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75¢

Spanish Regime

Confronted by

Wave of Strikes



KING JUAN CARLOS I: Blames "extremists."

Documents

Behind the Civil War in Angola

The Capitalist Offensive in Portugal

By David Frankel

The Portuguese government has stepped up its offensive against the working class and its allies. The attack has been cautious, reflecting the regime's fear of provoking a new upsurge, but its objective is clear. It is aimed at restricting and pushing back the economic and political gains made by the Portuguese masses since the April 25, 1974, coup that overturned the Salazarist dictatorship.

On the economic front, Premier José Pinheiro de Azevedo's government called for "voluntary and conscious acceptance of sacrifices" on December 20, 1975, while announcing new guarantees for foreign investment. The meaning of this policy was amplified by Azevedo December 23. In a televised speech he said that the fate of the economy depended on "the discipline of labor unions and workers." According to *New York Times* correspondent Marvin Howe, "He warned that unrealistic wage claims and overemployment had caused many enterprises to close."

The MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement)—aided by the Stalinist and Social Democratic leaders—has been trying to force the working masses to pay for the capitalist economic crisis since it came to power in April 1974. At one point this objective was cloaked in the demagogic call to win the "battle for production." Now Azevedo states the MFA's program more openly, talking about "overemployment" at a time when 13 percent of the work force is unemployed.

Marvin Howe described the impact of the regime's austerity program in the January 11 *New York Times*:

The Government's call for sacrifices hit home most powerfully with the removal of subsidies on essentials and the subsequent huge price rises.

An analysis of the rising cost of living just published by the weekly newspaper *Tempo* showed dramatic increases in Lisbon: eggs now cost \$1.60 a dozen, up 33 percent; potatoes are up 21 percent and carrots 140 percent.

The high food prices affect Lisbon most seriously, but the prices of gasoline, postage stamps and transportation are national.

The price of high-octane gasoline has risen by 40 percent, to \$2.45 a gallon, and public transport fares have increased by an average of 100 percent.

Another aspect of the government's offensive was manifested January 9 when

the regime announced that its land-reform program would not be applied at all in the northern two-thirds of Portugal, nor in part of the South as well.

The regime has also launched new attacks on the rights of assembly and protest. It chose the occasion of a January 1 demonstration in Oporto, called to demand the release of 140 persons arrested in the wake of the November 25 coup attempt, to test its repressive options.

Members of the Republican National Guard opened fire on a crowd of 3,000 persons, killing three and wounding many others. The government defended the shootings and charged that the demonstration had been part of a plot to enable the prisoners to break out of jail. In addition, demonstrations outside prisons in Oporto were banned.

A further attack on the right to demonstrate was reported in the January 3 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión*. An unsigned dispatch quoted a communiqué from the Oporto government, which argued that "the demonstration was illegal" because its organizers failed to give the president of the municipal council forty-eight hours' notice of their plans.

A similar demonstration in Lisbon on January 1 was broken up by commandos, who scattered the crowd by driving armored cars into its midst and firing over their heads.

The regime's use of the Republican National Guard, a paramilitary police force known for its right-wing character, was hardly accidental. A report from Oporto in the January 3 *Washington Post* pointed out, "A massive recruitment campaign for 10,000 extra men is being boosted by television commercials."

There have also been some signs that the Azevedo government is trying to whip up sentiment against "outside agitators." One of those killed at the Oporto demonstration was a twenty-two-year-old German student, Günther Bruns, who the government claimed was "interfering in Portuguese politics."

According to a report from Lisbon by Harold Sieve in the January 11 issue of the London *Sunday Telegraph*, "Portugal has begun expelling the first of the thousands of foreign revolutionaries, who, she claims, have been fomenting extremist agitation

and using the country as a training ground in subversion and terror."

Sieve added: "The military rulers are moving swiftly after making their expulsion threat last week. The Supreme Revolutionary Council then denounced 'foreign elements' often undesirable in their own countries and proposed legislation to deal with them."

The latest probe in the regime's attack on democratic rights came on January 13 when the ruling Council of the Revolution proposed a plan that would ensure continued military rule in Portugal until 1980. In a dispatch from Lisbon in the January 18 *Washington Post* Bernard Nossiter said that "the military plan would enable the Council to dissolve the elected legislature and veto many of its decrees on everything from nationalization through foreign affairs to defense.

"To be sure, this blueprint is not the last word. The civilian political parties are examining it and their agreement must be obtained before it becomes effective. They are likely to insist on a reduced military role and should gain some concessions. But in the end, it appears the power will rest where it has been, with the men who made the coup of April 25, 1974."

A January 18 dispatch from Lisbon in the *New York Times* quoted Socialist party chief Mário Soares, who denounced the plan. "The new proposal is antidemocratic and consecrates military guardianship over our political life," he said.

Unfortunately, Soares has refused to come out in opposition to the capitalist offensive that prepared the way for this latest attack. The working class as a whole has been deeply divided and disoriented by the policies of the reformist Socialist and Communist party leaders.

Instead of breaking with the MFA, the SP and CP leaders have participated from the beginning in the capitalist government and vied with each other to win the position of the MFA's privileged ally. Instead of attempting to unite the masses in defense of their basic interests, the SP and CP leaders have acted as agents of the capitalist government in the working class, supporting the MFA's policies to the hilt.

By taking responsibility for the MFA's capitalist policies and attempting to pawn off capitalist governments as progressive and revolutionary, the reformist leaders have disoriented the working class and opened the door to rightist forces.

This was demonstrated January 12 at a rally of right-wing farmers at Braga. One speaker told the crowd, estimated at 10,000 by *Washington Post* correspondent Nossiter, "Men who have never been out of Comercio Square [seat of the Agriculture Ministry in Lisbon] and out in the fields can't draw up laws for us. If they want to help us, bring us cheap fertilizer and

machinery to work this barren land. Build roads . . . Give us fair prices and credit."

This is precisely what a genuine revolutionary government based on the workers and peasants would do. By utilizing such policies the Cuban revolutionists led by Fidel Castro were able to carry out perhaps the most thorough land reform in the world, with the enthusiastic support of the small peasants.

Because the Stalinist and Social Democratic leaders are opposed to a socialist revolution in Portugal or anywhere else, they have refused to give up their reliance on the capitalist regime. On January 17 the Stalinist-controlled trade-union federation sponsored a demonstration against the wage freeze. But as in the CP's earlier conflict with the Azevedo government, the Stalinist leadership hopes to utilize such demonstrations to pressure the MFA into granting it a few more posts. Also, the Stalinists hope to use the economic issue to win votes in the upcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly.

The turnout at the January 17 demonstration was estimated at only 25,000 by *New York Times* reporter Howe, far below what the CP alone has been able to mobilize on previous occasions.

However, an enormous potential for struggle remains. The economic crisis and the capitalist offensive are going to continue and deepen. The Portuguese working class has been confused and misled by Stalinist, Social Democratic, ultraleftist, and centrist leaders, but it has not been defeated. The mass mobilizations of the construction workers in mid-November showed a glimpse of the power that can be tapped by a united struggle of the working class in defense of its interests. □

For Use Against Non-Whites Only

William Mackenzie King was prime minister of Canada for twenty-one years between 1921 and 1948. On January 1 of this year his 1944 and 1945 diaries were made public for the first time. Although much of them is taken up with descriptions of what he called his "visions" of the spirit world, the section on the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, at the order of U.S. President Harry Truman, is of some interest.

Mackenzie King described this murderous attack, in which a quarter of a million persons perished, as one of "the two great events that day," the other being his victory in a by-election that assured his continuation in the government.

However, the prime minister was not without an opinion on the broader issues raised by the use of the atomic bomb. "It is fortunate," he wrote, "that the use of the bomb should have been upon the Japanese rather than upon the white races of Europe."

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Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Editorial Staff: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, David Frankel, Ernest Harsch, Judy White.

Business Manager: Steven Warshell.

Copy Editor: Mary Roche.

Technical Staff: Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, James M. Morgan, Bill Razukas, Earl Williams.

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Massive Strike Wave Confronts Spanish Regime

By David Frankel

The working class of Spain has dealt a resounding blow to the plans of King Juan Carlos I and the coterie of Francoist functionaries running the Madrid regime.

In a massive wave of strikes, involving more than 100,000 persons in the Madrid area alone, the workers have served notice that they will not sit by in silence while Franco's old collaborators debate timid, piecemeal reforms.

"Work was at a standstill in Madrid's industrial suburbs, where many American multinational companies have factories," *Washington Post* correspondent Miguel Acoca reported in a January 12 dispatch.


"The strikes spread today to Barcelona," Acoca added, "where 5,000 electrical workers staged a sit-in for higher wages and other benefits." The electrical workers threatened to cut the city's power supply if the government sent police or the army against them.

Meanwhile, thousands of demonstrators shouted demands for liberty and amnesty in Madrid. The regime's response was the same in every case. Citing a typical incident, a January 12 United Press International dispatch said, "Police stormed into Madrid's main university campus to break up assemblies of demonstrators shouting 'Down with the dictatorship!'"

Despite repression, the strikes and demonstrations continued to spread. By January 15 the Associated Press estimated that 250,000 workers were involved in the strike movement. Dock workers went out in Barcelona January 14, telephone service was disrupted in the north, and banking was virtually halted in Madrid and Barcelona. The regime adopted stronger measures, and on January 14 Juan Carlos signed an order drafting thousands of striking postal workers into the army.

The following day police attacked a march by 2,000 women in Madrid demanding amnesty for political prisoners and an end to the government's wage freeze. They followed up with the arrest of 145 labor leaders, charging them with planning a general strike against the government.

In the midst of these developments, the regime attempted to present an appearance of calm. On January 15 the government declared: "The action of certain extremist groups that have sought to disturb or delay these plans [of the government] and that have in the last few days tried to provoke the Government and the citizenry as a



Cambio 16

GARRIGUES: Justice minister says new government will not "dismantle" Franco regime.

whole will have no other effect than to discredit definitively the responsible parties. The Government will serenely continue the path laid out, having no doubt that it is thus serving the monarchy and Spain."

The pretense that the opposition to the regime's policies is limited to an "extremist" fringe is absurd on the face of it. In a January 16 dispatch from Madrid, *New York Times* reporter Henry Giniger commented, "The Workers Commissions, clandestine organizations in which the Communists share influence with other Marxist groups, have been characterized as the 'catalyzers' of the strike, but the leaders say the movement began spontaneously. In some cases, the commissions found themselves joining in after the campaign had started."

With inflation in Spain running at a rate of 17 percent, there is hardly any mystery in the readiness of the working class to take action against the government-imposed wage freeze. The monarchy has claimed that it is ready to tolerate purely economic strikes, but that the current movement is a political strike. However, as one strike leader explained to Giniger, "If we want more money, we need independent unions

that can act and speak freely. If this is political, then our strike is political."

The workers have no strike funds because of the strictures placed on them by the dictatorship, making it more difficult for them to carry out a prolonged struggle. Agreements ended the walkouts of port and electrical workers in Barcelona on January 16, and on January 15 a contract was signed covering 150,000 construction workers in the Madrid area.

But the monarchy has still not defused the situation. On January 16, for example, negotiations broke down in the Madrid subway workers' dispute that was a major factor in sparking the labor upsurge, raising the possibility of a new strike. Furthermore, workers in many plants have been arrested or fired for strike activity, and their cases may well provoke new clashes.

Justice Minister Antonio Garrigués spelled out the government's approach on January 12. A Reuters dispatch from Madrid reported, "Mr. Garrigués said the new Government would not dismantle the Franco regime but improve it and bring it up to date."

In keeping with this philosophy, the government announced January 15 that parliamentary elections, previously scheduled for March, would be postponed one year. The government claims it needs the time in order to draw up a new electoral law and laws governing political association and assembly.

The "elections" to the Francoist Cortes set for March would hardly have been democratic. Of the 561 members in the Cortes, only 104 are elected, and only the heads of families are allowed to vote.

But it is the masses of people who should have the say in determining how to change the fascist electoral setup, not Franco's handpicked stooges. The significance of the decision to postpone the March elections is that it is the monarchy's way of answering the demand for a constituent assembly to be chosen immediately by direct, universal suffrage. The monarchy in effect told the demonstrators and strikers demanding the release of political prisoners and democratic rights, "Come back in fourteen months."

But the masses know very well that the program of the government is not to "dismantle the Franco regime but [to] improve it and bring it up to date." The pressures for change are building up in

every area of life. For example, Spain is the only industrialized country in the world where divorce is absolutely prohibited. People must apply to an ecclesiastical court for separation or to have their marriage annulled.

The Francoist heritage that the monarchy defends is also one of brutal oppression of national minorities in Spain, such as the Basques and the Catalans. The Spanish Trotskyists of the Liga Comunista

(Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International) point out in the December 12, 1975, issue of their newspaper, *Combate*, that after the civil war the Franco regime "put its assassins on the payroll to paint on the walls of Barcelona [in Catalonia], 'Don't bark like a dog, speak the language of the Empire!'"

To this day it is illegal to use Basque, Catalan, or Galician in courts or in plenary sessions of governmental bodies. The Fran-

coist slogan of "Speak Christian!" is still the official answer of the government to the oppressed nationalities.

King Juan Carlos may be able to ride out the current strike wave, but this is only a taste of mobilizations to come. The people of Spain have announced loud and clear that they are not going to stand aside while Franco's heirs decide their fate behind closed doors. □

Interview With a Spanish Trotskyist

Since Franco's Death—Growing Fight for Democratic Rights

[The following interview with a leader of the Liga Comunista, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain, was obtained December 29, 1975, by an *Intercontinental Press* correspondent in Europe.]

* * *

Question. What is the attitude of the Liga Comunista toward the new government of Juan Carlos? Do you see any significant change?

Answer. The new government is a continuation of Franco's. The jails are still filling up; there is no substantial change at the governmental level. There is, however, a changed relationship of forces. This past year has seen millions of workers on strike. Their whole thrust has been against the dictatorship. Just a few years ago most workers were openly anticommunist. Today all kinds of forces have entered into the struggle—students, petty-bourgeois layers, and peasants.

When the dictator died, an institution died. So they had to change their tactics. They began to talk about democratic changes. Of course this is only talk—they have said they will "study the problem" at the next session of the Cortes [Spanish parliament, controlled by the Falange]. They don't call for free elections, and for this reason we demand universal suffrage for all those over sixteen, a free vote for a constituent assembly, and the right of all political parties to work freely.

Q. So they really haven't changed? A lot was made in the foreign press about Fraga's¹ "concerned" telephone call to the young woman in Seville shot by the police.

A. Yes, but it is only talk. The amnesty that many people thought Juan Carlos would announce on Christmas never came. The persecution of political parties continues. One worker, Ricardo Tellez in Barcelona, is near death after his torture by the DGS [Dirección General de Seguridad—General Directorate of Security].

Just the other day Fraga denounced the Workers Commissions² as fronts for the Communist party. Still, it is a two-sided picture, because the government has been too weak to stop the mobilizations since Franco's death. When Tierno Galvan³ speaks of socialism he gets public sympathy, even though he is a demagogue.

During the past two months, activists of the Workers Commissions have been able to speak openly as members without being arrested—radicals as well as people like Camacho.⁴ Of course there is no change, and we don't believe in the goodwill of the king. But we are going to take every opportunity to get our ideas across.

Q. For instance?

A. We have a special campaign to produce a fortnightly paper in the next few months. We can now sell 5,000 in the

2. Ciandestine trade-union bodies in opposition to the state unions, the Central Nacional Sindicalista (CNS—National Federation of Syndicates).

3. Leader of the Partido Socialista Popular (People's Socialist party), which supports the Junta Democrática and has a notable composition of academics. Other components of the Junta include the PCE(i) (Partido Comunista de España—Internacional—Communist party of Spain—International, a Maoist grouping); the Coordinating Committee of the Workers Commissions (dominated by the CP); and the individual monarchist, ex-Opus Dei supporter Rafael Calvo Serer.

4. Marcelino Camacho, a leader of the Workers Commissions.

underground, and we think we can easily double this.

Q. Can you say something about the recent demonstrations for amnesty? What about the "indulto" [pardon] of Juan Carlos?

A. First, the pardon is a sham, a reaffirmation of Francoist legislation. The jails still fill up with people charged under the "antiterrorist" legislation of last August. (Under this, anyone even speaking or writing about an organization like the ETA⁵ can be imprisoned.) In December alone, 1,000 persons were arrested for violating this legislation.

About the demonstrations: The most important was at Carabanchel, an area of Madrid where upwards of 50,000 persons demonstrated for amnesty. The police cordoned off seven kilometers around the prison, so it is difficult to get exact figures. There have been thousands of workers on strike who made amnesty their central demand. There have been strikes and demonstrations in practically every Spanish city.

The police and army have been called on to intervene, but they have not been able to confront the demonstrators directly in every case, as there is a semilegal quality to the demonstrations. Even sectors of the bourgeoisie see the need to talk about amnesty. It is something people feel strongly about, and I think that if there is a powerful enough movement the government may be forced to grant an amnesty to avoid an even greater confrontation later on.

Q. What is the exact position of the Liga Comunista on the question of amnesty?

1. Manuel Fraga, the new minister of the interior, who is attempting to create a "liberal" image for the new government.

5. Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna (Basque Nation and Freedom).

A. Our party supports the fight for amnesty. We have led actions for it. But we don't view amnesty as a step toward the "national reconciliation" of all Spaniards as the Junta Democrática does. We believe that there should be no distinctions—that anyone repressed by the Franco regime should be included.

Furthermore, although we fight for amnesty we cannot pardon the crimes of Francoism. We call for the formation of democratic workers tribunals to judge the criminals. When the reformists speak of "reconciliation," they mean they don't want to fight against the Francoist apparatus. Amnesty doesn't mean leaving the criminals free to do what they like. We call for the disbanding of all the repressive bodies, like the Brigada Político Social [Political-Social Brigade, the Francoist political police], the Guardia Civil [Civil Guard, the riot police], and the armed police. We call for the dissolution of Franco's courts. For the abolition of not just the "antiterrorist" legislation but also the undemocratic laws that have been on the books for forty years now.

Q. What is the position of the Junta Democrática on this point?

A. The Junta Democrática is for leaving the Francoist apparatus intact, apart from one or two slight modifications. This is important, especially in view of the situation in Portugal. One of the first actions taken by the people was to demand that the PIDE⁶ be brought to trial. The Junta simply cannot recognize this democratic impulse.

Q. How does your position on democratic rights differ from that of the Junta Democrática and the Convergencia?⁷

A. Well, the working class needs democratic rights. The bourgeoisie needs to talk about them. And the Junta Democrática may say it's for democratic rights, but that is not true.

Q. For example?

6. Policía Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International State Security Police, the Salazarist secret police).

7. Convergencia Democrática (Democratic Convergence), the other main class-collaborationist bloc, which includes the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español—Spanish Socialist Workers party); the ORT (Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores—Revolutionary Workers Organization); and the Christian Democrats, such as Ruiz-Giménez of the Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana (Christian Democratic Left) and the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic party) of Gil Robles. Also the MCE (Movimiento Comunista Español—Spanish Communist Movement, a Maoist split-off from ETA), the Carlists, and the PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco—Basque Nationalist party).

A. Take the national question. In Catalonia they call for the return to the statute of 1932, which was passed by the Republic. But they still recognize the central Madrid government and its right to legislate in crucial areas like the army and foreign affairs. We say that the peoples of Euzkadi, Catalonia, and Galicia should be able to decide for themselves through national constituent assemblies what relationship to have with Madrid. Anything else would be undemocratic.

Second, the Junta and Convergencia view the army as part of the "democratic" process, and believe it can be called upon to support democracy. We say it is intrinsically undemocratic. We support democratic rights inside the army, and the setting up of soldiers assemblies.

Q. Isn't the CP supporting the UMD?⁸

A. Yes, and the CP tends to support the UMD's program, which doesn't even include democratic rights for soldiers. The UMD is demanding a more professional army. They want to keep their official privileges, and they want more money. The CP says they are "friends of the people." We are giving unconditional support to the nine officers recently charged with sedition. The government is not even letting them be defended by civilian lawyers.

But I should like to finish on the question of the Junta and democracy. Perhaps what shows them up more than anything is their attitude toward the new government. For example, there is a new regime in Catalonia, much broader than the Junta: the Consell de Forces Polítiques [Council of Political Forces]. This council even announces its opposition to the prince—I mean the king! They are waiting to see if he will grant democracy. But this is the very moment to cash in on the governmental crisis and oppose its demagoguery.

Q. What is the difference between the Asamblea de Catalunya⁹ and the new council?

A. The assembly is a much broader group, made up of neighborhood representatives, and dominated by the PSUC.¹⁰ The council comprises only representatives of political parties, some of them virtually unheard of. Jordi Pujol, the vice-president of the Banca Catalana, is one of its leaders.

8. Unión Militar Democrática (Democratic Military Union), a recently formed organization involving about 200 officers.

9. A popular-front-type organization formed in 1971.

10. Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (United Socialist party of Catalonia), a branch of the Spanish CP.

Some council members demand abolition of the monarchy, but others give the king critical support. The CP, as the only working-class party represented on the council, is ambiguous on this point; and this prevents the formation of a mass movement.

Q. Would you say that what is happening in Catalonia is a preview of what will happen in other parts of the country? What do you think of the 1932 statute?

A. The bourgeoisie in Catalonia has always been much more advanced and shrewd than the bourgeoisie elsewhere. Catalonia has as a rule been in the vanguard of the struggle. Instead of the statute of 1932, we call for self-determination through a freely elected national constituent assembly. Such a body could resolve the culture questions and decide about the teaching of Catalan. This would be the first step toward achieving a Catalan workers state.

Q. What is the difference between the Junta and the Convergencia? Could there be a coalition?

A. They are both interclass forces. But by calling for the "democratic break," the Junta appears to offer a democratic alternative. The Convergencia has the same program, but is viewed by some sections of the bourgeoisie as a potential threat to the CP. The big capitalists who do not support the dictatorship belong to the Convergencia.

But faced with the recent mass struggles, the Junta and the Convergencia have combined to try to suppress them. The Consejo Democrático [Democratic Council], which includes both, gives the king some critical support.

Q. Haven't the events in Portugal made this collaboration more difficult?

A. Not really. The Spanish CP, on the right, has been critical of the Portuguese CP. They claim that in Portugal the CP is not democratic, while in Spain the sort of alliances they are seeking are totally different. The bourgeoisie, of course, has been quick to see the useful role of the SP in the sixth provisional government, and the newspapers have tended to support it more than the CP. But in Spain the PSOE is not very strong.

Q. Is it growing?

A. Yes, it includes sections of the middle class. And some of its members are rapidly becoming radicalized. The youth group, the Juventud Socialista, has refused to support the Convergencia and has come out public-

ly against making alliances with the bourgeoisie. Some sections of the youth have declared themselves generally "Trotskyist."

Q. Back to the question of Portugal—what has been the effect of recent events there?

A. In general, the mass movement has grown in strength since the April 25 coup. There were demonstrations in every major city, especially in Seville. But the recent coup of the *izquierda inexistente* [nonexistent left] has caused great confusion in the vanguard here. We are trying to resolve this, but if the struggle in Portugal continues it will serve as a stimulus here—thus it is very important.

Q. What about an American presence in Spain?

A. Spain has had ties with Yankee imperialism for a long time. The Americans supported the government, and they hope to remain in Spain, especially in view of what is happening in Portugal. On April 25, when 2,000 U.S. marines landed in Seville, a local journalist who happened to write about their arrival was put in prison for I don't know how many months. The Americans intend to help the counterrevolution in Portugal. The last time Franco spoke, I think in October, he expressed the wish for a "return to law and order" in Portugal. And despite their lack of public support, the ELP¹¹ and the Spínolists maintain bases here.

Q. Hasn't the situation in Portugal provoked some differences inside the CP about Intersindical¹² and the role of the Workers Commissions?

A. There is a tendency in the Spanish CP that opposes the almost total support given to the fifth provisional government. *Nuestra Bandera* [theoretical organ of the Spanish CP] has run a public debate between Carrillo¹³ and Camacho. Carrillo says that the workers should continue to work through the Central Nacional Sindicalista. Camacho thinks that the Workers Commissions should be reconstituted. The strengthening of the sindicatos through elections has meant the virtual destruction of the Workers Commissions everywhere,

except in Euzkadi where they never got off the ground.

Q. So you think that the call for a boycott of the sindicato elections was correct?

A. Of course. It has been impossible for the sindicatos to defend the workers' interests. A big discussion is going on in the vanguard on this problem, and there is a movement that, although weak, is working against the CNS and even includes sections of the Stalinists.

Q. What about the recent events in Madrid?

A. During November, preparations were made for the December mobilizations, both in the factories and in the universities. The biggest strikes were in the metal industry, where there were from 50,000 to 80,000 on strike in places like Standard, Westinghouse, Simmons, particularly in the zone of Getafe. Many small firms came out.

There was an important strike on December 11 in the construction industry—more than 80,000 on the outskirts of Madrid. The Liga Comunista led some of the Workers Commissions' calls for a general strike in construction. The strikes had a dual purpose. On the economic front they were against the wage freeze [one of the king's first moves] and against *paro* [shutdown]. But the central issue was amnesty.

Metalworkers unions voted unanimously in favor of the December 7 demonstration at Carabanchel. Because of limited legal tactics available to the CNS and because slogans like, "Strike and everyone go home!" were used, the strikes were not centralized. There were meetings in each individual factory, and the CP refused to support the call for a general day of action, a *jornada*. The Liga Comunista called for a general strike in the metal industry and for demonstrations, stoppages, meetings, and elections of strike committees.

In the three universities of Madrid—the Autonoma, the Comprudencia, and the Polytechnic—there were continuous assemblies throughout December. A general strike was called for December 12 by the *comités de curso* [course committees]. These groups include all the political activists in a particular faculty.

Q. Where is the Liga Comunista located?

A. We have branches in Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Saragossa, Valladolid, Seville, Asturias, the Canary Islands, and in all four provinces of Euzkadi—Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, Aragon, and Navarra. The CP doesn't recognize Navarra as part of Euzkadi.

Q. Where are your forces concentrated?

A. We do a lot of work among the university youth and secondary-school students ["*bachilleres*"], as well as local youth. We are beginning to work among soldiers—not with officers but with young draftees. But we have not got very far with this yet.

In the working class our priority is the metal industry, in which we have workers from all of our locals, although they are unevenly distributed. Even though we have more trade unionists in Madrid, our influence in Barcelona is stronger. Next in importance is the construction industry, then textiles. Many of our members are bank workers and teachers.

Q. Are you considering more work among the youth?

A. We are discussing the formation of a Trotskyist youth group, in sympathy with the Fourth International. We are planning a conference soon and the discussion about this will start soon. Of major importance will be exactly how to organize a youth group. Other points we shall discuss will be tactics for building our party as part of the international. The debate taking place in the international now is very important to us; we have recognized the need for the Fourth International since our formation in 1971.

In closing I should like to say that in January and February there are going to be some vital struggles, especially in Madrid, Barcelona, and Euzkadi—probably strikes on economic and political issues. This is a guess, but I think I'll be proved right. □

Washington's Aid to Pinochet Soars

Washington has greatly increased its subsidy to the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, according to a report by John Palmer in the January 18 issue of the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*.

Figures gathered by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions show that the financial credits the Ford administration extended to Pinochet last year jumped from £26 million (£1=US\$2.02) to about £315 million, Palmer reported. That is more than half the £550 million total financial aid received by the regime in 1975.

Despite this wholesale infusion of funds, savage cuts continue to be made in the living standards of Chilean workers. "Since the dictatorship seized power in 1973," Palmer said, "the price of bread has shown a rise of 13,563 per cent, milk 11,328 per cent, sugar 25,566 per cent, and transport 9,900 per cent."

11. Exército de Libertação Portuguesa (Portuguese Liberation Army), the rightist underground forces led by General Spínola.

12. The Portuguese trade-union federation, dominated by the CP.

13. Santiago Carrillo, exiled head of the Spanish CP.

More European Mercenaries Sent to Angola

By Ernest Harsch

While foreign mercenaries continued to pour into Angola, the emergency summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adjourned January 13 without reaching agreement on what course the OAU should follow toward the imperialist intervention in the Angolan civil war.

The representatives at the summit, which was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, were evenly divided, 22 to 22, on two conflicting resolutions, one introduced by the Nigerian delegation and the other by the representative from Senegal. (The Ethiopian and Ugandan representatives did not publicly back either resolution.)

The Nigerian resolution called on the OAU to recognize formally the regime set up by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and condemn the South African intervention in Angola.

The Senegalese proposal called for the formation of a coalition government composed of the MPLA, FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—Angolan National Liberation Front) and UNITA (União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). It also called for a denunciation of South African and "all other forms of foreign intervention," a reference to the Soviet and Cuban role in aiding the MPLA and to the American intervention on the side of the FNLA and UNITA.

The OAU deadlock was a diplomatic victory for Washington and Pretoria. *Washington Post* reporter David B. Ottaway noted in a January 13 dispatch from Addis Ababa, "The Popular Movement did not gain official recognition by the African organization, as most U.S. officials had feared, and South Africa was not specifically condemned for its 'aggression' against Angola, as had been the foregoing conclusion up until the last moment."

In the weeks preceding the summit, the White House carried out a diplomatic drive to block recognition of the MPLA. Kissinger sent his assistant secretary of state for African affairs, William E. Schauffele, on a tour of several African and European countries to line up support for the U.S. position. President Ford sent letters to a number of African heads of state, including Brig. Murtala Muhammed of Nigeria, "suggesting" that they not call on the OAU to recognize the MPLA.

The White House enlisted the aid of several of its European allies in this effort.

West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher sent letters to twelve African heads of state, and British Foreign Minister James Callaghan was reported to have done likewise. Paris also sought to influence the position of some of its former African colonies.

Recognition by the OAU of the MPLA's People's Republic of Angola as the sole "legitimate" regime would have hampered Washington's efforts to get other members of NATO, some of which have important economic and political interests in Black African countries, to take on a greater role in funneling arms and money to the FNLA and UNITA.

According to the January 8 Lisbon daily *Jornal Novo*, a source in the Belgian Foreign Ministry indicated that an OAU recognition of the MPLA would have been a "key element" in any Belgian decision to establish diplomatic ties with Angola.

Administration officials in Washington tried to use the OAU impasse as a justification for continued American intervention, claiming that nearly half the OAU member states "supported" Washington's role in Angola. Schauffele, for instance, declared January 13 that "22 African countries do support our policy."

Within hours of the OAU summit's adjournment, White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen said that Ford would continue to provide "a limited amount of assistance" to those African regimes that were opposed to the MPLA. Much of the U.S. arms and money already sent to the FNLA and UNITA has been funneled through the regimes in Zaïre and Zambia, some of it under the guise of foreign "assistance" to those countries.

A few days earlier, CIA Director William E. Colby called it "the height of absurdity to say that CIA should not give some help" to the MPLA's rivals.

In addition to hiring an estimated 300 American mercenaries who are already fighting in Angola, the CIA recruitment of European gunmen has also picked up momentum. The January 11 London *Sunday Telegraph* reported that according to "diplomatic sources" in southern Africa, dozens of British mercenaries were in Angola.

