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Vol.64/No.2      January 17, 2000 
 
 
SabreTech found guilty of violating hazardous materials regulations  
 
 
BY RACHELE FRUIT 
MIAMI - In the first criminal conviction related to a U.S. airline disaster, a Miami jury on December 6 found maintenance contractor SabreTech guilty of recklessly violating hazardous materials regulations and failing to properly train workers in the May 1996 crash of ValuJet 592.

The jury, however, exonerated the company on charges of conspiracy, making false statements, and willingly violating hazardous materials regulations, and acquitted two former SabreTech employees of all charges.

SabreTech handled the oxygen canisters that are believed to have ignited the fire that caused the Everglades crash, which killed all 110 passengers and crew.

The jury found SabreTech's former mechanic, Eugene Florence, not guilty of one count of conspiracy and two counts of making false statements; Daniel Gonzalez not guilty of one count each of conspiracy and making false statements; and SabreTech not guilty of 14 counts of conspiracy, making false statements, and willfully violating hazardous materials regulations.

The jury found SabreTech guilty of eight counts of recklessly causing the transportation of hazardous materials in violation of federal regulations and one count of failing to properly train its employees in hazardous materials. Each count carries a penalty of up to $500,000, for a possible fine of $4.5 million for the now-defunct company.

SabreTech separately faces state charges, including 110 counts of third-degree murder, 110 counts of manslaughter, and one count of unlawful transportation of hazardous materials.

Jury forewoman Dorothy Alexander told the Miami Herald the jury found the individual defendants not guilty because they could find no evidence of intent to do wrong.

In defense of SaberTech, attorney Jane Moscowitz pointed to maintenance records of the 27-year-old DC-9 that show 45 mechanical problems in the five months preceding the crash, including 22 electrical ones and six auto-pilot failures, five of them during the plane's final week.

The 1996 crash highlighted the disregard of safety not only of the airline bosses, but of the government agency that is supposed to oversee them. Three internal reports by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) just a few months before the disaster detailed a laundry list of problems, from the lack of structural inspections of aging aircraft, to the use of the wrong training manuals, to inadequate maintenance procedures.

In September 1996 the U.S. Department of Transportation cleared ValuJet to resume operations over the objections of the Association of Flight Attendants, which challenged the carrier's safety record.

The company, since renamed AirTran, has continued to fly despite further findings of major safety violations by the FAA.  
 
 
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