BY FIDEL CASTRO
In February, Pathfinder Press released a new edition of Ernesto Che Guevara's Episodes of the Cuban Revolutionary War -1956-58.
To promote this book, the Militant is running "Pages from Cuba's Revolutionary History." This series features articles by and about combatants of the July 26 Movement and the Rebel Army, which led the revolutionary war that overthrew the U.S.- backed dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista and opened the socialist revolution in the Americas.
This week's installment - the eleventh - consists of excerpts from a speech given by Fidel Castro on Jan. 1, 1989, at a rally in Santiago de Cuba, the country's second largest city. It was held at the spot where Castro spoke 30 years earlier to a mass rally after Batista had fled Cuba and the Rebel Army had entered the city. The entire speech is contained in Fidel Castro's In Defense of Socialism: Four Speeches on the 30th Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution published by Pathfinder.
The excerpts are copyright a Pathfinder Press and are reprinted by permission. Subheadings are by the Militant.
BY FIDEL CASTRO
January 1 marked not just the culmination of a long effort of struggle by our people over the course of many years, over nearly 100 years at that time. That day was not just the day of victory; it was also a day of great decisions, fundamental decisions, and a day of great definitions, great lessons, and great training. Because on January 1 victory was not only won, it also had to be defended.
At dawn on that day in 1959, while we were in the town of Contramaestre - or rather at the sugar mill located there - we heard what we could say were the first rumors that the dictatorship had collapsed or rather that Batista had fled the country. A few minutes later the news began to be confirmed. We immediately realized what was going on because prior to this a series of important events had taken place.
The war had already been won. Three days earlier a meeting was held that had been requested previously - around December 25 - by the head of the enemy troops in the country's eastern region, General Eulogio Cantillo....
We were already preparing the advance on Santiago de Cuba and he told us they had lost the war - they openly admitted it -and that they were prepared to bring the fighting to an end.
We told him that the issue now was to find a practical way to put a stop to the war. In reality we were generous because we said that the army was sunk and that perhaps a number of officers not involved with crimes could be saved. So I proposed to him that in order to bring the fighting to an end in an honorable manner, an uprising should take place among the troops in Oriente Province - the former Oriente Province -mainly the troops of the Santiago de Cuba garrison, and that it should appear to be a revolutionary military movement that brought the fighting to an end, adding that such an event would immediately topple the dictatorship.
We warned him - as we had always warned throughout the fighting - that we were resolutely against any kind of coup d'état. We preached this constantly throughout the war, based on the experience of Latin America and of Cuba itself. Because in the past, great struggles had been waged against tyrannical governments and at a given movement a group of army officers always turned up, toppling the government and presenting themselves as saviors of the nation....
An eleventh hour coup d'etat
What did the army want to do at the eleventh hour,
unquestionably following the advice of the United States? To
carry out a coup d'état, confuse the people, saying: "Batista
is gone, the tyranny is over, a democratic era has begun,"
while keeping the military apparatus intact, maintaining the
system, and thus preventing the triumph of the revolution....
It must not be forgotten that on January 1 a government was
proclaimed. Those carrying out the coup appointed a Supreme
Court justice named Piedra as president of the republic.
Actually, that government was not even inaugurated.
That same day we made the decision, without wasting a minute, without wasting a second, to denounce the coup and issue instructions to all Rebel forces to continue operations. We didn't want even a minute of truce between the revolutionary forces and the enemy forces.
And on that January 1 an event occurred that we had foreseen on July 26, 1953. Our plan following the attack on the Moncada garrison was to issue a call to the people for a revolutionary general strike, and the time for calling a revolutionary general strike came precisely on the morning of January 1. I believe that was an exceptional event. All the trade unions were in the hands of official leaders tied to the dictatorship. There was not a single official trade union leadership body working with the revolution.
Immediately after denouncing the coup and issuing the instructions to heads of Rebel columns, a call went out to the people over Radio Rebelde for a general strike. At the same time, a proclamation was broadcast to Santiago de Cuba instructing the city to come to a total stop as of 3:00 p.m., except for the power station, to keep communications open with the population, and we warned the population we would proceed to attack the city. All those decisions were made one after the other on January 1.
At the same time as the Rebels were approaching Santiago de Cuba, Camilo [Cienfuegos] and Che [Guevara] were instructed to advance toward the capital, without stopping and without let up....
