Tricontinental is the magazine of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAAL), founded in January 1966 by the Tricontinental Conference in Havana. The inaugural issue of the magazine in April 1967 featured Guevara's last major political article, "Create Two, Three... Many Vietnams - That Is the Watchword," also known as the Message to the Tricontinental. In it Guevara discussed the world political situation and explained why it was necessary to build an "international proletarian army" and launch a Latin America-wide revolutionary struggle.
The interview with Piñeiro was reprinted in whole or in part in a number of publications around the world. Among them was the Militant, which published it in the Nov. 24 and Dec. 1, 1997, issues. It was subsequently reprinted by the Militant in the booklet Celebrating the Homecoming of Ernesto Che Guevara's Reinforcement Brigade to Cuba. The special issue of Tricontinental is available from Pathfinder in English and Spanish, as is the booklet that reprints a series of articles from the Militant.
In September 1997 OSPAAAL and Tricontinental sponsored an international conference in Havana titled "21st Century: The Legacy and Relevancy of Che's Works." Due to the interest sparked by the Piñeiro interview, Tricontinental organized - as one of the highlights of that conference - a public discussion with Piñeiro. For several hours the Cuban leader answered questions from an audience of more than 100 participants that included a number of foreign journalists. The slightly abbreviated transcript of that meeting, which took place Sept. 27, 1997, was reviewed by Piñeiro and edited for publication in issue no. 138 of the magazine. Piñeiro was on hand when it was launched in Havana on March 3, the week before his death. An English edition of Tricontinental issue no. 138 is in preparation and will be available shortly.
As the introduction to the article prepared by Luis Suárez Salazar notes, after a few introductory remarks to the conference Piñeiro responded "to about 20 questions related to Che's revolutionary course of action. In large part his statements were designed to respond to the fallacies spread by those interested in breaking the indestructible trilogy between Fidel, Che's internationalist efforts, and the consistent international and Latin American policy of the Cuban revolution."
The article below is copyright by Ediciones Tricontinental and is reprinted by permission. Translation is by the Militant.
Piñeiro: As early as the opening months of 1959, Che was in contact with a group of Nicaraguan exiles who had come from Mexico - among them Tomás Borge (who is here) and the former lieutenant Somarriba. He offered them all possible support at a time when Cuba's security and solidarity apparatus was in its earliest stage.
One of the Cuban comrades who participated in that effort, Carlos Lugo, who is still living, took a message from Che to Somarriba in which Che said, more or less, that if Somarriba and his column managed to set themselves up in Nicaraguan territory, he would fulfill the commitment he had made. According to Lugo, this commitment - signed in a very friendly way, without giving his name, as "He who helps you" - foresaw the incorporation of Che in the struggle of the Nicaraguan people against the Somoza dictatorship. That effort could not materialize because the Honduran army (with the participation of some of Somoza's officers) destroyed part of the expeditionary force. Two Cuban comrades - Onelio Hernández Taño and Marcelo Fernández Isla - died there along with a number of Nicaraguans. Notwithstanding this, Che subsequently aided other groups of Nicaraguan revolutionaries, one of which was led by the brothers Harold and Alejandro Martínez, and another was headed by Enrique Lacayo and Julio Alonso. On Che's instructions, the Cuban Renán Montero, who is still living, took part in the latter effort. Both groups sought to organize armed struggle in Nicaragua, from Honduran territory.
But regardless of the details, what I want to stress is that from the first days after the triumph of the Cuban revolution, Che was already thinking about carrying out what he considered to be his historic commitment to participate in the liberation of other peoples of our continent. That's why he also committed himself beginning in 1962 to participate and lead, along with Jorge Ricardo Masetti, the effort to initiate a guerrilla struggle in Argentine territory (referred to in the interview published in issue no. 137).(1) These facts help refute the commonly told lie that Che left Cuba, first for the Congo and later Bolivia, due to his "irreconcilable differences with the revolutionary leadership of our country."(2)
Venezuela and Colombia came later. In his frequent meetings with revolutionary leaders from those countries, Che explored the possibility of participating in guerrilla struggles that were developing there. In my opinion, I think he wanted to initiate and lead his own effort and, above all, guide it toward the Southern Cone, specifically to Argentina. He felt very anxious to carry out that commitment to his people and to our peoples. He could not stand to sit comfortably behind a desk while other compañeros fought and died trying to put some of his ideas into practice.
