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Imperialists Assess Setback in Angola



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The Case of Daniel Schorr

Desacuerdo Táctico con Trotsky

Argentine AAA—Isabel Perón's Murder Squad

By Judy White

As pressure mounts for the ouster of Isabel Martínez de Perón, startling disclosures have been made about the direct role of her regime in the wave of terrorist attacks ultraright murder gangs have been carrying out for more than two years.

Up to now, not a single arrest has been made in the hundreds of assassinations of revolutionists, trade-union militants, and other opponents of the regime's policies.

However, among the facts that have suddenly been made public are the following:

- There are direct links between high Peronist officials and the rightist terrorist gangs.

- The AAA (Alianza Anticomunista Argentina—Argentine Anticommunist Alliance), the most infamous rightist murder gang, is financed from government sources.

- AAA members have been recruited from personnel of the Ministry of Social Welfare and from the Argentine federal police. The latter were then put on the payroll of the ministry.

The principal informants in the new disclosures are two prison inmates who had been picked up "routinely" or for matters apparently unrelated to AAA operations.

The Buenos Aires daily *La Nación* reported in its February 23 international edition the testimony of Jorge Omar Heredia. Heredia had been arrested some days earlier in a "routine" police operation. He has confessed to being a member of a group that carried out assassination attempts against several persons. These include José Scabuzzo and his wife, Delia Burns; the Pujadas family—parents, a brother, and a sister of Mariano Pujadas, a victim of the 1972 Trelew massacre in which sixteen political prisoners were killed by the authorities; and Communist party activist Rodolfo Contreras.

Heredia stated he was acting under orders of Omar Leurino, a guard for Raúl Oscar Lacabanne, until recently the federally appointed governor of the province of Córdoba. According to Heredia, Leurino—who was later assassinated himself as a "traitor"—was working for the police and receiving orders from former Police Chief Luis Alberto Choux.

During Lacabanne's governorship, Heredia and one of his fellow goons were named to posts at Rawson hospital—

Heredia as chief of personnel, the other as chief of services.

Following the assassination of the Scabuzzo couple (Delia Burns de Scabuzzo was a doctor at Rawson hospital), pressure from trade unionists at the hospital forced Heredia and his associates out.

Heredia then went to work at the Ministry of Social Welfare, headed by Perón's former chief adviser, rightist strongman José López Rega. There he was part of a ring that stole official cars and transported them to Paraguay for resale to one of Lacabanne's associates. Thirty percent of the profits were turned over to an unnamed high government functionary.

Heredia provided details of the murder of an unnamed member of a revolutionary organization—telling who participated and who was in charge of getting rid of the body and the automobile that was used. He is also reported to have turned over to authorities a long list of names of members of the group in which he functioned.

Heredia's testimony followed by less than a month that of Salvador Horacio Paino (previously identified as Héctor Paino), who has been jailed since April 1, 1974, for falsification of documents.

Testifying February 4 before a special four-member parliamentary commission investigating corruption in the Ministry of Social Welfare and other governmental agencies, Paino revealed that he was a founding member of the AAA in 1973 and that the organization had been set up and funded through the Ministry of Social Welfare, on direct orders of López Rega.

In his testimony Paino reported that Jorge Conti, public-relations director in the

Ministry of Social Welfare, had on two occasions given him checks totaling five million pesos. The money was to be used to finance the assassination of Federal Deputy Rodolfo Ortega Peña and television executive Antonio Tomás Hernández, as well as for other AAA operations.

Paino's job was to organize a "security" force that would not be "of a defensive or static type," he said, "but one capable of going and striking in the places where they thought they had to strike, using the old military axiom that there is no better defense than a good offense."

López Rega personally chose those persons who initially filled AAA posts.

The ministry's director of administration, Rodolfo Roballos, supplied Paino with funds to buy machine guns for the AAA from a source in Paraguay. The arms themselves were picked up in Ministry of Social Welfare trucks.

Paino claims to have left the AAA when he was ordered to kill Ortega Peña, Hernández, and army Col. Vicente Damasco.

Ortega Peña was machine-gunned to death in Buenos Aires July 31, 1974.

Paino also maintained that after his 1974 arrest he made a full report on the AAA to Judge Teófilo La Fuente as a witness in another case concerning the right-wing murder group. This testimony was never made public.

The new disclosures come at a time when a wide array of opposition elements in the Argentine bourgeoisie have dismissed any hope of Perón's being able to deal with the country's mounting economic and social crisis. Calls for Perón's resignation and moves to force her to resign as "unfit" to govern have increased in recent weeks. The new disclosures have obviously given a boost to this campaign.

The only force still maintaining silence on this issue is the military, which is waiting in the wings for Perón to be totally discredited. In the meantime it continues ruthlessly to carry out its own program of "legal" repression against revolutionists and trade-union militants. □

The Case of Daniel Schorr

"In October, 1974, I was assigned to start investigating intelligence agencies," CBS television correspondent Daniel Schorr said last month. "In February, 1976, they seem to be back investigating me."

Schorr is under investigation because he provided the New York weekly *Village Voice* with a copy of the CIA report prepared by the House Select Committee on Intelligence. The House voted January 29 to keep the revealing document under lock and key. Schorr decided "that with

much of the contents already known I could not be the one responsible for suppressing the report."

What has been Schorr's reward for letting the American people read a little truth about the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation?

- The Justice Department is looking into the possibility that Schorr may have violated federal espionage laws.

- The House "ethics" committee, aided by the FBI, is attempting to determine whether Schorr should be declared in

"contempt of Congress" for releasing the report.

• CBS has relieved Schorr, an employee of twenty-four years' standing, of his reporting duties "until all Government proceedings have been resolved." In other words, he has been taken off the air.

"From the events of the past couple of weeks," Schorr told the Washington Press Club February 25, "let me report my preliminary conclusion: the joys of martyrdom are considerably over-rated."

CBS knew all along that Schorr possessed a copy of the report and that he based several broadcasts on "leaks" from it. "I held up the report in my hand more than once and showed it on television and nothing happened," Schorr said.

But outright publication of the findings embarrassed both the White House and Congress, which jointly conspired to suppress the report. "The *Voice* is what I'd call at least an 'anti-establishment' paper," said an unidentified CBS senior executive. "Publication of the report there made Dan's action very political."

The attempt to railroad Schorr out of the press corps—or worse—is just one aspect of Washington's scheme to clamp down the lid on government secrets. Ever since the release of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, the White House has found itself in roughly the same predicament as the "little Dutch boy" in the childhood tale. Every time it plugs one leak, two others spurt open somewhere else.

So finally it has come up with another solution: Try to build a better dike.

Ford has proposed legislation that would impose up to \$5,000 in fines and five years in prison on former or current government employees found guilty of disclosing "classified" information. Reporters would not be directly covered under the proposed law, but they could be declared in contempt of court if they refused to reveal their sources to grand juries or to testify against accused employees.

During the past five years Americans have learned a great deal they did not previously know about "their" government: its assassination plots; its deliberate lies about the Vietnam War; its illegal snooping and harassment activities against dissenters; the seamy details of its support to bloody, right-wing dictatorships.

And recently, with the disclosure of the House committee's findings, they have learned still more.

Confronted with all this, what is Washington's response?

A witch-hunt of Daniel Schorr.

His case deserves the support of all who defend the right of the American people to know the full truth about the crimes Washington commits *in their name*. □

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Imperialists Assess Impact of Setback in Angola

By Ernest Harsch

After Angola, what next?

This is the question being voiced by government officials and commentators in Washington and the other major imperialist capitals following the failure of the American and South African intervention in the Angolan civil war. It reflects a deep concern over the consequences of that setback on American and European interests outside Angola's borders.

The impact of the setback in Angola will be most immediately felt in the countries of southern Africa still ruled by white colonial-settler regimes: Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), South Africa, and Namibia (South-West Africa), which is occupied by South Africa.

The failure of the imperialist intervention in Angola showed the oppressed Black masses of those countries that Washington and Pretoria—the principal bulwarks of white rule in southern Africa—are not invincible. The antiwar sentiment among Americans, particularly among Blacks, was a major factor in limiting the White House's ability to carry out its intervention.

This failure can only encourage the Black populations of southern Africa to press ahead with their struggles against the last bastions of white colonial rule. It is this prospect that particularly worries the imperialist powers.

In a speech in mid-February, British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan warned that "southern Africa is sliding into a most dangerous situation."

The consensus among British rulers appears to be that the white settler regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia is the most immediately endangered. The country is still formally a British colony, although the settlers unilaterally declared "independence" from Britain in 1965 in a bid to avoid losing their privileges and power to the nearly six million Blacks.

Of all the white regimes in southern Africa, the Smith regime is the weakest. The 250,000 whites are outnumbered by Blacks by more than 20 to 1. The Rhodesian regime, moreover, has not been formally recognized by any country in the world.

Since the mid-1960s, Zimbabwean resistance to continued white rule has increased considerably. Guerrilla campaigns were launched in the rural areas. In 1972 mass protests, strikes, and rallies swept the

major cities in opposition to a proposed settlement reached between Smith and London that would have given the country its formal independence from Britain while at the same time entrenching the white supremacist regime in power. The Zimbabweans demand independence under Black majority rule.

One of Smith's major allies, the Portuguese colonial administration in neighboring Mozambique, was forced to abandon that country in 1975, further isolating the Rhodesian whites. News reports over the past few months have cited a step-up in recruitment of guerrilla forces by the Zimbabwean nationalists. Thousands of guerrillas are reported to be undergoing training in Mozambique and Zambia. On February 26, hundreds of Africans demonstrated in the Rhodesian capital of Salisbury.

British Minister of State David Ennals warned February 19 of "the fearful prospects of a bloodbath in Rhodesia." An editorial on Rhodesia in the February 15 *London Observer* declared, "The ghastly scene is now set for the next chapter in the struggle over Southern Africa. It will bring civil war between whites and blacks, and even more international involvement than in Angola."

One of the more blatant attempts to whip up a racist hysteria against the Zimbabwean nationalists appeared in the February 22 *London Sunday Telegraph*. Peregrine Worsthorpe said:

How would the British people react to the spectacle of a successful black invasion of Rhodesia, resulting in mass killings of the whites? This is no longer a nightmare possibility some time in the distant future. As a result of the Angolan debacle it could happen quite soon. It will not be a civilized invasion or a gentle revolution. Once the Africans smell white blood, the pent-up passions of history will wreak a terrible vengeance. Against shock and provocation on this scale, surely even the purest liberal non-racialist British heart may be fired by feelings of tribal white solidarity. . . .

In an attempt to defuse the explosive situation in Zimbabwe, the imperialists are increasing pressure on the Smith regime to make some compromises toward the Zimbabwean nationalists before the unrest in that country escapes control. Since late 1974, the South African and Zambian regimes have participated in this effort, with Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia harassing those Zimbabweans based in Zambia

who are opposed to negotiations with Smith.

Colin Legum reported in the February 15 *London Observer* that a Zambian official had told "Western leaders, as well as South Africa . . . that the only way to avoid 'a second Angola' in Rhodesia is effective intervention to persuade the Smith regime to accept majority rule."

Majority rule, however, would mean an end to the privileges and power of the white settler population, which rests on the dispossession and domination of the Africans. That is why Smith has been unwilling to make any compromises in that direction.

