In this issue we are publishing the majority of a Sept. 18, 1961, report by Capt. José Ramón Fernández to the central command of the revolutionary armed forces, in response to a request that he prepare a detailed report on the operations carried out by the revolutionary forces against the mercenary invasion at Playa Girón. Fernández, who led the principal column of Cuban forces at the Bay of Pigs, offers an almost hour-by-hour account of the three-day battle.

At the time of the invasion, Fernández was head of the Cadet School at the army base in Managua, Havana province, and of the Militia Leadership School in Matanzas, where selected workers and student youth with proven leadership capacities were trained as officers in the revolutionary militias.

The previously classified report was among the documents publicly released by the Cuban government and made available at a U.S.-Cuba conference on "Playa Girón: 40 Years Later," held March 22–24 in Havana. Fernández, the main organizer of the conference, is vice president of Cuba's Council of Ministers. He is a brigadier general of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, though no longer on active duty.

The following translation, as well as the annotation and subtitles, are by the Militant.
 

Together with three or four officers and enlisted men, I left for Matanzas, arriving at the school at about 0500 hours. Capt. Vilá, the secretary at the school, had already prepared more than 20 trucks he had requisitioned. Those at the school had been organized several days earlier into six companies.

2. In Matanzas I received another call from Commander Castro, who informed me that the enemy had been pinpointed, and told me to go with the battalion to Jovellanos, where I should again contact him and then establish the command post at Jagüey Grande.

I quickly took a jeep and rode ahead of the battalion, arriving in Jovellanos at about 0600 hours. I again contacted Commander Castro, who brought me up to date on the latest reports he had received about the enemy.  
 
Command post at Australia sugar mill
Continuing the trip, I arrived at the Australia sugar mill [near Jagüey Grande] at about 0800 hours and immediately established the command post with the small number of officers who accompanied me, not yet having troops available. It was evident that, although shots had not yet been heard, we were in a zone of operations. The residents expressed alarm, talk was rampant, and the peasant militias and even women were asking us for weapons.

In light of their reports that enemy planes had attacked civilians, we ordered men and vehicles to be dispersed and camouflaged.

3. We gave instructions to organize a seven-man patrol, headed by the manager of the sugar mill, to go through the area around two nearby cooperatives where, it was said, [enemy] paratroopers had landed. They returned a short while later, reporting that they had been attacked by planes, sustaining four casualties, including an old woman who had been traveling through the area.

While we did not yet have troops to begin operations, we remained in communication with Commander Castro, who informed us that our planes were successfully attacking the enemy and that they had sunk a ship.

4. Shortly after arriving at the Australia mill, two B-26 bombers, with the insignia of our air force painted on them, passed nearby and did not attack us. Later, Commander Castro informed me these were enemy planes.

5. At 0830 hours, I traveled through the area, giving the order to block off a nearby airstrip with vehicles and other obstacles.

During the trip I met Capt. Cordero, who told me he was the head of the 339th Battalion [of the militias], which had been posted at the Australia mill. They had resisted the enemy with the few available men and weapons, consisting of M-52 rifles and submachine guns, but had been repulsed and forced to retreat by the mercenaries and planes. I had thought that the members of his battalion had all been killed or captured, and that none of our forces were then putting up resistance to the enemy.

At that moment Capt. Benítez arrived and informed us that he was bringing a battalion from Bolondrón. We immediately ordered him to go to the front, dislodge a small group that--according to the news we had received--had seized the mouth of El Tesoro Lagoon, then take Pálpite and Soplillar, and fortify his positions at those locations.

He advanced and went past the mouth of the lagoon. The fighting became generalized, but they could not definitively push the enemy out of Pálpite.

6. Later the 227th Battalion from Matanzas, commanded by Capt. Pérez Díaz, arrived. I ordered it to advance and reinforce the battalion from Bolondrón.

7. At about 0930 hours, the Militia Leadership School arrived from Matanzas. We assembled them and I spoke, explaining the situation. I ordered them to take Pálpite and consolidate their strength there. Meanwhile, the Second Company [of the Militia Leadership School], commanded by Lt. Conyedo, would advance toward Soplillar, dislodge the enemy from its position there, and block off the airstrip, defending it against any possible landing by paratroopers. Around one hour later, we were informed that the mission had been completed.

