Vol. 72/No. 14      April 7, 2008

The selection below begins with a reference to the situation in Cuba in 1989, when José Abrantes was removed as interior minister and convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison on charges of abuse of authority, negligence of duty, and improper use of government funds and resources. Div. Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa was tried, convicted, and executed that same year for hostile acts against a foreign state, drug trafficking, and abuse of office.

The interviews in Making History were conducted by Socialist Workers Party national secretary Jack Barnes, Pathfinder Press president Mary-Alice Waters, and Militant staff writer Martín Koppel. The excerpt below is from an interview with Div. Gen. Néstor López Cuba. Copyright ©1999 Pathfinder Press. Reprinted by permission.

BARNES: Following the crisis in the Revolutionary Armed Forces and Ministry of the Interior in 1989, involving Ochoa and Abrantes and several others, many in the United States and elsewhere noticed that the FAR [Revolutionary Armed Forces] took on even more leadership responsibility throughout Cuba. The breadth of what the armed forces were responsible for seemed to expand. The revolutionary integrity exemplified by the FAR seemed to take on even greater importance. I wondered if you could comment on whether or not this perception is an accurate one? Because those habits and values of revolutionary honor and discipline set a very important example for workers and youth in the United States and elsewhere.

LóPEZ CUBA: Yes, that’s accurate, if one looks at this from the standpoint of moral authority and prestige—without this diminishing in any way the FAR’s subordination to the party, to the constitution, and to the authorities democratically elected by our people. And the leadership qualities of Raúl that we were discussing earlier also had a big influence here, I believe.

Since the triumph of the revolution, there has never been an economic battle, there has never been a natural disaster, where the armed forces have not been at the side of the people. Over thirty-eight years of revolution, there has never been a moment when the armed forces have not fought shoulder to shoulder with the people: whether in social efforts, economic tasks, or defense. This gives the FAR a great deal of authority.

Moreover, we have never allowed corruption in the armed forces. We are intransigent: the armed forces must be kept free of all personal interest. This is also an important aspect of the education of the cadres.

In capitalist countries, I believe, it is not unusual for an army officer to engage in business, to have capital, and he often devotes more time to business than to the armed forces. In the FAR no one is going to find any officer involved in activities beyond the revolutionary tasks we have taken on and the principles we have established.

In the 1980s, although the armed forces were very professional and technically proficient, we had some gaps in the areas of administration, finances, and production. So, in 1990 the minister [of defense, Raúl Castro,] called on the FAR to address these problems.

Raúl has demanded four things from the cadres of the armed forces. First, they must be political cadres, with high political, ideological, and moral qualities. Second, they must be highly skilled military professionals. Third, they must have the basic skills of food production and agriculture. And fourth, they must have a rudimentary knowledge of economic affairs. They don’t need to be economists, but they do need to know where each peso we spend comes from, and how to use it effectively.

We have integrated these requirements into the professional training of our cadres—both of older officers such as myself, and of the youngest ones. This is part of the program of study for new officers, and the veteran officers are given regular refresher courses on techniques of leadership, planning, economics, and production.  
 
An army of workers and peasants
All this gives the armed forces in Cuba more authority, more prestige. I think the origins of our Revolutionary Armed Forces and of its cadres has a lot to do with this, as well. It’s no secret to anyone that there are not many Colin Powells who can make it to the rank he achieved in the United States. Because generally the officers in capitalist armies are the sons of the bourgeoisie, of generals, of high officials, of better-off families.

In our army we make sure that our officer corps includes farmers, workers, those from the ranks of the humble, from the masses. Without such a policy, the social composition of the officer corps will slowly be transformed, and in the end will have negative results.

We pay conscious attention to the social background of those who go to officers’ school—the Camilitos.¹ Fifty percent of the Camilitos must be the children of workers and farmers. The other 50 percent is made up of children of teachers, doctors, officials, and others. But it’s a requirement that half must be from families of workers and farmers, so the army does not lose its class origins.

In spite of spending forty years in the struggle, for example, I continue to think like a peasant, like someone who tills the soil. I have not lost sight of my origins.