

Intercontinental Press

Africa

Asia

Europe

Oceania

the Americas

Vol. 14, No. 1

© 1976 by Intercontinental Press

January 12, 1976

75¢

ANGOLA: FORD PUSHES AHEAD



Under Gandhi's 'State of Emergency' Why Labor Party Lost Australian Elections

Interview With Peng Shu-tse

China: The Factional Struggle Continues

Ford Pushes Ahead in Angola

By Ernest Harsch

The Ford administration is driving ahead with its intervention in the Angolan civil war. In the doublespeak typical of White House statements, Ford declared January 3 that he wanted only to give the Angolans "an opportunity to make the decision for themselves" of who would rule that war-torn country.

But the right of the Angolan peoples to self-determination is the last thing on the minds of the American imperialists. They were the ones who supported Portuguese colonialism to the end.

The administration's determination to continue its intervention in Angola was pointedly reaffirmed by Kissinger December 23, just four days after the Senate passed an amendment to a defense appropriations bill barring any additional funds for the CIA's Angolan operations. He proclaimed that the White House was "going to make a major effort [in Angola], both diplomatically and on the ground. . . ." Complaining that the Senate vote "severely complicated" White House plans, Kissinger said the administration would use \$9 million it had left for military aid to continue backing two of the Angolan nationalist groups.

At the time of the Senate vote, the White House indicated that only about \$4 million remained in the CIA's "contingency fund" for covert operations. An unnamed U.S. official, however, told a reporter for the *New York Times* December 28 that more money had been "found."

According to some reports, part of these funds will be used to finance an undercover army in Angola reminiscent of the CIA's covert operation in Laos in the 1960s.

In a front-page article in the January 2 *Christian Science Monitor*, staff writer

David Anable reported that, according to "senior mercenary officers" who were "close" to the CIA, "the CIA is indirectly recruiting American ex-servicemen, training them, dispatching them to southern Africa, contributing toward their pay . . . and providing them and the indigenous forces with light and heavy weaponry."

These sources told Anable that about 300 American mercenaries were already operating in Angola and that another 300 were ready to go as soon as the CIA could obtain further funds. The second group included American officers and troops either on "indefinite leave" or recently discharged from the army. About 150, the sources said, spent the previous week undergoing training at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Other reports revealed that veterans of the 1961 CIA-organized Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba were recruiting anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami to fight in Angola. According to one of the recruiters, the pay was excellent: "From \$1,000 to \$1,200 a month for most, depending on their special skills or specialties. We are getting applications from former Green Berets in Vietnam, technicians, artillery people and so on. Pilots will get much more money." He said that "fewer than 100" had enlisted so far, although another recruiter put the figure at 365.

They refused to discuss how the mercenary operation is being financed.

When asked about these reports, White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen replied January 2 that no U.S. government agency was recruiting or training American mercenaries for Angola. He also claimed that he did not know if mercenary recruiting was being carried out by any "private

company," a technique commonly used by the CIA. When asked if Fort Benning was being used to train mercenaries or if Cuban exiles in the United States were being recruited, Nessen refused to answer.

Ford followed this performance with one of his own the next day. "The United States is not training foreign mercenaries in Angola," he claimed. "We do expend some federal funds—or United States funds—in trying to be helpful, but we are not training foreign mercenaries." He would not deny, however, that the government or CIA was providing funds for that purpose.

During the congressional debates on covert CIA operations and on the U.S. involvement in Angola, both the present CIA director, William Colby, and Ford's nominee as Colby's replacement, George Bush, stressed that covert CIA "paramilitary" operations cannot be ruled out.

In addition to sending arms and money directly to the FNLA and UNITA, the Ford administration has taken other measures to intervene in the Angolan civil war.

One of these steps was to cut off the MPLA's major source of revenue. Under pressure from the State Department, Gulf Oil announced December 22 that it was suspending the operations of its Angola subsidiary, Gulf Cabinda, and placing future royalty and tax payments to the Luanda regime in escrow. In September and October, Gulf paid \$116 million to the MPLA, which controls the Cabinda enclave, where Gulf has its oil fields. This payment alone was several times larger than what the White House is publicly known to have given the FNLA and UNITA and was about the same as the reported Soviet aid sent to the MPLA throughout 1975.

In late December, Kissinger sent his new assistant secretary of state for African affairs, William E. Schauffele, on a tour of several African countries in an effort to block formal recognition of the MPLA regime by the Organization of African Unity, which is scheduled to hold an emergency summit meeting on Angola January 10.

Kissinger has declared that the administration will attempt "to generate as much support from other countries [for the anti-MPLA forces] as we can." The White House, he said, has had "very positive responses from many African countries." Kissinger did not specify which African countries he was referring to. The racist white minority regime in South Africa has several thousand troops in Angola fighting against the MPLA.

In their justifications for the U.S. intervention in Angola, CIA and State Department officials have made it clear that they do not consider the MPLA a threat to the imperialist holdings in the country. For instance, at his December 23 news confer-

Political Line of Articles in Intercontinental Press

Owing to the current debate in the radical movement over policies in various areas such as Portugal, in which some of our regular contributors have taken variant positions, we should like to call special attention to the following paragraph in our masthead:

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental

Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

Up to now, statements, declarations, and resolutions of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International have appeared under the general heading of "Documents." As a matter of further clarification, we are now listing them under a separate heading.

ence, Kissinger said, "We are not opposed to the M.P.L.A. as such. . . . We can live with any of the factions in Angola. . . ." CIA officials have said that in their opinion "the differences in government should the MPLA win would be minimal."

Washington, however, is not interested in seeing any of the Angolan nationalist groups "win" the civil war. By funneling arms and money to the FNLA and UNITA, Kissinger and Ford are seeking to perpetuate the fratricidal war with the aim of weakening the entire nationalist movement and forcing the three groups to make concessions to imperialism.

In arguing his case for U.S. intervention, Kissinger has presented an updated version of the old "domino theory" used in the early days of Washington's aggression in Vietnam. "Mr. Kissinger believes," a report in the December 24 *Wall Street Journal* explained, "that a victory for Soviet-backed forces in Angola—while perhaps it wouldn't be of great significance as such to U.S. interests—would encourage Moscow to try similar tactics elsewhere."

But such shopworn arguments can no longer have the effect they once had. The American population has lived through the experience of the Vietnam War, and it is not eager to repeat it. In an article December 20 assessing the lessons of Vietnam as applied to the war in Angola, *New York Times* reporter Leslie H. Gelb pointed out that "the political nerve ends of the Vietnam war are still close to the surface, raw and sensitive."

This "sensitivity" has forced members of Congress to declare their opposition to a greater U.S. involvement in Angola. House Majority Leader Thomas O'Neill, Jr. has stated that "the feeling in Congress is no troops, no advisers . . . should be sent over."

Black people in the United States would certainly respond rapidly to any massive American intervention in an African country. One indicator of the potential for such a Black antiwar mobilization was a statement made public by the Congressional Black Caucus, demanding an immediate end to the sending of all military-related assistance, direct or indirect, to any Angolan faction. It also calls on Black elected officials to create "a groundswell of American public opinion to prevent another Vietnam."

Despite the broad sentiment against any more military adventures, Ford and Kissinger appear determined to press forward. The threat of another Vietnam is real. It is time for antiwar forces—both in the United States and around the world—to sound the alert. □

Sure Cure

"Anti-Inflation Board is expected to spend about \$500,000 on ads"—headline in the December 6 Toronto *Globe and Mail*.

January 12, 1976

In This Issue

Closing News Date: January 5, 1976

FEATURES	26	<i>Out Now!</i> —Chapter 16: April 15, 1967 —by Fred Halstead
INDIA	4	Under Gandhi's "State of Emergency"
U.S.A.	6	How Washington Uses Threat of Famine
	23	Washington's 1929 Outline for War With Britain
ZAMBIA	7	Why Kenneth Kaunda Collaborates With Vorster Regime—by Tony Hodges
	8	Zimbabwean Freedom Fighters Face Witch-hunt—by Tony Hodges
WEST GERMANY	9	"Anyone Who Cites Basic Rights Is Fair Game"
AUSTRALIA	10	Why Labor Party Lost Elections —by Sol Salby
	11	Socialist Campaign Presented Revolutionary Alternative —by Jim McIlroy
ANGOLA	12	Fifteen Years of U.S. Intervention —by Ernest Harsch
EAST TIMOR	14	Indonesian Invaders Meet Stiff Resistance —by John Percy
CHINA	16	The "Criticize-Lin, Criticize-Confucius" Campaign
NEWS ANALYSIS	2	Ford Pushes Ahead in Angola —by Ernest Harsch
AROUND THE WORLD	24	
DOCUMENTS	29	Interview With a Polish High School Student
	31	Lutte Ouvrière and International Socialism Debate on Portugal
	32	After the Israeli Bombing—An Eyewitness Account
DRAWINGS	1	Gerald Ford; 7, John Vorster; 8, Kenneth Kaunda; 21, Mao Tsetung—by Copain

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Editorial Staff: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, David Frankel, Ernest Harsch, Judy White.

Business Manager: Steven Warshell.

Copy Editor: Mary Roche.

Technical Staff: Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, James M. Morgan, Bill Razukas, Earl Williams.

Published in New York each Monday except last in December and first in January; not published in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial

opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism.

Paris Office: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guémenée, 75004, Paris, France.

To Subscribe: For one year send \$24 to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014. Write for rates on first class and airmail.

For airmail subscriptions in Europe: Write to Pathfinder Press, 47 The Cut, London SE1 8LL. In Australia: Write to Pathfinder Press, P.O. Box 151, Glebe 2037. In New Zealand: Write to Socialist Books, P.O. Box 1663, Wellington.

Special rates available for subscriptions to colonial and semicolonial countries.

Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

Copyright © 1976 by Intercontinental Press.

Under Gandhi's 'State of Emergency'

[The following interview with an Indian Trotskyist was obtained by a correspondent of *Intercontinental Press* in Delhi, December 2, 1975.]

* * *

Question. What, in your opinion, is the significance of the state of emergency that has been declared in India?

Answer. It has meant a major setback for the class struggle in India. The bourgeoisie has made full use of the state of emergency to impose anti-working-class policies and solutions for the mortal crisis that it is facing on the economic front, and to deal with the mass discontent that had been developing. The drift towards the right on the economic front and the trend towards authoritarianism in politics have become more and more pronounced. The economy has been stabilized in the current conjuncture, and the bourgeoisie is trying to integrate the labor movement more and more into the official state apparatus.

Q. Exactly what has happened under the emergency?

A. Under the emergency, the people have been deprived of all their basic rights. This especially includes their right to know the real facts. Under the censorship which has been imposed, all articles must be submitted to the censor before being published.

Many people have been arrested. The regime has never admitted the number of detainees, and it is difficult to arrive at the exact figure because of the censorship. Estimates range as high as 80,000 to 100,000. Most of the political prisoners are from the twenty-six banned organizations, but they also include dissidents among the ruling Congress party in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh.

Information on prison conditions is not known, but it is probably very bad. This number of new prisoners is over and above the number of political prisoners previously held—some 30,000 so-called "Naxalites." This is the name the government pins on many left-wing dissidents, whether or not they really are Naxalites.*

* Members of the Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist). The term Naxalites is derived from the 1967 peasant uprising in Naxalbari, West Bengal.—IP

Q. What has been the economic impact of the emergency?

A. For the working class it has been bad. "Bonuses" (deferred wages) have been slashed from an 8.33% minimum to 4%. Previously, under the government's bonus system, some of the workers' wages were supposed to be deferred until the end of the year, when a minimum lump sum "bonus" of 8.33% was to be paid. Theoretically, the bonus could be higher if higher profits were made, but it was to be an 8.33% minimum in any case.

This September the government reduced the minimum payment to 4%, and linked it to production, productivity, and profit. If there is no profit, the industries don't have to pay anything. And if there are high profits, the bonus can still be only 4%. Not only real wages, but nominal wages for the working class as a whole have been cut as a result of the bonus cut, inflation, unemployment, retrenchment, and so on.

As against this, things have improved for the big bourgeoisie. For example, licensing policies for import-export, for installation of new machinery, etc., have been liberalized. They have been afforded greater travel facilities in order to expand exports. The issuance of bonuses—extra shares to stockholders over and above cash dividends—has been permitted once again. Several tax concessions have also been given. The regime has also announced further concessions to bring black money (money not declared for tax purposes) into circulation.

Q. What about trade-union rights?

A. The unions have been deprived of the right to strike to demand higher wages and better conditions. The mechanism for negotiations will now be even more restrictive than before, and the only unions that will be recognized for the purposes of negotiations are those that support the emergency. At present there are only three such all-India federations: the INTUC (Indian National Trade Union Congress), controlled by the ruling Congress party; the AITUC (All-India Trade Union Congress), controlled by the Communist party of India (CPI); and HMS (Hind Mazdoor Sabha—India Workers Assembly), led by former Social Democrats, most of whom have joined the ruling Congress party.

Two other union federations have been completely shunted aside by the government and the employers. They are the CITU (Centre of Indian Trade Unions), controlled

by the Communist party of India (Marxist), the CPM; and the TUC (Trade Union Congress), controlled by the Revolutionary Socialist party (RSP), a centrist formation.

Q. What has been the response of the workers organizations to the emergency and the new conditions that have arisen?

A. There have been no trade-union actions against the emergency, even by those unions led by the CPM and RSP, which oppose the emergency. The INTUC, the AITUC, and the HMS support the emergency, though there are reports of a rift in the HMS over this. There have been verbal protests against the cut in the bonuses, even from within the INTUC, but no mass actions have been organized.

The pro-Moscow CPI supports the emergency and is closely tied with the ruling Congress party. The CPM and RSP oppose the emergency, but have done nothing in the form of mass actions. The CPM, which is a big force in some areas, has aligned itself in an unprincipled way with some of the right-wing parties opposing Indira Gandhi. So has the RSP.

There are some signs that the CPM is in disarray, and some dissidents within it are charging that the leadership has soft-pedaled its opposition to the emergency. The general secretary of the CPM, P. Sundaraiya, has resigned and has been replaced by Jyoti Basu from West Bengal. The Trotskyists of the Communist League of India oppose the emergency, but are a very small force.

Q. Have there been any mass protests at all to the emergency?

A. There were some protests at first in various states, but in general people were stunned. Then, too, there was the inaction by the leadership of the mass workers organizations, or worse yet, outright support to the emergency by the CPI. So this helped disorient the masses.

However, one significant barometer of the mass mood was shown recently in the state of Gujarat, where municipal elections were held in several cities at the end of November, resulting in a big defeat for Indira Gandhi's Congress party.

Of course, Gujarat may be somewhat different from the other states. The state government there has been in the hands of a coalition of parties grouped together in the Janata Morcha (People's Front). These

parties have been in opposition to the ruling Congress party for some time. The parties in the Janata Morcha are extremely right-wing, but because they are opposed to the central government and Gandhi's Congress party, they have tried to keep the door open for criticism in Gujarat. So they have not imposed as many restrictions on political life as elsewhere.

That is why the state government went ahead and called the municipal elections despite the "advice" to the contrary by the Gandhi regime. (In India, the state governments have the authority to call municipal elections, while the central government has the power over parliamentary elections.) So elections were held in three big cities, Rajkot, Surat, and Vadodara (Baroda) at the end of November, and they are scheduled to be held in the state capital, Ahmedabad, at the end of December.

These elections became a test of strength between the Janata Morcha and the ruling Congress party, and were actually part of a longer-term struggle between them. Last year, in the early part of 1974, there were huge mass upsurges in Gujarat—"bread riots" under drought and famine conditions, and protests against inflation and corruption. The right-wing parties that later came together in the Janata Morcha were able to capture the leadership of this mass upsurge and used it to bring down the state government, which had been under the control of Gandhi's Congress party.

The Indira Gandhi regime responded by dissolving the state legislative assembly and imposing president's rule. That was in March 1974.

But a year later, under threat of a strike by the Majoor Mahajan, the powerful trade union of Gujarat encompassing more than 80% of all organized workers there, the Gandhi regime was forced to call statewide elections in June 1975. Indira Gandhi put all her prestige on the line in these elections. She made a tremendous personal effort, appearing at meetings in 120 districts out of 180 districts altogether. And so, her regime suffered a real blow when the Gujarat elections resulted in a big victory for the Janata Morcha coalition.

In fact, this turn of events threatened to put new wind in the sails of the then-floundering movement of J.P. Narayan in Bihar, and raised the specter of that opposition movement spreading throughout all India. This prospect was an important factor in Indira Gandhi's decision to declare the state of emergency immediately afterwards. So when elections were called again in Gujarat, this time under conditions of a state of emergency, and in defiance of Gandhi's pressure against holding them, a clear test of strength was involved.

Of course, the Janata Morcha opposition to Indira Gandhi was a right-wing opposition. They denounced her as a stooge of



Der Spiegel

Gandhi's strong-arm men. They have arrested as many as 100,000 persons.

Moscow. But they also campaigned against the state of emergency and for the democratic right to dissent. This issue struck a responsive chord among the masses and the result was that Gandhi's Congress party was trounced in these municipal elections. The Janata Morcha got a thumping majority of 75%. I think that this vote should be interpreted not as a right-wing vote, but as an anti-emergency, anti-Gandhi vote.

Q. What attitude did the working-class parties take toward this development?

A. In Gujarat, the working-class parties are all small and weak, and thus were not in a position to mobilize broad masses or affect events in a major way. But it is possible to judge how they met the test of events as best they could.

The CPI is supporting the state of emergency, and so of course they said nothing against it. They did run a few candidates in the municipal elections, but these were token campaigns. The national CPI did not give them any real backing—one of the reasons being that they wanted most efforts and energies to be channeled behind Gandhi's Congress party.

The CPM, although opposing the emergency, adopted a completely opportunist and unprincipled policy of allying with the Janata Morcha. In Baroda they ran candidates officially on the Janata Morcha slate—that is, under the right-wing Janata Morcha program and under Janata Morcha discipline. They had no independent face at all, not even their own independent party

symbol. They got two candidates elected, and that is exactly all that they were looking for.

However, in Baroda there was an example of a principled revolutionary approach, carried out by the Communist League, Indian section of the Fourth International. When processions were called earlier against the emergency, the Communist League participated, but as a separate bloc, clearly distinguished from the Janata Morcha, and chanting its own independent anticapitalist slogans. When the municipal elections were called in Baroda, the Communist League was able to field two candidates for municipal council, both of them militant workers participating in the workers committee in their factory that has been fighting against the bonus cuts.

Their campaign was completely independent of any other party or group. The main local issues they campaigned on were free medical aid for all; low-cost housing; free quality education for all, with an end to special privileges for private schools; and for water and gas services for the slums. In their speeches to workers meetings they were able to denounce the emergency, to expose Indira Gandhi's twenty-point program, and to denounce the bonus cuts, explaining how to fight back.

The Communist League also put out a leaflet exposing both the Janata Morcha and the ruling Congress, as well as the CPI and CPM. They campaigned for lower ceilings on election expenses, for an accounting of all election campaign income and expenses, for the right to recall, and for

proportional representation.

The Communist League got only a little more than 1% of the vote, but it set an example in offering a class-struggle alternative.

Q. You mentioned that there was a struggle taking place over the bonus cuts. Is this limited to the one factory you mentioned?

A. No, it is not. Though it is not widespread, it is an important new development taking place, at least in a few places we know about.

In Gujarat, although the urban middle class, including salaried employees, was hostile to the emergency from the beginning, the same cannot be said for the working class. In fact, the workers had not generally supported the earlier mass upsurge in Gujarat (as elsewhere they had not generally supported the J.P. Narayan movement).

