The Militant has been reprinting excerpts from the new book and this week’s feature is taken from the fifth chapter, which describes efforts by the July 26 Movement in 1955-56 to win the leadership of the revolutionary vanguard and of the broader movement against the Batista dictatorship, contesting for influence with political currents within the Orthodox Party and other bourgeois opposition groups.

Fulgencio Batista had carried out a coup on March 10, 1952, and imposed a ruthless dictatorship backed by Washington. On July 26, 1953, a group of 160 revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro launched simultaneous armed attacks on the Moncada army garrison in Santiago de Cuba and the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes barracks in Bayamo, both in eastern Cuba, aiming to spark a popular revolt. While the attacks did not produce an uprising against the dictatorship and many of the captured revolutionaries were tortured and murdered, they marked the beginning of a growing popular struggle to overthrow the regime.

Released from prison as a result of a broad amnesty campaign, Castro and other surviving veterans of the Moncada attack founded the July 26 Movement. In July 1955 Castro and other leaders left for Mexico, where they organized an expedition of 82 combatants that returned aboard the yacht Granma, landing in southeastern Cuba on Dec. 2, 1956. They launched a revolutionary war that culminated in a popular insurrection leading to the overthrow of the dictatorship on Jan. 1, 1959. The revolutionary victory led workers and farmers to take political power and opened the door to the first socialist revolution in the Americas. Copyright ©2004 by Pathfinder Press, reprinted by permission. Material in brackets added by the Militant.
 

Despite the obstacles, Fidel tried to find peaceful and political solutions. But the government slammed all doors. It blocked the convening of a large rally on the university steps called for May 20, 1955. There was also discussion about having Fidel appear on a well-known political television program called “Meet the Press” and on the radio show “The Orthodox Hour,” but these were not allowed either.

Then we began to wage the most important political battle—denouncing the crimes committed by the regime on July 26, 1953, and the days that followed. Even though the accusations were not a call to revolution, they damaged Batista more than raising insurrection would have. Without calling for a war, Fidel demoralized the enemy to such an extent that an official— Waldo Pérez Almaguer, who had been governor of Oriente province at the time—decided he did not want to take responsibility for the horrible crimes of July 26-29, 1953. Spurred on by Fidel’s public appeal, Pérez Almaguer set about confirming the charges.

It was not easy to find a newspaper in Havana able to print these revelations. But the daily La Calle [The street], a tribune of the people run by Luis Orlando Rodríguez, did so on June 3. I went with Fidel to the newspaper’s offices to see the pages being prepared.

Fidel’s article “You Lie, Chaviano!” became the most important accusation against the tyranny. Soon afterwards, the government ordered publication of La Calle suspended….

These were months of intense activity. Fidel had proclaimed that in 1956 we would be free or we would be martyrs. Meanwhile, the traditional opposition parties kept trying to reach a peaceful arrangement with Batista.

Melba [Hernández], Haydée [Santamaría], Faustino [Pérez], and I maintained contacts on behalf of the Movement with the Martí Civic Front of Women, an organization that had been born in November 1952 to bring together Cuban women in the fight against the tyranny.

Shortly after Fidel left for Mexico, we received Manifesto no. 1, which he had drawn up and signed. In this document, the Moncada leader reiterated the road of insurrection and emphasized the measures that in essence had been presented in History Will Absolve Me. In a fifteen-point program he set forth the first measures that a revolutionary government would implement, and this was the program he carried out in the first months of 1959. We worked intensively to publish the Manifesto and distribute it clandestinely. It became the vehicle for organizing cells of the July 26 Movement, and it was distributed from one end of the country to the other.

Sometime later, in December 1955, Fidel issued Manifesto no. 2. These materials were a political call with a very clear revolutionary content. Together with History Will Absolve Me, they would become the guide for immediate action and the program of the Cuban Revolution.

Throughout these months, the expedition was being prepared in Mexico, and in Cuba organizational work was being carried out in support of the landing. We directed all the organization’s tasks to these ends.

