Vol. 73/No. 8      March 2, 2009

WATERS: It would be useful to return to a point you made earlier about the difference between a bourgeois army and a revolutionary army—the difference in the treatment of soldiers, and the relations between soldiers and officers.

FERNÁNDEZ: As a rule, a bourgeois army imposes its command, with some variation, through law, through established norms based exclusively on hierarchy and rank. A socialist army, our army, also uses norms and requires obedience. But discipline is achieved through conscious methods, and the commanding officers derive their authority from the consent of their subordinates; they earn that authority every day by their ability, work, and example.

In this army nobody can give orders who is not respected, who does not have the approval of one’s subordinates. Command, clearly, isn’t conferred by elections, but it’s essential to have the consent and approval of one’s subordinates. The army requires very strict discipline; there can be no concessions on that. But it must be very just, very humane, and maintain the highest moral values.

There have been tremendous abuses in other armies we know, or have known. To me, the attitudes that exist in the U.S. Marine Corps and among its instructors are often bestial; they’re often criminal, inhumane, and unworthy. They are truly contemptible in a military institution. I’m not talking about the young people who have drowned in the swamps. I’m talking about the dehumanizing and denigrating methods of treating young people. That is unacceptable. That is an example of the difference between the two types of armies.

When someone who exercises authority or enforces discipline must do so, this often rankles those who are the objects of the command. You have to remember, however, that in our armed forces there are the units of the party; there are units of the UJC [Union of Young Communists]. These organizations strive for discipline and at the same time defend and guarantee the rights of individuals. There are places where one may speak frankly and say everything, regardless of rank. That doesn’t happen in other armies.  
 
Battle in the Escambray
Barnes: You referred earlier to the fight against the bandits in the Escambray? Could we return to that?

During the conference that Mary-Alice and I took part in here, Compañero Balaguer1 talked about the generation of leaders that won their spurs not in the struggle against Batista, but at Girón, and in fighting to clean the bandits out of the Escambray. But the Escambray is a chapter of the revolutionary struggle that is very little known in the United States today.

It’s important for revolutionaries in the United States to learn about this. Many of us spent time in Nicaragua, and we closely followed the Nicaraguan revolution. We watched with concern as we saw methods being used there to defeat the U.S.-organized counterrevolutionary forces evolve in a manner that finally compromised the Sandinistas’ ability to win the political battle in the countryside. For that reason, among others, the question of the Escambray is very important for workers and youth who try to draw lessons from the Cuban revolution.

FERNÁNDEZ: I only participated in the Escambray on two occasions. Each time it was for one week, commanding some special unit that had been called up to fight there. But the battalions under my command that were training in Havana, at least those from the militias, were the principal forces in the mission to eliminate the bands in the Escambray.

The fight in the Escambray was conducted mainly by the militia units. The Escambray was an artificial situation created by U.S. agencies in late 1960 and early 1961 to promote subversion in Cuba. One of its aims was to provoke general uprisings and convert them into a force that would coincide in time and place and would cooperate with the invading brigade that landed at Playa Girón, which was initially scheduled to land at Trinidad.

Pardon me for a second. [Fernández goes to get a map.]

This is a tourist map of Cuba—the country is 1,200 kilometers [740 miles] from east to west, 100 kilometers [60 miles] from north to south, on average. Here is Trinidad, where the Girón landing was originally going to be. Kennedy was against it, since it’s next to a city and was going to be too much of a scandal. That’s part of history; it’s in all the books.

Instead, the landing took place here, [pointing to the map] at Playa Girón in the Bay of Pigs. And the Escambray [pointing] is here. In other words, promoting counterrevolutionary groups in the Escambray was part of the preparation for the invasion and was timed to coincide precisely with the landing. The Escambray was to serve as a base of support, creating a zone that could be dominated by the invading brigade and by enemy forces in general.