When the emergency was first declared, the working class and urban poor had some illusions in it, thinking it might save them from corruption, nepotism, and inflation, as Indira Gandhi had promised. There was a tremendous, systematic central government propaganda promising to crack down on smugglers and black marketeers, and announcing the twenty-point program as a boon for all. The workers at first were taken in by this.

But as time went on, prices kept going up, there were massive layoffs, no pay raises, and to top it off, the bonus cut. By September, the picture was becoming clear to the workers. They saw that the emergency served the interests of the "haves" against the "have-nots." The lead weight of illusions and fear began to melt away.

While the union officials took the position of making verbal protests, but doing nothing, the Communist League called for the workers organizations to fight back against the bonus cuts. They called for forming united fronts and action committees. They went to the factory gates, to the big textile mills in Baroda. They explained the capitalist class nature of both the central government of Indira Gandhi and the Gujarat state government of the Janata Morcha. They condemned the emergency and the bonus cuts. And they proposed broad action committees of the workers to fight against the bonus cuts.

Appeals like these met with some response among workers. Big factory gate meetings were held, ranging from 100 or 200 to almost 700 (almost an entire shift). In one case, nearly 1,000 workers from one textile mill came to a mass meeting to discuss their strategy of fighting back. The workers bypassed the do-nothing union and set up a workers committee which won some victories: a 4% cash bonus and an

additional 4% in kind; a 100% "dearness allowance" (cost-of-living wage increases) rather than the usual 90% that is standard in Baroda; and a discount on the purchases of clothing.

These are just small examples, and so far they are the only examples in all of Gujarat, but they give an idea of the changing mood among the working class and show that there is a potential that needs only a proper leadership.

Q. What do you think are the prospects ahead in India?

A. In the absence of a major change in the class relationship of forces, there is no possibility for a return to the situation existing prior to June 1975—in the sense that the people will not have the fundamental rights that they had prior to then (of course, even those rights were very limited).

The power of judicial review will not be

restored to its original form. The question of political prisoners will exist for quite some time. There was an opening for struggle around the bonus cuts, but unfortunately the big working-class parties and unions did not try to exploit that opportunity. So, on an all-India scale, the Gandhi regime has been stabilized.

Democratic demands will assume greater importance, demands like: release of political prisoners, removal of the emergency, removal of precensorship, removal of the ban on political parties, removal of all repressive legislation. Also, repeal of all anti-working-class legislation such as the partial wage freeze and the bonus cut, recognition of the dissident trade unions.

Demands like these will have to be a major area of activity for the left. And only independent mobilizations by the working class and toiling masses can help achieve them. □

'Food Is a Weapon'

How Washington Uses Threat of Famine

Speaking at the World Energy Conference in September 1974, U.S. President Gerald Ford told the assembled delegates, "When nations use their resources as political weapons against others, the result is human suffering."

Ford's pious statement, of course, was aimed at the oil-producing countries. His administration takes another view when it comes to resources controlled by American imperialism. An example was given by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, who told one interviewer in 1974, "Food is a weapon." Speaking at a time when millions were dying from famine, Butz added that food "is now one of the principal tools in our negotiating kit."

There is no indication that things have changed since then. In its December 15, 1975, issue, *Business Week* devoted its cover story to this question. It said:

"The deployment of American food power is the focus of a serious policy debate now under way in Washington. Nearly everyone agrees that in a world of hunger and overpopulation, the U.S. can apply its tremendous agricultural capacity as a lever on foreign countries to adopt policies beneficial to this nation. 'We have the food, and the hell with the rest of the world,' snaps one high-level State Dept. official."

Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan and Democratic contender Henry Jackson have both called for holding up

grain sales in order to extract political concessions from the Soviet Union and other countries. *Business Week* claims that this is already being done:

"The new policy was employed in the Russian grain agreement negotiated recently in Moscow. For the Russians, the price was to stop disruptive, inflationary raids on the U.S. grain market. They were also asked to ante up some oil on favorable terms, which have yet to be spelled out. And there is strong evidence that, as another condition for the grain sale, the Russians were persuaded to keep their hands off during Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's negotiations on the Egyptian-Israeli accord."

Business Week also notes another area where this policy prevailed. "Food power," it said, "discreetly figures in the multilateral trade negotiations getting under way in Geneva, aimed at reducing tariffs. U.S. officials privately concede that it will be exploited to try to reduce trade barriers in countries that buy large quantities of food here. Japan is an obvious case in point."

While recognizing the necessity for handling questions of food "with particular skill and sensitivity," the article says "There is a growing consensus that the U.S. should be as tough in using food power to achieve national objectives as it is in employing its other economic capabilities."

Why Kenneth Kaunda Collaborates With Vorster Regime

By Tony Hodges

LONDON—One year ago, on October 27, 1974, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia welcomed South African Prime Minister John Vorster's drive for "détente" in southern Africa as "the voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting."

Since then, Kaunda and Vorster have cooperated closely to engineer a settlement of the crisis in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)—a deal that would almost certainly postpone African majority rule in the country for years. Kaunda has jailed several dozen Zimbabwean nationalist exiles likely to oppose such a "solution." Recently, he sent Zambian Deputy Chief Justice Leo Baron to Salisbury to head a team of lawyers aiding the faction of the African National Council led by Joshua Nkomo in its constitutional talks with Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith.

The negotiations, which opened December 11, have been denounced by other Zimbabwean factions, such as those led by Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, and Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

Why is Kaunda playing such a prominent role in this bid to foist a "settlement" on the Zimbabwean people that would guarantee white settler rule for years to come?

The underlying consideration of the Zambian government is the destabilizing impact a successful liberation struggle in southern Africa would have on political life in Zambia itself. Emancipation of the oppressed masses of Zimbabwe or South Africa would doubtless stir the will to struggle of the Zambian workers and peasants, who are increasingly disillusioned with the neocolonial regime in power since "independence" eleven years ago.

But there is increasing evidence that more immediate economic and political considerations are also prompting Kaunda's collaboration with South Africa. The Zambian economy, hard hit by the world recession, is in the throes of its deepest economic crisis since independence. Kaunda is turning to South Africa for economic assistance that will allow him to meet the material demands of the Zambian masses.

Last October South African Minister of Economic Affairs J.C. Heunis reportedly visited the Zambian capital and signed an agreement to extend credit covering up to 125 million rand [1 rand = US \$1.15] worth of South African exports to Zambia. This would amount to a staggering one-quarter



VORSTER: Using economic leverage to gain cooperation of neocolonial regimes.

of Zambia's entire current annual import bill.

On October 27, Dr. Jan Marais, president of the South Africa Foundation, revealed that he too had visited Zambia at the end of October and held "extremely fruitful" talks with Kaunda on the "advantages to be derived from economic cooperation in southern Africa." Marais said it was clear that Kaunda wanted "peace and progress" in Africa.

On October 30, I have been told, there was a meeting of all the general managers of Indeco, a giant state-owned conglomerate, at which Zambian government officials announced that import policy had changed and that trade with South Africa was now to be encouraged.

This pattern of increasing economic contacts between Zambia and South Africa has been confirmed in an appropriately titled lead article in the November 27 issue of the *Johannesburg Financial Mail*, "Into deepest Africa: South Africa's businessmen on the march." According to the *Mail*, South Africa may already be Zambia's No. 1 foreign supplier.

There is also considerable speculation that South Africa is footing the bill for Zambia's increasingly costly oil imports. South Africa is thought to be making payment directly to Iran to avoid the embarrassment of publicly announcing financial assistance to Zambia. Zambia's

oil bill soared in 1974 to 47.1 million kwacha [1 kwacha at 1974 rate = US \$0.64] from 17.7 million in 1973 as a result of the quadrupling of oil prices.

The Zambian government seems also on the verge of formally reopening its border with Rhodesia, closed since January 1973. The first shot in what appears to be a well-orchestrated campaign to prepare public opinion came on November 17 when Arthur Wina, member of parliament for Livingstone and a former finance minister in Kaunda's cabinet, called on the government to reopen the border, as the export route through Rhodesia and Mozambique was the country's most "economic and efficient route." Then, on December 1, a caucus of MPs from the United National Independence party (UNIP), the country's sole legal political party, added their voice to the call for reopening the border.

In fact, the border is half open now. South African and Rhodesian railway trucks are a common sight in Zambia. Zaïre is known to use the rail route through Zambia, Rhodesia, and Mozambique to export some of its copper. And, according to a Radio South Africa report on November 16, Zambia decided to ship 9,000 tons of copper through Rhodesia after the closure of the Benguela railway in Angola because of the civil war. The Benguela railway used to take 45 percent of Zambia's copper exports.

While using the strictly government-controlled press to soften public opinion for the change in policy, the Kaunda regime will probably wait until some progress has been registered in the Salisbury talks before making a move. This was indicated by remarks made by Peter Matoka, Zambian minister of development planning, on December 1. "The border," he said, "cannot be opened now because the President has information that this is not the proper time to do so."

South Africa and Rhodesia clearly have the economic leverage at this time to impel a bourgeois-nationalist regime like the Zambian government to back the détente policy. The price of copper, which accounts for more than 90 percent of Zambia's exports, has plummeted from £1,500 [£1 = US \$2.02] a ton in the early part of 1974 to less than £600 a ton for most of 1975 as a result of slackened world demand during the world capitalist depression. Meanwhile, Zambia has been hit by world inflation, particularly in the cost of oil, fertilizers, and

machinery. In 1974, the total payments surplus was only K18 million. This year, observers predict the deficit may reach K250 million.

The same picture is unfolding in other countries now backing the African détente. Zaïre, for example, is known to have negotiated an R8 million loan from South

Africa to cover imports of food. The news leaked out in October. In the same month, the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of South Africa sent a representative to Zaïre with a group of South African businessmen. South Africa is known to export foodstuffs, steel, and pharmaceuticals to Zaïre.

Like Kaunda, President Mobutu of Zaïre

sees South Africa as a source of aid for his ravaged economy and unstable regime. The country also depends on copper for more than 70 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. Reserves have reportedly fallen from £370 million to less than £12.4 million, and the government is borrowing massively to keep afloat, according to the September issue of *African Development*. □

Amnesty International Charges Torture

Zimbabwean Freedom Fighters Face Witch-hunt in Zambia

By Tony Hodges

LONDON—Sam Geza is a member of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Several years ago, he was forced by the repressive white settler regime in his own country to seek refuge across the border in Zambia.

For two and a half years, Geza taught economics at the University of Zambia in Lusaka. But suddenly, on June 1, 1975, he was flung into jail by the Zambian authorities. Released five months later on November 4, he was given thirty days to clear out of the country.

Geza's case is typical of the plight of the hundreds of Zimbabwean nationalists now being hounded by the regime of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda. The crackdown has coincided with Kaunda's drive for "détente" with racist South Africa and a negotiated settlement of the crisis in Zimbabwe—a "settlement" that most observers believe would postpone African rule in the country for years.

Two weeks after his release, as he was packing his bags to leave for Tanzania, Geza told me of his ordeal at the hands of the Zambian police.

"I and three other ZANU comrades were arrested when we were driving through the town of Petauke near the Mozambican border. I was taken to the police station at Chipata and grilled for eleven hours, nonstop, by nine people from the Special Branch, the Immigration Authorities, the Security Police, and the Intelligence Unit."

Geza spent one month at Chipata before being transferred to Lusaka Remand Prison. At no point in his five months' detention were any charges laid against him. "I was declared a prohibited immigrant, even though I had a valid visa and a work permit."

This practice of declaring Zimbabwean exiles prohibited immigrants (PIs) is a common one, Geza said. "Zimbabweans who escape to Zambia to join the liberation movements are often immediately thrown



KAUNDA: Hoping for deal with racists at the expense of African masses.

in jail. When I arrived at Lusaka Remand on June 27 there were 120 Zimbabweans there as PIs. At least 80 of them are still in jail.

"There was one case of thirty-six Zimbabweans who arrived by plane from Botswana under the auspices of the African National Council (ANC) and with prior clearance from the Zambian Defence Ministry. They were all declared prohibited immigrants on arrival at Lusaka International Airport and sent to Lusaka Remand. They were freed after a prison riot on July 9.

"The Zambian authorities are pressing to have the PIs 'voluntarily' repatriated to Rhodesia. Every two weeks they pass

around forms saying 'I agree to be repatriated.' Conditions are made very harsh. Cells built for 50 are crammed with 100 prisoners. Sometimes there aren't enough blankets, and 500 people have to share two toilets." Geza did not know how many Zimbabweans were being held as PIs in other Zambian jails.

In addition to the PIs, about sixty-five ZANU members, including many of the movement's top leaders, have been detained since March without charge or trial under Zambia's notorious "Preservation of Public Security Regulations." Among them are five members of ZANU's Supreme Council: Mukudzei Mudzi (secretary), Josiah Tongogara (defense secretary), Matuku Hamadzariipi (treasurer), Rugare Gumbo (publicity secretary), and Kumbirai Kangai (welfare secretary). All six members of ZANU's High Command, the movement's military leadership, have been detained.

The pretext for the arrests was the murder of ZANU Chairman Herbert Chitepo on March 18 after four months of internal factional fighting within ZANU's ranks that left several dozen ZANU members dead. Nobody knows who killed Chitepo. But the Zambian government saw an ideal opportunity to strike a blow at the whole movement. Zambian police picked up many of those now detained while they attended Chitepo's funeral on March 22. The government said they would be held while an International Commission of Inquiry investigated the events leading to Chitepo's murder.

"The commission met in July," Geza told me. "But then it only interviewed people on the periphery of the affair. Sadat Kufa, Chitepo's bodyguard, who was wounded in the attack, has never been seen by the commission. Then, the commission suddenly stopped work. Its report is still not out."

"The Zambian government say they have confessions but these could not stand up in court, which is why only one of the

detainees, Tyupo Chigowe, has been brought up on charges. The commission has not found a shred of evidence that these people were involved in the murder of Chitepo. The Zambian government is worried what would happen if these militants were released. Would they resume the struggle and upset the détente exercise?"

There is a considerable body of evidence that the ZANU detainees have been tortured. On May 21, Amnesty International announced that it had "received reports from usually reliable sources that a number of the ZANU detainees had been tortured. They include Rugare Gumbo, ZANU's information officer, and Josiah Tongogara, who as ZANU's chief of defense was one of the main tacticians of ZANU's guerrilla activities in Rhodesia."

According to Geza, "Some of the ZANU detainees were interrogated by people suspected to have come from Rhodesia. Black and white interrogators spoke fluent Shona, indicating that they could only have come from Rhodesia. They used sleep deprivation techniques. One prisoner had paraffin poured over his back and set alight. People have been hanged upside down from trees.

"Kufa was taken from hospital before his wounds had healed and beaten up in jail. He still has bomb fragments in him and hasn't recovered from the shock and the beatings. Since Amnesty International protested, the physical tortures have stopped. But they continue to use psychological methods. Chigowe has been kept in isolation since mid-October and is not even allowed to exercise."

On September 11, the Zambian crackdown assumed an even uglier profile. Eleven ZANU members were gunned down by Zambian troops at the Mboroma ANC camp near Kabwe. The Zambian government refused to allow ZANU representatives to inspect the bodies—perhaps, it is widely suspected, because they were shot in the back. The shootings followed a disturbance over food in the camp, which is run by the Zambian army.

Kaunda's witch-hunt methods against ZANU are in keeping with his own domestic police-state practices. Zambia has been in an official "state of public emergency" continuously for more than eleven years. A "state of public emergency" allows the president, under the Emergency Powers Act, to "make such regulations as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the Republic, the maintenance of public order, and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot." It is this law which allows the president to detain persons without trial and, also, to amend any law except the constitution.

All political opposition to the ruling

United National Independence party (UNIP) has been progressively crushed. In 1968, the United Party, led by N. Mundia, who had previously been a minister in Kaunda's cabinet, was banned. Two years later, the government closed the University of Zambia for several weeks and expelled seven leaders of the students union following student protests in the capital. The same year, the government gave itself powers under the Industrial Relations Act to ban strikes.

In February 1972, the United Progressive

West Germany

'Anyone Who Cites Basic Rights Is Fair Game'

There are five million civil-service jobs in West Germany, employing 20 percent of the country's labor force. During the last two and a half years, 460,000 job applications have been processed by the West German government. Candidates are usually asked the following questions:

Were you, during the course of your studies, a member of any political organization?

Have you ever called for protest against the "genocide of the Vietnamese people"?

Have you ever applied the term "imperialist" to the Federal Republic (West Germany)?

Are you a member of a teachers union?

What is your attitude toward Marxism?

Toward private property?

To the German Democratic Republic (East Germany)?

To the dictatorship of the proletariat?

In what cases is criticism of the Free Democrat-Social Democrat government (the present ruling coalition) justified?

One applicant who refused to answer such queries was told in an official letter that "you are right when you claim that in principle an employer does not have the right to interrogate you about party membership. This nevertheless holds true only when it concerns a party which ranges itself on the side of the Constitution."

Since January 1972, when then-Chancellor Willy Brandt issued the "extremist executive ordinance," 467 persons have been denied government jobs because they were suspected of "not being committed at all times to liberal and democratic order."

In an article in the December 5 issue of *Le Monde* Daniel Vernet explained that "the hunt for 'extremists' in government sniffs out its prey almost exclusively on the left."

Vernet said, "The universities are watched to find out who distributes tracts, who takes part in demonstrations, who

party (UPP) was banned. Its leader, Simon Kapwepwe (who had once been vice-president of UNIP), and dozens of UPP members were detained. The following December, the Zambian constitution was amended to make all opposition political organizations unconstitutional.

Now, Kaunda is using the full force of the repressive apparatus to keep the reins on those Zimbabwean militants in his country who might not go along with a deal that falls short of immediate African majority rule. □

interrupts classes, and how."

He cited a law professor who warned that "anyone who cites basic rights, makes exaggerated social-welfare demands, and talks much about democratization is already fair game."

More than 100 university professors have voiced their opposition against this "system of espionage and repression of opinion." Nevertheless, the Social Democratic leaders appear to be pushing further with their repressive plans. They are supporting a ban on all writings that present violence as "desirable, necessary or inevitable."

German citizens ruled ineligible for public-service jobs under the "extremist executive ordinance" can appeal. But Vernet noted that "it is to say the least unfortunate that the Federal administrative court responsible for setting up appeal procedures for rejected applicants includes a judge, Edmund de Chapeaurouge, who applied race laws with zeal under the Nazis." □

Footnote to the Great Society

"My experience and research . . . suggest that human consumption of pet food is widespread in the United States. My estimate, one I believe to be conservative, is that pet foods constitute a significant part of the diet of at least 225,000 American households, affecting some one million persons. Who knows how many more millions supplement their diet with pet-food products? One thing that we can assume is that current economic conditions are increasing the practice and that it most seriously affects the unemployed, poor people, and our older citizens."

—From an article in the December 16 *New York Times* by Edward H. Peeples, Jr., assistant professor of preventive medicine at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Why Labor Party Lost in Australian Elections

By Sol Salby

[The following articles, analyzing the results of the Australian elections on December 13, are reprinted from the December 18 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Sydney. The Australian Trotskyists of the Socialist Workers League won 28,311 votes in the election.]

* * *

The trend away from Labor in the federal elections was nationwide. It is expected that by the end of counting all but one of the 127 seats in the House of Representatives will show a decline in Labor's share of the vote. This kind of swing is virtually unprecedented in Australian elections. What made it even worse for the Labor party was the more-than-proportional swing in the working-class areas.