Q: What can you tell us about Che's solidarity with the struggles of the peoples of Paraguay and Puerto Rico?
A: He always paid very close attention to the revolutionary struggle of the Paraguayan people, so much so that in early 1959, with the help of other compañeros from "Ciro Redondo" Column no. 8,(3) he personally participated in combat exercises with a group of Paraguayan combatants who were then training in Cuba. Che also helped various Puerto Rican independence leaders. I can assure you that he - like Fidel and the Cuban revolution - continually expressed his immense sympathy and solidarity toward the anticolonial struggles that were taking place in the early 1960s on that sister Caribbean island. He especially admired the late compañero Pedro Albizu Campos.(4)
Q: Some of Che's biographers have claimed that he lacked the most basic knowledge of the situation in Africa and in particular the Congo. What is your opinion on this?
A: I have read some commentary in this regard. I don't wish to judge the intentions of the authors. But it must be remembered that before joining the struggle in the Congo, Che had traveled through a number of African countries, and he personally knew many leaders of revolutionary movements and several progressive heads of state in the region. Che was not unaware of what was happening in Africa, or of the difficulties created for the anti-imperialist struggle by the social, tribal, ethnic, and cultural conflicts that characterize the majority of African countries. Not to mention the negative qualities of some of the leaders of the so-called Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Congo.
His diary, and his Episodes of the Revolutionary War in the Congo,(5) make clear that Che sought to broaden his knowledge of the characteristics of the area where the Cuban contingent operated, of the features and capabilities of the Congolese and Rwandan leaders, as well as the best banner under which to advance the revolution in that central African country. In spite of his will, the abrupt interruption of that solidarity effort kept him from concluding his investigations on this.
I want to emphasize one point: Che had an anti- imperialist and tricontinental strategic conception that fully coincided with the policy of the Cuban revolution, which in turn was the source of the decision that he would command the Cuban contingent that went to what is now known as the People's Republic of the Congo. Contrary to what some biographers have said, this was not a individual decision. This and other solidarity activities with the peoples of Africa were the product of the consistent policy toward that part of the world, developed from that period onward by Fidel and the revolutionary leadership of our country.
Q: What role did you play in the preparation of Che's internationalist effort in Bolivia?
A: As first deputy minister of the Ministry of the Interior, I was responsible for all activities aimed at determining the "operative situation" - to use the term from official language - in that country and neighboring countries, immigration controls, passports, and the documents necessary to guarantee the clandestine transfer of compañeros to Bolivian territory. Likewise, we took responsibility for surreptitiously getting Che out of Tanzania, for attending to him and his security while he was living clandestinely in Czechoslovakia, as well as organizing the routes and details of his subsequent trip from Cuba to Bolivia.
As with other countries in Latin America, Asia, or Africa, the team that I headed up took responsibility for reviewing the available information on the political, economic, and social situation in Bolivia. We oversaw the initial contacts with leaders of the Bolivian revolutionary organizations (first of all with the members and leaders of the Communist Party) who had made a commitment to support the internationalist effort commanded by Che. We also organized the training of a number of Bolivian compañeros in Cuba. I think that these were the basic things. Perhaps with the passage of time - at an appropriate political moment - other actions that we carried out in Latin America, Europe, and other parts of the world aimed at supporting the revolutionary strategy of the Heroic Guerrilla can be made public.
Q: What did the CIA and FBI know about Che's activities in Africa and Latin America? Did Che and the incipient Cuban solidarity apparatus you headed deceive the U.S. special services?
