BY JANICE LYNN AND NANCY ROSENSTOCK
BALTIMORE, Maryland - A year and a half after the crash of TWA Flight 800, the airlines, government agencies, and airplane manufacturer Boeing refuse to take steps to prevent similar disasters in the future. After conducting the largest investigation into any transportation accident in U.S. history, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) held public hearings the week of December 8 on the crash of the Trans World Airlines (TWA) plane that exploded over the Atlantic Ocean July 17, 1996, killing all 230 people aboard.

NTSB Chairman James Hall opened the hearings explaining that their purpose was "to reassure the public that everything that can be done is being done to ensure the safety of the airline industry. This hearing is not being held to determine the rights or liability of private parties, and any matters dealing with such rights and liability will be excluded."

The airline industry has finally been forced to acknowledge that a spark somehow caused an explosion in the center fuel tank of the Boeing 747, after whipping up more than a year-long scare campaign around a supposed bomb and skirting the real questions of airline safety and maintenance. But after testimony from scores of scientific and technical "experts" - complete with computer animation, color slides, and close-ups of the crash - the hearings came to no conclusive decision about what exactly caused the tank to explode. In fact, the NTSB will not even issue its final report on the week- long hearings until sometime in 1998.

The testimony did bring many mechanical problems to light for the first time. Immediately after the crash last July, a few reports mentioned the fact that the pilot had recorded an erratic fuel-flow gauge right before the plane crashed. This fact rapidly disappeared, however, until now. The NTSB released a written report of the cockpit voice recorder, which notes the pilot exclaiming, "Look at that crazy fuel flow indicator there on number four," referring to a gauge in the cockpit that measures fuel flow on the right outboard engine.

The 4,000 pages of reports that the NTSB released on the eve of the hearings also indicate that shortly before the crash, the pilot reported difficulty getting the plane to climb at a steady angle, as well as problems with the aircraft's altitude.

The reports also reveal that the Boeing 747 had wiring problems. The plane's wiring known as Poly-X "was found with numerous cracks in the insulation and examination found that the cracks penetrated to the core conductors," according to investigators. A frayed wire from a center tank fuel gauge was also displayed at the hearings. Testimony indicated that problems with fuel tank wiring could have been part of a series of failures that led to the explosion.

Safety measures are rejected
In its first public report after the July 1996 crash, the NTSB recommended to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in December of that year that the procedure known as "inerting" - pumping inert gas into the fuel tank so that built up fuel vapors will not explode - be implemented. This procedure, known for 24 years, is commonly used in military aircraft, but commercial operators have resisted using it due to the cost. For a 747, that would be $1-2 million plus additional costs for maintenance, design, and engineering.

When questioned at the hearings, Boeing officials acknowledged the problem with the buildup of flammable fumes. Jerry Hulm, the manager of electrical systems at Boeing, said, "The biggest problem is the tendency for air to flush too much fuel vapor overboard." However, Boeing officials refused to commit themselves to what needed to be done, only saying that they were researching possible ways of reducing the accumulation of vapors in fuel tanks.

Another measure that was discussed, but with no recommendation for immediate action, was the possibility of switching the kind of fuel that is used. Thomas McSweeny, the FAA's chief of aircraft certification, testified that fuel used by the military, called JP-5, would cut the risk of explosion to one-twentieth the current level in a center fuel tank, and eliminate the danger in wing tanks. JP-5 stays liquid at temperatures 40 degrees higher than the type used by commercial airlines. Since the fuel costs two cents more per gallon, it is anticipated that airline carriers will resist this measure as well.

The military takes other measures that are not used on commercial airlines. Sponge-like foam is inserted into tanks, causing the fuel to remain in a liquid form and not turn to vapor that can burn or explode. Airline carriers have objected to this as well, arguing that the foam takes up space needed for fuel, adds weight, and would require more costly maintenance.

30,000 miles more than intended
The Boeing 747 that crashed had been in service for 25 years, five more than the plane's design called for. It had logged 90,000 hours, 30,000 hours over what had been anticipated to be the life of the plane. Many airlines have held back from purchasing new planes and equipment as part of their drive to cut costs. Nothing conclusive came out of the week long hearings and no steps have been taken to immediately enhance aviation safety. William Crow, a senior FAA maintenance "expert" stated near the end of the hearings, "We should not take action until such time as we are absolutely sure of probable cause. We really have no probable cause. We have ideas."

The International Association of Machinists (IAM), the union that represents the mechanics and other workers at TWA, had an official delegation at the hearings.

During the week of the hearings a study by the National Civil Aviation Review Commission was released, warning that the number of major crashes in the United States will nearly double by the year 2010 unless accident rates are reduced.

Many of the families of those who died in the crash attended the NTSB hearings. The families of TWA Flight 800 Association held a press conference December 7, where they denounced the FAA for not moving faster on the previous recommendations made by the NTSB on the question of the fuel tanks. The Victims of Flight 800 Groups, also held a press conference calling for the grounding of all Boeing 747- 100's - the model of TWA Flight 800.

Charlie Bellamy, a city worker from New York whose wife was a flight attendant who died in the crash, told the Militant when asked what he thought of the hearings, "I feel they're talking through a smoke screen. I don't think they're telling it all. Frankly I think I'm down here for nothing. If they were really focusing on what happened, we would get better answers. If nothing is done to correct the problems, there is just another accident waiting to happen."

"Am I getting any answers? Not really," stated John Crandell from Maryland, whose oldest daughter was on TWA Flight 800.

Janice Lynn and Nancy Rosenstock are airline workers and members of the International Association of Machinists.  
 
 
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