"The Britons and other European mercenaries," *Telegraph* reporter Norman Kirkham said, "have entered Angola secretly over the last few months. Recruitment is being stepped up to check military gains by the Russian-backed forces of the Popular

Movement, M.P.L.A."

Representatives of the FNLA and UNITA reportedly visited England, Scotland, France, Belgium, and Switzerland to enlist several hundred troops. The overall recruitment operation was under the direction of "Mad Mike" Hoare, a veteran mercenary who fought in the Congo (now Zaïre) in the early 1960s. The mercenaries hired in Europe, the *Telegraph* reported, were flown first to Zaïre and then to an assembly point in southern Angola.

Operating from a headquarters in Gwelo, Rhodesia, Hoare was reported to have been allocated about \$10 million by the FNLA and UNITA. The *Telegraph* did not report how much of that money came from American sources.

South Africa Calls Up 15,000 Conscripts

Pretoria, which already has several thousand troops in Angola, has made preparations for a possible escalation of its intervention. More than 15,000 South African males between the ages of seventeen and twenty-five were conscripted in early January for a minimum of a year's military service. In addition, an undisclosed number of reservists were called up for three months of training. The conscription was one of the largest ever carried out in South Africa.

Maj. Gen. Neil Webster, director of resources for the South African military, said in the first week of January, "Never before in the history of South Africa has military service been so vital as it is now. These young men should feel privileged to be playing their part."

While the OAU was meeting, the MPLA continued to press its military offensive against the FNLA positions in northern Angola. After capturing the city of Uíge and the strategic airfield of Ngage, the MPLA forces, reportedly with heavy Cuban backing, took the coastal towns of Ambriz and Ambrizete. The MPLA also captured Caracassala, Cangala, Samba, Vista Alegre, and Toto.

In face of MPLA and Cuban artillery barrages, the FNLA troops retreated toward the northern border with Zaïre, a traditional sanctuary for the FNLA. *New York Times* correspondent Henry Kamm reported in the January 17 issue that according to accounts received in Kinshasa, Zaïre, much of the Bakongo civilian population, from which the FNLA gets most of its support, was also fleeing farther north. The FNLA has charged that several thousand civilians were killed by the MPLA forces.

Following this military setback, Paulo Iuba, a member of the FNLA's Political Bureau, declared in Kinshasa January 14 that the FNLA had decided to evacuate its troops and reorganize for guerrilla warfare against the MPLA. He also threatened that the FNLA would carry out terrorist actions

against the MPLA and its backers, both within Angola and abroad. He warned that the first such attacks would be "right in Luanda." Referring to the use of plastic explosives, he added, "We are prepared to plastic movies, markets and public places. . . . In a war of liberation people have to die."

A turn toward terrorist attacks against civilians by the FNLA—in this case against the Mbundu supporters of the MPLA—would be a dangerous development in the civil war. So far there have been no confirmed reports of massacres of civilians based on their ethnic origin. But the kind of actions outlined by Tuba could raise the already existing ethnic tensions to a boiling point, possibly leading to reprisals and counterreprisals between the Mbundu, Bakongo, Ovimbundu, and other peoples of Angola.

Although the MPLA has concentrated most of its attacks on the FNLA in the north, the fighting in eastern Angola has also continued and may rapidly escalate as the MPLA and UNITA contend for control of the strategic Benguela railway. The UNITA, which has received logistical support from South African troops, attempted to take the cities of Henrique de Carvalho and Teixeira de Sousa, but was unable to dislodge the MPLA. According to reports from the area, the UNITA forces in Luso, on the Benguela railway, were bracing for an MPLA attack.

Jeremiah Chitunda, the UNITA's spokesman at the United Nations, said that if the UNITA's front lines collapse, as a result of a cutoff of Western aid, the UNITA would revert to guerrilla warfare. He also admitted that South African troops were in UNITA-controlled territory, but denied that they were fighting with the UNITA (*Christian Science Monitor*, January 16).

MPLA Seeks to 'Discipline' Workers

In addition to arresting or deporting an unknown number of dissidents and political activists in the Luanda area, the MPLA has taken measures to tighten its hold over the population as a whole in the regions it occupies. Under a cover of "socialist" demagoguery, the MPLA has sought to organize an administrative apparatus—utilizing "people's power" groups, "neighborhood committees," and "workers commissions"—to control and "discipline" the working class.

Some of these groups originally developed independently of the MPLA. Several "neighborhood committees" were formed by Luanda slum dwellers in 1974 in response to armed attacks by white settlers. The "workers commissions" arose during the strike wave that swept Luanda and other cities following the April 1974 Portuguese coup. After the strike wave ended in mid-



COLBY: Spy chief says it would be "the height of absurdity to say that CIA should not give some help" to MPLA's rivals.

1975, the MPLA dissolved or reorganized them with the aim of transforming them into bureaucratically controlled organs capable of imposing MPLA policies on the masses.

René Lefort reported in the January 3 *Le Monde* that MPLA decrees specified that government officials are to follow the policies laid down by the MPLA's leading bodies. The function of the "people's power" groups, Lefort continued, was to execute decisions on a local level. To give them at least an appearance of having some authority, the "people's power" groups are to be allowed to veto the appointments of local officials.

From the MPLA's own statements, it appears that the "workers commissions" that were set up in some of the factories have been consigned to a similarly subordinate role. According to the MPLA's scheme, their chief function is to organize stepped-up production—not to represent the interests of the workers.

In a speech published in the December 20, 1975, issue of *Vitória Certa*, an official organ of the MPLA, MPLA leader Agostinho Neto declared that the MPLA faced a battle on two fronts. One was against the FNLA and UNITA and their backers, he said. The other was "the battle of production, the battle of labor, for productivity, against laziness, against idleness, against

sabotage of our rear lines."

Although the MPLA has broken various strikes since early 1975, and has instituted speedup and longer work hours since gaining power in Luanda, it has apparently not yet won this "battle of production." Neto complained of "insufficient" work in the factories, saying, ". . . it seems that in some factories the workers commissions have time and again failed in organizing production. . . ."

While noting that production was lagging in many enterprises, he singled out the problems the MPLA continued to face at Luanda's port. (The dock workers had been in the forefront of the strike wave.) He denounced the "so-called workers" who "sabotaged" the economy.

Neto also gave some "advice" to the workers on who should be elected to the "workers commissions." He said that they should "not elect to the workers commissions those who speak better, but those who work better. . . ."

In case the workers did not heed Neto's "advice," the same issue of *Vitória Certa* carried a series of articles describing what would happen to a "workers commission" that did not follow MPLA policy.

In Dondo, more than 100 miles southeast of Luanda, an MPLA Action Group at the SATEC factory, which employs 1,200 workers, organized a campaign for the ouster of the existing "workers commission." At a factory assembly held November 24, a motion was pushed through denouncing the "labor aristocracy" leadership of the commission for not solving the administrative problems of increasing production.

The MPLA's subdelegate in Dondo, Pakassa, who spoke at the assembly, also denounced the workers. He said that "the worker comrades of SATEC are totally undisciplined, and the drop in production in this factory is caused by the indiscipline of the workers." He also told the SATEC workers that their allies included "the patriotic comrades of the national bourgeoisie."

A January 12 United Press International dispatch from Johannesburg reported that strikes had taken place in Quibala in the southern area of the MPLA's region of control. If true, the UPI report would indicate that the MPLA still faces challenges to its anti-working-class policies.

"The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola," UPI reported, "said in a broadcast from Luanda, its capital, that walkouts by teachers, electricians, bakers, nurses, mechanics and civil servants had almost paralyzed essential services in the town of Quibala and surrounding districts."

"The Luanda radio called on the strikers to return to work immediately. It gave no reason for the strikes." □

How FBI Provoked Shootings, Beatings in San Diego

"As a result of our efforts, the Black Panther party in San Diego is no more. It has been completely done away with."

That was the boast of the San Diego, California, headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover in early 1970. Documents recently made public by the Senate Intelligence Committee directly implicate the FBI in the 1969 murder of two members of the Black Panther party (BPP), the wounding of four other Black activists, and additional terrorist activities in San Diego, including several shootings and a bombing.

"We were not trying to get people to kill each other," claimed James B. Adams, deputy associate director of the FBI, when he was confronted with the evidence that the secret-police agency had stirred up violence between the Panthers and US, a Black nationalist group.


Adams told *Los Angeles Times* reporters Ronald J. Ostrow and Narda Zacchino that the FBI was trying to prevent US and the Panthers from joining forces and "to reduce their effectiveness. I don't know of any action that was designed to produce violence."

However, the San Diego FBI office, reporting on its progress in disrupting the Black movement, said in a three-page memorandum dated September 18, 1969, "Shootings, beatings and a high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of southeast San Diego. Although no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this overall situation, it is felt that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributable to this program."

The FBI began its disruption program in San Diego at least three months before the first killing, the shooting of John Arthur Savage, a twenty-one-year-old Black Panther, in May 1969.

One FBI tactic was to circulate cartoons, attributed to US, that depicted the Panthers as police agents. After the August 15, 1969, killing of Sylvester Bell, who was distributing the Black Panther newspaper at a shopping center, the San Diego FBI office wrote, "a new cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will assist in the continuance of the rift between BPP and US."

One US member was wounded in the dispute with the Panthers, and a former federal investigator who talked at the time with two FBI agents assigned to US and the Panthers reports that one of the agents said, "That's two for me and one for you guys." The other agent responded, "That's



Militant

Example of FBI artwork, circulated to provoke violence in Black movement.

all right. I'll catch up."

The efforts to "catch up" may have included the bombing of the US headquarters on August 30, 1969. The September 18 memorandum said, "Efforts are being made to determine how this situation can be capitalized upon for the benefit of the counterintelligence program, and any possibilities will immediately be submitted for approval by the bureau."

Not only did the FBI initiate and encourage the use of violence between US and the Panthers, it also attempted to terrorize anyone who tried to put a stop to the quarrel. Leon Williams, San Diego's first Black member of the city council, tried to negotiate a truce between US and the Panthers in 1969. He told reporters that San

Black Leaders Urge Support to SWP Suit

The continuing disclosures about the FBI's vicious attacks on the Black liberation movement have prompted widespread protests. On January 15, the anniversary of the birth of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Political Rights Defense Fund* made public one such protest.

Fifteen prominent Black leaders signed a letter urging support to the lawsuit initiated by the Socialist Workers party and Young Socialist Alliance in 1973 against government harassment, surveillance, and disruption. They pointed out, "Socialists aren't the only victims of the government's illegal tactics. A White House official once proclaimed that the most serious issue facing

*P.O. Box 649, Cooper Station, New York, New York 10003.

Diego's police chief and city manager twice told him that they had learned from the FBI that the Panthers had put out a "contract" on his life.

George Stevens, head of the San Diego Congress of Racial Equality, also attempted to start peace negotiations. He reported that the FBI told him too that he was marked for death by the Panthers.

Although the material released by the Senate committee pertains only to San Diego, the Black Panther party was victimized and eventually destroyed by a concerted, nationwide police offensive from 1969 to 1971. The FBI was definitely involved in the assassination of Panther leaders Mark Clark and Fred Hampton in Chicago in 1969. Even the *New York Times* was forced to admit in a May 18, 1970, editorial that "the Chicago police appeared to have taken the offensive with the advice and consent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. . . ." Since then, it has been revealed that the FBI had an agent in the top leadership of the Chicago Panthers, who provided police with a floor plan of the house where Clark and Hampton were gunned down.

There can be little doubt that the friction between the Panthers and US in Los Angeles was also fanned by the FBI, to give another example. In that case, US members George and Larry Stiner shot and killed Alprentice "Bunchy" Carter and John Huggins, both Panther members, following a Black student meeting at the University of California at Los Angeles in January 1969. □

the Nixon administration by mid-1970 was the 'Black problem.'"

Giving the example of the murderous attacks on the Black Panthers, the signers ask, "To what extent was the government complicit in the murders" of Martin Luther King and Malcolm X?

They conclude that "victory in this [SWP and YSA] case will mean a victory for the political rights of all."

A number of well-known Black elected officials signed the appeal, including Georgia State Representative Julian Bond; Congressman Ronald Dellums; Washington, D.C., City Council member Julius Hobson; and Manhattan Borough President Percy Sutton.

Also signing were Black Panther party

British National Union of Students Debates Policy

By Skip Ball

SCARBOROUGH—The semiannual conference of the National Union of Students (NUS) was held at the seaside convention center here December 5-8, 1975. More than 1,200 delegates and observers debated what policies the union, representing almost 700,000 British college and university students, should follow.

The NUS is the only national student organization in Britain. It has a long tradition of fighting around issues of education and the level of student grants. (The overwhelming majority of British students go to college on government grants.)

Since the late 1960s the NUS leadership has been a coalition of supporters of the left wing of the Labour party's parliamentary caucus, of the Communist party, and unaffiliated students. This coalition, known as the "Broad Left," removed a clause from the constitution prohibiting the NUS from taking "political" stands.

Attempts to drive the mass of students away from the NUS through red-baiting have failed and the authority of the NUS has been enhanced by its democratic structure. Weekly or fortnightly "Union General Meetings," where local policy is made by vote of all those students who attend, are a regular feature on most British campuses.

Such meetings also present resolutions to the national NUS conferences, elect and instruct delegates, and determine the actual conference agendas by assigning priority to the motions to be discussed.

The central campaign of the "moderates" at the December 5-8 conference was to eliminate the current method of delegates electing national NUS officers. Recent victories by conservatives in trade-union elections held by postal ballot led the right wing of the NUS to believe that restricting the power of local campus meetings and NUS conferences could further their cause.

Despite considerable preconference publicity and encouragement from the right-wing press, the hastily formed "Students for Representative Policies" failed in its attempt. NUS Deputy President Al Stewart summed up the sentiment at the conference by saying, "If the right wing want control of this union let it do it the way the left did in 1967—by fighting for its proposals amongst students."

But most debate at Scarborough was between the Broad Left coalition currently leading the NUS and its opponents on the

left—especially the International Socialists (IS) and the International Marxist Group (IMG), British section of the Fourth International.

For example, the Broad Left called for support to the trade-union leadership's demand for "selective import controls" as a means of dealing with unemployment. A Communist Party Students leaflet arguing in favor of this protectionist measure for British industry charged that opponents of it "cannot really grasp the concept of a national planned economy."

Hugh Lanning, a member of the NUS Executive not in the Broad Left, told the conference, "I support more demonstrations against unemployment. I don't support closing down plants in Italy and France to keep one open in Britain."

The attitude of the different left forces at the conference was also illustrated by the issue of how to relate to the trade unions. The Broad Left's concept of unity with the trade unions is to meet with the leaders of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), occasionally calling a joint demonstration. The IS counter that NUS should have no dealing with "the Trade Union bureaucracy left or right." The IMG argues that the NUS should try to work with TUC leaders while encouraging joint local actions between NUS chapters and rank-and-file workers.

The formal positions adopted by the NUS conference were for the most part far to the left of those held by the most radical sectors of the TUC leadership or the left-wing Labourites in Parliament. For example, the conference went on record in opposition to the £6 limit in pay increases that has unanimous backing from the "left" leaders in Parliament and the TUC. In practice, however, the Broad Left has a record of abstaining from organizing militant struggle to actually implement the NUS program.

The IMG centered its criticism of the Broad Left on its failure to initiate any student action on a wide range of issues. The record of the NUS Executive on mobilizing students against the government's economic policies, for example, was so poor that when an IMG delegate called for rejection of the Broad Left's report on NUS activity in this area, NUS President Charles Clarke, who gave the report, voted in favor of the motion.

Similar criticism on the lack of action around the issues of women's rights led to

the conference rejecting that entire report on this issue.

In assessing the performance of the Broad Left, Peter Wilby commented in the December 12 *New Statesman* that "the student Broad Left, in short has gone gradualist. The spirit of the Fabian Society has reappeared in the most unlikely place."

Deputy President Stewart demonstrated his approach when he pleaded at one point, "Conference must give me a policy to take to Government."

The IMG, in contrast, fought for building militant mass actions in which students could link up with broader sectors of society.

On other political issues, the Broad Left was able to suppress any discussion of Northern Ireland, although they did participate in a debate with the Troops Out Movement after one evening session of the conference. The conference voted to support the MPLA* in Angola and condemn South African intervention in the civil war.

Broad Left failure to criticize the repression in India and its repeated association of NUS with the bureaucratic Czech Students Union led to their executive member in charge of international policy being removed from that post by the conference.

John Fairhall commented in the December 8 *Guardian*: "The effect of Communist [party] influence has been to make international affairs the Achilles heel of the Broad Left NUS leadership. There have been consistent attacks at NUS conferences on evasive Executive reports on Soviet dissidents. . . ."

Fairhall's assessment is accurate, but the Broad Left has another weak spot not mentioned by him. The coming year is going to put its leadership to a difficult test. Unemployment is hitting students very hard, with job opportunities in many occupations drying up. In this harsh economic climate, "taking policy to Government" will not be an adequate response. □

*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).—IP

Israel Opens New Golan Settlements

The third Israeli settlement to be established on the occupied Golan Heights since December was opened January 9. Residents of a fourth settlement under construction are scheduled to move in shortly.

The name of the latest settlement is "Shaal," apparently inspired by the slogan of the right-wing Land of Israel Movement, "Aff Shaal," or "Not an Inch."

One woman settler told a reporter, "We wanted Shaal to be Israel's answer to the Palestinian presence in the Security Council."

Wilson Sends Counterinsurgency Unit to Northern Ireland

By David Russell

A new outbreak of sectarian murders in the imperialist-ruled enclave of Northern Ireland has been seized upon by the British government as a pretext for stepping up its repression against the oppressed Catholic minority. On January 6 the Labour government announced that it was sending 600 troops to South Armagh, where the killings occurred.

The additional troops, doubling the earlier army garrison in South Armagh, were dispatched at the demand of right-wing Protestant organizations. In a further concession to rightist sentiment, the Wilson government announced January 7 that the troop reinforcements would also include a 150-man detachment from the Special Air Service. The SAS, a unit frequently compared with Washington's "Green Berets," is known for its record of political assassination and CIA-style intrigue.

Special Air Service units have been active in "counterinsurgency" operations in Oman in the politically sensitive Arab-Persian Gulf area. Their new assignment was hailed by one Tory member of Parliament as "the first move by the present Government since it came to power which shows any indication that they mean business in fighting the terrorists in Northern Ireland."

The occasion for the imperialist offensive was provided by a series of shootings. On January 4, masked Protestant terrorists killed five Catholics in attacks on two isolated farmhouses. The following night a small bus taking textile workers home was ambushed, and ten Protestants were left dead. A group calling itself the South Armagh Republican Action Force claimed responsibility for the attack on the bus, saying it was in retaliation for the previous killings.

Whoever was behind these heinous murders, it is clear that the only beneficiary is British imperialism. At one time the British rulers openly fostered the sectarian division of Ireland as a means of retaining their rule. Today, they try to cultivate an image of benevolent neutrality between Catholics and Protestants, as if they have been maneuvered into occupying part of Ireland against their will.

In practice, however, British troops have consistently been used to wear down the resistance to second-class citizenship and national oppression in the Catholic ghettos. The right-wing Protestant terrorists have correctly seen the British as their allies.



WILSON: Orders British "Green Berets" into action against Irish freedom struggle.

On another front, the Wilson government has moved to enlist the aid of the nominally independent Dublin regime in its attack on the Irish freedom struggle. Patrick Cooney, justice minister in the Dublin government, called January 6 for "full and total cooperation on both sides of the border with the security forces."

Supporters of Irish independence have also faced increased pressure inside the United States. There are strong indications that the Ford administration and the Wilson government worked together in orchestrating their moves. The *New York Times* printed a front-page article by Bernard Weinraub December 16, 1975, charging that the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) raised money in the United States for relief work, and used it to buy guns for the Irish Republican Army's "Provisional" wing.

Weinraub cited "United States intelligence sources in Washington," who charged "that 75 percent of the money sent by the committee . . . has gone to buy arms, and 25 percent for food, clothing and allowances for Catholic dependants."

Although Noraid members have been charged in a number of cases related to arms violations, the U.S. government has failed repeatedly in attempts to link Noraid

to any gun-running operation. In most cases, it has failed to win convictions against individuals as well.

However, the day after the appearance of Weinraub's article, Prime Minister Wilson addressed the Association of American Correspondents in London. In what Weinraub reported as "an unusual attack," Wilson said: "The fact is that most of the modern weapons now reaching the terrorists in Northern Ireland are of American origin—possibly as much as 85 per cent of them. They are bought in the United States, and they are bought with American-donated money."

Wilson, who had nothing to say about the Protestant terrorist groups, charged, "Those who subscribe to the Irish Northern Aid Committee are not financing the welfare of the Irish people, as they might delude themselves. They are financing murder."

Four days later, on December 22, five Irish-Americans were indicted in Philadelphia by a federal grand jury on charges of smuggling arms and ammunition to the IRA and of acting illegally as IRA agents in the United States. Three of those named, Daniel Cahalane, Neil Byrne, and Daniel Duffy, pleaded not guilty on December 31. The two others, Vincent Conlon and Thomas Reagan, were thought to be in Ireland.

On January 7, in the wake of the wave of killings in South Armagh, the editors of the *New York Times* repeated a charge they had previously made in a December 24 editorial that specifically attacked Noraid. They said "chances are great" that money raised for Irish relief work in the United States would go "not to feed and clothe the suffering but to murder the innocent."

Frank Durkan, the director of the American Committee for Ulster Justice, issued a reply to Wilson's slander that also answered the falsifications of the *New York Times*. In a statement printed in the January 3 issue of the *Irish People*, a newspaper published in New York that reflects the views of the "Provisional" IRA and Noraid, Durkan said in part:

He [Wilson] speaks of support for Warfare from Irish Northern Aid. Every penny collected in this country has been strictly accounted for both in its source, the manner of its distributions, and its destination. The books and records of the Irish Northern Aid Committee are subject to the strictest scrutiny. Agents of the United States Government have pored over them for weeks on end. United States law requires bi-annual reports

of all the dealings of Irish Northern Aid to the United States Department of Justice, and this has been strictly complied with.

To date, no scintilla of evidence has been produced to show that the money goes anywhere except to serve the purpose for which it was collected. Mr. Wilson desires to know what

American reaction would be to a British based organization financing terrorists in the United States. We would ask him instead to put that question to the impoverished and brutalized citizenry of Northern Ireland who have had to cope for the past five (5) years with the British army. □

INTUC³ General Council November 15. She asked the working class to discard its identity as a class and to learn to subordinate its interests to the interests of the nation.

A correspondent of the *Economic and Political Weekly* wrote in the magazine's November 22 issue that a feeling of grave apprehension exists in the labor movement—even in those union organizations that solidly support the government. This could be seen at the INTUC congress where, although Gandhi categorically endorsed the bonus cut,⁴ the INTUC General Council went ahead and asked for a review of the ordinance.

The All-India Trade Union Congress (controlled by the pro-Moscow Communist party of India) is also reported to be restive. According to S.A. Dange, the veteran leader of the AITUC and chairman of the CPI, workers face a "complicated situation on the political and economic front."

In Dange's view, the "big bourgeois and the conservative and rightist elements in [Gandhi's] entourage" are taking advantage of working-class support for her regime "to work out a line of one step forward and two steps backward in relation to the toiling masses."

It is not clear what Dange meant by "one step forward." By "two steps backward" he apparently meant the bonus cut, the drive to increase production, and so forth.

Since Gandhi's coup on June 26, 1975, the regime has seen to it that workers refrain from agitation, not to mention strikes. In fact, this is the test that now determines the accreditation of unions with the government. Under this criterion, only the INTUC, AITUC, and HMS (Hind Mazdoor Sabha—India Workers Assembly) qualify. Other union organizations such as CITU (Centre of Indian Trade Unions) are denied the right to participate in officially sponsored or approved industrial negotiations.

The Indian labor conference has been dismantled, as has the tripartite machinery for negotiations involving workers, employers, and the government. At the same time, the idea of a confederation of three major trade-union organizations—INTUC, AITUC, and HMS—is under active consideration. □

3. Indian National Trade Union Congress, dominated by Gandhi's Congress party.—IP

4. On September 25 Gandhi ordered that the minimum bonus to workers in the organized sector be cut from 8.33 percent to 4 percent.—IP

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Screws Tightened on Labor Movement

Gandhi Orders Fresh Measures to Boost Profits

NEW DELHI—The Gandhi regime offered a package deal to Indian capitalists November 13, 1975, claiming that the new measures would revive the sagging economy, boost the capital market, and stimulate demand in such vital sectors as steel, cement, and textiles through higher investment and increased exports.

The government's strategy for stimulating demand centered on steps to (1) relax the conditions for issuing bonus shares,¹ (2) step up activity in construction, (3) improve urban transport, (4) diversify consumer durable industries, and (5) liberalize the controlled cloth distribution scheme to clear out accumulated stocks.

The decision to relax conditions for issuing bonus shares was one of the most important measures announced. The minimum period between successive bonus issues was reduced from forty to twenty-four months. On an average, about twenty companies issue bonus shares every quarter, involving about Rs. 10 to 12 crores.² A jump in the number of companies issuing bonus shares is evidently expected as a consequence.

The regime has now permitted the public-sector enterprises to go ahead with construction projects. This will remove the glut of bricks, cement, steel, and other building materials. In addition, the Housing and Urban Development Corporation has been permitted to raise Rs. 10 crores from commercial banks to step up activity in construction.

A similar amount has been earmarked in the government's current budget for improving the public transport system. This will give a boost to the private-sector automobile industry, which is in the grips of a severe slump.

Commenting on these measures, a lead article in the *Economic Times* of November 15, 1975, said that they were obviously intended to reassure businessmen and

investors. A *Times of India* editorial of the same date welcomed "the government's willingness to tackle the problems of the economy with an open mind without being unduly hamstrung by ideological shibboleths."

A November 14 share market report in the *Economic Times* showed that share prices rose sharply in Bombay. This jump was one of the most spectacular in the last few months for a single session of the market.

Business and industry circles in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras generally greeted the package deal as a "positive step." They indicated, however, that they expect more from the regime and noted that "relief in installments" did not constitute an integrated approach toward reviving the economy. Various spokesmen for the bourgeoisie also voiced disappointment over the government's refusal to ease the credit squeeze.

The regime announced several months ago, with great fanfare, a voluntary disclosure scheme for the conversion of "black" money (i.e., money on which no taxes have been paid) into "white" money. December 31, 1975, was set as the deadline, and the government urged speculators to come forward with their hoarded wealth.

It is clear, however, that the sums disclosed are not likely to surpass Rs. 200 crores. Describing this as a "paltry yield," an editorial in the December 29 *Times of India* asked whether it justified sacrificing the basic principle that dishonesty should be punished.

The determination to hold on to hoarded black money also has disturbing implications, the *Times* said. It means that the smugglers, hoarders, license-peddlers, and contact men who operate in this twilight zone of the economy still hope that "business" will return to normal sooner or later, and that they do not expect the present price stability to last long.

The Gandhi regime has clearly spelled out what it expects from the working class—increased production at any cost. This was Gandhi's message in her speech opening the fifty-sixth session of the

1. Extra shares issued to stockholders over and above dividends.—IP

2. A crore is ten million units. One rupee=US\$0.113.—IP

International Campaign Wins Freedom for Leonid Plyushch

By Marilyn Vogt

As a result of the international campaign for his freedom, Leonid Plyushch has been released from a psychiatric prison hospital in the Soviet Union and allowed to emigrate with his family. Plyushch, his wife Tatyana Zhitnikova, and their two children arrived in Vienna January 10.

Plyushch, who had spoken out in defense of Ukrainian and Russian dissidents arrested and tried in the 1960s, was himself arrested in January 1972. He was tried in January 1973 and convicted on charges of having committed "especially dangerous anti-Soviet crimes" (Article 62 of the Ukrainian criminal code) while in a state of mental derangement.

Soviet examiners, "specialists" in diagnosing the mental ills of dissidents, determined that he showed signs of "creeping schizophrenia with messianic and reformist ideas," requiring lengthy confinement.

He was sentenced to an indefinite term of compulsory psychiatric treatment. On July 15, 1973, he was transferred from an isolation cell in a Kiev investigation prison to the Dnepropetrovsk psychiatric hospital, where he was confined until his release.

Plyushch, a mathematician, helped found the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR in May 1969. This led to his dismissal from his job as a bookbinder, the only employment he was able to secure after losing his post at the Cybernetics Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1968 for defending arrested dissidents.

After his arrest in 1972, a number of dissidents, particularly those like Tatyana Khodorovich who were associated with the Initiative Group, began publicizing Plyushch's case and campaigning for his release.

In addition, Plyushch's wife, Zhitnikova, carried out her own campaign of protests to all levels of authority in the Soviet Union. She also appealed to numerous foreign organizations and publications, calling for statements and actions in solidarity with her husband.

In the Dnepropetrovsk psychiatric hospital, Plyushch was confined with violently disturbed patients in unsanitary surroundings. He was also administered large doses of drugs that caused his mental and physical condition to deteriorate drastically. After the first few months of forced "treatment," Plyushch could no longer read or write and he had difficulty speaking.

A few months later, his condition was even worse. An international appeal from six Soviet dissidents issued February 12, 1974, reported that "Leonid Plyushch is near death."

The formation of the international group that was to be instrumental in securing



Sunday Telegraph

LEONID PLYUSHCH

Plyushch's release, the International Committee of Mathematicians for the Defense of Shikhanovich* and Plyushch, was announced in Paris in February 1974. It was composed of mathematicians from many countries, including France, England, Canada, Japan, the United States, and Italy.

In addition to making appeals to Soviet embassies and to top Soviet governmental officials demanding Plyushch's release, the committee periodically issued a bulletin containing documents concerning his case. It also called international days of protest demanding his release.

The publicity Plyushch's case received resulted in its gaining broad support, particularly from the French left and trade-union movement, and brought pressure to bear on the Communist parties in France and Italy.

When the committee announced its plans to hold an international rally October 23,

*Yuri Shikhanovich, a Moscow mathematician also arrested in 1972, was released in the summer of 1974.

1975, it reported that a number of French trade unions and individual members of European Communist parties had urged the Soviet government to release Plyushch.

The rally, held in Paris in the great hall of the Mutualité, was attended by 4,000 persons. It had broad sponsorship from the union movement and organizations of the French left, with the notable exception of the French Communist party and the CP-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT).

The pressure on the French CP was intensified during the rally itself when the secretary of the National Education Federation (France's largest teachers union) drew attention to the "serious problem of the empty chairs," referring to the absence of the CP and the CGT. He noted the "unfortunate luck" that the CP had scheduled a demonstration in support of democratic rights for the same day as the Plyushch rally.

The impact of the rally forced the CP to respond in an editorial in its newspaper *L'Humanité* on October 25, stating: "If it is true. . . that this mathematician is interned in a psychiatric hospital solely because he has taken a position against certain aspects of Soviet policy or against the regime itself, we can only affirm in the most forthright manner our total disapproval and demand that he be freed as rapidly as possible."