A: From what I've been able to read over all these years - including various statements by former high CIA officials, as well as information from sources friendly to our country - they lost Che's trail in Africa. Faced with that reality, they unleashed a systematic campaign to create a state of uncertainty about his whereabouts. In an operation very similar to the one they are currently waging, they began using all means at their disposal to spread slanders about how Fidel had jailed or murdered Che, or how Che had been expelled from Cuba due to disagreements with the top Cuban leadership. In addition to creating confusion in the revolutionary ranks during the 1960s, these actions were designed to learn Che's possible destination. Compañero Fidel maintained strict silence. The only thing he would ever say was that Che was in the right place and that he was making revolution. In that way he waited for the best moment to announce the exact place where Che was fighting.
Perhaps the CIA and the FBI had some clue as to Che's presence in Latin America. The facts, however, showed that they had no prior information on the plan, the sending of a number of Cuban comrades to Bolivia, much less the logistical resources that were sent there. If they did, then why didn't they stop any of these actions? Another proof that the CIA and the enemy's special services were deceived is that compañeros Renán and Tania were in Bolivia. In spite of the fact that Tania unfortunately was unable to accomplish the main task assigned to her, she lived there without her real identity being revealed, until unforeseen circumstances led to her joining the incipient guerrilla detachment.
Q: Can you offer us an assessment of the quality of the logistical support assigned to Che's internationalist effort in Bolivia? As you know, some biographers accuse Cuba of failing to make available the necessary means for an effort of that scope.
A: The logistics had to be obtained in Bolivia itself, sending equipment from Cuba proved to be very difficult. The weapons of the guerrilla unit were the same as those used by the Bolivian army. It is true - as has been said - that the communications equipment that the compañeros in Bolivia were able to obtain were inadequate for the needs at that initial stage of the struggle, when the mobility of the guerrilla unit demanded that each combatant prioritize the essential munitions and food. We must remember that one of the laws of guerrilla struggle is to seize and use the weapons, munitions, equipment, and provisions of the enemy forces. Otherwise, the development of the guerrilla detachment will depend on the difficult, if not impossible, task of getting supplies from abroad. As was proven in the Cuban experience, what makes the guerrilla unit superior is the moral quality of its fighters combined with the appropriate strategy and tactics, including the use of surprise. With some exceptions, the quality of the weapons, equipment, or logistics of the insurgent forces will always be inferior to that of the enemy forces. Anyone who thinks or says otherwise knows nothing about irregular warfare.
Q: The biography of Che written by U.S. journalist John Lee Anderson(6) states that there is still a big mystery surrounding who decided to initiate the guerrilla struggle in Bolivia. Other biographers - such as Mexican intellectual Jorge G. Castañeda(7) - claim that it was commander Fidel Castro who "sold" that idea to Che, in order to solve the "ambiguous" situation he had been left in following the defeat in the Congo. What can you tell us?
A: I repeat that the decision to undertake the guerrilla struggle in Bolivia and from there extend it to Peru, Argentina, and other countries in the Southern Cone, was entirely Che's. He took into account and had full confidence in the information we sent him through various channels from Havana, which were passed on to him directly by the Cuban comrades (such as Martínez Tamayo, Harry Villegas, and Renán Montero), as well as the information sent to him by Tania. All of these compañeros had previously been sent by him to Bolivia on different missions. But each and every one of the decisions was made by Che: the plan, the strategy, the selection of the Cuban combatants who accompanied him, each of the preparatory steps, the Bolivian and Latin American political organizations - initially from Argentina and Peru - that were contacted, and so on.
Those of us who knew him were aware that he had a lot of experience, not only from the responsibilities he had assumed in building our socialist state, but also as a military leader and a guerrilla leader. That experience was enriched in the Congo. That's why everything was studied and discussed with him. He always asked for and listened respectfully to the opinions of others - even when he disagreed with them - and he liked to debate and give thought to each decision. He sought out different points of view. In spite of his desire to begin the struggle as soon as possible, and the fact that he was a man of strong temperament, passion, and will, he was nevertheless very demanding, meticulous, and cold-blooded in his analysis... I would say that he was very objective, precise in all his thinking, particularly when it came time to make a decision.
