The spotlight on ValuJet has revealed the risks that the airlines and government overseers have been willing to take with the lives of passengers and crews. The May 20 issue Newsweek magazine published an essay by Mary Fackler Schiavo, inspector general of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Schiavo said, "In more than five years, we have found serious deficiencies in airline inspections, parts and training, and in the air-traffic- control system." She added, "like many Americans who are reading more and more about failing air-traffic systems, near misses and disasters like the ValuJet and the unsolved 737 crashes in Pittsburgh and Colorado Springs, I don't like to fly."

Following the crash, which killed all 110 people on board, the media reported that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had issued three internal reports detailing problems at ValuJet, all before the May 11 disaster.

The FAA, which has the stated dual purpose of regulating aviation safety and promoting the airline industry, placed ValuJet under special scrutiny in February after six accidents occurred in six weeks.

Despite the fact that ValuJet's fleet consisted almost entirely of old airplanes, the FAA made no structural inspections of the planes for two years. A February 14 report issued by the agency acknowledged that this area had been "severely overlooked."

According to an article in the May 18 New York Times, "Inspections on the airline's manuals and procedures were also neglected... at one point ValuJet was training DC-9 crews with manuals meant for other airplanes."

The February 14 report also said that the airline lacked "adequate policies and procedures for the maintenance personnel to follow," and it recommended that the FAA consider "recertification of this airline."

At one news conference Anthony J. Broderick, the FAA's associate administrator for regulation and certification, said the agency never grounded ValuJet because the company's problems never demonstrated "systemic safety violations."

A second report, prepared by the Atlanta inspector's office, "found an increased number of unfavorable reports on maintenance and `a significant decrease in experience level of new pilots being hired by ValuJet as well as other positions such as mechanics, dispatchers, etc.,' " the Times reported.

The third report contained an analysis of the rate of accidents of low-cost carriers per 100,000 departures, compared with the rate for major, higher-cost carriers. This report, made public on May 16 by the Chicago Tribune, did reveal that ValuJet had a higher accident rate than the other low-cost carriers. But in the FAA's final version of that report, released later the same day, the agency asserted that "contrary to the assessment of The Tribune, the figures did not show major differences between the two groups of airlines."

Plane carried hazardous load
According to investigators, the cause of the May 11 ValuJet crash may not be known for months. But they are searching for the origin of a possible fire on board the plane, and for the truth about the handling of hazardous oxygen canisters in the cargo bin.

Vernon Grose, a former employee of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and of Boeing, was quoted in the Miami Herald May 17 suggesting a fire could have been sparked by the cockpit wire bundles, whose insulation would have been worn by 27 years of use. He said that despite all the maintenance and repair required of older jets, the wiring doesn't have to be replaced. According to the Post, the FAA estimated the cost of rewrapping the wires as $220 and 3.5 hours work for each plane.

There has been discussion among safety officials for years about the transporting of the oxygen generating canisters that were listed on the cargo manifest of ValuJet flight 592. The ValuJet oxygen canisters were removed from an MD-80 aircraft and turned over to ValuJet for disposal by employees at SaberTech, a non-union maintenance company that did work for ValuJet.

The May 17 Herald reported that a shipping ticket dated May 10 referred to the canisters as empty, but that Gregory Feith of the NTSB said some SaberTech employees thought that some of the cans had not been discharged of their chemical contents.

A May 16 statement by the FAA stated that ValuJet had not had the proper training to haul hazardous materials and was not authorized to do so.

In Miami, discussion on the crash continues. For example Aerothrust, an engine repair shop that does work for ValuJet, is included in the FAA investigation. The company has also been named in a wrongful death lawsuit filed on behalf of the son of one of the victims. The company officers have appealed to the workers in the plant and members of the International Association of Machinists (IAM) not to speak to reporters or anyone about the crash. They said, "We speak with one voice, in consultation with our lawyers."

Some workers share the company's concern, saying that even if the company comes out clean through all the investigations, that "our" name will have been associated with a disaster, and that's not good for business.

Others look at it differently. "No, we don't speak with one voice. The workers speak for safety, no matter what the cost, and the bosses speak for profit," said one machinist.

Meanwhile, an incident involving an American Trans Air flight to St. Petersberg, Florida, was also reported in the days following the ValuJet crash. As a result of a loss of cabin pressure, the pilot passed out, but regained consciousness in time to make an emergency landing in Indianapolis.

Rachele Fruit is a member of IAM Local 1126 at the AeroThrust jet engine repair shop in Miami. She is the Socialist Workers candidate for Mayor of Dade County.  
 
 
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