The pressure of these events was felt in Moscow. On December 26, Tatyana Zhitnikova, who had for months been seeking permission from the authorities to leave the USSR with her husband and family, suddenly received word from the Kremlin bureaucrats that she should reapply for the visas. She was then informed that she, her husband, and family must be out of the Soviet Union by January 10.

A report in the January 11 *New York Times* on their arrival in Vienna stated that although Plyushch himself had no statement to make, Zhitnikova "said he was concerned about other dissidents still confined in Soviet mental institutions." There are at least several hundred such cases, according to a Soviet psychiatrist, Marina Voikhanskaya, who recently went into exile in London. (See *Intercontinental Press*, June 9, 1975, p. 791.)

Neither the state of Plyushch's mental and physical condition since his release nor his and Zhitnikova's destination has been verified. The *Times* reported that "after a

short stay in Vienna, the Plyushch family was expected to travel to Paris."

Plyushch was described as a Marxist by Soviet dissidents who knew him before his arrest. According to Tatyana Khodorovich, he has written a great deal, but the bulk of his work was confiscated by the Soviet secret police, the KGB, in 1969 and 1972 to be used as "evidence" in his trial. Nevertheless, we can get an idea of his thinking from a letter he wrote to the editors of *Komsomolskaya Pravda* in 1968 opposing the slander campaign in the Soviet press against dissidents Ginzburg and Galanskov, who were tried and sen-

tenced early that year. He said:

... the times are gone when the Bolsheviks proudly proclaimed: "We don't fear the truth, for the truth works for us! Their illegitimate heirs (the legitimate ones were exterminated in Stalin's prisons by Beria), the Thermidorians of October, are afraid of the truth. All they are capable of is stereotypes and distorted quotations, served up at random. . . .

I pity those who do not know and do not want to know what has happened and is happening in their land. . . . I hope that the time will come when Stalin and his lackeys will be judged according to the laws of our country, and not by trampling them underfoot. You, the editors of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, will be judged like all the falsifiers, according to the laws of honor.

Under those laws you have already earned the contempt of all honest people, as the lackeys and false witnesses of our day.

The release of Plyushch not only is important for saving his life but is also an example of what can be achieved through mobilizations like that of October 23 in Paris in defense of victims of the Kremlin's repression.

As the release of Plyushch demonstrates, such defense campaigns are of crucial importance in furthering the struggle of those who fight for socialist democracy in the USSR. □

Why It Failed to Win Support

The Air Force Officers' Attempted Coup in Argentina

By Arturo Gómez and Aníbal Tesoro

[The following article appeared in the January issue of the revolutionary-socialist monthly *Revista de América*, published in Buenos Aires. The translation and footnotes are by *Intercontinental Press*.]

Nine years ago, General [Juan Carlos] Onganía led a coup against the Radical¹ government, which was almost as discredited as the current Peronist government is. It amounted to little more than a Sunday outing. A small squad drove up to the Casa Rosada.² The officer in charge said to Dr. Illia:

"Mr. President, you are alone. Not even the Granaderos³ support you. We beg you not to resist."

In a dignified way, the president replied, "I will leave only if forced."

The officer shrugged his shoulders. Then, from the street, he ordered the government palace blanketed with tear gas. Obviously, the president had to leave hurriedly. A short time later General Onganía was installed with the good wishes of the businessmen and the trade-union leadership, and with the massive support of the middle class and the defeated working class. He announced a new twenty-year era.

1. On June 28, 1966, President Arturo Illia of the Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union) was overthrown.

2. The presidential palace.

3. The presidential bodyguard.

It only lasted three, but that is another story. . . .

Last week⁴ in Buenos Aires a group of air force officers, friends of General Onganía calling themselves nationalists and Catholics, entrenched themselves at the Jorge Newbery Airport and Morón Base. They detained the commander in chief of air force operations and seized three radio stations, from which they broadcast inflammatory proclamations against the government.

In their statements they also condemned all the bourgeois opposition parties and, of course, the "unpatriotic subversives," calling on the commander in chief of the army to take power. After five days of confusing negotiations they gave up on terms not known as of the writing of this article.

But although we do not know the terms of the negotiations, in which the intervention of Monsignor Tortolo—the vicar general of the armed forces and chief military chaplain—played a central role, there are two facts worthy of careful attention. One is the almost total isolation of the putschist group, which, in the five days it functioned more or less freely, was unable to gain the support of a single sector of the military or politicians. The other is the isolation and weakness, comparable to that of the putschists, revealed by the Executive Power, whose only support came from a sector of the trade-union bureaucracy.

In the middle, between the government and the putschists, was the overwhelming majority of the bourgeoisie with its political

parties, parliamentary majority, and the bulk of the nation's generals and admirals. This saddled the crisis with a much-discussed, provisional, foot-dragging solution showing—exactly as the commander in chief of the army said—that although the army agreed with the views of the putschists, it was against taking power and had faith in "institutional solutions."

What are these "solutions"? They are the ones demanded by the majority opposition in parliament. They could be, like the Holy Trinity, any one of three types, but they all amount to the same thing: to proceed with elections in October 1976, with the president resigning; to proceed with the elections, with a long leave of absence for Isabel Perón; or, if she resists, to proceed with impeachment proceedings against her for Watergate-style administrative irregularities.

The best indication that the coup was in trouble was that the air force officers did not dare to bomb the Plaza de Mayo and government house as they did in June 1955.⁵ There was also another big difference

5. The date of a navy revolt against the government of Juan Perón.

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with the 1955 coup attempt—the working class and people showed more concern about the terrible heat, the even worse inflation, or the fight to the finish of the national soccer championship by *Estudiantes de La Plata* and *River Plate*. In 1955 thousands of workers rushed to *Plaza de Mayo* asking for arms to defend the Peronist government. This time, it was only on the fifth day of intrigues between the putschists and the “loyalists” that they complied in great numbers and in a disciplined way with a fifty-minute general strike called by the divided trade-union bureaucracy.

Why did the armed forces and the bulk of the bourgeoisie refuse to take power, as they clearly did when faced with the “gorilla” minority in the air force? Particularly in view of the fact that the government is for all practical purposes defenseless, having been discredited before the people and having only scant support from one part of the official party apparatus, a parliamentary minority, and a divided trade-union bureaucracy.

It is because the main bourgeois leaders, both civilian and military, are debating an extremely serious problem at present: the problem of the militant upsurge of the workers movement. Although statistics have not yet been released, 1975 probably raised the curve of hours of work lost in production because of strikes to a very high point.

Even though the Peronist ministers have reduced real wages (by 13 percent for the married unskilled worker in 1975), this economic setback stimulated the working class’s fighting spirit. That spirit is being fanned even more by the fact that the working class feels “betrayed” by a government it had confidence in.

Thus, a political issue has been added to the economic one in a confrontation with the government and the bourgeoisie. This was shown clearly during the first half of last July, when thanks to a peculiar combination of forces, the trade-union bureaucracy, parliament, and opposition parties opposed the counterrevolutionary moves by Minister [José] López Rega, the Rasputin of the Peronist cabinet. At that time a mammoth general strike paralyzed the country for fifteen days.

Although the strikes were never again to become so massive and widespread, owing to the policy of the trade-union bureaucracy, the bourgeoisie faces an extremely hard fight by some sectors of the workers. What are they to do to detour it, slow it down, or eventually smash it? How can they regain control over the factories? How can they create a relatively peaceful political and social future for themselves?

With the December 18 dividing line of the putschist adventure in the air force, we



ISABEL PERON

have their response. Only a tiny sector siding with Onganía—who at the end remained isolated—wants a Pinochet-type gorillaist solution at any cost.

That is because military coups—the all or nothing approach—have been disastrous in the past. In the three recent experiences in which the armed forces took power, they had to abandon it in short order—driven out by the masses—leaving the country mired in formidable crises.

The gorilla dictatorship of Aramburu and Rojas⁶ had to turn over constitutional power to [Arturo] Frondizi after three years. One year after Frondizi was brought down, they had to accept the victory of Illia. And three years after Illia was overthrown came the Cordobazo⁷ and the beginnings of Onganía’s road to the cross.

With their fingers burned by such experience, the armed forces rejected a few months ago the fascistic nightmare of López Rega; and they now reject the bonapartist appeal, which, in the name of St. Thomas and the restoration, Onganía’s air force friends made.

Interpreting the doubts and fears of the bourgeoisie, the armed forces have leaned once again toward the institutional path—that is, to proceed with elections while

6. Gen. Pedro Eugenio Aramburu and Adm. Isaac Rojas led a successful military coup in September 1955.

7. The 1969 semi-insurrection in the city of Córdoba.

pressuring the government, accentuating its reactionary course, and obtaining wage exploitation measures that not even a military dictatorship could achieve. At the same time they will seek to divide, encircle, and absorb the government. This is how the armed forces seek to eliminate the party that has a political hold over the workers. If the workers are divided, the elections would be manageable for the three or four main bourgeois candidates, all of whom hold a hard anti-working-class position in common.

Thus, while the bourgeoisie sharpens its weapons of military, police, and parapolic repression, holding them in reserve for the most explosive workers struggles, in public it leans toward an electoral solution—a solution dictated by its failures with the mass movement and the strength of the current labor struggles. And why not? A speculation that comes immediately to mind is that by not throwing the government out now they may be seeking to avoid a martyrdom that could make Isabel Perón a political trump card.

We do not know whether the Argentine tradition that “nothing happens” during the summer will be respected this time. Normally during that season the leaders go to the beaches and draw pictures in the sand of plans, which are often carried away by the Atlantic winds. If the scope of workers’ strikes does not prevent the bourgeoisie from taking vacations this summer, the predominant plans will concern the electoral alchemy of October 1976, the card they are playing to sidetrack the rise of the workers movement. □

Sign of the Times

“Two of the three largest banks in the United States have been placed on a supersecret list of problem banks by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency,” according to a report in the January 11 *Washington Post*.

New York’s First National City Bank (Citibank) and Chase Manhattan Bank, which have combined assets of \$100 billion, were placed on the list after examinations revealed “inadequate” capital at both banks.

Banks are usually placed on the problem list when their total “classified” assets (mainly doubtful loans) exceed 80% of their capital.

Although the *Washington Post* report said that “there is no indication that either of the giant banks . . . faces any immediate financial difficulties,” it noted that an examination conducted early last year showed that Chase Manhattan had “classified” assets totaling 97% of its capital. The figure at Citibank, in an examination completed last July, was 114%.

Maspero Bookstores in France May Be Forced to Close

By F.L. Derry

PARIS—For twenty years the two bookstores on rue St. Séverin in Paris's Latin Quarter have been known to leftists throughout the world simply by the name of their owner: Maspero. The official name of the two stores is "La Joie de Lire" (The Joy of Reading). Now, mysterious financial manipulation may have accomplished what two decades of police attacks and fascist bombs failed to do—force La Joie de Lire to close its doors.

The bookstores were founded in 1955, just one year after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Fighting had already begun in Algeria, which was to mark another chapter of French imperialism's long struggle with a colonial empire in active rebellion.

French leftists at this time faced a serious problem: No antiwar and anti-imperialist literature was circulating through "normal" channels. Regular bookstores and bourgeois publishers were actively boycotting such material.

It was to aid in solving this problem that twenty-three-year-old François Maspero opened the two stores. He was aided by such others as Editions Minit, a leftist publishing house originally created under clandestine conditions during the Nazi occupation in World War II. Four years later, in 1959, the operation was expanded to include its own publishing house: Editions Maspero.

In addition to the welcome reception received from young leftists, Maspero received some unwanted attention from a somewhat different source. The terrorist OAS (Organisation de l'Armée Secrète—Secret Army Organization) had begun its campaign to prevent a French withdrawal from Algeria. What could be a more likely target than an anti-imperialist bookshop?

Plastic explosives became the all too common greeting card of the OAS. Meetings in the store had to be held in the basement, relatively protected from the effect of bombs.

There were also many near-misses, such as the one involving a slightly inebriated late-night partygoer. Returning home early in the morning, he found a small box in his way directly in front of La Joie de Lire. He kicked it across the street and the resulting explosion destroyed a nearby store, miraculously without individual injuries.

During the revolutionary upsurge that nearly toppled the French government in May 1968, La Joie de Lire became a natural

rallying place for young revolutionists, as well as a target for repression. Such repression against one of the many demonstrations at that time forced hundreds of demonstrators to take refuge in the store. Police then tossed in tear-gas grenades and barricaded the entrance. Forced to remain in the packed, tear-gas-filled store overnight, several demonstrators temporarily lost their eyesight.

Editions Maspero was leftist but "non-party." Works by Frantz Fanon and Che Guevara, by Trotsky and Mao, are among the literally thousands of books and pamphlets published over the years. But above all else, Maspero was associated with the Tricontinental Congress held in Havana, with the Cultural Revolution in China, and with the struggle against the war in Vietnam.

It was Maspero who distributed the French edition of *Tricontinental*, the magazine associated with the international Castroist current. This magazine was banned in France, and Maspero was often severely victimized for distributing it.

In 1970 Maspero joined the Ligue Communiste (Communist League), at that time the French section of the Fourth International. In a statement released at that time, Maspero declared that the overall political character of the bookstore and publishing house would remain unchanged. Several separate lines of books under the Maspero label were started, however. These included "Livres Rouges," "Cahiers Rouge," "Classiques Rouge," which were, according to the Maspero catalog, "published in collaboration with the Ligue Communiste and under its direction."

Two particular problems became increasingly important for Maspero over recent years: fines imposed for the circulation of illegal literature and massive theft of books from La Joie de Lire.

Under French law, books and magazines can be banned by order of a government censorship board. Even the list of banned books has been censored and cannot be legally published in France. When a book is banned, the stock of the book at publishers and distributors is seized and destroyed.

Book distributors would refuse to take Maspero's literature for fear of suffering a financial loss if the book were suddenly banned. Other publishing houses would refuse to take controversial manuscripts.

Maspero, however, refused to buckle before the censorship.

When a new book was printed, the stock was hidden in many different locations so it could not be seized. The bookstore continued to sell forbidden magazines such as *Tricontinental* and *Mundo Obrero*, the newspaper of the Spanish Communist party. For continuing to circulate forbidden books, both Maspero and La Joie de Lire were repeatedly and heavily fined.

La Joie de Lire's second problem was theft. A normal bookstore generally suffers between 2 and 7 percent theft. At Maspero this rose to between 12 and 17 percent—thief done on an organized basis. Books stolen at La Joie de Lire were sold at tables set up on college campuses.

Some political "spontanéists" justified their theft of books on the basis that Maspero was "making money off the back of the revolutionary movement." Nevertheless, for a long period of time the personnel at the store refused to interfere with the quite visible theft rings for fear of acting as a "repressive force."

However, La Joie de Lire survived and, in its own way, prospered. It serves several thousand customers a day. One separate room, selling only revolutionary newspapers and pamphlets from around the world, averages between 300 and 500 customers a day.

La Joie de Lire has been the expression of an important layer of mostly student youth who consider themselves to be Marxist revolutionists. In many universities these young Marxists clearly make up the overwhelming majority.

Often they are unaffiliated to any of the groups claiming to be revolutionary that abound in France. Others have already been members of one or several such organizations, constantly looking for the group that can demonstrate in action that it has the program and the abilities to initiate and lead effective mass struggles.

It is to La Joie de Lire that they have turned to search out the programs and ideas of the revolutionists of the past who have been able to accomplish this task, and of the groups of the present that claim to follow in this tradition.

In December 1974, Maspero sold the two stores that make up La Joie de Lire, as well as another store in Montpellier in the south of France, in order to concentrate on the publishing house. The new owner brought

in a partner, B. Lallement. It is he who is accused of creating the current crisis.

The November 1975 newsletter of Editions Maspero says that it was Lallement who "gave the history of 'La Joie de Lire' a sordid turn. Incompetence? Stupidity? Time will tell, perhaps. What is certain is that up to this very day, M. Lallement has paid no one, including us, for the price agreed upon for the store, the publishers who have sold him books, or finally the store staff, who have gone out on strike. . . ."

Having made his initial 10,000 francs [1 franc=U.S.\$0.224] deposit on the 3 million franc sale, Lallement apparently stopped investing his own money in the store. Additional payments to Maspero for the purchase of the store were made directly from the cash receipts at La Joie de Lire.

This left no money to pay the publishing

houses and book distributors, who eventually cut off the supply of books. Next Lallement launched a pornographic magazine using the store's mail-order facilities.

Within eight months, one of Paris's most active bookstores had been ruined. In September 1975, Lallement announced the firing of most of the staff, who then proceeded to occupy the store. It has now been reopened under a state-appointed administrator while bankruptcy hearings are held.

Since Maspero has not been paid for the sale of the bookstores, Editions Maspero itself is threatened. Negotiations are now being held between the bookstore staff, Maspero, the new administrator, and the major book publishers.

It seems possible that a combination of

publishing houses will take over direct management of La Joie de Lire. Meanwhile, charges have been made by members of the staff as well as by a number of political groups that Lallement has intentionally ruined La Joie de Lire for some political reason.

A support committee, initiated by the workers at La Joie de Lire, has been organized. In addition to organizing the negotiations with the publishers, it has been gathering support from writers and other well-known figures. Each night, different cultural events have been held at the store, at which authors autograph their books and speak on a variety of topics. The address of the support committee is Comité de Soutien, La Joie de Lire, 19 rue St. Séverin, 75005 Paris, France. □

The Herring Crisis in Iceland

North Atlantic Fishing—Victim of the Anarchy of Capitalism

[The following article was published in the December issue of *Neisti*, the organ of the Fylking, an Icelandic revolutionary-socialist organization. The translation from the Icelandic is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

For several months, the various political forces in this country have been gearing themselves up to exploit the territorial-waters question to the hilt. Their aim is not to maintain the stocks of fish or to ensure the livelihood of Icelandic workers. No! Their objective is to use this question to cover up the anarchy of capitalism, to distract the workers from the tasks posed by the class struggle, to use the territorial-waters question in their political game, to advance their own interests.

Fishing is an industry subject to ups and downs. But the technical advances of recent years have created the preconditions for improved stabilization. The behavior of fish is better known. Fishing technology and more efficient equipment have greatly increased the volume of the catch.

However, this higher technology has not brought greater stability to the fishing industry but made it still more subject to ups and downs. Capitalism's unbridled drive for profit has led to this technology being used in such a way that many species of fish are endangered.

An example of this anarchy inherent in capitalism is the development of herring fishing in Iceland over the last decade. High prices for herring and herring meal, along with large catches, caused a flow of capital into herring fishing and processing. One after another, all the credit-floated big

operators beat on the doors of the banks for loans to buy herring boats, herring processing machinery, or herring-oil extraction equipment.

As most people remember, the herring catch dropped by half between 1966 and 1967. But it was precisely in 1967 that investment in herring fishing reached its peak. That year thirty new boats were bought, in comparison with fifteen the year before, and twelve the year before that. The Icelandic capitalists had spent billions of kronar* gained from increased exploitation of the workers to buy equipment specifically designed for herring fishing. In its blind drive for profit, the Icelandic capitalist economy ignored the fact that the numbers of herring its fleet could take far exceeded what the schools of herring could sustain.

The Icelandic working people know the consequence of this anarchy. The downturn that developed in 1967 and lasted until 1970 was a direct result of this anarchy in the exploitation of herring and the dismal overinvestment in herring boats and processing equipment. Rot set in in the herring pickling barrels. The herring-oil extraction equipment rusted. And boats made for herring fishing had to be converted to other types of operations. The increase in the herring catch in the North Sea in 1969-70 did make it possible to get some use out of the herring boats.

The Fylking has pointed out many times that in the anarchy of capitalism the profit

drives of the individual capitalists come into conflict with the demands of overall economic development. This is nowhere clearer than in the case of the fishing industry. The individual capitalist takes only a small part of the total catch. So this capitalist can organize only a small part of the fishing industry. A small increase in the catch of one capitalist will not have a decisive adverse influence on the stock of fish. At the same time, such a small increase can solve this capitalist's economic problem. Thus, all of these individual capitalists together, each following their own profit drive, combine to increase the catch beyond the reproductive capacity of the fish.

Control has to be established over the fishing industry as a whole to prevent depletion of the fish. To achieve this, it is necessary to curb the right of the individual capitalists to treat their ships as private property. Their right to control the fishing done by these ships must be reduced. The incomes of the individual maritime concerns have to be organized so that they are not dependent on the volume of the catch each brings in but on the total income of maritime operations.

Such an organization of the fishing industry cannot be achieved by means of a "natural resources tax," as some bourgeois thinkers here consider. Because of the ups and downs in the fishing industry and the more or less chance variations in the catch of individual fishing boats, it is impossible to organize the fishing industry with the help of a "natural resources tax."

*96 Icelandic kronar equal US\$1.00—IP

There is another feature of the capitalist system that makes it particularly difficult to rationalize the fishing industry. In the capitalist market, cyclical and more or less accidental swings occur in the prices of specific commodities. When the price of one kind of fish goes up, a swarm of capitalists outfit ships to catch that fish. Unable to judge how long the price for this species will remain high (in general the capitalist market does not offer such possibilities), the capitalists begin to order boats and fishing equipment to exploit certain fishing grounds. When the ships and equipment are ready, then the market price drops. The capitalists are stuck with investments that mount up into the millions and billions. To avoid bankruptcy, they have to step up their effort, increase the volume of the catch and their overfishing.

Such situations are unavoidable under the capitalist system. Only with socialist planning will it be possible to assure rational exploitation of the sea. Such planning requires abolition of the right of private property and of the "control" of economic life by individual profit drives. Such planning requires a socialist revolution.

The main argument used to defend the extension of territorial waters to the 200-mile limit is that this is a way of protecting the stock of fish. It is obvious that if British and German trawlers do not fish within the 200-mile limit, then the size of the catch will be reduced by the amount they now take. It is obvious that if the Icelandic capitalists not step up their effort to the same extent that the British and German capitalists decrease theirs, overall fishing will be reduced, and the result will be that the resources of the sea will be protected within certain limits.

But let us examine this question more closely. It is most important to reduce the pressure on the fishing banks within the fifty-mile limit. In 1972, the territorial waters were extended to the fifty-mile limit. What was the response of the Icelandic capitalists and the Icelandic state? Did they seek to limit fishing?

Was any attention paid to the considerable information about the state of the cod banks that had been made available that same year by the International Oceanic Research Board? No!

After the Icelandic capitalists recovered from the 1967-70 slump, they began to invest in the fishing industry. The highly favorable evolution of prices in 1972 and especially in 1973 led to a great increase in investment in the fishing industry. In 1972-74, the capital in Icelandic fishing doubled. But this great increase in investment was not in proportion to the increase in the catch. The volume of the catch rose really only between 1972 and 1974, but in 1974 it

did not come up to the level of 1970.

It is pretty clear that the investment of the Icelandic capitalists led only to increased overfishing. The state of the cod banks is especially bad. The catch dropped from 471,000 tons in 1970 to 379,000 tons in 1973, a decline of 20 percent. Billions of kronar have been thrown into the sea! And now the Icelandic workers are being required to bear the burden of this hopeless anarchy of capitalism.

Immediately following this large-scale investment (while fourteen ships were still in the yards), the report of the state research board was published showing that the Icelandic fishing fleet was too large by half! This fact was not new. Among the marine biologists and economists of the Icelandic capitalists, it had been discussed for several years! But the anarchy of capitalism, in which every capitalist thinks only about his own interests, made it impossible to heed the warnings that had been offered. The fact that a report of the research board has been published now in the fall, immediately after the extension of the territorial limit, is obviously related to the need of the capitalists for believable arguments to justify this action.

The working people and the public are being stampeded into supporting the capitalists by the threat of unemployment. That concern for protecting the fisheries is not the real motive can be seen from the fact that this information has been kept secret for many years! The attitude of the Icelandic capitalists toward fish conservation is shown by the fact that last spring they spurned the proposal for setting fishing quotas in the North Sea. At a time when the extension of the territorial limit has been forcing the Icelandic capitalists to present a conservationist face, they declared herring in the North Sea entirely out of danger!

Does anyone believe that these capitalists can be relied upon to defend the conservationist point of view? Can anyone believe that the leading Icelandic capitalists will not try to solve their business problems by increasing their fishing operations? Who trusts the word of *Morgunbladidh* [the main bourgeois paper in Reykjavik] or Geir Hallgrímsson as regards overall control of fishing? Who believes that Icelandic capitalism can overcome its anarchy?

However, the insistence on the claim that extending the territorial limit is motivated by conservationist considerations is grotesque for reasons other than those having to do with the trust we can place in the Icelandic capitalists.

Protecting fisheries in the waters around Iceland cannot be accomplished by one country alone. In comparison to the narrow nationalism of the Icelandic labor leaders, the cod (the fish that next to the labor leaders is the most reliable support of

capitalism on the hallowed Icelandic soil) presents a certain "internationalism."

Two factors in particular caused the drop in the cod catch in recent years. In the first place, the number of fish maturing in these years has been mostly under average. Second, the cod migrations from Greenland decreased because of depletion of the cod banks there.

This example shows clearly that the problem of regulating the exploitation of fish can never be solved within one country's territorial limits. The extension of these boundaries will not solve the problem created by the competition of several countries for the North Atlantic catch. It is necessary to regulate all North Atlantic fishing. It is necessary to set quotas for the catch on the various fishing banks in the North Atlantic.

The capitalist system lacks any capacity to solve this problem. In particular, when the capitalists are in the grip of a crisis, as they are now, competition among the individual capitalist states increases. Each country is trying to solve its crisis at the expense of the others; and all together the capitalists are trying to solve their crisis at the expense of the workers.

The struggle for markets and natural resources is sharpening. Tariffs, currency controls, trade treaties, loans, and credit controls are the economic weapons that are being used. The conflict between the Icelandic and British capitalists over the territorial limit is only a small part of this struggle.

The Fylking supports Lenin's view that in a struggle among imperialist powers, communists cannot back the capitalist class of any one of them. The problem under discussion is capitalist anarchy itself. It will be solved only when the workers of the entire world unite in struggle against the capitalists and their system. Instead of supporting one capitalist class against the capitalists and workers of another country for some momentary interest, the working class ought to fight against the capitalists of its own country for the abolition of the capitalist system. Haven't developments over the last four decades made this clear?

The working class is the only social force that has the capacity to advance genuine conservation of fish reserves. It is the workers who have a fundamental stake in assuring conservation in this field. The capitalists can solve their immediate problems by overfishing. But it is the workers who will have to contend with unemployment and worse conditions when the consequences of overfishing are felt. Isn't the capitalists' herring adventure a grim example of this?

In order to be able to assemble a real force against capitalist plunder, the workers must organize themselves independently and wage their struggle against capitalism.

The Fylking has pointed out that to unite

the various sectors of the fishing industry, it is necessary to abolish the system of tying wages to the catch of the individual boat. To replace this, the fishermen should demand a fixed monthly wage. This is very important to ensure uniform wages for maritime workers. A fixed monthly wage is thus a precondition enabling the fishermen to organize their struggle against capitalist plunder.

We have often pointed out here that to stop the plundering of fish reserves, quotas have to be set for the North Atlantic fishing industry as a whole. The workers represent a force that can wage a real struggle for such regulation. The working class must demand complete information about the real state of the stocks of fish! This is a necessary step in establishing workers control over the capitalist fishing industry. Such regulation must be international. Instead of backing Icelandic capitalism, the fishermen's union should join with the fishermen's unions in Britain and West Germany and other countries involved in North Atlantic fishing. Only on that level will it be possible to establish genuine protection of the stocks of fish.

No one should be surprised that the leaders of the labor movement are now determined followers of Icelandic capitalism in its struggle for an extension of the territorial limit. They paint a grim picture of the unemployment and inflation that will result if the government makes a deal with British capitalism on fishing banks within the 200-mile limit.

However, these leaders have overlooked the responsibility the capitalists bear. Why? Is this because these labor leaders support capitalism and its anarchy? Is it because the "planned and regulated economy" the Althyhubandalagidh [People's Coalition, the Icelandic CP] evoked so grandly when the left government took office has proved to be a dismal overinvestment? The watchword of these labor leaders is the following: "Defend the anarchy of Icelandic capitalism, let the British and West German workers bear the burden of unemployment and inflation."

In this article, we have shown that such a course cannot block the plundering of the sea. This course runs counter to the working-class unity needed to combat the plunder of capitalism. This course will not turn unemployment and inflation from the doors of the Icelandic workers.

The working class now has to put up with an inflation rate of 30 to 40 percent. The struggle to better the conditions of the Icelandic workers must be waged against Icelandic capitalism.

Capitalist plunder has already created a situation in which it is necessary to reduce the catches of fish. This fact is grave and places an important task on the shoulders of the Icelandic working class. It is a task



New York Times

Inner line shows official 50-mile limit as drawn by government of Iceland. Outer line shows approximate extent of a 200-mile limit.

that demands effective working-class solidarity and struggle. Against the labor leaders' support of capitalist plunder, the working class must demand that the capitalists themselves pay the price for their anarchy.

Let us demand full employment! The wage slavery on the fishing boats is outrageous. Let us demand two shifts on the fishing boats without any cut in pay for the fishermen! Then it will be easy to combat unemployment and inflation. Then it will be easy to expose the class collaboration of the labor leaders. Then it will be easy to expose their treacherous game with the territorial limit.

Contrary to what the labor leaders maintain, their objective in stressing the territorial-limit question is not to defend the workers' standard of living and to fight unemployment in this country. Does anyone believe that the union leaders' statements can extract concessions from British capitalism? Does anyone believe that all this talk about "no deals" is anything more than hot air? Could they get by without deals on the fifty-mile limit? The state of the cod banks is as grave now as it was in 1972.

Obviously men like Björn Jónsson, Gudh-

mundur J. Gudmundsson, and Lúdvík Jóseppsson know very well that very little strength is being exerted in the tug of war between British and Icelandic capitalism. These men know very well that the result will be some kind of deal. These men, thus, know very well that the last thing on the minds of the leading capitalists today is to negotiate away their profits. This treacherous game has a twofold objective.

In the first place, the union leaders are trying to play the game that the capitalists have so often played, to divert the attention of the workers away from their class interests and away from the class struggle against Icelandic capitalism as well as its "foreign enemies." While the union leaders have adopted resolutions and called for strikes against any deals on the territorial-waters question, the resolutions on wages and conditions have been left a dead letter. No union meetings have given the slightest consideration to a strike against Icelandic capitalism. Thus, the union leaders are trying to hide their impotence in the economic struggle.

On the other hand, the Althyhubandalagidh and the Althyhuflokkur [People's party, the Social Democrats] have now formed a combination at the union leadership level. The decisions taken by the Althyhubandalagidh party committee meeting and the assembly of the Althyhuflokkur three weeks ago on the question of wages and conditions were clear evidence of this combination.

This bloc is now trying to turn the territorial-limits question into a profitable electoral issue. What is involved here is not the interests of the workers but the narrow partisan interests of the Althyhubandalagidh and the Althyhuflokkur.

• *Expose the union leaders' treacherous game!*

• *Take the road of class struggle against class collaborationism and social imperialism (which is socialist in words but in practice means support for our own bourgeoisie!)* □

Two Deputies Ousted in Brazil

Acting under "special powers," the Geisel regime in Brazil removed two legislators from office January 5, apparently on the grounds that they had links to the Communist party.