That's why I have no doubt that apart from all the support we gave him as a state - on compañero Fidel's orders - Che used his own methods and channels to verify the most important information we sent him. And this is logical, since in examining the circumstances of any country there can be subtleties, discrepancies between different sources of information, different conclusions reached by various compañeros, etc. And Che was very careful about that. As we say in Cuba, "He never swung at the first pitch, he would wait for the best one to hit."
Q: Considering that Che was responsible for planning and organizing all the details of the development of the guerrilla struggle in Bolivia, what is your analysis of the mistakes he made and of the causes of the failure of the Bolivian experience?
A: Much has been said and written about that. As for the causes of the defeat of the Bolivian guerrilla movement, I think there were several. First of all, the early discovery of the location of the rear guard and the premature beginning of guerrilla operations. As is known, a movement of this type must first get itself established, create ties, explore the terrain. It has to get the combatants seasoned and find out their capacity to withstand and adapt, and their willingness to continue the struggle, above all to continue it in the initial stage, which is always the most difficult. Before these minimum conditions were met, and while Che was away on an exploratory journey, the fighting began in Ñacahuazú. As a result, the existence of the guerrilla camp was revealed, all the plans were prematurely set into motion, and they had to begin fighting in an area that lacked the social and political conditions for the development of guerrilla struggle. This facilitated the gradual tightening of the encirclement by the 10,000 Bolivian soldiers involved in the confrontation with Che's small detachment.
Second, Che tried to get Régis Debray and Ciro Bustos out of the zone of operations.(8) He knew that the army was going to wage an intense effort to locate, confront, and surround the guerrilla unit. For this purpose, and faced with the fact that some comrades were sick and others had little willingness to fight (he termed them "the rejects"), he divided the detachment with the aim of reuniting in 15 or 20 days. That was not accomplished, reducing the firepower and combat capability of the column, which nevertheless obtained several military victories. Unfortunately, for six months, and with a reduced number of men, Che was circling around in an inhospitable area, making successive attempts to reunite with the group led by comrade Vilo Acuña (Joaquín). Now it may be analyzed whether this was correct or not, but I am sure that it was a decision made, among other reasons, out of Che's humanism and comradeship, and not for military reasons. In his mind it was unthinkable to abandon any compañero. That excessively delayed his plan to move to northern Chapare, an area of operations closer to La Paz and with much better social, political, and topographical conditions than those where the guerrilla unit operated.
Thirdly, all the commitments previously made by the various Bolivian forces, both with Cuba and with Che, were not fulfilled, either quantitatively or qualitatively. One of the causes of this, as is recognized today by the leadership of the Bolivian Communist Party, was the negative stance taken by Mario Monje, who was then its general secretary. This disoriented, disorganized, and demobilized many members of the party and its youth group, who, as was later proved, were ready and willing to join the struggle. The urban network, which was being built in various cities of Bolivia on Che's orders, was hard hit before it was ready, and the channels of communication, both within Bolivia and with Cuba, were unable to function. Logistical support was interrupted, as was the possibility of obtaining Bolivian reinforcements. This included some 20 comrades from that country who had already received training but were unable to leave Cuba. Those of us who have participated in guerrilla struggle know that in the initial phase, the guerrilla unit is compelled to rely primarily on its own forces and resources. Nevertheless, the support of the urban network is always necessary.
This whole situation conspired against the possibilities for the Bolivian detachment to survive. But in addition, no examination of this type can ignore the fact that elements of chance always come into play. Everything does not occur in a preestablished way. Sometimes accidents - even though they are not decisive in the end - condition the evolution of political or military events. There is more than one example of this in the history of the world, Latin America, and Cuba.
Finally, I want to stress that I evaluate the Bolivian experience as a whole, and therefore I do not characterize it as a total failure. All of us would have wanted Che's Latin American undertaking to have achieved great triumphs. Had this been the case, the situation in Latin America, and perhaps the world, would be different today. But even though from an objective standpoint it turned out to be a defeat in military terms, it constituted without a doubt a great moral, political, and ideological victory. It has put Che, the internationalist, forward as an example to millions of men and women in the world who raise the revolutionary banner.