Important imperialist sectors in London, Washington, and even Pretoria have realized that the Smith regime is an obstacle to any peaceful transition to neocolonial methods of rule. They fear that his intransigence will only heighten the militancy of the Zimbabweans, thus endangering imperialism's overall interests. Although for now the imperialists still hope to push through a negotiated settlement, they may be willing to write off the Smith regime if such a settlement becomes impossible, pressing instead for the installation of a neocolonial Zimbabwean regime.

Washington has added its weight to the British efforts to reach a negotiated "solution" to the conflict. A State Department spokesman declared February 20, "We are calling on Mr. Smith and the white regime to negotiate realistically and seize what well may be their last opportunity for a negotiated settlement."

Although the South African military presence in Namibia has been greatly increased over the past two years, the African nationalist struggle there may also gain new force. The main Namibian nationalist group is the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), which has been fighting for the independence of the colony since the mid-1960s.

According to the February 21 *London Economist*, SWAPO President Sam Nujoma recently visited Luanda, the Angolan capital, where SWAPO plans to open an office. Nujoma pledged to extend the guerrilla war in Namibia with backing from the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

The white authorities in South Africa

have so far managed to stifle most serious expressions of dissent in that country. But the mounting nationalist struggles in the rest of southern Africa will make their task more difficult.

In a February 20 dispatch from Johannesburg, *New York Times* correspondent Michael T. Kaufman quoted Colin Eglin, a leader of the Progressive Reform party, as saying in Parliament, "Far too many black people see what is happening in the north and in Angola as part of the process of liberation from discrimination within South Africa. I believe many of the black people of South Africa are getting silent satisfaction out of the successes of the M.P.L.A."

The imperialists' uncertainty about the future of southern Africa was reflected on the London stock market. According to the February 22 London *Sunday Times*, the gold mine index, which closely follows the fluctuations of South African gold shares, dropped about 1 percent each trading day during the previous fortnight. The paper value of Union Corporation, a mining concern with large investments in South Africa, dropped by 20 percent. Shares in Johannesburg Consolidated, the company most closely linked to South African platinum, fell in value by nearly 25 percent.

In addition, the *Times* report said, "Investments in Namibia (and naturally Rhodesia) must now carry a high political risk."

The *Economist*, in its lead article February 21, entitled "From the Angola Rubble," offered some proposals for joint imperialist action to "save" southern Africa from a "slide towards a general race war."

In addition to stressing the need for a "settlement" in Zimbabwe, the *Economist* advised that "it is necessary to reinforce the moderate men still in power in the area; to find out whether there are elements of possible moderation in the marxist regimes of Angola and Mozambique; and to neutralise, if possible, the new power of Soviet-backed Cubans."

In an effort to encourage "moderation" on the part of the MPLA regime, the *Economist* called on the European and American imperialists to launch a coordinated policy in which economic assistance would be offered to the MPLA on the condition that the Cubans leave Angola.

Such a policy has already been set in motion. On February 23, the foreign ministers of the European Common Market issued a statement offering economic and political "cooperation" to the Luanda regime. The statement also condemned all foreign intervention in the civil war, which in the imperialists' vernacular referred principally to the Soviet and Cuban backing to the MPLA.

The February 25 *Christian Science*

Monitor reported that the U.S. Agency for International Development had begun drawing up a program for economic and technical aid to the MPLA. Even more



RHODESIAN PRIME MINISTER IAN SMITH

than the European powers, Washington has coupled such overtures to the MPLA with condemnation of the Cuban presence and has indicated that it will not recognize the MPLA regime until the Cubans are out.

The MPLA, for its part, has already stated that the Cubans would leave Angola after the South African troops in southern Angola have withdrawn. About 4,000 to 6,000 South African troops remain stationed in southern Angola.

The imperialists, through such economic "aid," as well as through direct investments, will seek to expand their economic domination of Angola. Gulf Oil, the largest foreign investor in the country, has already begun negotiations with the MPLA to resume operations at its Cabinda oil fields.

The giant diamond company, Diamang (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola, SARL), has also sought to negotiate an arrangement with the MPLA. Diamang, which is controlled by Portuguese, American, South African, Belgian, and British capital, owns one of the largest diamond fields in the world, located in northeastern Angola. Diamang Chairman Carlos Abecassis said in an interview in Lisbon February 23 that the company wanted to turn over its rights to the MPLA regime,

while continuing to run the mines as a "contractor-partner."

Abecassis cited the company's sharp drop in production—due partly to a loss of labor—as the reason for the hand-over. According to Reuters, "He termed a take-over the only way to protect Angola's diamond production and make the laborers accept what he described as the strict discipline and hard work required to restore productivity and efficiency."

The MPLA, which has broken strikes and introduced speedup, has already launched such a campaign to "discipline" workers.

The February 21 *Economist* article also proposed that Washington, Pretoria, and the European powers provide emergency financial aid to Zambia's Kaunda, who has worked closely with the South African regime and is a key figure in the negotiation efforts in Zimbabwe.

The drop in the world price of copper, Zambia's major export, and the closing of its transport route through Angola as a result of the civil war there, has thrown Zambia into an acute economic crisis. Kaunda's declaration of a state of emergency in January indicated the mounting internal pressures he is under.

All the American and European imperialist efforts to maintain their position in southern Africa revolve around their strategy of bolstering the racist South African regime, which serves as the strongest imperialist foothold on the African continent. "It is on the borders of South Africa, not Rhodesia, that the west should be ready to draw a line in defence of its economic interests," the *Economist* stated.

Washington is additionally concerned about the international effects that its setback in Angola could have.

During his tour of Latin America in February, Kissinger, in a reference to possible Cuban involvement in other countries in the region, threatened, "The United States will not tolerate a challenge to the solemn treaty principle of nonintervention in this hemisphere." In Kissinger's dictionary, "nonintervention" means no interference with Washington's continued imperialist domination of Latin America.

In a warning to the Kremlin not to try to take advantage elsewhere of the American setback in Angola, Kissinger stressed during his Latin American tour that Washington had a "heavy responsibility to maintain the global balance of power. . . ."

Kissinger's threat was also directed at those peoples of the colonial and semicolonial world who will take inspiration from Washington's failure in Angola to advance their own struggles against imperialist domination. □

American Maoists Defend Forced Migrations in Cambodia

By Steve Clark

Chatichai Choonhaven, Thailand's foreign minister, announced in February that his government had closed its doors to refugees from nearby countries. "The wars in Indochina have ended," he said, "and we can't allow people from Indochina to continue crossing the border to our country anymore."

Choonhaven explained that henceforth persons who entered Thailand without proper papers would be arrested and deported.

The refugees inside Thailand who have received the most publicity the past several months are the estimated 9,000 persons who have fled Cambodia since the Khmer Rouge swept to victory over Washington's puppet Lon Nol regime last April. Thailand is attempting to normalize relations with the new Cambodian government, and its decision to close its borders was most likely an attempt to help this process along.


Cambodian refugees have also filtered into South Vietnam, according to a report by William Shawcross in the March 4 *New York Review of Books*.

Reports from refugees housed in camps along the Thai border indicate that the Khmer Rouge staged a massive transfer of the Cambodian population during the last several months of 1975. Many Cambodians are said to have fallen ill and died under the harsh conditions of the involuntary journey, which was said to be aimed at increasing the agricultural labor force in the fertile Battambang Province.

This was the second such forced migration since Lon Nol's ouster. No sooner had the Khmer Rouge's peasant-based army marched into Phnompenh last April than it launched a summary evacuation of the city. Even the hospitals were emptied of their patients, as the entire population of the capital—soon followed by other cities—poured into the countryside.

As in the more recent migration, death, hunger, and suffering were the result.

For the Maoist-leaning U.S. weekly *Guardian*, however, these events are merely "press slanders" against the Khmer Rouge regime. "The U.S. has inspired a propaganda campaign attempting to discredit Democratic Cambodia—with the apparent aim of trying to sabotage the country's economy," opens an article by George Hildebrand and Sokhom Hing



Christian Science Monitor

featured on the back page of the February 25 *Guardian*.

Hildebrand and Hing continue: "The current propaganda follows a classic device of planting stories among legitimate journalists who may not realize that the 'refugees' they interview have been carefully selected beforehand by the CIA. These refugees report obviously well-rehearsed stories about 'communist atrocities.'"

In the article, the two authors single out dispatches by *New York Times* correspondent David Andelman, the *Christian Science Monitor's* Daniel Southerland, H.D.S. Greenway of the *Washington Post*, and Peter Collins of the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS).

Accounts of the recent forced migration have also been filed by Jon Swain of the London *Sunday Times*, the *Manchester Guardian's* Martin Woollacott, and others.

Hildebrand and Hing complain, "None of these stories was based upon direct observation."

They fail to mention, however, that such "direct observation" is made impossible by the Khmer Rouge's ban on all foreign correspondents and most other foreign visitors.

Furthermore, the April 1975 migrations were witnessed firsthand by several correspondents, among them Sydney H. Schanberg of the *New York Times*, *Le Monde's* Patrice de Beer, and Jon Swain. These reporters were in Phnompenh during its evacuation, and they observed the evacuation of other Cambodian cities as the Khmer Rouge transported them out of the country by truck.

Schanberg reported at the time: "In

Phnom Penh two million people suddenly moved out of the city en masse in stunned silence—walking, bicycling, pushing cars that had run out of fuel, covering the roads like a human carpet, bent under sacks of belongings hastily thrown together when the heavily armed peasant soldiers came and told them to leave immediately. . . ."

"Hospitals jammed with wounded were emptied, right down to the last patient. They went—limping, crawling, on crutches, carried on relatives' backs, wheeled on their hospital beds. . . ."

To bolster their contention that such reports are "CIA concoctions," Hildebrand and Hing point out that two of the recently interviewed refugees were former functionaries of the corrupt Lon Nol dictatorship. "On the whole," the *Guardian* writers said, "the character of those interviewed indicates they comprised privileged elements of the old regime or actually fought against the patriotic forces."

This assertion is a conscious distortion of the news accounts, which describe other refugees as former factory workers, farmers, hospital and dispensary employees, and students.

Hildebrand and Hing are apparently aware that the correspondents who filed these reports cannot simply be dismissed as a band of rabid reactionaries out to discredit the Khmer Rouge at all costs. They suggest that some "legitimate" journalists "may not realize" that they have fallen victim to an intricate CIA fabrication.

The truth is that some of the correspondents were even quite sympathetic toward the problems facing the new Cambodian regime. For example, Martin Woollacott reported February 29: "The way in which the new Government has yanked a distorted economy into some kind of health is impressive. Refugees who complain of privation and coercion often do not realize that, without a determined Government, Cambodia could have faced starvation and chaos last summer."

In addition, Hildebrand and Hing are wrong in stating that "none of the recent spate of atrocity accounts reported to Americans bother to take note that Cambodia has just emerged from a devastating war of aggression and destruction imposed by the U.S."

In fact, most of the accounts point to this as one of the major problems facing the

new government.

Nearly 10 percent of the Cambodian population was slaughtered during Washington's five-year assault on the country. The dams, reservoirs, and irrigation networks essential for rice production were practically wiped out by U.S. terror bombing, and large tracts of farmland were also destroyed.

