BY BARRY FATLAND
LOS ANGELES - The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued a report December 11 blaming the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the railroad industry as a whole, and the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) railroad in particular, for the deadly Feb. 1, 1996, train crash in the Cajon Pass, an hour and a half east of here.

The February 1 crash resulted in the death of two union members, conductor Gilberto Ortiz, and brakeman Kevin Williams. The engineer, Lester Foster, was seriously injured before being rescued by residents in the area of the crash.

Forty-five of the 49 cars in the train derailed, with several of them exploding into flames. The resulting fire lasted for days and forced the closure of nearby Interstate 15 for 30 hours due to the smoke and toxic fumes from hazardous materials in several of the tank cars. Residents in the sparsely populated area were evacuated for days.

The NTSB report stated that the derailment occurred because the FRA and the railroads, including BNSF, had failed to require the use of a functioning two-way radio device on the rear of the train. This would have allowed the engineer to stop the train after its main braking system failed.

BNSF had installed two-way end-of-train devices (ETD) that were not completely compatible with the equipment in use at that time and frequently did not function because of this.

In 1989 the NTSB recommended to the FRA that it mandate the immediate installation of the end-of-train devices. The FRA failed to act.

In an NTSB accident report dated Dec. 14, 1994, regarding a similar accident in the same area, the NTSB again "...recommend(ed) the use of two-way end-of-train telemetry devices on all cabooseless trains by March 31, 1996." That deadline was two months too late to prevent the February 1 fatal accident. Both the FRA and the NTSB placed the short-term profits of BNSF above the safety of the train crews and the public in general.

Two-way brake system `inoperable'
In a Feb. 6, 1996 announcement reported by the Department of Transportation, the FRA "determined that the railroad's operations in the area pose an imminent and unacceptable threat to public safety." It then issued an emergency order requiring all railroads using the Cajon Pass to equip trains with a means to apply the brakes from the rear of the train.

The two-way devices were conceived as a substitute for the cabooses that used to be at the rear of all freight trains, where a crew member could apply the brakes in an emergency situation.

Over the past decade, U.S. railroads have recorded substantial increases in productivity and profits resulting from "cost cutting" measures. These included reduction in crew sizes, the centralization of dispatching for the control of train movements, and the elimination of cabooses. The impact of these cuts on the safety of train crews and the public has been of little concern to the rail barons.

Although the train that crashed had an ETD, it was not functioning properly when the train left the Barstow yard, some 55 miles east of the pass. At the time of the crash, the big-business media implied that the crew members were at fault. They said that "no one pushed the button at the back of the train that activated the [two-way ETD] system before the train started down the hill."

In fact, the crew had made numerous attempts to activate the ETD before leaving the Barstow yard. But until the February 6 FRA order requiring functioning ETD'S, it was standard practice for those in charge of the Barstow yard to tell crews to "highball" - ignore - the malfunctioning ETD and move the train.

According to reports in the San Bernardino Country Sun at the time of the accident, the crew members tested the brake system three times before starting down the hill.

Rail bosses cry sabotage
The BNSF railroad's response to the February 1 accident was to immediately raise the specter of sabotage. Trying to place the blame on others, the company offered a reward for the capture of those responsible.

Within months, to give credence to its "sabotage" theory, it went to great lengths to build what railroaders call "Fort Summit" at the top of the Cajon Pass. High, prison-like fencing stretching for more that a mile, along with high-intensity lighting and twenty-four hour guards, are supposed to "protect" the trains waiting to descend the pass from alleged terrorists who might try to sabotage a train's braking system. Few railroad workers, however, believe the company's propaganda about sabotage.

Barry Fatland is a member of the UTU and works for the BNSF in Los Angeles.  
 
 
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