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75¢

The Civil War in Angola



- **CIA Hires More Mercenaries**
- **Nigeria Tells Ford to Go to Hell**
- **OAU Condemns South Africa**

MOYNIHAN: U.S. ambassador to United Nations denies Washington is in touch with South Africa on intervention in Angola.

CIA Caught Passing Out Dollars to Italian Politicos

Washington's spy agency has been caught red-handed again. In sensational new disclosures it was reported January 7 that the Central Intelligence Agency has funneled \$6 million to anti-Communist politicians in Italy since December 8.

Instead of issuing another lying denial, which in light of current knowledge of CIA activities few would have believed, White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen lamented that the "publication of [such] allegations, whether true or false," was making it nearly impossible to carry out routine White House business.

In President Ford's view, Nessen said, such disclosures "undermine our capability to carry out our foreign policy and make it difficult to work with and continue to have a relationship with friends and allies around the world."

According to a report in the January 7 *New York Times*, the "relationship" with certain unnamed Italian allies consisted of direct payments from the CIA's cloak-and-dagger funds. The beneficiaries were mainly "influential members of the Christian Democratic Party and of the Socialist Party," the *Times* account said.

The disclosure, which preceded by hours the collapse of Italy's thirty-seventh post-war government, is not expected to ease the process of patching together another coalition regime.

A second White House tactic was to treat the affair as small-time stuff, hardly worthy of mention in the press. One "American official," quoted in the *Times* account, described the CIA operation as "peanuts."

"Six million dollars is absolutely nothing," he said, adding that the funds were merely intended to help some non-Communist politicians get publicity. In this, the move appears to have been successful, although the kind of publicity was not what the White House ordered.

The size of the outlay, reported in the January 7 *Washington Post* as equal to all direct CIA funding to Italian political parties during the past eight years, reflects the White House's increasing concern over the growing electoral strength of the Italian Communist party.

In the regional elections last June, the CP was credited with winning 33.5 percent of the vote, only a few percentage points behind the front-running Christian Democrats. It is the largest Stalinist party in Western Europe.

Washington's covert intervention in Italian political life goes back at least three decades. Secret State Department documents released last February confirmed that the CIA aided anti-Communist forces in the 1948 elections. That same year President Truman approved a recommendation that Washington "make full use of its political, economic, and if necessary, military power" to prevent a "Communist takeover."

Nigeria Tells Ford to Go to Hell

The chief representative of U.S. imperialism has been answered as he deserved. When President Ford, in typical imperialist fashion, called the Nigerian government to account for recognizing the MPLA government in Angola, he was told to go to hell.

The vehemence of the Nigerian response is not surprising in view of the arrogance of Ford's move. In a letter made public by the Lagos regime January 7, Ford stated, "Since your Government has recognized the M.P.L.A. regime as the government of Angola, I believe it is necessary that there be no misunderstanding about our position." He emphasized the importance of "our position" by saying, "As President of a country which has global responsibilities, I want you to know how seriously we regard this Soviet intervention 8,000 miles from its borders. . . ."

Ford claimed that "the U.S. in no way sought or encouraged the South Africans to become involved in Angola." But, he added, "we cannot . . . stand idly by if the Soviet and Cuban intervention persists."

Ford's letter taking the Nigerian government to task for its recognition of the MPLA implied that in the future Lagos should check with the white masters in Washington before making decisions that might have anything to do with U.S. imperialism's "global responsibilities."

The imperialist meddling in Nigerian affairs was not unique. Similar letters from Ford to other African governments were reported, although none were made public.

The *Nigerian Herald*, a government-owned newspaper, used half its front page for the words "To Hell With America" superimposed on a photograph of Ford.

According to a January 7 Reuters dispatch from Lagos, "A brief editorial said Africa must stand up squarely to the crude

Washington's instruments for such intervention are not limited to the CIA and the marines. Major American-owned oil companies with large holdings in Italy have for years picked up part of the tab for buying elections.

Exxon admitted last July that it had given between \$46 million and \$49 million in contributions to Italian parties from 1963 to 1972. Other funds, of an as yet undisclosed total, were made available through its Esso Italiana subsidiary. Mobil Oil has acknowledged donations averaging \$500,000 a year.

Gulf Oil, recently in the news because of its payments to the MPLA in Angola, also made contributions. It has admitted so far to passing out \$627,000 between 1969 and 1972 to publishing firms connected with the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties.

bullying and insulting logic of the U.S. Government."

The editorial accused Henry Kissinger of "trampling like a rogue elephant on the independence of Angolans."

If Ford and Kissinger could get away with it, they would trample on the independence of the whole world. The Nigerian government deserves commendation for its rejection of the crude imperialist attempt to dictate its policies.

The question of what Nigeria should do in relation to Angola or any other country is for the Nigerian people themselves to decide. It is their sovereign right and not the right of the would-be rulers of the world in Washington. □

Gandhi's 'New Order'

When Indira Gandhi staged her dictatorial coup in June 1975, she claimed that it was a "temporary" measure designed to crush a "reactionary conspiracy" that threatened the country. In addition to arresting tens of thousands of persons immediately after the coup, the new Empress of India systematically moved to destroy all channels of potential opposition. Her decrees extended from the banning of strikes to the muzzling of the press.

That the Indian bourgeoisie's turn toward authoritarian rule was not "temporary" at all was confirmed in late December and early January, when Gandhi's ruling Congress party approved the postponement of elections for at least one year. The Congress party also extended the state of emergency indefinitely, until "the dangers of internal and external subversion have been fully surmounted."

The parliamentary session that opened in Delhi January 5 was expected to pass amendments to India's constitution that would institutionalize Gandhi's repressive measures.

The June 1975 coup and the subsequent abrogation of virtually all civil liberties was a major setback for the Indian working class. The pro-Moscow Communist party of India (CPI), which claims to represent the interests of the workers and peasants, hailed Gandhi's state of emergency from the very beginning.

The CPI, however, has shown a few signs of unease at some of Gandhi's actions. Indrajit Gupta, a leader of the CPI, gave his "qualified" support to the state of emergency January 6. Three days later CPI Chairman S.A. Dange declared, "We, the Communist Party, while welcoming the emergency, note that certain disadvantages are imposed on the progressive forces and the working class in particular." While the CPI may note "certain disadvantages," it has not budged from its alliance with the Congress party.

The Stalinists have thus helped the Empress tighten her dictatorial grip over the country even more. □

110 in SWP on FBI 'Security' List

In a statement submitted to the House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence in December, the Federal Bureau of Investigation admitted that 110 members of the Socialist Workers party, including SWP presidential candidate Peter Camejo, are listed on its "Administrative Index." ("Adex" in FBI circles.)

The 1,250-name index is the successor to a list of some 15,000 persons marked by the government for transport to concentration camps in the event of a "national emergency." That list was supposedly destroyed when the law authorizing the concentration camps was repealed in 1971. However, the October 25, 1975, *New York Times* reported that the FBI simply filed away its original list and replaced it with the updated and streamlined "Adex."

In a statement released by the Socialist Workers party December 19, Camejo called for the abolition of the list and demanded that all FBI files be opened to the public. He said, in part:

The FBI claims the individuals on this list show "willingness or capability" of engaging in "treason," "terrorism," or "assassination."

But the fact is, the Socialist Workers party is a completely legal American party. Even the FBI itself has been forced to admit, in court, that the SWP has not engaged in a single act of violence, or violated a single law, for the thirty years it has been under FBI surveillance. . . .

The inclusion of 110 members of the Socialist Workers party thus proves that this is not a list of so-called "criminals." It is a list of political dissidents.

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CIA Hires European Mercenaries for Operation Angola

By Ernest Harsch

The recruitment of mercenaries for the CIA's "undercover army" in Angola has shifted from the United States to Western Europe, according to *Christian Science Monitor* staff writer David Anable. Citing "sources close to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency," Anable reported in the January 5 issue that European mercenaries were now being hired through unnamed African embassies in several European capitals and were being paid with funds from the United States and other countries.

This shift, according to Anable, was the result of an exposé published in the *Christian Science Monitor* three days earlier. On January 2 Anable reported that "the CIA is indirectly recruiting American ex-servicemen, training them, dispatching them to southern Africa, contributing toward their pay . . . and providing them and the indigenous forces with light and heavy weaponry."

It appears that the mercenaries were recruited through "private companies," a technique commonly used by the CIA for such operations. One of the "companies" that has reportedly recruited mercenaries for Angola is El Kamas Enterprises in California.

Significantly, South African newspapers disclosed the American mercenary operation several weeks before the *Christian Science Monitor* did. For instance, the December 6, 1975, issue of the South African *Star Weekly* reported from New York City: "Scores of American mercenaries are fighting in Angola and hundreds more are expected to be signed up in the United States in the next few days." One of the recruiters, David Bufkin, a former U.S. paratrooper with the Eleventh Airborne Division, worked through connections in New York City, Johannesburg, and Salisbury, Rhodesia.

The *Star Weekly* quoted another recruiter as saying, "We don't know who is bankrolling this thing. . . . There are a lot of potential sources—South African, Zaire and Portuguese businessmen . . . and somewhere along the line there may even be some American money."

As early as mid-November, *Intercontinental Press* correspondent Tony Hodges reported seeing an American mercenary in Angola and was told that another fifteen Americans were serving as instructors for the União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA—National Union

for the Total Independence of Angola) at its training camp near Silva Porto.

In his January 2 article, Anable reported that 300 American mercenaries were already operating in Angola. Most of them were with the UNITA forces in southern and central Angola, although one special forces "B-team" was working with the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA—Angolan National Liberation Front) in the northern region.

"This B-team," Anable said, "consists of a headquarters staff of ten, plus six 'A-teams' of 14 men apiece. Each A-team has specialists in weapons, explosives, medicine, and radio and can either provide leadership for local forces or can train other indigenous troops for combat. Working half and half in combat and training, a full B-team can prepare some 10,000 local recruits for combat in about six months."

Salaries, light weapons, and ammunition for each B-team costs about \$1 million for the first six months, according to Anable. Following the December 19 vote in the Senate blocking the use of defense appropriations funds in Angola, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger indicated that the administration had at least \$9 million left for its Angola operation.

A second group of about 300 American mercenaries, almost all of them Vietnam veterans, had also reportedly been recruited in the United States. Anable said that according to his sources, half of them had undergone a refresher training course at Fort Benning, Georgia. It is not clear what has happened to this second group of mercenaries (who had been waiting for the CIA to obtain further funds before going to Angola) since the reported shift in recruitment to Europe.

Although White House officials, including President Ford, have denied some of the details of the *Christian Science Monitor* exposé, they would not deny that the government or the CIA was providing money for the mercenary operation or that "private companies" might be carrying out the recruitment. In a January 6 editorial, the *New York Times* noted that these denials "have not been entirely convincing."

In addition to the mercenary operation, at least eight CIA agents are reported to be in Angola. According to the CBS television network, in its December 17 evening news program, the CIA was supervising the

distribution of military supplies in Silva Porto and Uíge (formerly Carmona). It has also been revealed that five spotter planes, with American pilots, fly missions over Angola from bases in neighboring Zaïre.

Citing "an eyewitness to operations in Angola," Senator John Tunney stated January 6 that American pilots have also been airlifting weapons into Angola from Zaïre. "They have been flying four to five missions a day in American-built C-130 Hercules cargo carriers," he said. Employees of an American aircraft company, Tunney added, have "already come under fire while flying in a helicopter near Luanda in Angola."

The White House's ability to intervene in Angola has been limited, however, by the widespread opposition of the American population to a repetition of the U.S. aggression in Vietnam. This antiwar sentiment has forced the Senate to vote against funding the government's involvement in the Angolan civil war and has made it difficult for the CIA to keep its operations secret.

In an effort to circumvent these "complications," Washington has appealed to its imperialist allies to take on a greater share of the intervention. In a December 23 news conference, Kissinger pledged "to generate as much support from other countries as we can."

Some of Washington's NATO allies have already rallied to its aid. Jim Hoagland reported in the December 24 *Washington Post* that the French secret-police agency, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE—Foreign Intelligence and Counterespionage Service), was channeling money and arms to the FNLA. This operation, Hoagland said, was carried out in cooperation with the CIA and with the approval of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Moreover, Jacques Foccart, who has been a key French intelligence figure in Africa for years, was reportedly supplying arms and money—and had promised mercenaries—to the Cabindan separatist Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC—Cabinda Liberation Front).

In his January 2 article, Anable revealed that a squadron of thirteen helicopter gunships equipped with heat-seeking missiles were en route from France to Angola via South Africa.

"SDECE's interests in Angola seem to be

largely strategic," Hoagland said, "although there is a healthy dose of economic self-interest involved. The French share American concern about the spread of Communism and Soviet influence in Africa, and are interested in building their influence in Zaïre and maintaining it in South Africa. . . ."

John Marks, coauthor of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* and an associate of the Center for National Security Studies, revealed in an article reprinted in the December 16 *Congressional Record* that London has joined Washington and Pretoria in backing the UNITA forces. UNITA has received British-made communications equipment. According to a report in the December 10 *Washington Post*, two British pilots working for the UNITA said arms are flown to the airport at Silva Porto aboard Pearl Air planes. Pearl Air is a chartered airline headquartered in the British colony of Hong Kong.


White House officials have denied that Washington is in contact with Pretoria on the Angola war. Trying to explain away the fact that Washington was intervening in Angola on the same side as the apartheid regime, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Patrick Moynihan stated December 14 that there was only a "convergence in policy" between the two governments.

Moynihan and the other government officials were simply lying about the extent of the U.S.-South African cooperation in Angola. The January 6 *Washington Post* revealed that according to sources in Washington, "the United States had originally urged South African entry [into Angola] as a desperation short-term move" to prevent the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) from winning the civil war.

The CIA and the South African secret police, the Bureau of State Security, are reported to cooperate closely under the terms of a secret intelligence agreement similar to those between Washington and other NATO members. Senator Richard Clark, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa, has charged that Washington and Pretoria are exchanging information on the war in Angola.

According to Sean Gervasi, an adviser to the Center for National Security Studies, this cooperation is not limited to an exchange of information. Citing "high sources in the Defense Department," Gervasi reported at a December 19 news conference in New York City that "United States cargo planes have now assumed a direct role in the operations on the central front. They are now air-dropping supplies directly to the South African columns operating there."

The white minority regime in South



Conrad/Los Angeles Times

Africa has several thousand troops in Angola, either supporting the FNLA and UNITA forces in the central and southern parts of the country or conducting operations in southern Angola against the guerrilla bases of the Namibian (South-West African) independence fighters. Pretoria has made preparations for a possible escalation of its involvement and has called on its allies in Washington and Europe to increase their intervention as well.

Less than two weeks after the Senate voted to cut off funds for the administration's Angola operation, South African Prime Minister John Vorster made his first public appeal for stepped-up Western intervention. He declared that "only a bigger Western involvement, not only in the diplomatic but all other fields" could prevent Angola from being "hounded into the Communist fold."

Pretoria has responded to the Senate vote with disappointment. A December 31 *Washington Post* dispatch from Johannesburg reported that a South African radio commentator, who generally reflects the views of official circles, said, "Angola was the testing-ground for the will of the West to resist Soviet expansionism in Africa, and the American Senate has lost the first round."

In conjunction with the U.S. military intervention in Angola, the Ford administration has also directed its diplomatic fire against the Soviet and Cuban backing for the MPLA.

Speaking in St. Louis January 5, Ford warned Moscow of the grave consequences to détente of its Angola policy. "The Soviet Union," he said, "must realize that the Soviet attempt to take unilateral advantage of the Angolan problem is inconsistent with the basic principles of U.S.-Soviet relations. If it continues, damage to our broader relations will be unavoidable."

Two weeks earlier, Ford directed a similar threat toward Havana, stating, "The action

by the Cuban government in sending combat forces to Angola destroys any opportunity for improvement in relations with the United States."

The White House "threats" toward Moscow are mostly for show. Ford and Kissinger have little interest in burying détente as a result of the Angola conflict.

In his St. Louis speech, Ford told a convention of the American Farm Bureau that U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union would not be halted. After a January 5 meeting in Washington, both Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin confirmed that Kissinger would go ahead with his scheduled trip to Moscow January 19 to continue the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with Soviet Communist party chief Leonid Brezhnev. A United Press International dispatch noted, "This was taken as an indication that both sides were trying to prevent the Angolan issue from upsetting détente."

The most direct action Washington has taken so far against either Moscow or Havana was to cancel an all-star, U.S.-Cuban exhibition baseball series that was scheduled to be held in Cuba.

One of the White House's principal aims in intervening in the Angolan civil war is to prevent Moscow from gaining increased diplomatic leverage within the détente, which might result if the MPLA won the war through heavy Soviet backing.

In arguing his case before Congress for continued U.S. aid for the FNLA and UNITA, Kissinger has presented a variant of the old "domino theory." In addition to the "threats" an MPLA regime might pose to Washington's allies in Zaïre and Zambia, Kissinger has said that if Washington did not "stop" Moscow in Angola, the Kremlin could be encouraged to press its political interests in other parts of the world.

One of the areas Kissinger apparently has in mind is the Middle East. *New York Times* correspondent Bernard Gwertzman cabled in a January 8 dispatch from Washington that Kissinger, in talks with Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, "reportedly told the visiting Israeli officials that if the United States, because of Congressional opposition, failed to halt Soviet military activities in Angola, the Soviet Union and others might not take American warnings seriously in the future."

"In Mr. Kissinger's view, this could encourage Arab countries such as Syria to run risks that could lead to a new attack on Israel, backed up by the Russians."

By funneling arms and money to one side in the Angolan civil war, Ford and Kissinger are also seeking to perpetuate the fratricidal conflict in order to weaken the entire nationalist movement. That could facilitate the continued imperialist domination of the country.

Ford's concerns in Angola, however, are

not limited to U.S. imperialism's international interests. He is highly concerned about his campaign for the 1976 presidential elections. Against the rightist wing in the Republican party, he is doing everything possible to show that he is not "soft on Communism."

Explaining Kissinger's warnings to the Kremlin, an unnamed administration offi-

cial told *New York Times* reporter Leslie H. Gelb December 16: "What Henry has been saying is that the Russians should realize they can't do this in general, but certainly not in an election year, and if they want to give us a black eye in Angola, it will strengthen the hands of the American critics of détente," i.e., those who support Ronald Reagan, Ford's chief rival for the Republican presidential nomination. □

Savimbi Switches Position

OAU Condemns South African Role in Angola

By Conrad Strauss

As the civil war in Angola continued, an emergency summit conference of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) opened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, January 10. The emergency meeting, the first in the organization's history, had been called to seek a political "solution" to the Angola conflict.

Although the participants at the summit were divided on other aspects of the civil war, the conference soon reached a consensus on condemning South African intervention in Angola.

In addition to denouncing the apartheid regime, representatives from some of the countries that have formally recognized the Luanda regime of the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) also condemned the MPLA's rivals for collaborating with the South African troops.

In the weeks preceding the OAU summit, the MPLA greatly strengthened its diplomatic hand as twenty-three African governments formally recognized the MPLA regime as the only "legitimate" government of the country. The rival regime set up by the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—Angolan National Liberation Front) and the UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) has so far not been officially recognized by any government.

The principal factor that swung half of the OAU member states behind the MPLA was the South African intervention on the side of the FNLA and UNITA. The military dictatorships in Nigeria and Ghana specifically cited Pretoria's involvement as their reason for recognizing the MPLA.

Some circles in South Africa realized that Pretoria's intervention in the civil war had given the MPLA a political advantage over its rivals in seeking African support. The December 28 South African *Sunday Times*, for instance, called Pretoria's involvement

in Angola "counterproductive" because it "placed the diplomatic initiative in the hands of the MPLA."

In an attempt to lessen the political effects at the OAU conference of the South African intervention, Pretoria hinted that it might be willing to withdraw from Angola if the South African-financed Cunene hydroelectric dam project in southern Angola was "protected" and guerrilla raids by Namibian (South-West African) freedom fighters into Namibia from their Angola bases were halted. The OAU rejected this "offer" December 30, stating that Pretoria had no right to "lay down conditions" for its withdrawal.

Seeking to block a possible recognition of the MPLA regime by the OAU, Kissinger sent his assistant secretary of state for African affairs, William E. Schaufele, on a tour of five African countries. In addition, President Ford sent a letter to several African heads of state in an attempt to pressure them into adopting Washington's proposals for an Angola "solution."