Several correspondents described the scenes they witnessed as they traveled to the Thai border last April after their expulsions from Cambodia. Swain reported on the condition of one farming village:

"The war damage here, as everywhere else we saw, is total. Not a bridge is standing, hardly a house. I am told most villagers have spent the war years living semi-permanently underground in earth bunkers to escape the bombing. . . .

"The entire countryside has been churned up by American B-52 bomb craters, whole towns and villages razed. So far, I have seen not one intact pagoda."

This was the legacy of imperialism in Cambodia and of the "agrarian policy" of the puppet Lon Nol government.

Faced with the wholesale destruction of indigenous agriculture, it is undeniable that the Khmer Rouge faced an awesome task in merely guaranteeing that the Cambodian population would be spared the disaster of starvation. The irrigation system had to be restored, and rice yields had to be adequate to feed the country.

But must such problems be solved by brutal, forced mobilizations of the masses? Revolutionary socialists say no. Hildebrand and Hing, on the other hand, imply that the answer is yes.

"Andelman's account of the 'new migration,'" they said, "reveals his ignorance of the fact that for centuries Cambodian peasants have moved to different parts of the country to harvest rice or to preserve large catches of fish. . . . The Times reporter cannot understand that the new population movements may be in the people's interest and carried out rationally in the context of a national economic plan.

"Furthermore, Andelman does not realize that the new government is attempting to relieve overcrowding in the central provinces that resulted from invasions from the neighboring feudal countries in the 19th century."

Be that as it may, the migration enforced at gunpoint by the Khmer Rouge peasant army last April was never explained to the Cambodian people. Still less were they asked to express their opinion on the matter, or to participate in planning how to meet the country's pressing economic problems.

When the Khmer Rouge forces first marched into Pnompenh last April, they enjoyed tremendous popularity. According to the reports of Western journalists,

thousands of Cambodians poured into the streets to greet the victorious peasant army.

The energies released by the downfall of the Lon Nol clique provided the opportunity for a truly democratic mobilization of the Cambodian masses to begin the urgent tasks of postwar reconstruction of the country. Instead, this mobilization of the urban population was viewed by the Khmer Rouge as a threat. Literally within hours the jubilation of the Pnompenh workers, artisans, and students was transformed into misery and suffering.

Cambodia's new leaders have adopted as their model the bureaucratic policies first used by Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union, and later applied by Mao Tsetung in China. These antidemocratic regimes stifle the creative initiative of the key social forces that can move toward a socialist society: the urban workers in alliance with the poor peasants.

The Khmer Rouge leaders are also

locked into the framework of Stalin's conception of "socialism in one country." The new Pnompenh regime has carried this doctrine to such an extreme that it has even refused to accept outside aid from any source other than China.

Even the largest conceivable yearly rice crops cannot provide Cambodia with the wealth necessary for the full-scale industrialization essential to the construction of socialism. Ultimately this can only be achieved through worldwide socialist cooperation.

But a revolutionary leadership in Cambodia could put the country on the road to a socialist society by pursuing an internationalist perspective and instituting democratic economic and social planning by the workers and peasants themselves.

The policies of the Khmer Rouge seem far removed from such a program. Instead, these policies follow the bureaucratic and narrow nationalist pattern characteristic of Stalinism the world over. □

Demonstrations Sweep West Bank

Palestinians Protest Israeli Occupation

A three-week-long wave of demonstrations by Palestinians protesting the Israeli occupation began January 27, the day after the debate on Palestine in the United Nations Security Council ended. Wafa, the Palestinian news agency, reported protests in Jerusalem, Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron, Bira, and Gaza. Protests also took place in Jericho.

The demonstrations were fueled by the refusal of an Israeli judge to rule against eight right-wing Israelis who invaded the Dome of the Rock, a Muslim shrine. The Israelis claimed the right to pray there, despite the fact that Jewish religious law forbids entry to the area, where King Solomon's temple once stood.

"Israeli leaders are blaming the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for instigating the riots, which have led to hundreds of arrests, injuries to troops and students and the imposition of collective punishment on several Arab towns," Eric Marsden reported in the February 22 London *Sunday Times*.

The protests involved both Muslim and Christian towns, and schools were closed in most of the West Bank. "In the town of Al Bira, Zionist forces occupied the Hashemite school and the roofs of all high buildings," Wafa reported in a February 12 dispatch.

According to the report, fines in Bira alone had reached a total of 100,000 Israeli pounds by February 10. In the meantime,

Israeli military authorities imposed censorship on all Arabic-language newspapers in the occupied territories in an effort to prevent news of the protests from spreading.

In Nablus, according to a report in the February 10 *Jordan Times*, "demonstrators blocked streets and set fire to car tyres while Israeli soldiers shot at them."

The February 15 *Jordan Times* reported that student demonstrations in Jericho were coupled with a general strike by merchants. "The military governor of the town ordered a curfew in the middle of the day, and then ordered the shopkeepers to reopen, which some of them did."

In addition, "The military governors of the cities of Nablus and Ramallah, north of Jerusalem, informed Arab leaders that no permits would be given to Arab residents to leave for Jordan as of Sunday.

"The Israeli authorities said the action was 'punishment' for student demonstrations in the two cities."

The travel restrictions were extended to include entry by relatives and friends of West Bank residents living in Jordan. Searches of persons in the streets and of private homes were also stepped up by the Israeli occupiers.

In Jerusalem, repeated demonstrations reached a high point February 13. The *Jordan Times* reported that "special border police were called in and broke up Arab marches with tear gas and water cannon."

Portuguese Political Parties Sign New Pact With Military

By Gerry Foley

The Portuguese bourgeois and reformist parties signed a new "constitutional pact" with the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement) February 26. The major signatories were the Communist party, the Socialist party, the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—Democratic People's party), and the Centro Democrático Social (CDS—Social Democratic Center).

The CP, SP, and the liberal-bourgeois PPD have participated in the popular-front coalitions collaborating with the MFA since the fall of the Caetano regime. The CDS is a rightist party that has not participated in the government coalitions but has functioned as a reactionary, more or less loyal, opposition to the MFA. Its most well-known figure is Gen. Galvão de Melo, a close associate of General Spínola and the most outspoken rightist in the original junta that took power after April 1974.

The new pact, according to *New York Times* correspondent Marvine Howe, was designed to "end military rule and establish a democratic system." That claim no doubt echoes the propaganda line of the MFA and its collaborators. It is clearly false.

If the military wanted to withdraw from politics, it would simply do so without obliging the parties to sign a new pact. The very fact that a new formal agreement between the MFA and the parties has been imposed signifies that the military is hanging on to its role of arbiter in Portuguese political life.

On the other hand, the provisions of the new pact as reported in the February 27 *New York Times* seem to represent a substantial retreat by the MFA from earlier proposals. For example, a report on the pact negotiations in the January 16 issue of the Lisbon daily *ODiário* indicated that the military was demanding that the office of president be reserved for an armed forces commander. According to this scheme, the president was to have the power to declare war and make peace, proclaim a state of siege or emergency, and dissolve the legislative assembly.

With the approval of the Council of the Revolution, the leading body of the MFA, moreover, the president would have had veto power over all legislation concerning economic, social, and financial policy; over legislation "defining the public sector"

(that is, nationalizations and expropriations); relations with other countries; military affairs; and "regulating the exercise of political freedoms."

Whereas, Howe wrote:

"Under the new agreement, the Council of the Revolution has abdicated its powers to veto the choice of president, to define the broad lines of domestic and foreign policy, to rule on the constitutionality of laws and decrees and to legislate in civilian matters. The council will function in the future essentially as an advisory body to the president."

In fact, the military may very well be able to manage Portuguese politics more effectively from a formal position of "adviser" than from one of being directly responsible for decisions.

For a period, the establishment of an assembly of the MFA as a whole and of MFA assemblies in the various services was necessary. The mass upsurge and the political weakness and divisions of the bourgeoisie left the MFA tops suspended virtually in midair. They had to try to ride the wave of radicalization while retaining the essential underpinnings of capitalism and bourgeois state authority.

Thus, the MFA leaders had to extend their direct political network in the armed forces and to develop a sounding board, as well as gain some legitimacy by seeming to reflect the political process going on in the country. Nonetheless, the form had its dangers, since the direct involvement of the military caste in politics is in the long run fatal to its unity and hierarchical discipline.

The new formula for constituting the Council of the Revolution reflects the same political need for appearing representative of the armed forces as a whole, but its scope has been narrowed to something more resembling the standard military junta. According to Howe: "It will be composed of the president of the republic, the armed forces' chief of staff and the deputy chief, the chiefs of staff of the army, air force and navy, the prime minister (if he is a military man), and eight officers delegated by the army, three by the air force and three by the navy."

The president will head the council and have veto over legislation. The *Times* report did not mention if and how such a veto can be overridden. The president does not have to be a military man, but of

course he may be. The actual decision about this will be determined by the course of the class struggle between now and the elections.

Both the CP and the SP leaderships have explicitly accepted the proposition that some degree of military tutelage is necessary to guarantee "revolutionary order."

The bourgeois parties have expressed stronger reservations about military rule for various reasons. In the first place, their rightist clientele was reluctant to accept many of the concessions the military was forced to make to the mass movement. Moreover, up to now the bourgeois parties have been in a distinct minority, and it has been necessary for them to assert a measure of independence from the government in order to build an electoral following.

Furthermore, the fact that the CP and SP leaderships have been committed to maintaining military tutelage has made "democracy" a profitable issue for the right. The CP has kept on hitching its hopes to the MFA; the SP, in particular its left wing, has accepted the notion that the MFA withdrawing completely from politics would open the road to the right. That, of course, is a notion the MFA leaders are anxious to encourage.

To a large extent, the bourgeois military can afford to step back, because the disastrous policies of the CP and SP have led to growth of rightist sentiment. For many months the Portuguese press has been referring to government polls that allegedly show that the bourgeois parties would win a majority in new elections. In fact, the main rightist party outside the government, the CDS, is expected to emerge as a major force, whereas it won only 7.65 percent of the vote in the April 25, 1975, Constituent Assembly elections.

Most observers in Portugal expect the government based on the upcoming legislative elections to be a continuation of the "center-left" popular front. But it is also expected that the government will be under strong pressure from a large rightist opposition led by the CDS representing more than a quarter of the total vote. Such an outcome would provide a favorable context for a continuation of the gradual restoration of bourgeois "law and order" by the government and the military and

for the preparation of more determined attacks on the workers movement.

This represents a striking change from the period of the Constituent Assembly elections in the spring of 1975, in which the workers parties won a substantial overall majority. At that time, all the bourgeois parties were on the defensive, trying to represent themselves as socialist.

This change was illustrated February 6 when the CDS held its first mass rally in Lisbon. The event reportedly drew about 15,000 persons. The Campo Pequeno stadium where it was held was ringed by the riot police, who are now heavily armed with, among other things, "crowd-control" armored cars mounted with machine guns facing in three directions. The pretext for this display of force was a counter-demonstration organized by the Maoist União Democrática do Povo (UDP—People's Democratic Union), which drew a crowd about one-tenth the size of the CDS gathering.

Since they are incapable of mobilizing the workers to fight for a socialist program, based on class independence and beginning with the immediate needs of the masses, the reformist workers parties remain, to varying degrees, the prisoners of the less and less "progressive" military, which they present as the only hope to block the advance of the right. In this, the left wing of the SP suffers from the greatest contradictions, since it looks to the military to defend both democratic rights and the economic and social gains of the masses.