Taking Santiago
This was the situation as we approached the city of Santiago
de Cuba on the north, from Palma Soriano, when the first
contacts took place requested by the heads of the Santiago de
Cuba garrison. The police headquarters immediately
surrendered; the commanding officers of two heavily armed
naval frigates docked in the Santiago de Cuba port
surrendered; the naval district chief surrendered; and the
heads of the garrison tried to contact us. All this was
happening during the afternoon. Following the first contacts,
I told the head of the Santiago de Cuba garrison that I wanted
to meet with all the officers in the garrison....
It so happened that Compañero Raúl [Castro] went there to arrange for the meeting agreed upon with the Santiago de Cuba garrison officers. He entered the garrison, spoke to the officers, tore down a portrait of Batista and ripped it up right in front of all of them, and he also spoke to the troops. He went with the officers to the meeting they had with me. We didn't mention surrender - because, I repeat again, the situation was very confused at the time - we didn't want to humiliate them. We asked them to condemn the military coup; I denounced the maneuvering of the promoters of the coup; I denounced Cantillo, the man who up to that moment had been their head. I told them about what we had agreed on, his lack of compliance, I called on them to disobey Cantillo's orders and to come over to our side, and they agreed.
I would say it was really a generous proposal on our part and an absolutely correct one, given that developments in the rest of the country still weren't clear.
What interested us were the frigates, the tanks, and the artillery in Santiago de Cuba, and also those who knew how to handle those weapons.
Although its forces had already lost all capacity to resist, the enemy continued its maneuvering. They dispatched a plane to the Isle of Pines - that was its name then -to bring back a group of officers who had plotted against Batista, primarily to bring back a colonel who hadn't really been involved with Batista - he had gained a certain authority precisely for having opposed Batista, for having plotted against him, and he had been kept imprisoned on the Isle of Pines. Since that officer had about him an aura of having fought against the dictatorship, they sent for him in an attempt to hold the army together. The colonel's group was known as the "pure ones"; this was how it was known nationwide.
So they sent for Colonel Barquín, who, in addition, was very friendly and close to the Yankees, they brought him back to Camp Columbia, and gave him command of the army - all of this, mind you, on January 1. They carried out this move together with the American embassy. And, indeed, the man arrived at Camp Columbia during the night....
On to Havana
All these events were happening that night, and then, as
soon as the rally here in this plaza had concluded, we took
the tanks and the artillery and, gaining strength, we advanced
on Bayamo. We had to see what was happening with the Bayamo
troops; the situation wasn't entirely clear, and no one knew
what might happen. Upon reaching Bayamo I met with the troops
there; I spoke to them and they joined us. They had bigger
tanks with heavier guns, they had artillery. All this was
happening around the morning of January 3. I was then heading
toward Havana leading a column of 1,000 Rebels and 2,000
Batista soldiers, artillery, and tanks....
On January 2, as our forces were approaching the capital as quickly as possible in view of what could happen there, the troops of Camilo and Che were advancing along the highway and capturing garrisons without combat. So the effort to get a leading figure out of jail, capable of holding the army together and boosting its morale, was to no avail.
I don't remember the exact date, but already by January 3 things were becoming clear and it was evident there would be no more resistance. Of course, heeding the call of the Rebel Army broadcast over Radio Rebelde, the general strike paralyzed the country from one end to the other in an impressive manner.
That strike played an extremely important role; it was a tremendous blow. It completely demoralized the enemy forces, avoided bloodshed, and saved lives. The workers of the radio and television networks hooked up with Radio Rebelde and at a certain point Radio Rebelde was broadcasting to the entire country by radio and television over all the stations. The people were mobilized everywhere and in the capital itself....
One can say that in seventy-two hours all the country's garrisons were under control and the weapons were in the hands of the people. In the span of a few days tens of thousands of compañeros had armed themselves....
Camilo and Che carried out their missions and at a certain moment they had control over the capital's military forces. Then our journey toward the capital became more a political tour than a military one....
That January 1 was a day of definitions, in which we said something that still had to be said. In view of the long record of deceit and corrupt politicians throughout the period of the pseudorepublic we had to say that this time we were serious, that a coup d'état could not be confused with a revolution. That was one of the big things our people learned on that January 1, when they confronted and defeated the maneuver. Because our people wanted change, our people wanted a revolution, and the changes had to be deep-going and fundamental, the exploiting society had to disappear. And we told the people that this time the revolution had triumphed, that the demands of the revolution would be fulfilled!