Ford's letter to Nigerian head of state Brig. Murtala Muhammed, made public in Lagos January 7, said, "It is our hope that the O.A.U. will insist upon a prompt end to all foreign involvement in Angola [rather than just South Africa's], arrange a standstill cease-fire between the forces, and bring about negotiations among the Angolan groups." Stressing Washington's "global responsibilities," Ford then warned, "We cannot, however, stand idly by if the Soviet and Cuban intervention persists."

This crude attempt to influence the Nigerian regime's position on Angola met with an unfavorable reception in Lagos. The government-controlled newspapers denounced the Ford letter January 7, carrying headlines reading "Shut Up" and "To Hell With America." On January 11, about 2,000 Nigerian students, teachers, and others marched to the U.S. embassy in Lagos, carrying anti-American placards.

The UNITA also launched a diplomatic campaign in preparation for the OAU summit. On a tour of several African countries, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called for an immediate cease-fire and the establishment of a "government of national unity." In a message broadcast over Radio Uganda December 24, the UNITA also called for the sending of military forces under the command of the OAU to Angola to supervise a cease-fire, which would be followed by "free elections."

Savimbi called for the withdrawal of South African troops. This was the first time he made such a move since these troops entered Angola in support of the FNLA and UNITA forces in late October 1975.

The December 18 Lisbon daily *Jornal Novo* reported, "Jonas Savimbi . . . in Kampala [Uganda] has just called on African states to help him drive the South Africans out of his country. 'By asking for this support,' he added, 'I have proven that I am not collaborating with the racist regime of South Africa.'"

While also demanding the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban forces from the country, the UNITA at its annual congress endorsed Savimbi's call for the ouster of the South Africans. The congress, which ended in Silva Porto January 1, also demanded the "immediate expulsion" from Angola of all forces of the Exército de Libertação Portuguesa (Portuguese Liberation Army, a rightist Portuguese terrorist group allied with Gen. António de Spínola).

It is not yet clear whether the UNITA's call for the ouster of the South Africans is just a demagogic bid to gain diplomatic backing at the OAU summit or is a correction of the dangerous error of allowing the South African forces to enter the country in return for military support in the UNITA's factional struggle for power. If the UNITA has reversed its stance toward the South Africans, and takes action to get them out, it would mark an important gain for the Angolan independence struggle.

Another sign of conflict between the UNITA and foreign troops who have been aiding it was the outbreak of fighting in Huambo December 24 between forces of the UNITA and of the "Chipenda Brigade." The brigade is led by Daniel Chipenda, a former leader of the MPLA who joined the FNLA in early 1975. According to the December 27 *Jornal Novo*, it is composed almost entirely of white troops, many of them mercenaries, from Angola, Mozambique, and Portugal.

According to *Jornal Novo*, Savimbi had warned that he would "physically discipline" the Chipenda forces. The fighting reportedly began when troops of the UNITA attacked the headquarters and other installations of the brigade in Huambo. Calling Chipenda a "reactionary" and

blaming him for the fighting, Savimbi said that twenty UNITA troops had died in the battles. The Chipenda Brigade withdrew from Huambo shortly after the clash.

In conjunction with its diplomatic campaign before the opening of the OAU summit, the UNITA also made a series of overtures to the MPLA. Several leaders declared that they were willing to open negotiations with the MPLA, without setting any prior conditions. The UNITA congress characterized the MPLA as "a brother who has been led from his true path, and not a mortal enemy."

Paulo Tchিপilica, the UNITA's representative in Lisbon, said that the UNITA and MPLA were "both progressive and patriotic movements." While conceding that the FNLA "could not be ignored" in any new coalition regime, he added, "Ideologically, we are much closer to the MPLA."

On January 5, just five days before the opening of the OAU summit, the FNLA suffered a major military setback in the northern region when the MPLA captured the city of Uíge (formerly Carmona) and the nearby airport of Ngage. Uíge was the FNLA's administrative headquarters and is the center of Angola's valuable coffee-growing region. The Ngage airport, one of the best equipped in Angola, had been used for the airlift of American and other supplies to the FNLA from Zaïre.

Uíge and Ngage mark the northern territorial limits of the Mbundu people, from whom the MPLA gets most of its support. The highlands farther north are inhabited by the Bakongo, who backed the FNLA throughout its guerrilla war against the Portuguese colonialists. The MPLA may face greater resistance than it has so far if it attempts to pursue the FNLA forces into the Bakongo region.

New York Times correspondent Michael T. Kaufman reported in the January 7 issue that the International Committee of the Red Cross said "that there was great hardship and near starvation in some sections, notably the northern Bakongo lands near the border with Zaïre." The United Nations High Commission for Refugees, which had asked the MPLA for permission to fly relief supplies to the Bakongo areas, was expelled from Luanda by the MPLA after Angola gained its independence November 11.

Peking has withdrawn its several hundred military instructors from Zaïre, where they had helped train FNLA troops. But according to C.L. Sulzberger in the December 20 *New York Times*, their functions have been taken over by a North Korean training mission.

"High-ranking American officials," cited by David Binder in the January 7 *New York Times*, said that they considered the MPLA's strategy to be to eliminate the FNLA forces in the north and then perhaps make a deal with the UNITA. But so far the



MPLA has ruled out any negotiations or cease-fire with the UNITA, and the two groups have fought heavy battles in the area south of Luanda near Porto Amboim, Gabela, and Quibala, as well as in the northeast near Henrique de Carvalho and Teixeira de Sousa.

As in the Uíge area in the north, the battle lines south of Luanda have also tended to follow the territorial limits between the Mbundu and the Ovimbundu, who generally back the UNITA.

Although the MPLA's income from the royalty and tax payments of Gulf Oil (estimated at about \$500 million a year) was cut off when the State Department pressured Gulf into suspending its operations in Angola, the MPLA is still reportedly receiving royalty payments from Diamang (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola, S.A.R.L.). Diamang, which is controlled by American, Portuguese, Belgian, British, and South African capital, owns vast diamond fields in northeastern Angola, which is controlled by the MPLA. It is not clear how large the Diamang payments to the MPLA are, but the UNITA has charged that they amount to \$80 million a year.

Up to now, the MPLA has taken no significant actions against the major imperialist holdings in Angola. In fact, it has continued its policy of soliciting greater foreign investments. Summarizing MPLA leader Agostinho Neto's economic policy statements, Kaufman reported in the January 4 *New York Times Magazine*, "Private investments will be necessary from all sectors, he says; there will be no confiscations."

The MPLA has also continued its repressive policies in order to tighten its control over the areas it occupies, particularly in Luanda. The January 2 issue of the French Trotskyist weekly *Rouge* reported that the

"neighborhood committee" in the São Paulo area of Luanda was occupied in October by MPLA troops after they arrested nine members of the committee. Eleven other militants, *Rouge* reported, were arrested elsewhere. In November they were released and deported to Portugal.

The Comitê Amílcar Cabral, which was active in the "people's power" groups in Luanda, was crushed by the MPLA, and the newspaper *People's Power* was banned. This repression was carried out under the guise of a campaign against "the partisans of Trotsky and Bakunin," *Rouge* reported. According to other reports, dissidents within the MPLA have also been arrested.

To better coordinate its repression, the MPLA has established a new secret police body, the Direcção de Informação e Segurança de Angola (DISA—Directorate of Information and Security of Angola). The decree setting up the DISA declared that it was to combat "all actions and activities that are directed against the Constitution, the organs of the State and of the MPLA and its officials. . . ."

To bring the rebellious dock workers under closer government control and to "increase their productivity," the MPLA "nationalized" all docking enterprises in Luanda in December. This appears to be the latest stage of the MPLA's campaign to curb the demands and actions of the dockers, who had been in the forefront of the strike wave that swept Luanda and other cities in late 1974 and early 1975. The MPLA had helped break those strikes and in the case of the Lobito dockers' strike in February 1975 reportedly sent troops against the workers.

In an interview in the December 26 *Le Monde*, Agostinho Neto declared that "measures will have to be taken to make sure that misguided elements can't interfere with our daily lives." □

261 Songs Banned in South Korea

The Art and Culture Ethics Committee of the South Korean Federation of Cultural Organizations has issued a list of 261 songs and asked all radio stations in the country not to play them. Among the songs banned because they are considered "subversive" are numbers by Joan Baez, John Lennon and Yoko Ono, Bob Dylan, and The Fugs. Alice Cooper, branded as "subversive, decadent, obscene and freaky" according to a report in the December 28 *New York Times*, has been banned as well.

"Also prohibited," the *Times* reported, "is 'We Shall Overcome,' which soared to popularity last year during anti-Government demonstrations. The ban on this song has caused criticism that there was a political motive behind the purge."

The Death of Chou En-lai

By Les Evans

The death of Chou En-lai at the age of seventy-eight in Peking on January 8 brought to a close a political career that spanned fifty-seven years of activity at the center of events that shaped modern Chinese history. At the time of his death, from cancer first diagnosed in 1972, Chou had served as premier of the People's Republic of China for twenty-six consecutive years, since its establishment in 1949. This itself was testimony to his skill in the devious inner-party warfare that had led to the purge and disgrace of all but a very few of Chairman Mao Tsetung's oldest and closest associates by the beginning of the 1970s. It was the more remarkable in coming after thirty years of experience before 1949 as a student leader, a hunted Communist revolutionist, a military commander, and a diplomat without a country representing the Chinese Communist party (CCP) throughout the 1930s and 1940s in negotiations with the government of Chiang Kai-shek.

In his last years, Chou served as a display piece in China's governmental apparatus and its diplomatic corps. He cultivated a reputation for suave urbanity at odds with the crude strong-arm methods of the regime he represented. Chou reputedly worked an eighteen- to twenty-hour day until the onset of his last illness. He claimed not to have taken a vacation in fifty years.

Chou's extraordinary staying power in the multifarious purges that dot the history of Chinese Stalinism resided in an absence of principles and a keen sense of which way the wind was blowing at the top of the party hierarchy. These attributes more than once permitted him to switch sides abruptly in inner-party disputes without bothering with the niceties of rationalizing his conduct.

The Western capitalist press, after Peking's turn toward Washington in 1972, professed to be charmed with Chou's personality and pleased with his moderation as a diplomat. On his death the editors of the *New York Times* hailed him as "one of the more far-sighted statesmen of the 20th century," citing as evidence his part, along with Mao, "in repairing the long-shattered Sino-American relationship."

These gentlemen, who are no friends of the Chinese revolution, are not shaming in voicing their regrets over Chou's passing. They are expressing appreciation of an erstwhile enemy for real services rendered. It is this internal transformation of Chou En-lai, the selfless proletarian revolutionist, into Chou En-lai the bureaucrat-administrator and great conciliator of capitalist power, that constitutes the central thread of his life and that defines his place in Chinese and world history.

Born into a ruling-class family in Kiangsu Province in 1898, Chou was won to socialist ideas as a student in Japan in 1918. He went home to take part in the radical nationalist student upsurge of 1919 known as the May Fourth Movement, then went to France as an exchange student, where he was won to the Communist party in 1922. Upon his return to China in 1924 he entered the leadership of the CCP, and of the Kuomintang as well, in which the CCP was submerged in a deep-entry policy ordered by Stalin and the Comintern.

Chou took part in virtually every major event in the revolution of 1925-27, a revolution brought to bloody and disastrous defeat by Stalin's policies of collaboration with the bourgeois Kuomintang and bureaucratic dictation of tactics to the CCP. It was in this school that Chou was formed as a revolutionist. He was arrested at Canton in March 1926 in Chiang Kai-shek's first move against

'He Was Always More of an Opportunist'

[In an interview published in the January 15 and 29, 1972, issues of the Amsterdam weekly *Vrij Nederland*, Peng Shu-tse gave the following assessment of Chou En-lai.]

* * *

He was always more of an opportunist. He returned from Germany in 1925 and attended the Fourth Congress of the Chinese CP. I had a good deal of contact with him, especially after the March 20, 1926, coup (when Chiang Kai-shek seized power in Canton and the Communists were forced onto the defensive).

His character was the exact opposite of Mao's. He was very friendly and reasonable. Everybody liked him. There were never any conflicts with him. But politically he hopped back and forth, from one side of the fence to the other. He never took a clear, definite position. For example, when I talked with Borodin in Canton and proposed leaving the Kuomintang, Chou said: "There is much truth in both arguments that needs to be weighed." That was Chou En-lai in a nutshell. And that has been his style his whole life long. But on the other hand, he was very capable, especially in matters of organization and administration. We had great need of him at the time. He had lived in France and Germany for many years and understood the situation in Europe. He understood it in an impressionistic way, but he did understand it. Chou was a man who was interested in knowing the opinions of others. He was ready to listen to them.

the CCP; he participated in the Shanghai uprising in the spring of 1927 and was one of the leaders in the city who decided to welcome Chiang's troops, leading to the anti-Communist massacre of April 12; he was in Wuhan in July 1927 when Stalin's policy of continued collaboration with a "left" splinter of the Kuomintang led to another massacre; he took part in the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, which marked the turn to ultraleftism known later as "Third Period Stalinism," which lasted until 1934.

One of Chou's admirers during the events in Shanghai in March and April 1927 was André Malraux, who was to write two novels based on these experiences, making Chou the hero of the second, *Man's Fate*. Leon Trotsky, in a 1931 review of Malraux's first novel of the Chinese revolution, *The Conquerors*, granted the personal heroism of the Comintern representatives and their Chinese associates. But he denied that this made them proletarian revolutionists:

"The type of the functionary-adventurer and the type of the professional revolutionist," Trotsky wrote, "at certain moments and by certain qualities, can find points of similarity. But by their psychological formation as much as by their historical function, they are two opposite types. . . . The French, the Russian or the Chinese proletarian revolutionist, will look upon the Chinese workers as his own army, of today or of tomorrow. The

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functionary-adventurer raises himself above all the classes of the Chinese nation. He considers himself predestined to dominate, to give orders, to command, independently of the internal relationship of forces in China. Since the Chinese proletariat is weak today and cannot assure the commanding positions, the functionary conciliates and joins together the different classes. He acts as the inspector of the nation, as the viceroy for the affairs of the colonial revolution."

Corrupted by Stalinism in his first serious experiences in the workers movement, the young, idealistic, and talented Chou En-lai became converted into the prototype of the functionary-adventurer, exchanging this role in 1949 for the even less admirable one of functionary-administrator. The highlights of his career bear out this harsh judgment.

Chou's greatest personal triumphs were all inspired either by obeisance to the Stalinist machine or by the effort to conciliate and join together the different classes, nationally or internationally. During the period of Mao's disgrace after the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprising of 1927, Chou became the chief lieutenant of Li Li-san, the Stalin-appointed head of the party after its founding leaders, such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Peng Shu-tse, were made scapegoats for the failure of Stalin's policies in China.

When Li was purged in January 1931, Chou adroitly switched loyalties to the new Moscow-appointed leadership of Wang Ming. Chou acted as the hatchet man for Wang in removing Mao from the post of military commissar of the so-called Kiangsi soviet in August 1932 (Chou was rewarded by being given the post himself). Chou was just as supple in abandoning his former leaders and submitting to Mao when at the Tsunyi conference in January 1935, during the Long March into North China, Mao's faction succeeded in defeating Wang Ming and taking over the party leadership.

Following the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in the summer of 1935 (which elected both Mao and Chou to the Comintern Executive Committee), Chou found his true niche as the ablest Chinese practitioner of the class-collaborationist People's Front line. His most famous single exploit of the 1930s was his intervention in December 1936 to save the life of Chiang Kai-shek after the counterrevolutionary generalissimo had been arrested by his own troops at Sian for sabotaging the resistance to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Chou went to Sian where he pleaded for Chiang's life, and at the same time concluded an agreement that again subordinated the CCP to the Kuomintang in a bloc against Japan that required the CCP to hail Chiang as its leader. Chou even rejoined the Kuomintang and was elected to its presidium in 1938.

Chou stayed in Chiang Kai-shek's capital even after Chiang used his authority as commander of the CCP forces to lure the Maoist New Fourth Army into an ambush in January 1941 in which thousands of CCP troops were massacred.

At the war's end in 1945 Chou again distinguished himself as the most energetic collaborator of American generals Hurley and Marshall in trying to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to accept the CCP as a junior partner in his government. This was typical of the outlook of the Stalinist functionary-adventurer: seeking to use the massive forces accumulated by the CCP leadership in the anti-Japanese struggle as a bargaining point in an effort to join together the contending classes. It was through no fault of Chou's or of General Marshall's that this reintegration of the CCP-held territories into Chiang's government failed. It was the aristocratic and obdurate Chiang who launched a military offensive against the CCP in July 1946, precipitating the civil war that he ultimately lost.

Chou was entrusted by the new CCP regime after 1949 with the abortive attempt to organize a capitalist coalition government (the explicit political content of Mao's heralded "New Democra-



CHOU EN-LAI

cy"), a project that collapsed only in 1953 under the pressure of bourgeois sabotage of the government and economy during the Korean War.

From the early 1950s Chou found his true calling as the diplomatic arbiter of Stalinist "peaceful coexistence" with world capitalism. As the Chinese representative to the Geneva conference in 1954 he sought to placate Washington by pressuring the Vietnamese to concede to the French the reoccupation of the south of their country after the Vietnamese military victory at Dien Bien Phu. Chou, in fact, is credited with being the initiator of the formula "two Vietnams," which laid the "legal" basis for the genocidal American aggression of the 1960s and 1970s. (In June of 1972, in the seventh year of the American bombing of North Vietnam, Chou told American sinologist John K. Fairbank that he "very much regretted" having signed the Geneva Accords of 1954. This could have been small consolation to the Vietnamese fighters who had to win back what they gave up at Geneva to satisfy the needs of Chinese and Soviet diplomacy.)

Chou's next "triumph" was at the Bandung conference of 1955, where he hobnobbed with Nehru, Sukarno, and other "unaligned" bourgeois leaders of the semicolonial world. What was involved here was not simply China's attempt to breach the American embargo or to offer support to oppressed nations fighting for genuine independence from imperialist domination. The something more Chou offered that was characteristic of Stalinist, and not proletarian, diplomacy was peaceful coexistence with capitalist regimes in exchange for diplomatic and trade concessions.

The meaning of this formulation has become unmistakably

clear in the years since the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. Under Chou's guidance, China has explicitly withdrawn support from revolutionary movements in countries whose governments are friendly to Peking. The examples range from Sri Lanka, where Chou complimented the Bandaranaike government on its efficiency in suppressing its radicalized youth in 1971; to Chile in 1973, when China was among the first governments in the world to recognize the military dictatorship of General Pinochet; to Peking's recent pledges of friendship to the shah of Iran, the late Generalissimo Franco, and the unlamented Nixon. These examples are striking evidence of the counterrevolutionary nature of Stalinism.

As one of the main leaders of the bureaucratic caste in China, Chou was an implacable opponent of the program of Trotskyism and of its representatives, including founding members of the Chinese Communist party who played a heroic role in the development of the Chinese revolution and who were prime targets

of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and of the Japanese imperialist invaders. Chou acquiesced in the purge of Trotskyists on a nationwide scale after the Maoists came to power. Thrown into dungeons without charges or trials, these Trotskyists have remained political prisoners for twenty-three years. The fate of most of them remains unknown.

For the international working class, the Chinese revolution remains a great progressive accomplishment. But the motor forces of the Chinese revolution do not reside in the functionary-adventurers of Stalinism like Chou and Mao, who were thrust into power in 1949. They reside in the immensely powerful mass movement of the workers and peasants, who will again resume their march toward socialism.

Peking's announcement of Chou's death called his departure a "gigantic loss." However, no changes are foreseen in the class-collaborationist foreign policy he promulgated and advanced. The parasitic bureaucracy will find little difficulty in replacing him by a technician of similar adroitness and lack of principles. □

King Charley Keeps Promising and Promising

Mounting Pressure in Spain to Finish With Francoism

By David Frankel

The heirs of the late dictator Franco have felt forced to acknowledge the demands for democratization of Spain. But so far they have avoided making any changes in the structure of the fascist institutions and laws left behind by the old general.

Installed on December 13, the cabinet headed by Premier Carlos Arias has been besieged with demands for unconditional amnesty for the estimated 1,500 political prisoners still held by the government. In addition, the cabinet faces a strike wave precipitated by the year-end expiration of labor contracts and the need felt by the workers for wage boosts to meet sharply rising prices.