Q: It has been asserted very strongly that conditions did not exist in Bolivia for the development of the guerrilla struggle. What is your opinion 30 years later?
A: Based on what is known about the way events unfolded, I'm aware that some "historians" believe that Che, or the leadership of the Cuban revolution, did not take into account the objective and subjective situation and the relationship of forces that existed in Bolivia at the time. Others term that effort "voluntaristic," "foquista," and "militaristic." I disagree with these opinions. I sometimes ask myself, what would these same "historians" have said if Fidel had been killed in the Moncada attack or at Alegría de Pío,(9) and had been unable to continue the insurrectional effort right then? I'm sure they would also have said that the Cuban revolution was impossible, that the objective and subjective conditions did not exist, or that Fidel was a "putschist," a "vanguardist," or an "adventurer."
Historical analysis cannot be reduced to a few epithets and insults... Think about the subsequent course of Bolivia's political situation, for example. There was an upsurge of struggle against the dictatorship that was already under way among the miners and students beginning in 1967 (I spoke about this in the interview that appeared in issue no. 137 of Tricontinental). Furthermore, barely three or four years later a broad nationalist, antidictatorial, and popular movement unfolded, headed by the late general Juan José Torres and other important political figures of the Bolivian left. Leaving aside its own errors, this effort could only be crushed by a merciless attack by the political and military right wing, supported by the United States.(10)
This demonstrates that beginning in the second half of the 1960s, big economic, social, and political contradictions were ripening in Bolivia, including within the ranks of the military itself and in the high command of the army. In addition, a will to struggle against the traitors of the 1952 revolution was being created.(11) All these forces needed to be organized and forged into a vanguard. Had the guerrilla movement led by Che been able to survive the difficulties of its initial stage, it had the potential to play such a role. I believe that Che grasped this situation like few others, and he concluded that the minimum conditions existed to begin the guerrilla struggle. As he conceived it, the remaining objective and subjective conditions would mature as the revolutionary armed struggle unfolded, including as a result of it.
The same could be said about the political situation in Peru and Argentina. Less than a year after Che's death, a movement of nationalist officers broke out in Peru, with important backing from progressive sectors.(12) Despite its limitations, this movement shook the traditional forms of domination by the oligarchy and imperialism. And in Argentina, a few years later various powerful popular movements were born (the cordobazo and rosariazo)(13) as well as dynamic political-military organizations (such as the Revolutionary Army of the People [ERP] and the Montoneros), which could be destroyed only by one of the most brutal campaigns of repression ever seen by that country and the entire continent. No less than 30,000 persons and hundreds of fighters from among the people were murdered or disappeared. If Che had been able to continue developing his strategic plan, I am sure that many of these compañeros would have joined his struggle. Remember that his was not a short-term strategy. It assumed that the struggle for national and social liberation of these countries would last 10, 15, or perhaps 20 years, above all because he always foresaw the probable intervention by imperialism.
Q: What role did Régis Debray play? Was he the "beginning of the thread" that led to pinpointing the location of the guerrilla unit?
A: There are various versions. Some compañeros allege that Debray revealed Che's presence in Bolivia. However, the information we possess - which is quite extensive, even if there are still some facts to verify - indicates that what Régis did, in the difficult situation he found himself in, was to confirm the information already supplied to the Bolivian army by some lower-level deserters, and above all by everything given them by the Argentine Ciro Roberto Bustos. The latter made drawings of each of the members of the guerrilla unit, and gave an immense quantity of facts, providing the enemy with very precise information on the guerrilla unit's camp, its composition, and its weaponry. What Debray does seem to have revealed for the first time, was Che's strategic plan of extending the guerrilla struggle from Bolivia to other South American countries, that is, the continental character of the movement undertaken in Bolivia.
The negative positions taken by Debray in recent years, his "repentance" of the revolutionary struggle, his direct or indirect connections with persons today who want to throw mud on the figure of Fidel, on Cuban socialism, and on our revolution's support to Che's internationalist efforts, cannot lead us to ignore the facts I have mentioned. It would not be ethical on my part, without proof, to assign Debray responsibility for pinpointing the guerrillas' location, much less for Che's death. As the saying goes, "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's."