President Ernesto Geisel annulled the election mandates and suspended the political rights for ten years of a federal deputy, Marcelo Gatto, and a São Paulo state deputy, Nelson Fabiano. Both are members of the only legal opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement.

Gatto and Fabiano were accused by the national police of receiving help from the Communist party in their election campaigns. Both denied the charge.

Writings of Trotsky (1929)

Reviewed by Tim Wohlforth



The issuing of this volume marks an important stage in the most ambitious publication project of the writings of Trotsky undertaken since the Soviet Union abandoned its complete works of Trotsky under Stalin's pressure in 1927. This volume actually marks the first of the series, which covers Trotsky's writings during his last exile (1929-40). Now the whole series is available, although three volumes remain to be republished in a new format and with expanded contents.

This means that students of Trotsky can now read the series in chronological order, tracing the development of Trotsky's policies on important world events as well as the development of the internal struggle to construct the Fourth International. Therefore the new volume facilitates study, and for those who have already read some of the volumes, restudy, of Trotsky's eleven-year battle to establish the political basis and to assemble the initial cadres for the Fourth International, the continuity of Bolshevism and of Marxism itself.

These volumes comprise all the available writings of Trotsky except those already published in book form. While a massive amount of material remains unavailable in the closed section of the Trotsky archives at Harvard, particularly material related to the internal development of the Fourth International, these volumes permit us to gain a rich understanding of Trotsky and his thinking.

One of the great advantages of the series lies in its chronological organization. Because of this we find combined into single volumes Trotsky's writings on a number of different countries with some of his writings on the problems of constructing the Fourth International under the particular world situation of the time. Thus we see a picture not just of Trotsky, the great thinker, or the brilliant analyst of world events, but most of all of Trotsky the *party man*, who assessed each development in the world situation from the point of view of constructing a new leadership of the working class dedicated to the sole purpose of establishing socialism worldwide.

The circumstances facing Trotsky during the year of this volume, 1929, were perhaps among the most difficult he ever encountered. Between 1923 and 1928 Trotsky

fought for revolutionary policies as a tendency within the Russian Communist party. He faced many difficulties, particularly in the last year of forced exile and isolation in Alma-Ata, but he remained in the USSR and was involved in the political life of the Communist movement there.

Suddenly he was forcibly removed from Russia and transported to Turkey, a coun-

Writings of Leon Trotsky (1929). Edited by George Breitman and Sarah Lovell. New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1975. 461 pp. \$13, cloth; \$3.95, paperback.

try whose language he did not know. He was cut off from old-time collaborators within the USSR, and just when he was beginning to develop relations with collaborators in other countries.

At the same time, the world political situation was extremely difficult. The working class had suffered a series of major defeats because of Stalin's leadership of the Communist International. The German Communists refused to take the revolutionary initiative in the 1923 crisis provoked by France's invasion of the Saar Basin. Stalin became implicated in the collapse of the great British general strike of 1926 through his alliance with the British reformist trade union leadership. Then the revolutionary opportunities of the second Chinese revolution were destroyed in the 1926-27 period because of Stalin's policy of subordinating the Chinese Communist party to the bourgeois Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek. All this demoralized the vanguard of the working class and made things extremely difficult for the small band of revolutionists.

On top of all this came the cynical turn made by Stalin in 1928 and 1929. Faced with the open rebellion of the middle and rich peasants and the virtual collapse of the Soviet economy, Stalin suddenly shifted to an ultraleft position, adopted large portions of the program of the Left Opposition, and in a bureaucratic and totalitarian fashion, imposed a super industrialization drive on the country. In foreign policy Stalin shifted to ultraleftist tactics and phraseology. At

the same time that he was stealing part of the Left's program and distorting it, he stepped up his police pressure on the Left Opposition. The result was a series of capitulations in the Left Opposition—Karl Radek, for example—and a further isolation of the Left Opposition from militant workers in and around the various Communist parties of the world who were taken in for a time by Stalin's demagogy and the prestige of the October revolution.

Nor were the groups that had rallied to the Left Opposition in various countries untouched by the difficulties of the period. These groups were themselves affected by the defeats and demoralization, some broke up into personal cliques, all of them suffered from isolation. In addition, their opposition to Stalin was not in all cases rooted in an alternative struggle for Bolshevism. All may have agreed that Stalin deserved to be criticized, but all did not necessarily agree as to the *causes* of the degeneration of the USSR, or the alternative Bolshevik program around which to assemble the cadres of the Communist movement.

It is perhaps the greatest testament to Trotsky's revolutionary integrity and his profound understanding of Marxism that this man, who had led millions in the struggle for power in a civil war against the imperialists and their agents, could turn with such understanding and patience to work among the tens and at most hundreds of oppositionists scattered around the globe.

Trotsky held no illusions about the difficulties of the period or the immensity of the tasks he now faced in his Turkish exile.

"We are heading for such difficult times that every cothinker, every *potential* cothinker, is precious to us. . . .

"Mass actions tend as a rule to wash away secondary and episodic disagreements and to aid the fusion of friendly and close tendencies. Conversely, ideological groupings in a period of stagnation or ebb tide disclose a great tendency toward differentiation, splits, and internal struggles. We cannot leap out of the period in which we live. We must pass through it. A clear, precise ideological differentiation is unconditionally necessary. It prepares future successes." (Page 80.)

Later he states:

"Revolutionary Marxists have been once again—not for the first time and probably not for the last time—driven into a position of an international propaganda society. By the very nature of things such a situation involves certain elements of sectarianism, which can be overcome only gradually. You seem to be frightened by the smallness of your numbers. This is, of course, unpleasant. It is, of course, best to have organizations numbering millions. But where are we, the vanguard of the vanguard, to obtain organizations of millions the day after the world revolution has suffered catastrophic defeats in the most important countries, defeats produced by a Menshevik leadership that hides behind a false mask of Bolshevism? Where?"

"We are passing through a period of colossal reaction, following the revolutionary years (1917-23). On a new and higher historical stage, we, revolutionary Marxists, find ourselves thrown back into a position of a small and persecuted minority, almost as at the beginning of the imperialist war. As all of history demonstrates, beginning, say, with the First International, such regressions are unavoidable. Our advantage over our predecessors lies in the fact that the situation today is more mature and that we ourselves are more 'mature,' for we stand on the shoulders of Marx, Lenin, and many others." (Page 159.)

Trotsky's approach in this difficult period was to base himself on the conquests of the struggle of the Left Opposition over the preceding five years. This in turn was a development of the basic outlook and strategy of the Bolshevik party and the Communist International under Lenin and the experience of the Great October Revolution. He insisted that there were three basic tendencies within Communism: the right, represented by Bukharin; the center, headed by Stalin; and the Left Opposition.

This assessment immediately brought him into conflict with Boris Souvarine, an early supporter of Trotsky's, who now sought to bring about a fusion of the Left Opposition with the right-wing breakaways from the official Communist parties, most notably Brandler's organization in Germany, which was of some size. Souvarine was typical of a kind of intellectual, demoralized by the rise of Stalinism and the various defeats, who caved in to the pressures of the times, running away from the difficult task of constructing actual organizations on the basis of principle. Before the year was out Trotsky would be forced to break definitively with Souvarine. In an open letter, he concluded:

"I am sure that tomorrow you will not be silent. You will pass to the other side of the barricades. Theoretically, you are already there.

"We record a man overboard and pass on

to the next point on the agenda." (Page 189.)

A more difficult problem came from another quarter. Trotsky was forced in 1929 to modify his assessment that there existed three main tendencies within the Communist movement. He noted the existence of a fourth, though minor, tendency, *ultraleftism*. The main ultraleft grouping was the German Leninbund, led by Hugo Urbahns. This tendency was actually a descendant of the Fischer-Maslow group that led the German Communist party in the period immediately following the passing of the 1923 revolutionary situation. The group, which was closely associated with Zinoviev, attempted to counter the right-wing policies of 1923 by persisting in a revolutionary offensive posture after the revolutionary tide had ebbed.

The main dispute with the Urbahns group in 1929 centered on a serious Sino-Soviet conflict involving the Manchurian railroad. Trotsky defended the right of the Soviet Union to maintain its control over the railroad and opposed its being ceded to China. He felt that under the concrete conditions existing in China at the time, this would mean that the railroad would fall into the hands of right-wing generals in the North and thus endanger both the Chinese revolution and the defense of the USSR. Urbahns insisted it was simply a formal matter of national self-determination, since the area the railroad passed through was populated by Chinese.

However, the dispute actually reflected deeper differences and in that respect was similar to the dispute that broke out within the American Socialist Workers party and the Fourth International in 1939 over defense of the USSR under the concrete conditions of the Soviet invasion of Finland and Poland. Urbahns claimed that the Thermidor (counterrevolution) in the USSR was complete, that a form of state capitalism had been instituted; and he demanded that the Trotskyist forces act as independent parties rather than as an opposition faction within the Communist International.

Trotsky resisted heavy pressure from his own supporters from 1929 until the victory of Hitler in 1933 to write off the Comintern as unreformable. He saw the Communist International and the Russian Communist party as products of the world's first successful proletarian revolution. Although they were caricatures of Lenin's party, Trotsky insisted on continuing the struggle to win over the ranks to Leninist policies. He carried this out without the slightest conciliation to Stalin and his policies. Only when a great objective event, the historic defeat in Germany of the world's strongest and most politically conscious working class, had taken place did Trotsky abandon this policy and move toward the construc-

tion of a fourth international. It was the great events of history, not subjective moods or passing events, that proved to Trotsky the unreformable counterrevolutionary character of Communist parties.

Much of the internal polemics of this period dealt with Urbahns, who received some support here and there among confused oppositionists in other countries. The final break between Trotsky and the Leninbund took place in 1930.

We can note certain important features of Trotsky's approach to all these political problems in assembling the initial cadres of what was to become the Fourth International. First of all, Trotsky proceeded in a principled and objective manner on the basis of principled programmatic positions developed over a period of time. He did not cave in to passing pressures. He knew that he was laying the programmatic foundations for the *future*, and that these foundations had to be sound if massive revolutionary movements were eventually to be built upon them.

Secondly, he proceeded at all times as an *internationalist*. He proceeded from an international perspective and not from the peculiarities of individual countries and parties separated from this international perspective. He did not judge Brandler solely on the basis of German politics. He did not sort out the forces of the Left Opposition in France on French issues alone.

Thirdly, he was painstakingly patient in his dealings with various oppositionists and potential oppositionists. He corresponded with Souvarine, breaking with him only when such a break was unavoidable. He fought for the Leninbund for over a year, despite the arrogant attitude of the Leninbund's leadership. He understood the objective circumstances causing confusion in the ranks of the oppositionists; and without compromise, but with great objectivity, he fought to the end for each confused individual or group, trying to help them find their way into the ranks of the international opposition. No break was precipitous, or politically unclear. Out of each effort, the small cadre of followers was educated and grew in revolutionary stature.

The period was not without significant small successes, the most important being the development of the Trotskyist forces in France and in the United States. Because of Trotsky's extensive knowledge of France, his involvement as a Comintern representative in the early stages of constructing the French Communist party, and his personal contacts with French Communists, oppositionist activity began earlier in France than elsewhere on the continent. However, at the time Trotsky was sent into exile, the oppositionists were split up. A number of conflicting little groups, whose differences

were unclear, formed around different individuals. The groups as a whole were ineffectual.

The major, in many ways historic, break in this situation came with the development of the *La Verité* group through Trotsky's own initiative. This group, consisting primarily of youth, launched a weekly paper as the only way to break out of the impasse and to begin participating in the struggles of workers and reaching the cadres of the CP.

In August 1929 when the weekly *La Verité* was launched, Trotsky greeted it:

"In France the influence of the Opposition is far too slight. This is because there are too many Oppositional groups in France. Many of them are stagnating. From time to time they put out an issue of a magazine containing documents of the international Opposition or episodic articles on isolated questions of French life. The reader forgets the contents of the last issue by the time a new one reaches him. It is indispensable to break out of this situation. It is necessary to supply the masses with correct and systematic Marxist evaluations of all the events of social life. Politics demands the continuity of thought, words, and deeds. That is why politics demands a daily newspaper.

"The Opposition still lacks the resources today to undertake a daily. You are obliged to begin with a weekly. This is already a step forward; provided, of course, you do not stop here but will continue to stubbornly steer—toward a daily." (Page 222.)

This effort did not receive support from all the opposition groups. Among those opposed was the lawyer Maurice Paz, a figure very much like Souvarine, who was content to "oppose" Stalin as an independent intellectual but who resisted building a principled political movement against Stalin that aimed to become the leadership of Communist workers the world over.

Trotsky's correspondence with Paz, included in this volume, has valuable lessons today for every young revolutionist:

"You do not find expressions forceful enough to disparage the five comrades who 'took their inspiration from Constantinople.' This sarcasm is out of place; and in bad taste. These comrades, however busy earning their living, came to help me at their own initiative and at their own risk, here, to Constantinople, at a very difficult time. Their help was invaluable to me. All of this is proper. But there is another part to the story. I said to myself, after having observed them closely, that comrades who are capable of such initiative and such personal sacrifice are revolutionaries, or can become such, because *it is in this way*, Comrade Paz, *that revolutionaries are formed*. You can have revolutionaries both wise and ignorant, intelligent or mediocre. But you can't have revolutionaries who lack

the willingness to smash obstacles, who lack devotion and the spirit of sacrifice. I was not mistaken. These young comrades declared that they were completely prepared to give their time, their forces, their means for a weekly paper, and to mobilize others. So, they are doing what they have promised, and you are sabotaging their work instead of helping them." (Pages 191-92.)

Just as important was the development of the American Left Opposition, led by James P. Cannon, Max Shachtman, and Martin Abern. This group was different from most in Europe because its leadership had considerable experience in the American workers movement and concerned itself from the beginning with the serious task of actually constructing a party organization. Its break with the CP had been more recent and the group was more internally cohesive. It was in this period that Trotsky was able to establish his first contact with the American group and to receive its support in the laborious task of sorting out the various oppositional figures and groups and assembling the serious revolutionary cadres the world over. It was also in this period that the *Militant* was launched as a weekly publication, although it was not able to sustain this schedule until somewhat later.

Trotsky's first public communication with his American supporters is included in this volume. The central points raised by Trotsky then are even more pertinent today.

First of all, he recognized the critical role the American working class was destined to play in the world revolutionary process.

"The work to be achieved by the American Opposition has international historic significance, for in the final analysis all the problems of our planet will be decided upon American soil. . . . We must not for a minute lose sight of the fact that the power of American capitalism rests more and more upon the foundation of the world economy, with its contradictions and its crises, military and revolutionary. This means that a social crisis in the United States may arrive a good deal sooner than many think, and have a feverish development from the start. Hence the conclusion: *it is necessary to prepare*." (Pages 131-32.)

In his conclusions Trotsky points out two specific areas that require the special attention of American revolutionists: the young workers and the Blacks:

"Every member of the Opposition should be obligated to have under guidance several young workers, youth from fourteen to fifteen years of age and older; to remain in continual contact with them, help them in their education, train them in questions of scientific socialism, and systematically introduce them to the revolutionary politics of the proletarian vanguard. Oppositionists who are themselves unprepared for such work should entrust the young workers they have recruited to more developed and

experienced comrades. We don't want those who are afraid of rough work. The profession of a revolutionary Bolshevik imposes obligations. The first of these obligations is to win over the proletarian youth, to clear a road to its most oppressed and neglected strata. They stand first under our banner.

"The trade-union bureaucrats, like the bureaucrats of pseudocommunism, live in an atmosphere of aristocratic prejudices of the upper strata of the workers. It would be tragic if the Oppositionists were infected even in the slightest degree with these qualities. We must not only reject and condemn these prejudices; we must burn them out of our consciousness to the last trace. We must find the road to the most unprivileged and downtrodden strata of the proletariat, beginning with the Negroes, whom capitalist society has converted into pariahs, and who must learn to see in us their brothers. And this depends entirely upon our energy and devotion to this work." (Pages 133-34.)

In order to get the most value out of a book, it is important to understand it at all times in relation to the present situation we face. Our situation has certain similarities with that faced by Trotsky in 1929. We have passed through a long period of more than twenty-five years dominated by a world capitalist boom, during which the only revolutionary developments were headed by other forces, particularly the Stalinists. It was a period of great difficulty for Trotskyists, great isolation, which produced splits, divisions, disorientation, and desertions much like those Trotsky faced in 1929.

But 1975 is not 1929. We do not face a long period of defeats. Rather it is a *transitional* period characterized by the deepening crisis of capitalism worldwide, the revolutionary explosion in Portugal on the very continent of Europe, and the beginning of important class struggles in the United States as well. We find ourselves still with many of the problems of the past, the divisions, the confusions. We cannot shed all these problems as one does a winter coat in summer. We must confront these problems as patiently and in as principled a manner as Trotsky did in 1929.

We are, however, entering a political summer. Opportunities for development are on all sides. Small forces can grow significantly in this new situation; and old disputes, and new confusions, can be tested quickly in developments in the class itself. There is no better time than now to study the whole history of the Fourth International as part of the necessary equipment to tackle these problems. We can only urge young revolutionists especially not to let the ever present pressures of day-to-day existence and activities push aside the just as necessary study of the rich lessons from the principled past of the movement Leon Trotsky initiated. □

AROUND THE WORLD



CIA's Use of Missionaries Protested

The National Council of Churches has urged its members to issue statements protesting the use of missionaries as CIA agents. In a letter to Senator Mark Hatfield written last September, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby admitted the practice, saying, "In many countries of the world, representatives of the clergy, foreign and local, play a significant role and can be of assistance to the United States through the CIA. . . ."

The following month, White House counsel Philip W. Buchen wrote another letter to Hatfield in which he noted that clergymen "are often valuable sources of intelligence," and said, "The President does not feel it would be wise at present to prohibit the CIA from having any connection with the clergy."

The United Methodist Church, with about 800 missionaries operating in eighty countries, and the United Church of Christ have protested the CIA policy of enlisting clergy as agents.

Qabus Claims Victory Over Rebels

The Omani regime is claiming victory in its ten-year war against the Dhofari tribes. The Dhofaris, ethnically different from the Arabs living in the northeast of Oman and long denied economic benefits from the central government, have carried out a

tenacious guerrilla war with support from South Yemen.

Situated on the southeastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Oman is in a strategic position because of its proximity to the oil-rich Arab-Persian Gulf and vital shipping lanes. In addition, the Omani government has now admitted that oil deposits have been discovered in Dhofar.

Sultan Qabus of Oman was aided in the fight against the Dhofari rebellion by a 4,000-man Iranian force and a smaller Jordanian force. The 12,000-strong Omani army is commanded by British Major General Kenneth Perkins and officered by about 350 British soldiers.

Officials of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman deny that they have been defeated and vow to continue their struggle. Although the Omani regime does appear to have improved its position substantially, it has indicated that it will continue to keep the Iranian force in Oman.

Reunification of Vietnam Planned

North and South Vietnam have announced that they plan to hold joint elections as a prelude to reunification of the country. A December 28 United Press International dispatch gave further details, quoting "informed sources" who said that elections for a joint national assembly would take place in early April, and that reunification would be completed by April 30. Hanoi was named as the most likely capital.

Hernán Cuentas Arrested in Peru

Hernán Cuentas, a leader of the Peruvian miners union and the Partido Obrero Marxista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Marxist Workers party), has been arrested by Peruvian authorities.

Cuentas, who is also a member of the International Bureau of the Organizing Committee for the Reconstruction of the Fourth International, has not been charged with any crime, according to the report on his arrest in the January 8-15 issue of the Paris weekly *Informations Ouvrières*.

Following his arrest, Cuentas was sent to the El Sepa penal colony, located in a disease-ridden area of the Amazon jungle, *Informations Ouvrières* reported. Sent to

the colony along with him were another miners union leader, Victor Cuadros Parades, and four lawyers—Ricardo Díaz Chávez, José Ono, Genero Ledesma, and Arturo Salas Rodríguez.

According to *Informations Ouvrières*, information on the arrests was made public December 18 in the Peruvian magazine *Marka*, which published a letter from the wives of the political prisoners.

The same issue of *Marka* also announced the formation of the Committee for Political Amnesty (Copapol), supported by more than twenty trade-union, workers, teachers, and student organizations.

As its first public action, *Informations Ouvrières* reported, Copapol organized a mass meeting of 30,000 persons in Lima to protest political repression.

Pentagon Hails 'Tranquil' Chile

The Pentagon has admitted that its top man in Latin America, Gen. Dennis McAuliffe, recently visited Chile. Columnist Jack Anderson reported January 3 that McAuliffe was warmly welcomed by Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet.

"The Pentagon representative," Anderson said, "told Pinochet how 'serene and tranquil' Chile had become under military rule. The U.S. armed forces, pledged McAuliffe, 'will continue to do everything possible to help the Chilean armed forces.'"

The Pentagon described McAuliffe's trip as a "routine orientation visit," and said his remarks were "a general statement of interest and good will that would apply to other nations he visits."

The Pentagon's statement should be viewed in light of recent disclosures by the Senate Intelligence Committee documenting Washington's continued support for the Chilean torturers. According to the Senate committee:

- The CIA collaborated in preparing "an initial overall economic plan which has served as the basis for the junta's most important economic decisions."

- The CIA assisted the junta "in gaining a more positive image both at home and abroad." Two CIA agents helped the Pinochet regime prepare a "White Book" justifying the overthrow of Allende.

- The CIA has established working relations with the junta's intelligence and security forces.



Christian Science Monitor

Behind the Civil War in Angola

[The following report was approved by the National Committee of the Socialist Workers party at its January 2-4 meeting in Milwaukee. It was presented by Tony Thomas on behalf of the SWP Political Committee.]

* * *

The Political Committee has proposed that we launch a national campaign against U.S. imperialist involvement in Angola. We want to help stop the intervention of the State Department, the CIA, and the Pentagon in the Angolan civil war. We want to help bring the secret moves of the Ford administration into the open and compel Kissinger and his cohorts to disclose the whole truth about their covert operations in Angola.

It is already known that Kissinger allotted at least \$33 million for arms and other aid for the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA) and for the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Sen. Hubert Humphrey stated a few weeks ago that the Ford administration is going to ask for another \$150 million for this coming year.

'Another Vietnam?'

The American people as a whole are worried. They are pressing for an answer to the question: "Is Angola to become another Vietnam?" The question is being argued on a broad scale. This is a debate in which we are already involved. We propose a response like the one given during the Indochina war—a broad campaign of mobilization and propaganda around the slogan, "U.S. out of Angola. Not one penny, not one bullet, not a single adviser or soldier, into Angola."

We should not underestimate the danger of American military intervention, despite Kissinger's pledges not to commit U.S. troops. The American Committee on Africa reported on December 19 that American soldiers are being pressured by officers at various bases to resign and sign up as mercenaries for the FNLA and UNITA. The committee also disclosed that American air force units have been put on alert to fly tactical air strikes in defense of South African troops in Angola, should the situation require it.

The propagandists of the Ford administration repeat the same line used to justify intervention in the Vietnamese civil war. They point to the alleged threat of a "Communist take-over." They remain silent

about the four centuries of Portuguese imperialist domination. They remain silent about Washington's long-term policy of active support to Portugal's war against the right of the Angolan peoples to determine their own fate.

In the ten years before the rebellion in Angola erupted in 1961, Washington gave \$298 million to Lisbon in military aid. In some years during this period the United States provided more than half the Portuguese military budget.

After the Angolans began fighting for their freedom in a way reminiscent of the American colonists of 1776, Washington continued to help the Portuguese. Portuguese officers and troops were trained at American military installations, including the Green Beret base at Fort Bragg.

During the last years of Portuguese colonial domination, American imperialism increased its support to Portugal against the African rebels.

Tad Szulc, formerly a correspondent of the *New York Times*, described the policy toward southern Africa laid down by Kissinger in 1970: "In a National Security Decision Memorandum secretly issued by the NSC [National Security Council] in January 1970, the administration set forth a new policy of 'communication' with white regimes in southern Africa (including Portugal as the ruling power in Angola and Mozambique) on the grounds that 'the whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them' and that 'there is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will lead only to chaos and increased opportunities for the Communists.'"

What Imperialists Are After

Wall Street's interest in Angola centers on its resources.

Angola is the third-largest coffee producer in the world. Much of its production goes to the United States.

Diamond mines owned by American, South African, Belgian, and Portuguese interests produced more than two million carats in 1972 alone, with an export value of some \$110 million.

The country has important deposits of iron ore, manganese, phosphates, copper, granite, marble, and asphalt.

Most importantly, Angola has oil. Gulf Oil's concession in Cabinda produces about 10 million tons a year. By the turn of the

century, Gulf projects pumping out more than 100 million tons a year from these fields alone. Exxon, Texaco, and the French Total corporation are exploring for oil in other parts of Angola.

In the Cunene River Valley in southern Angola, a large hydroelectric power plant has been built by South African and Portuguese capital. In the next few years the source is scheduled to provide the bulk of the power needs for Namibia and other South African-held areas as well as Angola.

Other known resources remain largely untapped. Angola's geographic location gives it important strategic value. It is in position to control the mouth of the Congo River; and it borders on territories occupied by South Africa. Zambia and Zaïre depend on Angolan railroads and ports to ship their copper to world markets.

Moreover, Angolan events influence the affairs of Zambia, Zaïre, the People's Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), and the South African colony of Namibia in a direct as well as indirect way. Many of the ethnic groups or nationalities in Angola extend beyond the boundaries between these countries, which were drawn by the European colonial powers.

Despite the help given by American imperialism to Portuguese colonialism, the liberation struggle led by the Angolan National Liberation Front, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the fighters in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique eventually broke the Portuguese grip.

The armed actions began in 1961. The main ones took place in northern Angola where fighters of the Angolan People's Union, led by Holden Roberto, launched an uprising. The forces involved in this revolt were able to secure control over an area reaching 200 miles from the Congo (now Zaïre) border.

Portugal's response was the use of terror not only in the northern region but in Luanda and elsewhere. As many as one million people were forced to flee the north into Zaïre, Congo (Brazzaville), and Zambia.

Until the mid-1960s, it was the FNLA that carried out the main military actions in Angola. This is contrary to some of the claims of the MPLA and its supporters that the FNLA never fought as a real national liberation group and that only the MPLA was committed to the armed conflict.

In fact, the FNLA played such a prominent role that the Fourth International in 1964 correctly recognized that the FNLA was leading the struggle and should be supported accordingly. The Fourth International, of course, did not support the FNLA politically, for its program was limited to winning national freedom.

At the same time, the FNLA was slan-

dered by the MPLA, which called it a tool of Western imperialism and of Tshombe's regime in the Congo. The truth was that Tshombe, who was backed by Portugal, Belgium, and Washington, severely harassed the FNLA.

The Fourth International defended the FNLA against these slanders. Comrades like Livio Maitan pointed out in articles that even if the FNLA had sought aid from Washington, what was essential was not such links but how the struggle of the Angolan masses for independence was carried on.

During this period, the MPLA was very weak—in 1963 it came close to dissolving. It lacked links with the fighters in Angola and with the refugees in Zaïre. However, in subsequent years it established links with Mbundu religious (Methodist) and ethnic leaders in central Angola. By 1967 it was able to gain bases in Zambia and Congo (Brazzaville), carrying out actions against the Portuguese in the areas bordering these countries.

The UNITA entered the field in 1964 and 1965. It began as a split from the FNLA led by Jonas Savimbi, who was the foreign minister and deputy commander of the FNLA. The UNITA was joined by pro-Mao splitters from the MPLA who attacked that organization as "tribalistic" and "pro-Soviet." During the later 1960s and the early 1970s, the UNITA claimed to have no outside support. It said that all its activities were based inside Angola in contrast to the activities of the MPLA and the FNLA, which were primarily based abroad at that time.

The areas liberated by the UNITA were in south-central Angola, which is inhabited chiefly by the Ovimbundu people.

The inability of Portugal to continue the burden of the colonial wars was decisive in bringing about an end to the Salazar-Caetano regime and in touching off the mass struggles that have shaken Portugal since April 1974.

The Portuguese imperialists sought to prop up various neocolonialist and white-settler organizations so as to postpone granting independence. All three liberation groups opposed this neocolonialist scheme and demanded immediate independence. All three, especially the FNLA, stepped up their guerrilla actions against the Portuguese.

On May 26, 1974, right after the downfall of Caetano, 20,000 Blacks demonstrated in Luanda, demanding independence. On July 15, in response to racist attacks on African communities, a general strike was staged, followed by occupations of universities and high schools by students, faculties, and staffs.

This upsurge brought the Angolan working class into the political arena.

With the growth of non-Portuguese imperialist investments in the 1960s and 1970s, the working class expanded in Angola. In 1973, out of an African population of five to



Lou Howort/Militant

TONY THOMAS

six million persons, there were 130,000 workers employed in manufacturing, mainly concentrated in Luanda, Lobito, and Nova Lisboa.

In the wave of mass actions in Angola following the April 1974 coup in Portugal, the workers in Luanda, Lobito, Benguela, and Nova Lisboa launched a wave of strikes for better pay and working conditions and against racist moves.

In marches and demonstrations, participants carried the banners of each of the liberation groups.

Transitional Government

To meet the problems posed by this wave of mass mobilization and workers' struggles, the Portuguese signed an agreement that brought the UNITA, the FNLA, and the MPLA into a so-called transitional government with Portuguese officials.

Independence was to come later, following elections.

The establishment of the transitional government coincided with the opening of a new phase in the struggle. This phase has been marked by the breakup of the Portuguese colonial hold over Angola, by the efforts of the masses to establish their own government, and by the struggle of the various imperialist powers and other forces to gain control over the situation, or at least to take advantage of it.

The outstanding feature of this period has been the Angolan civil war—that is, the fighting between the three nationalist factions. This fratricidal conflict has greatly facilitated imperialist intervention. One of the aims of Washington, for instance, has been to deepen and exacerbate the hostilities.

Most of the groupings on the left have offered support to one or another of the nationalist factions in Angola. Some of the Maoists support the FNLA or the UNITA; the pro-Moscow Stalinists, the group around the *Guardian* in the United States, and most of the ultraleft groups support the MPLA.

As the comrades know, this is a question in dispute in the world Trotskyist movement. The comrades of the International Majority Tendency favor supporting the MPLA. Their position has been presented most vigorously by C. Gabriel in an article "On the Question of Angola" published in the December 8, 1975, issue of *Intercontinental Press*. The leadership of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores in Argentina agrees with the IMT on this.

The comrades of the IMT argue that in Angola the MPLA is supported by the working class and that because of this the MPLA must be supported no matter how inadequate or wrong its program may be. They contend that the MPLA must be credited with leading the workers' upsurge and that the victory of the FNLA and UNITA would signify the suppression and even massacre of the most radical wing of the workers. They also claim that the MPLA is more progressive than the other groups and has enacted a more progressive social program in the territories it controls.

These comrades contend that the FNLA and the UNITA are not legitimate national liberation movements, but are venal agencies of Washington and other imperialist powers. The FNLA and UNITA are pictured as "tribalistic," that is, based on ethnic groups. The implication is that "tribalistic" types are more "backward" than the MPLA, which is pictured as a "pan-Angolan" movement.