The new government's first policy statement, issued December 15, promised some changes in the Francoist political structure. But these were so inadequate as to cause even the conservative Catholic reformists of the newspaper *Ya* to express dissatisfaction. They characterized the government's statement as a "declaration of intentions," and added that "we continue and the country continues to wait for its [the government's] programmatic declaration."

The executive commission of the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español—Spanish Socialist Workers party), the major Social Democratic grouping in Spain, also scored "the absence of concrete measures" in the declaration, especially the failure to release political prisoners, the failure to abolish political crimes and special tribunals for political offenses, and the failure to affirm "the rights of protest, assembly, and free association."

The regime's promises of reform have been accompanied by continuing attacks on demonstrations and rallies. On December 14, for example, police aided by rightist goons broke up a rally staged by 2,000 Basques near the Basauri prison who were demonstrating in behalf of amnesty for political prisoners. About sixty demonstrators were arrested.

The day before, a fifteen-year-old student was shot through the lung by a member of the Civil Guard during a demonstration in Seville. Manuel Fraga, the new minister of the interior, tried to publicize his liberalism by telephoning the hospital to ask how the victim was doing.

The minister's gesture did not stop further attacks. In a December 18 dispatch from Madrid, *New York Times* reporter Henry Giniger said: "Riot police broke up tonight the second attempt in two days by leftist opposition groups to demonstrate in Madrid in favor of amnesty for political prisoners and exiles."

Madrid was not the only place where demonstrations were continuing, Giniger said. "Agitation is persisting throughout Spain and among a wide variety of political, professional and civic groups for immediate measures to erase past practices as a necessary preliminary to starting a new political system."

On December 20, Spain's National Conference of Bishops issued a statement urging amnesty for political prisoners, the right of exiles to return to Spain, and wider individual liberties. On the same day the bar association of the Basque province of

Vizcaya called for legalization of strikes and street demonstrations, repeal of the draconian "antiterrorism" law, and abolition of the special political tribunals.

In response to the demands of the masses, Fraga promised December 20 that the government "will carefully differentiate between opponents who support a political cause or option of power and the enemy that makes war against the society without respecting any law."

A few days later, Fraga elaborated on his distinction between "opponents" and "the enemy" in an interview with the French daily *Le Figaro*. "Spain is moving toward the establishment of a democratic society," he said, "but the Spanish Communist party (PCE) will remain outside of the political arena."

However, the government has conceded greater leeway to the opposition. In Palma and Córdoba the police allowed amnesty demonstrations to be held; and on January 1, police stood by while 500 persons demonstrated for amnesty at Barcelona's main prison.

On December 28 about 2,000 persons met in the Basque town of Guernica to form a "Basque Democratic Assembly," and the police did not interfere. Similarly, a large meeting in Barcelona December 30 in support of the recently formed "Council of Political Forces of Catalonia" proceeded without incident. These events were also reported in the Spanish press.

Another statement by Fraga, made on December 31, took up the issue of amnesty. "We are going to do it," he insisted, "but we

are going to do it carefully." He added, "We are not prepared to do that [release prisoners] under any pressure, nor in response to Communist propaganda."

The policy of limited concessions and promises of reform will hardly satisfy the masses for very long. *Mundo* said in its December 27 editorial, "What the people are insisting on are steps showing that the intentions are sincere: amnesty, an end to special jurisdiction and tribunals, genuine recognition of the rights of assembly and expression . . ."

But there is strong opposition within the regime to such steps. On December 29 Torcuato Fernández, the president of the Cortes, declared: "It is up to the Government to decide on political action. It is up to the Cortes to set the legal guidelines for this action."

A dispatch from Madrid in the December 30 *New York Times* characterized the statement as "an implicit warning against substantial political change."

The warning was underlined January 4 when police in Bilbao broke up a demonstration, estimated by Associated Press at 5,500 persons. The protesters were trying to petition the civil governor in the Basque city.

The regime's maneuvers to gain time on the political front have been complicated by the danger of an escalating confrontation with the illegal labor movement. Contracts covering 1.5 million of Spain's 8 million salaried workers are up for renegotiation. The government estimates that inflation over the last year has run close to 17 percent, but it is attempting to impose a wage freeze nonetheless.

On December 29 Finance Minister Juan Miguel Villar, giving the usual capitalist explanation for inflation, said, "It is absolutely impossible for any economy to bear increases in wage costs of 28 percent without their resulting in strong price increases."

Henry Giniger reported from Madrid January 1 on the reaction to Villar's speech: "Management applauded the speech, but from labor came accusations that Mr. Villar, who had headed the country's biggest steel company before joining the Government, spoke more like a board chairman than a minister."

Earlier, Fraga had made clear that the illegal union organizations would not be recognized by the government. The December 24 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión* reported Fraga's view that "the Workers Commissions are an organization dominated by the Communists, who have entered the trade-union system with a precise objective: to convert it into the instrument of a party, for the good of only one party."

The red-baiting, however, did not seem to affect the workers. Taxi drivers in Barcelo-



KING JUAN CARLOS I

na and Bilbao, and bus drivers in Valencia, went on strike. "In Madrid," the December 21 *New York Times* reported, "about a third of the 11,000 taxis were made idle for a third day by a strike, despite a threat by the mayor to revoke the licenses of striking drivers."

"Strikes also affected the metal industry in Madrid, Pamplona and Barcelona, keeping 30,000 workers off their jobs."

Although the strikes were provoked by economic issues, the metalworkers in many plants also demanded freedom of expression, assembly, and other democratic rights.

Bank workers in Madrid, Valencia, Seville, and Barcelona also went out on strike in December. Nearly 30,000 bank workers from twenty-two provinces signed a petition that called for, in addition to economic demands, recognition of the rights of assembly, expression, and strike, and for a general amnesty.

Negotiations are still continuing in these and many other labor struggles, and new flare-ups can be expected. An example of this is the situation in the Madrid subways.

On January 5 more than 3,000 subway workers voted to strike. Following the example of Franco in a similar strike five years ago, the government on January 7 ordered troops to run the trains.

The subway workers voted January 9 to go back to work, but a Reuters dispatch from Madrid reported that they "also voted overwhelmingly to walk out again on Jan-

19 if the partly state-owned subway company did not make solid proposals in response to their demands for a nearly 50 percent wage increase backdated to August."

A January 10 United Press International dispatch added that the "company promised [a] \$455 annual pay raise and assured the workers that no punitive action would be taken against them, even though the walk-out was illegal."

The subway strike, which caused huge traffic jams in Madrid, was a highly visible challenge to the government's wage-control policy. It was a sign of the general attitude of the working class as was shown by dozens of sympathy rallies and walkouts in banks and the metal and construction industries.

The government responded to its defeat with a series of predawn raids on January 10 in which twenty labor leaders were arrested. On January 11, riot police broke up two separate demonstrations in the Madrid area in opposition to the wage freeze and in favor of amnesty for political prisoners.

So far the new regime has been able to get by with mere promises. How much time King Juan Carlos I can gain by this procedure remains to be seen.

The editors of the *New York Times* warned January 4: "What is in doubt—and cause for concern for Spaniards and others who desire to see a democratic Spain take its place in the European Community—is whether the projected reforms will be bold enough and will come soon enough to halt a dangerous polarization. . . ."

"Meanwhile . . . valuable time is being lost, and there are no assurances that even the moderately liberal and democratic voices in the Cabinet will be able to prevail." □

Oral History of the American Left

Tamiment Library of New York University announced January 1 the formation of an Oral History of the American Left project, under the direction of Paul Buhle and Roger Keeran, to record the experiences of the veterans of radicalism in labor, politics, and culture.

According to the statement issued by the library, "The intent is to create a central repository for those interviews that already exist and insure that many activists who have not yet been interviewed will have their experiences recorded."

Tamiment Library will house and classify the tapes, duplicating and returning those loaned by individuals and institutions. A guide to the tapes acquired will be issued by the library.

All inquiries should be addressed to Oral History of the American Left, Tamiment Library, Bobst Library, New York University, 70 Washington Square South, New York, New York 10012. Telephone: (212) 598-3708.

The Struggle in Portugal Today

[*Labor Challenge*, a socialist fortnightly published in Toronto, obtained the following interview from a Brazilian political exile who visited Portugal for six weeks during September and October 1975.

[The interview was published in the November 17 issue of *Labor Challenge*, that is, just before the attempted ultraleft coup. Despite the changes in the political situation following that event, we think the interview contains information that will be of interest to our readers.]

* * *

Question. Since the formation of the sixth provisional government in mid-September, the Armed Forces Movement [MFA] has been trying to reestablish order and discipline in the ranks of the military, and to introduce an austerity program. To what extent has it succeeded in these objectives?

Answer. The government is well aware of the difficulties it faces in reimposing reactionary discipline in the barracks. That's why it started to structure a new military body called the AMI [Agrupação Militar de Intervenção—Military Intervention Group] with the specific task of guaranteeing order in the regiments. Headed by the reactionary Brig. Melo Egidio, the AMI is still largely a paper organization. Most of the military units, prodded by the media outcry against this new repressive force, refused to participate in it.

Faced with this resistance, the government has resorted to the Public Security Police and the National Republican Guard, and to some loyal commando units like the one in Amadora headed by Col. Jaime Neves—although their main contingent seems to be formed by mercenaries recruited among unemployed ex-commandos.

The decree creating the AMI was issued right after the big soldiers' demonstration in Lisbon September 25. According to the bourgeois weekly *Expresso*, about 100,000 persons marched, led by soldiers belonging to a rank-and-file organization called the SUV—Soldados Unidos Vencerão, or Soldiers United Will Win. My estimate was 60,000 people, with at least 6,000 soldiers and sailors.

Their slogans centered around the issue of democratic rights in the barracks and some specific demands like a minimum wage, opposition to military discipline, and so on. The thrust of this mass demonstration was clearly against the military

hierarchy and against the MFA. It had a very explosive character and opened a new stage in the political and military crisis.

The government's other tactic is to send privates home on indefinite leave. The SUV charges that they plan to cut the size of the army in half.

The response to attacks on the workers' standard of living has been rather fragmented. The mass reformist parties, the Socialist party (SP) and the Communist party (CP), are mainly responsible for these limitations. The SP is now playing the watchdog role for the government that the CP played in the previous governments, supporting and trying to explain unpopular measures. The CP mobilizes the masses only to get a better bargaining position in the government, or to avoid losing influence in the key unions.

Without leadership, the masses are responding on a local basis. The metalworkers went on a massive national strike on September 24 to enforce a contract that had been negotiated long before. About 30,000 metalworkers demonstrated in front of the Ministry of Manpower in Lisbon, forcing the government to give in. The 3,000 workers of the merchant marine paralyzed the thirty-three ships of the commercial fleet. Their main demands were for the repeal of the fascist Disciplinary Code (which is still in force), for a forty-hour workweek, and for the same benefits for sea workers and dock workers.

The teachers are mobilizing against measures of the Ministry of Education giving privileges to the teachers returning from Angola at the expense of teachers already working.

On September 17, there was a big mobilization in the Alentejo region in support of agrarian reform. About 200 latifundia, or estates, were taken over by the rural workers during this struggle.

The government's attempt on September 29 to impose some sort of censorship on the news media through the military occupation of all radio and television stations was largely unsuccessful, since the soldiers fraternized with the workers in most cases. The only station successfully occupied, Rádio Renascença, was later reopened in the course of a demonstration by 30,000 persons on October 22. [On November 7, troops loyal to the Revolutionary Council of the MFA seized the station's transmitter and blew it up.]

Despite its difficulties, the government has made some headway in politically isolating the CP and groupings further to

the left. By the end of October, capitalizing on mistakes by the Stalinists and ultraleftists, the sixth government was able to mobilize significant mass support for its policies, at least in the relatively conservative region around Oporto in the North.

Q. What changes have occurred in the relationship of forces between the Socialist party and the Communist party, the main political tendencies in the workers movement, since the events of the summer?

A. Before going into your question, I'd like to refer to a shift in the MFA role in the government that I noticed during my visit to Portugal. During forty-five days of permanent crisis, there was no public statement by the MFA as such, no MFA Assembly (except for one in the air force denounced as undemocratic by the ranks), and in all the demonstrations I saw in that period I spotted only a couple of placards calling for unity of the people and the MFA. The MFA as a political organization inside the officer corps has not yet been able to recover from the crisis that led up to the formation of the present government.

Of course, a number of the most important MFA figures have the leading positions in the state apparatus, but they're trying to rule directly through the Council of the Revolution (sort of a Security Council), the ministers, and the chiefs of staff. The SP talks vaguely of rebuilding the MFA, but doesn't throw its weight behind the idea.

The CP has been paying a high price for its anti-working-class maneuvers: strike-breaking activities, support for all types of unpopular measures taken by the previous governments, bureaucratic manipulation of the unions and the mass movement. The CP was literally smashed by the SP in the union elections held during the last three months.

The SP union slates were named "For a Democratic Union" and the main points in the platforms were against the CP-controlled union bureaucracy, against a bureaucratized Intersindical, and in some cases, for the right to form political tendencies inside the unions. They stressed the independence of the unions in relation to the state and they defended the workers commissions, which they said should exist independently from the union structure in order to develop forms of workers control. That's why these slates won by an overwhelming majority in most big unions, with the only important exception being the metalworkers, a traditional CP stronghold.

The antibureaucratic struggle was a very important experience for the workers, and the SP will have trouble if it now tries to duplicate the bureaucratic policies followed by the CP.

The SP is in a contradictory position. It wants to maintain and extend the lead it

has over the CP in popularity—support it won on the grounds largely of its opposition to the CP's bureaucratic practices in the workers movement. But at the same time the SP leaders are fervent supporters of the government, in which they hold posts, and they defend the government's unpopular and reactionary actions.

I witnessed the first SP attempts to mobilize the masses in support of the reactionary policies of the sixth government. The same party that was able to mobilize 100,000 persons against the fifth government last summer in defense of its own democratic rights was unable to draw more than 15,000 in Lisbon. That shows the weight of the working-class base of the SP.

These first demonstrations were tightly controlled by the SP leadership, who tried to maintain the right-wing thrust within certain limits. Incidents with the bourgeois PPD [Democratic People's party], which is also in the government, were quite frequent. The SP leaders wouldn't allow the PPD general secretary to speak in a Lisbon rally.

I think the CP is losing ground. When the radio and TV stations were occupied the CP didn't have anything to say. The official CP line was to talk about "good or bad occupations, depending on the next developments." They didn't mobilize either to support the repressive measure or to oppose it. This lack of a position on fundamental questions tends to demoralize the ranks, who shift toward the Maoist-centrist People's Democratic Union [UDP], or the SP, or small groups further to the left that claim to be revolutionary.

The last CP demonstration I saw, on October 23, was a big fiasco. Called through the Intersindical [the national trade-union federation the CP controls] and a number of workers and tenant commissions, it was publicized as a kind of showdown with the government. No more than 25,000 people came out on the streets in this gross CP maneuver. Originally called to defend "People's Power"—the "grass-roots democracy" the MFA claims to favor—it turned out to be a demonstration to revive the old fifth government, the government headed by Vasco Gonçalves. Many people waved posters with Gonçalves's photo. Not even the big factories where the CP is strong were massively represented. Siderurgia Nacional, the steel complex, which has 6,000 workers, sent a contingent of only 150 workers, probably the whole CP cell.

Q. Has there been any recent change in the relationship of forces between the SP and CP, on the one hand, and the smaller organizations in the left that claim to be revolutionary?

A. There have been no significant splits to the "far left" in the mass reformist parties as yet. Unfortunately, there is no

major grouping in Portugal that poses a clear alternative to the policies of the reformists. The Front for Revolutionary Unity [FUR], which includes most of the "far left" organizations, has a confused and sectarian line.

For example, the various components of the FUR were divided among themselves on whether or not to support the CP-sponsored demonstration I just described.

The FUR tends to line up with the CP on several basic political issues. The most important is their sectarianism toward the SP workers. Some groups in the FUR, such as the PRP-BR [Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades], wage a big campaign against Social Democracy, but don't say anything about Stalinism. At the same time, they tend to embrace a putschist concept of revolution.

Some weeks ago Adm. Rosa Coutinho, a leader of the MFA, declared that to think of making a revolution with the majority was nonsense, that revolutions are made by conscious minorities. This anti-Marxist concept was loudly applauded by the ultra-lefts.

A total disregard for democratic rights is another fatal trap in their political line.

These serious political mistakes are the only explanation I can see for the relative success the SP is now having in mobilizing support for the sixth government.

The FUR Manifesto is a good summary of its political weaknesses. It spells out a sectarian approach to the SP, stating that one of its main objectives is "to defeat Social Democracy and crush fascism." The priority implied is no accident. The FUR sees its goal as unifying the already revolutionary-minded workers, the "vanguard," rather than striving to win the mass of the workers to the revolutionary program through active participation in the political struggles and issues that concern those workers.

The FUR Manifesto includes a fourteen-point platform of immediate struggles. Although the document is dated September 10, there is no mention whatsoever of the need to support the military police who refused at that time to embark for Angola, and who were victimized by their officers. On the other hand, there is a point that commits the FUR to the struggle for "national independence" and another one demanding the "dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the exposure of its bourgeois character."

The group that effectively sets the line for the FUR, the Movement of the Socialist Left [MES], is in a crisis. The October 25 *Expresso* reported a split in its organization in Coimbra. There is also unrest among the MES ranks in Oporto. The splitters charge that the organization has been tail-ending the CP.

The Internationalist Communist League

[LCI—Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International] is a member of the FUR and so shares in some of its contradictions and its problems.

The Revolutionary Workers party [PRT], a group that has declared its support of the Fourth International, is, in my opinion, the only "far left" organization in Portugal that has a nonsectarian line toward the SP workers. It is also one of the most consistent defenders of the democratic rights of the masses—a key question for the Portuguese masses today. Showing no illusions in the MFA generals or in the bourgeois government, the PRT has been able to double its membership in the last two months. Although the PRT is still very small and its leadership lacks experience, these comrades struck me as being quite serious in their approach to the difficult job of building the revolutionary party.

Q. What support does the Soldiers United Will Win [SUV] organization have, and what is its perspective? Has it agitated for withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Angola, for example?

A. By centering on the issue of democracy in the barracks, the SUV has met with a strong response in the ranks. It tends to rely upon the soldiers committees, which are the most advanced form of rank-and-file organizations that exist in Portugal.

The SUV's political manifesto, however, advances the dangerous idea of "destroying the bourgeois army and building the People's Revolutionary Army." That is, they operate inside this "People's Army" strategy, without providing any perspective of arming the masses.


During the demonstration to reopen Rádio Renascença, called by the FUR and UDP, the soldiers took control of all the organizational aspects. The implicit idea seemed to be a distrust of civilians as effective and disciplined organizers.

The SUV can still count on the people's gratitude toward the men who overthrew the hated repressive regime. But the Socialist party masses tend to distrust them, fearing that these soldiers might be pushed against them by the sectarianism of the CP and the FUR.

An SUV activist I spoke to said they didn't include a demand for withdrawal of the Portuguese troops from Angola because "it would be just a provisional demand." He was convinced, as are most people in Portugal, that the government will no longer intervene in Angola after the scheduled independence date of November 11. □

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Hugo Blanco Cheered on Return to Peru



Hugo Blanco back home in La Convención.

LIMA—"Hugo Blanco en Perú—Victoria popular!"

The cheers greet him everywhere. Blanco is home again, and he is already out rousing socialist sentiment and exposing the Peruvian regime's "pretended revolution."

Recently he visited the area of his former activity as a peasant organizer, the province of La Convención in eastern Peru. The two weeks of travel had been the same from the beginning: policemen, a lot of them, all the time and everywhere. But everywhere the threat of the uniforms was drowned in flowers and embraces.

Tierra o muerte! Land or death! In every village the truck passed, people stood along the road shouting the watchword from the old days. Even though there had been a news blackout, it had been impossible to stop the word that Hugo Blanco was coming back.

An ice-cold rain started to fall, and all of us, except Blanco, looked for protection under the truck's canvas. He wanted to see his home country again after twelve years.

"Kausachun!" Long live Hugo Blanco, in the peasants' language, Quechua. From the

outskirts of the village to the peasants' meeting place in the center of Quiabamba, the people crowded along behind the truck. It was the middle of the night, but the people wanted to hear Blanco speak. They wanted to have him sit at their tables and dance the *huayno* with them.

Two hours' sleep on a cold dirt floor before the next day's meetings and problems.