There can be no question that tens of thousands of unionists, people who work in factories and mines as well as offices, changed their vote from Labor to Liberal in the last elections. They did this as a protest against Labor's policies. Even the most superficial analysis shows that as of December 14, the drop in the Labor vote was 4.7 percent in the rural areas, 5.7 percent in the rural provincial cities, 6.0 percent in the Labor strongholds of the inner city areas, and 7.7 percent in the outer suburban areas.

Labor leaders would no doubt point out that Labor already lost a substantial proportion of the countryside vote last year and couldn't expect to lose much more this year. They have already pointed out that Labor gained 43 percent of the vote compared to only 40 percent in 1966, so the disastrous result is not so bad after all. They have blamed the unequal distribution of electorates for that. This claim is obviously justified, but once again cannot detract from the huge loss of votes suffered by the Labor party.

Another point made by ALP [Australian Labor party] President Hawke was that at 7.1 percent the swing against Labor was less than the 7.2 percent swing against the Liberals in 1969 and that Labor could regain office if it were to repeat its 1969 success. But all these are only excuses. The loss of twenty-eight or twenty-nine seats in the House of Representatives cannot simply be explained away in this fashion.

Within hours of the defeat, the recriminations started. Clyde Cameron, former minis-

ter for science and consumer affairs, said that seeing that Gough Whitlam claimed responsibility for the electoral success of 1972 and 1974 he should also accept responsibility for the electoral debacle of 1975. Cameron also said that the ALP has made a mistake by printing Gough Whitlam's picture on the how-to-vote cards. In a way Cameron was right: The Labor party did place higher emphasis on Whitlam's personality than at previous times. It was people like the NSW [New South Wales] president of the party, John Ducker, who led the chants of "We want Gough." The whole campaign was based on Whitlam's personality.

But Cameron cannot absolve himself or any other Labor figure from the defeat. They all backed the personality cult of Whitlam, and what's more important, they all endorsed Whitlam's policies which were responsible for the disaster.

Why did Labor lose then? If the opinion polls are to be believed, why did the party lose so much ground in the last five weeks leading to the election? There are many reasons. Certainly the dismissal of the Labor government on November 11 [see *Intercontinental Press*, December 1, 1975, p. 1678] gave the Liberals all the advantages of the government without any of the disadvantages, which they exploited to the limit. But the most important reason for the loss of the working-class vote can be summarized in two words: unemployment and inflation.

For working people, the Labor record on jobs and prices was undoubtedly a major factor in changing their vote. Labor promised full employment and protection from price rises. However, under Labor, unemployment reached 300,000 while inflation remained in double figures since the early days of the Labor government.

Aside from increasing the unemployment benefits, Labor has done nothing to create jobs or curb price rises. Most workers regard the Prices Justification Tribunal as a joke. They know that the real effect of the indexation scheme introduced by the government was to stop wage rises. They know that a wage freeze is currently operating. They know that Labor had a "resounding success," in keeping wage rises to less than 10 percent in 1975. This is certainly lower than price rises during the same time.

Workers are also aware that the Labor government's policies contributed directly

to the high level of unemployment. The credit squeeze of 1973-74 and the cuts in government spending played a major role in the loss of so many jobs.

Worse still, many people who voted Labor in 1974 feel deceived. They remember that unemployment was falling and that Whitlam made a lot out of the drop in price rises which took place in the March quarter of that year, just before that election. They now know that the forces which caused the rise in unemployment were already unleashed by 1974 and that the government was well aware of this. At the same time, with the benefit of hindsight workers can tell that the fall in inflation was a false dawn. It was a temporary result of seasonal forces. Justifiably these workers feel cheated.

Those workers who felt deceived by Labor will be even more deceived by the Liberals. The Liberals and their big business friends are already spreading deception by promising them an improvement in the jobs and prices situation. The Liberals are no more capable of solving the problems of unemployment and inflation than Labor was. Their projected increased subsidies and other payments to big business can only increase inflation.

It is quite clear that the determination of the employers to have Labor thrown out must have been pretty close to unanimous. There was certainly no public indication that any section of the employing class was backing Labor.

For its part the privately owned media spoke with a single voice: "Labor must go!"

In the case of press baron Rupert Murdoch, one of the main reasons for the change was the Labor government's refusal to waive some of the regulations concerning the inflow of foreign capital to a project in which his News Ltd. has a share. Labor's refusal on the grounds of economic nationalism and the environmental impact incensed Murdoch, who previously was also a major contributor to the Labor party funds.

Regardless of how representative of the capitalist class Murdoch and News Ltd. were, the 1975 elections have proven the old dictum that a Labor government which wants to preserve the capitalist system cannot survive the opposition of the capitalists themselves. The Labor leaders did everything they could to preserve the system; they even wrote their support for it

into the Labor party platform at the 1975 Terrigal conference. But none of their actions succeeded in gaining sufficient backing from the capitalist class to win.

On the other hand what has Labor done for working people? Now that we no longer have a Labor government it may be appropriate to draw the balance sheet of Labor in power. It may also be appropriate to view the period since the last time Labor's stocks hit rock bottom—the 1966 elections.

In one of the most laudatory descriptions of Whitlam's rise to power, David Solomon and Laurie Oakes wrote in the *Making of an Australian Prime Minister*: "The 1966 election was the nadir of the Labor Party's fortunes. Under the leadership of Arthur Calwell, Labor was routed. It received only 40 per cent of the formal votes compared with the Liberal-Country Party coalition's 49 per cent, lost eleven seats and was left with only forty-one members in a House of one hundred and twenty-four. In other circumstances commentators and political scientists might have been tempted to write the ALP off after such a disastrous result, even though it had proved its power of recovery often enough in the past. But no-one did, largely because waiting in the wings was a man who was widely seen as the great white hope of the party. Edward Gough Whitlam had already built up his reputation as a vote winner. . . ."

Nine years later the reputation of Edward Gough Whitlam as a vote-winner has been demolished. In terms of seats, Labor is down to thirty-six or thirty-seven in a slightly larger House. In terms of achievements, after nine years of Whitlamism, the party can only point to the introduction of Medibank. True, there have been a few other minor reforms: spending on education has increased dramatically; pensions are up to 25 percent of average weekly earnings; and free tertiary education has been established. But almost everything else has remained the same. Asio [Australian Security Intelligence Organization] still spies on activists in the labor and radical movements, Australian troops are still stationed overseas, foreign bases still remain in Australia. . . .

All the changes that Whitlam introduced, the rewriting of Labor's platform in 1967, 1969, and 1971, did not help him. When it came to the crunch he was deserted by his big business friends.

In the turmoil which has been caused by the electoral debacle the suggestion has been made that Bob Hawke should replace Whitlam as leader of the Labor party. It remains to be seen whether or not the Labor caucus will take up this suggestion: But regardless of the final outcome, Bob Hawke is the last person to claim that he wasn't responsible for the December 13 landslide.

Bob Hawke cooperated with the leadership of the parliamentary wing of the party in urging "wage restraint."

He made little if any criticism of Labor even when unemployment was steadily increasing. But more than that, Bob Hawke was the person who sealed the fate of the Labor government. By refusing to call a general strike on November 11 when the Labor government was dismissed, Hawke made sure that Labor couldn't win. A general strike would have been essential to mobilize the working people, not only against the Fraser-Kerr coup but against the anti-working-class policies of the Labor government.

Hawke's endorsement by the Murdoch and Fairfax press gives an indication of whose interests he would serve. The problems faced by the Labor party cannot be solved by a change of personalities at the top. They cannot be solved either by superficial changes in the party platform and other forms of window dressing.

As this newspaper has pointed out in the past, what is required is a change of policy. The change that we want is a change away from the old big-business policies which underlie Labor's defeat to radical socialist policies in the interests of the working class. Labor was defeated not because, as some are already trying to claim, its policies were too advanced, too radical, but because they were not nearly radical enough. □

Socialist Campaign Presented Revolutionary Alternative

By Jim McIlroy

The Socialist Workers election campaign, which sought to put the socialist alternative right up front in the recent political crisis, has achieved considerable success in getting the message out to wide layers of the population. In addition to the significant vote gained by the nine candidates of the Socialist Workers Senate team on December 13, the overall impact of the campaign has been tremendous.

Particularly impressive was the very positive response the campaign received from Labor supporters at rallies and elsewhere. Campaign workers noted the large numbers of people who were looking for a positive alternative to the procapitalist program of the Whitlam leadership and who appreciated the socialist policies advanced by the Socialist Workers campaign.

During the course of the campaign 100,000 copies of the eight-page Socialist Workers election manifesto were distributed at Labor rallies, street corner meetings, and by letter-boxing. This was the single most solid piece of election material put out by any party during the entire course of the

campaign and certainly served to inject ideas into an election based almost entirely on slogans as far as the major parties were concerned.

An example of where the manifesto was distributed in the final week of campaigning was the 5,000 handed out at the windup rally for Whitlam in Hyde Park, Sydney, on December 12. The Socialist Workers campaign newspapers, *Direct Action* and *Young Socialist*, also were well received, and sales rose dramatically during the crisis period.

Tens of thousands of copies were sold at Labor rallies, in the streets, at factories, and at other selling places during the few weeks of the campaign. For instance, over 1,000 *Direct Actions* were sold at a Labor rally and in the streets of Brisbane during the last week. In Melbourne, almost 800 *Direct Actions* and 150 *Young Socialists* were sold at the final Labor rally at the Moorabbin Football Ground. Street sales in Melbourne outside Myers sometimes ran at a rate of 70 an hour per seller.

The socialist campaign sparked consider-

able controversy at times. In Adelaide, one *Direct Action* seller, Steve O'Brien, sold thirty in a very short time with the help of the far-right Workers party. When Workers party candidate John Whiting, who was spruiking in Rundle Street, saw O'Brien he launched a frenzied verbal assault on "the communist selling newspapers." Immediately, people crowded around to buy O'Brien's papers to express their disgust at Whiting's attack.

On the other side, several times Labor officials at campaign meetings formally dissociated the ALP from our election material. However, this didn't prevent members of the audience at a Labor meeting in suburban Melbourne from asking questions directly based on points raised in the Socialist Workers election manifesto, one on the abolition of the Senate and another on wage indexation. A further response: A marshal at the ALP vigil on December 10 in Canberra commented that he was beginning to think that the socialist policies the Socialist Workers

campaign stood for were just what Labor needed.

Socialist Workers candidates spoke at a large number of meetings and rallies during the campaign. In the last two weeks, South Australian candidate Brett Trener spoke to audiences of 200 to 250 during meetings for the candidates at Salisbury and Murray Park Colleges of Advanced Education. Candidates also addressed the December 6 demonstrations in several cities for the repeal of all abortion laws, and spoke at meetings and rallies in defense of independence for East Timor.

Rod Quinn, Socialist Workers candidate for the ACT [Australian Capital Territory], was well received by the women present at a Women's Electoral Lobby forum and at a December 6 meeting on abortion in which he delivered a strong attack on the Right to Life Association. Quinn also defended the rights of the Palestinians to a strongly pro-Israeli audience at the National Jewish Centre.

Press, radio, and television coverage also stepped up in the final weeks, with interviews and reports on the Socialist Workers campaign in every major city where socialist candidates were running. Certainly, the name of the Socialist Workers League is immensely more widely known now than before the beginning of the political crisis leading up to December 13.

One of the most striking aspects of the campaign were the 25,000 posters pasted up, highlighting a number of different demands of the Socialist Workers team. These posters became very prominent around the inner suburbs of the major cities in particular in the weeks leading up to December 13, rivaling the posters of all other parties.

The final rallies in all centers were a fitting culmination of the campaign. The most successful was in Sydney, where nearly 100 people heard the two NSW Senate candidates and Socialist Workers League National Secretary Jim Percy speak

on the meaning of the Socialist Workers campaign and the present crisis.

A final point: The campaign was only able to cover a limited number of polling booths in the major cities on December 13. It is clear from the importance of the how-to-vote cards, especially in the Senate, that the Socialist Workers vote would have been increased considerably the more supporters there were available to help out. So, too, the overall impact would have been even greater with more campaign workers to carry out the general publicity.

The Socialist Workers League has grown as a result of this campaign, but more members and supporters are always needed. This is only the beginning. The next year offers big new opportunities for further building the socialist alternative for the great struggles ahead. The fighting demands of the Socialist Workers campaign have shown how the labor movement can defend itself in the dangerous period looming up. □

White House 'Played All Ends Against the Middle'

Fifteen Years of U.S. Intervention in Angola

By Ernest Harsch

Washington's drive to influence the course of the Angolan civil war expanded sharply during the summer of 1975, as the Central Intelligence Agency funneled millions of dollars worth of military aid to two of the three contending nationalist factions. Although the American imperialist intervention in Angola reached a qualitatively new stage with this escalation, its roots go back a long way.

In fact, Washington has been involved in the mineral-rich African country for nearly fifteen years—from the time of Portugal's "Great War" against the Angolan rebels in 1961.

In March of that year, a massive uprising against Portuguese colonial rule swept northern Angola. Initiated by the predecessor of the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—Angolan National Liberation Front), the rebellion was met by a brutal Portuguese counterinsurgency campaign that left tens of thousands of Africans dead and devastated large areas of the north.

Washington tacitly allowed the Salazar dictatorship to use American arms—supplied through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—in its Angola operations. For instance, according to an official Portuguese military publication in 1963, the planes used against the Angolan rebels

included American F-84 Thunderjets, PV-2 Harpoon bombers, T-6 trainers reequipped for armed reconnaissance flights, and C-54 transports.

The 1961 uprising, however, was a clear signal of the growing nationalist sentiment in the Portuguese colonies. To some American policy makers, it appeared probable that Lisbon would someday have to relinquish direct political control of its African empire. Washington's policy in the Portuguese colonies, as in other parts of the world, was to hedge its bets. It continued to throw most of its support behind its imperialist ally in Lisbon, but also sought to keep its options toward the emerging nationalist leaders open.

Recent government leaks have unveiled some aspects of this side of Washington's Angola strategy. Citing "four official sources," Leslie H. Gelb revealed in the September 25, 1975, *New York Times* that the CIA began sending arms and funds to FNLA leader Holden Roberto as early as 1962. John Marks, an associate of the Center for National Security Studies (a nongovernment organization) and coauthor of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, provided additional details of this CIA operation in an article reprinted in the December 16 *Congressional Record*.

Marks cited a former White House aide as saying that during the administration of President Johnson, Washington's policy toward the Portuguese colonies was "to play all ends against the middle." This meant, according to the aide, giving some military and political support to the Salazar dictatorship, while subsidizing the independence groups to a certain degree.

The CIA, the official said, had the "habit of picking out single individuals and making them our guys, somehow assuming they would turn out all right. It was mainly a cash-in-the-envelope kind of thing—conscience money to show American good intentions."

In Angola, the CIA expressed its "good intentions" to Roberto. In Mozambique, according to the official, it was to Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, the principal leader of Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique—Mozambique Liberation Front) until his assassination by parcel bomb in early 1969.

It is not unusual for nationalist organizations to seek to exploit the contradictions among the world powers. In their struggle against Portuguese colonialism, the Angolan and Mozambican rebels had the right to accept aid from wherever they could obtain it. The imperialists, of course, hoped to gain

political concessions in return for such aid.

Although other nationalist groups existed in Angola and Mozambique, it appears that the White House chose the FNLA and Frelimo as recipients of CIA aid because they were the largest and most active, and therefore the most useful targets for the American attempts to gain future political influence. The FNLA carried out the bulk of the fighting in Angola throughout the early 1960s, as did Frelimo in Mozambique from the mid-1960s until Lisbon agreed in 1974 to grant the colony its independence.

In contrast, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), a small organization paralyzed by factional struggles in the early 1960s, was turned down when it approached Washington for help during that period. (The MPLA subsequently sought aid from Moscow, and received it.) The MPLA and Frelimo, it should be noted, have maintained close ties for many years.

Although Marks's source did not reveal how much aid the CIA had sent to the FNLA and Frelimo, he did note that it was not enough to turn the tide against Lisbon. Until the April 25, 1974, Portuguese coup, the White House continued to place most of its bets on the Salazarist dictatorship.

Between 1962 and 1968, Washington sent more than \$39 million in military aid and \$124 million in economic assistance to the Lisbon regime. Hundreds of Portuguese troops received U.S. military training, either in Portugal by the Pentagon's Military Assistance Advisory Group or at bases in the United States. Some received instruction at the U.S. counterinsurgency school in Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Since 1962, U.S. representatives in the United Nations abstained on or voted against all major resolutions condemning Portuguese colonialism. In his book *Portuguese Africa and the West*, William Minter quoted a State Department document: "The United States recognizes the contribution made in Africa by Portugal and believes that it is important that Portugal continue to contribute to stability in that continent."

Washington's policy of bolstering Portuguese colonialism prompted Roberto to declare in January 1964, "I came to the conclusion that the Western countries are hypocritical. They help our enemies. While paying lip service to self-determination, the United States supplies its North Atlantic treaty's ally, Portugal, with arms that are used to kill us."

According to the official quoted by Marks, President Nixon halted the CIA's "program aid" to the African independence groups in 1969 as part of an overall policy of easing the pressures against the white regimes in southern Africa. The CIA, however, did not



Der Spiegel

Portuguese troops in Angola. They were armed and trained by Washington.

want to close the door on Roberto entirely, and kept him on a \$10,000 a year "retainer."

In February 1970, Nixon adopted a secret policy, on the recommendation of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, that codified Washington's support for Portuguese colonialism, as well as for the white minority regimes in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Nicknamed "Tar Baby," the policy was based on the premise that the "whites are here [in Africa] to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists." (See *Intercontinental Press*, November 3, 1975, p. 1504.)

In line with this policy, the White House increased its military and economic aid to the Lisbon regime. A \$436 million Export-Import Bank credit loan was extended to Portugal in 1971. In addition to herbicides of the type used by Washington in Vietnam, two Boeing 707s were sold to Lisbon for use in troop transport. U.S. investments in Angola and Mozambique also increased significantly during the Nixon administration.

Washington's stepped-up aid to Lisbon's colonial war was a losing venture. Nixon and Kissinger had not foreseen the April 1974 Portuguese coup, which led to the collapse of Lisbon's African empire.

However, the ensuing struggle for power between the three main Angolan nationalist forces, the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), gave Washington another opportunity to continue its intervention in Angola, this time in a more direct fashion.

Its aim is to prevent Moscow from gaining increased diplomatic leverage within the détente, which might result if the MPLA won the civil war through heavy Soviet backing. Washington is also seeking to perpetuate the fratricidal war in order to weaken the entire Angolan nationalist movement and facilitate continued imperialist domination of the country.

In January 1975, the White House's high-level intelligence-coordinating body, known as the 40 Committee, decided to "reactivate" the flow of CIA funds to the FNLA, setting the stage for the current escalation of American intervention. Seymour M. Hersh reported in the December 19 *New York Times* that the meeting, chaired by Kissinger, approved the sending of \$300,000 to Roberto.

Later that spring, the White House authorized the sending of another \$300,000 in arms and other aid to the UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi. In mid-July, the CIA was authorized to send \$10 million worth of arms to the FNLA and UNITA. By the end of the year, at least \$33 million had been sent or was "in the pipeline." □

Indonesian Invaders Meet Stiff Resistance in East Timor

By John Percy

[The following article appeared in the December 18 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Sydney, Australia.]

* * *

The generals in Jakarta launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor on December 7, giving up all pretense they weren't using military force to try to crush the nationalist Fretilin* government.

Indonesian troops overran Dili, the capital of East Timor, in six hours after a naval bombardment. The government of East Timor and its forces retreated to the hills. As many as twenty Indonesian warships, several dozen aircraft, and over 2,000 elite paratroops and marines took part in the assault, according to eyewitness reports radioed to Darwin.

