt cannot answer these problems, no more than Hoover could. "He" can, however, hurry the process of strengthening the exploiters position in the coming class struggles and wars and revolutions. Our task is to expose this "liberal" friend of the "forgotten man" and see to it that in the leftward shift of the workers we are able to defeat the reformers in their attempt to hold the discontent and struggle in safe channels.—HUGO OHELER

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THE ONLY ROAD

From the Series of Articles in the Forthcoming Book 'The Only Road' : - by Leon Trotsky

CAN IT BE expected that the Central Committee of the Communist party will independently accomplish a turn to the right road? Its whole past demonstrates that it is incapable of doing this.

Hardly had it begun to rectify itself than the apparatus saw itself before the perspective of "Trotskyism". If Thälmann himself did not grasp it immediately, then he was told from Moscow that the "part" must be sacrificed for the sake of the "whole", that is, the interests of the German revolution for the sake of the interests of the Stalinist apparatus. The abashed attempts to revise the policy were once more withdrawn. The bureaucratic reaction again triumphed all along the line.

It is not, of course, a matter of Thälmann. Were the present-day Comintern to give its sections the possibility of living, of thinking and of developing themselves they would long ago, in the last fifteen years, have been able to select their own leading cadres. But the bureaucracy erected instead a system of appointed leaders and their support by means of artificial ballyhoo. Thälmann is a product of this system and at the same time its victim.

The cadres, paralyzed in their development, weak in the party. Their inadequacy they supplement with repressions. The oscillations and the uncertainty of the party are inexorably transmitted to the class as a whole. The masses cannot be summoned to bold actions when the party itself is robbed of revolutionary determination.

Even if Thälmann were to receive tomorrow a telegram from Manuilsky on the necessity of a turn to the path of the united front policy, the new zig-zag at the top would bring little good. The leadership is too compromised. A correct policy demands a healthy régime. Party democracy, at present a plaything of the bureaucracy, must rise again as a reality. The party must become a party, then the masses will believe it. Practically, this means to put upon the order of the day: *an extraordinary party convention and an extraordinary congress of the Comintern.*

The party convention must naturally be preceded by an all-sided discussion. All apparatus barriers must be razed. Every party organization, every nucleus has the right to call to its meetings and listen to every Communist, member of the party or one expelled from it, if it considers this necessary for the working out of its opinion. The press must be put at the service of the discussion; adequate space must be allotted daily for critical articles in every party paper. Special press commissions, elected at mass meetings of the party members, must supervise that the papers serve the party and not the bureaucracy.

The discussion, it is true, will require no little time and energy. The apparatus will argue: how can the party permit itself the "luxury of discussion" at such a critical period? The bureaucratic saviors believe that under difficult conditions the party must shut up. The Marxists, on the contrary, believe that the more difficult the situation, the more important the independent rôle of the party.

The leadership of the Bolshevik party enjoyed, in 1917, a very great esteem. And notwithstanding this, a series of deep-going party discussions took place throughout the year 1917. On the eve of the October overturn, the whole party debated passionately which of the two sections of the Central Committee was right: the majority, which was for the uprising, or the minority, which was against the uprising. Expulsions and repressions in general, were nowhere to be seen, in spite of the profundity of the differences of opinion. Into these discussions were drawn the non-party masses. In Petrograd, a meeting of non-party working women dispatched a delegation to the Central Committee in order to support the majority in it. To be sure, the discussion required time. But in return for that, there grew out of the open discussion, without threats, lies and falsifications, the general, indomitable certainty of the correctness of the policy, that is, that which alone makes possible the victory.

What course will things take in Germany? Will the small wheel of the Opposition succeed in turning the large party wheel in time? That is how the question stands now. Pessimistic voices are often raised. In the various Communist groupings, in the party itself, as well as its periphery, there are not a few elements who say to themselves: in every important question the Left Opposition has a correct stand. But it is weak. Its cadres are small in number and politically inexperienced. Can such an organization, with a small weekly paper (*DIE PERMANENTE REVOLUTION*) successfully counterpose itself to the mighty Comintern machine?

The lessons of events are stronger than the Stalinist bureaucracy. We want to be the interpreters of these lessons to the Communist masses. Therein lies our historic rôle as a faction. We do not demand, as do Seydewitz and Co., that the revolutionary proletariat should believe us on credit. We allot ourselves a more modest rôle: we propose our assistance to the Communist vanguard in the elaboration of the correct line. For this work we are gathering and training up our own cadres. This stage of preparation may not be jumped over. Every new stage of struggle will push to our side those in the proletariat who reflect the most and are most critical.

The revolutionary party begins with an idea, a program, which is aimed at the most powerful apparatus of class society. It is not the cadre that creates the idea, but the idea that creates the cadre. Fear of the power of the apparatus is one of the most conspicuous features of that specific opportunism which the Stalinist bureaucracy cultivates. Marxian criticism is stronger than any and every apparatus.