It was here in the valley of La Convención that the peasant revolt began. And it was Hugo Blanco who led it. Because of this, La Convención is one of the areas where the Peruvian government has been most active in applying its land reform.

However, there are many problems that remain to be solved. The peasants now own the land they are cultivating, but they do not have any control over the prices of their products. The Peruvian peasants are still paid miserably, but they are too divided to do anything about it.

Many peasants are organized in so-called *ligas agrarias* (agrarian leagues), a form of organization that the government initiated. The strongest opposition to these agrarian leagues comes from the CCP (Confedera-

ción Campesina del Perú—Peruvian Peasant Federation), which the peasants started themselves.

The Trotskyist party to which Blanco belongs does not have a majority in the CCP, but Blanco has joined the organization. "It's only as a united group that we can defeat the government," he argues.

"What a tragedy!" Blanco despaired after the first day's meeting with the peasants. Stones had been thrown, arguments had led to blows, and throats had become raspy in the attempt to unite the peasants.

But Blanco was more optimistic after his two-week campaign. "The masses themselves are not sectarian," he says.

The repression is not as strict now as it was during the previous military government. Then people were sent to prison without being indicted or tried. But Blanco is nervous nonetheless. He is always under surveillance.

"... the farmers of today and tomorrow will never forget Hugo Blanco..." This traditional *huayno* song often released the tension that accumulated in the atmosphere. It was written when he was in prison on the island of El Frontón. His companion, who was in prison for "only five years" and now has neither identification nor a steady name, sang the song when we were on the train going "back home" to Chaupimayo, where Blanco worked as a farmer.

At the train's exit there were four policemen. There are always some representatives of "law and order" on the trains. But are there usually so many? And do they usually carry machine guns?

"But I will go on working," says Blanco. "I'll be working against their capitalist policy and for a socialist revolution."

He says, "Our success was limited in La Convención largely because we were without a strong party. It's very important that I now stay in Lima and take part in the building of the party. It doesn't matter how many strikes and land occupations we have. They won't lead anywhere if they are not coordinated and supported by the masses." □

Miners Call General Strike in Elath

Workers in Elath, an Israeli town of 20,000 inhabitants, declared a general strike after the government announced January 4 that it was closing the Timna copper mines.

According to a January 5 Associated Press dispatch, "Elath's airport and harbor were closed and for a time angry copper miners blocked the desert road into town with a barricade of earth-moving machines, stranding tourists in a score of hotels." Almost 5,000 tourists were in Elath at the time of the strike.

The government cited a \$9 million operating loss in its decision to close the mines.

Who Are the Shah's Political Prisoners?

"No country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran."

This statement by Martin Ennals, general secretary of Amnesty International, is cited in a press release issued December 25, 1975, by the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI).*

The committee, an organization dedicated to publicizing the plight of Iran's tens of thousands of political prisoners, illustrates the truth of Ennals's statement by focusing on the cases of seven prominent intellectuals who are currently held in the shah's notorious prisons.

The seven are only a few among the many thousands whose brutal treatment at the hands of SAVAK, the shah's secret police, has aroused international concern. They are the following:

Atefeh Gorgin. Gorgin, a poet, editor, and journalist, has been in prison for nearly two years for publishing an anthology of contemporary literature, and has three years still to serve. "Presumably," CAIFI states, "she has been given this harsh treatment for being the wife of the poet Khosrow Golsorkhi, who was executed in 1974.

Vida Hadjebi Tabrizi. Tabrizi, a sociologist and researcher at the University of Tehran, was arrested in July 1972 and has been sentenced to eight years in prison by a secret military court. The proceedings of her trial, the charges against her, and the facts of her arrest have never been announced by the Iranian government. Tabrizi has been subjected to such harsh torture that she has lost all sense of feeling in her hands and feet, has developed a bad heart, poor circulation, and meningitis, and no longer menstruates.

Fereydoun Tonokaboni. Tonokaboni, a novelist, was arrested in March 1974 for the publication of *Money, the Measure of Value*, a satire of the political situation in Iran. Tried secretly in a military court and sentenced to two years imprisonment, Tonokaboni has been tortured.

Tonokaboni was first arrested in 1971 for publication of the satire *Notes of a Turbulent City*, despite the fact that it had been approved by the censors. At the time, he was an active member of the Iranian Writers Union.

Nasser Rahmani-Nejad. A playwright, director, and critic, Rahmani-Nejad was arrested in February of 1975, along with his

entire theater group, as they were preparing to stage Gorky's *The Parasite* in Tehran. According to a report in the November 4 *Le Monde*, he was tried in a military court and sentenced to eleven years in prison.

Saeed Soltanpour. An actor, playwright, and poet, Soltanpour was recently tried in secret for his participation in preparing for the Gorky play. He was given a five-year term. In 1970 another of his plays, *The Teachers*, dealing with the lives of two dissident Iranian writers, was also banned, leading to an earlier arrest.

Mohsen Yalfani. Yalfani, a director, translator, and critic, is a close friend of Rahmani-Nejad and Soltanpour, and has taken part in the plays written and directed by them. He has been sentenced to five years in prison in connection with his participation in the Gorky play.

Appeal to Halt the Execution of Ten Iranians

[The following statement was issued January 6 by the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran.]

* * *

An Associated Press dispatch from Tehran on December 31 stated that the government of Iran is planning to execute ten political opponents of the shah by firing squad. They are charged with belonging to an urban guerrilla group and were allegedly instrumental in assassinating two U.S. Army colonels in Tehran last spring and another in June 1973.

Prior to the AP dispatch, the Iranian government-controlled press ran a series of sensational stories about arrests the government had made in connection with the assassination of the two American colonels. Altogether, the names of seven individuals were given by the government; there was no mention of a trial, military or otherwise. (*Ettela'at*, August 12, 1975.) The only evidence cited by the government against the seven was based on "confessions" extracted by the SAVAK, the shah's secret police, from the defendants.

While the arrests were apparently made last summer, the only mention of a trial came when the press was informed of the death sentences. It is doubtful that a trial actually did take place. At best, a secret military tribunal was convened where the prosecutors and court-appointed "defense"

Mahmoud Dowlat-Abadi. One of the most widely read writers of the young generation in Iran, Dowlat-Abadi has written a dozen works of fiction in the last ten years. These include the novel *Baba Sobhan's Tale*, later made into the film *The Earth*, which won fame as a highly acclaimed social commentary on the life of peasants in the Middle East.

Dowlat-Abadi is one of the great favorites of Iranian youth, and popular editions of his works have run through many printings. He was given two years imprisonment because of his association with the Gorky play.

In its statement to the press, CAIFI stressed its confidence that "international public opinion will not remain indifferent to this all-out attack by the shah on freedom of expression in Iran." The committee urges all who value civil liberties to demand the immediate release of the seven political prisoners.

Protests may be sent to Shah of Iran, Niavaran Palace, Tehran, and to Ardeshir Zahedi, Ambassador, Iranian Embassy, Washington, D.C. □

lawyers each received their instructions from SAVAK—after the defendants were made to "confess" in SAVAK torture chambers. This has been the pattern of previous trials, as has been noted in the international press. (London *Sunday Times*, January 19, 1975.)

Although the names of all ten defendants have not been disclosed, the AP dispatch named Ms. Manijeh Ashrafzadeh Kermami as one of those condemned to death. Another woman, Tahereh Sajjadi Tehrani, was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. In the Iranian context of the growing number of women who have stood up in political opposition to the shah's repressive regime, the execution of a woman political prisoner is a new and ominous sign. This is the first time that the shah's regime has marked a woman political prisoner for execution.

Human decency and respect for human life dictates that the shah stay the execution of the ten Iranians. We urge that the Iranian government stop the execution of the ten defendants and permit the case of the ten to be remanded to the custody and protection of the United Nations Human Rights charter, of which Iran is a signatory.

Telegrams and letters of protest should be sent to Shah of Iran, Niavaran Palace, Tehran, Iran, and to Ardeshir Zahedi, Ambassador, Iranian Embassy, Washington, D.C. □

*853 Broadway, Suite 414, New York, New York 10003.

Zimbabwe's Struggle Against White Rule

Reviewed by Ernest Harsch



With the collapse of Portugal's colonial empire, the only imperialist strongholds remaining on the African continent are South Africa (with the occupied territory of Namibia) and Zimbabwe, which the white rulers call Rhodesia.

The racist Rhodesian regime is by far the weaker and more vulnerable. The white settler population is outnumbered by Africans 20 to 1, and Zimbabwean resistance has heightened during the past several years. Moreover, the regime is not officially recognized by any government in the world.

In a December 6, 1975, editorial, the *New York Times* voiced the concern of the imperialist powers that the Ian Smith regime may be incapable of containing the

imperialists in the last half of the nineteenth century, a period marked by a fierce scramble among the rival European powers to carve up those areas of Africa that had not yet been "claimed." Drawn by rumors of rich gold and diamond fields north of the Limpopo River, Britain was anxious to seize control of the area before the Portuguese or German colonialists, or the Boer settlers in the Transvaal,¹ had an opportunity to do so.

Operating from their base in the Cape Colony, the British sent an advance column of missionaries into the area to make contact with the Ndebele chief, Lobengula, who ruled Matabeleland and claimed control of parts of Mashonaland. Using this foothold, the British South Africa Company (BSAC), headed by Cecil Rhodes, acquired mining concessions from Lobengula.

These concessions only whetted the British appetite. Rhodes sent a group of settlers into Mashonaland in 1890. They seized the best land and imposed a hut tax on the Shona to force them to work on the European-controlled farms.

In 1893 Rhodes organized an army of mercenaries, promising each recruit 6,000 acres of land, mineral rights, and a share of whatever loot was taken from the Ndebele. The army invaded Matabeleland, forcing Lobengula, who died shortly after, to retreat. The Ndebele were robbed of their land and cattle and forced onto reserves. As with the Shona, the Europeans employed various methods, including the hut tax, to force the dispossessed Ndebele onto the labor market.

The African resistance, however, had still not been broken. Three years later the Ndebele and Shona rose against the colonizers. Although the Ndebele were defeated in a few months, the Shona revolt lasted until 1899 despite the use of British imperial troops to crush it.

With the virtual destruction of the Ndebele and Shona societies, the BSAC began the systematic exploitation of the country's resources, which included gold, chrome, coal, lead, tungsten, and asbestos. The BSAC also encouraged European settlers to

set up tobacco farms. When the BSAC's chartered rule over Rhodesia ended in 1923, the country became an official colony of Britain, governed by the local settlers.

Loney noted the extent of the African dispossession by citing figures released in 1970: about 98 percent of the land suitable for afforestation, fruit growing, and intensive beef production was in areas reserved for whites, as was 82 percent of that suitable for intensive farming; all the land that was of no agricultural value whatever was in the African areas.

African labor was also an important resource exploited by the imperialist mining companies and the local settler-farmers. As in South Africa, depressed African wages were the central factor behind high profit rates.

Sir G. Huggins, one of the Rhodesian prime ministers, noted this role of African labor in a 1944 speech: "We cannot exist for five minutes without the native today. He is absolutely essential to our wage structure, if nothing else. . . ." On another occasion, he said: "The Europeans could not have the standard of living they have today if it were not for the fact that we have a big native population who are doing a great proportion of the work of this country."

To help keep African wages low, it was necessary to create a "glut" on the labor market. Migrant workers from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland² (now called Zambia and Malawi, respectively) were recruited.

More Zimbabweans were driven off their land by the 1951 Native Land Husbandry Act, which abolished communal property relations in the Tribal Trust Lands (reserves) and set up an independent class of small African farmers. This prevented the further division of African land among the inhabitants of the reserves, forcing them to seek a living as wage earners, either on the commercial farms, in the mines, on the railroads, or in the small manufacturing sector.

2. Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland were administered as a federation from 1953 to 1963. With the breakup of the federation, Southern Rhodesia has simply come to be known as Rhodesia.

1. The Transvaal became a British colony in 1902 and a part of South Africa in 1910.

Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response, by Martin Loney. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1975. 235 pp. \$2.95, paperback.

social conflicts in Zimbabwe much longer. "Rhodesia potentially represents as great a threat to international peace as Angola does," the *Times* said, "and a greater danger of becoming the cockpit of catastrophic black-white conflict in southern Africa."

Martin Loney's *Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response* examines the evolution of the Zimbabwe conflict from the British colonization in the late nineteenth century to the present. He places particular emphasis on the role of the white settler community and the complicity of the imperialist powers, especially Britain, in helping to prop up the white regime since 1965, when Smith proclaimed a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain.

Although Loney also describes the effects on the African population of the policies of the imperialists and the settlers, his treatment of the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle against white oppression is extremely sketchy. The book nonetheless provides a good, though partial, introduction to the conflict in the country.

The territory now known as Rhodesia first aroused the interest of the British



Photoreporters/Newsweek

Demonstration in January 1972 protesting British proposal for formal "independence" under white-minority rule.

The need of the white settlers and the European companies for African labor produced an important change in Zimbabwean society: It led to the development of an African working class. Between 1946 and 1956, the number of Africans working in the agricultural, mining, and manufacturing sectors rose 60 percent, from 161,000 to 267,000 workers (this figure did not include government employees or domestic servants). By 1974 the number of Africans in paid employment had risen to 600,000, or about 10 percent of the African population.

Zimbabweans have also become one of the most urbanized populations in Africa, with 37 percent of all Zimbabweans living in cities and towns (similar to the percentage of Blacks in urban areas of South Africa). Most urban Blacks are impoverished and live in restricted slum areas.

Like their counterparts in South Africa, the white rulers in Rhodesia have found that the growing proletarianization of the African population combined with continued national oppression can be an extremely volatile mixture.

The first major African strike after the Second World War was launched by railway workers in Bulawayo in October 1945. The strike lasted two weeks and spread to other major rail centers in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Less than three years later, the municipal workers in Bulawayo led a walkout that quickly developed into a general strike affecting every urban and mining center in Southern Rhodesia.

In later years, African unrest followed an increasingly political direction with the emergence of various nationalist currents.

The African National Council, headed by Joshua Nkomo, the former general secretary of the Rhodesian Railways African Employees Association, was formed in 1957. In 1958 a nationalist upsurge swept the entire Rhodesian Federation. Large-scale actions broke out in Nyasaland in early 1959. A state of emergency was

declared in Southern Rhodesia and the ANC was banned.

Nkomo then reorganized his group into the National Democratic party. One of the NDP's most significant actions was a demonstration of 25,000 persons in Salisbury in July 1960 to demand the release of three of its leaders who had been arrested. After clashes in Bulawayo and a widespread strike, the NDP leaders were released.

In 1962 Nkomo formed the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), after the NDP was also banned. A group of nationalists led by Ndabaningi Sithole split from ZAPU in 1963 and formed the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). Both ZANU and ZAPU were banned, and Nkomo and Sithole were arrested.

In addition to the use of the police and army to quell protests, the Salisbury regime adopted a number of techniques perfected by the ruling Nationalist party in South Africa to keep the Black population in check. However, the social weakness of the Rhodesian settler population prevented Salisbury from instituting a system of racial separation, or apartheid, on a scale comparable to that in South Africa.

Africans were denied any rights in towns or rural areas in those parts of the country claimed by the whites. Every adult African male in an urban area was required to carry a pass to prove his reason for being there. Those African unions that could legally be set up were not allowed to give funds to political parties. Although some Africans were allowed to vote, their number was kept to several thousand at the most by the imposition of high property and education qualifications.

The anticolonial upsurge that swept Asia and Africa after the Second World War made it clear to the imperialists that repression and direct colonial rule could not work indefinitely.

"The Mau Mau movement in Kenya, which cost Britain a total of £70m. and was only suppressed after some 1,000 Kikuyu had been hanged and another 80,000 placed in concentration camps, dramatized the need for a swift reconsideration of British policy," Loney writes. "It was clear that to hold on to the Empire would be an expensive and bloody business—a lesson which the French and the Dutch learnt in Indo-China, Algeria and Indonesia."

Britain, like most of the other European colonial powers, decided to adopt neocolonial methods of rule. It granted formal independence to most of its African colonies, while retaining a measure of economic control through domination by British industrial and financial concerns.

The same general pattern held true in Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were granted "self-governing" status in 1963 and gained their formal independence the following year.

The estimated 250,000 white settlers in Southern Rhodesia viewed things differently. While the foreign mining companies could expect to continue their exploitation of the country's resources under an independent African government (as long as capitalism was maintained), the settlers faced the immediate prospect of losing their social position, which was based primarily on the dispossession of the Zimbabwean peasants. The higher-paid white workers, whose skilled job categories were protected from African competition through special laws, also saw African rule as a direct threat to their privileged status.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Ian Smith, the white Rhodesian settlers resisted Britain's moves to grant the country independence under any form of African rule. In negotiations with the settlers and African representatives in the early 1960s, London revealed its readiness to accommodate the whites as much as possible, but the

settlers were willing to make only token compromises with the Zimbabwean nationalists.

Finally, on November 5, 1965, the Smith regime broke its formal political ties with Britain and declared Rhodesia's "independence" on the principle of continued white supremacy.

At the time of the UDI, Smith's action was widely viewed as an adventure that would quickly fail. Similar white revolts in other countries—such as the May 1958 French army mutiny in Algeria—were short-lived. Loney suggests that even Pretoria and Lisbon adopted an initially cautious attitude to the settler coup—waiting to see if it could succeed—before coming to Smith's aid.

The Rhodesian settlers had several advantages that enabled the Smith regime to survive for at least a decade. Unlike most other African colonies, Rhodesia had been "self-governing" since 1923, with its own parliament, police force, and army. It had considerable experience before the UDI in suppressing the African population and in administering the country in the interests of the whites.

After the initial hesitation, it also had the active backing of Pretoria and the Portuguese in Mozambique, who helped prop up the Rhodesian economy after the United Nations called for the imposition of economic sanctions against the Smith regime. The South Africans and the Portuguese also helped Salisbury combat the nationalist rebels. The key factor in Smith's initial success was the "passive" complicity of the British imperialists. Loney's examination of the British response to the UDI is the most valuable section of the book.

Although the British authorities and the Rhodesian settlers were in conflict on the political level, London was unwilling to press to the point of open confrontation its general strategy of fostering a neocolonial African regime. Its overall interests in the region took precedence, and British military intervention against Salisbury could have threatened its significant political and economic stake in South Africa (about 10 percent of London's foreign investments are in South Africa).

The Labour party government in London made it clear even before the UDI was declared that no force would be used against Smith. At a Commonwealth Conference in June 1965, Prime Minister Harold Wilson ruled out a possible military intervention, which, he said, "could plunge Africa into armed conflict going far beyond the borders of Rhodesia." The threat of force against the Rhodesian whites, Wilson said, "was never on." This encouraged the settlers to go ahead with their racist coup.

Following the UDI, London agreed to abide by economic sanctions against the Smith regime only under pressure from the

African, Asian, and Caribbean members of the British Commonwealth. However, it refused to extend those sanctions to South Africa, which was serving as the principal conduit for foreign companies seeking to break the Rhodesian sanctions.

Since 1965, London's main goal in Rhodesia has been to find a "constitutional solution" to the conflict that would allow it to grant "legal" independence to Salisbury and lift the economic sanctions.

"The restoration of legality," Loney comments, "was imperative for profitable economic activity, though that in itself could not resolve the underlying contradiction. . . . The continued conflict with Southern Rhodesia was, in any case, a destabilizing element in Southern Africa and consequently jeopardized other trade and investment interests." Loney notes that the sanctions had given companies in other countries that were more active than Britain in breaking the sanctions an opportunity to capture a greater share of the Rhodesian market.

In London's quest for a settlement, the will of the African population for majority rule and an end to foreign domination barely entered the picture. The British government revealed its attitude to the Zimbabwean nationalist rebels when it adopted the term "terrorists" to describe the freedom fighters. The British government's racist attitude to the Zimbabwean people as a whole was voiced by Wilson before the UDI, when he declared that Rhodesia was not yet "ready" for majority rule.

A high point of British complicity with the racist settler regime came in 1971, when both London and Salisbury agreed to a set of proposals for the future form of the country's government. The 1971 proposals were designed to perpetuate white minority rule for many more years.

Under the proposals, high property and education requirements were maintained to ensure that only "civilized" Zimbabweans could vote. Moreover, only half the new African seats in parliament were to be directly elected; the other half were to be chosen by a tribal electoral college dominated by the conservative chiefs. The right of Africans to trial by jury or to legal aid was also denied in the 1971 proposals.