True to their form of 1965, when they butchered up to half a million people, the Indonesian generals are engaging in a wholesale bloodbath. Frantic radio appeals from Dili were received in Darwin on the morning of December 7:

"They are killing indiscriminately," said one broadcast. "Women and children are being shot in the streets. A lot of people have been killed.

"We are all going to be killed. I repeat, we are all going to be killed. . . .

"This is an appeal for international help. We appeal to the Australian people. Please help us. Please."

Fretilin radio reports monitored in Darwin accused Indonesian troops of killing many of Dili's 10,000 Chinese population. José Ramos Horta, Fretilin's spokesman on foreign affairs, said in Lisbon on December 8 that at least 500 people, mostly women and children, had been massacred during the attack.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik at first denied it was an Indonesian invasion. "Indonesia acted in response to a call for help," he said. According to Malik, pro-Indonesian forces captured Dili and then invited Indonesia in to "restore security." But little effort was made to stick to this flimsy cover.

Even while Malik continued to pretend the invasion was by invitation, the Indonesian state radio station in West Timor was

telling a very different story:

"As you know, from December 7, 1975, the Indonesian Armed Forces [Tentara Nasional Indonesia—TNI] have taken over the whole of Timor," it told its listeners in East Timor.

"The TNI is going to help unite all the people of Timor Island.

"So don't be afraid of the Indonesian Army, because it is coming to help you and give you freedom.

"Seven December is really a big day. It is the day of liberation for the people of East Timor from the Fretilin communist yoke."

The broadcast made no mention of the pro-Indonesian parties—UDT, Apodeti, Kota, and Trabalista. It gave specific instructions to Fretilin soldiers on how they should surrender:

"As you know, the TNI is going to receive you with open arms and all kindness. So, Fretilin army forces, it is better to surrender, otherwise the TNI cannot be responsible for what happens to you.

"We call on you to stop fighting. Think several times. Throw down your arms, return home, and surrender to the TNI.

"If not, they will kill all of you."

In a broadcast from Dili after the city was captured, Indonesian and pro-Indonesian parties vowed to kill anyone who supported Fretilin. (Fretilin claims to have 200,000 card-holding members, out of a total population of 650,000.)

Both the Australian Labor party [ALP] and the Liberal-National Country party coalition reacted to the invasion with pious statements of regret.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs Andrew Peacock described the Indonesian invasion as "tragic." He said that while Indonesia's stated objective of restoring law and order was "laudable, the means chosen by Indonesia to achieve it was a matter for deep regret and concern on the part of the Australian Government." However, apart from raising the matter at the United Nations, he indicated his government was not going to do anything about it.

Gough Whitlam also said he deplored the invasion, and accused the coalition of inflaming Indonesia's attitude toward Fretilin by describing it as procommunist. However, he added that "without going into details," the parties in East Timor had made the present situation "probably inevitable." Like Peacock, Whitlam made it plain he wasn't going to go beyond a verbal protest:

"The best we can hope for is that all the governments of the region, the Philippines, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Australia and Indonesia, might be able to persuade the United Nations to resume decolonisation and to ascertain the wishes of the people of East Timor," he said.

John Kerin, secretary of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, condemned the invasion on December 11 and said Australia should urge the UN to demand Indonesia withdraw its troops.

"The Prime Minister, Mr Fraser, must take some of the responsibility for the whole thing because he knew of the invasion plans several days before the invasion took place and did not lift a finger.

"The resort to force by Indonesia will only further remind Australians of the nature of the regime in Jakarta which still has 55,000 political prisoners in its jails."

Writing from Jakarta for the December 15 *National Times*, however, Hamish McDonald pointed out the hypocrisy behind the protestations of both Peacock and Whitlam.

"The Australian Government has been aware, right from the beginning, of the covert campaign Indonesia launched on October 6 against the nationalist Fretilin party," he wrote.

"Moreover, both Mr Peacock and the former Prime Minister, Mr Whitlam, are understood to have communicated private assurances to the Indonesians, at crucial points during the four-month civil war, that no objections would be forthcoming to even direct intervention."

The Australian government was given plenty of warning of the invasion. The Australian ambassador in Jakarta was one of the ten ambassadors called in to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry on December 4 to be informed that Indonesia might even feel obliged to "help restore order." The Indonesian government closed the main airport in West Timor several days before the invasion and a major military buildup was reportedly under way.

The national chairman of Community Aid Abroad, David Scott, also accused the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs of having had advance notice of the invasion. "The department set out to seal off the island so there would be no chance of any embarrassing incidents," he said on December 9. He said the department had

*Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor).—IP

canceled a regular flight due to leave Dili for Darwin on December 7, and had been scrutinizing all cables coming into Darwin from Dili for several weeks.

Having been assured that both major parties in Australia would be willing to turn a blind eye, all the butchers in Jakarta needed to proceed with their military conquest was the go-ahead from Washington. According to Fretilin spokesperson Chris Santos speaking in Sydney on December 7, "Dr Kissinger knew of the invasion and gave it his encouragement." The invasion began only hours after President Ford and Kissinger left Indonesia after an official visit.

According to early reports from Indonesian sources, the Indonesian troops won an easy victory. The Indonesian news agency Antara reported that Indonesian forces appeared to be in control of all of East Timor. Reports from Jakarta quoted in the December 12 *Sydney Morning Herald* said Bacau, the country's second largest town, had been captured.

Later reports showed that the Indonesians were meeting stiff resistance, however. A few days after the invasion Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik was only claiming that his forces held "most" of Dili. He said more "volunteers" would be needed from Indonesia.

Radio broadcasts from Fretilin tell of fierce fighting in Dili and Bacau and claim that Indonesian soldiers in villages near Bacau have been surrounded. A message on December 15 from Fretilin's prime minister, Nicolau Lobato, claimed that "Fretilin forces realised several attacks in Dili yesterday, eliminating 150 enemy soldiers."

A glimpse of the fate awaiting East Timor if the Indonesian generals are successful was gained on December 14 when the former Portuguese enclave of Ocussi Ambeno was incorporated into Indonesia. A ceremony in the West Timor capital Kupang officially ended 400 years of Portuguese rule.

It remains to be seen how long the people of East Timor and the Fretilin forces can hold out against the superior Indonesian numbers and military might. It is clear, however, that the resistance is putting up a brave fight, and if the generals are to achieve their aims, they are going to have to carry out a massive policy of genocide against the people of East Timor and import a huge army of occupation to subdue and colonize the country.

Fretilin's president, Francisco Xavier D'Amaral, told *Sydney Morning Herald* correspondent Michael Richardson on December 2, shortly before he left Dili, that if Indonesia invaded East Timor, "I believe they will have to kill or capture more than 70 per cent of the 650,000 people. . . ."

The United Nations General Assembly condemned the Indonesian invasion on



Der Spiegel

Timorese guerrillas. Indonesian regime has vowed to kill all who resist.

December 12. A motion deploring the military intervention and calling for Indonesian troops to withdraw without delay was approved by 72 votes to 12 with 43 abstentions. Although the Australian delegate voted for the resolution, he prefaced his vote with an objection to the resolution's crucial parts. Those parts included an expression of deep concern "at the critical situation resulting from the military intervention of armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese Timor," and a call to Indonesia to "Withdraw without delay." Neither section was endorsed by Australia.

In Australia, demonstrations were held in most major cities protesting the Indonesian attack. Within hours of news of the invasion, 150 demonstrators gathered outside the Indonesian consulate in Sydney. Further demonstrations were held on December 8 and December 17. Demonstrations were also held in Melbourne on December 9, Adelaide on December 10, and Brisbane on December 11.

Speakers at the Brisbane demonstration included representatives of the Building Workers Industrial Union, the meat workers, and the Waterside Workers Federation, as well as Terry Farr of the Communist League and Socialist Workers League Senate candidate Renfrey Clarke. Clarke criticized the refusal of the ALP leadership to take an unequivocal stand in opposition to the invasion or to support demands by rank-and-file unionists for a ban on trade with the aggressors.

In Hobart a Timor Action Group has been formed following the invasion. The initial meeting of the committee was addressed by John Green, Labor member of State Parlia-

ment, Derek Roebuck of the Communist party, Bob Ridley of the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union, and John Tully, Senate candidate of the Socialist Workers League.

The most effective action so far has been taken by Australian maritime unions, who have refused to handle war material destined for Indonesia. Waterside workers in Sydney have halted shipment of 200 tonnes of barbed wire—enough to go four times around the earth. Delivery of two Nomad aircraft has also been held up in Darwin.

Coastal Residents Take Note

An unusually high level of radioactive gases was released from the Oskarshamn 1 nuclear reactor in Simpsvarp, Sweden, July 18 following an emergency shutdown.

The reason given for the poisonous emission was a defect in a backup condenser, a problem that was discovered at the beginning of June, according to a report in the August 2 *Dagens Nyheter*.

Furthermore, the Stockholm daily reported, "It was clear then that if an emergency shutdown of a reactor was necessary, the amount of radioactive gas could increase to 50 times the usual level."

The utility covered up the incident for two weeks because, as civil engineer Carl Erik Wikdahl explained, "there was no point to explain it to the newspapers before everything was made clear."

Besides, a company spokesman said, the release of the radioactive gases was not particularly harmful since the wind happened to be blowing out to sea.

Intercontinental Press

DOCUMENTS

**World Congress
of the
FOURTH
INTERNATIONAL**

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11, \$2.50

Intercontinental Press
P.O. Box 116, Village Station
New York, NY 10014

The 'Criticize-Lin, Criticize-Confucius' Campaign

[Peng Shu-tse was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist party and later of the Chinese Trotskyist movement. He has lived in exile for many years because of the repression of the Chinese Trotskyists under the bureaucratic regime of Mao Tsetung.]

[The interview we are publishing here was obtained recently by a correspondent of *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Question. Since the beginning of 1974, the media in Europe and the United States have reported on the campaign in China to "criticize Lin Piao" and "criticize Confucius." What is the significance of this campaign, which is directed against two historical Chinese figures who are separated by so many centuries in time?

Answer. This campaign is complicated and difficult to understand. The media's attempts to explain it only add to the confusion. Not only Westerners sense the contradictions involved; the Chinese themselves are left in a fog about it. In order to explain the campaign, we must first determine the origin of the conflict between Mao Tsetung and Lin Piao. This examination must begin with the outcome of the Cultural Revolution movement. I have described in general the origins of this conflict in an interview which was published in January 1972 in the Amsterdam weekly, *Vrij Nederland*.¹ In this interview I pointed out that the friction between Lin and Mao was extreme, stemming from the developments of the so-called Cultural Revolution. Lin intervened in the Cultural Revolution with the armed forces under his command. The military controlled almost all the power in the center and the localities.

Through his position, Lin gained great respect in the party, the armed forces, and the government. In the military apparatus, for example, the Defense Ministry, the office of the chief of staff, and the commanders of the air force and navy were controlled by Lin or by members of his faction. Even in such top policy-making bodies as the Standing Committee of the party's Political Bureau, Lin's faction had a powerful influence. In the provinces, municipalities, and localities the power was almost totally controlled by army personnel influenced by Lin. This was because in the latter part of the Cultural Revolution, all the governmental bodies in the local areas had been replaced by the Revolutionary Committees. Most of these committees were under the control of military people because they had been commanders in such places as Wuhan, Nanking, Canton, Kwangsi, Fukien, and Manchuria.

At the same time, Lin Piao was the first vice-chairman of the party and the vice-premier of the government. Mao's personal dictatorship was threatened by this situation. To overcome this unfavorable situation, Mao united with Chou En-lai, determined to destroy Lin's faction and recover his personal dictatorship. Mao raised the slogan: "The party must command the gun [the armed forces], not the gun command the party." In order to retain its power, Lin's faction was forced to counterattack, even to the extent of preparing a political coup d'etat to destroy Mao. Lin's coup failed. It was later alleged that Lin's daughter told the Maoist authorities about the plot in order to save her husband's

life, and her revelation of the plot caused Lin and his followers to try to escape by plane to the Soviet Union. The plane was reportedly shot down over Outer Mongolia and they lost their lives.

It was ironic, to say the least, that the conflict between Mao and Lin reached the point that Mao had to have Lin and his followers killed. Even before the Cultural Revolution, the armed forces controlled by Lin had supported Mao. From the time Lin became minister of defense in 1959, he propagated "Mao Tsetung Thought" inside the armed forces.

Lin did all this to establish the cult of Mao in the armed forces before the Cultural Revolution in 1966. At the same time, the Maoists raised the slogan, "The people must learn from the army," as they had used the earlier slogan, "Power springs from the barrel of a gun." They had used these slogans to enhance the position of the armed forces, and as a result this position was very high. The people were supposed to learn from the armed forces, especially during the Cultural Revolution.

In the Cultural Revolution, at first, the Red Guards, helped by Lin's armed forces, destroyed Liu Shao-ch'i's faction, thereby winning for the Mao-Lin faction the commanding position in the party and the government. Then the Red Guards became more radical and split into two major factions, fighting each other to the point of civil war in many localities, with some of them against Mao and Chou. Mao and Chou at this point decided to stop the Red Guard movement. But these millions of young people were not so easily stopped. The result was bloody battles in places like Canton, Kwangsi, and Szechuan. Before, Mao had used the Red Guards to destroy the Liu Shao-ch'i faction; now he used the armed forces to destroy the Red Guards and stop the Cultural Revolution, establishing the Revolutionary Committees under armed-forces leadership.

Because Mao had used the armed forces to stop the Red Guards, sending almost all of them to the countryside, power was now centered in the Revolutionary Committees, but the Revolutionary Committees were controlled by Lin's faction. Mao was once again threatened by a faction, as he had been before by Liu Shao-ch'i and the Red Guards.

Q. With Lin dead, was his faction destroyed?

A. Even though Lin and his main followers were killed, the survivors of his faction had great potential force in many different organizations within the party, the armed forces, and the government. The reason for the continued influence and potential threat to Mao of Lin's faction was that for many years Lin was considered by Mao to be his "comrade-in-arms" and his legal successor, his heir. This was even written into the CCP's constitution, which was adopted at the party's Ninth Congress in 1969. The constitution read: "Comrade Lin Piao has consistently held high the great red banner of Mao Tsetung Thought and has most loyally and resolutely carried out and defended Mao Tsetung's proletarian revolutionary line," and designated Lin as "Mao Tsetung's close comrade-in-arms and successor."

Now, if Lin was so highly praised and had so consistently "held high the great red banner," and was the legal successor and heir to Mao, how could he betray Mao and attempt a coup d'etat against Mao?

If Lin was such a bad person, a rotten egg, why didn't Mao understand this from the beginning, rather than elevate Lin to be

1. This interview was also published in an English translation in two parts in *Intercontinental Press*, June 5 and June 12, 1972.—IP

his close "comrade-in-arms and successor"? It was impossible for Mao to explain this. Therefore, for a long time after the death of Lin in September 1971, he never attempted to explain it. Neither did the newspapers controlled by the CCP. Why the silence? Because Mao had no explanation!

For a long time the newspapers attacked Lin indirectly, referring to him only in the phrase "Liu Shao-ch'i and other swindlers." This was, of course, very abstract. No attempt was made to mention the important charges against Lin, or to state the facts of the case openly. There were a few reports, especially from Taiwan, that Lin had tried to launch a coup d'état against Mao. This plan was called the "Outline of Project 571." This secret plan was first published in Taiwan. It was very difficult to believe the reports from Taiwan, since it was likely that they had come from Chiang Kai-shek's agents. I was very skeptical, but then Mao's newspapers confirmed them. They quoted from this document in their attacks against Lin.

During that time, Mao was cautious in his attacks on Lin because it was still difficult for him to explain his past high esteem for Lin. How could the Maoists explain to the ranks that Lin, who was second only to Mao, had become a counterrevolutionary? The obvious next question would be raised, Was this also true of Mao?

Q. What were the contents of the "Outline of Project 571"?

A. I do not have the document at hand. However, some of the articles attacking Lin Piao in the *People's Daily* indicate the contents of the document.

For example, the *People's Daily* repeatedly attacked Lin for allegedly saying that the "May 7 Cadre Schools" were a maneuver to strip the cadres of their posts and jobs in the party, to take away their livelihood.² It was also claimed that Lin had said that "the intellectuals were sent to the mountains and countryside for reform through forced labor." He was supposed to have described the Cultural Revolution as a failure.

The August 1974 issue of *October Review*, published by Trotskyists in Hong Kong, cited two particular paragraphs from Lin's "Outline of Project 571": "... he [Mao] abused the trust and post given by the Chinese people, he is opposing history. In reality, he has become a current Ch'in Shih-huang."³

"He is not a real Marxist-Leninist and uses the name Marxism-Leninism to carry out his doctrine of Confucianism-Menciusism, adopting the method of Ch'in Shih-huang. He is the greatest tyrant in the history of China."

These attacks against Mao expressed not only the opinions of Lin and his followers, but reflected the discontent, dislike, and hatred of the overwhelming majority of the people.

After Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in May 1966, not only the party and its youth, but the trade unions, the government at all levels, the schools, from middle school to university, and the cultural and educational institutions were thrown into great confusion. Bloody clashes took place throughout the country. Thousands and thousands of cadres who worked in the party and government institutions were attacked by the Red Guards. Most of them were purged from the party or lost their jobs and posts. Many were put in prison. Finally, the millions of Red Guards were sent to the mountains and countryside. All the people were

2. The "May 7 Cadre Schools" are "reeducation" centers for cadres who were attacked by the Mao faction. These "schools" are located in the countryside and most of the curriculum consists of physical labor.—IP

3. Ch'in Shih-huang was the first emperor of China. He unified the country in 221 B.C., defeating the many warring kingdoms and establishing a centralized absolute monarchy. In traditional Chinese history he was regarded as a tyrant.—IP



Red Guards on the march during Cultural Revolution. Mao used Red Guards for his own factional ends, then dispersed them.

affected by these events. They felt as if they were living in an atmosphere of terror. Naturally, they were dissatisfied with Mao; they disliked and hated him. That is why Lin Piao and his followers called Mao "the current Ch'in Shih-huang" and "the greatest tyrant in the history of China."

It is very clear that Mao was isolated both from the ranks and from his old comrades who had cooperated with him in the movement for several decades. Even his closest comrades-in-arms—Lin Piao and Ch'en Po-ta—left him, and according to the regime, made an attempt on his life.

It is necessary to point out that Lin was the only person in the central leadership who had faithfully and consistently supported Mao since the initiation of guerrilla war in Chingkanshan in 1928. Ch'en Po-ta had been Mao's private secretary since the late 1930s and helped Mao draft many documents and articles that established his personal cult. Ch'en also helped Mao, as head of the Cultural Revolution Group, during the Cultural Revolution. But both Lin and Ch'en became Mao's bitter enemies. They charged Mao with being a tyrant. This was the dangerous situation facing Mao after Lin's downfall.

Q. With the continued influence of Lin's faction, how could Mao break this deadlock?

A. Only one person could help Mao: Chou En-lai. The people had a better impression of Chou; they thought he was better than Mao. Chou seemed more moderate, more human. The general public considers Chou the best of the bureaucrats. Unlike Mao, Chou had not fostered a personal animosity against himself among party cadres, government officials, or the military. He was even liked, because in the worsening situation his reputation as a moderate led people to hope for improvements if he were put in charge.