We then ordered the forces stationed at Pálpite to march toward Playa Larga until we made contact with the enemy. At that moment we saw the first body of the enemy, a paratrooper who had died while landing, and who seemed to be a foreigner named Koch, according to his ID tags.

8. At about 1000 hours, Lt. Elio López, designated by the general staff as information officer, arrived. We assigned him, as his initial mission, to try to find out whether the enemy was situated at the rear of what had already become our front at Pálpite and Soplillar. The conclusion was that there was no enemy at the rear.

9. At about 1015 hours, we received a report from Commander Castro that three or four ships and landing craft had been sunk, others had been damaged, and the ships had withdrawn about 30 miles offshore.  
 
Initial attack on Playa Larga
10. Having captured Pálpite and Soplillar, a mission completed around 1200 hours, we received Fidel's order to attack Playa Larga with the Militia Leadership School.

We knew this attack would be difficult, given our lack of artillery, tanks, antiaircraft weapons, and air cover, but we also knew dislodging the enemy from its positions was key. The attack was launched around 1300 hours. We could not engage the enemy immediately, however, because the enemy planes remained constantly on top of the battalion, inflicting numerous casualties on us in terms of dead and wounded.

While it is true that the battalion heroically withstood the enemy's aerial attack, advancing and keeping up the pressure on them, it was unable to achieve its objective, so we gave the order to halt the advance. At that moment, Commander Fidel Castro arrived at the command post and we apprised him of the situation. Shortly before, a battery of 85 mm. cannon under the command of Lt. Gutiérrez had arrived. It was rapidly sent to the front to reinforce the attack we were launching.

11. Commander Castro informed us that tanks and field artillery would be arriving at night. The antiaircraft artillery was arriving at that moment.

12. Commander Fidel Castro ordered us to establish the command post in Pálpite and prepare an attack to be launched at midnight. He would remain at the Australia mill in charge of operations.

As we headed toward Pálpite, so did several batteries of four-barreled machine guns and antiaircraft guns, commanded by Capt. Alvarez Bravo.

Having reached these units, we arrived at the mouth of the lagoon, where I discovered that the 85 mm. cannon had been withdrawn to that location and unhitched. I ordered them to be hitched up again and to advance toward the front. On the way we ran into the battalions from Matanzas and Bolondrón, and some personnel from the Militia Leadership School who were marching along the highway toward the Australia sugar mill. They informed us that they had received orders to withdraw, which we canceled immediately.

I ordered the battalion from Bolondrón to take the highway from Pálpite to the area near the Australia mill in order to secure the mission and protect the sewer system and communications.

I ordered the battalion from Matanzas to stay in Soplillar, reinforcing the Second Company of the Militia Leadership School.

The battalion from the Militia Leadership School was ordered to reorganize in Pálpite. The field artillery and heavy mortars were deployed to the north, south, east, and west of Pálpite. The antiaircraft guns formed a ring around the field artillery and the town of Pálpite.

At about 2000 hours, the tanks began to arrive in Pálpite, where we had established the command post. We were at a position that had been hit by enemy planes, mortars, and cannon.

At that time we were also visited there by Dr. Fidel Castro; soon after, the Rebel Army's Special Combat Column 1 and a bazooka company also arrived.

We ordered the artillery units to fix their line of fire on the enemy positions, with the aim of subsequently launching a barrage in preparation for the attack. The 85 mm. cannon were the first to fire, followed soon after by the 122 mm. guns. But the ammunition for the 85 mm. artillery did not arrive ready for use and the firing was very slow.

The battery of 120 mm. mortars had one piece that was out of service and, because of the rocky terrain, the head of the unit insisted on not firing because the guns would be damaged.

Communications were poor because we had no radio. Only the 122 mm. guns had some radio equipment mounted on vehicles.

Although we had set up telephone lines, they were not of much use because the darkness and the flat terrain with its dense vegetation did not allow for much observation.

At around 2200 hours, I ordered Lt. Milián to take a vehicle and go as close to the enemy as he could in order to adjust the artillery's line of fire.