In order to gain international credibility for this farce, London sought to provide evidence that the African population had "accepted" the proposals. For this purpose, a Royal Commission was appointed to determine the sentiment of the Zimbabweans. Dominated by aristocrats and former administrators in the British Colonial Office, the commission was expected to return to London with a "yes" verdict.

What the Conservative government of Edward Heath in London did not expect was the massive reaction of the Zimbabwean masses. The country was swept by

demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and other protests, in both urban and rural areas, in which thousands of Africans declared their categorical rejection of the sellout. The chant of "No! No!" quickly became a national slogan.

Despite the brutal repression (at least fifteen demonstrators were shot down by police) and pressure from employers on Africans to return a "yes" verdict, the African rejection was so widespread that the Royal Commission found few supporters of the proposed settlement. In the first month of the commission hearings, in fact, only *one* African, a progovernment tribal chief, came forward to support the proposals. Consequently, the commission was forced to give a "no" verdict.

Unfortunately, Loney barely touches on this massive upsurge except to note its effect on the commission verdict. In fact, his entire treatment of the Zimbabwean struggle for independence and majority rule is rather shallow in comparison with his detailed analysis of the political and social forces active in Salisbury and London. His examination of the various Zimbabwean nationalist currents, for the most part, is limited to a brief listing of events and leaders.

By concentrating on the diplomatic maneuvering between London and Salisbury, Loney fails to see the importance of the tremendous pressure exerted by the Zimbabwean population, particularly in their massive rejection of the 1971 proposals. That upsurge changed the entire focus of the "constitutional conflict," pushing aside the British attempts to negotiate a sellout. Smith has since been forced to face directly the demands of the Zimbabwean nationalists for majority rule.

Although some of the nationalist leaders have expressed their willingness to make a few compromises with Smith, they are limited from going very far in that direction by the mass sentiment against any settlement that does not include majority rule.

Ndabaningi Sithole, one of the principal nationalist leaders, pointed to this mass pressure in early 1975. "One strange thing about the proposed talks," he said, "is that while African nationalist leaders are for them, their supporters are dead set against them. They believe that these talks will not solve anything except to entrench white supremacy."

With the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Angola and Mozambique, the Smith regime has lost an important prop in its struggle for survival. What the imperialist powers, particularly South Africa, fear is a sudden collapse of the settler regime. That is why they have recently been applying pressure on Smith to reach some agreement with the nationalist leaders that can defuse the mounting African unrest before it escapes control. □

Capitalism Fouls Things Up



Polluters Ignore Court Ruling

Despite a November 28 ruling in the Rouen administrative tribunal ordering two chemical trusts, APC and Rhône-Poulenc, to cease dumping gypsum phosphate into the Seine estuary, the dumping continues. The two companies have appealed the ruling and have decided to ignore it until the appeal is heard.

According to a report in the December 13 issue of *Lutte Ouvrière*, a Paris weekly, the chairman of APC claims that the phosphate is not harmful. In addition, the two companies have threatened to lay off 5,000 workers if the ban is enforced.

In face of this counterattack by the polluters, *Lutte Ouvrière* reported, the fishermen in the region have called for a blockade of the port of Le Havre if the initial ruling is not upheld.



Lutte Ouvrière

No, these spots aren't hereditary. They're signed Rhône-Poulenc.

Australian Unions Call for Ban on Export and Mining of Uranium

Citing the dangers of global radioactive pollution, the annual congress of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) overruled an executive committee recommendation September 18 and passed an amendment urging a near total ban on the mining and export of uranium.

ACTU represents thirty-seven unions and 380,000 workers, including every major industrial union in the country.

According to the report in the *Melbourne Age*, the vote represented the "first time in the four days the congress has been running that an executive recommendation had been defeated." The resolution, as passed by the congress, reads:

In view of the danger of global radioactive pollution, the threat of nuclear proliferation, the problems of disposing of radio-active waste, the energy consumption imbalance between the industrialized countries and underdeveloped Third World, and the denial of the legitimate land rights of black Australians:

This Executive of the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations insists

1. That Australia should immediately halt all uranium mining operations, except as is necessary for medical purposes and then only under strict controls.

2. That existing Australian uranium stockpiles be used or exported only for biomedical research and, indirectly through the production of isotopes, for medical diagnosis and treatment.

3. That uranium exports be refused to those countries engaged in researching or manufacturing nuclear weapons or generating power by fission or breeder reactors; and,

4. That those existing contracts for the supply of uranium not in accord with these principles, be abrogated.

Furthermore, this Executive recommends to all affiliated organizations the imposition of bans where applicable on any work contributing to the mining and export of uranium for purposes other than biomedical, medical diagnosis, and treatment.

Pollution Alert in Rouen

A thick layer of dangerously polluted air blanketed the city of Rouen and the surrounding area at the end of November, tripping a pollution alert for the second time in less than a month. Factories in this industrial center, located about ninety miles northwest of Paris, were ordered to switch temporarily to low-sulfur fuel.

The alert was ended twelve hours later when winds blew the noxious fumes elsewhere. But more emergencies can be expected in the future. An article in the November 27 issue of the Paris daily *France Soir* explained:

"In this part of the Seine Valley, topographical and climatic conditions often lead to stagnation of the polluted fumes discharged from factory smokestacks. The other night, weather conditions, following a cold and windless day, were particularly favorable for an extension of this phenomenon. A veritable 'lid' of fumes covered the city. It represented a real danger for the 300,000 inhabitants of this region, where industries release 400 tons of sulfur compounds into the air each day."

Enough for Everybody

The continued transportation of radioactive materials through the city could in the event of an accident have "cataclysmic results, bringing death or serious injury to tens of thousands of New Yorkers."

That was the opinion of the director of New York's Bureau of Radiation Control, Dr. Leonard Solon, testifying before a public hearing of the Board of Health November 6. The board was considering an amendment to the city health code that would ban the transportation by any carrier of most large quantities of radioactive materials through the city. A temporary ban was imposed August 1.

Dr. Solon said the inhalation or ingestion of one milligram of plutonium could result in lung cancer or death. He said an average air shipment contained 40 million milligrams. This would be enough to kill the entire population of New York City five times over.

Fishing in Seine Not Recommended

"The situation is quite serious in an area west of Paris," says Jean Salesses, head of the Seine Pollution Bureau. "There, the river has been deoxygenated. Fish have died, while those that survived have become monsters."

Surviving fish in the Seine, according to a report in the January 4 *Washington Post*, tend to be blind and lack scales. Water from the Seine is so dirty that it has been killing fish in the area where it empties into the sea.

OUT NOW!

Chapter 16

April 15, 1967

By Fred Halstead

[Last of four parts]

Much of Muste's time in the last days of his life was devoted to working on the formal call for the Spring Mobilization, a process that involved long hours of meetings and rather delicate negotiations to come to agreement within what was by this time a much broader coalition. In its final version the call was politically a stronger condemnation of the very idea of U.S. involvement in Vietnam than those issued by the previous coalitions.

It contained no mention of negotiations and declared: "We march to dramatize the world-wide hope that the United States remove its troops from Vietnam so that the Vietnamese can determine their own future in their own way."³⁷ The committee printed up a variety of slogans for participants to carry, including both the negotiate and withdrawal demands.

The Student Mobilization Committee issued its own call, which explicitly demanded immediate withdrawal, an end to campus complicity with the war, and an end to the draft.

The Spring Mobilization Committee call also reflected the attempt to reconcile the desire for an ongoing multi-issue movement with the central focus of mass action against the war.

"We call all Americans to unite and mobilize in a movement to end the senseless slaughter of American GIs and the mass murder

peace, radical, and civil rights figures, some prominent ministers, a few labor officials, and even some movie stars like Robert Vaughan and Harry Belafonte. James Farmer, at last, lent his name.

It was obvious, at least in New York, that the major media had a policy of avoiding prominent mention of antiwar demonstrations until the day of the event so as not to help attract participants. Mortimer Frankel, a professional public relations man who volunteered his services, did the best he could, but by and large April 15 had to be publicized the hard way—by hand-to-hand leaflets, word of mouth, mailings, and a few paid advertisements which required a great deal of organizational work and considerable time beforehand just to raise the money.

Financially the whole operation was bootstrap. We borrowed money to put out the first fund appeal mailings, spent the proceeds, borrowed more, and so it went. We knew we were in somewhat better shape when contributions in response to a coupon on the leaflets being distributed would exceed the cost of printing them. From then on we could distribute freely. The paid staff—which got subsistence ranging from \$15 to \$75 a week, depending on people's needs—wasn't always paid, and the committee was constantly in debt.

The Parade Committee alone distributed a million leaflets publicizing April 15. Much of this was done by special teams organized by Bernie Goodman, a house painter, about fifty, who was the Parade Committee's master leafleteer. Ron Wolin of Vets and Reservists—which had a special leafleting project directed at GIs—had succeeded in establishing the right to leaflet inside public transportation terminals, like the Port Authority bus building in New York where it had previously been forbidden. This was but one of many ways in which the state of civil liberties was greatly improved through the activities of the antiwar movement.

The nuts and bolts organizational work for the New York affair was done mainly out of the Parade Committee office, which had long since spilled out of the 5 Beekman Street complex into a large loft around the corner at 29 Park Row, off City Hall Park. The SMC operated in the same loft, as did the Spring Mobilization Committee initially, until it got an office at 857 Broadway near Union Square. Lora Eckert, a student from Minneapolis on the Parade Committee staff, and Susan Sutheim for the Spring Mobilization Committee, set up efficient office procedures. The paid staffs were never very large and most of the work was done by volunteers—there were literally hundreds of them—coming in and out at all hours. Marc Paul Edelman, a draft resister, ran the mimeograph machines and never seemed to sleep.

Sutheim put all the volunteers on computer cards—though we had no computer. She notched the holes on the edges for certain skills and availabilities. If we needed a layout artist who could write Spanish and work on a Tuesday evening, for example, she'd push several knitting needles through the holes in the stack of cards, lift them, and out would fall the cards of volunteers with those abilities. Sutheim, incidentally, was a member of SDS who came to work for the mobilization on her own initiative.

The central offices were only a focus for the operation. A great

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of Vietnamese. We call for the enlistment of the men, money and resources now being used to maintain the military machine in a fight against the real enemies of man—hunger, hopelessness, ignorance, hate, fear, discrimination and inequality.

"As the war cruelly destroys in Vietnam, so it denies hope to millions in the United States. The need for decent homes, quality education, jobs and fair employment are brushed aside. Our cities smother in smoke and grime, strangle in traffic. Our slums continue to rot. Streams and rivers are polluted, and the very air we breathe is fouled. Our vast wealth could in a short time eliminate these ills. It goes instead to murder and destroy. War contracts and the draft corrupt our campuses and laboratories. And, as the war continues, the ultimate danger of nuclear holocaust hangs over all. . . .

"This national mobilization will affirm the will of the American people for peace in Vietnam and a new life for America and for all mankind. We speak to people around the world to mobilize to stop the war in Vietnam. We declare not merely a protest but a new beginning."

The sponsors' list was the broadest yet, including a host of

37. "Call to a National Mass Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam Now! April 15, 1967. New York-San Francisco." (Copy in author's files.)

deal of the building was done by participating neighborhood, campus, occupational, political, and other categories of groups. They organized meetings, fund raisers, buildup demonstrations, mailings, ads in regional newspapers, etc. There came to be a certain air of exhilaration in the movement as a whole during this period and things would move almost on their own with minimal encouragement and direction.

I learned it is important at such a time to be wide open to initiatives and suggestions and not to hesitate to put responsibility on the most recent volunteer if they were willing and exhibited common sense. Actually the operation was expanding faster than anyone could keep up with anyway. Such surges occurred from time to time but not often and they did not last more than a few weeks at a time. It was important to make the most of them and that could not be done by trying to keep a tight rein. A few key things—like financial accounting or the training of marshals—had to be watched carefully by the responsible committee, but by and large when the movement had a chance to expand rapidly it was best to rely on the initiative of even the newest activists.

This expansion was not limited to New York or San Francisco, but also occurred to some extent across the country even in places so far away from either demonstration they could send few people to the main marches. New committees were formed, local coalitions brought together, dormant groups activated, and organizations previously not involved brought into antiwar activity. In many areas send-off demonstrations were organized when the buses, trains, or car caravans left for New York or San Francisco and an uncounted number of local demonstrations were held by people who couldn't make the trip.

Almost all the peace and radical political groups were involved, as well as a significant number of local Democratic clubs, moderate religious groups, churches, and so on.

Women Strike for Peace played an important role. Dagmar Wilson became a vice-chairman of the Spring Mobilization Committee (as did Rev. Ralph Abernathy) and WSP organized a whole train to bring demonstrators from Washington, D.C. Amy Swerdlow, who was Wilson's representative on the working committee, Pauline Rosen, and Cora Weiss sparked the New York WSP participation and the WSP contingent was some 20,000 strong in the march.

National SANE maintained its distance and issued a statement declining to endorse but leaving the door open for local chapters to participate, which a number did including New York SANE. Dr. Spock endorsed as an individual and cochaired the New York rally.

Progressive Labor, whose youth members had entered SDS when they dissolved the May Second Movement the year before, was one of the few groups on the left that did not participate. In the pages of the PL newspaper *Challenge* the mobilization was denounced as a "Trotskyite, revisionist, pacifist, liberal alliance," and PL was not represented among the sponsors. William Epton, however, who was still a member of PL at the time, joined with Paul Boutelle and James Haughton to initiate the Black United Action Front that organized the Harlem contingent for April 15.

Many local SDS chapters were also involved though the National Council did not reverse its previous position until April 5, when it finally voted to endorse. SDS National Secretary Gregg Calvert had become a sponsor in March

* * *

One thing that figured in the SDS endorsement was a draft-card-burning project initiated by Cornell SDS members, which they wanted to make part of the April 15 event in New York, At the same December National Council meeting where it had voted against endorsing the Spring Mobilization, SDS had adopted a draft refusal program and Calvert had coined the slogan "from protest to resistance."

A Cornell "We Won't Go" group that included SDS members who were advocates of nonviolent resistance announced March 2 that they were seeking pledges from draft-age men to burn their cards publicly at the Spring Mobilization. Bob Greenblatt, who taught at Cornell, knew of the plan, as did Dellinger. Most of the rest of us on the Spring Mobilization working committee, however, hadn't heard of it until March 24 when a proposal was made by Mike Margolies that the Cornell group be invited to participate in the rally April 15 and possibly burn their draft cards on the platform. According to the minutes, Abner Grunauer of New York SANE "said that to include the card burning at the rally would be to violate the basis of the coalition because it would involve thousands of persons in an act of civil disobedience to which they had not agreed to commit themselves, and strongly urged that the Committee discourage card burning on the 15th (although by no means on the 14th or 16th or any other given day)."

Greenblatt, the minutes continue, "pointed out that he has been working very closely with the organizers of the card burning, and that at this point they have not asked the Committee for any sort of official recognition, approval or inclusion in the Mobilization program."³⁸

The issue was put off for later decision and debated at two subsequent meetings. Tim Larkin, one of the original signers of the Cornell pledge, spoke at at least one of these. In the course of this discussion it appeared to some that Dellinger—who attached great importance to the slogan, "from protest to resistance"—had made some prior commitment to the Cornell group regarding April 15. In any case these students had made their announcement about "destroying our draft cards at the Spring Mobilization"³⁹ before it had been discussed in the committee and were obviously disappointed that the committee did not readily accept it.

Previously I had participated in support demonstrations at public draft card burnings, not because I thought the tactic was effective, but because I thought the young men facing jail for an antiwar activity deserved support. But these demonstrations had been announced and built, and endorsers obtained, on the basis that civil disobedience would be a central feature of the action. Not so with the Spring Mobilization.

What disturbed me about this situation was that the Cornell plan—which at best would involve a relative handful—was presented to a much broader coalition as a fait accompli. This threatened the coalition that was building an action of hundreds of thousands in a clear, sharp statement against the war. It was, in my view, a bad omen.

On this aspect of the question a rather bitter exchange occurred between Dellinger and Harry Ring of the Socialist Workers Party, who accused Dellinger of irresponsibility regarding the coalition. Dellinger maintained that a certain amount of "creative tension" was necessary between those who wanted to reach broad sections of the population and those who wanted to sharpen the struggle with civil disobedience.

Recalling the incident later, Ring said he was upset because the attempt to get the draft card burners on the platform "almost seemed like a deliberate move to narrow the coalition precisely at the moment when it was on the verge of a major breakthrough."

"We had all worked hard," he said, "to bring in the additional forces that were needed if we were going to build a movement big enough to actually stop the war. Throughout, we tried to achieve the kind of consensus where the pacifists and individual resisters

38. Minutes, Working Committee of the Spring Mobilization, March 24, 1967. (Copy in author's files.)

39. *The Resistance* by Michael Ferber and Staughton Lynd (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 72. This book contains a more detailed account of the draft resistance aspect of the movement from the point of view of those who considered it crucial.

could do their particular thing, but not impose it on others who would not or could not accept this tactic. But some of the pacifists—and some of the non-pacifist advocates of ‘resistance’ as well—almost seemed to feel that if the movement was making headway in winning new forces it must be doing something wrong. It seemed to be just at those points that some of them were most determined to impose their particular tactic on the coalition.”⁴⁰

The compromise which was finally reached was that the Spring Mobilization Committee would not sponsor the draft card burning but that it would take place April 15 in Central Park’s Sheep Meadow while the mobilization was assembling there for the march. The card burning was listed in the mobilization program as one of the concurrent activities of participating groups.

On April 15 a few hundred persons gathered near the edge of the assembly and while cameras flashed and plainclothes police waited to pick up the ashes for “evidence,” between 150 and 200 cards were burned. Meanwhile, on the other side of the vast crowd, Grunauer was busy with Al Evanoff heading a team of marshals getting the first contingents lined up for the march.

* * *

April 15, 1967, was a chill day in New York with a bit of rain in the morning and threatening more. The march was scheduled to step out of Central Park at noon, go east on 59th Street, south on Madison Avenue, then east on 46th and 47th Streets to the United Nations on First Avenue. The police had cleared the area between 43rd and 47th on First Avenue and the sound equipment was set up to cover that as well as 46th and 47th back to Second Avenue. For some reason the police were adamant that none of the crowd should go south of 43rd.

After checking out the technical assignments at the rally area, along the route, the assembly, and the charter bus unloading area—where the drivers had to be given instructions on where to park and the passengers on how to find their buses later—I went to the front of the march to help get it started. The start was delayed by a problem we hadn’t anticipated, but which appeared at most of the subsequent large marches as well.

There were so many photographers blocking the way—insisting on “just one more shot”—that the march couldn’t move. Professional cameramen, I learned, will not listen to reason while on assignment. You might as well try to reason with the camera. We finally had to shove them aside as gently as possible to get the march started. Fortunately we had a little serious muscle on hand—mostly friendly unionists, as a precaution against possible physical attack on the prominent persons in the front of the march—to accomplish this task. (This incident caused some critical discussion later by some of the Quakers in the coalition. They objected to the fact we had used our hands to move the photographers. They suggested instead that we should have locked arms and simply pushed. The front-line marshals, apparently, were to operate under rules similar to the offensive line in a football game—it was OK to block but not to tackle. In the interests of unity we subsequently adopted that technique, which actually did work better, though I had some difficulty grasping the philosophical distinction.)

The first part of the march made it to the UN along the assigned route without further difficulty though a few missiles were thrown at the marchers from a tall building under construction along the way. The marshals assigned to that area later told me the missiles stopped after a short time. The perpetrators either ran out of things to throw, or had second thoughts when they grasped the size of the demonstration. For over four hours the street was filled with marchers passing that spot.

The march was more a swarm than a parade. The contingents jammed up on one another and filled the streets from one side to the other. The march began only a little late, but the crowd was so huge and so many arrivals were pouring in—some of them along the long, winding road from Sheep Meadow to the 59th Street exit—that it appeared to many in the meadow that the march hadn’t even started yet when the first part had already reached the UN.