The people had a good impression of Chou En-lai. In addition, he had a great deal of influence among those old leaders purged by Mao during the Cultural Revolution. Almost all the leaders, from the center to the provinces, were attacked by the Red Guards

under Mao, and were later purged. Thus, these old leaders were dissatisfied with Mao and hated him. Chou, however, always tried to intercede with Mao in their behalf, and he sometimes even defended them against Mao's attacks. So almost all the leaders purged by Mao placed their hope in Chou.

Even though these old leaders were purged and dismissed from their posts, they still had a certain influence among the middle- and lower-level cadres. For Mao this again was dangerous; the people influenced by the purged leaders were also opposed to Mao.

Among all these people, Mao's only hope, Chou En-lai, alone still retained his influence and had connections with top military commanders in local areas.

Chou had been the leader of the party's military committee for a long time before the CCP took power in 1949. He was the real head of the committee, a post Mao later took for himself. Chou retained contact and influence with the military leaders after the CCP took power.

At the end of the Cultural Revolution, Mao lacked this support; he was isolated. He had almost no reliable supporters in the party, government, or the military. To break this isolation, Mao used Chou against the party and military cadres, because Chou was still influential.

The result of the new Mao-Chou combination was a decision to bring party cadres together to discuss the situation. This was done with the Tenth Congress of the CCP, held in August 1973.

Q. Why did Mao have so few party cadres loyal to him?

A. At the time that Mao launched the Cultural Revolution against Liu Shao-ch'i's faction, the CCP apparatus as a whole was controlled by Liu's faction. But Mao's Red Guards and later Lin's troops attacked and purged virtually *all* the leaders in the local areas, leaving Mao without cadres. Even among those few officials who supported the Red Guards there were further purges for "ultraleftism." This was the charge aimed by Mao at those of his supporters who became too closely tied to the Red Guards. These "ultraleft" supporters of Mao continued to encourage the Red Guard movement even after some of the Red Guards had begun to turn on Mao's lower-level followers. Such Red Guards concluded that the Mao faction was just as bureaucratic as the Liu faction had been and that they deserved to be removed from office just as much as did the opponents of Mao whom the Red Guards had been encouraged to attack.

You see, almost all the government cadres were also in the party, so when these cadres were purged, the local governing organs in the provinces were likewise purged. After this purge, when the Revolutionary Committees were established, they were composed only of members of Lin's faction and some "neutralists." Later, when Lin came to oppose Mao, all the cadres under Lin's influence were attacked or purged.

During the Cultural Revolution, all the supporters of Liu Shao-ch'i were purged from the cultural, education, and propaganda departments, where many people were employed. Ch'en Po-ta at that time used the authority of the Cultural Revolution Group to purge also a few people for "ultraleftism." These included Wang Li, Ch'i Pen-yu, Kuan Feng, and Lin Chieh. None of the top leaders of the "left" wing were purged at that time, however; Ch'en Po-ta and Chiang Ch'ing (Mao's wife) retained their official posts.

In this struggle, Mao purged first the "right" and then the "left." He destroyed the factions of Liu and then Lin, but in the process he left himself isolated and without loyal cadres.

At the Tenth Party Congress, Mao was forced to make some changes. Most important, he made concessions to the old leaders. The situation was very clear at the congress. Chou En-lai made the political report for the Central Committee of the party.

Chou's report is very revealing. In the first part of the report, he read a list of Lin Piao's "crimes": Lin was a "bourgeois

careerist" and "conspirator"; he launched an "armed counterrevolutionary coup d'etat," including an attempt "to assassinate our great leader Chairman Mao"; he was turning the CCP into a "revisionist, fascist party," reinstating the "landlords and bourgeois classes," and instituting a "feudal-comprador-fascist dictatorship"; he was a renegade, traitor, superspy, and double-dealer connected with the Soviet revisionists, aligning with imperialism, revisionism, and reactionaries to oppose Chinese communism and revolution.

Of course, this was simply slander. And what Chou said in this unbelievable report, he stated for Mao. Chou's report also slandered Ch'en Po-ta. The report said that Ch'en was the principal member of Lin Piao's antiparty clique. (Elsewhere Ch'en was accused of being an anticommunist Kuomintang element, a Trotskyist, and a renegade, an enemy agent, and a revisionist.)

The Tenth Congress endorsed Chou's report, and in a meaningless gesture expelled Lin—after his death! All references to Lin, such as "Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor," were removed from the party constitution, and a new, revised constitution was adopted. Very easy! Ch'en Po-ta was expelled from the party and dismissed from all posts outside the party. This was Chou's report for Mao; it was dictated by Mao Tsetung. At the same time, a number of the old leaders who had been purged were rehabilitated. They included Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the former party secretary-general, T'an Chen-lin, and Ulanfu. These three had all been members of the Political Bureau before the Cultural Revolution; now they were rehabilitated. Others were also rehabilitated; among them were some important and powerful military commanders, such as Hsu Shih-yu in the Shanghai-Nanking area; Ch'en Hsi-lien in Manchuria; and Han Hsien-ch'u in Fukien. They retained all their posts, remaining party first secretaries in their local areas and heads of their Revolutionary Committees. Hsu was commander in the Nanking area, which is very important because it includes Shanghai. Manchuria is another important area because it is highly industrialized and lies close to the Soviet Union. Fukien is important because it is the front with Taiwan. Quemoy and Matsu are near Fukien and they are occupied by Chiang Kai-shek's forces. So the armed forces in this area are more important than elsewhere.

There were other commanders of lesser importance who were similarly rehabilitated. Of course, this was a large concession for Mao to make.

Q. Were all these people attacked during the Cultural Revolution?

A. Yes, but in varying degrees. In Nanking in 1967, there had been some clashes between the Red Guards led by Mao's Cultural Revolution Group, and those who supported the army and the party. Hsu was attacked at that time. But Chou En-lai and even Chiang Ch'ing stepped in to moderate the situation, which was less serious than the case in Wuhan and Canton.

In Wuhan, the commander, Ch'en Tsai-tao, was purged. This was not universal. In Canton, the commander, Huang Yung-sheng, was Lin's man. He not only was not purged, but was elevated to Peking to become chief of staff. Lin Piao promoted him after Huang was attacked.

Besides smashing the factions that opposed him, and rehabilitating some of the old purged leaders, Mao also promoted a new figure, Wang Hung-wen. Wang reported to the Tenth Congress on the revision of the party's constitution. He was then elected as a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, becoming third after Mao and Chou. Mao used Wang, along with Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, the mayor of Shanghai, to control the Shanghai workers during the Cultural Revolution. Wang is a young man in the CCP leadership, about forty years old. He was



CHOU: Acted as Mao's hatchet man.

not a leading figure in the government or party prior to his elevation by Mao.

Q. What did Wang and Chang do for Mao in Shanghai?

A. The workers in Shanghai were influenced by the old leaders, Chen P'ei-hsien, the party first secretary; and Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, the mayor. These leaders had sympathized with Liu Shao-ch'i and were later purged. From late December of 1966 to January 1967 there was a massive strike movement organized by the old leaders in the trade unions, party, and government. This strike was against the Cultural Revolution, although not openly. The workers wanted to improve their living standard, and the older leaders in the party and the government made some concessions to them. Mao sent people to Shanghai, especially the Red Guards, under the protection of the army (which was led by Lin Piao), so the old leaders there, almost as a whole, were purged. For the first time, Revolutionary Committees were established, returning power to Mao's supporters. Besides Wang, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao also opposed the old leaders and he organized a group for Mao. At the same time, a similar strike movement broke out in Nanking.

Mao used Wang and Chang against the workers to break the strike. Mao, through Wang, attacked the old leaders who were supported by the workers. Mao repaid Wang for his services by elevating him into the party leadership.

The main features of the Tenth Congress were the following:

first, the smashing of the faction that had been led by Lin Piao; second, the rehabilitation of purged older leaders; and third, the elevation of nonentities, such as Wang, to the leadership.

Q. If Lin Piao was so discredited by Chou En-lai at the Tenth Congress, why does Mao continue a nationwide campaign against him and against Confucius?

A. Lin was disgraced at the congress, but a certain influence still existed. This was especially true among the military commanders who maintained their posts in the most important regions such as Nanking, Manchuria, and Fukien. Also, the older leaders had been rehabilitated. A force still existed; this was not only unsatisfactory for Mao, it was a mortal threat to him. You see, even though Chou En-lai helped Mao to disgrace Lin, Chou himself became an attractive center for all the cadres who opposed Mao. In this situation, Mao must continue to struggle to suppress the opposition in order to restore his own personal dictatorship. First of all, to eliminate the powerful military commanders from their posts. With this in mind, Mao prepared a new campaign against Lin and against Confucius.

The first aim of this campaign was to remove the commanders: Hsu Shih-yu, Ch'en Hsi-lien, and Han Hsien-ch'u. All of these people were transferred to other places. This happened in December 1973. Hsu was transferred to Kwangtung; Ch'en to Peking; Han to Lanchow. Although they retained their posts as commanders in the new areas, they were not appointed to posts of first party secretaries or as chairmen of the Revolutionary Committees.

Q. Why did Mao allow these commanders to retain their posts in the military?

A. If Mao had removed them from the military positions, it would have caused discontent among the cadres in the army. After all, the commanders had not committed any crimes or made any serious mistakes. Mao proceeded slowly against them, first failing to reappoint them to all their former posts. Later, of course, he hoped to eliminate all the old commanders and replace them with newer, more pliant people who are more likely to obey Mao. But the problem for Mao was that he had no new supporters to replace the old officers. That is why the Maoists energetically propagandized that the party must control the army. In other words, the army officers must absolutely obey the party leadership, which the Maoists hoped would be wielded exclusively by Chairman Mao. In the year that followed the transfer of the commanders, however, Mao's position in the leadership deteriorated very severely.

The Maoists did their utmost to expand the urban people's militia. Especially in Shanghai and Peking, millions of militia members, who for the most part are workers, were organized and trained by the Maoists. The Maoists attempted to counterpose the people's militia to the army, pressuring the commanders of the army to give up their opposition to Mao. Of course, such a plan would not be easy to bring about, but it was not impossible. In any event, it would not be enough by itself to accomplish Mao's aims. Thus we see the continued campaign against Lin and Confucius.

Q. What then is the real aim and significance of the campaigns against Lin and Confucius?

A. The main or central task is to counter Lin's accusation that Mao is a new Ch'in Shih-huang, the greatest tyrant in Chinese history, and to "prove" that instead of a tyrant, Mao is the most progressive figure and the greatest revolutionary leader in the history of China.

With this in mind, the Maoists first of all must "prove" that

Ch'in Shih-huang was not a tyrant, but the greatest, most progressive emperor in Chinese history because he destroyed "slave society" and established a "feudal society." However, Ch'in Shih-huang did not actually do this. The society that Ch'in Shih-huang destroyed was not a slave society but a classical feudal society.

This was a great step in China's historical development. Ch'in Shih-huang's actions can be compared to those taken in Europe by several monarchs in the period of the rise of capitalism, the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, in which they destroyed the power of the local feudal lords and established absolute monarchies. On a world scale, the best known examples of this were England and France.

In China, prior to the unification, the ruling class was a hereditary landed nobility that passed on its property to the eldest son through the institution of primogeniture. Seven independent kingdoms existed, each at war with the other. A kingdom had its own administration, army, customs, tariffs, and written language. At that time, land owned by the kings could not be bought or sold. The peasants worked the land paying taxes to the feudal lords. This was a feudal institution based on periodic labor service, not the buying and selling of humans as slaves.

When Ch'in Shih-huang destroyed the kingdoms, unifying China as a centralized monarchy, the first step he took was to remove all the nobility from their native kingdoms. Ch'in wanted no remnants of the prior system to exist.

After unifying the kingdoms, Ch'in then divided them into thirty-six provinces. All previous borders were abolished and all officials were appointed and recalled by the central government.

Ch'in established a common written language and standardized the currency and measures. This was a necessary step to remove the obstacles for establishing economic commerce.

As is obvious, in this process, Ch'in and his supporters represented the rising new merchant and landowning class, which had struggled against the feudal landowners. The new society he built introduced money relations in place of feudal bondage. This new system created the circumstances, both economically and politically for economic development.

As for the "criticize Confucius" campaign, according to the Maoists, Confucius represented "slave society." Therefore, all Confucianists were attempting to restore the slave society, after it was supposedly destroyed by Ch'in Shih-huang. Hence, all Confucianists were utterly reactionary. And, they assert, Lin Piao was playing a similar role. As a representative of the "landlords and capitalists," he was trying to restore "slave society." They are falsifying history on both counts.

Q. The Maoists call Lin a "Confucianist." What evidence do they produce to prove that he was such a reactionary?

A. The Maoists claim to have found a single sentence, a quotation from Confucius written by Lin on a scroll on the wall of his room. The sentence read: *K'e chi fu li*. Literally this means "Restrain oneself in order to restore the rites." "Rites" here is the Confucian term *li*, which refers to rationality in ethics, morality, and politics. The Maoists cite this to "prove" Lin was trying to restore capitalism in China. It is highly possible that Lin Piao wrote this sentence and hung it on his wall. Perhaps it was an expression of a wish to return to the earlier, less dangerous days of the CCP's history, right after they took power in 1949. After all, he had personally seen most of the old leaders and cadres, who fought alongside Mao during the revolution, purged, and in many cases jailed and even assassinated.

But in any event, this sentence hardly proves that Lin wanted to restore capitalism in China. Rather, it is yet another example of the Maoists slandering their opponents, pretending that anyone who disagrees with Mao wants to restore capitalism. They have thus framed up all their opposition. It is ironic that Lin Piao had

helped Mao do this before, and that the same method was used to destroy him and his followers.

It is necessary to point out that the campaign against Lin and Confucius is very widespread. In the last part of 1974, the Maoists wrote thousands of articles in newspapers and magazines. They held meetings on a massive scale in the party, armed forces, factories, schools, and other institutions. In these articles and meetings, the theme was the same: The Confucianists were reactionary elements because they wanted to restore "slave society." The Legalists (the scholars who codified Ch'in Shih-huang's reforms) were progressive because they helped the Ch'in dynasty destroy the "slave system."

Q. The Maoists have emphasized that the Confucianists were utterly reactionary and that the Legalists were progressive. What were the actual differences between these two tendencies?

A. The essential difference between the Confucianists and the Legalists centered on how to unify China, ending the continual state of warfare between the heads of the seven kingdoms. The followers of Confucius, accepting his ideas and developing them, looked back to the period of the Western Chou dynasty; there was no war and the many feudal lords obeyed the central king.

A premier of the Western Chou dynasty, Chou Kung, had developed, based on the feudal system, a code of ethics, morals, and politics. Confucius looked to this as a model, and his saying, *K'e chi fu li*, proposed a return to the practices of the Western Chou dynasty.

Thus, we can say that Confucius was a reformer of feudalism, but that he looked backward to an earlier, idyllic period. In this he was both an idealist and a reactionary.

After Confucius died, his followers, such as Mencius, continued to develop his ideas along the same lines. But, another Confucianist, Hsun Tzu, broke with the backward-looking Confucian concepts and developed proposals for the reform of feudalism based on the current realities. The disciples of Hsun Tzu, such as Han Fei and Li Ssu, became the Legalists. Han Fei was a great theoretician of the Legalist school and Li Ssu became premier for Ch'in Shih-huang. Li proposed systematic changes in policy that resulted in the elimination of feudalism, growth of the petty landlord class, and the establishment of a centralized monarchy, under Ch'in Shih-huang.

The Confucianists opposed Ch'in Shih-huang's reforms. In this struggle, the Legalists played a progressive role, the Confucianists a reactionary one.

But it is not sufficient simply to outline the roles of these two tendencies. The brutal methods used by Ch'in and the Legalists left a reputation for cruelty and arbitrariness unsurpassed in Chinese history. It was not just the fact that Ch'in buried alive hundreds of Confucianists and burned books. More important is the fact that Ch'in and the Legalists were extremely brutal toward the peasants, to the point that fifteen years after the unification and centralizing of the government, the first peasant revolt in recorded history overthrew the Ch'in dynasty. In its place arose the Han dynasty—which, not unexpectedly, utilized the Confucian scholars as advisers in place of the Legalists who were used under Ch'in. However, the Confucianists did not restore the old property relations, they did not reestablish primogeniture, rebuild the landed nobility, or abolish the alienability of land.

This shows that from the time of the Han dynasty (206 B.C. to A.D. 220) no one can show that these two schools of thought represented opposing social classes. On the contrary, they differed only in the methods of their support to the landlord-merchant class that had arisen with Ch'in Shih-huang's reforms. From this point on the Legalists were no more progressive than the Confucianists. Their differences had narrowed to the point of being analogous, for example, to those in the United States today between "law and order" conservatives and liberals. The first

base themselves more on naked repression, while the liberals depend more on illusions and guile. The Legalists continued to stand for harsh methods, especially toward the peasantry. The role of Confucianism in maintaining the Chinese social order through its conservative mores is well known; it is enough to mention the backward status given women (subordinated first to their fathers, then to husband, and then to son).

It is, of course, the reputation for brutality of the Legalists that causes Mao to be termed a second Ch'in Shih-huang; and the modern Confucianists are those like Liu Shao-ch'i, who opposed some of Mao's more brutal policies.

Q. Confucius, then, was not a representative of a slave society, and the social system established by Ch'in was not feudalism, but rather a transitional regime from feudalism to capitalism. Can you explain this development?

A. The development of Chinese society was different from the European pattern. Europe, as Marx wrote, passed from a slave society, such as in Greece and Rome, through a feudal social system in the Middle Ages, directly to capitalism.

Based on recorded history, we know that the Shang dynasty (1787-1134 B.C.) marked the transition directly from a community of tribes to a feudal society. Following the Shang was the Chou dynasty (1134-256 B.C.), which was a classical feudal society. This was the society that Ch'in Shih-huang destroyed. The transitional regime that Ch'in established lasted almost two thousand years, from the third century B.C. to the mid-nineteenth century, when capitalism penetrated China from abroad. From this time on China declined to a semicolonial country. That is to say, the old economic form of petty commodity relations gradually declined. Handicrafts could not compete with the modern goods and machinery introduced to China by imperialism.

The introduction of these goods brought the development of railways, factories, mines, and so on. In the process, the merchants of China, working as agents (compradors) for the imperialists, became the new class, the bourgeoisie.

Slowly, China evolved from the old petty commodity economy to the new form of capitalism. Through these stages, China's economic life became tied to world imperialism.

Q. Since Ch'in destroyed the feudal society, establishing a monarchy based on new social relations, why did China not develop capitalism in this earlier period?

A. This is a very interesting and complicated theoretical question. One could ask why capitalism did not emerge from ancient Rome, but waited until the eighteenth century, when it arose in England. This question was explained by Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto*:


"The discovery of America, the rounding of the Cape, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonisation of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally, gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development."

That is to say, *capitalism can be organized only on a world scale, as the Manifesto said:*

"Modern industry has established the world market, for which the discovery of America paved the way."

That is, *without a world market, industrial capitalism could not arise.*

In China, when Ch'in destroyed the feudal system, the countries or nations surrounding China were very backward. So the China united by Ch'in remained very narrow as a market. Of course, these conditions could not give rise to capitalism. Even though for



MAO: Did slander campaigns against his opponents backfire?

a number of years handicrafts and commerce developed to a limited extent, and limited trade relations existed with Southeast Asia and Japan, the scale of the commerce remained narrow. Therefore, China remained stagnant for a long time, about two thousand years.

Q. The Maoists have carried out a vigorous campaign against Lin Piao and Confucius for more than a year now. What are the results of this campaign?

A. The results can be seen clearly in the consequences of the Fourth National People's Congress held in January 1975. In order to understand the consequences, we must consider some of the congress's most important decisions.

