STATEMENT OF FACTS  
 
A. Use of Chemical Weapons in Vietnam
In late 1961, President Kennedy approved a joint recommendation of the Departments of State and Defense to initiate, on a limited scale, a chemical warfare campaign in Vietnam involving the use of defoliants.

Operation Trail Dust, as the Air Force’s chemical warfare program was originally called, and which later became Operation Ranch Hand, began its spray missions in January 1962. The initial aerial spraying took place near Saigon. Its purpose, ostensibly, was to clear the thick jungle canopy from around roads, power lines and other lines of communications in order to lessen the potential for ambush.

At the start of the government’s chemical warfare campaign in Vietnam, the spraying of all targets required prior approval from the White House. In late 1962, authority for defoliation target selection in the chemical warfare program was delegated to the US ambassador to the Republic of South Vietnam (“RVN”). In late 1963 authority for crop target selection in the chemical warfare program was delegated by the Ambassador to the White House.

Although the stated purpose of Operation Ranch Hand was to defoliate forests and mangroves and to destroy crops depriving enemy combatants of food, this was still chemical warfare employed by the U.S. military, with the knowing participation of the defendants herein, to further the military and foreign policy objectives of the USG [U.S. government] in Vietnam.

From the beginning, the USG took steps to cover up its involvement in this chemical warfare program. U.S. government policy initially emphasized that the U.S. military was merely assisting the RVN government in the herbicide program. In fact, a 1962 pact assigned the ownership of the herbicides to the RVN government once they were delivered, and RVN soldiers handled the loading and transportation of the herbicides.

The United States Air Force (“USAF”) aircraft used to spray the herbicides were camouflaged and equipped with removable identification insignia. When performing crop destruction missions, the aircraft bore RVN insignia, the USAF flight crews wore civilian clothing and were accompanied by a RVN army crewmember, pursuant to a U.S. Department of Defense concept codenamed “Farmgate.”

The USG’s use of chemical weapons to advance its objectives during the Vietnam War escalated in late 1964 as the war escalated. Controls and limitation on spraying were gradually relaxed and the areas sprayed were expanded. A frequent target of the Ranch Hand operation was the complex of roads and footpaths in southern Vietnam used as a supply route by forces loyal to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (“DRVN”) and the National Liberation Front (“NLF”) personnel, commonly known as the “Ho Chi Minh Trail.” Also heavily targeted by the herbicide campaign were the heavily wooded Demilitarized Zone, the Mekong Delta and U.S. military bases.

The use of chemical weapons for crop destruction also gradually expanded, and in 1965 alone, 45% of the total spraying was designed to destroy crops. The crop destruction included the spraying of fields suspected of being used by the NLF. However, fields used exclusively by civilians were also frequently sprayed. In 1967 alone at least 20 million liters were sprayed—85% for defoliation purposes and 15% for crop destruction.  
 
B. The Chemical Weapons Used
Agent Orange was the most widely used chemical weapon, particularly after 1964. Agent Orange was a 50-50 mixture of the n-butyl esters of 2,4-dicholorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T). The later component was found to contain the contaminant TCDD or 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (i.e., dioxin), which is regarded as one of the most toxic chemicals known to man.

Dioxin is a family of chemicals (75 in all) that does not occur naturally, nor is it intentionally manufactured by any industry. The most toxic dioxin is called 2,3,7,8 - TCDD. Dioxins are produced as byproducts of the manufacture of some herbicides.  
 
C. The Extent of Their Use
During the course of Operation Trail Dust, Operation Ranch Hand and the final period of the war, large numbers of Vietnamese combatants and civilians were directly exposed to herbicides by spraying. In addition to those who were sprayed directly with the herbicides, many more were exposed indirectly, by coming into contact with soil, plants, food and water that were contaminated. It has been estimated that up to 4 million Vietnamese were exposed to herbicides during the period 1961-1971 alone.

Dr. James R. Clary [U.S. scientist then employed at the Air Force Armament Development Laboratory, Elgin Air Force Base, Florida] explains how the USG and these defendants could manufacture and use such a toxic chemical, even though they were aware of the ill effects it would cause:

When we (military scientists) initiated the herbicide program in the 1960’s, we were aware of the potential for damage due to dioxin contamination in the herbicide. We were even aware that the ‘military’ formulation had a higher dioxin concentration than the ‘civilian’ version due to the lower cost and speed of manufacture. However, because the material was to be used on the ‘enemy’, none of us were overly concerned. We never considered a scenario in which our own personnel would become contaminated with the herbicide. And, if we had, we would have expected our own government to give assistance to veterans so contaminated.

For example, in 1949, an accidental spill occurred at defendant Monsanto’s chemical plant in Nitro, West Virginia, in which a compound containing dioxin was dispersed throughout the building, exposing the defendant’s workers to the toxic substance. Many of the workers at the Nitro plant developed serious health problems and developed symptoms, in some cases severe and intractable, of chloracne and other conditions soon after the accident.

In 1954, an outbreak of serious and permanently disfiguring forms of chloracne, as well as diseases of the blood-forming elements of the body, including liver disease, occurred among workers at a Diamond Alkali plant, who were working with phenoxy herbicides, including 2,4,5-T. Beginning in 1960, a dermatologist named Jacob Bleiberg began making rounds in the chemical plant in Newark in order to see workers and treat their skin conditions.

In 1972, Dr. Bleiberg wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times that was never published. It described some of his findings in the Diamond workers. He notes that “fifty percent of the men developed chloracne…two workers died of liver disease…one man died of liver cancer…almost all of the workers complained of severe fatigue…and 20% of our men had abnormal blood sugar tests indicating diabetes.” He did this investigation at the request of Diamond management, indicating that they were aware of all of his findings.

In February 1964, at Dow’s plant in Midland, Michigan, more than 40 workers developed chloracne, some quite severe, due to the presence of dioxin. At this time, Dow believed that extreme exposure to dioxin could result in “general organ toxicity,” as well as “psychopathological,” and “other systemic problems.” As a result of this experience with chloracne, Dow decided to explicitly inform the other defendants of its experiences and knowledge, going back to the 1940s. It organized a meeting in Midland, Michigan in March, 1965 which candidly shared all of this information with the defendants, including defendants Hooker, Hercules and Diamond Alkali. Though representatives from Monsanto were not present at this meeting, Dow shared the same information with them at the time.
 
 
Related articles:
Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange sue U.S. chemical giants
Plaintiffs’ stories told in legal briefs  
 
 
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