The south Korean president has declared his intention of signing a "peace declaration" with the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the coming months, and is actively pursuing rail and other links across the border of the divided nation.

Bush, on the other hand, has placed negotiations with Pyongyang on hold while a "thorough review" of relations with the DPRK is undertaken. The recent public shift in Washington's policy has alarmed the south Korean government, which is pursuing closer relations with the workers state in the north, and had supported efforts by President William Clinton to pressure Pyongyang into signing a "missile accord."

In broad terms, that accord was designed to outlaw missile exports by Pyongyang, bar the development of missiles with a range of more than 180 miles, and other concessions demanded by Washington. In exchange, the north Korean government had proposed an increase in aid from the U.S. government and assistance in developing satellites. In December, Clinton himself froze efforts to bring the deal home, announcing that his promised trip to Pyongyang was off.

In addition, Bush has put a question mark over Washington's compliance with a 1994 deal with Pyongyang dubbed the Agreed Framework. Under this agreement, involving the governments of the north and the south, as well as Japan and the United States, Seoul and Washington agreed to construct two light-water nuclear power stations and provide fuel oil and other assistance to north Korea in exchange for concessions on missile development. Implementation of the accord is already well behind schedule.

The White House has stepped up its fear-mongering propaganda offensive against Pyongyang, questioning the government's reliability and criticizing its supposedly unusual secrecy. Bush's officials regularly call north Korea a "rogue nation," an epithet used by the Clinton government as justification for initiating development of a missile shield designed to give Washington a first-strike advantage in any nuclear conflict. Bush has criticized Clinton's missile shield as inadequate, and has announced his intention to proceed with a scaled-up National Missile Defense, continuing to use a possible strike from north Korea as a key pretext.

A regular U.S. theme is that north Korea, in the words of Wall Street Journal columnist George Melloan, quoting from a 1998 report by a congressional commission headed by present secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, is a "major proliferator of missiles of ballistic missile capabilities, selling missiles and support equipment to Iran, Pakistan and others." The same report claimed that "North Korea maintains an active WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] program," including nuclear and biological weapons.

U.S. military and "intelligence" officials allege that Pyongyang is reinforcing its defenses along the demilitarized zone, which has divided the north and the south since 1953. According to the New York Times, the "North [has] begun laying fiber-optic cables [to] stymie American intelligence gathering and bolster its ability to unleash a devastating conventional attack on Seoul."

One administration official stated bluntly the day before the talks that "the North Korean regime is a problem and [President] Kim Jong Il is a problem."  
 
Nervous capitalists in the south
Although President Kim Dae Jung maintains a deferential tone when referring to Washington, he has so far continued to defend his "sunshine policy" of closer relations with the north. He speaks for a substantial layer of the ruling class in semicolonial south Korea that fear the war threats that are a logical outcome of Washington's confrontational policy. In spite of their own massive armed forces, and the presence of 37,000 U.S. troops on south Korean soil, they are less than confident of their survival in any conflict.

The government in the south also feels the heat from mass support among Koreans for the reunification of their U.S.-divided nation.

These political differences marked the March 7 meeting and surrounding events. In the week before the summit, the White House sharply criticized a statement that Kim and Russian president Vladimir Putin issued after holding talks in Seoul. The joint statement endorsed the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Moscow has consistently pointed out that Washington's "missile defense" would violate the terms of the 1972 treaty between the two powers.

The south Korean and Russian heads of state described the treaty as a "cornerstone of strategic stability" in their February 27 statement. As Washington pressed Seoul for an explanation, one Bush administration official stated, "We certainly don't consider it the cornerstone."

In what appeared to be a half-hearted retraction on March 1, the south Korean foreign ministry denied that any opposition to the proposed missile system had been implied. The ministry said it was "still carefully reviewing its position" on missile defense, and had not "voiced any opposition to it."

In his post-meeting remarks, Bush asserted that "part of the problem in dealing with North Korea is there's not very much transparency. We're not certain as to whether or not they're keeping all terms of...agreements.... We look forward at some point in the future to having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but...any negotiation would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement."

Secretary of State Colin Powell also stressed the demand for "verification." He implied that Washington will demand the right to inspect the north Korean nuclear reactors that are being constructed under the 1994 agreement.

Powell said the administration also needed time to "decide whether an agreement should cover other aspects of the north Korean military," according to a Reuters report. "For example," he said, "there's a huge army poised on the demilitarized zone pointing south that's probably as great a threat to South Korea, Seoul, and regional stability as weapons of mass destruction."  
 
Tactical differences among U.S. rulers
The U.S. secretary of state was speaking in response to criticism of Bush's policy by Democratic Party senators. Tactical differences on this question have crossed party lines. They have also been reflected in the big-business media. "Mr. Bush Picks Up a Stick," read one laudatory editorial in the Wall Street Journal. On the other hand, the New York Times editors complained that Bush was "losing momentum on Korea."

Kim Dae Jung told a luncheon at the American Enterprise Institute that "without progress between the U.S. and North Korea, advances in South-North Korean relations will be difficult to achieve, and it will be impossible to end the Cold War and establish a system of lasting peace on the Korean peninsula."

"We must not lose this opportunity," he stressed.

Bourgeois voices of concern have also been raised in Japan. "It is imperative that Washington and Seoul understand and trust each other when dealing with North Korea," read an editorial in the Japan Times. "Treating Pyongyang like an enemy will ensure that it becomes one."

On March 12 Pyongyang called off cabinet-level talks with the south Korean government. "Considering various circumstances, we cannot participate in today's meeting," said DPRK spokesperson Jon Kum Jin. His counterpart from the south, Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu, "expressed strong regret," according to the Associated Press. The wire service reported that Park "urged that the Cabinet-level talks--the fifth round since an inter-Korean summit in June--be held as soon as possible."
 
 
Related article:
Washington hands off Korea  
 
 
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