The reality is somewhat different from that. So I'd like to take time to show how false and misleading this picture is.

National Question

I think the issue that most of the supporters of the MPLA fail to weigh properly is the national question—what they choose to call "tribalism."

The MPLA, UNITA, and FNLA all claim to represent a "pan-Angolan" movement; and each of them pictures the two others as "tribalistic." The truth is that each of them is based on one of the country's three main ethnic groups.

With the exception of small urbanized

layers, it is false to claim that an Angolan nationality exists in anything like finished form. The bulk of the population of Angola consists of ethnic groupings in well-defined geographical regions, spilling over into other countries in some cases.

These groups have their own distinct languages and culture, and they have their own body of historical experience as distinct peoples. In short, each of the three has the attributes of a nationality.

Angola's boundaries, after all, were determined by imperialist colonial powers, and not by the ethnic boundaries or the desires of the African masses. Also, Portuguese capitalism blocked the economic and political integration of the various Angolan peoples.

The liberation struggle developed unevenly, with each of the three groups representing one of the three main nationalities in the country.

The MPLA's base is the Mbundu who live in north-central Angola and around Luanda. They number roughly one to one and a half million.

The FNLA is based among the one to one and a half million Bakongos in the north-western area of Angola.

The UNITA finds its support among the more than two million Ovimbundu who inhabit the central region and southern Angola.

Ethnic Divisions

In fact, except for a few brief periods, the military positions of the groups have reflected the divisions of these different ethnic areas.

Ethnic divisions are also to be found in the urban areas. For example, in Lobito, the second most important port city, tens of thousands of demonstrators greeted the arrival of Jonas Savimbi and the UNITA when they took the town in November. Not surprisingly, Lobito is a center for the Ovimbundu.

When the MPLA secured control of Luanda, their own newspapers reported that for days thousands of workers of Bakongo and Ovimbundu origin demonstrated, demanding transportation to FNLA- or UNITA-held areas. Thousands were able to get away to Lobito where they were met by pro-UNITA demonstrations.

We have to anticipate that the victory of either side in this civil war may mean pogroms, with victims running into the tens of thousands. Already leaders of the MPLA have talked about turning the Bakongo areas held by the FNLA into "another Biafra."

In Africa, the word "Biafra" is synonymous with the civil war in Nigeria and the immense slaughter that occurred over the so-called tribal issue. A similar perspective is involved in Angola. Each of the groups—

not just the MPLA—is using the animosities among the nationalities to further its goals.

We must make it clear that we aren't exactly "Angolan patriots." Being a "pan-Angolan" is not necessarily more progressive than being for helping the Bakongo, the Ovimbundu, and the Mbundu establish working relations against the common enemy—imperialism.

As Leninists we understand that the road to uniting the masses in Angola against exploitation and oppression is not to denounce the national aspirations of these peoples as "backward tribalism," but to support their right to self-determination, which includes the right to autonomy or even secession.

Urging a victory for one of these nationalist factions against the two others leads to exacerbating the tensions. The MPLA, for instance, has announced that the supporters of the other groups will not be allowed Angolan citizenship, a threat that is bound to strengthen their determination to fight to the death against an MPLA victory.

One reason why none of these groups has really cut across the lines of nationality is that they stand on procapitalist and anti-working-class social and economic programs that are basically similar.

That was also one of the reasons why the Portuguese brought the nationalist groups into the transitional government. The Portuguese wanted to use them to curb the working-class upsurge.

This goes counter to the arguments pushed by supporters of the MPLA in the Trotskyist movement who claim that the MPLA is more "progressive" than the UNITA or the FNLA, or at least more sensitive to pressures from the working class.

All three groups complied with the dictates of the Portuguese. Particularly active were the UNITA and the MPLA, which are supported in the urban centers.

Antistrike Campaign

One of the first measures the groups took was to appeal to the workers to stop their strikes. The appeal was soon followed by a decree empowering the government to place striking dockers and other workers under military control.

The various groups tried to use the antistrike campaign to gain factional advantages, as well as to try to maintain their bases among the workers.

For example, when the dockers in Lobito struck, the MPLA used this as an excuse to send troops against the UNITA. The MPLA claimed that UNITA troops were responsible for the strike, since the dockers were Ovimbundu supporters of the UNITA.

This is not to say that the UNITA played a more progressive role in that situation.

After the MPLA attack on the strikers was beaten back, the UNITA helped break the strike by claiming that the dockers were blocking Zambian supplies for African liberation forces.

Since the collapse of the coalition regime and the initiation of civil war in July 1975, there has been no change in the attitude of these groups, including the MPLA, toward the workers.

In Luanda, under MPLA control, harbor work has been returned to almost around the clock, hours having been lengthened with no pay increases. There may be some labor resistance there, judging from the continual denunciations by MPLA leaders of workers who do not comply with the speedup as saboteurs.

Another indication is the report, acknowledged by leading comrades in Europe, that a crackdown on working-class militants took place recently in Luanda. This followed an earlier report of a purge of "left-wing" members of the MPLA.

The recent arrests of militants occurred in the context of a witch-hunt in Luanda against "Trotskyism" even though there is no indication that a large, or even any, Trotskyist group exists in the country. Comrades in Portugal have reported that Angolan students interested in Trotskyism, who returned to MPLA areas, were driven out by the MPLA at gunpoint.

On the crucial question of the working-class upsurge the facts show that the MPLA has taken the same basic stand as the FNLA and UNITA. The MPLA aims to break strikes, lengthen hours, and block independent organization of political action by the working class.

One claim made by the IMT comrades is that the MPLA is supported by the most radical layers of the working class, who would be suppressed if the other groups entered Luanda. Even if this were true, it could be argued just as cogently that with an MPLA victory in Lobito, the MPLA would suppress the pro-UNITA working-class militants such as the dockers against whom the MPLA sent troops.

Whatever support the MPLA may have obtained from the working class in the Mbundu areas, it has already broken strikes and arrested working-class militants in Luanda, and suppressed expressions of real working-class political radicalism.

The class lines in Angola do not follow ethnic lines but exist between the workers and the leaderships of all three nationalist factions. The indicated course for the workers and their allies, in Luanda, Lobito, the Bakongo, Mbundu, and Ovimbundu areas, and all other parts of Angola, is to press ahead independently.

The workers and their allies need to break from each of these groups and form a party of their own based on a revolutionary working-class program.

Only by following that kind of program can the workers cut across the factional divisions and national animosities feeding the civil war. A program of class independence is required by the Angolan working masses to defeat the anti-working-class policies of the three nationalist groups and their neocolonialist and imperialist backers.

Still another element in the situation is the imperialist support given to the UNITA and the FNLA, including the use of South African troops. Does this automatically require us to support the MPLA?

First of all we have to consider our criteria. If we put a plus wherever the White House puts a minus, or if we put a minus wherever the White House puts a plus, it would be very simple to determine our policies.

We already went through this in the discussion with the IMT comrades on the Portuguese Socialist party's defense of its democratic rights last summer. Should we have opposed this defense because the CIA claimed to have channeled funds to the SP and because Wall Street's propagandists claimed they were defending democracy by favoring the SP over the Communist party? We answered no—although we of course sharply opposed the class-collaborationist policies of the Portuguese SP.

In Angola we must begin by checking the stands of the three groups in relation to imperialism. Here again we find no basic difference. The MPLA has made it very clear—as have the UNITA and the FNLA—that it favors foreign imperialist investments in Angola.

In fact, while they participated in the transitional government, the nationalist groups found themselves in mutual accord in this respect. All three favored continued foreign investment, with the proviso that in major resource industries the government should hold 51 percent of the ownership.

The government already held a 51 percent share of Gulf Oil's concession in Cabinda and a similar share in the diamond concession owned by South African, Belgian, Portuguese, and American interests.

Moreover, many of the Portuguese holdings had already been nationalized owing to MFA (Armed Forces Movement) decisions in Portugal.

The only major action of this kind that was demanded, particularly by the MPLA and the FNLA, was expropriation of the coffee plantations and farms. On this point there was joint agreement, a consensus that was reached without great difficulty since most of the smaller Portuguese coffee planters had already fled Angola.

In addition, each of the groups has shown its willingness to solicit imperialist political, material—and even military—support against its enemies.

The MPLA, for example, solicited the

support of the MFA regime while it still governed Angola. Although the Portuguese rulers were divided on how to respond, their main line after the transitional government was set up tended to be in support of the MPLA. For example, when the MPLA forced the FNLA and UNITA out of Luanda, the Portuguese army announced that it would prevent any attempt by the FNLA to return to the city. The MPLA received thousands of rifles, trucks, ships, and other equipment when the Portuguese withdrew from Angola, while most of this type of equipment was withdrawn from UNITA and FNLA areas (some of which was taken to MPLA areas).

The MPLA also has sought, and boasts of having received, material and political support from the governments of the smaller imperialist powers such as the Scandinavian countries, Holland, Belgium, and Canada. This support may have declined in recent months because of U.S. pressure.

We should add that the MPLA has maintained good relations with some of the biggest imperialist companies holding concessions in its territories—even those whose governments are actively supporting the UNITA or the FNLA.

Gulf Oil and the MPLA

Gulf Oil holds the biggest imperialist concession in Angola, grossing more than \$1 billion a year from its Cabinda wells, which are to be stepped up to ten times their current output in a few years.

There are many reports from the MPLA, from the U.S. State Department, and from sources in Gulf Oil, that relations between the MPLA and Gulf Oil are very good. There have even been reports that Gulf is trying to put pressure on the State Department to change its current anti-MPLA line.

Gulf Oil was the main financial stay of the MPLA until December 22, when the State Department forced the company to suspend payments.

In September and October Gulf Oil gave \$116 million to the MPLA. It planned to make another \$95 million payment by December 31. However, after Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Edward Mulcahy put the squeeze on Gulf Oil, the company halted payments.

The September-October payment was three times the reported U.S. aid to the FNLA and UNITA combined. It matched the reported Soviet aid to the MPLA for the entire year of 1975. Thus from the formal point of who is on the receiving end of American imperialist aid—the MPLA was the recipient of the most American aid until a few weeks ago. Of course, the aid did not come from the Ford administration but from the biggest imperialist company operating in the country.

The stopping of payments for the time being came after a battle between the State Department and Gulf Oil. Gulf had tried to induce the State Department to take a less truculent stand toward the MPLA. Kissinger was strong enough to win this battle. The contest is indicative of the divisions in the American ruling class over intervention in Angola.

The friendly relations between Gulf Oil and the MPLA are not unique. Other companies of the same type get similar treatment.

This does not prove that the MPLA is controlled by Gulf Oil. It only underlines the point that each of these nationalist organizations holds an identical position toward imperialism; each of them maneuvers with imperialism; each is willing to make political and economic concessions to gain imperialist support.

The groups are real nationalist movements with mass support; consequently they are not dependent on imperialism. It is their factional rivalry, deepened now to the level of a civil war, that has exacerbated their readiness to invite aid from abroad to match their opponents in heavy arms and sophisticated military equipment.

To seek imperialist aid is common among such nationalist groups. Moreover, the various imperialist forces often intervene—as in this situation—on several sides to make sure that their interests are preserved no matter who wins.

It may be that the main strategy of the State Department in the current conflict is not to tip the scales decisively in favor of one of the sides—which could easily have been done by sending more massive aid to the UNITA and the FNLA or by more massive involvement of South African troops.

The State Department may be aiming at maintaining a balance of power between the three groups, preventing the total defeat of the UNITA and the FNLA. As time goes on, the Angolan masses may become exhausted and each faction will become more receptive to attempts by imperialism to increase its influence in return for support.

Moscow's Intervention

Kissinger gives as one of his reasons for supporting the FNLA and UNITA the intervention of the Kremlin in the Angolan situation on the side of the MPLA.

Moscow granted an estimated \$100 million worth of military supplies to the MPLA.

The Kremlin's aims are the same as in other colonial and semicolonial areas. It seeks to strengthen the diplomatic influence of the Soviet Union, but without extending

the world revolution or really assisting the national liberation of Angola.

In fact, like Washington, Moscow does not appear to be aiming to bring about a total victory for the side it favors. The Soviet bureaucrats are looking for chips to be used for bargaining purposes within the context of "détente" with American imperialism. That is the basis of the Kremlin's approach to the MPLA.

Another objective is to counteract Peking's prestige in Africa. By backing a supposedly progressive MPLA, pitted against the UNITA and the FNLA, which have received support from China, Moscow's image can be enhanced at the expense of Peking. In Africa, Moscow has long been regarded with less sympathy than Peking. In fact, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, two countries whose leaders are closely aligned with the MPLA, have closer relations with Peking than with Moscow.

Cuban Intervention

The intervention of Cuba, which is reported to have as many as 5,000 troops in Angola, is subsidiary to the involvement of the Soviet Union. For diplomatic reasons, Moscow prefers not to send Soviet troops. From the Cuban viewpoint, the action may be considered worthwhile as a demonstration of opposition to imperialism.

Kissinger has denounced Moscow's support of the MPLA, claiming that this puts in question the détente as a whole. At the same time, Kissinger has not proposed any serious countermoves such as cutting off grain sales to the Soviet Union. But even if this propaganda were to be taken at face value, does this mean that we should support the "right" of a workers state to take advantage of a situation like the one in Angola and that this calls for giving political support to the MPLA?

We don't think so. The interests of the world revolution do not coincide with the interests of the parasitic Soviet bureaucracy or its narrow diplomatic maneuvers. The military and diplomatic support given by the Kremlin to the MPLA is not meant to help the Angolan masses but to place the MPLA regime under obligations to Moscow.

If we were to base our stand on the actions of the bureaucratic representatives of a degenerated or deformed workers state, we would face a difficulty.

North Korea and China have sent advisers and some military aid to the FNLA and the UNITA. Romania, another deformed workers state, has pursued a policy of courting and aiding all sides in the current conflict. So which camp do we choose among these workers states that are fishing in the troubled waters of Angola?

Do we believe that Cuba and the Soviet Union are more "progressive" in supporting

one petty-bourgeois nationalist faction than Peking and Pyongyang are in supporting a different petty-bourgeois nationalist faction?

If no confidence can be placed in the capacity of any of the factions to advance the socialist revolution in Angola or on an international scale, it follows that the aid offered by the bureaucracy of a degenerated or deformed workers state will not change that political conclusion.

For example, the counterrevolutionary bureaucrats who run the Soviet Union aren't at all opposed to the strikebreaking or the arrests of militants—especially under the cover of a witch-hunt against "Trotskyism." In fact, they may have made such a witch-hunt one of the conditions of their aid to the MPLA.

It is clear that a revolutionary-Marxist position in the Angolan civil war cannot be automatically derived from the Soviet and Cuban intervention in behalf of the MPLA, or from the Chinese and North Korean intervention in behalf of the UNITA or the FNLA.

The civil war involves basically three unprincipled nationalist factions that follow procapitalist, anti-working-class, and class-collaborationist policies.

South Africa's Intervention

The most ominous development in the Angolan civil war is the intervention of South Africa. This is one of the consequences of the unprincipled character of the contestants, who invite foreign intervention, no matter how reactionary its nature.

The South African intervention has passed through several phases.

The initial South African incursions began in late June or July. Their immediate objective was the pursuit of SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation) guerrillas from Namibia who had crossed the border into Angola. South African troops had been barred from such forays under Portuguese rule, even under the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship. The Portuguese feared that South African incursions would pave the way for South African penetration of the area.

The pursuit of SWAPO guerrillas was followed in August by seizure of the Cunene dam and military occupation of the area.

It is important to note that the FNLA and UNITA did not serve as puppets of South Africa in this imperialist invasion. Instead, it was the FNLA and UNITA that spearheaded the fighting against South Africa in June, July, and August, along with the MPLA. This is not surprising since these are areas where the local population supports the UNITA and the FNLA units led by Daniel Chipenda.

It was the deepening civil war that prevented the three organizations from

joining forces and driving the South African forces out of Angola.

In October, reports began to appear in the press that South African troops were involved in a drive of UNITA and FNLA forces up the coast from the South. According to the MPLA, the column included several hundred South African troops, some of whom were masquerading as mercenaries. Other sources claim that today five or six thousand South African troops have invaded Angola with more troops being stationed in the border areas of Namibia.

Because of the South African censorship and the efforts of the FNLA and UNITA to cover up the South African moves, it is not clear at the moment which field of operations is primary, pursuit of SWAPO, occupation of the Cunene valley, or military thrusts against the MPLA.

The South Africans have intervened for four obvious reasons: 1) to maintain control over the Cunene region; 2) to strengthen their grip on Namibia; 3) to tip the balance in the civil war toward the UNITA and the FNLA; 4) to facilitate the counterrevolutionary designs of the State Department.

The UNITA and FNLA must be condemned for blocking with the South Africans, just as the MPLA had to be condemned for collaborating with the Portuguese colonial army against the FNLA and UNITA.

As for the Vorster regime in South Africa, it must be pilloried along with the Ford administration for intervening in the Angolan civil war. Vorster is using South African troops to help pave the way for use of troops from other imperialist powers. Our slogan must be "South Africa out of Angola!"

What Position for Revolutionaries?

Our judgment of the civil war between the nationalist groups in Angola can be summarized as follows: 1) All three of these groups favor collaboration with imperialism and are opposed to working-class mobilization and any real struggle for socialism. 2) All three of them seek to inflame animosities between the main nationalities in Angola. 3) At the same time each of them has a real mass base and has played a real role in the struggle for independence.

In our opinion, no political support ought to be given to any of these three nationalist groups. The victory of any one of the three offers no special promise of advancing the Angolan masses toward socialism. To impose the rule of one nationality over the other two nationalities offers no stable solution to the problems facing Angola and would only facilitate imperialist designs on the country.

In fact, I do not think that any of these groups can "win" the struggle in view of the

broad popular base each has. If one of them does gain a decisive victory over the others, its current political outlook could signify a bloodbath in which the real winner would be imperialism.

Our position is one of opposition to the factional war. We stand for the program of socialism—for the struggles of the workers, the youth, and the peasants that point toward a socialist society. We are opposed to the program and practices of each of the nationalist groups. We are for a class-struggle policy for the masses.

Responsibility of American Socialists

Our job as American revolutionary socialists is to oppose imperialist intervention in Angola, particularly American imperialist

intervention. Our job is to build meetings, organize picket lines and demonstrations, and do everything possible to deepen the opposition that already exists against intervention in the Angolan civil war.

If the imperialist intervention increases, as seems quite likely, we may decide to favor the victory of one or another of the groups on tactical grounds, but of course without giving it any political support. In fact, we would continue to oppose that group politically.

However, as I have indicated, it would not be correct for us to take such a stand at this point. Our main concern is to mount an effective campaign against Washington's intervention in the civil war and against its aim of blocking the national liberation and social struggles of the Angolan peoples.

Summary of the Discussion

I would like to begin by taking up a few of the factual questions that comrades raised during the discussion. I think it is important to realize that many of these factual questions are very hard to answer, as comrade Fred Halstead pointed out. We try to go by concrete information: things that have been verified, usually even by pro-MPLA sources, such as many of the newspapers in Portugal, many of the publications in Angola published by the MPLA itself, as well as the reports of comrades who have been able to go to Angola.

Our statements on the slanders of the MPLA against the FNLA are not something recent. This was the position of the Fourth International throughout the initial years of the struggle. Only in the last couple of years did the International Majority Tendency make a shift on this.

It is rather dangerous to make flat, unqualified statements about one group favoring imperialism while another does not, or about one group not being a real national liberation movement while a different one is. The concrete facts have to be taken into consideration. The facts show that the other two groups are not simply puppets, despite the assertions of the MPLA.

It is not a matter of an Angolan Ky or Thieu or somebody like Ngo Dinh Diem, who was brought over to Vietnam from New Jersey. The analogy with Vietnam in this respect does not hold.

The FNLA and UNITA are real movements, real movements that have proven many times over that they have mass support. Even the MPLA says that it has no hope of politically winning over the people in regions like the Bakongo. And those areas are not just tiny pockets. Each

liberation group has roughly a quarter to a third of the support in Angola.

I think it is important to take up some of the points that comrade Sam Manuel made. What do the three groups stand for? On the basic question of their attitude toward imperialism there is no fundamental difference.

One comrade mentioned that the MPLA does not call for a mass campaign against U.S. imperialism—perhaps because the MPLA does not want to disrupt détente. The MPLA's attitude is not primarily related to the détente between Moscow and Washington. It is true that the MPLA does not call for a big mass campaign against American imperialism. But that's not because of concern about the détente. They are looking ahead and holding open the possibility of friendly relations with American imperialism. This is the counterpart of the policy of the other two groups, who have been trying to outbid the MPLA in seeking friendly relations with American imperialism.

That tends unfortunately to be the character of the politics of these groups in this struggle.

At some point the situation could change in such a way that we would call for material support to the MPLA—or the UNITA, or the FNLA, or some combination of the three—while maintaining our political opposition to its program.

Our point of departure is opposition to American imperialist intervention, and if this ends up placing us in the same camp as one or another of the national liberation groups, then so be it.

It is possible that over time one or another of the three organizations could evolve in such a way that they would cease to be national liberation groups, would lose

their mass support, would become puppets of imperialism. That could happen. At this stage there is no basic difference of this kind among the three groups.

Our opposition to the intervention of imperialism does not stem from any view that the imperialists are backing the wrong group or something like that. In our opinion, imperialism is intervening in this situation with the aim of imposing its control. Imperialism wants to hold back the independence of Angola, to weaken Angola in general. Even if we were to support the MPLA at some stage, we would not make the error of trying to pressure imperialism into supporting the MPLA.

I think it is important to note in addition that the American ruling class is not unanimous on the question of just which group to back. Even before the present debate there was pressure from those concerned about the danger of another Vietnam. The fact is that the American imperialist specialists in African affairs in the State Department were unanimously opposed to Kissinger's policy. They held that the United States should seek a diplomatic settlement between the three groups.

Richard Clark, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, went to Angola and talked with the leaders in the MPLA. After he came back, he maintained that there was no basic difference among the three groups. He said that the MPLA leaders assured him that they would turn away from the Soviet Union as soon as they were able to beat the other groups.

Oppose Demanding Soviet Withdrawal

I want to say a word about the campaign of the social democrats and the Maoists demanding that "the Russians" or "Soviet imperialism" get out of Angola. We are opposed to this. There is no such thing as Soviet imperialism, anyway, and all this does is play into the hands of American imperialism. It equates Soviet aid to national liberation movements with attempts by the imperialists to maintain their economic exploitation and social oppression of the colonial countries.

As revolutionists and as unconditional supporters of the right to self-determination of the Angolan people, we of course criticize the Kremlin's inadequate aid to the struggle against imperialism. We criticize the Stalinists' uncritical support to MPLA policies, including the MPLA's chauvinist attitude toward the Bakongo and Ovimbundu peoples and its attempts to crush these peoples. We criticize the Kremlin's political course blocking the development of a revolutionary socialist party in Angola. We do not agree with the Stalinist policy.

The interests of the Angolan workers and

peasants do not guide the Soviet bureaucracy, any more than the Soviet bureaucracy's policies represent the interests of the Soviet workers and peasants. But the threat, the danger, in Angola is *imperialist* intervention.

Our job is to demand that the U.S. government get out. If the Soviet Union stopped sending weapons to the MPLA, would that be a step forward for the Angolan revolution? No. It would embolden imperialism!

We do not demand that *any* of the national liberation groups in Angola give up the arms they have received from *any* source.

It is the political course that all three groups have followed, not the source of their arms, that is playing into the hands of world imperialism. And as comrade Peter Seidman pointed out, the last thing we want to do is give Washington any cover for its own intervention anywhere. This is a particularly scandalous aspect of the Maoists' and social democrats' demand for the Soviet Union to get out. It is a capitulation to the pressure of American imperialism.

What do we think should be done in Angola? First of all, we call for the unity, in anti-imperialist action, of the three nationalist organizations or any other similar organizations that may exist in Angola. We call on them to unite against the various imperialist powers that have intervened.

When the Portuguese ruled there, we were for the nationalist organizations uniting in action to drive the Portuguese out of Angola instead of each one of them trying to maneuver in various ways with the Portuguese. We propose the same course in response to South Africa or any other imperialist power trying to get involved. At the same time our basic objective is to help the masses break from these organizations on a political level.

We don't have a neutral attitude toward the three groups in relation to the civil war. We are against the policies of each of them in the civil war; we are against their refusal to follow a united policy against imperialism. In my opinion, the fault does not lie with just the UNITA or the FNLA. At the time the UNITA and the FNLA were opposing the initial South African attacks—opposing the seizure of the Cunene Valley and so on—the MPLA took advantage of the South African invasion, tried to turn it to the MPLA's advantage.

Instead of launching a national campaign to unite the various organizations against South Africa, the MPLA advanced militarily against the UNITA and to a lesser extent against the FNLA.

It is difficult at this distance to assess all the ins and outs of the factional war between the three groups. But we have no difficulty in seeing what our main job is, as Fred and other comrades said. This is to

organize opposition to American imperialist intervention, not only in words but in deeds.

We will do that and to the extent that the national liberation groups in Angola are also consistent in their struggle to end all imperialist intervention we will find ourselves in the same camp.

But it would be an obstacle to make an incorrect assessment on the basis of a one-sided set of facts, so that we would find ourselves in the factional camp of one of these nationalist groups pitted against the others without adequate justification.

That would stand as an obstacle in our battle against imperialism, just as it has among the various groups in Portugal and around the world, who place support of one of the groups above the needs of the struggle against imperialism.

The main thing that we have to act on right now is not the polemic going on

between the various groups or the polemic on this question in the Fourth International. The main decision this plenum must make to advance the interests of the Angolan peoples and the African revolution as well as the American revolution is to launch a campaign around Angola.

We have to establish the Socialist Workers party as the organization that is doing the most to get the United States out of Angola, that is trying to get everybody working together on this question, that is trying to override the factionalism engendered by the supporters of one or another of the three groups.

I think that we are going to find a very broad response to such a campaign in the Black communities. I think we are going to find a good reception in the labor movement, in the student movement—wherever the Indochina experience is remembered. □

The Need for Solidarity Against British Fascists

[The following is a letter sent to *Intercontinental Press* by two members of the Socialist Charter group in Britain.]

* * *

Dear Comrade,

We are writing to you to raise a matter that has much preoccupied IP in recent weeks: democratic rights and how best to defend them.

In Manchester, on Sunday, November 30, a meeting was organised by the liberal National Council for Civil Liberties to discuss the topic, "The State, the Law and Northern Ireland." Speakers were Pat Arrowsmith, the well-known pacifist and defendant in the British Withdrawal from Northern Ireland Campaign trial, Eamonn McCann from the Troops Out Movement, Steven Cohen of the NCCL, and Rock Tansey, a lawyer who has been in the forefront of civil liberties defence. The meeting was aimed at bringing out the repressive character of the Labour Government's Prevention of Terrorism Act.

Before the meeting got under way, a body of men entered the hall. All wore black armbands. They were identified as members of various fascist organisations: the National Front, British Movement, and Mosleyites. There were 40 of them as against 30 genuine members of the audience, who were mainly middle aged and middle class. Given the relationship of forces, it was not possible to eject the fascists. While the liberals of the NCCL dithered, a young trade unionist went to call the police . . . who took 20 minutes to arrive.

As soon as the meeting started, the fascists attacked. One got up and advocated

that the platform and the audience "should be slowly garrotted" and described the chairman as a "Jewish maggot." This was the signal for an orgy of violence in which chairs were thrown at electric light fittings to bring glass showering down, bottles and bricks were hurled, and plate glass windows were smashed. The violence, obviously premeditated and planned, resulted in several people being hospitalized and over £1,000 worth of damage to the students' union building by these hoodlums who say "we will whip juvenile delinquents till the skin comes off their backs." Among their victims was a 60 year old woman whom they hit over the head with a chair and who needed six stitches in the wound.

All this, stated leading National Front fascist Martin Webster, because the meeting was "anti-British," that is, because it dared take a stand against reactionary, repressive legislation by the Labour Government. The chauvinist attitudes of the British Labour and trade union movement towards the Irish national struggle are an invitation to the fascists to go on the offensive. This they have done.

Ironically, the architect of the vicious anti-Irish legislation, Roy Jenkins, has been the fascists' first victim just as were the German Social Democrats victims of laws they had formulated and which were used by Hitler. Clearly, a decision has been taken by the National Front to show its mettle by smashing up public meetings. Last summer they attacked two meetings addressed by Home Secretary Jenkins. Then they wrecked a Liverpool meeting of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Campaign. The attacks are a product of the crisis of British capitalism and the frustra-

tion felt by the middle class and backward workers who are attracted to the fascist banner.

Already, certain sections of employers have made discreet approaches to the fascists. The latter—to win their spurs and financial aid—must show that in future battles they can give value for money and that, with organised violence, they can build the sort of movement which can terrorise the working class into submission, should it be required by the boss class.

Thus, while fascism is by no means a candidate for power, it is obvious that the crisis conditions which give rise to such movements are rapidly maturing . . . helped by the refusal of the Labour Government to break from the ruling class and base itself on the workers' industrial strength to resolve the deepening crisis with socialist measures.

The whole workers' movement in Britain must recognize this because failure to do so, failure to combat anti-Irish chauvinism, failure to combat racialism and sexism, failure to organise within the Labour Party and trade unions against Wilson's betrayals—all of which are expressions of capitalism in its death agony—will cost the working class dearly later.

Most tendencies in the left take these developments seriously and are probing in different ways towards dealing with them. With some difficulty, because of the fragmentation of the revolutionary left, attempts are being made to build an anti-fascist united front drawing in the mass organisations. We as members of the Trotskyist Socialist Charter are active in this fight for a united class front.

The response of the Labour Movement to the fascist assault on November 30 has been fairly positive. The National Executive of the 1.5 million member Transport and General Workers' Union has demanded a public inquiry into the attack, while trade union branches and trades councils are calling for workers' self-defence and the banning of the fascist organisations.

Significantly, the arch-advocates of "unity," the Communist Party, have not responded to the call of the revolutionary left in Manchester and have dodged the issue of defence of workers' rights to discuss and hold meetings against the Prevention of Terrorism Act and in support of the Irish struggle for national self-determination. The CP ratted on a 270 strong meeting in defence of democratic rights, on Tuesday, December 9, in Manchester, calling it "an ultra-left adventure" despite messages of support from leading trade unionists and Labour MPs. Trotskyists can expect this from Stalinist leaders who hold articles in the *Morning Star* by bishops and other assorted liberal and bureaucratic riff-raff as being more important than a workers' united front against fascist hooliganism.



Two victims of attack by fascists in Manchester November 30, 1975. Graeme Atkinson required nineteen stitches. Malcolm Peach suffered a severe eye injury and a broken arm.

Tragically, a similar response has come from a so-called Trotskyist organisation: the Workers Revolutionary Party, which once had a fine record of action against the fascists. The WRP printed several factual articles on the fascist attack in its daily paper, *Workers Press*. The details were given but the WRP made *no comment whatsoever*. There was no denunciation of the attack, no sympathy with its victims, no call for a united front, no slogan of joint defence of meetings, no call to build strong, workers' movement based antifascist committees . . . *nothing!*

Presumably, to the sectarian idiots of the WRP, the attack was without significance and implications for workers' defence of democratic rights . . . about which the WRP shouts much but does little. In this case, they couldn't even live up to their own standards of *revolutionary socialism*.