The Movement was also involved in other events during this period, of which I’ll mention the most significant. A meeting was held of representatives of the membership of the Cuban People’s Party to debate the political line to be followed in those times of revolutionary ferment. Given the significance of that meeting, the main party leaders attended. Among those representing the party organization were political bigwigs serving only their own venal interests. In addition, there were honest men like Manuel Bisbé, and progressives like Leonardo Fernández Sánchez. The latter two supported Fidel’s positions.

Ñico López, Faustino Pérez, Pedro Miret, and I also attended, with the task of asking the Orthodox Party to formally approve the insurrectional line. The heart of the matter was that a large number of party members were putting pressure on it to decide on revolutionary action. With the support of honest leaders, they were demanding that the Orthodox Party formally approve the July 26 line, that is, for revolution.

The atmosphere was hot. The Orthodox Youth, our main ally within the organization, was becoming stronger every day. Fidel’s prestige among the youth and the party ranks was growing, to such a degree that in the minds of many leaders and members he was filling the space left by Eddy Chibás.

In the midst of a large group of delegates, Faustino read out the July 26 Movement’s proposal, calling for the Orthodox Party to proclaim the insurrectional line.

The general atmosphere in the country, the popular roots of the Orthodox Party, Fidel’s prestige, and the action of a vanguard—all this resulted in the positions of the July 26 Movement being approved by that meeting. This was the last time all the elements that made up the Orthodox Party came together. The rank and file of the party and its youth had surpassed their traditional leaders.

Anyone who opposed the proposal of the July 26 Movement would have been rejected. The petty politicians were morally very weak, and they turned out to be the only real enemies at the meeting. They acted demagogically, and to their surprise they found themselves in a position they had not anticipated. Since they claimed to support the insurrectional line, and since this line was being put forward for official vote, they had no alternative but to accept it formally. For the big-shot politicians of the Orthodox Party there was no alternative: either they united with Batista or they joined the revolution. A leadership had emerged in Cuba capable of transforming and developing the purest ideas of the Orthodox Party.

Fidel used to point out that the July 26 Movement was the revolutionary instrument of the Orthodox Party. But he knew that neither the Cuban People’s Party nor its youth organization would be adequate to carry out the insurrectional line, since they were incapable of moving the revolution forward.

The best of the rank and file of the Orthodox Party had joined the July 26 Movement, which was already at the head of the popular movement. Thus Ñico, Faustino, Pedro, and I, on behalf of the July 26 Movement, witnessed the party’s death. The Orthodox Party’s youth and its best rank-and-file cadres were to make up the basic structure of the July 26 Movement. Although the party ceased to exist, it should be emphasized, we never abandoned its ideals.

Juan Manuel Márquez, the most outstanding revolutionary leader of the Orthodox Party, built up a close relationship with Fidel and became one of his closest collaborators. He worked with Fidel in Mexico and the United States, came on the Granma, and died heroically after the landing.

Other members of the Orthodox Party leadership closely identified with us at that time included Luis Orlando Rodríguez, Conchita Fernández, Vicentina Antuña, Manuel Bisbé, and Leonardo Fernández Sánchez.

On September 1, 1955, several bank strikes erupted. This was a very sensitive matter for the ruling class, since the strikes threatened to develop an openly political character. The strike’s organizers were opponents of the regime. My brother Enrique, who worked in the bank at Línea and Paseo, was one of the most outstanding promoters of the strike. He did it with a very clear understanding that he was contributing to the fight against the tyranny. He did not have the slightest uncertainty in this regard.

Enrique was arrested. Taking advantage of being a lawyer, I inquired into his case at the Urgency Court. They had ordered others arrested to be set free, but they did not want to let Enrique out since they regarded his case as a political one, not solely a labor matter. The judge who functioned in this repressive body refused to hand over the file to me. A big uproar took place at the courthouse that could have ended in an altercation. In order not to be arrested, I left and went into hiding at the home of some relatives who lived in the Víbora neighborhood.

A few days later the strikes ended and the court had no alternative but to let Enrique go. He was released along with all the others detained, since from a strictly legal point of view they were all equally involved.

