The Militant(logo) 
    Vol.60/No.8           February 26, 1996 
 
 
Could N.J. Train Crash Have Been Prevented?  

BY JANE HARRIS

HOBOKEN, New Jersey - What seemed to be a normal rush hour here in New Jersey Transit's Hoboken Terminal came to a screeching halt in seconds on February 9, as an eastbound commuter train collided into a westbound at a nearby interlocking, a place where two lines cross. The impact caused both trains to derail. The two engineers and one passenger were instantly killed, and 162 passengers were injured.

Co-workers were stunned and shocked with the sober realization that it could have just as easily been them who died.

While the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said it was still gathering evidence, the agency held a press conference less than 48 hours after the accident. NTSB chairman James Hall strongly suggested that eastbound engineer John DeCurtis had been at fault. He said DeCurtis had six infractions, neglecting to mention this was over a 39-year career. Only two of these involved signals and DeCurtis had not been disciplined in seven years. The New York Times headline the next day, however, read, "Engineer in Fatal Train Collision Had a Record of Running Signals."

At the press conference, Hall omitted the fact that Terry Abbott, general chairman of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers at New Jersey Transit, had noted several reports of signal irregularities in the vicinity of the accident.

Workers here are sorting out what they think might have happened and why.

Jim Stanley, a longtime engineer, said, "There is no way anyone should work a 14-and-a-half-hour job with a four-hour break. At least an eight-hour break is needed at a decent place where you can really sleep."

He was referring to the fact that since 1992 DeCurtis started his workday about 6 p.m., ran trains until about 1 a.m., took a legally required four-hour break in a passenger yard in Suffern, New York, and then drove an early train back into Hoboken in the morning. On the day of the crash, management asked him to make an extra run. Had he lived, this would have put his workday under the legal limit of 16 hours, including the four-hour break, bringing him into Hoboken at 8:44 a.m.

The NTSB is "studying" whether this particular split shift, aggravated by too short a break and no proper facilities in which to rest, may have contributed to the accident. Meanwhile, many engineers, whether or not they think DeCurtis went by a stop signal, have no need of any academic studies. Experience has taught them that this is not a safe way to work.

Split shifts are common at New Jersey Transit. Of the 268 engineers, 62 work in shifts of more than 12 hours, with a four to five hour break. NJ Transit executive director Shirley DeLibero explained why at a press conference: it saves the agency money. It would cost the railroad $200,000 a year just to eliminate the three nighttime split shifts by hiring three more engineers, she said.

Following widespread publicity of the split shifts, New Jersey Transit officials announced February 13 they are considering ending them for nighttime workers.

Some engineers are pointing to another decision that puts profits ahead of public safety: the fact that in the entire Hoboken division, no lines are equipped with cab signals and automatic braking systems. These devices make sure the train is stopped if the engineer does not respond properly to a given wayside signal. Federal law mandates these devices only where trains run 80 miles an hour or more, thus exempting Hoboken division trains.

Another device that could have prevented the accident from taking place, again one which is not required by law, is one that will derail a train failing to stop at a red signal connected with an interlocking. Far less damage and perhaps no lives would have been lost had the eastbound train (if in fact it had a stop signal) derailed traveling at seven miles an hour, instead of hitting the other head on.

Additionally, over the last two decades, crew consist, or the elimination of crew members, has contributed to accidents. In the case of passenger trains, many firemen (basically assistant engineers) were cut on passenger runs. Just like a copilot on an airplane, an additional trained employee in the engineer's cab makes the run safer.

The bosses weigh the expense of hiring more workers against their bottom line - and we are feeling the cost. Safety is a question rail workers need to fight for ourselves. A major challenge we face as we try to find effective means to fight for a safer railroad is the fact that rail workers are organized by many different craft unions instead of one strong industrial union that would better enable us to create safer conditions for ourselves and those who ride the trains.

Jane Harris is a locomotive engineer at New Jersey Transit and a member of the United Transportation Union Local 800.

 
 
 
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