The series of crises that began last May has demonstrated again the counter-revolutionary results of a workers party trying to hitch its wagon to "progressive" officers or to substitute "influence" in the military for winning and organizing the masses in independent class struggle. This has made the CP and SP themselves the focus of resentments against the failure of the military government to solve the problems of the masses.

Furthermore, the military can, and will inevitably, discard its reformist allies as their political credibility is used up. It has already done this to a large extent in the case of the CP.

The most sophisticated representative of the U.S. ruling class, the *New York Times*, hailed the new pact in an editorial February 29: "It is significant that only the Communists and their allies, painfully aware that they cannot win an election, wanted the military to retain political power."

Actually the popularity of the CP first and then the SP declined because they proved loyal to the bourgeoisie and not to the workers they claim to represent. And this commitment to bourgeois "order" was reflected by their subordination to military

rule. This fundamental decision led to a whole chain of developments, such as deteriorating living standards and coups and countercoups, that alienated large sections of the masses.

The result has been a vicious circle where the large reformist workers parties have been trying to defend their positions by clinging to increasingly discredited military rule, while the resurgent right, which aims at repressing the mass movement, has been rallying growing support with calls for "democratic government."

Furthermore, this has all taken place within the framework of accepting military tutelage over political life. Both the SP and the CDS signed the first pact in 1975 as well as the new one.

According to Howe, there was pushing and shoving up to the last minute in the negotiations over the new pact: "... disagreement arose over a preamble introduced by the military at the last moment. Only after the preamble was withdrawn at a meeting last night did the party leaders agree to go ahead with the signing today."

However, for the moment, the military has every reason to make formal concessions on governmental powers, as a sly politician like President Costa Gomes no doubt realized. With the military government so discredited, it is wise to let the civilian parties take the responsibility for a while for unpopular policies.

Such a retreat by the military and concessions to the principles of representative government have their dangers. However, the apparent growing mass following for the bourgeois parties reduces these risks and makes such a maneuver possible.

However, there are signs of regroupment

of the working class on the trade-union level, with a widening split between SP unionists and the government. That could open the way for an advance in union organization and militancy, which is precisely what the Portuguese bourgeoisie, now practically without reserves, can least afford.

Whatever maneuvers the Portuguese rulers try, the Portuguese revolutionists can best meet them by tirelessly explaining the need for the workers and toilers to unite to defend their own interests and not to rely on either the "progressive" bourgeoisie or the "progressive" military □

Mihajlov Reported Seriously Ill

Mihajlo Mihajlov, an imprisoned Yugoslav dissident, was reported to be seriously ill and possibly near death as a result of a three-month hunger strike. Friends who visited him said February 23 that Mihajlov was bloated and his skin had turned yellow, a common symptom of jaundice. He was reported to have lost forty pounds since he began his hunger strike on December 6, 1975.

Mihajlov was imprisoned on October 7, 1974, and sentenced to seven years for criticizing the Tito leadership. He had previously served three and a half years in prison in the late 1960s for circulating "hostile propaganda."

Mihajlov began his hunger strike to back his demands for more heat in his cell, contact with other political prisoners, and permission to receive religious literature.

The Yugoslav government denied February 25 that Mihajlov was in danger of death.

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Labour Launches Fresh Assault on Workers' Living Standards

By Tony Hodges

LONDON—"1976 is a year when we cannot afford to let up," Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson warned British workers in a new belt-tightening appeal December 28, "even though there will be some pretty bleak months, particularly in the early months of the year."

Wilson's "pretty bleak months" are in fact the bleakest seen in this country for more than thirty years, and there is no sign that they will be limited to just the "early months of the year."

There are now 1,430,369 unemployed workers in Britain (6.1% of the labour force), according to statistics published by the Department of Employment January 20. This is double the number out of work one year ago and the highest level of unemployment since the late 1930s. The jobless figure in Northern Ireland is 8.9%.


Britain is in the throes of recession, with industrial output in the third quarter of 1975 8% less than two years back. Manufacturing investment, according to the January 6 *Financial Times*, fell 13% in 1975 and is expected to tumble another 5 to 8% this year, hitting its lowest level in twelve years.

Even if the recession has "bottomed out," it is now obvious that unemployment will continue its upward climb throughout 1976.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecasts a 2% growth rate for Britain in 1976. With the underlying rise in productivity at about 3% a year, however, more men and women will be out of work at the end of this year's "expansion" than at the beginning. Britain's fifth biggest union, the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), announced January 25 that it expects 1.75 million persons to be jobless by the end of the year.

Redundancies are being declared in one industry after another. According to a December 18 statement by the president of the National Federation of Building Trades Employers, more than 175,000 construction workers are unemployed and the total could reach 250,000 by the middle of this year. Meanwhile, 748 million bricks (enough to build 70,000 homes) are lying in stockpiles, vivid proof of the anarchy of the capitalist system.

Big layoffs are also the order of the day in Britain's uncompetitive, recession-hit car industry. Last year's output of 1.26



The Guardian

million vehicles was a twelve-year low and 18% less than in 1974. British Leyland, the country's biggest car producer, "shed" 14,000 workers this year. One-third of the 25,000-strong work force at Chrysler's British subsidiary will be laid off early this year—a "nonnegotiable" condition for a £162.5 million [£1=US\$2.02] "rescue" operation for the giant multinational announced by the Labour government December 16.

The steel industry, where output slumped 11.5% last year, tells the same story. Late last year, British Steel Corporation chief executive Bob Scholey said he wanted to axe 44,000 workers (20% of the labour force) from the payroll in the next two years. Steel union leaders signed a deal with the corporation January 23 effectively allowing Scholey to proceed with his two-year redundancy programme.

Wilson and Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey have no intention of checking this drift towards mass unemployment. In fact, Trades Union Congress (TUC) leaders now believe that present policies could keep unemployment over the million mark until 1980.

High unemployment is built into the Labour government's industrial strategy, codified in the "Chequers Blueprint" published November 6. The plan gives the green light for outdated plants to be run down and employment levels reduced (to

raise productivity and British firms' prospects in the world capitalist market), whatever the social cost in rising joblessness. As the blueprint put it—in guarded language—"For the immediate future this will mean giving priority to industrial development over consumption or even our social objectives."

At the same time, Wilson is using mounting unemployment as an enforcement mechanism for the government's wage-control policy. Last August, in a bid to drive down real wages and raise profits, the Labour government imposed a £6 ceiling on wage rises over the following twelve months.

"A certain measure of unemployment," noted the *Observer's* political diarist Alan Watkins January 25, "was, curiously, essential to the success of the £6 limit. 'If you don't behave yourselves,' the Chancellor could—did—say, 'even more of you are going to find yourselves on the dole.'"

Real wages were falling even before the imposition of the £6 limit. Consumers' real disposable incomes, the Central Statistical Office announced January 9, fell 2.8% in the second and third quarters of 1975 from their level in the previous two quarters. The *Times* commented the next day: "It now seems certain that general living standards in 1975 showed one of the largest falls experienced in the past twenty years with little early recovery in prospect."

Retail prices rose 5% faster than average earnings in the first ten months of 1975.

This erosion of workers' living standards is the main reason for the fall in retail sales, which were down 2.3% from 1973 levels in the first eleven months of 1975.

While unemployment soars and wages fall, the Labour government is launching an assault against a third aspect of workers' living standards: welfare services. Hospitals, schools, housing, and other needed social services are on the chopping block.

Last year, the government lopped £75 million off the National Health Service (NHS) budget as part of a £900 million package of public-expenditure cuts. By next year, capital expenditure in the NHS will have been cut in real terms by 28% from its 1972 level. Education cuts have made 7,000 teachers unemployed in England and Wales.

These cuts are small-fry compared to

what the government now has in store: On January 15, the cabinet agreed to far-ranging public expenditure cuts in the 1977-78 financial year totaling £3,250 million. "The public expenditure cuts now agreed," commented the *Guardian* the next day, "go right across the board and do not spare some of the Labour Party's most sacred cows such as housing, education and health.

"Education is understood to be relatively hard hit by the cuts. There have already been indications that university programmes and nursery school education as well as the overall numbers of teachers will have to be reduced. The Department of Health is also bound to suffer. Here the cuts are expected to fall principally on new capital projects such as hospitals."

The government announced January 25 that up to 35,000 public-sector workers are set to lose their jobs under the austerity programme.

To push through this across-the-board, anti-working-class offensive, the Labour government is making full use of the trade-union leaders. In fact, this has been at the heart of Wilson's strategy since the Labour party's election victory in February 1974. The new government and the union bureaucrats immediately made a "social contract" under which the TUC leaders pledged to convince the rank and file to hold down their wages "voluntarily."

When Wilson decided that voluntary methods were insufficient and threw the weight of the law behind his wage-control programme with the £6 limit, the union leaders became cheerleaders for this new infringement of the right to free collective bargaining. They endorsed the £6 wage ceiling by a massive majority at the September TUC congress. Only one large union, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), voted against it.

Now the AUEW has also stepped into line with government policy. On December 8, the union's National Committee voted 32 to 20 to back the £6 limit. "It must be a source of satisfaction to the government and the TUC," said AUEW President Hugh Scanlon after the decision, "to know that the second largest union is now in support of their policy."

It was indeed!

In fact, it has emboldened the government to seek an even tighter pay policy when the present restrictions expire at the end of July. In the next annual wage round, Healey urged January 14, "we must have a lower percentage increase in wages as a whole." Ten days earlier he said that pay limits were probably here to stay for two more years.

Union leaders are not contesting the government's right to impose "phase two" of its statutory pay curbs this summer, but

are merely arguing over what form the controls should take. Jack Jones, general secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), Britain's biggest union, came out January 24 for another round of flat-rate wage controls.

The TUC leaders have failed equally in their responsibility to defend the right to work. In fact, as the *Guardian* concluded January 22, "a notable absentee from the ranks of those who have spoken out against mass unemployment, or rather against the acceptance of it as a by-product of the Government's current economic policy, has been the trade union establishment."

When the London area of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions sponsored a demonstration November 26 for the right to work, mobilizing 20,000 from throughout Britain, the TUC's General Secretary Len Murray went so far as to call a press conference to denounce the march as "exploitation of this concern" over jobs "by extremist groups."

The union bureaucrats have not even attempted to put forward policies that could safeguard jobs. Their incessant

negotiations with government ministers have centred on proposals for reflation of the economy and the imposition of "selective" import controls. Reflationary measures within the capitalist framework of today's economy (at a time when retail prices rose last year by 24.9%) would probably send inflation through the roof.

The chauvinist propaganda for import controls merely seeks to unload the burden of unemployment onto the backs of foreign workers. Both these illusory "solutions" are echoed—indeed championed—by Labour's "left-wing" Tribune Group in Parliament and by the Communist party. Not one of the seventy Tribune MPs even voted in Parliament December 17 against the enforced firing of 8,300 Chrysler workers as part of the government's £162.5 million hand-out deal with the giant auto manufacturer.

The policies of surrender pursued by the trade-union bureaucrats and their Tribune and CP allies underscore once again the burning need to replace these labour misleaders with a new, class-struggle leadership. □

Kurdish Students Denounce Iraqi Torturers

[The following statement was issued in Stockholm February 17 by the Preparatory Committee for the Seventeenth Congress of the Kurdish Students Society in Europe.]