Q: According to the biography written by Jorge G. Castañeda, Che had a martyr complex. What is your opinion of such a statement?
A: I have read it. He also says Che had a mystical affinity, and he tries to explain all of Che's acts by what he calls a "fuite en avant."(14) I don't know if this is a literary term or a psychological concept, but all of us who were acquainted with Che know that he did not seek death, but rather victory of the revolutionary cause. He was very altruistic and daring, so much so that compañero Fidel termed his audacity his "Achilles' heel."
In my opinion - and this is shared by other compañeros who were with him in the guerrilla effort in Bolivia - these were personality traits that led him to play an active role in the battle of the Yuro ravine. In this, as on many previous occasions in the Sierra Maestra and the Las Villas campaign - Che, rather than pull back, remained in the front line to slow up the attack of a Bolivian unit and thus facilitate the retreat of the other compañeros, in particular the ones who were ill. One can ask oneself today whether or not this was correct, but for him it was very difficult to abandon compañeros in such a state. This does not mean that he went around seeking death. What he certainly was seeking was to preserve the maximum guerrilla forces in order to reorganize them and continue the struggle.
Something else that disproves this "psychoanalysis" is that even when he was wounded, with his carbine put out of action, and with no bullets for his pistol, Che tried, with the help of a Bolivian compañero, Willy Cuba, to break out of the encirclement and meet up again with the other compañeros at a prearranged site. Che was a man who defended his life, conscious of what it signified for the revolutionary plan of action, and he was determined to sell it very dearly to our enemies. It's true that he did not fear death and that he was prepared like few others to face it. But that is different from stating that Che had a propensity to martyrdom.
Q: Was an escape route or a plan to rescue Che envisioned ahead of time? If so, what prevented such a plan from being carried out?
A: The idea of a supposed "rescue plan" for Che in Bolivia that was not implemented because compañero Fidel did not authorize it, is one of the many lies propagated - with the clear support of our enemies - by Dariel Alarcón, alias Benigno.(15) He raised this after betraying the Cuban revolution and the ideals he fought for together with Che. These arguments reveal his frustrations and resentments, and the way he is being manipulated by the enemies of the revolution. We note his trips to the United States to offer his services to the CIA and to the imperialist campaign against Fidel and the Cuban revolution.
What Benigno and the authors of these fallacies suggest is that Cuba should have declared war on Bolivia, that it should have sent a unit or a commando squad, thousands of kilometers away, to a landlocked country, transporting tens or hundreds of thousands of men by air to rescue Che. Such a thing is seen only in adventure movies....
Furthermore, I think that those who have spread such a hoax forget one basic thing: no one who is fully and consciously involved, as was Che, in guerrilla struggle or in revolutionary combat, maps out a rescue plan in the eventuality of failure. For this reason neither Che in Bolivia nor Fidel in Cuba ever envisioned ahead of time any rescue plan. Che went to Bolivia with the determination to fight, to win or to die. As I stressed in the interview already mentioned, he was optimistic about the possibility of carrying out the revolutionary plan of action, given the conditions of Bolivia and the Southern Cone of Latin America. And he believed that as the project grew, it would receive the solidarity of all progressive sectors of Latin America and the world.
As I already said, the only thing approximating a plan or an "escape route" foreseen by Che was to head toward another region of Bolivia where there were better conditions to develop the guerrilla struggle. He certainly would have done this, even if all he had left was a handful of combatants. I'm convinced that regardless of the circumstances, Che would have made all efforts to reorganize and reinitiate the struggle, just as Fidel did in Cuba after the "shipwreck" of the Granma,(16) and above all, the disaster of Alegría de Pío. Remember that when it appeared he had only seven men and five rifles, Fidel said, "Now we've really won the war!" Che had this same spirit, this same strategic optimism.