The all-Black contingent organized by the Black United Action Front marched first through Harlem and then down Eighth Avenue. When it reached the assembly area the field was so full the Black contingent couldn’t get in so it swept around the park and down Seventh Avenue, opening up another street. It made the turn from Seventh Avenue toward the UN in good order, but at the intersection where it met the other stream of marchers a jam occurred. Some of the crowd spilled southward and the cops made a mounted charge that briefly disrupted the march. Laura Moorehead, a seventeen-year-old student who was on this part of the Black contingent, later recalled:

“We were walking toward the UN, some people were throwing eggs down at us from the apartments. [This was an exclusive, high-rent district.] Some people ahead of us were apparently trying to go somewhere the cops didn’t want. The cops came through on horses and we started running, ducking under horses. We found ourselves next to a Women Voters group. They were all these nice ladies dressed up in their Sunday best trying to reason with the cops. We kept getting pushed, almost in a circle it seemed. Finally we made another turn and I looked up and there we were right in front of the speakers’ stand. As far as I could see down any of the streets there were demonstrators. It was raining and people were standing there. It was Antiwar City that day. I stood right there and saw Martin Luther King speak. That was a big thrill for me because I had waited so long for him to come out against the war and I became so excited when he actually did. That was one of the main reasons I came because I knew King was going to speak and publicly identify himself with the demonstration, and I hoped that would help win my parents over.”⁴¹

While all this was going on I was arguing with Chief Inspector Sanford Garelik, who was in charge of the police, trying to get him to move his barricades further north to accommodate the unexpectedly large crowd. It was clear he was under orders not to budge. Finally he lost his temper saying something like, “Look, get off my back. You people have made your point, there’s a lot of people against the war.” Unfortunately the administration continued to deny that fact, which after April 15 could not honestly be ignored.

At 5:00 p.m. a heavy downpour ended the rally, just as Linda Dannenberg was starting to speak for the SMC. In a few seconds she got soaked to the skin and had to quit. As thousands left they met additional thousands still marching, carrying their placards overhead against the rain. The last two contingents to make the whole march—the students and the medical workers—arrived at the UN, sloshing through the puddles, at 6:00 p.m., five hours after the first section.

* * *

It also rained intermittently in San Francisco that day, but nevertheless 75,000 demonstrators turned out, a record for the city. A contingent of 7,000 trade unionists made the march, many from locals of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) which supported the demonstration. As in the East, however, the students were the largest section, and the crowd was mainly young.

40. Letter from Harry Ring to the author, November 14, 1975.

41. Taped interview with Laura Moorehead, November 12, 1975.

In general the West Coast mobilization had somewhat greater success than the East in involving trade unions. It even got the support of the Santa Clara Central Labor Council, a body of delegates from all the AFL-CIO unions in that county. A number of union officials also spoke at Kezar stadium. One of these was Paul Shrader, West Coast regional director of the United Auto Workers, and later a backer of Senator Robert F. Kennedy for the presidency. Shrader was applauded when he proposed a national debate and referendum on the war, but booed when he called for the U.S. to take up "easily defended" positions in South Vietnam if negotiations did not succeed. This was a variation of the "enclave theory" then being supported by a number of critics of escalation who couldn't bring themselves to flatly oppose the U.S. military presence in Vietnam.

Robert Scheer, who spoke later, commented: "One of the things that disturbs me about more 'reasonable' speakers at meetings of his sort is that they always talk about the complexity of peace. If someone advocates just getting out of Vietnam, he's told that isn't a complex enough solution. I think it's time we said very clearly that we have to get out of Vietnam, and let's not beat around the bush."⁴²

There was no draft card burning at the San Francisco event, but one of the speakers was David Harris, formerly the student-body president at Stanford, who announced the formation of a new group of draft refusers called "The Resistance."

Kipp Dawson, who was executive director of the West Coast Spring Mobilization (Ed Keating was chairman), told the rally:

"There's one section of American youth who aren't with us in the stadium today. They aren't in the New York rally. Those are the American youth who have been drafted to fight this dirty war in Vietnam. But because they are not with us today, we cannot assume—and indeed we must not assume—that they are against us. . . . We are here to demonstrate our belief that the soldiers have the right to protest the war in Vietnam. We're extending our hands to them, and taking a lesson from the students who have been . . . making attempts to build links with the soldiers. We are joining with the soldiers in their demand—that they be brought home now."⁴³

Another speaker was Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg of Toronto, who had accompanied Muste and the other ministers on their trip to Hanoi. He said: "Some Americans seem to think that the daily count of Viet Cong corpses, like pheasants in a bag, will somehow lead to victory. A.J. Muste, Bishop [Ambrose] Reeves, Pastor Martin [Niemoller], and I assure you that even if and when the mightiest nation in the history of the world, namely the United States, decimates, devastates, obliterates, subjugates, pulverizes, North Vietnam, the Vietnamese people will never surrender. . . ."⁴⁴

* * *

Earlier that day Raul Gonzales, who had just turned thirteen, was walking from his home in San Francisco's Mission district to the Haight-Ashbury area "to watch the hippies" when he heard the noise of the demonstration. He followed the sound to Kezar stadium and went inside. Later he recalled:

"I didn't know what was going on. So I asked someone. They said it was a demonstration to get the troops out of Vietnam. Personally I was against the war, but I didn't really know why. I thought maybe I was the only one against it. The rally impressed me. So many people behind one thing. And the music and the bands. Country Joe and the Fish were there, and Moby Grape. Country Joe sang, 'And it's one, two, three, what are we fighting

42. *Militant*, April 24, 1967.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.*

for?' That's the first time I heard it. Later it was a hit and you could get it on AM even. . . .

"I had no arguments against the war. From talking to people at the demonstration, and listening to the speeches, I got arguments. It strengthened my feelings. I took the arguments I learned there and the literature that was being passed out and used that with my friends. Those who were wavering tended to side with me now that I had the facts and figures and the stuff I'd gotten at the demonstration."⁴⁵

It would be two years before Gonzales would engage in another organized antiwar activity—through the Mission High School SMC—but as of April 15, 1967, he knew he wasn't alone in his opposition to the war, and he continually talked to his friends about it. Multiplied many thousands of times, such undramatic and unreported processes played an important part in spreading the antiwar sentiment, and were part of the repercussions of April 15.

* * *

Martin Luther King said the New York march was bigger than the 1963 civil rights march on Washington, and that event had enjoyed the approval of the administration at the time and been widely publicized beforehand in the major media. The Spring Mobilization Committee's newsletter reported: "At least 400,000 marched to the UN building in New York, according to Mr. Serge Bourtourline, Jr., a leading professional crowd appraiser, who studied aerial photos of the event." The *New York Times* estimated 125,000 in front of the UN, but there wasn't room for half the turnout there, and some people never did make it out of Sheep's Meadow before it was over. The April 16 issue of the *Boston Globe* carried a headline: "400,000 March in New York Against War."

The turnout was the more remarkable in view of the fact that not a single United States congressman or senator had lent his name as a sponsor or accepted the committee's invitation to speak or to march among the notables at the head of the parade. In any case April 15, 1967, in New York produced the largest single march of any kind ever held in the United States up to that time.

[Next chapter: *The Pentagon March*]

45. Taped interview with Raul Gonzales, November 21, 1975.

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
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AROUND THE WORLD



Coup in Ecuador

Gen. Guillermo Rodríguez Lara of Ecuador was overthrown in a bloodless military coup January 11. A three-man military junta comprised of navy Vice Adm. Alfredo Poveda Burbano, army Gen. Guillermo Durán Arcentales, and air force Gen. Luis Leoro Franco replaced the former president. Rodríguez Lara himself had seized power in a military coup in 1972.

In the weeks before the coup protests against the government had taken place in response to sharply rising prices and government failures to implement promised reforms.



RODRIGUEZ LARA: Deposed by military.

Two Political Prisoners Executed in India

Despite appeals for clemency, the Indian regime of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi executed two alleged members of the Communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist) on December 1. The two were charged with killing their landlord in the state of Andhra Pradesh in 1971.

The executions of Gunal Kista Gowd and Jangam Bhoomaiah were considered the first legal executions for political reasons in India since the assassin of Mahatma Gandhi was put to death twenty-five years ago.

The two men had been scheduled to be hanged twice before, but each time the executions were stayed as the result of a defense campaign carried out by various political and legal groups. Defense lawyers argued that the defendants had acted not out of any personal consideration, but in response to the wretched conditions imposed on peasants by landlords. Two judges of the Andhra High Court accepted this argument, stating that "sometimes it is also necessary to recognize that people acting out of genuine and passionate motives according to their conscience do not merit extreme punishment."

The imposition of press censorship with Gandhi's June 1975 coup prevented the case from receiving continued publicity. On October 3, the Indian Supreme Court rejected a petition for clemency. More than 130 Supreme Court lawyers appealed to President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed to commute the death sentences. The Communist party of India also appealed for clemency for the two political prisoners.

Washington Uses Food Aid for Blackmail in UN

High officials in the State Department have confirmed that the Ford administration has formally initiated a policy of cutting back aid—including food aid and humanitarian relief—to countries that side against Washington in United Nations votes.

Leslie H. Gelb reported in the January 9 *New York Times*: "Nations whose aid programs have been delayed or canceled are not explicitly being told why, although as one official said, 'When our Ambassador comes to them and complains about their votes in the U.N., and a few weeks later an aid transaction falls through, they get the picture.'"

The policy, initiated by Henry Kissinger, has already been applied by postponing agreements on development aid to Tanzania and Guyana because they voted to

condemn Zionism and opposed the administration's policy on Korea. Other votes cited in the report as being of prime concern to Kissinger were those on the independence of Puerto Rico and the removal of U.S. bases from Guam.

Officials acknowledged that in most cases only small countries that could do little to Washington in return are chosen for action.

Plyushch Released by Moscow

Leonid Plyushch arrived in Austria on January 10 after his release from a Soviet psychiatric prison. The Ukrainian mathematician was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" in 1973 and was held for two and a half years in a mental ward because of his defense of Ukrainian national rights. His release followed worldwide publicity on his case.

London Protests Chilean Torture

The British ambassador to Chile has been withdrawn indefinitely in protest over the "uncivilized, brutal treatment" of Dr. Sheila Cassidy. A surgeon, Dr. Cassidy was arrested by the Chilean regime for treating a wounded man accused of being a guerrilla. She was held for fifty-nine days, at least three weeks of which was spent in solitary confinement.

At a December 30 news conference upon Dr. Cassidy's return to London, a statement was read from Foreign Secretary James Callaghan. He declared that "Dr. Cassidy was tortured by the Chilean security police. In order to obtain information from her, they stripped her and gave her severe electric shocks. No British Government can accept such uncivilized, brutal treatment of a British subject at the hands of a foreign government."

Iranian Students in U.S. Protest Death Sentences

Twenty-five members of the Iranian Students Association in San Francisco have begun a hunger strike to protest the recent death sentences handed down to ten political prisoners in Iran. Associated Press reported January 6. The association issued a statement scoring Washington's support for the shah's "dictatorial rule."

DOCUMENTS

U.S. Out of Angola!

[The following statement was adopted January 3 by the National Committee of the Socialist Workers party.]

* * *

Immediate action is needed to stop the Democrats and Republicans from plunging the United States into a new war. Picket lines, teach-ins, rallies, and marches are required to get the message to Washington: Stop the U.S. intervention in Angola—Hands off!

Working people in this country have nothing to gain and everything to lose by Ford's intervention in the civil war in Angola. They have no interest in seeing tens of millions of dollars spent on another war while funds for education, health, and housing are slashed. And they have no interest in seeing American troops sent to die in Angola, which can happen if Washington's intervention escalates.

Black Americans in particular want no part of Ford's war policy. The American government has waged an unceasing war on the Black freedom struggle—in Africa and in the United States. Black Americans know better than anyone that Washington's policies are thoroughly racist. Why should they believe Ford's rhetoric about defending democracy in Africa, when they see the U.S. government refusing to enforce its own laws on desegregation at home?

Why should they believe that the CIA is fighting for freedom in Angola, when they know that the United States plotted to murder Patrice Lumumba, the Congolese rebel leader, just as it has conspired to disrupt and destroy the Black liberation movement in this country?

Why should they support the spending of millions of dollars for war in Angola, while social services desperately needed by the Black communities are being slashed?

The Ford administration has offered repeated assurances to the American people that the U.S. intervention in Angola is "not analogous" to the war in Vietnam. But Ford's policies point precisely to another Vietnam. Ford is involving the United States in a new colonial war, in which American financial resources and military might are committed to the protection of the profits and investments of the giant corporations.

For years the United States backed Portugal's colonial wars in Black Africa. Portuguese troops were trained in the United States, armed with U.S. weapons,

and financed by U.S. dollars in their racist war to crush the African freedom fighters. Now, in the wake of the disintegration of Portugal's empire, Washington is moving toward direct intervention to impose its will on the peoples of Angola and to maintain imperialist control of that country.

This involvement runs the risk of escalation into a nuclear war that would destroy humanity.

As in Vietnam, Washington's moves have been carried out behind a screen of lies and secrecy.

Despite the official denials, there ought to be no illusions about the U.S. aims in Angola. The war makers have been escalating their intervention step by step, testing the reaction, gauging how far they can go without generating a new antiwar movement.

Just as the anti-Vietnam War movement played a major part in forcing the United States to get out of Indochina, a movement against U.S. intervention in Angola can help prevent Washington from dragging the country into a new foreign adventure. The potential exists for such a movement to be built, and to win mass support.

The American people are already deeply distrustful of the government's aims and motives in Angola. The justifications offered by Ford and Kissinger for the U.S. operation in Angola are the same as those used in Vietnam: the need to "stop Communism" and to defend "national security" by intervening in a small country thousands of miles away.

Vietnam, Watergate, and the steady stream of disclosures about secret CIA plots abroad have left the American people with a healthy suspicion of government propaganda and deep opposition to any new imperialist adventures.

The hypocritical argument that Washington is acting to stop "Soviet colonialism" in Africa doesn't carry much weight with millions of people who are beginning to see that the real threat to the right of the peoples of the colonial world to self-determination comes from Washington.

Kissinger's claim that the goal is to defend self-determination is a transparent cover-up of the real U.S. role. Throughout southern Africa Washington has been a steadfast supporter of colonialism and apartheid.

United States backing of Portugal's colonial wars went hand in hand with its unwavering support to the white-settler regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia.

The deep and potentially explosive opposition to Ford's moves in Angola has already caused divisions within the U.S. ruling class over the tactical wisdom of Ford's policy. A section of this country's rulers believes that the danger of a political reaction against U.S. intervention, hand in hand with South Africa's apartheid regime, outweighs what could be gained through such a course. They argue that a new Vietnam could be disastrous for American imperialism.

It was the representatives of this point of view who carried the vote in the Senate on December 19 to cut off funds for "covert" operations in Angola.

But this Senate action, taken with much fanfare, isn't binding. Congress conveniently adjourned for the holidays before the measure could be taken up in the House, freeing Ford's hand for at least several more weeks of military aid and diplomatic maneuvering.

Just as happened time after time during the Vietnam War, the congressional war critics satisfied themselves with rhetoric about peace, while refusing to take action to get the United States out.

What an abdication of responsibility it would be for opponents of U.S. intervention in Angola to rely on the Democratic and Republican politicians to halt the U.S. war drive! The movement against the Vietnam War was successful because it did not trust the "doves" in Washington to live up to their peace promises. Instead, it mobilized millions of people in the streets.

The anti-Vietnam War movement learned that the only voice the "doves" ever responded to was the voice of masses of protesters.

The labor movement, the Black communities, the colleges and high schools, ought now to become the arenas for antiwar discussion, education, and action.

All those who opposed the Vietnam War, and those who have marched against U.S. intervention in southern Africa, need to join forces in a determined effort to stop Ford's war plans in Angola.

The differing views that exist on the role and programs of the three liberation groups now involved in the civil war in Angola should not stand in the way of united actions by all supporters of the Angolans' right of self-determination.

Now is the time to launch a campaign of action to stop U.S. aggression and to let Washington know that the American people don't want another Vietnam. The Socialist Workers party pledges its aid and support to build such a movement.

No secret war! Let the American people know the full truth about U.S. intervention!

Not one penny for war, not one soldier to Angola!

No more Vietnams! Hands off Angola!

WSL Scores Healyite Frame-up of Joseph Hansen

[The following article appeared in the December 31, 1975, issue of *Socialist Press*, the fortnightly paper of the Workers Socialist League. Under the title "WRP FRAMES HANSEN," the statement presents the position of the WSL on the efforts of the Workers Revolutionary party to frame up the editor of *Intercontinental Press*.

[In an accompanying note, the Workers Socialist League declares:

["As our recently published International Perspectives document *Fourth International—Problems and Tasks* shows clearly, the Workers Socialist League has major political differences with the U.S. Socialist Workers Party.

["But our differences do not prevent us speaking out in a principled manner to defend one of the leading members of the SWP, Joseph Hansen, from a lying and scurrilous attack from the press of the Workers Revolutionary Party."

[The opening paragraph of the article refers to a police raid "on the Derbyshire education centre of the Workers Revolutionary Party." For information about this raid see the following articles in the October 20, 1975, issue of *Intercontinental Press*: "Police Raid WRP School," p. 1439; "WRP Solicitors Protest Conduct of Police," p. 1440; "The 'Observer' Article Used as Pretext for Police Raid," p. 1437; and "Defend the Democratic Rights of the WRP!" by Joseph Hansen, p. 1394.

[For further information about the Workers Socialist League see "Healy Purges 200 Dissidents From WRP," in the January 13, 1975, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, p. 25, and "Alan Thornett's Contribution to the Discussion in the WRP," in the February 10, 1975, issue, p. 199.

[A subscription to *Socialist Press* can be obtained by writing to 31 Dartmouth Park Hill, London NW5 1HR. The cost is £1 (US\$2.02) for six issues.

[In the text below we have corrected a few obvious typographical errors. The subheads appear in the original.]

* * *

The police raid on the Derbyshire education centre of the Workers Revolutionary Party and the subsequent stonewalling by the Home Office and police authorities, underline the increase in police attention and harassment directed at organisations of the revolutionary left.

The same point was highlighted by a right wing Labour MP in November, who spoke in a Parliamentary debate on the public spending cuts, congratulating Wilson on his mutilation of the social services, but pleading that spending on police forces should be *maintained* to the full.

And indeed the two go hand in hand. As the Labour leaders are forced by the economic crisis to launch an all-out assault on the gains of the working class movement, the state apparatus limbers itself up for disruption, harassment and frame-ups of revolutionaries and left-wingers.

At the same time the economic and political crisis thoroughly tests out every "revolutionary" organisation—its cadre, its programme and policies, its defence of principle, and its ability to fight and build within the workers movement. Any "party" which is unprepared, in which routine has replaced the ferment of revolutionary politics, in which the line has become an everyday implement of polemic, must inevitably be thrown into a severe internal crisis.

Thus it is with the Workers Revolutionary Party, which a year ago set the seal to its political degeneration by expelling wholesale the opposition tendency (later to form the Workers Socialist League) which was fighting for a return to communist methods and to the Transitional Programme of the Fourth International.

It is against this background that we must assess the long series of articles published by its General Secretary, Gerry Healy, together with the WRP leadership, on *Security and the Fourth International* (*Workers Press*: 7 articles April 19th-26th, 1975, and 19 articles August 14th-September 9th, 1975).

Purpose

The prime purpose of these series is very simple, as is made clear in the concluding articles. It is to *frame* Joseph Hansen, along with other members—alive and dead—of the world Trotskyist movement.

Hansen, who is now a leading figure of the American Socialist Workers Party (sympathising organisation of the "United Secretariat of the Fourth International"), was in charge of the bodyguards at Coyoacan, Mexico, on August 20th, 1940, when Trotsky was murdered by Stalin's agent. The articles in *Workers Press* accuse him (in assertions thinly veiled as questions, or in insinuations) of being, since before 1940, an agent of the FBI, or of the Stalinist GPU, or both!

The preceding articles—which draw almost entirely on materials that are published and have been known for some time—are all designed to lead up to this conclusion: that for *forty years* the SWP has had a police spy in its political leadership, and that the struggle, since the split of 1963, between Healy and Hansen has been, in reality, a struggle against police provocations.

As the WRP leadership say, their accusa-

tions (*if true*) raise very grave problems for the SWP and the world Trotskyist movement. But it is worth noticing that these accusations also seek to *solve* some problems for Healy and the WRP leadership—they relieve them of the need to carry out a political struggle!

For what is the point of mobilising and convincing the membership in a struggle to defend the Transitional Programme, to sharpen and resolve the crisis in the world Trotskyist movement—if your principal adversaries are not genuine *political* opponents but police spies?