Worse still, in a spineless centrist manner, the middle class radicals of Clapham High St evaded the issue of the fascist nature of the National Front. Rather than state what is, the WRP insists on calling the NF "extreme right wing" and "ultra right" whereas it is qualitatively different from the Tory extreme right, being fascist in theory and practice.

We in the "Socialist Charter" have had the unedifying experience of raising this with the WRP before. Six months ago, Cde. E. Lazarovitch sent a letter to *Workers Press* after the vicious police riot at the Kingston Hall, Glasgow, in which 78 trade unionists were arrested. On that occasion the WRP refused publication . . . probably

because it couldn't give a straight answer to the questions we posed. We enclose a copy of this letter [printed elsewhere in this issue] and hope you will publish it as an appendix to this letter. The points we made then are even more relevant now than before. It is in the interest of the whole Trotskyist movement that the sectarians of the WRP are dragged out from under the table to answer for their abstention from antifascist struggle.

The class struggle cannot be fought with words alone. The young workers who actively resisted the fascists on November 30 showed that. Young workers will come forward to defend their rights despite the failure of those like the WRP, who prefer to run away from the fight and trample Trotskyism into the dirt in the haste of their retreat.

Yours fraternally,
Graeme Atkinson
David Wilson

Mao Says Nixon Welcome in China

Chairman Mao Tsetung, the chief of Chinese Stalinism, met with Julie Nixon Eisenhower on December 31. A photograph of the meeting and a statement on it were prominently featured in the January 2 issue of *Peking Review*.

Mao told the daughter of the discredited former president to convey "his regards to Mr. Richard Nixon and said that Mr. Nixon was welcome to revisit China."

An Unpublished Letter to 'Workers Press'

[The following letter from a member of the Socialist Charter group in Britain was submitted to *Workers Press*, which declined to publish it. It is now being circulated to the workers movement in mimeograph form.]

* * *

Dear Comrade,

Once again, *Workers Press* has thoroughly excelled itself. Alex Mitchell, in his article on the "Lesson of the Kingston Hall" [*Workers Press*, May 27, 1975], has performed the somewhat miraculous feat of assessing the implications of the Glasgow demonstration against the National Front [May 24, 1975] without *once* affirming solidarity with the trades unionists and socialists, who, motivated by determination to defend their organisations, turned out to demonstrate against this fascist outfit.

Mitchell can trot out formally correct statements about the nature of the Special Patrol Group, whose actions reveal how the bourgeois state will protect those who defend it against the working class. But that is as far as Mitchell can go, because it is quite evident from his article that he cannot grasp the elementary necessity—an ABC issue—of defending the working class victims of this same Special Patrol Group.

Says Mitchell, "The NF gloated since it was the first time that a UK corporation has allowed the NF to use a corporation hall. It was calculated to provoke the labour and trade union movement whose opposition to the Common Market has nothing in common with the utterly reactionary campaign of the NF." The whole point is, comrade Mitchell, that the anti-NF picket was not directed at the question of the E.E.C. but was aimed at exposing the fascist nature of the National Front and mobilising working class opposition to it. Workers who demonstrated understood, quite correctly, that the struggle against fascism is a life or death question for the workers' movement. Nowhere does Mitchell explain this. Consequently, he fails to defend the comrades, who, going beyond verbal statements, take action against the National Front.

Nor is the "gloating" confined to the NF. After implying that the antifascists walked into a "well prepared provocation," Mitchell, too, starts gloating with his infantile sneer that "The peaceful road to socialism" took something of a battering: three leading members of the Communist Party were manhandled, arrested and charged with 'Riotous assembly.' Instead of a principled defence of the Stalinists against the attacks of the bourgeois state, we read worthless and cheap smears. One can almost see an

expression of delight on Mitchell's countenance!

Although Mitchell would never dare say it openly, his position (and that of his mentors in the W.R.P. [Workers Revolutionary party] leadership) is one of total abstention from the battle against the fascists, and of vilification of those who do engage in struggle. More than enthusiastic to tilt at the "corporatist" windmills of the Labour and trades union leadership, Mitchell finds it a positive virtue to turn a blind eye to the emergence of real corporatists like the NF which pulled over 100,000 votes in the October elections and who make no secret of their aim to "embark on a campaign of repression of the left in the unions, which could in the process involve the repression of much that is legitimate union activity."

Mitchell suggests that action against the NF is a response to "provocation." He cites figures for those who attended the NF meeting and the numbers arrested at it . . . and, with his cricket score conception of struggle implies that the labour movement is allowing itself to be the victim of "calculated provocation." The "lesson," presumably, is to ignore the NF, which will then obediently disappear. I have no doubt that Mitchell's reasoning will have great appeal to trades unionists like John Hoskins (N. London District Council of the N.U.R. [National Union of Railwaymen]) who nearly lost his eyesight after being beaten by fascist thugs . . . without a meeting being organised to provoke him . . . or to Bro. Dave Ward of Crawley Trades Council who was smashed over the head with a hammer wielded by an NF supporter . . . or to the other socialist and trade union militants who have been victims of fascist violence in recent months. This violence has gone unreported in the columns of *Workers Press*, which, one can only assume, prefers to look the other way.

Because Mitchell poses no concrete alternative, no programme of action to develop a workers' united front against the still small but growing threat of fascist violence, one can only conclude that the W.R.P.'s advice to workers is: "stay off the streets, ignore the fascists, don't give them publicity and then they'll go away." Contrary to the idealist notions of Mitchell and the *Workers Press*, the fascists will no more vanish automatically than will the economic and political crisis upon which they feed.

It is noteworthy that, in practice, the W.R.P.'s position is no different from that of the Social Democratic leaders in pre-Nazi Germany, who also conceived of ignorance as the best policy for dealing with the Nazi threat. Thus, all the "leftist" phrasemongering in *Workers Press* about Jack Jones, Tom Jackson and Wedgewood Benn being

"corporatists" (i.e., fascists) is but a cover for a rightward retreat in the face of real fascists. The W.R.P.'s ultraleftism is organically connected with sectarian refusal to take up the questions of racialism and fascism—just like the Stalinists in the 1929-33 period in Germany—through the fight for the united front.

The whole political essence of the economic crisis is that it is producing a profound polarisation of class forces. While it is true that, at the present juncture, the employing class relies on the class collaborationist policies of Labour and trade union leaders to hold back, demoralise and defeat the working class, this period is not anointed with permanence. Quite the opposite. The inability of the reformist leaders to perform this task in the teeth of massive working class opposition—expressed at this stage through the traditional workers organisations, the Labour Party and the unions—will drive the bourgeoisie to look for more desperate solutions in the shape of a crisis-crazed, fascist organised middle class which can be used as a bludgeon against the workers' movement which the capitalist class will regard as incompatible with the future existence of capitalism.

All the signs of such a process are taking shape today. Fascism is *not an immediate* threat . . . nor does it become so overnight. It

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is our task to smash it before it becomes a threat. That is the lesson we can draw from Hitler who said, "Only one thing could have broken our movement—if our opponents had understood its principle and, from the first day, had smashed, with the most extreme brutality, the nucleus of our new movement." The weapon to do that is the united class front of workers' organisations. The incipient fascist organisations must be politically destroyed before they are in a position to deal violent blows against the whole working class. Even the "corporatist" Jack Jones of the TGWU [Transport and General Workers Union] has perceived that much by publishing an official union pamphlet on *Racialism, Fascism and the Trade Unions* . . . a significant development despite all Jones's reformist and bourgeois democratic illusions about the antifascist struggle.

Unfortunately, the doors of perception are closed tightly to the W.R.P. which has published no pamphlets warning the working class about the dangers of the National Front, which has never made clear its position on the nature of the National Front and which has consistently refused to participate in antifascist demonstrations, even those called by bona-fide labour and trade union bodies!

The W.R.P. must answer: is the National Front a fascist organisation? So far *Workers Press* has evaded this vital question . . . probably because it cannot see the fascists for the corporatists! This evasion is a centrist refusal to state what is, just as the description of the NF as merely "extreme right-wing" is a cover for an abject refusal to take up a fight—in practice—against fascism and racialism.

Finally, another vital question. Is the W.R.P. in favour of free speech for the National Front? If not, why does the W.R.P. abstain from the struggle to deny the NF a platform from which to peddle its racist, corporatist, anti-working-class filth?

The publication of this letter in *Workers Press* would be appreciated as would an honest political answer to the issues dealt with above. Refusal to answer these questions will constitute a further step away from the politics of Trotskyism on the W.R.P.'s part, and an abdication of the fight for Marxist leadership.

Yours fraternally,
E. Lazarowitch

It Figures

Americans who take their tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service for help can expect accurate advice less than half the time, a representative of Ralph Nader's Tax Reform Research Group testified before a congressional subcommittee December 15.

For persons who use a more complicated tax form and itemize their deductions, the degree of accuracy falls to 25 percent.

An Interview With Manuel Alegre

[In its December 23, 1975, issue, *Combate Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT—Revolutionary Workers party, a Portuguese organization that has declared its adherence to the Fourth International), published an interview with Manuel Alegre, one of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist party. The text of this interview is given below, along with *Combate Socialista's* introduction. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The future of the MFA-parties pact, the role of the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement], the role of the organs of workers power, the struggle for democratic rights in the barracks, and the importance of the Constituent Assembly are questions that concern almost everyone. *Combate Socialista* has expressed its position on these questions in other issues and elsewhere in this issue itself.

We have decided to publish an interview granted us by the Socialist deputy Manuel Alegre, not because we agree with his views, but to inform our readers of the positions held by the party supported by the majority of workers. This is a way, in particular, of facilitating discussion of the fundamental questions concerning us, questions on which our positions are clearly expressed elsewhere in this issue.

* * *

Question. Today it is generally recognized that the Pact-Platform* limited the exercise of popular sovereignty by imposing certain restrictions on the constitution from the start. Why did the SP sign the pact?

Answer. As I have already had the occasion to say, the pact was a tactical move in the Cunhal and Gonçalves strategy for seizing power in Portugal. In the final analysis, this was an application here of the Stalinist putschist strategy for seizing power not by the road of a real insurrection but through the conquest of positions in the state apparatus. In the Portuguese case this was through domination of the armed forces and utilization of the MFA, subordinating it to this strategy.

This move also reflected a relationship of

* Before the April 25, 1975, Constituent Assembly elections, the MFA demanded that all parties on the ballot sign a "Pact-Platform" endorsing continued military rule for an indefinite period and giving the MFA all the essential powers in whatever governmental structure the assembly might establish.—IP

forces at that time. The primary objective was to discredit the elections, to minimize their significance, and then to limit the result of the expression of popular will. Signing the pact was in fact an endorsement by the SP of an attack on democracy, or a limitation of democracy. On the part of the SP, this position reflected a desire to safeguard what was essential for us at that time, the elections for the Constituent Assembly. This was because the CP, with the help of its military allies, had created an appearance of strength by its conquest of positions in the state apparatus and by manipulation of the news media that was out of all proportion to the real relationship of forces in the country.

Q. In the current debate over the pact, several persons have spoken in the Constituent Assembly and outside it supporting a revision of the agreement. Our question is whether you think that in order to safeguard democratic freedoms the pact should be revised or that such pacts should purely and simply be done away with.

A. You know, I think there is only one way to safeguard democracy, and that is to practice it without restrictions and without limitations. The Portuguese people and the toiling masses in this country have already demonstrated sufficient political capacity and maturity to be allowed to make their own decisions without any kind of tutelage. I have already had occasion to say that controlled democracy is halfway down the road to bonapartism or dictatorship.

This issue is in fact now under discussion. We are going to present a proposal some time before December 30; and in the SP itself, where the right of tendency exists, there are still various opinions. We have not yet arrived at a definite position as a party. In any case, the central idea of the pact, which was to establish the role of the MFA as the moving force and guarantor of the revolution, has been discredited in the SP. The military has a relationship to politics; it remains to be seen precisely what kind, whether its role will be to dictate politics, or whether it should subordinate itself to the expression of popular will, as I said.

Q. This raises another question. Until now, the parties supported by a majority of workers agreed—as this was set down in the pact—that the MFA was the "moving force of the revolution" and the guarantor of democratic rights. In taking a critical position toward the pact, is the SP now coming to say that the rank-and-file workers organizations are the guarantor of these rights?

A. We think we have to find practical ways to achieve a coordination and synthesis between representative and direct democracy. We believe that if representative democracy is not based on direct democracy, specifically on the independent organizations of the workers, it is in danger of losing its content and in fact opening the way for some form of Nasserism or Peronism here in our country. But we have to find out how to achieve this synthesis.

What was done here in Portugal, and especially in Lisbon, what was called "organs of people's power," was in the last analysis an adaptation, and a bad one at that, of what Spínola and his followers tried to do in Guinea-Bissau. If this had been successful, it would not have led to any people's power. It would have led to a kind of Peronism.

Q. As regards the rank-and-file organization of the soldiers in the barracks, some figures have tried, especially in the most recent period, to convince us that in order to have democracy in the country we cannot have democracy in the barracks. What is your opinion about this?

A. To be sure, you raise an important question, and one I think has been badly posed for a long time in Portugal. What was called democratization of the armed forces, in the final analysis, was nothing of the sort. There were some folkloric and manipulative exhibitions in the Lisbon area.

However, we believe that there should be democratic rights in the barracks, that the soldiers should have freedom of expression. Military personnel, most of all, the ranks, should have the right to organize democratically in the barracks. Just as we support the Workers Commissions and other independent workers committees, we think the soldiers should have the opportunity to form their own committees in order to try to solve their problems. In this, they should not challenge the basic principles, let us say, of the army and the armed forces, especially of armed forces engaged in democratizing themselves and the country. But we think the soldiers should have the right to form their own committees.

I should tell you that at the time the SUV [Soldados Unidos Vencerão—Soldiers United Will Win] appeared, which we think had one very concrete and specific aim—we strove throughout the country to organize the soldiers and form a democratic movement of soldiers around their concrete demands, around their concrete problems, in order to assure real democratization of the armed forces and the safeguarding of democratic rights in the barracks.

Q. In conclusion, perhaps you would care to sum up the results of the Constituent Assembly's work.

A. The first thing to note is that the Constituent Assembly was not dissolved, it has survived. And the fact that it has functioned at all is a demonstration of resistance to the Stalinist, totalitarian plan. The Constituent Assembly was able to resist all forms of blackmail, pressure, and disparagement by the news media, and was thus able to achieve dignity.

Moreover, I think the results of its work are positive. Some important aspects are reflected in the constitution. In the first place, democratic rights are clearly inscribed in this document, as well as some social and economic advances, which are also important, although they could have been instituted in a better way. At least

their implications could have been more clearly defined. This is the case of the nationalizations, the beginning of the agrarian reform, and—most important for our conception of the way socialism must be built—the start of control over management, which can lead us in fact to democratic socialism with workers self-management.

Over and above certain contradictions and certain imperfections, which are natural, I think the balance sheet of the Constituent Assembly is quite positive. Our democratic rights, the nationalizations, and the start of agrarian reform and control of management are important advances for the toiling masses. □

Position of 'Socialist Worker'

Behind the November 25 Coup Attempt

[In its December 6, 1975, issue, *Socialist Worker*, the weekly newspaper of the International Socialists, a centrist group in Britain, published what it claimed was the inside story of the November 25 coup attempt in Portugal. The information was apparently obtained by its Lisbon correspondents from the leaders of the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado (PRP—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat), a centrist group with which the International Socialists have formed an international alliance.

[The PRP, one of the most influential groups in the Frente de Unidade Revolucionária (FUR—Front for Revolutionary Unity, a bloc of ultraleftists, centrists, and Stalinists formed to defend the fifth provisional government of Gen. Vasco Gonçalves), publicly advocated an insurrection in the weeks preceding the November 25 military uprising. After the collapse of the rebellion, a number of officers identified with with PRP were arrested.

[Because of the testimony it offers about the facts of the November 25 adventure, we are reprinting the *Socialist Worker* article below.]

* * *

The soldiers were betrayed. No to repression.

With that headline, a special edition of the worker-controlled paper *Republica* appeared on the streets on Sunday [November 30, 1975], for the first time for five days.

But how was the battle lost?

Already a myth is being pushed that the extreme left tried to stage a coup.

The real sequence of events was rather different. The revolutionary left groups, the

PRP and the MES [Movimento de Esquerda Socialista—Movement of the Socialist Left, a centrist group], had been arguing that an insurrection was necessary to avoid the danger of another Chile.

But they expected it only after some weeks of building support for it in the factories.

However, on the night of 24-25 November, right-wing military figures made a number of provocative moves—putting commandos outside the military police barracks and removing Otelo de Carvalho from his command for being too tolerant to the left.

The paratroops, who had only just come over to the left, seized airbases and the main radio station in retaliation. The authorities are now claiming that "elements of the Communist Party and the extreme left participated in the rebellion."

But when the paras moved, the revolutionary groups were as surprised as everyone else. The CP seems to have been directly involved. It issued an hysterical call for "vigilance" and bodies it influenced called people to the barracks. Only after these calls had been made did the revolutionary left join the movement.

Late on Tuesday morning [November 25], Fifth Division officers sympathetic to the Communist Party visited the PRP offices to persuade them to join in.

However, at that point the CP did an about-turn and abandoned to the fury of the right those who had followed its initiative—including some of its own key people in the armed forces.

The marines, who had initially supported the paras, withdrew to the sidelines. CP-influenced officers in key military units began negotiating for surrender, creating

general demoralisation.

The Metal Workers' union [CP-controlled], which had called for a general strike on the Tuesday, did nothing to work for it the next day. The Intersyndical, the CP-led trade union federation, did nothing. A CP leaflet called for "serenity."

Suddenly, the left wing soldiers and the revolutionary groups found themselves isolated.

The left wing army units were divided and confused. Although they were opposed

by at most 1000 right wing commandos, the CP-influenced officers advised surrender.

But why did the CP leadership do a somersault that amounted to nothing more than betrayal of its own military supporters?

The rumour in Lisbon is that, at the height of the rebellion, Cunhal, the leader of the CP, made contact with the President of the Republic.

Jointly they agreed that the CP would be allowed to remain in the government,

providing it would oppose strikes in future and would work with the government to clamp down on the revolutionary left.

Certainly, the evening the revolt was crushed, Melo Antunes, one of the leading "moderates," appeared on TV to say that the CP should still be in the government.

The tragedy was that the revolutionary left did not have the foresight to see the scale of the treachery, nor the strength in the factories to gain support for the soldiers once the CP had changed sides. □

How Tancos Paratroopers Saw the November 25 Coup Attempt

[In its December 6, 1975, issue, *Combate Socialista*, the weekly newspaper of the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT—Revolutionary Workers party, a Portuguese group that has declared its adherence to the Fourth International), published an interview with a paratrooper who was on the Tancos base at the time of the November 25 putsch attempt. The paratrooper's statements are of interest as an indication of the attitudes of the radicalized soldiers and also for the light they shed on some obscure aspects of the military rebellion. The translation of the interview and *Combate Socialista's* introduction is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

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The interview that follows is the testimony of a Tancos paratrooper, and that is how our readers should regard it. We are publishing this eyewitness account because it is helpful in demythologizing the events in Tancos. This interview reflects the political confusion that existed among the paratroopers and made it possible to manipulate them. On the other hand, it also reflects their just demand for the right to organize and choose their commanders, an aspiration that has often been slanderously misinterpreted.

But, as the comrade interviewed said, "We are ready to continue the struggle, no matter where we have to fight."

* * *

Question. Before you take up the paratroopers' opposition to Morais e Silva [the air force commander], I would like you to say something about the question of the Lisbon Military Region command. A position attributed to the paratroopers was published. How was this position reached?

Answer. This position was adopted in a general meeting of noncommissioned officers and privates. We did not want Vasco Lourenço as commander; the majority rejected him.

Q. Besides rejecting Vasco Lourenço's nomination, did you present any alternative? What position did you take toward Otelo [Saraiva de Carvalho] as commander? I ask this question because the CP used the opposition of many soldiers to Vasco Lourenço to reinforce its support for Otelo.

A. We, support Otelo? In Tancos we didn't say a word about Otelo. He was not called to the base. We didn't want Vasco Lourenço because we knew what his positions were, and so Otelo was left as the lesser evil. But not a word was said about him.

Q. What is the story about Morais e Silva's visit to the Tancos base and your demand for his resignation?

A. He came to explain the case of Rádio Renascença,* to say that this was an order and could not be discussed. It was the draftees who attended the meeting with Morais e Silva. They were taken there by the officers. Almost all the privates were there who had been in the general assembly. The crowd began to boo Morais e Silva, to say that they were sick of him, that they already knew what he thought, that they didn't want to hear anything more, and that they wouldn't let him keep on trying to deceive the paratroopers.

Then, he said the paratroopers had three choices—to support the sixth government unconditionally, to support a leftist minority, or to forget about politics. Finally, when he was leaving, he said: "The paratrooper corps is going to be done away with soon."

So, all the officers left; we drove them out. We were on alert. The same night we got

*Rádio Renascença had been occupied by leftists who used it to mobilize demonstrations against the sixth government. The government sent in paratroopers to put the station off the air. During this operation, the transmitter was dynamited. Spokesmen for the soldiers said that they did not know what the objective of the exercise was and that the government had tricked them.—IP

information that the barracks was going to be flattened, and so we stayed at the ready. This was the background for everything that happened later, for the position of the privates and the first sergeants who wanted to drive out Morais e Silva and Pinho Freire [the second in command of the air force].

Q. And the occupation of the bases? How was that decided? Do you think that was the most effective form of struggle to get rid of Morais e Silva, or do you think that it was part of a larger plan that the officers knew about and you did not?

A. The occupation was carried out at night. In the preceding days, there had been no general assemblies. The personnel rushed to the bases. "We are going to get rid of Morais e Silva," that was the idea. But it was certainly part of a putsch attempt. The first sergeants knew about it. They were the ones who gave the orders. And they were also the first ones to leave Tancos on Thursday night [November 27]. First sergeants influenced by the CP were involved.

We were surprised by the coup. "A coup, but what we wanted was to get rid of Morais e Silva, and the men knew nothing about this." If we had been sure we had the support of the population, we were ready to go right to Lisbon, to throw out the sixth government, Mário Soares, Alvaro Cunhal, and all the rest in the government who aren't doing anybody any good. If the population had been ready to move ahead, if they had supported it—but this was a struggle for the working masses. We did not go out to carry out a coup. Besides, we knew very well that the military personnel in the northern and central regions were with the sixth government. In addition, some paratroopers also supported the sixth government. It would have been lunacy to stage a coup.

Then, when we saw that we did not have the support of anyone, we thought: "We are alone. OK, let's throw them out." Before this we never thought about overthrowing

the government. We knew that it was not a good government; we were against it. But a thousand paratroopers are not going to overthrow a government. After falling into an error—I think it was adventurism to occupy bases to get rid of Morais e Silva—we were inclined to push ahead.

The men thought that by occupying the bases, they were throwing out Morais e Silva. Maybe this was inexperience. Even a lot of us were against this, because it was adventurism and there were other ways to get rid of him. As for the coup, it was only later that we learned that the support of the marines had been promised. Later, and not before.

Q. Was there any attempt by the paratroopers or any paratroopers committee to contact workers commissions or other workers organizations?

A. On Thursday, soldiers went to Lisbon to distribute comunicués and to contact the workers at Lisnave and Setenave. They went to see if we had any support and whether it was worth going on. But when these men came back on Friday, everybody was already leaving. There was a total demobilization, which had been started by the sergeants. The men were demoralized. ("Before they supported this; it was they who started it. And now they are running away.") There were also paratroopers who did not want to fight or shed blood, and they began to leave. Fewer and fewer men were left. And then we held a general assembly: "We've lost, let's go home. There's no possibility to continue the struggle."

Moreover, those who went to Lisbon were liable to get arrested. This was an obstacle to making contact with the workers. There were roadblocks in Entroncamento. In Tancos, the first sergeants, the CP supporters, did not know about our efforts, because for the most part it was the privates who decided that men should go to Lisbon to try to make contacts so that at least we would know where we stood. The men didn't want the sergeants to know: "They don't have anything to do with this, we are going to make the contacts." We had seen that we had been betrayed by the sergeants.

Q. What do you think now?

A. After all this happened, a thousand men broke into tears, one after the other. We were really down, some men wanted to wage armed struggle from the underground. This was lunacy, but the men were demoralized; they didn't know what to do. But I don't think we have lost, we have to go on. I think the men who were in Tancos, after a little while, will be ready to continue the struggle no matter where we have to fight.

DOCUMENTOS

Atrás de la Guerra Civil en Angola

[El siguiente informe fue aprobado por el Comité Nacional del Socialist Workers Party (SWP—Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores) en su reunión del 2-4 de enero en Milwaukee. Fue presentado por Tony Thomas de parte del Comité Político del SWP. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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El Comité Político ha propuesto que lancemos una campaña nacional contra la intervención del imperialismo norteamericano en Angola. Queremos ayudar a poner fin a la intervención del Departamento de Estado, la CIA, y el Pentágono en la guerra civil angolosa. Queremos ayudar a revelar las medidas secretas tomadas por el gobierno de Ford y obligar a Kissinger y sus compinches a hacer pública la verdad acerca de sus operaciones encubiertas en Angola.

Es de conocimiento público que Kissinger asignó al menos 33 millones de dólares para armas y otro tipo de ayuda al Frente Nacional de Liberación de Angola (FNLA) y a la Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). El Senador Hubert Humphrey declaró hace unas semanas que el gobierno de Ford va a pedir otros 150 millones de dólares para el año que entra.

¿Otro Vietnam?

El pueblo norteamericano en su conjunto está preocupado. Presiona para que se le conteste lo siguiente: "¿Se convertirá Angola en otro Vietnam?" Se discute el problema ampliamente. Es un debate en el que ya estamos involucrados. Proponemos una respuesta como aquella dada durante la guerra en Indochina—una amplia campaña de movilización y propaganda en torno a la consigna, "E.E.U.U. fuera de Angola. Ni un quinto, ni una bala, ni un solo consejero o soldado para Angola."

No deberíamos subestimar el peligro de la intervención militar norteamericana, a pesar de las promesas de Kissinger de no comprometer a tropas estadounidenses. El American Committee on Africa (Comité Norteamericano sobre Africa) informó el 19 de diciembre que los oficiales en varias bases están ejerciendo presión sobre los soldados norteamericanos para que renuncien y se alistén como mercenarios para el FNLA y UNITA. El comité también reveló que unidades de la fuerza aérea han sido

alertadas para llevar a cabo bombardeos tácticos en defensa de tropas sudafricanas en Angola, si la situación lo requiere.

Los propagandistas del gobierno de Ford repiten la misma línea que se usó para justificar la intervención en la guerra civil vietnamita. Señalan la supuesta amenaza de un "golpe comunista." Mantienen silencio sobre los cuatro siglos de dominación imperialista portuguesa. Mantienen silencio sobre la política a largo plazo de Washington de apoyo activo a la guerra de Portugal contra el derecho del pueblo angolés de determinar su propio destino.

Ayuda de Washington a Lisboa

Durante los diez años que precedieron el estallido de la rebelión en Angola en 1961, Washington otorgó 298 millones de dólares a Lisboa en ayuda militar. Durante algunos años en este período los Estados Unidos proveyeron más de la mitad del presupuesto militar portugués.

Después de que los angolese empezaron a luchar por su libertad en una manera que recuerda a los colonizadores norteamericanos de 1776, Washington continuó ayudando a los portugueses. Los oficiales y las tropas portuguesas fueron entrenados en instalaciones militares estadounidenses, incluyendo la base de los Boinas Verdes en Fort Bragg.

Durante los últimos años de la dominación colonial portuguesa, el imperialismo norteamericano incrementó su apoyo a Portugal contra los rebeldes africanos.

Tad Szulc, anteriormente corresponsal del *New York Times*, describió la política hacia el sur de Africa asentada por Kissinger en 1970: "En un National Security Decision Memorandum [Memorándum de Decisiones Sobre la Seguridad Nacional] publicado secretamente por el National Security Council [NSC—Consejo Nacional de Seguridad] en enero de 1970, el gobierno formuló una nueva política de 'comunicación' con los regímenes blancos en el sur de Africa (incluyendo a Portugal como el poder dominante en Angola y Mozambique) porque 'los blancos van a permanecer aquí y la única forma en que se pueden llevar a cabo cambios constructivos es a través de ellos' y que 'no hay ninguna esperanza de que los negros ganen derechos políticos por medio de la violencia, que sólo conducirá al caos y a más oportunidades para los comunistas.'"

Los intereses de Wall Street en Angola se

Intercontinental Press

centran en sus recursos naturales.

Angola es el tercer productor mundial de café. Gran parte de su producción es para los Estados Unidos.

Las minas de diamantes en manos de intereses norteamericanos, sudafricanos, belgas y portugueses produjeron más de dos millones de quilates en 1972 únicamente, con un valor de exportación de unos 10 millones de dólares.

El país tiene importantes depósitos de hierro, manganeso, fosfatos, cobre, granito, mármol y asfalto.

Más importante aún, en Angola hay petróleo. La concesión de la Gulf Oil en Cabinda produce cerca de 10 millones de toneladas anuales. A fines de siglo, Gulf calcula que producirá más de 100 millones de toneladas anuales sólo en esos campos. Las corporaciones de Exxon, Texaco y Total (francesa) están buscando petróleo en otras partes de Angola.

En el Valle del Río Cunene en el sur de Angola, se ha construido una gran planta hidroeléctrica con capital sudafricano y portugués. En los próximos años se ha calculado que esta fuente proveerá la mayor parte de las necesidades de energía para Namibia y otras regiones controladas por Sudáfrica, además de Angola.

Otros recursos conocidos no han sido todavía explotados.

La posición geográfica de Angola le da un importante valor estratégico. Le permite controlar la boca del río Congo; y se encuentra en las fronteras de territorios ocupados por Sudáfrica. Zambia y Zaire dependen de los ferrocarriles y puertos angoleños para exportar el cobre a los mercados mundiales.

Además, los acontecimientos angoleños influyen los asuntos de Zambia, Zaire, la República Popular del Congo (Brazzaville) y la colonia sudafricana de Namibia, directa e indirectamente. Varios de los grupos étnicos o nacionalidades en Angola se extienden más allá de las fronteras entre estos países, que fueron delineadas por las potencias coloniales europeas.

A pesar de la ayuda otorgada por el imperialismo estadounidense al colonialismo portugués, la lucha de liberación dirigida por el Frente Nacional de Liberación de Angola, la Unión para la Independencia Total de Angola, el Movimiento Popular para la Liberación de Angola (MPLA), y los luchadores en Guinea-Bissau y Mozambique finalmente rompió el férreo control portugués.

Las acciones armadas comenzaron en 1961. Las principales se dieron en el norte de Angola donde los combatientes de la Unión Popular de Angola, dirigidos por Holden Roberto, lanzaron una insurrección. Las fuerzas involucradas en esta revuelta pudieron asegurar el control sobre una región que abarcaba 200 millas desde la frontera del Congo (actualmente Zaire).