First, the congress adopted a new constitution for the People's Republic of China, in which the words "the chairman of state" were removed, and "the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China commands the country's armed forces" were added. This means that formally all the armed forces have been put under Mao's control. On paper at least, all the armed forces' officers and soldiers must obey Mao's orders.

However, the other important decisions made by the congress show how fictitious Mao's control of the military really is. He suffered heavy setbacks at the congress. For instance, the new constitution added the words: "... people's commune members may farm small plots for their personal needs, engage in limited household sideline production, and in pastoral areas keep a small number of livestock for their personal needs." This was a great concession to the peasants, under the pressure from the old cadres, including the supporters of Liu Shao-ch'i. This step had been carried out by Liu after the failure of the people's communes, and was then violently opposed and prohibited by the Maoists during the Cultural Revolution.

In addition, the new Standing Committee of the People's Congress elected by this congress, the highest organ in China, was another blow to Mao. The committee's chairman, Chu Te, was reelected. Chu Te is an important and well-known old leader. He participated in and led the Nanchang uprising in August 1927. In addition, he was a longtime leader of the army prior to the

CCP's taking power. He has disagreed with Mao, sometimes openly, as during the Great Leap Forward and people's commune period. He was attacked violently by the Maoists during the Cultural Revolution.

There are twenty-two vice-chairmen of the Standing Committee of the congress. These include a number of people who were previously attacked or purged by the Maoists, such as T'an Chen-lin, Li Ch'ing-ch'uan, Ulanfu, Nieh Jung-chen, and Ch'en Yun. T'an Chen-lin and Ulanfu, as I have already stated, were former members of the party Political Bureau who were rehabilitated. Li Ch'ing-ch'uan, Nieh Jung-chen, and Ch'en Yun were also attacked and removed from their posts in the Cultural Revolution. Li was first secretary of the Southwest Region Political Bureau and a member of the CCP's Political Bureau. Nieh was minister of science and technology; atomic research and production were fields under his control. Ch'en was minister of heavy industry.

The leading members of the central governmental apparatus, the Executive Committee, are Chou En-lai, reelected as premier; Teng Hsiao-p'ing, first vice-premier and chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army; and Yeh Chien-ying, defense minister. Yeh is the oldest figure in the People's Liberation Army. He participated in the December 1927 Canton insurrection, and was chief of staff of the Eighth Route Army under Chu Te, a supporter of Chou En-lai.

Teng Hsiao-p'ing is another well-known old leader of the CCP who fell out with Mao. He participated in the Long March, rose in the Red Army, and became party secretary-general. In 1966 he was attacked by the Red Guards, who considered him second only to Liu Shao-ch'i as a figure to be removed. For seven years he was out of a job, and now he has been rehabilitated by Chou En-lai.

Mao hates Teng. When Teng was purged during the Cultural Revolution, Mao in a speech accused him of having refused for a long time even to inform Mao on the work of the party center under Teng's control. And now this man is second to Chou En-lai!

With these posts, Chou and his supporters now have in their hands the central governmental apparatus and the armed forces. Hence, Chou has now become the most powerful leader, the real leader in the People's Republic of China.

Mao's most important supporters, on the other hand, got only one position of any importance. That was Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, who is now *third* vice-premier and head of the Political Commission of the People's Liberation Army. Others of Mao's supporters, such as Wang Hung-wen, Yao Wen-yuan, and Chiang Ch'ing, got no important posts.

Of course, Mao was designated as commander in chief of all the armed forces. But this is merely a figurehead post. The real power is in the hands of the defense minister and the chief of staff—these are Chou En-lai's men.

Thus, from the outcome of the Fourth National People's Congress, you can see that despite the furor of the campaign against Lin and Confucius, the Maoists have made no real gains, but to the contrary, have only succeeded in further isolating themselves from the old leaders and cadres, and they are further from the power than when they began the campaign. The one place the Maoists remain strongly entrenched is in the press. Their opponents permit them to talk as a way of avoiding a further disruptive struggle within the bureaucracy, but this is not where the important decisions are made.

The isolation of the Maoists is one reason why Mao did not attend the Fourth National People's Congress. He knew that the outcome of the congress would not be favorable toward him.

Q. What do you think Mao will do in the period ahead?

A. There is a logic to the struggle for power in the Stalinist system; and taking this into account, along with Mao's character and methods, which have been consistent, we can say that Mao and his followers will try to recover their former authority in the

party hierarchy. The bureaucracy has used Mao for so long as the symbol of its power that it will be reluctant to risk a public break with him. This gives his followers more room for maneuver than their actual strength should warrant. (This was an important factor in permitting Mao to defeat Liu Shao-ch'i.)

Just after the close of the congress, the *People's Daily* and other newspapers and magazines continued to publish articles against Lin Piao and against Confucius. In particular, *Red Flag*, the theoretical magazine of the CCP, published a "call to learn the theory of proletarian dictatorship" in March 1975. This article quoted Mao as follows:

"Why did Lenin speak of exercising dictatorship over the bourgeoisie? It is essential to get this question clear. Lack of clarity on this question will lead to revisionism. This should be made known to the whole nation."

Following this quotation from Mao, the editors of *Red Flag* asserted:

"Millions of millions of people must learn and grasp Marxism concerning the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat which is the most important thing, the most important thing in consolidating and strengthening the proletarian dictatorship. All members of party committees must learn and grasp the theory of proletarian dictatorship in order to carry out consciously the basic line and all policies, and *advance to carry out the anti-Lin and anti-Confucius campaign*" (emphasis added). Following their own proposal, the editors proceeded to publish long quotations from the works of Marx and Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This "call" to learn the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat is clearly a *new campaign*. Its purpose is to use the Marxist theory of the proletarian dictatorship as a smoke screen, a code word for the personal dictatorship of Mao Tsetung, and to justify all the purges of his opponents in the past as necessary and correct because they were allegedly against the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is also to warn "all members of party committees" that they will be severely punished or purged if they do not "learn and grasp the theory of proletarian dictatorship," i.e., Mao's personal dictatorship, and "carry out consciously the basic line and all policies" as elaborated by Mao.

Following the line of the article mentioned above, Yao Wen-yuan, Mao's son-in-law, wrote an article titled "On the Social Basis of Lin Piao's Antiparty Group," which was published in the same issue (March 1975) of *Red Flag*. After he listed many of Lin's "crimes," such as attacking the May 7 Cadre Schools and calling Mao "a current Ch'in Shih-huang," Yao presented an analysis of the social basis of Lin's faction. He concluded that "Lin and his followers represented not only the aspirations for restoration of the regime of the overthrown landlords and bourgeoisie, but also the aspirations to usurp power held by new bourgeois elements that have developed in the socialist society."

From these words, one can see the attitude of the Maoists toward Lin's followers and all other opponents. Every political difference is treated as coming from an enemy class. This is the method of Stalinism.

The April 1975 issue of *Red Flag* also published another article, by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, called "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie." Chang quoted Lenin's writings from *Left-Wing Communism* that "small production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale. For all these reasons the dictatorship of the proletariat is essential."

In his article, Chang asserted that in the present Chinese situation, it is not only necessary to have a proletarian dictatorship, but necessary that the dictatorship over the "bourgeoisie" be all-sided, including in the ideological field, in order to eliminate the new bourgeois elements that continually arise "in one batch after another." Otherwise, the new bourgeois elements could convert the proletarian dictatorship into a

dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and restore capitalism. Chang goes on to argue that this is what happened in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and that Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao were trying to follow in the footsteps of Khrushchev and Brezhnev in the Soviet Union, by using the same methods.

From these articles in *Red Flag*, we can easily see what the next step for the Maoists will be. We should recall the experience of the purges under Stalin's dictatorship in the 1920s and 1930s, and after the end of World War II. In China, since the CCP came to power in 1949, there have been four mass purges.

First, Kao Kang, the vice-chairman of the People's Republic of China and the first secretary of the party's Northeast Bureau, and Jao Shu-shih, first secretary of the party's Eastern Bureau, along with several dozens of old cadres, were purged by Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Chou En-lai in 1954. They had some differences over economic policies and personnel posts in the party and the government. Next, P'eng Te-huai, defense minister, and Huang K'o-ch'eng, chief of staff, and several members of the Central Committee were purged by Mao at the Lushan conference in 1959

because they disagreed with the adventurist policies of the Great Leap Forward and the people's communes. Then, Liu Shao-ch'i's faction, and later Lin Piao's group, were purged by Mao, as the whole world now knows.

From this we can conclude that the Maoists will certainly continue their struggle to purge all their opponents in order to restore Mao's personal dictatorship. They will do this as long as Mao lives. The question is whether the Maoists have the strength to achieve this goal. In my opinion, not only can they not succeed, but they will become more and more isolated. Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing's faction, after all, has had much experience in the past internal struggles, and will be prepared to arrange their forces to counter the Maoists' attacks.

Finally, the endless struggles and purges inside the CCP will demonstrate more clearly to the masses that what is necessary is a political revolution carried out by the masses themselves. Only through a political revolution can the bureaucratic dictatorship be overthrown and a proletarian system of socialist democracy be established. Only this can open the broad road to socialism. □

'Basic War Plan Red'

Washington's 1929 Outline for War With Britain

In 1925 Leon Trotsky insisted in his book *Where Is Britain Going?* that the economic expansion of the United States at the expense of the British empire would lead to a situation in which Britain "must either fight America or submit to her."

The accuracy of Trotsky's assessment recently received confirmation from an unexpected source. As a result of the "freedom of information" laws passed by Congress following the Watergate scandal, the U.S. government declassified a document known as "Basic War Plan Red."

Drafted in 1929, on the eve of the Great Depression, the top-secret plan was a blueprint for war with Britain. Such a war was likely, the planners argued, because of

"constantly increasing Blue [U.S.] economic expansion and commercial penetration into regions formerly dominated by Red [British] trade to such an extent as eventually to menace Red standards of living and to threaten economic ruin."

U.S. war aims, according to the military plan, "should be the expulsion of Red from North and South America and waters adjacent thereto and definite elimination of Red as a strong competitor in foreign trade."

Also planned was an invasion of Canada, with the seizure of the key Canadian ports of Halifax on the Atlantic Coast and Vancouver on the West Coast. Areas of Québec and Ontario near the Great Lakes

were to be occupied as well, and Canadian rail communications were to be cut in Winnipeg.

Noting Britain's problems with its colonies, the plan added, "Some of the colored races, however, come of good fighting stock and, under white leadership, can be made into very efficient troops."

A Reuters dispatch printed in the December 19, 1975, *Los Angeles Times* said, "State Department and Pentagon officials emphasized that the plans were purely defensive—except for what one termed 'that preemptive foray into Canada to protect ourselves.'"

The Reuters dispatch quoted another official who said: "I think the State Department probably is still reluctant to allow the release of other similar 'war game' plans. Some countries, especially in Latin America, are very sensitive and might misunderstand that the Defense Department feels it has to have these sorts of scenarios." □

Heard the FBI Was Coming to Town

"Police Chief Joseph McNamara says terrorists could infiltrate Kansas City [Missouri] next August because of the 1976 Republican National Convention.

"Mr. McNamara, addressing a political science honor meeting at the University of Missouri-Kansas City recently, said he fears the city's 'period of tranquility will be coming to an end and that there may be bombings and other tactics similar to those that disrupted political conventions in 1968 and 1972.'"

—An Associated Press dispatch in the December 16 *Christian Science Monitor*.

MEMO

to: Intercontinental Press
P.O. Box 116
Village Station
New York, N.Y. 10014

from:

Name _____


Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Country _____

- \$24 enclosed for one-year subscription.
- \$12 enclosed for a six-month subscription.
- Send information about first-class and airmail rates.

AROUND THE WORLD



Martin Sostre Wins Release From Jail

After eight years in prison as a result of a frame-up drug charge, Martin Sostre is being released.

The fifty-two-year-old Sostre was granted clemency December 24 by New York Governor Hugh Carey. A Black Puerto Rican nationalist, Sostre had been characterized as a political prisoner by Amnesty International. Governor Carey had received appeals for his release from Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov and former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, antiwar activists Philip and Daniel Berrigan, and Black leaders such as Rev. Ralph Abernathy and Julian Bond.

Sostre opened the Afro-Asian Bookstore in Buffalo, New York, in 1965. It soon became a center for Black and antiwar activists, and a target for police harassment. In July 1967, following a ghetto rebellion in Buffalo, Sostre was charged with arson and inciting to riot. Both charges were later dropped, but in 1968 Sostre was convicted for allegedly selling \$15 worth of heroin. He was given a 30-to-41-year sentence by an all-white jury.

Although the key witness against him later recanted, and the key police officer in the case was later dismissed in connection with the disappearance of \$10,000 in heroin, Sostre was denied a new trial.

A fighter for prisoners' rights, Sostre initiated numerous lawsuits. He won the right to freely exercise his Muslim religion, was awarded \$13,000 in damages for illegal solitary confinement, helped establish the right of prisoners to receive revolutionary literature, and challenged the legality of all-white parole boards and of degrading rectal searches.

The executive-clemency measure under which Sostre is being released is an important victory, although it is not a full pardon. Sostre will still be subject to parole restrictions.

Anthropologists Jailed in Paraguay for 'Subversive' Aid to Indians

In a cable of protest to the Stroessner regime in Paraguay December 18, the International League for the Rights of Man demanded the immediate release of three social scientists arrested for their "subversive" work to improve the living conditions of Paraguay's Indian population.

The scientists are anthropologist Miguel Chase Sardi, his assistant Victorio Suárez, and sociologist Mauricio Schwartzman. News of their arrest was received in a December 8 letter from German anthropologist Mark Munzel.

All three worked on the Marandu project, a program aimed at informing Indians of their civil rights. "The arrests," Munzel wrote, "may be . . . for the fact that Indians, informed of their rights through the Marandu project, had asked for higher wages in 1975."

It is feared that the prisoners may have been tortured. Two of them were taken to the Centro de Investigaciones, which Munzel described as "a place where many newly arrested are brought to and often tortured."

The cable from the International League for the Rights of Man also protested the arrest of an estimated 100 Paraguayans in a roundup at the end of November and beginning of December.

Victory in British 'Conspiracy' Trial

After a trial lasting more than ten weeks, a London jury took only an hour and a half to find fourteen activists of the British Withdrawal from Northern Ireland Campaign (BWNIC) not guilty on charges of seeking to create disaffection within the British army. The verdict was a victory for the right of free speech in Britain, particularly for those calling for the withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland.

The charges stemmed from a leaflet distributed by the fourteen to British troops informing them of their rights and providing them with information on gaining a conscientious objector discharge. Specifically, the fourteen were charged with conspiring to contravene the Incitement to Disaffection Act (1934), which bars any "endeavour to seduce a member of Her Majesty's forces from his duty or allegiance." Twelve of the defendants were also charged with possessing "seductive" antiwar literature.

The acquittal followed a defense campaign involving trade-union branches, student groups, and some Labour party members of Parliament.

The charges against the fourteen were part of a broader campaign by the British government against those demanding that it get out of Ireland. Several other cases are

pending involving charges similar to those leveled against the fourteen. In one case, that of the "Aberdeen 4," the charges have been dropped.

The BWNIC activists pledged to continue to expand their antiwar campaign. "We feel the judgment has declared legal our leaflet *Some Information for Discontented Soldiers*," said Gwyneth Williams, one of the defendants. She added that the BWNIC is preparing a new version of the leaflet.

'Errors' Found in Attica Prosecution

A report drawn up by Bernard Meyer on the investigation of the 1971 Attica, New York, prison revolt and the subsequent massacre of inmates and guards by state troopers found "serious errors in judgment" by the Attica prosecutors. In the series of cases following the crushing of the rebellion, sixty-two inmates were charged with 1,289 crimes, while only one police officer was charged with a crime.

Meyer was named to conduct the report in the spring of 1975 after Malcolm Bell, a former Attica prosecutor, charged that chief prosecutor Anthony Simonetti had covered up possible crimes by police and state troopers.

The Meyer report avoided saying that there was a cover-up. Instead, it called for the appointment of a special prosecutor to determine if indictments should be brought against any law enforcement officers who took part in the massacre.

State of Emergency Extended in India

The national convention of Indira Gandhi's ruling Congress party, which was held in late December and early January, approved the postponement for one year of the parliamentary elections scheduled for early 1976. It also called for the extension of Gandhi's state of emergency, proclaimed in June 1975, until "the dangers of internal and external subversion have been fully surmounted."

In addition, the convention platform hinted that the Congress party would push through changes in the Indian constitution during a parliamentary session beginning January 5. Those changes, which the Congress party claimed would be designed to make the constitution more responsive

"to the current needs of the people and the demands of the present," are in fact aimed at permanently institutionalizing the repressive and authoritarian powers Gandhi assumed in June.

Even without making any changes in the present constitution, the Congress-dominated Parliament can continue without elections indefinitely, extending its life a year at a time as long as the state of emergency remains in effect.

Austrian Abortion Law Threatened

"Action Life," a church-sponsored pressure group in Austria, claims to have collected 800,000 signatures on a petition calling on the government to make abortion a crime once again. Abortions during the first three months of pregnancy became legal in Austria in January 1975 with the change of a fifty-year-old law.

According to the Austrian Justice Ministry, up to 70,000 illegal abortions were performed annually until 1975. One Vienna clinic reported that no woman has died in the 2,400 abortions performed there since January 1, 1975, compared with the nationwide mortality rate before the new law of 25 percent.

Despite this, there are many areas where public hospitals refuse to perform abortions. The director of public health in Styria Province told one reporter: "We are not murderers. To interrupt a pregnancy for social or other private reasons is out of the question for us."

Shah Sentences Ten to Death

An Iranian army tribunal announced December 31 that it had sentenced ten persons to death by firing squad and an eleventh to fifteen years of solitary confinement. The military court claimed that those sentenced were Marxist guerrillas, and announced that they had confessed to the killing of three U.S. military officers in 1973 and 1975.

Since no observers were at the trial, it is not known whether the "confessions" were obtained by the usual methods of torture, or were simply announced by the shah's regime regardless of the actual statements of the defendants.

An Associated Press dispatch from Tehran gave the names of two of the defendants, both women. Tahereh Sajjadi Tehrani was given the fifteen-year sentence. Manijeh Ashrafzadeh Kermani was among those sentenced to death.

Gap Between Rich and Poor Growing

Annual output per person in industrialized countries averaged \$4,550 in 1974, an

increase of 165 percent compared with the 1960 figure of \$2,768. In contrast, the output for each of the one billion persons living in the very poorest countries in the world remained virtually unchanged during the same fourteen-year period, hovering at about \$116 a year.

The statistics are published in the 1975 edition of the *World Bank Atlas*, which summarizes population growth, national output, and output per capita for 130 countries for the years 1960 through 1974.

The atlas did not list the 800 million persons in China among the poorest billion, estimating per capita income there at about \$270 a year.

Among industrialized countries, South Africa and the United States had the lowest per capita growth rates. They were 1.82 percent and 2.15 percent respectively.

Jail Twenty From Former Greek Junta

A Greek court sentenced twenty military officers on December 30 for their part in the bloody suppression of the November 1973 student rebellion against the Papadopoulos dictatorship. More than forty persons were shot to death in the action, in which tanks and armored personnel carriers were called out against the unarmed students and workers.

Former President George Papadopoulos, who ordered the army into action, was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.

Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, who actually commanded the troops, and who later replaced Papadopoulos as the regime's strongman, was sentenced to life imprisonment on each of seven counts against him, plus twenty-five years.

The prosecution presented a photograph showing one of the defendants, Brig. Nicholas Dertilis, leveling his pistol at a target. Witnesses testified that he had shot a youth in the head and bragged about it to his jeep driver. Dertilis received life imprisonment.