The traditional opposition parties were still strong enough to convene a great outdoor public meeting November 19, 1955, which we all attended because the people were there. That was the famous rally at the Plaza of the Forsaken at Muelle de Luz pier, organized under the leadership of Don Cosme de la Torriente, a veteran of the Independence War and by then an octogenarian, who had become a political figure for the traditional opposition parties.

In order to discuss what we should do at that meeting, as well as to evaluate other political questions, I traveled to the United States to meet with the head of the movement. Fidel was there touring different cities and carrying out recruitment work among exiles and immigrants.

I witnessed his tireless activity. It seemed to me as if we were in times like those of the War of Independence or the struggles of the 1930s against the Machado tyranny. Today I feel as much pride in that visit as would any nineteenth century Cuban who traveled to Key West to visit Martí. In Miami Fidel spoke to me about economic questions and programmatic measures that were reflected in the documents mentioned earlier.

I raised with him the situation with regard to unity of the opposition and the efforts that Cosme de la Torriente, José Miró Cardona, and other leaders were making. Fidel recommended that I speak to Don Cosme and ask him to play a recorded speech by Fidel during the rally at Muelle de Luz, which was supposed to be an act of unity.

Upon my return, Haydée and I met with Don Cosme at his office in Old Havana. The meeting was arranged by Miró Cardona. Pelayo Cuervo Navarro also participated in it.¹ It was an unpleasant situation. Don Cosme began speaking and would not let us get a word in. In an attempt to say something and not “interrupt him disrespectfully,” I began my arguments with the words, “Venerable patriot.” But the abyss separating us prevented any dialogue. He even said Fidel should organize his own meeting, since the one at Muelle de Luz had different objectives from those being pursued by the head of the July 26 Movement. Don Cosme was right about that. But what he didn’t know was that Fidel Castro, just a few years later, was to organize the largest political rallies in the history of Cuba and the Americas.

When the rally at Muelle de Luz took place on November 19, 1955, it ended, as the Cuban saying goes, like the “Guatao party”—that is, by almost coming to blows. Groups of Authentic Party supporters physically attacked the revolutionary militants as we chanted, “Revolution!” That effectively dispersed us. I left with Haydée and other compañeros to meet at Melba’s house to discuss the events.

The popular rally, according to its main organizer, had the goal of compelling Batista to agree to a solution acceptable to all the traditional oppositional parties. Although an immense crowd of tens of thousands was brought together, the rally also completely revealed the opposition’s weaknesses and ended up breaking apart. “The opposition is divided,” the tyrant said. We thought—and history confirmed—that it was necessary to “change the platform,” that is, the leaders. And in fact that’s what happened, but at the cost of struggle and blood.

As expected, Batista did not accede to the pressure and summoned Don Cosme to the palace to meet. The latter presented himself to the dictator with the intention of laying down his demands, but he was unable to speak. The big chief of March 10 seduced him with words and treated him “deferentially.” After leaving the presidential mansion, Don Cosme and what he represented were totally finished. José Miró Cardona, who was present at the meeting, told me that the situation was rather embarrassing. Miró Cardona left the meeting ashamed by the way Batista had manipulated the veteran.

What had happened was simply that Don Cosme de la Torriente was representing the bourgeoisie, which could not lead any type of a revolution in Cuba, because it lacked real strength.

After that, no one else was capable of uniting all the traditional opposition parties in a public rally that could confront the Batista government. That event, at which Don Cosme de la Torriente did not want us to play Fidel’s speech, was the swan song of traditional Cuban politics.

There were other political meetings later on, of course, even in the midst of generalized insurrection throughout the country. But they were so servile and submissive to the tyranny that they cannot be properly regarded as opposition.

At Muelle de Luz, the epitaph of the traditional parties was written. Perhaps a commemorative plaque should be erected there to the country’s impotent, mediocre, and subservient bourgeoisie. I have called it “the bourgeoisie that did not exist,” because the United States prevented an independent development of capitalism in Cuba.

From that moment on, the opposition to Batista broke apart forever and remained dependent upon the dictates of the tyranny or the outcome of a true revolution.

¹ Pelayo Cuervo Navarro was brutally murdered by the tyranny’s henchmen on March 13, 1957.  
 
 
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