* * *

Reports from Iraqi Kurdistan show that vast numbers of Kurds are being imprisoned by the Iraqi authorities. Some are imprisoned officially whilst others simply disappear after being picked up for police interrogation. When news of their fate is sought by their families, the police deny any knowledge of them. On a number of occasions the bodies of missing people have been found dumped. This reign of terror by the Iraqi authorities against citizens having differing views from those of the Baath party are carried out against Arabs and Kurds alike.

There are now seven Kurds in Sulaimanya Central Prison. These patriots had fled to Iran secretly from where they hoped to leave for other countries. The Iranian security forces arrested them and when their prime minister, Mr. Hoveida, visited Baghdad between 7-14 January 1976 he handed over the men to the Iraqi government, who reciprocated by handing over to Hoveida three Iranians.

These prisoners have been subjected to such a degree of torture that, in the words

of one of them to his family, he would much prefer death.

We appeal to you in the name of humanity to do what you can to put pressure on the Iraqi government to save the lives of these prisoners and prevent their further torture. □

More Strikes Hit Spain

Police fired rubber bullets into a crowd of striking construction workers in downtown Barcelona February 27. Hundreds of strikers were demonstrating for higher wages at the time of the police assault.

Elsewhere in Spain, a strike by truck drivers in Madrid has reportedly become nationwide. As of February 27, more than 20,000 teachers were in the third day of a strike demanding higher wages and expanded trade-union freedom.

Sixty-Two Arrested in Colombia Anti-Kissinger Demonstrations

Police in Bogota, Colombia, arrested sixty-two students February 21 during a demonstration against Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's scheduled visit to the country.

President Alfonso López Michelsen used the demonstration as an excuse to announce that he will not lift the state of siege order that he has imposed in Colombia, despite his previous promises.

How the White House Arms South Africa

By Ernest Harsch

[First of three articles]

Over the past several years, the racist white minority regime in South Africa has accumulated a military arsenal greater than the combined force of most of Black-ruled Africa. Its record of repression within South Africa has shown its ruthlessness in using that power to maintain its superexploitation of the country's more than seventeen million Blacks. Pretoria's intervention in the Angolan civil war underlined its ability—and determination—to strike beyond its borders to advance its own interests and those of its American and European imperialist allies.

Washington and the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have played a decisive role in accelerating this South African military buildup.

These NATO governments have filled Pretoria's arsenal in defiance of the military sanctions imposed against South Africa by the United Nations in 1963, which formally barred all UN members from selling arms to Pretoria or maintaining other military links with it.

Although the widespread international opposition to the policies of the apartheid regime has forced some of the NATO powers to curtail their open arms aid to South Africa, the shipments of military supplies have continued, either in secrecy or with little publicity.

In addition, the Western powers have provided Pretoria with technical and economic assistance designed to help it reach a degree of "self-sufficiency" in arms production. For instance, the U.S.-based Africa Research Group has pointed out:

Nearly all the NATO countries permit their corporations to invest in the South African armaments industry. They place no restrictions on the transfer of military know-how, including the sale to South Africa of blueprints and patents for military production. For example, the entire South African army and police force are equipped with NATO FN rifles, manufactured in South Africa under license from NATO. All these governments permit their citizens to accept jobs in the South African arms industry.¹

Washington 'Relaxes' Its Arms Embargo

In 1970, the White House adopted a secret policy toward southern Africa (nick-

named "Tar Baby") that included a "relaxation" of the arms embargo against the white minority colonial-settler regimes.

In line with this policy, Washington sold Pretoria (as well as the Portuguese imperialists) millions of dollars worth of "dual purpose" equipment. While ostensibly earmarked for civilian use, this equipment could also be used for military purposes. Much of this was in aircraft sales.

In 1970, U.S. aircraft exports to South Africa were valued at \$25.6 million. One year later they jumped to \$70 million, and in 1972 rose even higher to \$80 million. Between 1967 and 1972, a total of \$272.8 million worth of American aircraft were sold to South Africa.

The "dual purpose" aircraft included Bell helicopters capable of being used in police or military operations and twin-engined Lear jets that could be outfitted for reconnaissance and certain combat missions. It also included C-141 Starlifter and Hercules C-130 transport planes suitable for ferrying troops and war matériel.

The South African Air Commandos, a paramilitary flying militia trained for counterinsurgency operations, use the small American Pipers and Cessnas. Although the Air Commandos are technically "civilians," and therefore the sale of U.S. planes to them does not legally contravene the UN arms embargo, they nevertheless are included in Pretoria's "security planning."

Some sales, however, are made directly to the South African military. Jennifer Davis, a member of the Southern Africa Committee and a research director of the Africa Fund of the American Committee on Africa, stated during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee July 24, 1975:

... both light aircraft such as Cessnas and heavy transport planes, such as the Lockheed Hercules C 130 have been provided directly to the South African Government for military use, long after the supposed imposition of an embargo in 1963. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies there are now at least 7 C-130's operating in transport squadrons of the South African Airforce. Cessnas are used in a squadron assigned to the army, and in both the Reserve squadrons and the Air Commando squadrons.

Davis also quoted an issue of the South African military journal *Paratus*, which referred both to the usefulness of the C-130s and to the invaluable role played by the Cessnas. *Paratus* commented that

"without these aircraft, the helicopter, Cessna and Dakota, problems of supplies and communication would be insurmountable.

Among the tasks performed by the Cessnas, according to *Paratus*, were, "Reconnaissance: Low-level visual reconnaissance with a pilot and observer is done with the Cessna because of its manoeuvrability and low fuel consumption. These small aircraft keep the one thousand mile border under constant surveillance"; and "Aerial observation post: Cessnas can be used to control ground fire onto specific targets and to report subsequent enemy movement."

In addition, between 1967 and 1972, more than \$22 million worth of American communications equipment, including radar and electronic search-and-detection equipment, was exported to South Africa. At least four IBM computers were supplied directly to the South African Department of Defense. In the same period, about \$10 million worth of herbicides and defoliants of the type used by Washington in Vietnam were sold to Pretoria. A General Motors plant built in South Africa was specifically designed to allow for conversion to military production if necessary.

London's 'Gentleman's Agreement'

Although the British Labour party government maintains a formal ban on British arms sales to South Africa, it was reported in early 1975 to have agreed to license the sale of spare parts for Pretoria's British-built helicopters and Buccaneer aircraft.

Until June 1975, London had a military agreement with Pretoria that pledged the British government to "defend" the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope in exchange for British naval use of the Simonstown base near Cape Town. The pact, which was initiated in 1955, also provided that Britain help Pretoria build up its own navy through the sale of warships and through other British assistance.

The September 1975 issue of *South African Scope*, a monthly magazine published by the South African consulate in New York City, commented, "The Agreement made no specific mention of the supply of arms but the supply of arms was regarded by South Africa as a 'gentleman's agreement' between two allies."

1. *Race to Power: The Struggle for Southern Africa* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1974).

Apparently as part of this pact, Britain agreed in 1971 to supply South Africa with seven Wasp helicopters, ostensibly to help protect the Cape sea route against Soviet warships and submarines. The March 1971 issue of *APDUSA*, a bulletin of the African People's Democratic Union of South Africa, pointed out that Wasp helicopters are virtually useless for sea defense. They are, however, well suited for counterinsurgency operations.

Upon coming to power in 1974, the British Labour government—as a result of widespread domestic opposition against relations with the apartheid regime—was forced to cancel delivery of the seventh Wasp helicopter to South Africa (the previous Conservative government had already shipped six of them).

Although the Labour government was obliged to formally dissolve the Simonstown Agreement in June 1975, it indicated that British ships would continue to use the South African port on a "customer" basis.

Abdul Minty, the secretary of the London-based Anti-Apartheid Movement, said in December 1974, "There are very strong grounds for believing that Britain intends to carry on as before and the setting aside of Simonstown is aimed merely at overcoming political embarrassment without ending military cooperation with the apartheid regime. . . .

"The Simonstown Agreement will in effect be replaced with a new and secret defence understanding between the two countries."


Paris: An Eager Quartermaster

The French government has been the most open in its violations of the UN arms embargo against South Africa. Since 1961, it has supplied large numbers of planes, helicopters, tanks, and other pieces of sophisticated military equipment to Pretoria.

According to the October-December 1974 issue of *Sechaba*, an organ of the African National Congress of South Africa, this equipment included: 40 Mirage interceptors, fighter-bombers, and reconnaissance planes; 92 Alouette, Super Frelon, and Puma helicopters; 20 Panhard AMX 30 tanks; 12 Mystère and Transall transport planes; 3 Daphne submarines; 3 missile gunboats, and a large number of aircraft engines, rockets, antitank missiles, armored cars, and machine guns.

In addition, Paris provided licenses for the construction in South Africa of Panhard and Lorraine armoured cars, 60mm and 90mm machine guns, and Mirage-Milan bombers.

Two months after London announced the end of the Simonstown Agreement, Paris declared that it would no longer sell



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Pretoria arms having "continental use." However, the announcement, made by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing during a visit to Kinshasa, Zaïre, was little more than a propaganda gesture to provide cover for the Black African regimes with which Paris maintains close relations. It had almost no effect on French military ties to South Africa.

The announcement did not bar the sale of French naval equipment to Pretoria nor did it restrict the manufacture of French weapons under license in South Africa. *Washington Post* correspondent Bernard Kaplan reported in the August 29, 1975, issue, "South Africa will continue manufacturing French arms under dozens of licensing agreements concluded within the past 12 years. Most still have a number of years to run. The terms of the French ban do not appear to prevent them being renewed when they expire."

Giscard's announcement also did not affect existing arms contracts, which are designed to resupply and strengthen South Africa's air force and navy. Paris will continue with its scheduled delivery of forty-five Mirage F-1 jet fighters, the most advanced military aircraft built in France, to replace the older Mirage IIIs. It will also supply additional helicopters and two Agosta submarines.

Pretoria is scheduled to assemble its own Mirage F-1 jets by 1977. "South African engineers and designers," Kaplan reported, "are working long hours here [Paris] with their counterparts at Dassault, the company which makes the F-1, on a program for South Africa to manufacture the plane from scratch."

The September 1975 issue of the London monthly *Africa* magazine reported that during a visit to South Africa by French Secretary of Foreign Trade Norbert Segard, Pretoria proposed to eventually acquire several medium-range transport planes from France.

"If Pretoria decides to buy these planes," the *Africa* report said, "their function will

extend beyond the range of civilian transport. It is not difficult to adapt these planes to the task of in-flight refueling of her Mirage fighter planes. This would greatly increase their combat range and put all of Mozambique as well as much of central Africa within aerial surveillance distance."

Another joint South African-French project is the financing and development of the Cactus (Crotale) ground-to-air missile system. In 1972, Rockwell International Corporation, one of the largest American arms manufacturers, signed an agreement with the French electronics company Thompson-CSF, to help produce the missile if it is adopted by the U.S. Army.

In case some French arms sales to South Africa are cut off, Pretoria has other suppliers in Europe willing to fill the gap. "The South Africans," Kaplan said, "have quietly concluded arms deals with Spain—for mortars and rockets—and Italy—for torpedoes. Italy, sources here said, may pick up whatever business is lost to France."