When they had just begun to adjust their line of fire, the enemy began to fire its batteries. Some rockets landed nearby and one of them left us four casualties among the four-barreled machine-gunners.

We intensified our artillery fire against the enemy positions, and soon the enemy stopped shooting. Lt. Milián reported to us that after some corrections our fire was becoming effective, so we ordered all artillery units to fire at maximum speed for 10 minutes.

13. We immediately coordinated the details of the attack:

Four T-34 tanks would advance in front. Beside them would march the infantry--First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Companies of the Militia Leadership School, led by Lts. González, Méndez, Rivero, and Palacios.

Column 1 and the bazookas would follow behind them. The attack began just after midnight. I advanced with our units about 1,500 meters and, after giving final instructions, returned to the command post.

After about an hour of marching, the shooting intensified. The enemy unleashed a violent barrage against our troops, keeping it up for an hour.

The Third Company and elements of Column 1, headed by Capt. Ferrer, reached a triangle at the entrance to Playa Larga, where the enemy positions were located. Lt. Díaz, head of the Third Company, fell in combat as he advanced beyond the forward enemy positions, along with a number of courageous compañeros. Others fell when they were already in the very trenches of the enemy.  
 
Heavy enemy fire
Due to the hesitations of some tank operators in advancing, the small number of effective subordinate officers, and the heavy and powerful enemy fire, our fire was ineffective against the weapons of the enemy, who had tanks, mortars, bazookas, recoilless cannon, and so on. Our infantry suffered many casualties and began to fall behind along the side of the highway. Only one tank, heads of units, and a total of 50–60 men--many of whom fell as they advanced--reached the site of the attack; only one bazooka from the entire company arrived.

The tank operator at the front of the march stopped before reaching the triangle where the enemy stood, because the others were not following. He later continued his advance, and, as he fell into an enemy position, one of his tank treads was destroyed by enemy fire. This was the head of the platoon, Lt. López [Cuba], who was able to evacuate his tank despite the risk of being wounded.

Another tank crossed enemy positions, heading in the direction of Girón. It got off the highway and fell into a ditch, where it was destroyed.

Along the highway on the east side, the enemy had deployed troops with light weapons about 800 meters ahead of their front lines, and they allowed our troops to advance without firing on them. When the enemy fired, they did so suddenly and very effectively. Their weapons were placed so as to be able to sweep the highway. The cannon and mortars were also targeting the highway. So were the troops positioned along the road who had let our troops pass without shooting at them.

After fighting and advancing bravely, our troops, who lacked a terrain where they could entrench themselves or protect themselves from the tanks, had to withdraw from Pálpite.

This withdrawal was an error, since they no longer maintained their contact with the enemy. So we immediately reorganized some units and prepared a new attack, sending the remaining units to the rear.

14. The Militia Leadership School suffered 18 dead and more than 50 wounded.

Knowing that the enemy planes, emboldened since the previous afternoon, would try to destroy us at dawn, we alerted all batteries starting at 4:00 in the morning. We did not need to wait long. At dawn a B-26 appeared; our response was intense and the plane was unable to penetrate our ring of fire--spinning wildly, it dropped its bombs in the middle of the woods. It withdrew and did not appear again.

15. The 180th and 144th Battalions arrived at daybreak. We instructed the 144th to move as fast as it could through Soplillar toward Caletón del Rosario, and to reinforce some of its elements there to avoid an attack from Girón; the rest were to advance to Playa Larga on the Girón-Playa Larga highway.

We ordered the 180th Battalion to move with the tanks and attack from the Pálpite-Playa Larga highway toward Playa Larga. Some of the tanks and two companies from the Militia Leadership School were to attack Playa Larga, using the road that leads to Buenaventura; that is, the attack was to be launched from the north, east, and west, with troops converging on the only three roads giving access to this location.

16. At about 0800 hours, the troops began to move against the enemy positions. As soon as they approached, a group of civilians came out holding white flags. In face of our presence, the enemy had abandoned that position; the battalion that tried to cut off its retreat arrived just minutes too late. The enemy had left Playa Larga, which was quickly occupied by our troops. The 180th Battalion was ordered to fortify Playa Larga, and the light combat battery of the 180th Battalion was instructed to begin pursuit.  
 