The organizational forms which the further evolution of the Left Opposition will assume, depend upon many circumstances: the momentum of the historical blows, the degree of resistance power of the Stalin bureaucracy, the activity of the rank and file Com-

munists, the energy of the Opposition itself. But the principles and methods we fight for have been tested by the greatest events in world history, by the victories as well as by the defeats. They will make their way.

The successes of the Opposition in every country, Germany included, are indisputable and manifest. But they are developing slower than many of us expected. We may regret this, but we need not be surprised at it. Every Communist who begins to listen to the Left Opposition is cynically given the choice by the bureaucracy: either go along with the baiting of "Trotskyism" or else be kicked out of the ranks of the Comintern. For the party official, it is a question of position and wages: the Stalinist apparatus plays this key to perfection. But immeasurably more important are the thousands of rank and file Communists who are torn between their devotion to the ideas of Communism and the threatened expulsion from the ranks of the Comintern. That is why there are in the ranks of the official Communist party a great number of partial, intimidated or concealed Oppositionists.

This extraordinary combination of historical conditions sufficiently explains the slow organizational growth of the Left Opposition. At the same time, in spite of this slowness, the spiritual life of the Comintern revolves, today more than ever before, around the struggle against "Trotskyism". The theoretical periodicals and theoretical newspaper articles of the C. P. S. U., as well as the other sections of the Comintern, are chiefly devoted to the struggle against the Left Opposition, now openly, now masked. Still more symptomatic in significance is that mad organizational baiting which the apparatus pursues against the Opposition: disruption of its meetings by blackjack methods; employment of all sorts of other physical violence: behind-the-scenes agreements with bourgeois pacifists, French Radicals and Freemasons against the "Trotskyists"; the dissemination of venomous calumnies from the Stalinist center, etc., etc.

The Stalinists perceive much more directly and know better than the Oppositionists to what extent our ideas are undermining their apparatus pillars. The self-defense methods of the Stalinist faction, however, have a double-edged character. Up to a certain moment, they have an intimidating effect. But at the same time they prepare a mass reaction against the system of falsity and violence.

When, in July 1917, the government of the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionists branded the Bolsheviks as agents of the German General Staff, this despicable measure succeeded at first in exercising a strong influence upon the soldiers, the peasants and the backward strata of the workers. But when all the further events clearly confirmed the truth of the Bolsheviks, the masses began to say to themselves: so they deliberately slandered the Leninists, they basely incited against them, only because they were right? And the feeling of suspicion against the Bolsheviks was converted into a feeling of warm devotion and love for them. Although under different conditions, this very complex process is taking place now too. By means of a monstrous accumulation of calumnies and repressions, the Stalinist bureaucracy has undeniably succeeded for a period of time in intimidating the rank and file party members; at the same time, it is preparing for the Bolshevik-Leninists an enormous rehabilitation in the eyes of the revolutionary masses. At the present time, there can no longer be the slightest doubt on this score.

Yes, we are today still weak. The Communist party still has masses, but already it has neither doctrine nor strategic orientation. The Left Opposition has already worked out its Marxian orientation, but as yet it has no masses. The remaining groups of the "Left" camp possess neither the one nor the other. Hopelessly does the Leninbund pine away, thinking to substitute the individual fantasies and whims of Urbahns for a serious principled policy. The Brandlerists, in spite of their apparatus cadre, are descending step by step; small tactical recipes cannot replace a revolutionary-strategic position. The S. A. P. has put up its candidacy for the revolutionary leadership of the proletariat. Baseless pretension! Even the most serious representatives of this "party" do not overstep, as Fritz Sternberg's latest book shows, the barriers of Left-Centrism. The more assiduously they seek to create an "independent" doctrine, the more they reveal themselves to be disciples of Thalheimer. But this school is as hopeless as a corpse.

A new historical party cannot arise simply because a number of old social democrats have convinced themselves, very belatedly, of the counter-revolutionary character of the Ebert-Wels policy. A new party can just as little be improvised by a group of Communists who have as yet done nothing to warrant their claim to proletarian leadership. For a new party to arise, it is on the one hand necessary to have great historical events, which would break the backbone of the old parties, and on the other hand, a position in principle worked out, and cadres tested, in the experience of events.

While we are fighting with all our strength for the rebirth of the Comintern and the continuity of its further developments, we are least of all inclined to any fetishism of form. The fate of the proletarian world revolution stands, for us, above the organizational fate of the Comintern. Should the worst variant materialize; should the present official parties, despite all our efforts, be led to a collapse by the Stalinist bureaucracy; should it mean in a certain sense to begin all over again, then the new International will trace its genealogy from the ideas and cadres of the Communist Left Opposition.

And that is why the short criteria of "pessimism" and "optimism" are not applicable to the work which we are carrying through. It stands above the separate stages, the partial defeats and victories. Our policy is a policy of long range.

PRINKIPO, September 12, 1932.

L. TROTSKY.