Italy, however, already has an important share of the South African arms market. Pretoria began production of the MB-326 M Impala jet under a license from Italy in 1967. By 1973 it had built 200 of these planes. It also obtained a license from Italy in 1973 first to assemble and later produce the MB-326 K jet.

The West German government has not lagged far behind. Two German companies, Waffen und Lufttrüstung AG and Herman Oberth Gesellschaft, helped start Pretoria's missile industry at a base near Tsumeb, Namibia (South-West Africa), more than a decade ago. It was revealed in 1964 that the project was directly financed by the West German Defense Ministry.

According to the German Committee for Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique, three German companies, Schmidt, Bolkov, and Blohm, sold BO 105 helicopters to Pretoria in 1972. (Cited in the November 5, 1974, *Zambia Daily Mail*.)

In 1970, Bonn sold nine Transall military transport planes to the South African regime. The March 13, 1974, *Le Monde* reported that Pretoria had ordered the new Milan antitank missile, which was developed jointly by West German and French arms manufacturers and financed by the West German armed forces. On August 1, 1974, an official of the West German Foreign Ministry confirmed that 137 heavy military trucks had been sold earlier that year to the South African army.

The arms sales to Pretoria by individual NATO governments are only a small part of what appears to be an intricate—and increasingly coordinated—network of military contacts and alliances between the

South African regime and its American and European partners. Although the full scope of these ties are not yet known, some aspects have been publicly revealed.

According to Sean Gervasi, a special consultant to the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, the U.S. military commitment to Pretoria first started to escalate in the late 1960s.

In his essay "The Politics of 'Accelerated Economic Growth,'"² Gervasi wrote:

Britain, the United States and other powers are not opposed to change in southern Africa, but they are opposed to change which they cannot control. In 1968 and 1969 they became exceedingly worried about the prospect of an upheaval in the region that they considered to have 'deteriorated' quite suddenly. They could not, as they saw it, stand idly by while the liberation movements dismantled, piece by piece, the whole structure of White power in the industrial heartland of Africa.

Washington and London, as leaders of the Western capitalist powers, decided on a three-pronged strategy for southern Africa, according to Gervasi. The first was to try to encourage some "reforms" in order to defuse the discontent in the area before it became too explosive. "Second," Gervasi continued, "they resolved to strengthen the White powers so that they would be better able to meet the military challenge posed by the liberation movements. This obviously had to be done very discreetly. Finally, they began to prepare the way for more direct and substantial military assistance to the White regimes. This was essentially contingency planning. It nonetheless reflected a definite commitment to go to the assistance of the White regimes in the event of a major crisis."

One of the first significant steps toward tightening relations between Pretoria and the rest of the imperialist powers was taken in Washington in April 1969. At that time, Nixon ordered Henry Kissinger to draw up a secret policy study of southern Africa, entitled National Security Study Memorandum 39.³

In February 1970, Nixon adopted a policy, based on Kissinger's recommendation, that "tilted" Washington more in favor of the white minority regimes in the region. Option 2 of the secret study, which was the one adopted by Nixon, was nicknamed "Tar Baby" by White House advisers. Among the possible U.S. moves toward Pretoria suggested by Kissinger under this option were the following:

—Enforce arms embargo against South Africa but with liberal treatment of equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes. . . .

—Retain tracking stations in South Africa as long as required.

—Remove constraints on EXIM Bank facilities for South Africa; actively encourage US exports and facilitate US investment consistent with the Foreign Direct Investment Program.

—Conduct selected exchange programs with South Africa in all categories, including military.

—Without changing the US legal position that South African occupancy of South West Africa is illegal, we would play down the issue and encourage accommodation between South Africa and the UN.

The basic premise behind "Tar Baby" was that the "whites are here [in Africa] to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists."

According to the Kissinger study, there was general agreement in the White House and State Department that the "racial problems of southern Africa probably will become more acute, perhaps leading to major violence and greater involvement of the communist powers." This presented Washington with a problem: "The prospect of increasing violence in the area growing out of black insurgency and white reprisal could jeopardize our interests in the future."

One of the primary goals of the American ruling-class policy toward southern Africa, the study pointed out, was "to protect economic, scientific and strategic interests and opportunities in the region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production."

South Africa is of strategic value to Washington and the other NATO powers for several reasons. It controls the vital sea route around the Cape of Good Hope, past which much of the world's trade is shipped, including an estimated seven million barrels of Middle Eastern oil to Europe each day (about half the oil consumption of the European NATO countries). The Cape retained its importance even after the reopening of the Suez Canal, which is too shallow to allow passage of the giant oil tankers.

South Africa has some of the largest naval bases bordering on the Indian Ocean. Noting that "South African port facilities are of long-term strategic importance" and that they are "the best in Africa," the Kissinger study concluded that "their availability to the Navy would be useful in peacetime and essential in time of war."

Since the Suez Canal is also too shallow for American aircraft carriers, the deployment of U.S. fleets into the Indian Ocean from the Mediterranean Sea or Atlantic

Ocean would have to go by way of the Cape route.

The South African 'Treasure House'

An August 1971 report, submitted to the State Department by the African Affairs Advisory Council, pointed out another reason for the region's strategic value to the imperialists. The report stated that "Africa contains a major proportion of the world's reserves of a few commodities important to US strategic or economic needs. In the future, the US will probably have to look to Africa for, among other products, its chromite, platinum group metals, tantalite, petalite, gold, long-fibered amosite and crocidolite asbestos, natural industrial diamond stones and phosphate rock (in 20-30 years) . . . most of these key minerals are found in southern Africa."

South Africa also has important deposits of nickel and manganese, and including the occupied territory of Namibia, controls 26 percent of the world's uranium reserves. Dr. A.J.A. Roux, chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board, has described South Africa as a "treasure house."

The American imperialists' share in the exploitation of this wealth is rapidly growing. The October 1975 *South African Scope* reported:

Three hundred and sixty U.S. enterprises have a direct investment of over \$1.2-billion in South Africa—an increase of 100% over the past ten years.

The U.S. is South Africa's second largest trading partner and American investments in South Africa continue to increase by 12.8 percent a year.

Just how important South Africa is regarded by the Americans as a market for investment is seen in the fact that South Africa is one of fewer than a score of countries with more than \$1,000-million in direct American investment.

What is more, Department of Commerce figures show that the American stake in the South African economy is growing at a rate that will double the investment in under ten years. . . .

The value of South African exports to the United States in 1974 stood at \$650.5 million, a 74 percent increase over 1973 and more than twice the figure in 1972. South Africa's imports from the United States likewise rocketed to \$1.2 billion in 1974, up 55.4 percent from the previous year and nearly twice the amount imported in 1972.

Among the features in South Africa that are attractive to American and other foreign investors, *South African Scope* pointed out, are "political stability," a "comparatively stable labor force," and the "commitment of major political parties to the principles of free enterprise. No private sector corporation has ever been nationalized."

2. Published in *Change in Contemporary South Africa*, eds. Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975).

3. For the full text of the study, see *The Kissinger Study on Southern Africa* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975).

Another major attraction for American investors in South Africa is the extremely low wages paid to Black workers, who are denied any union rights and whose wages are kept depressed by the rigid apartheid restrictions on Black labor. In 1967, for instance, the average profit on all U.S. corporate investments in South Africa was about 19.2 percent, compared with 10 percent in other parts of the world and still less for investments made within the United States.

South Africa's economic value is also a major consideration for Washington's imperialist competitors in Europe. Britain remains the largest foreign investor in South Africa, accounting for 60 percent of

all foreign investments in 1974. Also reflecting the high profits to be made in South Africa, the British imperialists earned more from their direct investments in South Africa between 1965 and 1968 than from any other overseas source.

In addition to the growing American role, Britain's position is also being challenged by French, West German, and Japanese capital. For instance, the value of West German investment in South Africa in 1973 jumped 35 percent over the previous year. The trade figures between Bonn and Pretoria rose by a similar percentage.

South Africa's economic value to the Western imperialist powers is not limited

to its vast natural wealth or to its large supply of cheap Black labor. As the most industrialized country on the continent, with a highly developed infrastructure, South Africa serves as an important base for American and European companies seeking to expand into the rest of Africa.

Pretoria's economic might, combined with its growing military capability, makes it a bastion of imperialist rule in Africa. The protection of this racist bulwark—from both external and internal challenges—is a priority item in the planning rooms of Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn.

[Next: NATO: South Africa's Secret Partner]

Sharp Debate Among Ranks

The French CP Begins Discarding Its Marxist Mask

By Rebecca Finch

PARIS—The Twenty-Second Congress of the French Communist party, held February 4-8 in the Paris working-class suburb of St. Ouen, attracted unusual attention this year. Dubbed by party leaders as a "historic" event, the congress ratified some changes in the party's posture that bring out more clearly the class-collaborationist policies of the leadership, and it reaffirmed a course begun in 1968 of dumping some of the Marxist rhetoric used to cover its betrayals of the working class.

These moves included a decision to abandon the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat." A campaign against "immorality, pornography, perversion, violence, and criminality" was approved. This was intended to complement special efforts to win over a section of the Catholic church hierarchy to the "Union of the French People," the French CP's version of the antimonopoly front.

The delegates also reaffirmed a stepped-up propaganda campaign, launched in May 1975, to project the CP as "the best fighter" for democratic rights in France. All of this was within the framework of continuing the "Union of the Left" electoral alliance with the Socialist party and reaffirmation of its "Common Program."

In the months leading up to the congress, Georges Marchais, the French CP's general secretary, signed a joint statement with Enrico Berlinguer of the Italian Communist party charting the "democratic" road to socialism, and French CP

leaders issued two statements taking their distance from some of Moscow's more scandalous repression of dissidents.

The roots of these changes can be traced to some striking developments in recent years. The French CP, still far and away the strongest working-class party in the country, has experienced some growth since the May-June 1968 upsurge, but not a major advance, owing to a high turnover in membership. In 1966, the party claimed it had 425,000 members. Today it claims 491,000, still far below its post-World War II peak of 900,000. On the electoral level it has actually declined somewhat, dropping from 22.46 percent of the vote in the 1967 elections to about 20 percent today.

On the other hand, the French Social Democrats have experienced rather impressive growth after reorganizing the stagnant Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (French section of the Workers International—Second International) into the French Socialist party in 1969. Today the top SP leader, François Mitterrand, claims that his party is now the largest in the left, representing some 30 percent of the electorate.

The SP claims 150,000 members and wields strong influence in two unions, Force Ouvrière and the Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail (CFDT). It began to build party sections in workplaces in 1969. By 1973 it claimed 253 such sections, and its goal for 1975 was 700 sections.

The SP tries to present an image of

bustling activity and of being more democratic internally than the CP. For example, within the SP there is a growing dissident wing called CERES,* which publishes its own journal.

All this is a potential threat to the leading position of the CP in the working class and has led to a running polemic between them. In a January 7 television interview, for example, Georges Marchais attacked the SP's workplace sections, saying that these "do not constitute one bit of progress for the workers movement. What the working class needs is a revolutionary party. . . . When there is no SP section in an enterprise, it's not important. But when there is no organization of the Communist party, the workers have only one leg to walk on."