La respuesta de Portugal fue el uso del terror, no sólo en la región norteña sino en Luanda y otras partes. Hasta un millón de personas tuvieron que huir del norte hacia Zaire, Congo (Brazzaville) y Zambia.

Hasta mediados de la década de los 1960, fue el FNLA que llevó a cabo las principales acciones militares en Angola. Esto va en contra de algunas afirmaciones hechas por el MPLA y sus partidarios de que el FNLA nunca luchó como un verdadero grupo de liberación nacional y que sólo el MPLA estuvo comprometido en la lucha armada.

En realidad, el FNLA jugó un papel tan prominente que en 1964 la Cuarta Internacional reconoció correctamente que el FNLA estaba dirigiendo la lucha y por consiguiente, debería de ser apoyado. La Cuarta Internacional, por supuesto, no le dio apoyo político al FNLA, porque su programa se limitaba a ganar la liberación nacional.

FNLA Calumniado

Al mismo tiempo, el FNLA fue calumniado por el MPLA, que lo llamó una herramienta del imperialismo occidental y del régimen de Tshombe en el Congo. La verdad es que Tshombe, apoyado por Bélgica, Portugal y Washington, hostigó severamente al FNLA.

La Cuarta Internacional defendió al FNLA contra estas calumnias. Algunos camaradas como Livio Maitan señalaron en artículos que aún si el FNLA le hubiese pedido ayuda a Washington, lo esencial no era semejantes conexiones, sino cómo se llevaba a cabo la lucha de las masas angoleñas por la independencia.

Durante este periodo, el MPLA era muy débil—en 1963 llegó a punto de disolverse. Carecía de vínculos con los luchadores en Angola y con los refugiados en Zaire. Sin embargo, en años posteriores estableció vínculos con los dirigentes religiosos (metodistas) de la tribu mbundu y dirigentes étnicos en el centro de Angola. En 1967 pudo ganar bases en Zambia y el Congo (Brazzaville) por medio de acciones contra los portugueses en las regiones fronterizas de esos países.

La UNITA entró a la lucha en 1964 y 1965. Comenzó como una escisión del FNLA dirigida por Jonas Savimbi, ex Ministro del Exterior y segundo comandante del FNLA. Los escisionistas del MPLA pro-Mao, quienes atacaron a la organización por "tribalista" y "pro-soviética," se unieron a la UNITA. A fines de los sesenta y principios de los setenta, la UNITA afirmó no tener ningún apoyo del exterior. Decía que todas sus actividades se basaban dentro de Angola, contrario a las actividades del MPLA y el FNLA, que se basaban principalmente en el extranjero en aquel entonces.

Las zonas liberadas por la UNITA se

encontraban en la parte sureña del centro de Angola, poblada primordialmente por los ovimbundu.

La inhabilidad de Portugal de mantener el peso de las guerras coloniales fue decisiva en causar el fin del régimen de Salazar-Caetano y en impulsar las luchas de masas que han sacudido a Portugal desde abril de 1974.

Los imperialistas portugueses intentaron apoyar a varias organizaciones neocoloniales y de colonizadores blancos para posponer el otorgamiento de la independencia. Los tres grupos de liberación se opusieron a este proyecto neocolonialista y exigieron la independencia inmediata. Los tres, especialmente el FNLA, incrementaron sus acciones guerrilleras contra los portugueses.

El 26 de mayo de 1974, inmediatamente después de la caída de Caetano, 20,000 negros hicieron una manifestación en Luanda, exigiendo la independencia. El 15 de julio, en respuesta a los ataques racistas contra las comunidades africanas, se inició una huelga general, seguida por ocupaciones de universidades y secundarias por los estudiantes, los profesores y el personal no docente.

Este ascenso trajo la clase obrera angoleña a la arena política.

Con el crecimiento de las inversiones imperialistas no-portuguesas en las décadas de los 1960 y 1970, la clase trabajadora se expandió en Angola. En 1973, de la población africana de cinco a seis millones de personas, 130,000 trabajadores estaban empleados en la manufactura, concentrados principalmente en Luanda, Lobito y Nova Lisboa.

Durante la oleada de acciones de masas en Angola después del golpe de abril de 1974 en Portugal, los trabajadores en Luanda, Lobito, Benguela y Nova Lisboa lanzaron una serie de huelgas por aumentos salariales, mejores condiciones en el trabajo y contra las acciones racistas.

En las marchas y manifestaciones, los participantes llevaban mantas de cada uno de los grupos de liberación.

Para resolver los problemas planteados por esta oleada de movilizaciones de masas y luchas obreras, los portugueses firmaron un acuerdo que unió a la UNITA, el FNLA y el MPLA en un supuesto gobierno de transición con funcionarios portugueses.

A continuación vendría la independencia, después de las elecciones.

El establecimiento del gobierno de transición coincidió con el comienzo de una nueva etapa en la lucha. Esta etapa ha sido marcada por el resquebrajamiento del control colonial de Portugal sobre Angola, por los esfuerzos de las masas de edificar su propio gobierno y por la lucha de varias potencias imperialistas y otras fuerzas para ganar el control de la situación, o por lo menos de aprovecharla.

El rasgo más notable de este período ha sido la guerra civil angoleña—o sea, la lucha entre las tres fracciones nacionalistas. Este conflicto fratricida ha facilitado enormemente la intervención imperialista. Uno de los objetivos de Washington, por ejemplo, ha sido el de profundizar y exacerbar las hostilidades.

La mayoría de los grupos de izquierda han ofrecido su apoyo a uno u otro de los grupos nacionalistas en Angola. Algunos maoístas apoyan al FNLA o a la UNITA; los stalinistas pro-Moscú, el grupo alrededor del *Guardian* en los Estados Unidos, y la mayoría de los grupos ultraizquierdistas apoyan al MPLA.

Como saben las camaradas, éste es un problema que se disputa en el movimiento trotskista mundial. Los camaradas de la Tendencia Mayoritaria Internacional están a favor de apoyar al MPLA. Su posición ha sido presentada bastante vigorosamente por C. Gabriel en un artículo "Sobre el Problema de Angola" publicado en el número del 8 de diciembre de 1975 de *Intercontinental Press*. La dirección del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores en Argentina está de acuerdo con la TMI sobre esto.

Los camaradas de la TMI dicen que en Angola el MPLA es apoyado por la clase trabajadora y que debido a esto hay que apoyarlo, no importa qué tan incorrecto o inadecuado sea su programa. Sostienen que al MPLA se le tiene que reconocer su papel dirigente en el ascenso de masas y que la victoria del FNLA y UNITA significaría la supresión e incluso la masacre del ala más radical de los trabajadores. También afirman que el MPLA es más progresista que los demás grupos y ha promulgado un programa social más progresista en los territorios que controla.

Estos camaradas sostienen que el FNLA y UNITA no son legítimos movimientos de liberación nacional, sino agencias venales de Washington y las demás potencias imperialistas. Describen al FNLA y UNITA como "tribalistas," o sea, basados en grupos étnicos. La inferencia es que los tipos "tribalistas" son más "atrasados" que el MPLA, el cual describen como un movimiento "pan-angolés."

La realidad es un poco distinta. Por lo tanto me gustaría tomar un poco de tiempo para demostrar lo falso y erróneo de esta descripción.

Pienso que el problema que la mayoría de los partidarios del MPLA no toman en cuenta debidamente es el problema nacional—lo que ellos llaman "tribalismo."

El MPLA, UNITA y FNLA se reclaman representantes del movimiento "pan-angolés"; y cada uno describe a los otros dos como "tribalista." La verdad es que cada uno está basado en uno de los principales grupos étnicos del país.

A excepción de pequeños sectores urbani-

zados, es falso afirmar que existe una nacionalidad angoleña en una forma acabada. La mayoría de la población de Angola consta de grupos étnicos en regiones geográficas bien definidas, que en algunos casos se extienden a otros países.

Estos grupos tienen sus propios idiomas y cultura, y tienen su propia experiencia histórica como pueblos distintos. En resúmenes cuentas, cada uno de los tres tiene los atributos de una nacionalidad.

Las fronteras de Angola, después de todo, fueron delineadas por potencias imperialistas colonialistas, y no por las fronteras étnicas ni los deseos de las masas africanas. Además, el capitalismo portugués impidió la integración económica y política de los diversos pueblos angoleños.

La lucha de liberación se desarrolló de una forma desigual, con cada uno de los tres grupos representando a una de las tres principales nacionalidades en el país.

La base del MPLA está entre los mbundu que habitan la región norteña del centro de Angola y alrededor de Luanda. Son aproximadamente un millón o millón y medio de personas.

El FNLA se basa en los millón o millón y medio de bakongos en la región noroeste de Angola.

La UNITA tiene se apoyo entre los más de dos millones de ovimbundu que habitan las regiones del sur y centro de Angola.

Divisiones Etnicas

En realidad, excepto por unos cuantos períodos muy breves, las posiciones militares de los grupos han reflejado las divisiones de estas tres regiones étnicas.

También se encuentran divisiones étnicas en las regiones urbanas. Por ejemplo, en Lobito, el segundo puerto más importante, docenas de miles de manifestantes recibieron a Jonas Savimbi y a la UNITA cuando tomaron el pueblo en noviembre. No es sorprendente que Lobito sea la región central de los ovimbundu.

Cuando el MPLA aseguró el control de Luanda, sus propios periódicos informaron que durante varios días miles de trabajadores de origen bakongo y ovimbundu hicieron manifestaciones exigiendo transporte a las regiones controladas por el FNLA o UNITA. Miles lograron escaparse a Lobito donde fueron recibidos por manifestaciones a favor de la UNITA.

Tenemos que anticipar que la victoria de cualquiera de los dos lados en esta guerra civil podría significar pogromos con docenas de miles de víctimas. Los dirigentes del MPLA ya han discutido la posibilidad de convertir las regiones de los bakongo "en otro Biafra."

En Africa, la palabra "Biafra" es sinónimo con la guerra civil en Nigeria y la

tremenda masacre que ocurrió sobre el supuesto problema de las tribus. Una perspectiva parecida está involucrada en Angola. Cada uno de los grupos—no sólo el MPLA—está aprovechando las hostilidades entre las nacionalidades para avanzar sus objetivos.

Tenemos que dejar muy claro que no somos precisamente "patriotas angoleños." Ser "pan-angolés" no es necesariamente más progresista que estar a favor de ayudar a los bakongo, los ovimbundu y los mbundu a establecer buenas relaciones contra un enemigo común—el imperialismo.

Como leninistas comprendemos que el camino para unir a las masas en Angola contra la opresión y la explotación, no es el de denunciar las aspiraciones nacionales de estos pueblos como "tribalismo atrasado," sino apoyar su derecho a la autodeterminación, que incluye el derecho a la autonomía o incluso la separación.

Impulsar la victoria de uno de estos grupos nacionalistas contra los otros dos conduce a incrementar las tensiones. El MPLA, por ejemplo, ha anunciado que a los partidarios de los demás grupos no se les permitirá tener ciudadanía angoleña, una amenaza que acabará casi seguramente fortaleciendo su determinación a luchar hasta la muerte contra una victoria del MPLA.

Una razón por la cual ninguno de estos grupos ha podido superar las divisiones de la nacionalidad es que se basan en programas económicos y sociales procapitalistas y anti-clase obrera que son básicamente similares.

Esa también fue una de las razones por la cual los portugueses unieron a los grupos nacionalistas en el gobierno de transición. Querían usarlos para frenar el ascenso de la clase trabajadora.

Esto va en contra de los argumentos usados por los partidarios del MPLA en el movimiento trotskista quienes afirman que el MPLA es más "progresista" que la UNITA o el FNLA, o al menos más sensible a las presiones de la clase obrera.

Los tres grupos cumplieron los mandatos de los portugueses. La UNITA y el MPLA, que fueron apoyados en los centros urbanos, fueron especialmente activos.

Campaña Anti-huelgas

Una de las primeras medidas tomadas por los grupos fue llamar a los trabajadores a poner fin a sus huelgas. El llamado fue seguido inmediatamente por un decreto dándole el poder al gobierno para poner a los trabajadores portuarios y demás trabajadores en huelga bajo control militar.

Los distintos grupos trataron de usar la campaña anti-huelgas para su provecho fraccional, así como para intentar mantener sus bases entre los trabajadores.

Por ejemplo, cuando los estibadores en



Sven Simon/Christian Science Monitor

Refugiados huyendo de la zona de combate en Angola.

Lobito se lanzaron a la huelga, el MPLA lo usó como pretexto para enviar tropas contra la UNITA. El MPLA afirmaba que las tropas de UNITA eran responsables de la huelga, porque los estibadores eran partidarios de UNITA, de la tribu ovimbundu.

Esto no significa que la UNITA jugó un papel más progresista en esa situación. Después de la derrota del ataque del MPLA contra los huelguistas, la UNITA ayudó a romper la huelga afirmando que los estibadores estaban bloqueando los abastecimientos provenientes de Zambia con destino a las fuerzas de liberación africanas.

Desde el colapso del régimen de coalición y el inicio de la guerra civil en julio de 1975, no ha habido ningún cambio en la actitud de estos grupos, incluyendo al MPLA, hacia los trabajadores.

En Luanda, bajo el control del MPLA, el trabajo portuario se ha vuelto de nuevo un trabajo de casi veinticuatro horas, y las horas han sido alargadas sin aumentos salariales. Puede surgir alguna resistencia por parte de las fuerzas laborales, en vista de las continuas denuncias por parte de los dirigentes del MPLA, calificando a los trabajadores que no cumplen con este incremento, de saboteadores.

Otro indicio es el informe, confirmado por los camaradas dirigentes en Europa, de que se efectuó recientemente en Luanda una supresión de los obreros militantes. Esto

vino después de un informe sobre una purga de los miembros "izquierdistas" del MPLA.

Las recientes detenciones de militantes ocurrieron en el contexto de una cacería de brujas en Luanda contra el "trotskismo" aunque no hay ningún indicio de que existe cualquier grupo trotskista en ese país. Los camaradas en Portugal han informado que los estudiantes angoleños con interés en el trotskismo, que regresaron a las regiones del MPLA, fueron echados a la fuerza por el MPLA.

Sobre el problema crucial del ascenso de la clase trabajadora los hechos demuestran que el MPLA ha tenido básicamente la misma posición que el FNLA y UNITA. El MPLA piensa romper huelgas, alargar las horas de trabajo e impedir la organización independiente de la actividad política de la clase trabajadora.

Una de las afirmaciones hechas por los camaradas de la TMI es que los sectores más radicales de la clase trabajadora, que serían suprimidos si los otros grupos entraran a Luanda, apoyan al MPLA. Aún si fuera cierto, se podría arguir de una forma igualmente lógica, que con la victoria del MPLA en Lobito, el MPLA reprimiría a los militantes de la clase obrera a favor de la UNITA, como los trabajadores portuarios atacados por las tropas del MPLA.

Cualquiera que sea el apoyo obtenido

para el MPLA por parte de los trabajadores en las regiones de los mbundu, el MPLA ya ha participado en el rompimiento de huelgas y la detención de militantes de la clase obrera en Luanda, y suprimido las expresiones del verdadero radicalismo de la clase obrera.

Las líneas de clase en Angola no siguen líneas étnicas, pero existen entre los trabajadores y las direcciones de los tres grupos nacionalistas. El curso apropiado para los trabajadores y sus aliados, en Luanda, Lobito, las regiones de los bakongo, mbundu y ovimbundu, y las demás regiones de Angola, es el de seguir adelante independientemente.

Los trabajadores y sus aliados necesitan romper con cada uno de estos grupos y formar un partido propio basado en un programa revolucionario de clase.

Sólo si siguen un programa de esta índole, podrán los trabajadores elevarse por encima de las divisiones fraccionales y las hostilidades nacionales que alientan la guerra civil. Un programa de independencia de clase es esencial para que las masas obreras angoleñas derroten la política anti-clase obrera de los tres grupos nacionalistas y sus partidarios neocolonialistas e imperialistas.

Otro elemento en esta situación es el apoyo imperialista que ha recibido la UNITA y el FNLA, incluyendo el uso de

tropas sudafricanas. ¿Esto significa que debemos apoyar automáticamente al MPLA?

En primer lugar tenemos que considerar nuestros criterios. Si colocamos un signo positivo donde la Casa Blanca coloca un signo menos, o si colocamos un signo menos donde la Casa Blanca coloca un signo positivo, sería muy fácil determinar nuestra política.

Ya discutimos esto en una discusión con los camaradas de la TMI sobre la defensa por parte del Partido Socialista [Portugués] de sus derechos democráticos el verano pasado. ¿Nos deberíamos de haber opuesto a esta defensa porque la CIA afirmaba que había canalizado fondos al PS y porque los propagandistas de Wall Street decían que estaban defendiendo la democracia al favorecer al PS sobre el Partido Comunista? Nosotros contestamos que no—aunque por supuesto nos opusimos rotundamente a la política colaboracionista del PS portugués.

Tres Grupos Favorecen la Inversión Imperialista

En Angola debemos empezar con un análisis de las posiciones de los tres grupos en relación con el imperialismo. De nuevo no encontramos ninguna diferencia básica. El MPLA ha dejado bien claro—así como UNITA y el FNLA—que está a favor de la inversión extranjera en Angola.

De hecho, cuando participaron en el gobierno de coalición, los grupos nacionalistas estaban de acuerdo sobre esto punto. Los tres estuvieron a favor de que se continuaran las inversiones extranjeras, con la condición de que el gobierno controlara el 51 por ciento de las industrias de los principales recursos del país.

El gobierno ya tenía el 51 por ciento de la concesión de la Gulf Oil en Cabinda y un porcentaje similar en las concesiones de diamantes controladas por intereses sudafricanos, belgas, portugueses y norteamericanos.

Además, gran parte de las posesiones portuguesas ya habían sido nacionalizadas debido a las decisiones del Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas (MFA) en Portugal.

La única acción grande de este tipo que fue exigida, especialmente por el MPLA y el FNLA, fue la expropiación de los cafetales y las granjas. Hubo acuerdo común sobre esto punto, un acuerdo que se tomó sin mucha dificultad debido a que la gran mayoría de los dueños ya habían huido de Angola.

Además, cada uno de los grupos ha demostrado su disposición de solicitar el apoyo político, material y aún militar del imperialismo contra sus enemigos.

El MPLA, por ejemplo, solicitó el apoyo del régimen del MFA cuando aún gobernaba en Angola. Aunque los gobernantes portugueses estaban divididos sobre cómo responder, su línea principal después de que haya sido erigido el gobierno de transición

tendía hacia el apoyo al MPLA. Por ejemplo, cuando el MPLA expulsó al FNLA y UNITA de Luanda, el ejército portugués anunció que impediría cualquier intento del FNLA de regresar a la ciudad. El MPLA recibió miles de rifles, camiones, barcos y demás equipo cuando los portugueses se retiraron de Angola, mientras que la mayor parte de esta clase de equipo fue retirada de las regiones del FNLA y UNITA (y parte fue llevada a las regiones del MPLA).

El MPLA también ha buscado, y se jacta de haber recibido, ayuda política y material de los gobiernos de las potencias imperialistas más pequeñas como los países escandinavos, Holanda, Bélgica y Canadá. Es posible que este apoyo se ha disminuido durante los últimos meses debido a la presión por parte de los Estados Unidos.

Debemos agregar que el MPLA ha mantenido buenas relaciones con algunas de las compañías imperialistas más grandes que tienen concesiones en sus territorios—aún aquéllos cuyos países apoyan activamente al FNLA o UNITA.

La Gulf Oil y el MPLA

La Gulf Oil tiene la concesión imperialista más grande en Angola, ganando más de mil millones de dólares anuales de sus pozos en Cabinda, que serán incrementados a diez veces su capacidad en unos años.

Han habido varios reportes del MPLA, el Departamento de Estado de los E.E.U.U. y de fuentes en la Gulf Oil, de que las relaciones entre el MPLA y la Gulf Oil son muy buenas. Han habido reportes de que la Gulf está tratando de presionar al Departamento de Estado para que cambie su línea actual en contra del MPLA.

La Gulf Oil era el principal apoyo financiero del MPLA hasta el 22 de diciembre, cuando el Departamento de Estado obligó a la compañía a suspender los pagos.

En septiembre y octubre la Gulf Oil le otorgó 116 millones de dólares al MPLA. Pensaba hacer otro pago de 95 millones de dólares el 31 de diciembre. Sin embargo, después de que el Subsecretario Suplente de Estado para los Asuntos Africanos Edward Mulcahy presionó a la Gulf Oil, la compañía paró los pagos.

El pago de septiembre-octubre era tres veces más grande que la ayuda estadounidense al FNLA y UNITA en su conjunto. Igualaba la ayuda soviética al MPLA durante todo 1975. Por lo tanto desde el punto de vista formal de quien está recibiendo la ayuda imperialista norteamericana—el MPLA fue el recipiente de la mayoría de esta ayuda hasta hace pocas semanas. Por supuesto, la ayuda no provino del gobierno de Ford sino de la compañía imperialista más grande en el país.

El paro de los pagos por el momento vino después de una batalla entre el Departamento

de Estado y la Gulf Oil. La Gulf intentó persuadir al departamento de Estado a tomar una posición menos agresiva hacia el MPLA. Kissinger tuvo la suficiente fuerza para ganar esta batalla. Esta contienda es un indicio de las divisiones en la clase dominante norteamericana sobre la intervención en Angola.

Las relaciones amistosas entre la Gulf Oil y el MPLA no son únicas. Otras compañías del mismo tipo reciben un tratamiento similar.

Esto no demuestra que el MPLA está controlado por la Gulf Oil. Sólo subraya el punto de que cada una de estas organizaciones nacionalistas tiene una posición idéntica hacia el imperialismo; cada una manobra con el imperialismo; cada una está dispuesta a hacer concesiones políticas y económicas para ganar el apoyo del imperialismo.

Los grupos son verdaderos movimientos nacionalistas con apoyo de masas; por consiguiente no dependen del imperialismo. Es su rivalidad fraccional, profundizada actualmente hasta el nivel de una guerra civil, que ha exacerbado su disposición de solicitar ayuda del extranjero con el objetivo de igualar a sus oponentes con armas pesadas y equipo militar sofisticado.

Buscar ayuda imperialista es común entre semejantes grupos nacionalistas. Además, las diferentes fuerzas imperialistas a menudo intervienen—como en esta situación—a favor de varios lados para asegurar sus intereses independientemente de qué lado gane.

Puede ser que la estrategia principal del Departamento de Estado en el actual conflicto no es para cambiar la balanza a favor de uno de los lados—lo que se podría haber logrado fácilmente mandando más ayuda a la UNITA y al FNLA o por medio de una participación más masiva de las tropas sudafricanas.

Es posible que el Departamento de Estado busca un balance de poder entre los tres grupos, impidiendo la derrota total de la UNITA y del FNLA. A medida que pase el tiempo, las masas angolesas se pueden cansar y cada fracción se volverá más receptiva a los intentos del imperialismo de incrementar su influencia en cambio de su apoyo.

La Intervención de Moscú

Kissinger da como una de sus razones por apoyar al FNLA y UNITA, la intervención del Kremlin en la situación angolesa al lado del MPLA.

Moscú otorgó una cantidad de 100 millones de dólares en abastecimientos militares al MPLA.

Los objetivos del Kremlin son los mismos que en otras regiones coloniales o semicoloniales. Busca fortalecer la influencia diplomática de la Unión Soviética, pero sin

extender la revolución mundial o verdaderamente fomentar la liberación nacional de Angola.

En realidad, así como Washington, Moscú no parece buscar una victoria total para el lado que favorece. Los burócratas soviéticos buscan fichas que podrán usar en las negociaciones dentro del contexto de la "distensión" con el imperialismo estadounidense. Esta es la base del acercamiento del Kremlin al MPLA.

Otro objetivo es el de contrarrestar el prestigio de Pekín en África. Al apoyar a un MPLA supuestamente progresista, opuesto al FNLA y UNITA, que han recibido apoyo de China, la imagen de Moscú puede ser realzada a expensas de Pekín. En África, Moscú ha sido visto por mucho tiempo con menos simpatía que Pekín. Es más, Guinea-Bissau y Mozambique, dos países cuyos dirigentes están alineados estrechamente con el MPLA, tienen relaciones más estrechas con Pekín que con Moscú.

La Intervención Cubana

La intervención de Cuba, que según los informes tiene 5,000 tropas en Angola, es secundaria a la intervención de la Unión Soviética. Por razones diplomáticas, Moscú prefiere no enviar tropas soviéticas. Desde el punto de vista cubano, esto podría ser considerado valioso como una demostración de oposición al imperialismo.

Kissinger ha denunciado el apoyo de Moscú al MPLA, afirmando que esto cuestiona la distensión en su conjunto. Al mismo tiempo, Kissinger no ha propuesto ninguna contra-acción seria como la de dejar de vender trigo a la Unión Soviética. Pero, aún si su propaganda fuera tomada literalmente, ¿significa esto que deberíamos apoyar el "derecho" de un estado obrero de aprovecharse de una situación como la en Angola y que esto merece darle apoyo político al MPLA?

Nosotros pensamos que no. Los intereses de la revolución mundial no coinciden con los intereses de la burocracia parásita soviética ni sus estrechas maniobras diplomáticas. El apoyo militar y diplomático dado por el Kremlin al MPLA no tiene el objetivo de ayudar a las masas angoleñas sino de comprometer al régimen del MPLA con Moscú.

Si fuéramos a basar nuestra posición sobre las acciones de los representantes burócratas de un estado obrero degenerado o deformado, tendríamos una dificultad.

Corea del Norte y China han enviado consejeros y ayuda militar al FNLA y UNITA. Rumania, otro estado obrero deformado, ha seguido una política de coquetear con y ayudar a todos los lados en el actual conflicto. ¿Qué campo escogemos entre estos estados obreros que pescan en las aguas turbulentas de Angola?

¿Deberíamos de pensar que Cuba y la

Unión Soviética son más "progresistas" al apoyar a una fracción pequeño burguesa, que Pekín y Pyongyang, que apoyan a otra fracción nacionalista pequeño burguesa?

Si no se puede depositar ninguna confianza en la capacidad de cualquiera de estas fracciones de avanzar la revolución socialista en Angola o a escala internacional, sigue lógicamente que la ayuda ofrecida por la burocracia de un estado obrero degenerado o deformado no cambiará esa conclusión política.

Por ejemplo, los burócratas contrarrevolucionarios que dirigen a la Unión Soviética no se oponen de ninguna manera al rompimiento de huelgas o al arresto de militantes—especialmente bajo pretexto de una cacería de brujas contra el "trotskismo." Es más, es posible que hicieron semejante cacería de brujas una de las condiciones de su ayuda al MPLA.

Está claro que una posición marxista revolucionaria sobre la guerra civil angoleña no se derive automáticamente de la intervención cubana y soviética a favor del MPLA, o de la intervención china o de Corea del Norte a favor de la UNITA o el FNLA.

La guerra civil involucra a básicamente tres fracciones nacionalistas sin principios que siguen una política procapitalista, anti-clase obrera y colaboracionista.

La Intervención de Sudáfrica

El acontecimiento más amenazante en la guerra civil angoleña es la intervención de Sudáfrica. Esta es una de las consecuencias del carácter carente de principios de los rivales, quienes invitan la intervención extranjera, sin importarles su naturaleza reaccionaria.

La intervención sudafricana ha pasado por varias etapas.

Las primeras incursiones sudafricanas empezaron a fines de junio o julio. Su objetivo inmediato era el de perseguir a los guerrilleros de la SWAPO (Organización del Pueblo del Suroeste de África) provenientes de Namibia, quienes habían cruzado la frontera de Angola. Bajo el dominio portugués, se les había prohibido semejantes incursiones a las tropas sudafricanas, aún bajo la dictadura de Salazar-Caetano. Los portugueses temían que las incursiones sudafricanas abrieran el paso a la penetración sudafricana de la región.

La persecución de los guerrilleros de la SWAPO fue seguida en agosto por la toma de la presa de Cunene y la ocupación militar de la región.

Es importante señalar que el FNLA y UNITA no sirvieron como títeres de Sudáfrica en esta invasión. En cambio, fueron el FNLA y UNITA que iniciaron la lucha contra Sudáfrica en junio, julio y agosto, junto con el MPLA. Esto no es sorprendente porque éstas son áreas donde la población

local apoya a las unidades de la UNITA y del FNLA dirigidas por Daniel Chipenda.

La Profundización de la Guerra Civil

Fue la profundización de la guerra civil lo que impidió a las tres organizaciones unir sus fuerzas y echar a las fuerzas sudafricanas fuera de Angola.

En octubre empezaron a salir informes en la prensa de que las tropas sudafricanas estaban empujando a las fuerzas de UNITA y el FNLA hacia el norte a lo largo de la costa. Según el MPLA, la columna incluía a varios cientos de tropas sudafricanas, algunas de las cuales estaban disfrazadas de mercenarios. Otras fuentes afirman que actualmente cinco o seis mil tropas sudafricanas han invadido Angola, y hay más tropas localizadas en las regiones fronterizas de Namibia.

Debido a la censura sudafricana y los esfuerzos del FNLA y UNITA de encubrir los pasos tomados por los sudafricanos, no está claro actualmente qué campo de operaciones es primordial, la persecución de la SWAPO, la ocupación del Valle de Cunene o las agresiones militares contra el MPLA.

Los sudafricanos han intervenido por cuatro razones obvias: 1) para mantener el control sobre la región del Cunene; 2) para fortalecer su control sobre Namibia; 3) para cambiar la balanza en la guerra civil a favor de la UNITA y el FNLA; 4) para facilitar los planes contrarrevolucionarios del Departamento de Estado.

La UNITA y el FNLA tienen que ser condenados por haber formado un bloque con los sudafricanos, así como el MPLA tenía que ser condenado por haber colaborado con el ejército colonial portugués contra el FNLA y UNITA.

En cuanto al régimen de Vorster en Sudáfrica, debe ser duramente censurado, junto con el gobierno de Ford por su intervención en la guerra civil angoleña. Vorster está usando las tropas sudafricanas para abrir el camino al uso de tropas de otras potencias imperialistas. Nuestra consigna debe ser "¡Sudáfrica fuera de Angola!"

¿Qué Posición para los Revolucionarios?

Nuestra evaluación de la guerra civil entre los grupos nacionalistas en Angola se puede resumir de la siguiente manera: 1) Los tres grupos favorecen la colaboración con el imperialismo y se oponen a la movilización de la clase obrera y cualquier lucha verdadera por el socialismo; 2) Los tres buscan inflamar las hostilidades entre las principales nacionalidades en Angola; 3) Al mismo tiempo cada uno tiene una verdadera base de masas y ha jugado un verdadero papel en la lucha por la independencia.

En nuestra opinión, no se debería de dar

ningún apoyo político a ninguno de estos tres grupos nacionalistas. La victoria de cualquiera de los tres no ofrece ninguna promesa especial de avanzar a las masas angolesas hacia el socialismo. Imponer el dominio de una nacionalidad sobre las otras dos no ofrece ninguna solución estable a los problemas que encara Angola y sólo facilitaría los planes imperialistas para el país.

