BY FARRELL DOBBS  
Since 1907 Daniel J. Tobin sat astride the Teamster organization as its general president. During those years he became wholly committed to the concepts of business unionism. As the term implies, that outlook is designed to assure the capitalists of organized labor’s cooperation, both within industry and at the governmental level. In return, it is fatuously assumed, grateful employers will make a few significant concessions to the workers. On that premise the ruling hierarchy in the trade unions—today as yesterday—displays “statesmanlike” sensitivity to ruling-class needs, thereby stripping itself of any capacity to lead struggles in defense of the workers’ interests.

Organizationally, business unionism first took shape through the establishment of the American Federation of Labor along narrow craft lines. (The structural base widened later on, however, when the Congress of Industrial Organizations became extensively bureaucratized.) From the beginning, the AFL concentrated on recruitment of skilled and semiskilled workers. In the case of its IBT [International Brotherhood of Teamsters] affiliate, efforts along that line focused primarily on select categories of drivers, helpers, and platform workers. Being somewhat better paid than the average laborer, they could more readily be drawn into contractual relations with the employers on class-collaborationist terms, especially when the arrangement also provided little job trusts for them.

In seeking contracts with trucking firms on this basis, Tobin put emphasis on gradual improvements for the workers. He insisted that union demands be “within reason.” If a working agreement could not be obtained through direct negotiations with a given company, the Teamster president called for an effort to secure arbitration of the dispute. Only when an employer rejected that proposal as well was a strike to be considered, and even then strict procedures were laid down for taking a vote on the question in an IBT local. It was done in a way intended to “cool off hotheads” and give full play to any expression of hesitation that might emanate from the ranks. When a strike was voted despite these obstacles, the decision was not yet final. Formal approval of the action was still required from the IBT’s general executive board.

Strict control over strikes was only one aspect of the Teamster head’s bureaucratic arbitrariness. The union’s constitution contained a set of “laws” designed to serve his objectives at the expense of rank-and-file democracy. “Official policy” was laid down by him through freewheeling interpretation of resolutions adopted by IBT conventions, which were held at five-year intervals. He kept a staff of watchdogs on the alert for signs of dissidence within the organization, and anyone who got out of line could expect harsh discipline.

Tobin’s scheme of things had no place at all for workers whose occupations fell outside the elitist categories of craft unionism. To him they were “rubbish.” He said as much in the official IBT magazine, adding that the union didn’t want such members, “if they are going on strike tomorrow.” His reference was, of course, to the underprivileged masses who were radicalizing under the impact of the post-1929 depression. For their part, these workers were ready to fight in defense of their interests, if a way could be found for them to get organized with the help of competent leaders. But to do that in the trucking industry some basic alterations had to be made within the Teamster movement.

Steps toward the necessary changes were initiated in 1933 by revolutionary socialists who worked in the coal yards in Minneapolis. They belonged to the Communist League of America, the organizational form then taken by the Trotskyist movement. Plans for their course of action in the IBT had been carefully thought out in advance. As the Trotskyists saw the situation, the key to success in a clash with Tobin over union policy lay in his failure to adjust to the new times.  
 
 
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