The SP for its part has dealt some of its most telling blows against the CP by pointing to the repression of democratic rights in the Soviet Union and associating the French CP with the "Thermidoreans of October," as it calls the Soviet bureaucracy. The SP lent its name to the big October 23 Paris rally called to free Leonid Plyushch, the Soviet mathematician interned for three years in a psychiatric hospital. It claims that this was one of the factors that led to publication of an editorial in the October 25, 1975, CP daily *l'Humanité*

*Centre d'études, de recherches et d'éducation socialistes (Center for Socialist Studies, Research, and Education).

calling for Plyushch's release.

Mitterrand also claims that the growth of the SP is responsible for the changes now being made by the CP. Appearing on French television January 18, he said, "... the present rise of the Socialist party has been a determining factor in the evolution of the Communist party, which must take account of our presence and growth."

Competition with the SP in bidding for working-class support is one of problems plaguing the CP. But there are others. For instance, the French bourgeoisie is increasingly inclined to see the SP as moving into position to play a key role in keeping the discontented French masses under control. One of the reasons for the CP's latest turn is to regain its former standing in the eyes of the French ruling class.

For the French capitalist rulers, these developments are important. If present trends toward militancy among the masses continue, some form of class-collaborationist government may be required by French capitalism to contain and curb the deepening aspirations of the masses.

The French ruling class is still resisting a shift toward a popular-front government but recognizes that this may become necessary. In this context, the French bourgeoisie welcomes the CP's shift toward greater "moderation," since it can blunt the militancy of the workers who follow the CP. And the CP leadership, no doubt, is thinking ahead to prepare its supporters to accept fewer economic and social concessions than they aspire to.

Important sectors of the international bourgeoisie, particularly West German, British, and U.S. imperialism, argue against shifting to popular-front governments. They fear that such governments will give fresh impulse to expectations on the part of the French, Italian, or Spanish workers, which will in turn spread to workers elsewhere.

This has led to disagreements internationally within the Social Democracy, with a division developing along "north-south" lines. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Prime Minister Harold Wilson also parrot Henry Kissinger in stressing that the Common Market and NATO would be endangered by Communist party participation in West European governments. Their concern is that the CPs will be subordinate not to the national bourgeoisies in foreign and military policy but to the Soviet Union.

On the other side of the dispute are the southern European Socialist parties—particularly those of France, Spain, and Italy—which argue that Western Europe's Communist parties are becoming more independent of Moscow, and in any case, that the SP or bourgeois parties would

play the decisive role in any governmental coalitions, the CP being relegated to less important ministries such as health, agriculture, or labor, rather than those of defense or foreign affairs. They argue that in their countries CP participation in such governments is necessary to maintain social "stability."

Even in Portugal the SP, now that it has regained its "rightful place" in the government, speaks of the value of its bloc with the CP. For example, Mário Soares, who was in the United States recently, told *Time* magazine reporters that keeping the CP in the Portuguese government had served both to split that party and to make it share responsibility for the unpopular austerity measures there.

This forms the background to the highly publicized changes that have been ratified by the Twenty-Second Congress of the French CP. What is involved is not a turn away from a previously revolutionary policy, but only a change in posture and image.

The shift began last November with the joint Italian-French CP declaration signed by Enrico Berlinguer and Georges Marchais. The Italian CP has long sought to regain acceptance in the cabinet from which it was ousted in May 1947. Berlinguer has sought to win this objective by consistently betraying mass struggles and proclaiming the capacity of his party to bolster social stability in Italy. This is the meaning of Italian CP pledges to guarantee a "mixed" economy, a multiparty system, and the alternation of political power through elections if it comes into office.

The joint statement was intended to show that the French CP has adopted Berlinguer's formula. Marchais also wanted to dissociate the French CP from the pseudorevolutionary posture of the Portuguese CP.

"A Communist party official in Paris said yesterday that the document not only underscored the differences between the Western and Eastern parties but also was aimed at certain Western parties, such as Portugal . . .," the November 19 *International Herald Tribune* reported.

But clearly a joint statement with the Italian CP pledging respect for bourgeois democracy was not enough. In view of the French CP's reputation as one of the most slavish of the Kremlin's agents, Marchais also had to establish some claim to independence from Moscow. This is the context of the CP's decision to call for the release of Leonid Plyushch and to condemn the Soviet labor camps.

The call for Plyushch's release came on October 25, just two days after the big rally at the Mutualité attended by 4,000 persons, the high point in a broadly sponsored campaign to win his release. An

editorial in *l'Humanité* said, "If it is true . . . that this mathematician is interned in a psychiatric hospital solely because he has taken a position against certain aspects of Soviet policy, or against the regime itself, we can only affirm our total disapproval and demand that he be freed as rapidly as possible."

The December 12 statement of the CP Political Bureau on the Soviet labor camps came after a BBC film dealing with the subject was broadcast on French television. The statement said, "... the Political Bureau of the Communist party declares that if the reality corresponds to the pictures that have been shown—and this has not been denied by the Soviet authorities—it expresses its profound surprise and most severe condemnation."

This is not the first time that the French CP has taken its distance from Soviet policy on repression of dissidents. In 1968, the party openly dissociated itself from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, in 1971 it called for clemency for Jews in Leningrad convicted of seeking to leave the USSR, and in 1973 it came out against Moscow's decision not to publish Solzhenitsyn's works in the Soviet Union.

But while the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* indirectly criticized the French CP after its statement on the camps for giving credence to "anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism," and while there have been other articles in *Pravda* implicitly critical of the French CP for openly breaking with Marxism, this does not mean that a fundamental break with Moscow has occurred.

On the contrary, although the CPSU can be expected to offer routine denunciations of the criticisms made by the French CP, the "critical" stance adopted by the French CP facilitates the class-collaborationist approach to Western imperialism promoted by the Soviet bureaucracy since Stalin's usurpation of power. It confirms—as if that were necessary—the adaptation of the Stalinist parties to bourgeois parliamentarism.

It is worth noting that the French CP's commitment to democratic rights is certainly less than thorough. It has nothing to say about the denial of the rights of opposition groups to form tendencies inside the CPSU, or to organize their own parties, or print and distribute their own press in the Soviet Union. To espouse democratic rights of these groups would, after all, contradict the French CP's prohibition of tendencies inside its own party, or in the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), the big trade-union federation that it dominates.

Just as revealing is the French CP's recent condemnation of the fight by French draftees for committees and unions, through which the soldiers hope to

win the rights of freedom of expression and organization in the barracks. To support such a fight would cut across the CP's pledges that the party's entry into the government would not endanger bourgeois foreign policy and military security.

So the French CP has condemned the fight for the soldiers' democratic rights as an "ultraleft" provocation that is harmful to discipline. As a concession to mounting mass pressure, the CP has now come out for defense of the militants who have been jailed and indicted for their activity. But the party leadership still appeals to national chauvinism and calls for a strong, well-disciplined army that can defend imperialist France's "national independence."

This chauvinist theme figured prominently in Marchais's address to the Twenty-Second Congress of the party. Denouncing French President Giscard d'Estaing's "Atlanticism," he said: "A quarter of French industry is now controlled by foreign capitalists. Its foreign debt is increasing. . . . Its sovereignty is being torn away bit by bit; the fate of our farmers is being decided today in Brussels, that of our currency in Washington; and tomorrow, if our people don't watch out, the fate of our country will be decided in Luxembourg, or even in Bonn, by the general staff of the reactionary forces and multinational trusts of Atlantic Europe. . . ."

To meet this threat, he appealed to patriotism. "Faithful to its tradition, the French Communist party fights and will fight with all its energy to safeguard France's independence and sovereignty. . . . Far from being an outmoded idea, national independence is a grand aspiration of our time. To win it, to defend it, to consolidate it—these tasks are on the agenda in the contemporary world. There is nothing more immediate, or more modern, than the fight for the independence, the sovereignty, and the full blossoming of France."


These themes, of course, are designed to appeal particularly to the Gaullist wing of the French bourgeoisie. Not surprisingly, this line also coincides with Moscow's interest in seeing greater French independence from the United States.

This position of the French CP has been met with approval in the circles to which it was aimed. As one Gaullist writer said in *Le Monde* February 3, ". . . the Communists furnish the big battalions for those who say no to any attempt to steer France into a direction in which it would lose its identity. . . ."

The CP's cautious reprimands to Moscow on repression of political dissidents did not create as much interest as the pre-congress debate around a proposal to drop the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" from the party statutes. Po-

lemics were published each day in a "discussion column" published in *l'Humanité*, and in *France Nouvelle*, a CP weekly newsmagazine. But it was a caricature of a genuinely democratic discussion.

The editors of these publications had the



CP LEADER GEORGES MARCHAIS

right to select and edit what was published. And although individuals could write contributions, the right to form tendencies was strictly forbidden. While this makes it difficult to evaluate the real extent of opposition in the party, the discussion is interesting because of its indications of the problems the leadership faces in uniting the party around the changes.

The draft resolution published by the Central Committee, entitled "What Communists Want for France," made no mention of the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat." During a public meeting in Epinay-sous-Senart on November 27, Pierre Juquin, a member of the Central Committee, had said that the phrase was "passé."

Two members protested against this in the January 5 *l'Humanité* asking that at least a reference to "dictatorship of the proletariat" appear in the draft resolution. On January 7, Georges Haddad, a cell secretary from Epinay-sous-Senart, proposed that even though the question of the party statutes was not on the agenda of the congress, the statutes should be amended to have the phrase removed. But other party members complained that the language of the draft resolution was not Marxist enough.

On January 9, Marchais appeared on a

French television show and was asked his opinion about Haddad's idea. The general secretary said, "I agree with the proposal by this cell secretary. . . . This is 1976. . . the Communist party is not rigid. It is not dogmatic. It knows how to adapt to the conditions of its times. Today the word 'dictatorship' does not correspond with what we want. It has an unacceptable meaning, contrary to our aspirations, to our theses.

"Even the word proletariat is no longer appropriate. . . ."

On January 16, Marchais and the Political Bureau held a news conference at which they announced that the party was "almost unanimous" in abandoning the phrase.

Marchais's maneuver did not go unchallenged inside the party, but the outcome was a foregone conclusion. M. Guerpillon of Paris complained about this as follows, in the January 24 issue of *France Nouvelle*. "In the good journalistic method, letters of Communists that protest against the abandonment of dictatorship of the proletariat from the statutes were printed at first in the 'discussion columns.' Then the general secretary spoke publicly on television and committed the party, with the verbal concession that it could still be discussed. But who is going to dream of discussing it now? They would have broadsides fired against them."

The identification of the scientific Marxist term "dictatorship of the proletariat" with the crimes of the Stalin regime clearly made it that much easier for the CP's leaders to jettison the phrase with no genuine discussion of what it really means. For Marxists the phrase signifies the rule of the working class and its allies, that is, real majority rule instead of the present rule of the wealthy few. As used by Marx and Engels, the term signifies the broadest, most effective democracy ever known.

Although the CP leadership's intention in dropping the phrase was to underscore its opposition to revolutionary change, the CP ranks may not all have had the same motivations. Because of the strangling of workers democracy and all elementary democratic rights in the Soviet Union, the phrase has become discredited among the masses of workers, and even among many Communist party members. Thus, confused contributions appeared in the *l'Humanité* discussion columns that accused those who were opposed to dropping the phrase of being "against the content and form of socialist democracy, especially freedom of expression for diverse ideological and political currents, the existence of an opposition press, etc."

But it was another part of the CP's draft resolution calling for a struggle against "immorality" that apparently stirred up

the most open resistance in the party ranks.