Several witnesses testified that they were refused medical treatment at hospitals and in some cases were beaten in emergency wards by police.

Protests Force Paris to Back Down on Guiana Colonization Scheme

As a result of virtual unanimous local opposition and growing international protest the French government has been forced to abandon a plan for transporting 30,000 French settlers to its South American colony of Guiana.

French Premier Jacques Chirac, who ended a forty-eight-hour visit to the colony December 24, denied that the settlement plan was aimed at building a settler population that would oppose any moves to

independence. Denouncing such charges by "irresponsible extremists," Chirac insisted that there was "absolutely no intention of imposing anything on French Guiana" and that a "settlement scheme was only one means to economic development" for the colony.

According to a report by Greg Chamberlain in the *Manchester Guardian*, "About 1,000 extra police and troops were flown to the colony in case of trouble during the [Chirac] visit. All street demonstrations were forbidden, but there were no incidents. Truckloads of soldiers in jungle camouflage uniforms patrolled the streets of Cayenne, the capital."

However, friction on other issues remains. Guy Lamaze, a leader of the proindependence movement, said of the \$3.6 billion economic plan proposed for the colony by Paris: "The overall development plan still has nothing to do with the local population. It is simply to enrich metropolitan France, and we are not French, whatever they say."

France currently spends \$450 million a year on paper imports. The French government hopes to develop a lumber and pulp industry based on Guiana's vast forests. But this highly mechanized industry would make almost no impact at all on the unemployment rate in the colony. Two-thirds of the work force is currently jobless.

Seoul Convicts Three Oppositionists

Two newspaper reporters and a teacher were convicted by a South Korean court on December 31 of plotting against the regime of President Park Chung Hee. Lee Pu Yong, a leader of about 120 reporters on strike since March to protest restrictions on the press, was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Sung Yo Bo, another striker, and Chung Chung Bong, a lecturer at a private institute, each got four years.

The three defendants denied the charges against them, saying that confessions they made were obtained by coercion and intimidation.

Park Regime Threatens NDP Leader

Kim Young Sam, who heads the New Democratic party, the major bourgeois opposition party in South Korea, was questioned for three and a half hours by government prosecutors December 30. Kim advocates a "struggle within the system" against the dictatorial rule of President Park Chung Hee. In a news conference last August he demanded that the constitution, which gives Park virtually unlimited tenure in office, be revised, and that the state of emergency under which Park is ruling be lifted. Both demands are criminal offenses under Park's regime, punishable by a minimum sentence of one-year imprisonment.

OUT NOW!

Chapter 16

April 15, 1967

By Fred Halstead

[Third of four parts]

During the building of the April 15 demonstrations the antiwar movement still operated by and large in an atmosphere of hostility on the part of the major news media in the United States. Statements by movement spokespersons challenging the official version of the conduct of the war were not taken seriously by the media, though they generally proved to be far more accurate than the official handouts. There was plenty of information of this kind in the foreign press, in reports by occasional critical visitors from various countries to Vietnam, and even in letters from GIs that would find their way into print, not infrequently in the *Congressional Record*. This material was picked up by movement publications like *Viet Report*, leaflets, and newsletters, and distributed as widely as resources permitted. But the major media were dominated by the official versions and denials. The circumlocutions, euphemisms, and double-talk of the Pentagon and State Department press agents were not as a rule seriously challenged in the major newspapers and on TV.

In December 1966, however, a series of dispatches was filed from Hanoi by *New York Times* Assistant Managing Editor Harrison E. Salisbury, which provided a major breakthrough in this regard and helped lay the basis for a more searching

With this chapter we continue the serialization of **Out Now!—A Participant's Account of the American Antiwar Movement** by Fred Halstead. Copyright © 1976 by the Anchor Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed by permission. To be published by Monad Press.

approach on the part of sections of the major media. The editors of the *New York Times* no doubt had their own journalistic and political reasons for sending Salisbury on this assignment. His dispatches, however, appeared in a changing political context in which the antiwar movement was a factor.

It was the standing position of the North Vietnamese that they would not enter negotiations while the North was being bombed by the U.S. As Christmas approached there was hope among critics of the escalation policy that the traditional holiday truce might once again be extended, the bombing of the North suspended, and that this might lead to negotiations. On December 13, however, reports appeared in the foreign press that the U.S. had escalated the bombing of the North by strikes on Hanoi proper, and civilian areas had been hit. The administration issued denials. The reports persisted and the Pentagon offered the explanation that military targets near Hanoi may have been hit, but that any damage to the city proper must have resulted from North Vietnamese antiaircraft ordnance falling back upon the city.

It was the kind of denial that would be taken seriously only by those who were willing to believe anything just because the government said it. In those days there were a lot more people with that attitude than there are now.

In New York City a number of antiwar figures had previously arranged an emergency demonstration to be set in motion on a

few hours notice should another major escalation of the war take place. The bombing of Hanoi was one of the several acts that it had previously been decided would trigger this demonstration. The idea, initiated by Norma Becker, was that leading activists in the New York City antiwar movement would pledge to commit civil disobedience at the Whitehall draft induction center near Wall Street in Manhattan in the event of such an escalation. A small committee headed by Muste was empowered to set the time for the action when it judged the escalation was indeed occurring.

This procedure was decided upon precisely because we anticipated that another escalation would be denied at first and obscured as much as possible by the administration. The fact that a number of leaders of the New York antiwar movement would be arrested protesting the escalation would, it was hoped, at least break into the major news media, whereas mere statements by movement spokespersons would have been ignored or given short shrift.

Civil disobedience by small groups was never my cup of tea. But I went along with this plan and signed the pledge, because the chances were that a mass demonstration could simply not be organized on such short notice and it was important that the country, and particularly the movement, should receive a clear signal about the escalation.

So on December 15, two days after the first reports of the Hanoi bombing and while the administration was still contemptuously denying them, fifty-two of us, led by Muste and supported by a much larger crowd of pickets, blocked the main entrance to the induction center and sang Christmas carols while the police loaded us into vans one by one. The movement, at least, got the message about protesting the escalation.

Incidentally, when they threw me into a cell in the Tombs, A.J. was already inside, sitting quietly on a bench. "Look what you got me into," I joked. "It's every man for himself," he replied, which like most of his offhand humor also contained a philosophical point. None of us knew it then, but that was to be A.J.'s last arrest.

Shortly thereafter a delegation of American women went to Hanoi at the invitation of the Vietnamese Women's Union. They were Barbara Deming, an editor of *Liberation*; Pat Griffith; Grace Mora Newman, sister of one of the Fort Hood Three; and Diane Nash Bevel, one of the heroic figures of SNCC's early civil rights battles and the wife of James Bevel. A major reason for their trip was to see for themselves, and report back to the United States, what kind of bombing had actually been taking place in North Vietnam. These women were in Hanoi at the same time Harrison Salisbury was, and on one occasion even found themselves huddling together with the newsman in the same Hanoi hotel cellar during a U.S. bombing raid.

On December 24 Salisbury's first dispatch refuted the U.S. denials of the December 13-14 raids, declaring that "damage certainly occurred right in the center of town." Salisbury's reports confirmed that the U.S. had been bombing North Vietnamese population centers since 1965, that extensive damage had been caused to civilian areas where even U.S. military dispatches did not claim there were military targets, and that Hanoi proper was indeed being bombed.

The articles provoked a deep reaction in sections of the American news media. Salisbury's *New York Times* stories were reproduced in important papers across the country. The *Denver Post* of December 28 commented: "It is far from reassuring to have his on-the-spot reports conflict so sharply with the official pronouncements of the government of the United States." The same day the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* declared: "The credibility gap yawns wider as one reads Salisbury's account from the capital, Hanoi. . . . The government is waging a war of steel and fire in Vietnam. It should not treat the American people as a second adversary, to be kept at bay with a smoke screen of

distortion and soothing syrup.”

Following the Salisbury articles, three major TV stations in the Pacific Northwest—KING-TV in Seattle, KREM-TV in Spokane, and KGW-TV in Portland—carried an editorial attacking Johnson’s conduct of the war and demanding an immediate halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. Stimpson Bullitt, the president of King Broadcasting Company, which owned the stations, said the editorial was prompted by the failure of the networks to give adequate coverage to the critics of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

“In their regular newscasts, which is what most people see,” Bullitt said, “the networks are just showing us pictures from Vietnam on the sacrifices and misfortunes of war and talking about the enemy. They’re not covering the real controversy over our policies.”²⁸

This was an important breakthrough in the all-important TV media. This attitude did not spread overnight, but little by little the reports from Vietnam became more revealing and the dissimulating handouts of government officials more and more subject to searching review.

Still, the attitude of the press toward the antiwar movement itself was not friendly. It was characterized at a New York press conference held by Deming, Newman, and Griffith on January 10 shortly after their return to the U.S. The reporters were generally hostile. One of them asked if the women didn’t realize they were “being used” by the North Vietnamese. Deming replied:

“It is undeniable that what we are saying is useful to them. But it is a truthful report and we believe it will also prove useful to the American people.”²⁹ Another reporter confronted the women with a Defense Department denial of one of their previous statements that “lazy dog” bombs were being dropped by the U.S. on North Vietnam. These were one variety of antipersonnel weapon in which a batch of small bombs contained in a larger one are scattered when the main receptacle hits, and which explode later spraying small pieces of metal over a wide area. They are completely useless against structures and only affect flesh. Griffith responded by displaying half of one of the small bombs which she had brought back with her in her purse. (Typically, the Defense Department denial had been a subterfuge based on a quibble over the formal name of the device.) Said Deming:

“This attempt to terrorize the people into surrendering is just not going to work. Unlike our people, it is very clear to these people what they are fighting for—even the children. For them it is simply a matter of getting rid of foreign domination of their country. They will fight to the last child to win their independence. If they are bombed back into the jungle, they will fight from the jungle. They are quite prepared to do this. This is something the American people must look at. The only way to defeat these people is to exterminate them. Our government is moving in that direction. The American people must ask themselves if this is what they want.”³⁰

* * *

A.J. Muste himself took a trip to North Vietnam with an international delegation of elder ministers, departing at the end of December and returning to the U.S. on January 25, 1967. He also reported that the Vietnamese “seem absolutely determined to see it through.” He was pleased to find that the preparations for April 15 had progressed well during his absence. For the next two weeks he devoted himself to this work. On February 11, 1967, he died of a heart attack at the age of eighty-two.

28. *New York Times*, January 1, 1967.

29. *Militant*, January 16, 1967.

30. *Ibid.*

There was much feeling and some tears among those who knew and worked with him, but little anguish because there was no sense of tragedy about A.J.’s life or death. He had lived long and done well by the tasks he set himself.

In terms of the particular role he played in the antiwar movement A.J. was irreplaceable. But when it came, his death did not shatter the coalition. To be sure, there were problems later that would have been easier and perhaps better resolved if he had still been around. But he was not a star or a guru or an organizational dynamo with all the reins in his own two hands. Like all good organizers he was a team worker who tried to bring out the best in those with whom he worked. He was indifferent to the limelight, had accumulated little fame, and few illusions were attached to him. So with his passing the movement simply carried on.

He had lived long enough to play a crucial role in unifying and broadening the antiwar movement while working to maintain its radical thrust, its ability to cut away at the root of the problem. If he had died six months earlier—before the Spring and Student Mobilization Committees were established and on their way—there might well have been some greater political cost to it.

“Some of A.J.’s friends and co-workers,” commented Dellinger in *Liberation*, “have been saying that he would not have died when he did unless he felt that he could afford to.” Elsewhere in the same article Dellinger made the following observation about Muste:

“He managed to work creatively with those who shared only a part of his philosophy or strategy, without sacrificing the integrity of his own deepest beliefs or being prevented from engaging in the actions that stemmed from them. It was part of his greatness that he could feel that he was right without becoming self-righteous or demeaning those who could not share in all his activities or attitudes. It was enough for him that they walked part of the way with him and that while walking together he and they could probe and examine and analyze so that each might learn from the other.”³¹

As one who “walked part of the way” with Muste I appreciated this tribute.

* * *

Bevel’s approach to building April 15 was at least dramatic. He also had a way of shaking cobwebs from the mind. On one occasion he burst into the New York office with: “What this demonstration needs is some Indians.” This time Bevel’s argument was simple and clear enough: There were some 15,000 Native Americans in the U.S. forces in Vietnam, a proportion several times their weight in the population as a whole, and like Blacks, their casualties were out of proportion. What is more, Native Americans know what it is to be on the receiving end of genocidal war. Somewhere out there, said Bevel, are Indians who will want to participate in this demonstration.

After some initial inquiries, Paul Boutelle got the assignment of sending out some letters to Native American groups inviting them to participate. Boutelle then visited some Indian reservations. At the Onondaga reservation in upstate New York, he recalls:

“I stopped near three Native Americans working on a car to ask directions to the longhouse where the meeting I was to speak to was being held. One of them—he was in his twenties—said: ‘What do you want, nigger? Did you come here to get us to sit-in, demonstrate, or riot?’ I didn’t get mad at him. I understood he had the white establishment’s interpretation from the TV or newspapers of what was going on in this country, or maybe that it was just whites and Blacks fighting each other over the Indians’ land. Another thing too: Indians are the most oppressed and economi-

31. *Liberation*, January 1967. This issue was late, and some of the material in it was written in February.

cally deprived people in North America. These three were fixing an old car and I was driving a new one. It wasn't mine, of course, just rented so I could get from the airport to the reservation. But there was no use trying to explain that.

"I just told him he shouldn't use the white man's derogatory names toward me because I wasn't using any names like that toward him. I told them why I was there—I'd been invited by a friend, Mad Bear Anderson, to speak to a gathering of Iroquois chiefs about the antiwar movement. Eventually I found the longhouse and the council was interested, but there was a conflict of dates, and they couldn't make it April 15."³²

Boutelle finally got a positive response from Robert Burnette, a Rosebud Sioux who lived on the reservation at Mission, South Dakota, and was director of the American Indian Civil Rights Council. Burnette wrote: "The more I see of our policy towards the Vietnam war, the more it reminds me of the way Indians ended up on reservations."³³

Boutelle visited the Rosebud Sioux reservation and was well received. Burnette organized a busload of Rosebud Sioux to make the two thousand-mile trip to the East Coast. They planned to attend the mobilization in New York and then go on to Washington for a demonstration of their own at the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The mobilization had little difficulty raising the money for the bus.

But Burnette had not counted on the government's crude response and its use of the FBI as an agency for political dirty tricks. Later Burnette wrote the following account in an affidavit to the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee:

"Two FBI agents, a Bureau of Indian Affairs officer, and a City Marshal began questioning and intimidating those who were to take the trip and due to the intimidation and lies, only 7 out of the 35 chose to remain in the group to make the trip.

"Such accusations as 'the participants were to march with niggers' and that this was 'nothing but a nigger march,' and 'had nothing to do with Indians' made these people choose to remain on the Reservation and not participate.

"Those remaining went out on the Reservation and gathered others, and on the way picked up others in Winner, South Dakota; making a total of 19. These people proceeded to New York and did participate in the parade and rally, and two of them appeared on the speakers' platform in front of the United Nations headquarters."³⁴

On April 16 the bus went to Washington while Burnette, who had some arrangements to make, followed by other means. According to the Sioux on the bus, FBI agents met them in Washington and told the driver not to wait at the agreed meeting place. The Indians on the bus, unfamiliar with the city, were unable to find Burnette, or he the bus, in spite of frantic appeals to the police and in spite of the fact that the police and FBI knew where both Burnette and the bus were.

The demonstration in Washington was therefore aborted. Burnette was worried sick and didn't know the others were safe until they arrived back in South Dakota where he telephoned from Washington. His narrative continues:

"Mr. Burnette immediately proceeded back to [South Dakota] by car and upon talking to the various people involved, learned just what took place in Washington, D.C., and the part the FBI and Federal Park Police had played in the separation of the chartered bus and Mr. Burnette. This separation was deliberately carried out.

"Upon returning home, Mr. Burnette was advised by those who

32. Taped interview with Paul Boutelle by the author, August 20, 1975.

33. "Roundup of Nationwide Mobilization Activity," April 3, 1967. Spring Mobilization Committee mailing. (Copy in author's files.)

34. "No First Amendment for First Americans" by Robert Burnette. *Rights*, Spring 1967. Journal of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

took part in the rally in New York, that all were to be arrested as soon as Mr. Burnette returned to the Reservation. This threat was made by Tribal officials, Office of Economic Opportunity officials, and Federal officials. But it was never carried out.

"Up to this very day (May 11, 1967) we have been receiving continuous pressure from the FBI agents—even some people who had not participated. They too have been questioned simply because of the similarity of their names. These FBI agents have been using older models of automobiles in order to conceal their presence on the Reservation. . . . It is the opinion of Robert Burnette that these acts took place solely for the purpose of keeping the American Indian out of a very touchy international issue because of the impact the American Indian has internationally. . . ."

But Burnette's intrepid band had already had an international impact. On April 13, Burnette and Chief Lame Deer of the Rosebud Sioux, and Mad Bear Anderson of the Tuscarora, spoke at a street corner meeting at 125th Street and Seventh Avenue in Harlem. "We are losing Indian boys by the hundreds," said Burnette. "Last July 4th, when the white man was celebrating his independence, I lost a first cousin in Vietnam. We Indians are without any rights anyway. What are we fighting for? We are destroying little people. Our people are being forced to kill in Vietnam.

"People have asked me 'What are you doing in Harlem?' My answer is that I have come to the other reservation. . . . The government plays a game of divide and conquer. Some day we'll all get wise and not let them do this to us. This society is run by the dollar and by the landlords. This is not right. No man owns the land we stand on. It belongs to the people that use it. When you die it goes to somebody else."³⁵

Mad Bear Anderson said: "They used germ warfare against us in 1870 when they drove my people across into Kansas. They promised us homes, land and tools. . . . Wagons came filled with clothes and blankets. They were infected with smallpox! My people took them and they died and died." Anderson had been to Vietnam several times as a seaman. He said: "When I walk down the streets in Saigon, those people look like my brothers and sisters. They have a right to determine their own destiny. Many told me they detest American GIs being over there. In Vietnam the people should not be forced to accept a government at the point of a gun."³⁶

On April 15 Native Americans made up the first contingent of the New York march carrying signs comparing U.S. Vietnam commander General William C. Westmoreland to Custer, and others that said: "Great White Father Speaks with Forked Tongue!" and "Americans—Do Not Do to the Vietnamese What You Did to Us." Chief Lame Deer and Henry Crow Dog of the Rosebud Sioux joined the other notables at the head of the march.

[To be continued]

35. *Militant*, April 24, 1967.

36. *Ibid.*

Success Story

Air pollution in Japan, thought to be among the worst in the world, is being reduced slightly. Or so says S. Kawazoe, an executive vice-president of Tokyo's Nissan Motors.

One way you can tell, he said, "is to look at the pine trees in front of the Imperial Palace. The trees now last at least five years whereas they used to replace them every three years." (Quoted in the December 18 *Christian Science Monitor*.)

Interview With a Polish High School Student

'I Want More Freedom'

[The following interview with Karol Kysz, a Polish high-school student, was originally published in the August 30 issue of the Warsaw weekly *Polityka*. It was reprinted in the November issue of *Est-Informations*, an information bulletin on Eastern Europe published in Paris, from which we have taken the text. The translation from the French is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Polityka. Let's settle first how we are going to address each other. This interview should be as straightforward as possible and take place on an equal footing.