Evidently, none! And that is why, hand in hand with the WRP's political degeneration and paralysis, has come a rich harvest of such accusations.

Rigged

But what of the specific charges against Hansen? Hansen *himself* (*Intercontinental Press*, 24th November) easily demolishes the main points as simple lies and rigging of the evidence. We take just one example from the mountain of circumstantial titbits under which the WRP "investigators" seek to bury him: a report from Robert G. McGregor, a US diplomatic official in Mexico City, of his conversation with Hansen on Saturday, August 31st, 1940—i.e. 11 days after Trotsky's murder.

To this report (in the form of a memorandum forwarded to the State Department by the US Consul) Healy's "investigators" add evidence or qualification, as "fact" that McGregor was an *FBI agent* (at this time the FBI had not been replaced by the CIA on overseas work), and draw the following inferences:

1. That Hansen was familiar with an FBI official and met with him probably "clandestinely," and certainly out of office hours (i.e. on a Saturday).
2. That Hansen deliberately attempted to direct the search for the GPU network which planned Trotsky's assassination away from Europe (where it was mainly based) towards the USA.

Twisted

In order to steer towards these conclusions Healy's journalists—unfortunately for them—are obliged to twist the facts in the most barefaced way:

1. They deliberately disguise the fact that Hansen was only *one* of at least *four* members of the Trotskyist movement—the others being two Americans, Charles Cornell and Walter O'Rourke, and *Trotsky himself*—who had private discussions with McGregor both before and after Trotsky's death.

These conversations were all, no doubt, reported equally swiftly to the State Department, especially after the failure of the May attempt by the Stalinists on Trotsky's life and the kidnapping (and later murder) of his young American bodyguard, Robert Sheldon Harte.

2. The WRP imply—contradicting their own main insinuation that Hansen was an FBI agent—that Hansen was both misleading the FBI and, it is implied, the Trotskyist movement by guiding the search for those who planned Trotsky's murder towards the United States, instead of France.

This is then used to bolster the additional accusation that Hansen deliberately covered up the role of the most important Stalinist agent in the Fourth International, Mark Zborowski ("Etienne"), who was implicated in the murder of Trotskyists in Paris in the 1930's, and later came to America and spied on the Trotskyist movement there.

In fact (as Hansen's reply makes clear) there were excellent reasons for the Trotskyist movement to try and protect itself by using the resources of the capitalist states and (in particular in this case) to try and persuade the FBI to probe clandestine Stalinist activity in the USA (the country where the FBI was in charge) for clues as to the murder of Trotsky. In August 1940 this required concentrating the attention of the State Department on anti-Trotskyist conspiracies by the GPU inside the USA.

Loose End

The ideas that Hansen could both be an agent of the FBI and deliberately misleading them are one glaring loose end in the WRP frame-up—there are many others. This is the case even though Healy's "sleuths" include at least one man—Mr Alex Mitchell, editor of *Workers Press*—with detailed knowledge of police and espionage techniques. And what they make no attempt to explain is why—if Hansen was the FBI's agent—he should maintain contact with them (as is implied) by meeting in public with a US official well-known to several other Trotskyists and why a report on this contact should be sent using his real name in the normal correspondence, to later finish up among publicly available State Department papers—while Hansen is still a leading SWP member?

Such conduct would contradict every ground rule of clandestine work. It is, of course, logically conceivable that while Hansen's meeting with McGregor was wholly legitimate (and McGregor's report does nothing to suggest otherwise) he was simultaneously in undisclosed contact with the FBI through quite different channels—but the WRP produce not one shred of evidence to support such a verdict.

Their fraudulent manner of handling facts

and evidence carries right through the series *Security and the Fourth International*. For example, they uncritically accept all aspects of the testimony (before American criminal courts and witch-hunting committees of Congress) of a range of ex-Stalinist stool pigeons and exposed Soviet spies, busy "singing" to save their skins.

One such is Louis F. Budenz, a notorious Judas throughout the US labour movement, a one-time GPU agent, and subsequently managing editor of the American CP's *Daily Worker*. In October 1946 Budenz announced his renunciation of communism and his return to the Roman Catholic Church. A month later he was a star witness before the McCarthyite House Un-American Activities Committee, slinging mud at every brand of "communist."

For years he made a living from slanders and inventions, mainly against the Stalinists. But this is not all—Budenz played (according to testimony before congressional committees) a big role in driving Trotsky to Mexico from Norway in 1936.

It was Budenz, then New York editor of the *Daily Worker*, who supplied the "confidential evidence" of violent plots by Trotsky which was used by Stalin's ambassador in Oslo to twist the arm of the Norwegian government into placing Trotsky under house arrest at the height of the Moscow purge trials, and then expelling him.

But for *Workers Press* Mr Budenz is all good stuff. They are quite content to use fragments from his writings and testimony to cobble together their "investigations" of Trotsky's murder, and to help frame Hansen. Budenz opens his autobiography (*This Is My Story*, 1957) with a prayer to "the Mother of God, Mary of the Magnificat" and rejoices that "but for her amazing assistance" his story could not have been told. Precisely the same can be said of the story told by the WRP's "investigations".

What makes the matter even more serious is that the slanders to which Hansen replies are by no means an isolated instance. In the last two years or so similar insinuations, in writing or verbally, have been levelled by Healy and the WRP leadership against a number of individuals and tendencies in the labour movement, including:

1. The "Bulletin" group, sympathising organisation in Britain of the "Organising Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International."
2. Members of the 1974 opposition within the WRP which, after its unconstitutional expulsion by Healy, fought on to form the WSL.
3. Tim Wohlforth, former leader of the Workers League, sympathising organisation of Healy's "International Committee" in the USA.
4. Members of the "International Spartacist Tendency" in Australia.

This cascade of mudslinging—neither substantiated nor withdrawn—serves in no way to assist in removing the real police and Stalinist agents who undoubtedly operate in the ranks of the Trotskyist movement.

It serves only to divert from political struggle on the life-and-death issues now facing the international working class—of the struggle for revolutionary programme and for resolving the crisis of leadership within the working class and the Trotskyist movement itself.

Healy's calumnies, therefore, run parallel to one of the main pursuits of the police agencies themselves—the circulation of false and disruptive accusations that revolutionaries involved in internal political battles are themselves police provocateurs.

Provocation

For example, among the FBI files released as a result of congressional investigations and legal moves taken by the leadership of Hansen's Socialist Workers Party are documents showing that in January 1962 the New York Office of the FBI attempted an elaborate provocation which involved feeding the SWP leadership forged evidence that Jack Arnold (a member of the minority tendency supported by Healy within the SWP) was an FBI informant.

The aim was to disrupt the political struggle by having Arnold expelled.

In fact, it appears, the FBI's scheme got nowhere because the SWP refused to act on anonymous "evidence" which they considered fake.

But Healy and the WRP leadership, as we have seen, readily resort themselves to the faking of evidence. This is all the more criminal since the WRP leadership now includes Alex Mitchell, who has studied in some detail the methods of British police and intelligence agencies and who must be aware that such frame-ups are a standard technique.

Mitchell, present editor of *Workers Press*, was previously employed as a journalist on the *Sunday Times*. And in the late 1960's he acted as research assistant in the writing of a book by members of the *Sunday Times* staff on the Philby-Burgess-Maclean affair* and its widespread repercussions in the British intelligence services (*Philby, the Spy Who Betrayed a Generation*, by Page, Leitch and Knightley, 1968).

As the Preface makes clear, research for this book involved not only study of

*Philby was the Soviet agent who, after the war, was put in charge of British intelligence operations against the Soviet Union, and, later, liaison with the CIA. His exposure caused, to put it mildly, a major shake-up in the methods and personnel of the British intelligence apparatus.

publicly available material, but extensive "off-the-record" contact with those prepared to give an "inside" account to journalists regarded as reliable.

Presumably Mr Mitchell no longer involves himself in Saturday morning conversations with such characters. We mention this past employment not in order to accuse him of anything (given the WRP's leadership's scrupulous attitude to "security" we assume they investigated his past in the most thorough manner before recruiting him, never mind making him editor of *Workers Press*). The point is rather that, if other tendencies were to adopt the method of the WRP school of falsification (of whom Mr Mitchell has shown himself an able student), then the editor of *Workers Press* himself would be an obvious and easy target for slander and insinuation.

As we have said, the slanders and frame-ups of Healy and the WRP leadership are not an accident. They are part of a swift political degeneration.

Turning their backs on the fight for principles and programme in the mass movement, with a membership confused and paralysed by—for example—the WRP's participation in the "corporatist" Ryder committees at British Leyland—the WRP leadership head into an insoluble political and organisational crisis. They have now publicly declared that they are £50,000 in debt, and that unless a "crisis fund" of this amount can be raised by February, *Workers Press* will be in jeopardy.

Slander Fund

But how, and from who, was this huge debt incurred? Part of it was (as is stated in *Workers Press*) used in the "special fund" allocated by the International Committee to send journalists to France and the USA to prepare the special series on "Security and the Fourth International"—i.e. to manufacture slanders against Joseph Hansen and others!

There is another, equally serious, implication of the WRP's £50,000 "crisis fund"—if their own published figures are to be believed. At the time of the WRP conference in December 1974 at which the expulsion of the opposition was rubber-stamped the leadership publicly claimed 8,000 members. With an active membership of this size it should be no serious problem to raise £50,000 in two months (it would only mean £3.12½ per month each!). But the claimed membership was and is clearly a lie. This is shown also by the fact that even with the support of other political organisations and trade union contingents they mobilised only about 1,400 on the demonstration in November against the police raid on their premises—and even *Workers Press* claimed only 5,000!

Uncontrolled

But the issue is not simply how big the WRP membership is or isn't. It is that the WRP has, since at least 1974, inflated its real "active" membership with a huge "halo" of paper members—many "signed up" on street corners and on doorsteps in the WRP's liquidationist election campaigns. These "recruits" never really had any political agreement with the WRP, are inactive most of the time and not under the discipline of the leadership, and who (as the "crisis fund" bears witness) will not even contribute to Party funds. *But such a*

In Defense of Andrei Sakharov

[The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Andrei Sakharov on October 9, 1975, provoked a virulent campaign in the Soviet press against the dissident physicist. We print below a statement signed by twelve Soviet dissidents in reply to that campaign.

[Signers of the reply include prominent dissident communists Pyotr Grigorenko and Roy Medvedev, Crimean Tatar spokesman Reshat Dzhemilev, and the chairman of the Soviet group of Amnesty International, Valentin Turchin.

[The statement was a direct response to one signed by seventy-two members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and circulated by the Soviet news agency Tass October 25. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Moscow, October 30, 1975

The 1975 Nobel Peace Prize has been awarded to Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov.

All of A.D. Sakharov's public activities originate from the premise that unless governments recognize fundamental human rights, genuine peace is impossible. Violence used domestically is, sooner or later, also applied abroad. Thus, the "nonaggression pact" concluded by Hitler and Stalin in 1939 was the prelude to the most terrible war in the history of humanity.

It would have been absurd if Stalin and Hitler had received the peace prize in 1939, but at the same time anyone who pointed to the victims of Hitlerism and Stalinism had been condemned as "an opponent of international peace."

We now see, by the example of the Nobel committee's decision, that this terrible historical experience was not in vain.

We are, then, all the more distressed and amazed by the statement of the seventy-two Soviet scholars claiming that the Nobel committee's decision is "disgraceful and provocative." The words "disgraceful and provocative" can better be applied to describe an

"membership"—uncontrolled and political ly responsible to no-one—is precisely the environment in which police spies and provocateurs flourish.

WRP members who are being asked by *Workers Press* to hand over half their wage packets for six weeks have a right to know what the money is being used for. And the true answer is—not for the building of a revolutionary leadership—but to have journalists for the manufacture of frame-ups, and to give a lease of life to the politically bankrupt clique which has led the WRP into its present acute crisis. □

instance in which several words torn from their context, combined with one's own fabrications, are passed off as the views of a Nobel laureate. We suggest that the majority of people who signed that statement were deceived, since the figure of A.D. Sakharov portrayed there bears no resemblance to the real A.D. Sakharov.

We understand that a statement of this kind by scholars may mark the onset of an anti-Sakharov campaign and that the opinions expressed there will be passed off as the views of all Soviet people. Therefore, we people of diverse views and political convictions, who are not always and not on all things in agreement with A.D. Sakharov, consider it necessary to declare that we welcome the decision of the Nobel committee of the Norwegian parliament to award the peace prize to our remarkable compatriot. We consider this decision to be a great contribution to the cause of peace, détente, and the struggle for human rights.

We cannot, and do not wish, to present our views as if they were the views of all Soviet people, but we know that a great number of Soviet citizens share them.

Our heartfelt congratulations to Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov.

Andrei Amalrik, Roy Medvedev, Valentin Turchin, Yuri Orlov, Vladimir Kornilov, Vladimir Voinovich, O. Sergei Zheludkov, Osip Cherny, Ernst Neizvestny, Pyotr Grigorenko, Reshat Dzhemilev, Vitaly Rubin.

Argentine Inflation Hits 335%

Official statistics released in Buenos Aires January 6 showed that prices increased 30 percent in December 1975, bringing Argentina's inflation rate for last year to 335 percent. This is the highest rate of inflation in the world.

Intercontinental Press

¡E.E.U.U. Fuera de Angola!

[La siguiente declaración fue adoptada el 3 de enero por el National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party (Comité Nacional de Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores). La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Es necesario actuar inmediatamente para impedir que los demócratas y los republicanos sumerjan a los Estados Unidos en una nueva guerra. Se requieren piquetes, conferencias, mítines, y marchas para transmitir el siguiente mensaje a Washington: ¡Alto a la intervención de los E.E.U.U. en Angola—fuera de Angola!

Los trabajadores en este país no ganarán nada y perderán todo con la intervención de Ford en la guerra civil en Angola. No tienen ningún interés en ver que se gasten millones de dólares en otra guerra mientras que se reducen drásticamente los fondos para la educación, la salubridad y la vivienda. Y no tienen ningún interés en ver que se manden tropas norteamericanas a que mueran en Angola, lo que puede suceder si se incrementa la intervención de Washington.

Los norteamericanos negros en particular no quieren tener nada que ver con la política bélica de Ford. El gobierno norteamericano ha llevado a cabo una constante guerra contra la lucha por la liberación de los negros—en Africa y en los Estados Unidos. Los norteamericanos negros saben mejor que nadie que la política de Washington es completamente racista. ¿Por qué van a creer la retórica de Ford acerca de la defensa de la democracia en Africa, cuando ven que el gobierno de los E.E.U.U. se niega a implementar sus propias leyes sobre la "desegregación" en su propio país?

¿Por qué van a creer que la CIA está luchando por la libertad en Angola, cuando saben que los Estados Unidos conspiraron contra la vida de Patrice Lumumba, el dirigente rebelde congolés, así como había conspirado para desorganizar y destruir el movimiento por la liberación de los negros en este país?

¿Por qué van a apoyar los gastos de millones de dólares para la guerra en Angola, mientras que los servicios sociales que necesitan urgentemente las comunidades negras son recortados?

El gobierno de Ford ha asegurado repetidamente al pueblo norteamericano que la intervención de los E.E.U.U. en Angola "no es análoga" con la guerra en Vietnam. Pero la política de Ford apunta precisamente hacia otro Vietnam. Ford está involucrando

a los Estados Unidos en una nueva guerra colonial, en la cual los recursos financieros y la fuerza militar están comprometidos en la protección de las ganancias e inversiones de las grandes corporaciones.

Durante años los Estados Unidos apoyaron las guerras coloniales portuguesas en Africa negra. Las tropas portuguesas fueron entrenadas en los Estados Unidos, armadas con armas de los E.E.U.U. y financiadas por dólares norteamericanos en su guerra racista para aplastar a los africanos que luchan por la libertad. Actualmente, tras la desintegración del imperio portugués, Washington se acerca a una intervención directa para imponer su voluntad sobre el pueblo de Angola y mantener el control imperialista de ese país.

Esta participación corre el riesgo de convertirse en una guerra nuclear que destruirá a la humanidad.

Así como en Vietnam, los pasos de Washington han sido tomados engañosa y secretamente.

A pesar de las negativas oficiales, no debe de haber ninguna ilusión acerca de los objetivos de los Estados Unidos en Angola. Los belicistas han estado incrementando su intervención paso por paso, probando la reacción, calculando qué tan lejos pueden ir sin generar otro movimiento antibélico.

Así como el movimiento contra la guerra de Vietnam jugó un papel fundamental en obligar a los Estados Unidos a retirarse de Indochina, un movimiento contra la intervención de los E.E.U.U. en Angola puede ayudar a prevenir que Washington arrastre el país hacia una nueva aventura en el extranjero. Existe el potencial para que semejante movimiento sea construido, y para que logre un apoyo de masas.

El pueblo norteamericano tiene ya una profunda desconfianza de los objetivos y motivos en Angola. Las justificaciones dadas por Ford y Kissinger por la operación de los Estados Unidos en Angola son las mismas que aquéllas usadas en Vietnam: la necesidad de "parar al comunismo" y de defender "la seguridad nacional" mediante la intervención en un pequeño país a miles de millas de distancia.

Vietnam, Watergate y las constantes revelaciones de las conspiraciones de la CIA en el extranjero han dejado al pueblo norteamericano con saludables recelos hacia la propaganda del gobierno y una profunda oposición a cualquier aventura imperialista.

El argumento hipócrita de que Washing-

ton actúa para poner un alto al "colonialismo soviético" en Africa no tiene mucho peso entre millones de personas que empiezan a ver que la verdadera amenaza contra el derecho de los pueblos del mundo colonial a la autodeterminación proviene de Washington.

La afirmación de Kissinger de que el objetivo es la defensa de la autodeterminación es un pretexto transparente para encubrir el verdadero papel de los Estados Unidos. A través del sur de Africa Washington ha sido un partidario firme del colonialismo y del apartheid.

El apoyo de los Estados Unidos a las guerras coloniales de Portugal iba de acuerdo con su apoyo inquebrantable a los regímenes de colonizadores blancos en Sudáfrica y Rodesia.

La profunda y potencialmente explosiva oposición a los pasos que Ford ha tomado en Angola ha causado ya divisiones dentro de la clase dominante de los E.E.U.U. acerca de la prudencia táctica de la política de Ford. Un sector de los gobernantes de este país cree que el peligro de una reacción política contra la intervención de los Estados Unidos junto con el régimen del apartheid en Sudáfrica, es más preponderante que lo que se pudiera lograr al seguir este curso. Dicen que otro Vietnam podría ser desastroso para el imperialismo norteamericano.

Fueron los representantes de este punto de vista los que ganaron el voto en el Senado el 19 de diciembre a favor de recortar los fondos para las operaciones "encubiertas" en Angola.

Pero esta acción, tomada con mucha demagogia, no tiene que ser necesariamente respetada por el Senado. El Congreso fue suspendido convenientemente durante los días de fiesta antes de que se pudieran discutir estas medidas en la Casa de Representantes, permitiendo que Ford siguiera otorgando ayuda militar y maniobras diplomáticas, al menos durante varias semanas más.

Así como sucedió una y otra vez durante la guerra de Vietnam, los críticos de la guerra en el Congreso se contentaron con una retórica sobre la paz, negándose al mismo tiempo a tomar medidas para retirar a los Estados Unidos.

¿Qué falta de responsabilidad sería que los oponentes de la intervención de los E.E.U.U. en Angola dependieran de los políticos demócratas y republicanos para parar este impulso bélico de los Estados Unidos! El movimiento contra la guerra de Vietnam fue exitoso porque no tuvo ninguna confianza en que los "doves" (políticos que favorecen una política más moderada) en Washington fueran consecuentes con sus promesas de paz. En cambio, movilizó a millones de personas en las calles.

El movimiento contra la guerra de Vietnam aprendió que la única voz que hizo

reaccionar a los "doves" fue la voz de las masas en protesta.

El movimiento obrero, las comunidades negras, las universidades y las secundarias, deberían ser ahora los círculos de discusión, educación y acción contra la guerra.

Todos aquéllos que se opusieron a la guerra de Vietnam, y aquéllos que han marchado contra la intervención de los Estados Unidos en el sur de África, deben unirse en un esfuerzo enérgico para poner fin a los planes bélicos de Ford en Angola.

Los diferentes puntos de vista sobre el papel y los programas de los tres grupos de liberación involucrados en la guerra civil en Angola no deberían de obstaculizar las

acciones unidas de todos los partidarios del derecho de los angoleños a la autodeterminación.

