The move comes in the face of continuing reverses suffered by the Mobutu regime, which admitted March 31 that its military headquarters at the town of Mutshatsha had been taken by antigovernment Katangan troops.

In addition to the aid from France and Morocco, Mobutu's other international allies--particularly the governments in the United States, Belgium, and China--have rushed in supplies to help bolster his dictatorial regime.

Although there have been no reports of further direct American assistance to Mobutu since president Carter approved an initial shipment of $2 million worth of supposedly nonlethal supplies March 15, indirect backing has been given in the form of Washington's approval for the sending of the Moroccan troops.

Although Administration officials were emphatic in saying that Washington had not encouraged the Moroccan decision, they made no secret in private of their hopes that King Hassan's soldiers could stabilize the military situation in Zaire's Shaba Province, formerly known as Katanga.

April 21, 1952
Contrary to the beliefs or hopes of the millions of parents, wives, children and friends of the G.I.'s in Korea, the U.S. troops will not be returned home in the event of a truce. Approximately a half million American personnel will be kept in Korea indefinitely.

This was made plain by Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, U.S.-UN Far East war commander, in an exclusive interview published in the N.Y. Herald-Tribune of April 13, 14 and 15.

The high-ranking militarist expressed the fear that the American people will demand the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Korea, reports Mac R. Johnson, who interviewed the general.

"He indicated that it would be most unfortunate if an armistice in Korea signaled a 'bring-my-boy-back-home' movement such as developed in the United States immediately after Japan's surrender as World War II ended."

This is a warning that the Big Brass intend to keep the U.S. forces in Korea despite the great unpopularity of the war and the majority sentiment, shown by repeated nation-wide polls, that the U.S. should never have intervened in Korea to begin with.

But Ridgway's fear is also an indication to the American people of how they can bring an end to the war and secure the safe return of their conscripted loved ones. There is nothing the generals fear so much as a mighty mass movement, expressing the deepest desires of the GI's themselves, such as forced the return of the troops at the end of World War II.  
 
 
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