Karol Kysz. You begin the same way our teachers do. They promise equality but you find out that their concept of it is different from ours. But that has nothing to do with the form of address you use with me. I am accustomed to being spoken to in the familiar, so don't worry about it.

Polityka. You don't like your teachers?

Karol Kysz. It's not that I don't like them; most of the time I feel sorry for them. To be frank, their job is not an easy one. But you can scarcely forgive them just out of charity for all their various—how shall I put it—weaknesses . . .

Polityka. Like what, for example?

Karol Kysz. Your notebook isn't big enough. For example, they are afraid of any exchange of ideas. There are exceptions, but the majority are afraid. They either read the manual or ask you questions from it. And if you go so much as a line away from it they immediately jump back to the lesson program like a dog to his bone.

Polityka. Could you give some examples?

Karol Kysz. Is this going to be published? I don't want to compromise myself too much. OK, fine. Our main teacher, who also teaches us geography, was discussing the project to collect waste paper. He spoke about patriotic duty, the role of natural resources in the economy, the outdoors, things of that sort. He added at a certain point that we are a small country. One of

my comrades then asked him if they collected old newspapers in the Soviet Union too. It was a completely innocent question, but he immediately became frightened and said, all of a sudden, "You know, you just reminded me that we only have until the end of the week to finish studying the earth's crust; we could go on to that right away."

Polityka. Do you have the impression that teachers avoid discussion because they have nothing to say or because they don't want to start a polemic?

Karol Kysz. It is more the second. Perhaps it's not very fair the way we sometimes drive them up the wall, intentionally. But there are times when you feel compelled to embarrass the teacher, especially the ones who like to pretend to be infallible. I remember once, during one of the first lessons on the ancient Chinese empire, one of us used something from Confucius to bring up contemporary China. None of us are attracted by Maoism, but seeing how frightened the teacher was, we began to kid around. And like before, with the earth's crust, the teacher told us that because of the schedule, we had to move on to the next lesson, on Greece. It's the same way with everything.

Polityka. Hasn't it crossed your mind that it is the duty of these teachers to make you study the earth's crust and ancient Greece, and that because of this they cannot spend a lot of time on other topics, however interesting they may be?

Karol Kysz. Of course, and furthermore I don't say that it's the fault of the teachers. The problem is the entire school system. The program, the program, always the program. As though all your life you could study according to the program: civic education and education for family living. In our daily lives, who will ever use this knowledge about the earth's crust, or calculate the volume of a truncated cone? If one of us needs to know it for his profession, he will be taught it during his later studies.

Polityka. Do you really believe, you and your comrades, that you are taught a lot of useless things?

Karol Kysz. You must be joking. We don't think it, we know it for a fact. What's more, it's openly discussed in the newspapers. We learn what is demanded of us, and then we forget it immediately. School is supposed to form intelligence, understanding, the art of living, and not merely engrave formulas into our memories.

Polityka. As far as I know, this is also the aim of those responsible for matters in the field of education. But how should intelligence be formed? Do you have a few concrete suggestions?

Karol Kysz. You expect too much of me. I'm not a pedagogue. But I think that in place of teaching us hundreds of physics formulas it would be better to teach us, in a general way, the laws that govern the universe. In place of dates in history, give us a glimpse of how things were different in the past, and how, little by little, things changed. And, in any event, provide more discussion and fewer boring lessons in which the teachers talk and the students doze off.

Polityka. If I asked your teachers why they don't schedule more discussion, they would probably reply that they do organize it but you don't take part, that whenever there is a discussion you don't have anything to say. Isn't that true?

Karol Kysz. No, it's not. Among ourselves we spend hours in discussion, and on some of the most important questions. But with the teachers, you can't make contact. They impose such a feudal system that you have the impression they are simply waiting to pounce on errors. What would you do if you began to discuss an important question and someone stopped you with a remark like this on pronunciation: "You don't say 'ton,' but 'tin'?"*

Polityka. Do your teachers do things like that?

Karol Kysz. There are exceptions, but we have the impression that the most intelligent ones are afraid to deviate from the common practice—that is, to treat us like children, to do what they are supposed to and nothing more, and be vicious.

Polityka. You're going too far. I realize that there are teachers who are incompetent, but vicious?

Karol Kysz. Yes, of course—when they question a pupil who is considered a disciplinary problem, they are overjoyed

*At issue here is an error in pronunciation. "Ton" and "tin" can both be translated as "this."

when they find a weak point. And the same speech always follows—the little smart alecks still have a lot to learn before they can claim the right to be taken seriously.

Polityka. But perhaps it's true.

Karol Kysz. What?

Polityka. That the little brats still have a lot to learn. After all, the program, however open to criticism it might be, is the real criterion for both the teacher and the student. The same way the law is for adult society. We may not like one or another aspect, but everyone must conform to it.

Karol Kysz. If everyone thought the way you do there would be no progress.

Polityka. Violation of the rules or scorn for duty—that is not quite what you call progress.

Karol Kysz. I see that you're singing the same tune as our teachers. But there are people who think differently. I saw recently, in the magazine *Literature* I think, an article headlined, "Why the School System Must Be Destroyed." That is true, it has to be destroyed and something else imagined in its place.

Polityka. But that article was about Latin America.

Karol Kysz. I don't know anything about it, I didn't read it. But the title is absolutely correct.

Polityka. Could you tell me how you envisage the sort of school you would enjoy attending?

Karol Kysz. That follows, I think, from what I have already said. More discussion, less "school" work. The teachers should be more open so that this waiting to pounce on errors can be eliminated. And by the way, you know, we wait for them to make a slip, too. What else? Less homework, fewer tests, more reading, but of our own choice, not assigned—whether it be Rej, Kochanowski, or whatever.

Polityka. Would a pupil who graduates from a school of this sort be the kind of material that would make a good specialist or a valuable member of this society?

Karol Kysz. In any event he would be better than some members of our present society. They may have learned their lessons in school but in terms of their desire to work, consciousness, honesty, integrity . . . well, we can see what has happened. And furthermore, when you read the biographies of famous men you can see that only a very few of them were at the head of their



Der Spiegel

GIEREK: Polish CP chief may have to find new ways to keep students in line.

classes. So that's not the only road.

Polityka. But does society need only geniuses? Don't you think that the schools must also prepare ordinary people? That in twenty years we will need people to teach, care for the ill, build things, and repair them? And not only great inventors?

Karol Kysz. Whether one becomes an inventor or simply a shoemaker, you should be able to go to school without feeling a sense of dread every morning. The school system must be made into something that can be enjoyed.

Polityka. Do your parents like their work?

Karol Kysz. I see where you're heading. Perhaps I'll find that that turns out the same way. I won't like my work but will have to do it. But at the moment we don't like being compelled to do things like, for example, the social labor that is supposedly voluntary—but just try to skip it! Is it, in your opinion, educational?

Polityka. A year ago we posed the same question to Minister Kuberski. He firmly rejected the idea that one could force a student to perform social labor. You have made clear that it is not educational, but what interests me more is the question of who will reseed the lawns or install swings in the playgrounds? You want to be free, leaving another to take your place—someone who doesn't want to be free?

Karol Kysz. I think that we would go if the work made some sense. But we know, on

the basis of plenty of experience, that where the first group digs a hole the second one fills it in. So we'd like to get out of it.

Polityka. But it is not the fault of the school system if social labor is poorly organized. It's really up to the autonomous school councils or the ZMS (Union of Socialist Youth) circles to organize this work in a sensible manner.

Karol Kysz. You're joking. Neither the autonomous councils nor the ZMS will take part in activity of any sort unless the schools do.

Polityka. Is that also our fault, us adults?

Karol Kysz. I think so; we don't have enough say over our own affairs.

Polityka. I discussed this subject recently with a teacher. He said that the rights of both adults and young people always entail duties, and that the youth of today wish to give little, but receive a great deal.

Karol Kysz. That doesn't make sense. What do we have to give? This is where the real point of the whole thing comes in: They don't expect anything of us. When my parents tell me about their school days, they talk about this or that struggle or aim. But for us, what is there? Learn, know your lessons, sit up straight, and keep your hands on the table.

Polityka. That's not all. This teacher complained that young people paid no attention to school regulations, that for example they smoked everywhere, you would meet students in the streets after ten o'clock at night, and that the schools couldn't get it across to the pupils that they shouldn't dress in this stuff from abroad.

Karol Kysz. It's true that between us and the teaching staff there's a permanent war on all possible fronts. I don't smoke myself, but many of the guys do it to make the teacher angry. When he goes into the restroom during the break between classes he sees a cloud of smoke. As for this ten o'clock thing, that doesn't make any sense. They give us so much homework that we can't go out to see each other and talk until after ten o'clock. As for what we wear, that rule is just as stupid. Why should we have to leave these clothes to rot in the closet and play soldier, going to school with those navy blue shirts on?

Polityka. In other words, you think you shouldn't be bothered with any discipline or restrictions?

Karol Kysz. You're the one who said "any." But there are a lot that don't apply,

that treat us like children. Like those films that are forbidden to anyone under eighteen years of age. What is so special about them? They are just as boring as the others.

Polityka. Pardon my frankness—you seem to really know what you want. You'd like to have less demanded of you and more permitted. You'd like to have your teachers know more but permit you to learn less. What sort of teachers and parents would you like to have?

Karol Kysz. No, you are the one who is simplifying. I want more freedom, that's true, but freedom is better than rigid discipline for studies.

Polityka. But what if it turned out the

other way? Should Poland allow itself to run the risk of having an "undereducated" generation?

Karol Kysz. You speak as though your generation were without defects, without faults.

Polityka. Of course we make mistakes. Except that I don't see what our error was in this case. Have we demanded too much or not enough of you?

Karol Kysz. Are you treating this ["ton"] interview as . . .

Polityka. The word is pronounced "ton," not "tin." □

Lutte Ouvrière and International Socialism Debate Differences on Portuguese Revolution

[The following article is from the November 1975 issue of *Class Struggle*, a bilingual publication of Lutte Ouvrière, a French organization that describes itself as Trotskyist. The article appeared under the title, "The Discussion Over Portugal at the Sixth International Conference Organized by Lutte Ouvrière."]

* * *

The sixth International Conference to be organized by Lutte Ouvrière was held in November 1975. Seven organizations participated in it: International Socialism (Great Britain), Lotta Comunista (Italy), Combat Ouvrier (Antilles), Spark (United States), the POUM (Spain), the African Union of Internationalist Communist Workers, and Lutte Ouvrière.

Four topics figured on the agenda of the conference: the situation in Portugal, the end of the war in Vietnam and the new world policy of US imperialism, the world economic crisis, and the national question in the Antilles. The first three topics were introduced by Lutte Ouvrière, the fourth one by Combat Ouvrier.

The greater part of the discussion was devoted to the question of Portugal for two reasons. This was the most burning issue as well as the issue over which the widest differences of opinion were expressed by the various groups.

The discussion on Portugal was mainly carried out by the delegations of International Socialism and Lutte Ouvrière. It bore on the appreciation of the present situation in Portugal and on the policy to be put forward by revolutionaries who are active in that country.

Introducing the discussion, the represen-

tative of Lutte Ouvrière recalled that the political crisis which emerged in April 1974 with the overthrow of Caetano's dictatorship had given the Portuguese working class a number of important prospects. These concerned mainly its organizational strengthening and its participation in the country's political life. However, the Portuguese working class, in its great majority, has not yet reached the point of raising the problem of power—either openly or implicitly, at the level of concrete reality. On the contrary, the Portuguese working class is deeply divided by the struggle opposing the Socialist Party to the Communist Party about who is going to have the larger place at the side of the military within the bourgeois government. Under these circumstances, the political line of the revolutionaries must consist in putting forward demands corresponding to the preoccupations and the aspirations of the great majority of workers, whether they be influenced by the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, or the extreme left. But, by the same token, we must not hide our own political colouring and program. This is the best way of reinforcing the unity of the working class and of making it aware of the actual interests defended by the reformist workers' parties.¹

In its intervention, the delegation of International Socialism showed itself to be in complete disagreement with Lutte Ouvrière. They disagreed on the appreciation of the present situation as well as on the political conclusions to be drawn from it,

1. For a more detailed account of Lutte Ouvrière's analysis of the Portuguese situation, see *Class Struggle*, no. 31, October 1975.

but they developed their view on the first point alone.

For International Socialism, all the required conditions for the working class to take power are present in Portugal with the exception of "a few subjective conditions." However, as International Socialism itself admitted, these subjective conditions were nothing less than the existence of organs of workers' power and that of a revolutionary workers' party. It is true that the way in which International Socialism poses these two questions enables it to solve them rather easily . . . at least in words.

Concerning the problem of the non-existence of authentic organs of workers' power in opposition to the power of the bourgeoisie, International Socialism admits that there does not exist a situation of dual power in today's Portugal. And it explains this very well. Tony Cliff, leader of International Socialism, writes in *Portugal at the Crossroads*, a pamphlet submitted to the conference by International Socialism:

The fact that the Armed Forces Movement was obliged to make concessions has created among many workers the illusion that this movement is on their side in one way or another and that they can count on the army to solve their problems, instead of understanding the necessity of counting on themselves.²

But International Socialism does not draw the logical conclusions of this analysis and considers that explaining the problem and the reasons for it suffice to solve it.

After admitting the non-existence of a situation of dual power in Portugal, the delegation of International Socialism tried to make the best of a bad job by saying that what existed was a situation of "dual powerlessness." But this is playing upon words, because though it is obvious that there is a crisis of the bourgeois power in Portugal, this crisis—profound as it may be—cannot be equalled to the absence of true organs of workers' power. The paralysis of the bourgeois state does not prevent the bourgeoisie from remaining the ruling class, whereas the constitution of organs of proletarian power is an absolutely necessary pre-condition for the working class to become the ruling class.

Concerning the bourgeois state apparatus, International Socialism gives a great importance to the *saneamento* ("purging") that came in the wake of the 25 April coup. In the pamphlet cited above, T. Cliff writes:

An efficient and complete purging implies the near destruction of the structure of the bourgeois state.

But just what is a "near destruction" of

2. The quotations in this text were translated from the French version of IS's pamphlet. They may differ from the English original.

the bourgeois state? Was the Portuguese state "nearly destroyed" in April-May 1974, or since then? Must revolutionaries demand the extension of this purging instead of explaining to the workers that they will have to totally—and not nearly—destroy the bourgeois state apparatus? To all these questions International Socialism is careful not to give clear and precise answers. However, by refusing to explain that the "purging" in Portugal in 1974 is a mystification (just like the "purging" in France in 1944), the aim of which is to fool the masses and prevent them—at the cost of a few scapegoats—from raising the question of the responsibilities of the whole state apparatus in their previous misfortunes, one becomes the accomplice of this mystification. And remaining vague on the question of state is typical of all opportunists.

International Socialism treats the question of the revolutionary party in the same shallow manner. They say that the construction of such a party is an absolute necessity in today's Portugal and that the only way of working toward this aim is to resolutely support the PRP-BR (Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat Revolutionary Brigades), one of the existing extreme-left organizations. International Socialism declares that they have some political differences with this group. At the same time, they claim that this group is the best of all those active in Portugal today. The already mentioned pamphlet by Cliff says for example that

the PRP is a genuine Marxist-revolutionary organization which stands for the necessity of an armed revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the building of autonomous organizations of the proletariat: councils (Soviets).

And he goes on to say that he considers "the accent put on the self-organization of the working class" as a "vivifying" thing. To which he adds:

The PRP must rapidly become a mass revolutionary party. It is a life and death question for the revolution. At each meeting, at each demonstration, the PRP must recruit massively.

When you know that the leading article in a recent issue of *Revolução*, the organ of the PRP, was an open letter to "Comrade Oteló" (that is, General Oteló de Carvalho) asking him to make the revolution, you realize what credit can be given to International Socialism's judgement on the real place of the "self-organization of the working class" in the PRP's policy.

The lack of seriousness in the way the delegation from International Socialism treated the problems of the state and the party shows that the differences that appeared at this conference between Lutte Ouvrière and International Socialism are not simply due to a conflict between two political lines, resulting from two different views of the situation. The approach of

International Socialism does not consist in trying to set down a policy that would best help the Portuguese working class—starting at its present level of consciousness—to go forward on the road to power. It consists in talking a lot about the "Portuguese revolution," without giving much attention to the problems confronting this revolution, or to the difficulties it will have to solve. International Socialism simply hitches its own carriage on to the train of the Portuguese revolution, in the hope of becoming the main beneficiaries of it in Great Britain.

This is an opportunistic approach which does not even have the merit of being original. It has been a long-time practice in extreme-left circles. And at times, it even

constituted the essential part of the political line of many extreme-left groups.

Now, basically, nothing is changed by the fact that International Socialism chose to leave the conference under the pretext that it refused to vote on a resolution which summed up their views of the revolutionary character of the Portuguese situation.

As for us, we would not consider slackening our contacts with other revolutionary groups throughout the world because of the events in Portugal. On the contrary, we feel all the more cruelly the absence of an International as well as the absence of a genuine confrontation of the policies and analyses of the various revolutionary groups. The events in Portugal in fact impel us to make even greater efforts in our international activities. □

After the Israeli Bombing—An Eyewitness Account

[Two French physicians, Professor M. Larivière and Dr. B. Morin, visited two of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon that were bombed by the Israeli air force December 2. We print below their eyewitness account of the effects of the bombing, published in the December 11 *Le Monde*. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The Baddawi camp, which has 12,000 inhabitants, was reported to have been bombed for thirty minutes by twenty-eight planes. The dead numbered 45 and at least 100 persons were wounded; 90 percent of the casualties were children, women, and old people. The men were at work in the fields or in nearby factories when the first bombs exploded. The spectacle was different in comparison with what we had been able to observe in other camps bombed in February. There was none of the massive devastation produced by the use of heavy-caliber bombs against the masses of concrete used to protect supplies of munitions and military equipment. They had clearly used "bird shot" on private houses. Roofs and walls showed one or more holes thirty to forty centimeters in diameter, whereas the interiors were riddled with fragments. It appeared that delayed-action bombs had been used—a mother shell of sufficient penetrating power to pierce walls of sheet metal, clay, or light cement, then releasing a burst of metal fragments. The victims included entire families. Here, a woman riddled with fragments but still living, lost on the same day her son, daughter, daughter-in-law, and granddaughter. There, a two-year-old child whose left hand had to be amputated and who no longer has a

mother or his two sisters.

In the Nahr al-Bared camp (15,000 inhabitants) the same technique was used, along with a few barrages of giant bombs. The bombing lasted forty-five minutes—twenty-eight planes in waves of four. At least ten deaths, fifty-five wounded: open fractures, pulmonary perforations, maxillary-facial wounds. Some of those who were wounded we saw in the Lebanese hospitals of Marloum (which received seventy-five wounded, of whom eighteen died) and El-Husseini (twenty-one wounded, of whom nine died). In all these hospital beds—very young children, women, and old people.

Stripping itself of its humanist mask, Israel has committed the most odious of war crimes—the deliberate bombing of a civilian population. It is also the most stupid: The hoped-for effect of demoralization never occurred in Vietnam. In the Palestinian camps we did not encounter a people reduced to a state of bewilderment, but rather a people sure of their cause and resolved to defend it no matter what. □

Booming Market for Rotten Fish

QUEBEC (CP) December 6—The Quebec Agriculture Department said yesterday it has seized about 14,000 pounds of fish declared unfit for human consumption.

A statement from the Agriculture Department said the fish was imported to the United States from Japan but did not pass U.S. inspection standards for human food. It was sold to a Quebec firm that produces food for animals.

The fish was then bought by a mink rancher, who resold it to fish merchants for human consumption.

Intercontinental Press