Cuban forces head to Playa Girón
17. Carrying out Commander Castro's orders and using the 123rd Battalion for this purpose, we organized the attack on Girón. Using elements from the Light Combat Company in front to protect the tanks and trucks, reconnaissance patrols were sent out. They covered 15 kilometers and found no enemy forces.

18. At that point we received information that our air force was going to protect our troops in the afternoon, between 1500 and 1600 hours. We therefore changed plans and had the troops ride on the tanks, ordering those marching behind them to ride in the vehicles (buses), which were driven at full speed. We considered that it would be an audacious blow to march against the enemy with such speed, since we did not already have air cover.

19. About 17 kilometers past Playa Larga, three enemy B-26s surprised our column, which was riding in vehicles. One of the officers marching at the front--who thought he knew about our plans, that is, that we were advancing in this way because we would have air cover--concluded that the planes were ours and did not allow the troops to be moved off the road, saying they were our planes. The planes flew over our troops and began to attack. They particularly targeted the tanks marching at the front but did not succeed. They hit three buses, however, which began to burn, and we suffered some casualties.

20. Learning of the attack almost immediately, we quickly marched over there, arriving as the planes were still machine-gunning the column.

The highway was blocked by the destroyed vehicles.

We rallied the troops' enthusiasm and when the burned vehicles were moved aside, continued to advance on the enemy. By nightfall, we were about 9 kilometers from Girón. There we ordered the men to organize the defense and to rest until two hours before daybreak. During the night we were joined by the battalion from the Revolutionary National Police.

21. At about 0400 hours of the 19th, we gave the order to begin advancing on Girón, starting from where the troops were situated. Shortly thereafter they came under enemy fire and assumed battle positions.

We knew that at bottom their defenses were aimed at slowing us down. We ordered the tanks and forward elements to ignore their fire, whose only purpose was to slow us down and compel us to assume battle positions.

This was done, and we quickly took three or four enemy positions, capturing machine guns, mortars, trucks, and so on. We were able to do so because the enemy hadn't expected what we did, and didn't even have time to turn around their vehicles toward Girón and drive off.

In this operation, we advanced within 1.5 kilometers of Girón, where there were strong enemy defensive positions--with tanks, recoilless cannon, heavy machine guns, infantry in position, and so on.

22. At about 7:00 a.m., a B-26 plane attacked our positions, and the alert antiaircraft gunners quickly shot it down. At the same time a B-26 attacked Playa Larga, strafing our positions and wounding one. But the heavy antiaircraft fire made it retreat. The plane was apparently damaged, since this was the last air attack we faced.

23. In this way, we moved the artillery into position about 4 kilometers from Girón. There we had four 122 howitzer batteries, one incomplete 120 mortar battery, one 85 cannon battery, and another one that was added shortly afterward.

We ordered observers to the front lines, at the same time that the artillery was finishing up getting into position, on rocky and difficult terrain. Despite all the resources we were employing, the observers were unable to locate the enemy positions (given the difficulties of the flat terrain and thick vegetation).

24. After reaching a point 4.2 kilometers from the enemy, we ordered the 120 mm. mortars to begin firing. The artillery units, a little further back, were set up about 40 meters from each other. We had to saturate the entire area with artillery fire, so, because of our lack of information, we ordered four batteries to be raised at an angle corresponding to a range of 3.8 kilometers and to begin firing--first three salvos, and then increasing the distance by 100 meters. As a result, 18 shots fired by the first battery would land at the initial position, and immediately afterward the battery behind it would fire 18 shots at the position, and so on. We proceeded to shell every 100 meters, up to 4,800 meters.

After completing that process, all the batteries would shift their direction, firing 300 meters to the right and pulling back the line of fire just as they had moved it forward. When they returned to the shortest distance, 3,800 meters, they would again shift their line by firing 600 meters to the left, moving up the line of fire again up to the maximum distance.

We assumed that all the enemy weapons and positions were within the rectangle that we were tracing and that was being saturated by our artillery fire.