No creo que ninguno de estos grupos pueda "ganar" la lucha en vista de la amplia base de masas que cada uno tiene. Si uno logra una victoria decisiva sobre los otros dos, su actual punto de vista significaría un baño de sangre en que el verdadero ganador sería el imperialismo.

Nuestra posición es una de oposición a la guerra fraccional. Nosotros representamos el programa del socialismo—la lucha de los trabajadores, la juventud y los campesinos que apunta hacia una sociedad socialista. Nos oponemos al programa y las prácticas de cada uno de los grupos nacionalistas. Estamos a favor de una política de lucha de

clases para las masas.

Nuestra tarea como socialistas revolucionarios norteamericanos es oponer la intervención imperialista en Angola, particularmente la intervención imperialista norteamericana. Nuestra tarea es hacer mítines, organizar piquetes y manifestaciones, y hacer todo lo posible para profundizar la oposición que ya existe contra la intervención en la guerra civil angoleña.

Si se incrementa la intervención imperialista, y parece bastante probable, podríamos decidir favorecer la victoria de uno u otro de los grupos sobre bases tácticas, pero por supuesto, sin darle ningún apoyo político. En realidad, seguiríamos oponiéndonos políticamente a ese grupo.

Sin embargo, como he señalado, no sería correcto tomar semejante posición en estos momentos. Nuestra preocupación principal es montar una campaña efectiva contra la intervención de Washington en la guerra civil y contra sus objetivos de poner fin a la liberación nacional y a las luchas sociales del pueblo angolés.

Resumen de la Discusión

Me gustaría comenzar con algunos de los problemas en cuanto a los hechos que los camaradas plantearon durante la discusión. Pienso que es importante tomar en cuenta que varias de estas preguntas son difíciles de contestar, como señaló el camarada Fred Halstead. Tratamos de basarnos en hechos objetivos: cosas que han sido verificadas, normalmente incluso por fuentes pro-MPLA, como muchos de los periódicos en Portugal, varias de las publicaciones en Angola del MPLA, así como informes de camaradas que han estado en Angola.

Nuestras declaraciones sobre las calumnias del MPLA contra el FNLA no son recientes. Este fue la posición de la Cuarta Internacional a través de los años iniciales de la lucha. Fue tan sólo durante los últimos dos años que la Tendencia Mayoritaria Internacional cambió su política sobre esto.

Es bastante peligroso hacer declaraciones categóricas, no calificadas, de que un grupo favorece el imperialismo y el otro no, o que un grupo no es un verdadero movimiento de liberación nacional y el otro sí. Los hechos concretos tienen que ser considerados. Los hechos demuestran que los otros dos grupos no son simples títeres, pese a las afirmaciones del MPLA.

No se trata de un Ky o Thieu angolés ni de alguien como Ngo Dinh Diem, quien fue traído a Vietnam desde Nueva Jersey. La analogía con Vietnam no existe en este sentido.

El FNLA y UNITA son verdaderos movimientos, verdaderos movimientos que han demostrado una y otra vez que tienen

apoyo de masas. Aún el MPLA dice que no tiene ninguna esperanza de ganar políticamente a la gente en las regiones como las de los bakongo. Y esas regiones no son pequeñas. Cada grupo de liberación tiene aproximadamente entre un cuarto y un tercio del apoyo en Angola.

Pienso que es importante discutir algunos de los puntos que el camarada Sam Manuel señaló. ¿Qué representan cada uno de estos tres grupos? No hay ninguna diferencia fundamental sobre el problema básico de su actitud hacia el imperialismo. Un camarada mencionó que el MPLA no trata de impulsar una campaña masiva contra el imperialismo estadounidense—tal vez porque el MPLA no quiere interferir con la distensión. La actitud del MPLA no está relacionada principalmente a la distensión entre Moscú y Washington. Es cierto que el MPLA no trata de impulsar una gran campaña de masas contra el imperialismo norteamericano. Pero eso no se debe a ninguna preocupación por la distensión. Están mirando hacia adelante y dejando abierta la posibilidad de relaciones amistosas con el imperialismo norteamericano. Este es el equivalente de la política de los otros dos grupos, que han estado tratando de licitar más que el MPLA en busca de relaciones amistosas con el imperialismo norteamericano. Este es el equivalente de la política de los otros dos grupos, que han estado tratando de licitar más que el MPLA en busca de relaciones amistosas con el imperialismo norteamericano.

Desafortunadamente, ese parece ser el

carácter de la política de estos grupos en esta lucha.

En determinado momento la situación puede cambiar de tal forma que nosotros pediríamos ayuda material para el MPLA—o la UNITA, o el FNLA, o alguna combinación de los tres—pero al mismo tiempo manteniendo nuestra oposición política a su programa.

Nuestro punto de partida es la oposición a la intervención imperialista norteamericana, y si esto nos coloca en el mismo campo que uno u otro de los grupos de liberación nacional, que así sea.

Es posible que a medida que pase el tiempo una u otra de las tres organizaciones puede evolucionar de tal forma que dejaría de ser un grupo de liberación nacional, perdería su apoyo de masas y se convertiría en títere del imperialismo. Eso podría suceder. A estas alturas no existe ninguna diferencia básica de esta índole entre los tres grupos.

Nuestra oposición a la intervención del imperialismo no parte del punto de vista de que los imperialistas están respaldando al grupo equivocado o algo por el estilo. En nuestra opinión, el imperialismo está interviniendo en esta situación con el objetivo de imponer su control. El imperialismo quiere impedir la independencia de Angola, en general debilitarlo. Aún si fuéramos a apoyar al MPLA en determinado momento, no cometeríamos el error de intentar presionar al imperialismo para que apoyara el MPLA.

Pienso que es importante señalar además que la clase dominante norteamericana no piensa unánimemente sobre la cuestión de cuál de los grupos debe apoyar. Aún antes del actual debate hubo presión por parte de aquéllos que estaban preocupados por el peligro de otro Vietnam. La verdad es que los especialistas imperialistas norteamericanos en los asuntos africanos en el Departamento de Estado se oponían uná-

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memente a la política de Kissinger. Ellos afirmaban que los Estados Unidos deberían buscar un acuerdo diplomático entre los tres grupos.

Richard Clark, Presidente del Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa (subcomité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado sobre África), fue a Angola y habló con los dirigentes del MPLA. Cuando regresó, mantuvo que no existía ninguna diferencia básica entre los tres grupos. Dijo que los dirigentes del MPLA le aseguraron que se alejarían de la Unión Soviética en cuanto pudieran derrotar a los otros grupos.

Quiero decir algo sobre la campaña de los social demócratas y los maoístas exigiendo que "los rusos" o el "imperialismo soviético" se retire de Angola. Nosotros nos oponemos a esto. No existe tal cosa como el imperialismo soviético, en todo caso, y lo único que logra esto es ceder ante el imperialismo norteamericano. Compara la ayuda soviética a los movimientos de liberación nacional con los intentos de los imperialistas de mantener su explotación económica y opresión social de los países coloniales.

Como revolucionarios y partidarios incondicionales del derecho del pueblo angolés a la autodeterminación, por supuesto criticamos la ayuda inadecuada del Kremlin a la lucha contra el imperialismo. Criticamos el apoyo no crítico de los stalinistas a la política del MPLA, incluyendo la actitud chauvinista del MPLA hacia los bakongo y ovimbundu y sus intentos de aplastar a estas tribus. Criticamos el curso político del Kremlin de impedir el desarrollo de un partido socialista revolucionario en Angola. No estamos de acuerdo con la política stalinista.

Los intereses de los obreros y campesinos angoleños no guían a la burocracia soviética, así como la política de la burocracia soviética no representa los intereses de los obreros y campesinos soviéticos. Pero la amenaza, el peligro en Angola es la intervención imperialista.

Nuestra tarea es exigir que el gobierno estadounidense se retire de Angola. Si la Unión Soviética dejara de enviar armas al MPLA, ¿sería esto un paso adelante para la revolución angoleña? No. ¡Le daría más confianza al imperialismo!

Nosotros no exigimos que ninguno de los grupos de liberación nacional en Angola entregue las armas que ha recibido de cualquier fuente.

Lo que está cayendo en el juego del imperialismo, es el curso político que han seguido los tres grupos, no la fuente de sus armas. Y como señaló el camarada Peter Seidman, lo último que queremos es darle cobertura a Washington por su propia intervención en cualquier parte. Este es un aspecto particularmente escandaloso de la demanda de los maoístas y social demócratas

de que se retire la Unión Soviética. Es una capitulación a la presión del imperialismo norteamericano.

¿Que pensamos nosotros que se debería de hacer en Angola? En primer lugar, hacemos un llamado para la unidad, en actividades antimperialistas, de las tres organizaciones nacionalistas o de cualquier otra organización parecida que pueda existir en Angola. Les llamamos a que se unan contra las diversas potencias imperialistas que han intervenido.

Cuando los portugueses gobernaban ahí, estuvimos por la unidad de las organizaciones nacionalistas en torno a acciones para expulsar a los portugueses de Angola en vez de que cada una intentara maniobrar de diversas maneras con los portugueses. Proponemos el mismo curso en respuesta a Sudáfrica o cualquier otra potencia imperialista que trate de intervenir. Al mismo tiempo nuestro objetivo básico es el de ayudar a las masas a romper con estas organizaciones en el plano político.

No tenemos una actitud neutra hacia los tres grupos en relación a la guerra civil. Estamos en contra de la política de cada uno en la guerra civil; estamos en contra de su negativa a seguir una política de unidad contra el imperialismo. En mi opinión, la culpa no cae únicamente sobre el FNLA o la UNITA. En el momento en que la UNITA y el FNLA se oponían a los primeros ataques sudafricanos—oponiéndose a la toma del Valle de Cunene, etc.—el MPLA se aprovechó de la invasión sudafricana, trató de usarla a su favor.

En vez de lanzar una campaña nacional para unir a las diversas organizaciones contra Sudáfrica, el MPLA avanzó militarmente contra la UNITA y en menor grado contra el FNLA.

Es difícil a esta distancia apreciar todos los detalles de la guerra fraccional entre los tres grupos. Pero no tenemos ninguna dificultad en ver cuál es nuestra tarea fundamental, como han dicho Fred y otros camaradas. Esta consiste en organizar la oposición a la intervención imperialista norteamericana, no sólo con palabras, sino con hechos.

Lo haremos y en la medida en que los grupos de liberación nacional en Angola sean consecuentes con su lucha para acabar con toda intervención imperialista, nos encontraremos en el mismo campo.

Pero sería un obstáculo hacer una valoración incorrecta en base a hechos unilaterales, de tal forma que nos encontraríamos en el campo fraccional de uno de estos grupos nacionalistas en oposición a los demás sin justificación adecuada alguna.

Eso sería un obstáculo en nuestra batalla contra el imperialismo, así como lo ha sido entre los diversos grupos en Portugal y a través del mundo, que colocan el apoyo a uno de los grupos por encima de las

necesidades de la lucha contra el imperialismo.

La cuestión principal sobre la cual tenemos que actuar inmediatamente es la polémica actual entre los diversos grupos o la polémica sobre este problema en la Cuarta Internacional. La decisión principal que se debería de desprender de este pleno para avanzar los intereses de los pueblos angoleños y la revolución africana, así como la revolución norteamericana, es la de lanzar una campaña sobre Angola.

Tenemos que establecer al Socialist Workers Party como la organización que hace más que cualquier otra para sacar a los Estados Unidos de Angola, que intenta unir a todos sobre este problema, que intenta hacer a un lado el fraccionalismo engendrado por los partidarios de uno u otro de los tres grupos.

Pienso que encontraremos una respuesta muy amplia a semejante campaña en las comunidades negras. Pienso que encontraremos una buena recepción en el movimiento obrero, en el movimiento estudiantil—en cualquier lado donde todavía exista la memoria de la experiencia de Indochina. □

Hernán Cuentas Arrestado en el Perú

Hernán Cuentas, un dirigente del sindicato de mineros peruano y del Partido Obrero Marxista Revolucionario, ha sido arrestado por las autoridades peruanas.

Cuentas, quien es, además, miembro del Buró Internacional del Comité de Organización por la Reconstrucción de la Cuarta Internacional, no ha sido acusado de ningún crimen, según el informe sobre su detención en el número del 8-15 de enero del semanario parisiense, *Informations Ouvrières*.

Después de su arresto, Cuentas fue enviado a la prisión de El Sepa, ubicada en una región infestada de la selva de las Amazonas, según *Informations Ouvrières*. Otro dirigente del sindicato de mineros, Víctor Cuadros Paredes, y cuatro abogados—Ricardo Díaz Chávez, José Ono, Genero Ledesma y Arturo Salas Rodríguez—fueron enviados junto con él.

Según *Informations Ouvrières*, la información sobre las detenciones fue dada a conocer públicamente el 18 de diciembre en la revista peruana *Marka*, que publicó una carta de las esposas de los presos políticos.

En el mismo número de *Marka* también se anunció la formación del Comité por la Amnistía Política (COPAPOL), apoyado por más de veinte organizaciones sindicales, de trabajadores, profesores y estudiantiles.

Como su primera actividad pública, según *Informations Ouvrières*, COPAPOL organizó una reunión de 30,000 personas en Lima para protestar contra la represión política.

La Muerte de Chou En-Lai

Por Les Evans

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "The Death of Chou En-lai" que apareció en el número del 19 de enero de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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La muerte de Chou En-Lai a la edad de setenta y ocho años en Pekín el 8 de enero finalizó una carrera política que abarcó cincuenta y siete años de actividad en medio de los eventos que formaron la historia moderna de China. Cuando se murió de cáncer, diagnosticado en 1972, Chou había servido como Primer Ministro de la República Popular de China durante veintiséis años seguidos, desde su establecimiento en 1949. Esto en sí es evidencia de su pericia en la guerra solapada dentro del partido que había conducido a la purga y deshonra de todos excepto unos cuantos de los colaboradores más viejos e íntimos de Mao Tse Tung al comienzo de la década de los 1970. Esto era aún más increíble porque se dio después de treinta años de experiencia antes de 1949 como dirigente estudiantil, revolucionario comunista perseguido, comandante militar, y diplomático sin país representando al Partido Comunista Chino (PCCh) durante las décadas de los 1930 y 1940 en las negociaciones con el gobierno de Chiang Kai-Shek.

Durante sus últimos años, Chou sirvió como adorno en el aparato gubernamental chino y su cuerpo diplomático. Cultivó la reputación que había ganado por su fina cortesía, la cual no concordaba con los burdos métodos férreos del régimen que representaba. Chou trabajaba entre dieciocho y veinticuatro horas diarias, supuestamente, hasta el comienzo de su última enfermedad. Decía que no había tomado vacaciones en cincuenta años.

La extraordinaria persistencia de Chou durante las múltiples purgas a través de la historia del stalinismo chino, se debió a su falta de principios y una aguda sensibilidad para detectar en qué dirección soplaban el viento en los altos rangos de la jerarquía del partido. Estos atributos le permitieron más de una vez cambiar repentinamente de un lado para otro en las disputas internas sin tomarse la molestia de racionalizar su conducta.

La prensa capitalista del occidente, después del viraje de Pekín hacia Washington en 1972, manifestó su encanto con la personalidad de Chou y su agrado por su moderación como diplomático. Después de su muerte los escritores del *New York Times* lo saludaron como "uno de los estadistas más clarividentes del siglo veinte," citando como evidencia su papel, junto con Mao, "en la reparación de la relación sino-estadounidense que durante muchos años había sido destrozada."

Estos caballeros, quienes no son amigos de la revolución china, no están fingiendo cuando expresan su pesar por la muerte de Chou. Están expresando su estimación de un anterior enemigo por los verdaderos servicios que prestó. Es la transformación interna de Chou En-Lai, el revolucionario proletario desinteresado, en Chou En-Lai el administrador-burócrata y gran conciliador del poder capitalista, que constituye el hilo central de su vida y que define su lugar en la historia china y mundial.

Nacido en una familia de la clase gobernante en la Provincia de Kiang Su en 1898, Chou fue ganado a las ideas socialistas cuando era estudiante en Japón en 1918. Regresó a China para participar en el levantamiento estudiantil nacionalista radical de 1919, conocido como el Movimiento Cuatro de Mayo, entonces se trasladó a Francia en un viaje de estudios, donde fue ganado al

'Siempre Fue Bastante Oportunista'

[En una entrevista publicada en los números del 15 y 29 de enero de 1972 del periódico de Amsterdam *Vrij Nederland*, Peng Shu-Tse presentó la siguiente evaluación de Chou En-Lai.]

* * *

Siempre fue bastante oportunista. Regresó de Alemania en 1925 y asistió al Cuarto Congreso del Partido Comunista Chino. Tuve bastante contacto con él, especialmente después del golpe del 20 de marzo de 1926, (cuando Chiang Kai-Shek tomó el poder en Cantón y los comunistas fueron obligados a tomar la defensiva).

Su carácter era exactamente opuesto al de Mao. Era muy amistoso y razonable. Todo el mundo lo quería. Nunca hubo conflictos con él. Pero políticamente dio bandazos de un lado a otro. Nunca tomó una posición clara, definida. Por ejemplo, cuando hablé con Borodin en Cantón y propuse que nos saliéramos del Kuomintang, Chou dijo: "Ambos argumentos constan de verdades que deben ser medidas." En resumidas cuentas, eso era Chou En-Lai. Y ese ha sido su estilo durante toda su vida. Pero, por el otro lado, era muy capaz, especialmente en cuestiones de organización y administración. Nos era muy útil en aquel entonces. Había vivido en Francia y Alemania durante mucho tiempo y comprendía la situación en Europa. La comprendía de una forma impresionista, pero enfin, la comprendía. Chou era un hombre que tenía interés en conocer las opiniones de los demás. Siempre estaba dispuesto a escucharlas.

Partido Comunista en 1922. Al regresar a China en 1924, entró a la dirección del PCCh, y también del Kuomintang, en que se encontraba sumergido el PCCh en una política de entrismo profundo ordenado por Stalin y el Comintern.

Chou participó en virtualmente todos los principales acontecimientos en la revolución de 1925-27, una revolución que fue conducida a una derrota sangrienta y desastrosa por la política de Stalin de colaboración con el Kuomintang burgués, y su formulación de las tácticas para el PCCh. Fue en esta escuela que Chou se formó como revolucionario. Fue arrestado en Cantón en marzo de 1926 en el primer paso que tomó Chiang Kai-Shek contra el PCCh; participó en la insurrección de Shanghai en la primavera de 1927 y fue uno de los dirigentes en esta ciudad que decidió permitir la entrada de las tropas de Chiang, conduciendo a la masacre anticomunista del 12 de abril; estuvo en Wuhan en julio de 1927 cuando la política de Stalin de seguir practicando el colaboracionismo de clase con una escisión de "izquierda" del Kuomintang condujo a otra masacre; participó en la Insurrección de Nanchang el 1 de agosto de 1927, que marcó el giro ultraizquierdista conocido posteriormente como el "Stalinismo del Tercer Período," que duró hasta 1934.

Uno de los admiradores de Chou durante los acontecimientos en Shanghai en marzo y abril de 1927 fue André Malraux, quien escribió posteriormente dos novelas basadas en estas experiencias, convirtiendo a Chou en el héroe de la segunda novela, *El Destino del Hombre*. León Trotsky, en una reseña de la primera

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novela de Malraux en 1931 sobre la revolución china, *Los Conquistadores*, reconoció el heroísmo personal de los representantes del Comintern y sus asociados chinos. Pero negó que esto los convirtiese en revolucionarios proletarios.

“El tipo de funcionario-aventurero y el tipo de revolucionario profesional,” escribió Trotsky, “en determinados momentos y en ciertas de sus características, pueden tener puntos de convergencia. Pero por su formación psicológica, así como por su función histórica, son dos tipos opuestos. . . . El revolucionario proletario francés, ruso o chino, verá a los trabajadores chinos como su propio ejército, de hoy o de mañana. El funcionario-aventurero se eleva por encima de todas las clases de la nación China. Se considera predestinado a dominar, dar órdenes y mandar, independientemente de la relación de fuerzas internas en China. Debido a que el proletariado chino es débil actualmente y no puede asegurar las posiciones dirigentes, el funcionario concilia y une a las diferentes clases. Actúa como el inspector de la nación, como el virrey de los asuntos de la revolución colonial.”

Corrupto por el stalinismo durante sus primeras experiencias serias en el movimiento obrero, el joven, idealista y dotado Chou En-Lai se convirtió en el prototipo del funcionario-aventurero, intercambiando este papel en 1949 por el papel aún menos admirable de funcionario-administrador. Los puntos álgidos de su carrera corroboran este juicio severo.

Los triunfos personales más grandes de Chou fueron inspirados por su obediencia al aparato stalinista o por el esfuerzo de conciliar y unir a las diferentes clases, nacional o internacionalmente. Durante el período en que Mao estuvo desacreditado después de la derrota de la Insurrección de la Cosecha de Otoño de 1927, Chou llegó a ser el principal teniente de Li Li-San, el jefe del partido nombrado por Stalin después de que los dirigentes que lo fundaron, como Chen Tu-Siu y Peng Shu-Tse, fueron convertidos en los chivos expiatorios del fracaso de la política de Stalin en China.

Cuando Li fue purgado en enero de 1931, Chou hábilmente transfirió su lealtad a la dirección recientemente nombrada por Moscú de Wang Ming. Chou actuó como secuaz de Wang en la eliminación de Mao del puesto de Comisario Militar del supuesto soviet de Kiangsi en agosto de 1932 (Chou recibió este puesto como recompensa). Chou fue igualmente flexible al abandonar a sus anteriores dirigentes y someterse a Mao cuando, en la conferencia de Tsunyi en enero de 1935, durante la Gran Marcha hacia el norte de China, la fracción de Mao logró derrotar a Wang Ming y apoderarse de la dirección del partido.

Después del Séptimo Congreso del Comintern en el verano de 1935 (donde fueron electos Mao y Chou al Comité Ejecutivo del Comintern), Chou encontró su verdadero lugar como el practicante chino más hábil de la política colaboracionista del Frente Popular. Su hazaña más famosa de la década de los años 1930 fue su intervención en diciembre de 1936 para salvar la vida de Chiang Kai-Shek después del arresto del generalísimo contrarrevolucionario por sus propias tropas en Singan por haber saboteado la resistencia a la invasión japonesa de Manchuria. Chou se trasladó a Singan donde intercedió a favor de Chiang, y al mismo tiempo concluyó un acuerdo que de nuevo subordinó el PCCh al Kuomintang en un bloque contra Japón que obligó al PCCh a aclamar a Chiang como su dirigente. Chou incluso se reunió al Kuomintang y fue reelecto a su presidium en 1938.

Chou permaneció en la capital de Chiang Kai-Shek (Chong King) aún después de que Chiang usara su autoridad como comandante de las fuerzas del PCCh para tender una trampa para el Nuevo Cuarto Ejército maoísta en enero de 1941 donde miles de tropas fueron masacradas.

Al final de la guerra en 1945 Chou destacó de nuevo como el colaborador más enérgico de los Generales norteamericanos Hurler y Marshall en su intento de persuadir a Chiang Kai-Shek a aceptar al PCCh como socio-menor en su gobierno. Esto era típico de la forma de pensar del funcionario-aventurero stalinista: el



CHOU EN-LAI

intentar usar las fuerzas masivas acumuladas por la dirección del PCCh en la lucha anti-japonesa como un punto de negociación para unir a las clases rivales. No fue culpa de Chou o del General Marshall que fracasara esta reintegración de los territorios tomados por el PCCh al gobierno de Chiang. Fue el aristócrata y obstinado Chiang quien lanzó una ofensiva militar contra el PCCh en julio de 1946, acelerando la guerra civil que en última instancia perdió.

El nuevo régimen del PCCh después de 1949, le encargó a Chou el intento abortivo de organizar un gobierno de coalición capitalista (el contenido político explícito de la proclamada “Nueva Democracia” de Mao), un proyecto que se desintegró sólo en 1953 bajo la presión del sabotaje burgués al gobierno y la economía durante la guerra de Corea.

Desde los primeros años de 1950 Chou encontró su verdadera vocación como árbitro diplomático de la “coexistencia pacífica” stalinista con el capitalismo mundial. Como el representante chino a la conferencia de Ginebra en 1954, intentó apaciguar a Washington, presionando a los vietnamitas para que permitieran la reocupación francesa del sur de su país después de la victoria militar en Dien Bien Phu. A Chou, en realidad, se le reconoce como el iniciador de la fórmula “dos Vietnams,” que asentó la base “legal” de la agresión genocida norteamericana de las

décadas de los 1960 y 1970. (En junio de 1972, durante el séptimo años del bombardeo norteamericano de Vietnam del Norte, Chou le dijo al sinólogo norteamericano John K. Fairbank que "lamentaba mucho" haber firmado los acuerdos de Ginebra de 1954: esto ha de haber consolado muy poco a los combatientes vietnamitas quienes tuvieron que reconquistar lo que perdieron en Ginebra para satisfacer las necesidades de la diplomacia china y soviética.)

El segundo "triunfo" de Chou fue en la conferencia de Bandung de 1955, donde se codeó con Nehru, Sukarno, y otros dirigentes burgueses "no alineados" del mundo semicolonial. Lo que estaba involucrado ahí no era simplemente el intento por parte de China de romper el embargo norteamericano o de ofrecer apoyo a las naciones oprimidas que luchan por una verdadera independencia de la dominación imperialista. El "algo más" que Chou ofrecía que era característico de la diplomacia stalinista, no proletaria, fue la coexistencia con los regímenes capitalistas en cambio de concesiones diplomáticas y comerciales.

El significado de esta formulación ha sido absolutamente claro en los años desde la Revolución Cultural de la década de los años 1960. Bajo la dirección de Chou, China ha retirado su apoyo explícitamente a los movimientos revolucionarios en aquellos países cuyos gobiernos tienen relaciones amistosas con Pekín. Los ejemplos abarcan desde Sri Lanka, donde Chou alabó el gobierno de Bandaranaike por su eficacia en suprimir a la juventud radicalizada en 1971; a Chile en 1973, cuando China estuvo entre los primeros gobiernos en el mundo que reconoció a la dictadura militar del General Pinochet; a las más recientes promesas de

Pekín de amistad con el Shah de Irán, el difunto Generalísimo Franco, y el no lamentado Nixon. Estos ejemplos constituyen evidencia impresionante de la naturaleza contrarrevolucionaria del stalinismo.

Como uno de los principales dirigentes de la casta burocrática en China, Chou era un oponente implacable del programa del trotskismo y de sus representantes, incluyendo a los miembros que fundaron el Partido Comunista Chino, quienes jugaron un papel heroico en el desarrollo de la revolución china y fueron los principales blancos del régimen de Chiang Kai-Shek y de los invasores imperialistas japoneses. Chou consintió en la purga de los trotskistas a escala nacional después de que los maofistas tomaron el poder. Echados en calabozos sin acusación ni juicio algunos, estos trotskistas han permanecido presos políticos durante veintitrés años. Se desconoce el destino de la gran mayoría.

Para la clase trabajadora a nivel internacional, la revolución china fue un gran logro progresista. Pero las fuerzas motrices de la revolución china no residen en los funcionarios-aventureros del stalinismo como Chou y Mao, quienes fueron empujados a tomar el poder en 1949. Residen en el inmensamente poderoso movimiento de masas de los obreros y campesinos, quienes emprenderán de nuevo su marcha hacia el socialismo.

El anuncio en Pekín de la muerte de Chou la calificó como "una gran pérdida." Sin embargo, no se prevee ningún cambio en la política exterior de colaboracionismo que él promulgó y avanzó. La burocracia parásita tendrá pocas dificultades en reemplazarlo con un técnico de semejante habilidad y falta de principios □

Préstamo de \$58 Millones en Juego

Pekín Gana Aprobación de Pinochet

En un momento en que la represión asesina de los oponentes políticos por parte de la dictadura de Pinochet la ha aislado internacionalmente al punto de que el régimen bañado en sangre ha llegado a ser una vergüenza pública aún para la Casa Blanca, ha recibido ayuda de la burocracia maísta en Pekín.

"La junta militar chilena, cada vez más aislada y asediada en Chile y en el extranjero, busca lazos más fuertes con China, uno de los pocos amigos que le quedan," informó Hugo O'Shaughnessy en el número del 23 de noviembre del *Observer*.

"El Comandante Gaston Frez, jefe de Codelco, la Corporación del Cobre del Estado chileno," continúa O'Shaughnessy, "anunció en Santiago la semana pasada que China incrementaría su importación de cobre chileno de 8,000 toneladas este año a 34,000 toneladas en 1976."

Se ha informado que un préstamo bastante grande por parte de Pekín es parte del pacto. En una entrevista reciente con Pinochet, el columnista del *New York Times* C.L. Sulzberger preguntó si era cierto el rumor que había oído de que "Chile estaba discutiendo con Pekín un préstamo de \$58 millones a esta economía tambaleante" como parte de las negociaciones acerca del cobre.

"Para mi sorpresa," dijo Sulzberger en su columna del 29 de noviembre, "lo confirmé."

Según Sulzberger, Pinochet "dijo que las discusiones con los chinos ya se habían iniciado durante la época de Allende, pero continuaban actualmente, después de haber sido suspendidas. 'El asunto permanece abierto y el préstamo queda pendiente,' agregó."

Sulzberger, aparentemente escéptico aún, buscó verificar la declaración de Pinochet, con los siguientes resultados:

"Confirmé esto en una conversación con el chileno que ha sido el principal contacto negociador con el Embajador de Pekín, un hombre que él describe como 'muy, muy paciente.'"

Pinochet tiene todas las razones en el mundo para sentirse satisfecho con los representantes diplomáticos de Pekín.

Después del golpe en septiembre de 1973, la Embajada China en Santiago cerró sus puertas a todos los refugiados políticos. Mientras que los trabajadores estaban siendo liquidados por miles y los presos políticos ejecutados y torturados, la Embajada de Pekín rechazó a refugiados desesperados, dejándolos a merced de los gorilas chilenos.

Además, ante el clamor mundial contra la

matanza, Pekín se negó a romper relaciones diplomáticas con el régimen.

En su lugar, el 11 de octubre de 1973, Pekín le dijo al Embajador pro-Allende en China, Armando Uribe, que ya no era reconocido como el representante de Chile. El 5 de noviembre, se informó que un representante de la dictadura militar estaba en Pekín reemplazando a Uribe.

Con tal de obtener concesiones diplomáticas y comerciales, Pekín traicionó de nuevo los principios más elementales del internacionalismo proletario. Al hacerlo ha ganado la aprobación de Pinochet.

"China se ha portado bien," le dijo a Sulzberger. □

Mao Dice Nixon Bienvenido a China

El Presidente Mao Tse-Tung, el jefe del stalinismo chino, se reunió con Julie Nixon Eisenhower el 31 de diciembre. Una fotografía de la reunión y una declaración sobre ella fueron presentadas prominentemente en el número del 2 de enero de *Peking Review*.

Mao le dijo a la hija del desacreditado ex presidente que le diera "sus saludos al Sr. Nixon y dijo que el Sr. Nixon podría visitar de nuevo a China."