Those who believe in "escape routes" and "rescue plans" mapped out ahead of time, apparently project onto others - as the psychologists would say - their own cowardice, inadequacy, and pragmatism. But fortunately we revolutionaries are not so pragmatic. We are inspired by different values and principles. We have confidence in victory. We try to make great ventures possible at all costs. The more difficulties they entail, the more interesting and attractive they look to us. This is what Fidel and the Cuban revolution have demonstrated each and every day. And it is proved by the life of all men and women who, like Che, know how to conquer immortality.
FOOTNOTES
1. A guerrilla nucleus in the Salta mountains of
northern Argentina operated from late 1963 to early
1964 led by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, an Argentine
journalist who lived in Cuba after the revolution and
founded the Prensa Latina news agency. The plan for
the operation foresaw Che's eventual participation in
the undertaking. In early 1964, however, the Argentine
guerrillas were wiped out by government troops and
Masetti was killed.
2. Guevara led a contingent of over 100 Cuban volunteers to the Congo in 1965 to aid the anti- imperialist struggle by supporters of the late prime minister Patrice Lumumba. In 1966-67 he led a guerrilla movement in Bolivia against that country's military dictatorship. He was captured by the Bolivian army in a CIA-organized operation on Oct. 8, 1967, and murdered the following day.
3. This was the Rebel Army column commanded by Guevara in 1958.
4. Pedro Albizu Campos was a leader of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party. He was imprisoned by the U.S. government for over 20 years for proindependence activities. He was released from prison just prior to his death in 1965.
5. Major excerpts from Guevara's unpublished manuscript on the Congo are included in the recently published book by William Gálvez, El sueño africano de Che (Che's African dream), now available from Pathfinder in Spanish.
6. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997).
7. Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).
8. Debray, a French writer, and Bustos, an Argentine artist, had gone to the guerrilla camp in Bolivia in March 1967 at Guevara's invitation to discuss international support work for the guerrilla movement. The two were trapped in the zone of operations after the onset of combat, and were arrested in April.
9. On July, 26, 1953, the Moncada army garrison in Santiago de Cuba was the site of an insurrectionary attack, together with the garrison in nearby Bayamo, by 160 fighters led by Fidel Castro. The combatants failed to take the garrisons, and over 50 captured revolutionaries were murdered. Castro and 27 other fighters were subsequently captured, tried, and sentenced to up to 15 years in prison. Alegría de Pío was the first battle of the Cuban revolutionary war in December 1956, in which the Rebel forces were taken by surprise and almost wiped out.
10. Riding a wave of popular mobilization in Bolivia in 1970-71, a People's Assembly - an incipient workers' parliament - was formed in 1971. Following months of wavering and indecision by workers leaders, right-wing military forces overthrew the Torres government. A wave of murderous repression followed.
11. A powerful, revolutionary mass upsurge in Bolivia in 1952 resulted in nationalization of the largest tin mines, legalization of the trade unions, initiation of land reform, and the elimination of the literacy requirement that had effectively disenfranchised the majority of Bolivia's people, the Aymará- and Quechua-speaking population. But Bolivia remained one of the most impoverished countries of the Americas. The increasingly corrupt and fractured government of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), a bourgeois party that initially had strong support from Bolivia's superexploited tin miners, was overthrown by a military coup in 1964.
12. In 1968 Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado led a military coup in Peru. The Velasco regime nationalized the country's oil fields and initiated a land reform.
13. In May 1969 a general strike erupted in Rosario, Argentina's second-largest city, followed by a massive uprising in Córdoba, the third-largest city. The cordobazo ushered in a period of rapidly sharpening class struggle in Argentina. Only after the workers movement failed repeatedly to resolve the conflict in its interests did the struggle culminate in a 1976 military coup, followed by years of the infamous "dirty war" waged by the dictatorship of Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla, in which thousands of Argentines are estimated to have been killed or "disappeared."
14. A surge forward, no matter what the obstacles.
15. Alarcón, a Cuban veteran who fought with Guevara in Bolivia with the nom de guerre of Benigno, defected from Cuba in 1996.
16. The name of a yacht used to transport 82 members of the July 26 Movement, including Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, to Cuba to begin the revolutionary war in November-December 1956.