25. The results were effective. After the enemy was destroyed, we captured numerous heavy weapons, mortars, and recoilless cannon, which showed marks of being hit by our artillery. Some mercenary prisoners were interested to know what procedures we had used to adjust our line of fire in order to be able to keep landing shells on them.

26. By 1300 hours, the enemy mortar fire seemed to have died down. We began to prepare a new attack against enemy positions. At about 1440 hours, as our tanks and infantry advanced, we noticed that warships appeared on the horizon. Landing craft were immediately lowered from the ships, and smaller boats were also observed going from land toward the ships. We determined that it was a landing. We reported to the high command and deployed all the artillery against the small enemy vessels.

The range finder for our antiaircraft artillery indicated that the ships were six to seven kilometers away, which put them outside Cuban jurisdictional waters, even though it was an open provocation and intervention. We gave the order to fire using all available weapons against the landing craft, boats, and smaller vessels. This was done, and we were able to appreciate the effectiveness of the two batteries of 85 mm. cannon, the tanks, and the self-propelled cannon, which sank some of the boats.

We were informed that our air force was going to attack Girón at 1500 hours so that we could launch an assault on it.  
 
U.S. warships withdraw
27. At approximately 1540 hours, after changing positions several times and positioning themselves in a threatening manner, the enemy warships, which appeared to be two destroyers, headed out to open sea at full speed. This seemed to be because their radar had detected the presence of our planes, which had arrived then, attacking the landing craft and sinking many of them.

28. We organized our lines of defense to repel a possible attack and went to Playa Larga to report on what had happened. There we were informed that Dr. Fidel Castro's opinion was that they were trying to escape--which turned out to be true--and not trying to land, as we had believed.

29. We then returned to our point of departure, organized a small group of tanks and two companies of infantry, and made our way to Girón, which fell into our hands practically without firing a shot. The enemy had fled, leaving behind tanks, cannon, mortars, etc. It was about 1830 hours and it was beginning to get dark when we entered Girón. We ordered the 123rd Battalion to head down a road that starts at the Girón-Playa Larga highway, about 1 kilometer from Girón going north. We ordered this operation to form a circle and pressure the enemy from a wider front. It was not possible to do this completely owing to the difficulties of the terrain and, in part, because it was not carried out resolutely by the head of the battalion.

30. After entering Girón, we began to search all the cabins, buildings, and so on, trying to find any enemy elements lying in ambush or in hiding. In the course of this operation we freed the employees of the beach, who had been made prisoners by the enemy.

31. We also proceeded to arrest some 20 mercenaries. Through them we found out that the rest had fled--leaving their weapons and positions, after their attempted evacuation by U.S. ships was foiled by the fire from our artillery and planes--and had taken refuge in the woods.

The search, collection of weapons, and cleanup operation were carried out practically without firing a shot.

32. Shortly after starting this operation, a tank arrived carrying Capt. Pardo. He looked rather lost, and was surprised on finding us in the area rather than the enemy. Through him we learned that Commander Fidel Castro was in San Blas. So we headed there to bring him up to date on developments. We were unable to get there because our vehicle came under intense fire from two machine guns and some lighter arms.

We therefore continued our mopping-up efforts, using the time to reorganize the defense of Girón against a possible attack both by land and by sea.

33. At dawn the following day, we received word that an aircraft carrier was nearby, accompanied by some warships. Jet planes were flying in the vicinity of Girón, and we began the systematic pursuit and capture of the mercenaries who had fled into the woods.

34. In two days we captured about 700 who turned themselves in, exhausted by hunger, thirst, and surrounded with no possible escape.

35. All were treated well by those who captured them. Insulting or offensive expressions or actions against them were prohibited. They were afforded the best care possible in terms of food and medical care. Cuban and foreign journalists were allowed to freely interview them and, in general, they all expressed regret about the action that had been carried out.

Next week the Militant will run the concluding section of Fernández's report, which is a critical balance sheet of weakness of the Cuban forces in the battle.

At the recent conference in Havana "Playa Girón: 40 Years Later," Fernández noted that the commission reviewing documents for declassification had proposed blacking out that section before releasing the report, but that Fidel Castro, as commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, overruled the recommendation and insisted the entire report be declassified.
 
 
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