Este es el momento de lanzar una campaña de acción para poner un alto a la agresión de los E.E.U.U. y para dejarle saber a Washington que el pueblo norteamericano no quiere otro Vietnam. El Socialist Workers Party promete su ayuda y apoyo para construir semejante movimiento.

¡No a la guerra secreta! ¡Que el pueblo norteamericano sepa toda la verdad acerca de la intervención de los Estados Unidos!

¡Ni un quinto para la guerra, ni un soldado para Angola!

¡No más Vietnams! ¡Fuera de Angola! □

"equipo-B" de las fuerzas especiales estaba trabajando con el Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) en la región norteña.

"Este equipo-B," dijo Anable, "consiste de un personal en el local central de diez personas, más seis "equipos-A" de once hombres cada uno. Cada equipo-A tiene especialistas en armas, explosivos, medicina, y radio, y puede proveer la dirección de las fuerzas locales o entrenar otras tropas indígenas para el combate. Si trabaja la mitad del tiempo en combate y la otra mitad en entrenamiento, un equipo-B puede preparar a unos 10,000 reclutas locales para el combate en aproximadamente seis meses."

Los sueldos, las armas livianas y las municiones para cada equipo-B cuestan alrededor de un millón de dólares por los primeros seis meses, según Anable. Tras el voto tomado el 19 de diciembre en el Senado que impidió el uso en Angola de fondos asignados para la defensa, el Secretario de Estado Henry Kissinger señaló que el gobierno tenía todavía de menos 9 millones de dólares para su operación en Angola.

Otro grupo de unos 300 mercenarios norteamericanos, casi todos veteranos de Vietnam, también había sido reclutado en los Estados Unidos, según se ha dicho. Anable dijo que de acuerdo con sus fuentes, la mitad de ellos había pasado por un curso de entrenamiento en Fort Benning, Georgia. No está claro qué le ha sucedido a este grupo de mercenarios (que estuvo esperando que la CIA obtuviese más fondos antes de partir para Angola) desde que se trasladó el centro de reclutamiento a Europa.

Aunque los funcionarios de la Casa Blanca, incluyendo al Presidente Ford, han negado algunos de los detalles del escrito en el *Christian Science Monitor*, no negaron que el gobierno o la CIA estuviese proporcionando dinero para la operación de mercenarios o que algunas "compañías particulares" estuviesen llevando a cabo el reclutamiento. En un editorial del 6 de enero, el *New York Times* señaló que estas negativas "no han sido muy convincentes."

Además de la operación de mercenarios, de menos ocho agentes de la CIA están en Angola, según los informes. De acuerdo con la cadena de emisoras de televisión CBS, en su noticiero del 17 de diciembre, la CIA estaba supervisando la distribución de abastecimientos militares en Silva Porto y Uíge (anteriormente Carmona). Se ha revelado que cinco aviones de reconocimiento, con pilotos norteamericanos, vuelan sobre Angola desde bases en el vecino Zaire.

Citando "un testigo de las operaciones en Angola," el Senador John Tunney declaró el 6 de enero que los pilotos norteamericanos también han estado llevando armas por avión a Angola desde Zaire. "Han estado llevando a cabo cuatro o cinco misiones al día en aviones de carga Hércules C-130 de construcción norteamericana," dijo.

Matones Norteamericanos Canalizados Vía Sudáfrica

CIA Emplea Mercenarios para Operación Angola

Por Ernest Harsch

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "CIA Hires European Mercenaries for Operation Angola" que aparece en este número. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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El reclutamiento de mercenarios para el "ejército encubierto" de la CIA en Angola ha sido cambiado de los Estados Unidos a Europa occidental, según el escritor del *Christian Science Monitor*, David Anable. Citando "fuentes cercanas a la Agencia Central de Inteligencia de los E.E.U.U.," Anable informó en el número del 5 de enero que los mercenarios europeos son empleados actualmente a través de embajadas africanas, cuyos nombres no son mencionados, en varias ciudades capitalinas europeas y se les estaba pagando con fondos provenientes de los Estados Unidos y de otros países.

Este cambio, según Anable, fue el resultado de un escrito publicado en el *Christian Science Monitor* tres días antes. El 2 de enero Anable informó que "la CIA está reclutando indirectamente a ex soldados norteamericanos, entrenándolos, enviándolos al sur de África, contribuyendo a su sueldo . . . y proveyéndoles a ellos y a las fuerzas indígenas con armas pesadas y livianas."

Parece que los mercenarios fueron reclutados a través de "compañías particulares," un método comunmente usado por la CIA para semejantes operaciones. Una de estas "compañías" que, según los informes, ha reclutado mercenarios para Angola es El

Kamas Enterprises en California.

Notablemente, los periódicos sudafricanos revelaron la operación de los mercenarios norteamericanos varias semanas antes que el *Christian Science Monitor*. Por ejemplo, el número del 6 de diciembre de 1975 del periódico sudafricano *Star Weekly* informó desde la ciudad de Nueva York: "Docenas de mercenarios norteamericanos están luchando en Angola y se espera que cientos estén inscritos en los Estados Unidos en los próximos días." Uno de los reclutadores, el anterior paracaidista, David Bufkin, de la División Aérea No. 11, trabajó por medio de relaciones en las ciudades de Nueva York, Johannesburgo y Salisbury, Rodesia.

El *Star Weekly* citó otro reclutador diciendo, "No sabemos quién está financiando esta cuestión. . . . Hay varias posibles fuentes—hombres de negocios sudafricanos, zairotas y portugueses . . . y en alguna parte puede ser que haya fondos norteamericanos."

Tan temprano como mediados de noviembre, el corresponsal de *Intercontinental Press* Tony Hodges informó haber visto un mercenario norteamericano en Angola y se le dijo que otros quince norteamericanos estaban sirviendo como instructores para la União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) en su campo de entrenamiento cerca de Silva Porto.

En su artículo del 2 de enero, Anable escribió que 300 mercenarios norteamericanos ya trabajaban en Angola. La mayoría de ellos estaba con las fuerzas de la UNITA en el sur y centro de Angola, aunque un

Los empleados de una línea aérea norteamericana, agregó Tunney, ya "han sido bombardeados cuando vuelan en helicópteros cerca de Luanda en Angola."

La habilidad de la Casa Blanca de intervenir en Angola ha sido limitada, sin embargo, por la amplia oposición de la población norteamericana a una repetición de la agresión de los E.E.U.U. en Vietnam. Este sentimiento antibélico ha obligado al Senado a votar en contra de proporcionar fondos para la participación del gobierno en la guerra civil angolosa y le ha dificultado a la CIA mantener secretas sus operaciones.

Con el intento de eludir estas "complicaciones," Washington ha hecho un llamado a sus aliados imperialistas para que tomen una mayor porción de la intervención. En una conferencia de prensa del 23 de diciembre, Kissinger prometió "conseguir todo el apoyo que se pueda por parte de otros países."

Algunos de los aliados de Washington de la OTAN ya han respondido a su petición de ayuda. Jim Hoagland reportó en el *Washington Post* el 24 de diciembre que una agencia de policía francesa, el Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE—Servicio de Inteligencia del Extranjero y de Contra-Espionaje), estaba canalizando fondos y armas al FNLA. Esta operación, dice Hoagland, fue llevada a cabo en cooperación con la CIA y con la aprobación del Presidente Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Además, Jacques Foccart, quien ha sido una figura clave de inteligencia francesa en África durante años, estaba proporcionando armas y dinero, según los informes—y había prometido mercenarios—al separatista Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC).

En su artículo del 2 de enero, Anable reveló que un escuadrón de trece helicópteros fuertemente armados y equipados con proyectiles guiados por el calor se encontraba camino a Angola desde Francia vía Sudáfrica.

"Los intereses del SDECE en Angola parecen ser en gran medida estratégicos," dice Hoagland, "aunque existe una gran medida de interés económico. Los franceses comparten la preocupación de los norteamericanos por la extensión de la influencia soviética y del comunismo en África, y tienen interés en incrementar su influencia en Zaire y mantenerla en Sudáfrica. . . ."

John Marks, coautor de *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (La CIA y el Culto a la Inteligencia) y un asociado del Center for National Security Studies (Centro de Estudios de Seguridad Nacional), reveló en un artículo reimpresso en el *Congressional Record* el 16 de diciembre que Londres se ha unido a Washington y Pretoria para respaldar a las fuerzas de UNITA. UNITA ha recibido equipo británico de comunicaciones. Según un informe en el *Washington*

Post del 16 de diciembre, dos pilotos británicos que trabajan para la UNITA, dijeron que se trasladan armas en aviones Pearl Air al aeropuerto de Silva Porto. Pearl Air es un avión alquilado que tiene su base en la colonia británica de Hong Kong.

Los funcionarios de la Casa Blanca han negado que Washington tenga cualquier contacto con Pretoria sobre la guerra angolosa. El Embajador de los E.E.U.U. en las Naciones Unidas Patrick Moynihan, tratando de hacer a un lado el hecho de que Washington estuviere interviniendo en Angola del mismo lado que el régimen del apartheid, declaró el 14 de diciembre que sólo existía una "convergencia de línea política" entre los dos gobiernos.

Moynihan y los demás funcionarios del gobierno estaban mintiendo acerca de la extensión de la cooperación entre los Estados Unidos y Sudáfrica en Angola. El *Washington Post* del 6 de enero reveló que, según fuentes en Washington, "los Estados Unidos habían impulsado la intervención de Sudáfrica [en Angola] originalmente, como una acción desesperada de corto plazo" para impedir que el Movimiento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) ganara la guerra civil.

La CIA y la policía secreta sudafricana, el Bureau of State Security (Buró de Seguridad del Estado), están cooperando muy estrechamente bajo los términos de un acuerdo secreto de inteligencia similar a aquéllos entre Washington y otros miembros de la OTAN. El Senador Richard Clark, Presidente del Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa (subcomité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado sobre África), ha declarado que Washington y Pretoria están intercambiando información sobre la guerra en Angola.

Según Sean Gervasi, un consejero del Centro de Estudios de Seguridad Nacional, esta cooperación no está limitada a un intercambio de información. Citando a "fuentes dignas en el Departamento de Defensa," Gervasi reportó en una conferencia de prensa el 19 de diciembre en la ciudad de Nueva York que "los aviones de carga de los Estados Unidos han empezado a jugar un papel directo en las operaciones en el frente central. Actualmente están dejando caer abastecimientos directamente sobre las columnas sudafricanas que trabajan ahí."

El régimen blanco minoritario en Sudáfrica tiene varios miles de tropas en Angola, que están apoyando a las fuerzas del FNLA y de UNITA en las regiones centrales y sureñas del país o llevando a cabo operaciones en el sur de Angola contra las bases guerrilleras de los luchadores por la independencia de Namibia (África sudoccidental). Pretoria ha hecho los preparativos para una posible intensificación de su participación y ha hecho un llamado a sus aliados en Washington y Europa para que incrementen su intervención también.

Menos de dos semanas después de que el Senado votó por recortar los fondos de la operación del gobierno en Angola, el Primer Ministro sudafricano John Vorster hizo su primer llamado público para una mayor intervención de los países occidentales. Declaró que "sólo una mayor participación del occidente, no tan sólo en el campo diplomático, sino en todos los campos" podría impedir que Angola fuese "acorralado en el tropel comunista."

Pretoria ha respondido al voto en el Senado con decepción. Un despacho del *Washington Post* el 31 de diciembre proveniente de Johannesburgo, informó que un locutor sudafricano de radio, quien refleja generalmente los puntos de vista de los círculos oficiales, dijo, "Angola fue el campo de prueba de la voluntad del occidente para resistir el expansionismo soviético en África, y el Senado norteamericano ha perdido la primera ronda."

En conjunción con la intervención militar de los E.E.U.U. en Angola, el gobierno de Ford también ha dirigido su fuego diplomático contra el apoyo soviético y cubano al MPLA.

Hablando en St. Louis el 5 de enero, Ford advirtió a Moscú de las graves consecuencias para la distensión como resultado de su política en Angola. "La Unión Soviética," dijo, "debe darse cuenta que el intento soviético de aprovecharse unilateralmente del problema angolés es inconsecuente con los principios básicos de las relaciones E.E.U.U.-U.R.S.S. Si continúa, el daño a nuestra relación más amplia será inevitable."

Dos semanas antes Ford dirigió una amenaza similar a La Habana, declarando que "La acción tomada por el gobierno cubano al mandar fuerzas de combate a Angola destroza cualquier oportunidad para mejorar las relaciones con los Estados Unidos."

Las "amenazas" de la Casa Blanca hacia Moscú son principalmente para impresionar. Ford y Kissinger tienen poco interés en enterrar a la distensión como resultado del conflicto en Angola.

En su discurso pronunciado en St. Louis, Ford le dijo a una convención del American Farm Bureau (Buró de Agricultura Norteamericana) que las ventas de trigo a la Unión Soviética no serían interrumpidas. Después de una reunión el 5 de enero en Washington, Kissinger y el Embajador soviético Anatoly Dobrynin confirmaron que Kissinger llevaría a cabo su viaje planeado a Moscú el 19 de enero para continuar los Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT—Limitación de Arsenales Estratégicos) con el jefe del Partido Comunista Soviético Leonid Brezhnev. Un despacho de United Press International señaló, "Esto fue interpretado como una indicación de que ambos lados estaban tratando de impedir que el problema de Angola interfiriera

riese con la distensión."

La acción más directa que Washington ha tomado contra Moscú o La Habana fue cancelar una exhibición de béisbol E.E.U.U.-Cuba que supuestamente se iba a realizar en Cuba.

Uno de los objetivos principales de la intervención de la Casa Blanca en la guerra civil angoleña era el de impedir que Moscú lograra una mayor ventaja diplomática en la distensión, lo que podría suceder si el MPLA ganara la guerra con el fuerte apoyo soviético.

Al presentar su caso ante el Congreso por la continuación de la ayuda por parte de los Estados Unidos al FNLA y UNITA, Kissinger ha presentado una variante de la vieja "teoría del dominó." Además de las "amenazas" que un régimen del MPLA pudiese plantear para los aliados de Washington en Zaire y Zambia, Kissinger ha dicho que si Washington no lograra "parar" a Moscú en Angola, el Kremlin se podría sentir libre de impulsar sus intereses políticos en otras partes del mundo.

Una de las regiones que Kissinger aparentemente tiene en mente es el Medio Oriente. El corresponsal del *New York Times* Bernard Gwertzman mandó un despacho desde Washington el 8 de enero diciendo que Kissinger, en pláticas con el Ministro del Exterior de Israel Yigal Allon, "según informes, les dijo a los funcionarios israelitas que si los Estados Unidos, debido a la oposición dentro del Congreso, no lograra parar las actividades soviéticas en Angola, la Unión Soviética y otros tal vez dejen de tomar en serio en el futuro las advertencias de los Estados Unidos.

"Desde el punto de vista del Sr. Kissinger, esto podría animar a los países árabes como Siria a correr riesgos que podrían conducir a otro ataque contra Israel, apoyado por los rusos."

Al canalizar armas y dinero a un lado en la guerra civil angoleña, Ford y Kissinger también buscan perpetuar el conflicto fratricida con el fin de debilitar a todo el movimiento nacionalista. Eso podría facilitar la continuación de la dominación imperialista del país.

Los intereses de Ford en Angola, sin embargo, no están limitados a los intereses del imperialismo internacional. Está bastante interesado en su campaña presidencial de 1976. Está haciendo absolutamente todo lo posible para demostrar, en contra del ala derechista del Partido Republicano, que no es "blando con el comunismo."

Un funcionario del gobierno, cuyo nombre no fue mencionado, le dijo al reportero del *New York Times* Leslie H. Gelb el 16 de diciembre, como explicación de las advertencias de Kissinger al Kremlin: "Lo que Henry ha estado diciendo es que los rusos se deberían de dar cuenta que por lo general ellos no pueden hacer esto, pero definitivamente no durante el año electoral, y si nos

quieren golpear en Angola, eso fortalecerá a los críticos norteamericanos de la distensión," i.e., aquéllos que apoyan a Ronald

Reagan, el principal rival de Ford para el nombramiento del candidato para presidente por parte de los republicanos. □

Dirigente Campesino Visita La Convención

Blanco Recibido Con Aplausos en Perú

LIMA—"Hugo Blanco en Perú—¡Victoria Popular!"

Los gritos de entusiasmo lo reciben en todas partes. Blanco ha regresado, y ya ha empezado a despertar el sentimiento socialista y denunciar la "supuesta revolución" del régimen peruano.

Visitó recientemente la región de su anterior actividad como organizador de los campesinos, la provincia de La Convención en el este del Perú. Las dos semanas de viaje habían sido iguales desde el comienzo: la policía, bastantes policías, todo el tiempo y en todas partes. Pero en todas partes la amenaza de los uniformes fue sofocada por las flores y los abrazos.

¡Tierra o muerte! En cada pueblo que atravesó el camión, la gente estuvo parada al lado del camino gritando la consigna del pasado. A pesar de una censura de las noticias, había sido imposible impedir que se supiera que Hugo Blanco iba a regresar.

Empezó a caer una lluvia helada, y todos nosotros, excepto Blanco, buscamos protección bajo la lona del camión. El quería ver su patria de nuevo después de doce años.

"¡Kausachun!" Viva Hugo Blanco, en el idioma de los campesinos, quechua. Desde las afueras del pueblo hasta el lugar de reunión de los campesinos en el centro de Quiabamba, la gente se amontonó atrás del camión. Era media noche, pero la gente quería oír a Blanco. Quería que se sentara con ellos a comer y que bailara el *huayno* con ellos.

Dos horas de dormir sobre un piso de tierra fría antes de las reuniones y los problemas del día siguiente.

Fue aquí en el valle de La Convención que empezó la revuelta de los campesinos. Y fue Hugo Blanco quien la dirigió. Debido a esto, La Convención es una de las regiones donde el gobierno peruano ha sido más activo en llevar a cabo la reforma agraria.

Sin embargo, todavía hay muchos problemas que resolver. Los campesinos ahora son dueños de la tierra que cultivan, pero no tienen ningún control sobre los precios de sus productos. Los campesinos peruanos todavía reciben sueldos miserables, pero están demasiado divididos para poder responder a esto.

Muchos campesinos están organizados en las llamadas *ligas agrarias*, una forma de organización iniciada por el gobierno. La

oposición más fuerte a estas ligas agrarias proviene de la CCP (Confederación Campesina del Perú), que los campesinos originaron ellos mismos.

El partido trotskista al que pertenece Blanco no tiene una mayoría en la CCP, pero Blanco ha ingresado a la organización. "Sólo como grupo unido podremos derrotar al gobierno," argumenta.

"¡Qué tragedia!" dijo Blanco desesperadamente después del primer día de reunión con los campesinos. Se habían lanzado piedras, las discusiones se habían convertido en golpes, y las voces se habían vuelto ásperas con el intento de unir a los campesinos.

Pero Blanco tuvo más optimismo después de su campaña de dos semanas de duración. "Las masas no son sectarias," dice.

La represión no es tan rígida actualmente como durante el anterior gobierno militar. En aquél entonces se mandaba la gente a la prisión sin que haya sido acusada ni juzgada. Pero Blanco, no obstante, está preocupado. Está siempre bajo vigilancia.

"... los campesinos de hoy y de mañana no se olvidarán jamás de Hugo Blanco..." Esta canción *huayna* tradicional a menudo aliviaba la tensión que se acumulaba en el ambiente. Fue escrita cuando él estuvo preso en la isla de El Frontón. Su compañero, quien estuvo preso durante "sólo cinco años" y que carece actualmente de identificación y de nombre fijo, la cantó cuando íbamos en tren "de regreso" a Chaupimayo, donde Blanco trabajaba como campesino.

En la puerta de salida del tren se encontraban cuatro policías. Siempre hay algunos representantes del "orden público" arriba de los trenes. Pero, ¿acaso hay tantos? ¿Y generalmente llevan ametralladoras?

"Pero seguiré trabajando," dice Blanco. "Estaré trabajando contra su política capitalista y a favor de la revolución socialista."

Dice, "Nuestro éxito fue limitado en La Convención en gran medida porque no tuvimos un partido fuerte. Es muy importante que permanezca en Lima para participar en la construcción del partido. No importa cuántas huelgas y tomas de terrenos hayan. No llevarán a ningún lado si no son coordinadas y apoyadas por las masas." □