Vol. 71/No. 16      April 23, 2007

The number one cause of the explosion, according to the report by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), was cuts in spending to boost profits. “The combination of cost-cutting, production pressures, and failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of safety at the refinery,” said CSB chair Carolyn Merritt at a March 20 news conference in Houston.

Necessary preventative maintenance on aging equipment was slashed, workloads in refinery operations were sharply increased as jobs were cut, and training programs were eliminated.

Then, on March 23, 2005, nearly 180 barrels of highly flammable light hydrocarbon were released into the atmosphere at the plant’s isomerization unit, as it was being brought back on line after a maintenance “turnaround.” The main causes of the release were woefully inadequate and antiquated pressure relief systems and faulty instrumentation that had long gone unrepaired.

This hydrocarbon quickly vaporized, found a source of ignition—a diesel truck idling nearby—and a giant fireball shot into the sky followed by a tremendous shock wave. Structures were blown apart, including temporary trailers full of workers, and a massive fire ensued.

The refinery industry has long touted itself as safe, pointing to decreasing injury rates. But the CSB report points out that BP executives “were largely focused on personal safety—such as slips, trips, falls, and vehicle accidents—rather than on improving process safety performance, which continued to deteriorate.”

This was echoed by the findings of an investigatory commission initiated by BP and headed by former U.S. secretary of state James Baker. The commission said process safety was a problem throughout the oil industry.

Other factors in the BP explosion identified by the CSB included:

• Vulnerability of temporary trailers widely and routinely used in refinery settings. All 15 deaths at the BP blast were of personnel in and around trailers.

• Operator fatigue. All personnel in the unit at the time of the explosion had worked 12-hour shifts for 29 or more consecutive days during the turnaround.

• Failure of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The report found that despite numerous fatal incidents from 1985 to 2005, OSHA conducted only one major process safety inspection at the Texas City refinery. A similar pattern was observed in refineries around the country.

The problems at BP are not unique. Both the CSB and the Baker commission reports stressed that their findings have more general application in oil refining. A March 23 Los Angeles Times article said, “Refineries in California and across the country are breaking down with unusual frequency this year… . The breakdowns stem from the hard use of aging equipment, a shortage of trained workers, corporate cost cutting and ownership changes, refinery experts say.”

Kim Nibarger, a safety expert for the United Steelworkers, which represents most union-organized refinery workers, testified to this point at a March 22 hearing on refinery safety before the congressional Education and Labor Committee. In the first six weeks of 2007, he said, there were 43 incidents involving pipeline leaks, chemical releases, plant breakdowns, and fires.

Jerry Freiwirth is an oil refinery operator and a member of the United Steelworkers Local 5.
 
 
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