The section of the draft, entitled "We Want Fraternity," reads in part, "We Communists . . . are fighting for a new world. We fight against violence, hatred, racism, immorality.

"The society we want would recognize for each the right to live his life fully. This has nothing in common with the exaltation of brutality or the display of perversion."

In a news conference reported in the January 15 issue of *l'Humanité*, Marchais was asked, "There is a debate on sexuality; does your party have a position on morals in this area?"

Marchais answered, "Sexuality is a very big problem. But it is a problem that cannot come before economic and social questions. It is necessary to do more for sexual education. Couples must have the right to decide themselves whether or not to have children. . . . Abortion must be free. . . . All these questions must be judged and put in their place, their real place.

"There is also the problem of pornography. I say this is immoral. . . ."

These are cynical pronouncements coming from the man whose party was one of the biggest obstacles in the French struggle for the right to abortion, and who vigorously condemned France's falling birth rate in his keynote speech to the Twenty-Second Congress. While Marchais has now declared for "free abortion," he has nothing to say about the need to get rid of the French law, which allows abortion on demand only up to the tenth week of pregnancy and still forces many thousands of French women to leave the country for the procedure, or to seek illegal abortions.

Nor was Marchais talking about helping to build an independent women's movement that can fight against the degradation of women in films or literature. His real objective in the appeal for a fight against "immorality" was to win over a section of the Catholic hierarchy to the antimonomopoly front "Union of the French People" and to curb sections of the CP that have been affected by the youth radicalization and the women's liberation movement.

Marchais's statements, and the proposals in the draft resolution, coincide closely with the Vatican's new pronouncements against premarital sex, homosexuality, and masturbation, and there have been recent lively public discussions in the French Catholic hierarchy about the "moral crisis" and the church's relationship to communists and socialists.

In his speech to the congress Marchais said, "We are very interested in certain recent positions taken by the Church of

France, expressing its emotion at the social and moral consequences of the crisis, its understanding of the political commitment of Christians to socialism. . . ."

Although the French CP's approaches to the top church hierarchy have been brushed aside for the time being, the party has held local-level conferences with religious figures, and it wants these to continue. Thus, the *l'Humanité* discussion columns were flooded with contributions with titles such as "Christians and Communists Together," and "Yes, We're Against Immorality!"

Objections to the campaign against "immorality" were raised largely by the younger, newer members of the party, who suspected that the real target was the new life-styles of youth, that is, the increasing rejection of bourgeois moral standards, which is a threat to the CP's glorification of the family.

Le Monde reported that in the oral debate at the federation level in Bouches-du-Rhône, the party leadership was supported by a lively "workerist" current that attacked "intellectuals with long hair" who think "the workers are easy marks."

In response, according to *Le Monde*, the "intellectuals" said that the party had committed serious errors in the area of morals in the past and had to reconsider its position on them. At the Moselle federation debate, the conference decided by a vote of 101 to 79 to recommend that all reference to "immorality" be taken out. The maker of the amendment demanded that the resolution explain that pornography rested on "the exploitation of sexual misery" and was "founded largely on scorn for women."

Opposition to this question was so strong that 4 out of the 34 federations that had met by January 24 adopted amendments aimed at modifying the resolution. Although the discussion column was to have closed January 24, the Political

Bureau felt it necessary to continue the discussion an extra two days because of the critical reactions this proposal stirred up in almost every federation debate. Because of the heated polemics, the leadership closed some federation meetings that had originally been opened to the press.

If there were other subjects that might have been seriously contested, such as the party's position against democratic rights for soldiers and for a strong bourgeois army, these did not make it through the censor's control over the "discussion columns." But it is clear that at least part of the CP membership has been affected by the radicalization in France since May-June 1968. For example, statistics for the January 24 meeting of the Parisian federation of the party showed that the average age of the 500 delegates was thirty-one years and that 70 percent of them had joined the party since 1968. In fact, the CP nationally claims that it recruited almost 94,000 members in 1974-75 alone. These new recruits are certainly not all hardened Stalinists.

Clearly there are big opportunities for Trotskyists to explain the real character of Stalinist policies and to win new members from this milieu. The Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), French section of the Fourth International, is trying to take full advantage of these new openings. Every week its paper, *Rouge*, has published articles directed to CP militants and sympathizers, giving a Trotskyist view of the key issues that have arisen in the discussion.

The LCR has placed special emphasis on defending the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and genuine workers democracy, as opposed to the concepts and practices of the bureaucratic dictatorship that rules in Moscow. If the ferment and interest generated up to now continues in CP-influenced circles, a consistent presentation of the Trotskyist position on these issues will certainly bear fruit. □

Bolivian Workers Win Big Victory

Solidarity from miners and students all over Bolivia has helped the 820 workers at the Manaco shoe factory near Cochabamba win an important victory. The shoe workers went on strike January 14 and stayed out despite threats from the military dictatorship of Gen. Hugo Banzer. (See *Intercontinental Press*, February 9, p. 167.)

By the end of January, thousands of miners had walked off work in sympathy strikes, and the principal universities in Bolivia had closed in support of the shoe workers. Mindful that a strike at the same Manaco factory two years earlier had sparked a major revolt in the surrounding

countryside, the Banzer regime settled the strike by negotiating the reinstatement of all strikers, including 200 whose dismissal had led to the conflict in the first place.

However, the regime also took steps to try to inhibit similar support in the future. On February 5 Interior Minister Juan Pereda personally led a police attack on the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés in La Paz, one of the centers of student support for the Manaco workers. Hundreds of students were detained, and numerous student leaders were expelled from the country, according to a report in the February 20 issue of the London weekly *Latin America*.

European Stalinism and the Congress of the French CP

By David Frankel

Is something new happening in the West European Communist parties?

This is the impression of many, especially after the Twenty-Second Congress of the French CP, held in a Paris suburb early in February. Declaring a policy of "Communism under the French colors," the congress voted to recommend dropping any mention of the dictatorship of the proletariat from the party program.

Reacting to this news, the editors of the *New York Times* said February 9, "However one appraises the sincerity of the changed image the French Communists seek to project, the historic nature of the shift in line is undeniable."

It is certainly true that the aim of the congress was to give the impression of a new course. French CP chief Georges Marchais told the delegates that there were "noticeable divergences" between the French and Soviet parties and that "we do not intend to give lessons to anyone, nor will we accept any from anyone."

Moreover, in the name of "the Communist ideal," and "the happiness of man," Marchais criticized the Kremlin's brutal suppression of political dissent. "It is natural," he said, "that we express our disagreement with repressive measures that infringe on freedom of opinion, expression or creativity wherever they occur."

But for nearly five decades the only "natural" response of the French CP has been to follow unflinchingly the twists of the Kremlin's line. Is it realistic to think that a party of 500,000 could repudiate its distinguishing political character almost overnight, and without any major internal division?

Another consideration that should be kept in mind in evaluating the French CP congress is that the general approach outlined there is being followed by the West European Communist parties as a whole. The British CP, for example, published an article in the January issue of its theoretical magazine criticizing the treatment of dissidents inside the Soviet Union, the "remnants of anti-semitism" apparent in the country, and the general lack of democratic rights.

The article, written by John Gollan, who recently retired after nineteen years as the leader of the British CP, was published as a pamphlet in February. Noting that the real decisions in the USSR are made by

the top party leadership "with little or no public explanation," Gollan concluded that "it is difficult to visualise that the present system can continue indefinitely."

The leaders of the Italian and Spanish Communist parties have been attempting for years to demonstrate some independence from Moscow in order to gain acceptance from the capitalist allies they seek. "We are not adventurers who will systematically wave the flag of social unrest," Santiago Carrillo, head of the Spanish CP, insists.

The Italian CP has gone so far in pursuit of its "historic compromise" with the Christian Democrats that the conservative British financial weekly *Economist* ran an article in its December 6 issue urging non-Communist parties in Europe to "ponder whether the Italian Communists may not have taken on a role normally associated in northern Europe with the Social Democrats, and if so whether it would not be wise cautiously to increase contacts with them."

Of course, this attitude stems in large part from the awareness that, as the *Economist* article said, "In the long run it looks as though all Italy's partners will have to reckon with the PCI, whether they like it or not."

Nevertheless, the question raised by the *Economist* is the basic one that must be answered in analyzing the meaning of the line being followed by the West European Communist parties. Is the link between these parties and Moscow dissolving? Are they developing into simply Social Democratic parties like the ones in power in Britain, West Germany, Sweden, and other West European countries?

Certainly the Stalinist parties, like the Social Democrats, make no secret of their desire to help administer the capitalist system. Stalinist reformism, however, arose differently than Social Democratic reformism and it responds to different pressures.

Stalinism is the result of the degeneration of the Soviet party and state during the 1920s. The bureaucratic caste that developed in the USSR wanted only to defend its own privileges within the borders of the Soviet Union. This turn away from the perspective of world revolution was elevated to the status of a theory in December 1924 when Stalin first pro-

claimed the possibility of "socialism in one country."

This theory was in complete contradiction to Marxism. Marx and Engels held that one of the basic contradictions of capitalism was the growth of productive forces to the point where they came into conflict with the straitjacket of national boundaries. The basis for Marxist internationalism is the realization that it is impossible for the workers to solve the fundamental problems of our epoch except on a world scale.

Yet in 1928, at its sixth congress, Stalin's reactionary theory was formally adopted as part of the program of the Communist International. The bureaucracy did not need an international association of *revolutionary* parties, but foreign supporters of its diplomatic maneuvers.

Trotsky, in explaining the deadly logic of the new move, said:

The new doctrine proclaims that socialism can be built on the basis of a national state *if only there is no intervention*. From this there can and must follow . . . a collaborationist policy towards the foreign bourgeoisie with the object of averting intervention, as this will guarantee the construction of socialism, that is to say, will solve the main historical question. The task of the parties of the Comintern assumes, therefore, an auxiliary character; their mission is to protect the U.S.S.R. from intervention and not to fight for the conquest of power.¹

In accordance with Trotsky's prediction, the nationalist perspective of building "socialism" in one country led the Stalinized Communist movement to offer political support to whichever capitalist governments maintained friendly diplomatic relations with the USSR. This orientation was codified in the doctrine of the popular front at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in 1935.

The popular-front strategy was rationalized to the masses as the way to defend democracy against fascism. But the method of defense proposed by Stalin was not the independent mobilization of the working class, but rather its subordination to the capitalist parties claiming to stand for democracy.

This policy of attempting to hold the struggles of the working class within limits acceptable to the liberal capitalists

1. *Third International After Lenin*, 3rd ed. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), p. 61.

was an attempt to win their friendship. It was an integral part of Stalin's main strategy: the establishment of a military and diplomatic alliance with the imperialist democracies in return for his help in opposing the extension of the socialist revolution.

In pursuit of this counterrevolutionary collaboration with imperialism—no different in essence than the present Brezhnev détente—the Stalinists consciously strangled the Spanish revolution, thus helping to pave the way for the fascist victory in the Spanish Civil War and the outbreak of World War II. In the United States, they began their forty-year-old policy of backing the Democratic party, while in France their collaboration was central to the preservation of capitalism during the tumultuous years of 1934-38.

As Trotsky pointed out after the Comintern's seventh congress, from the point of view of program, "Nothing now distinguishes the Communists from the Social Democrats except the traditional phraseology, which is not difficult to unlearn."²

But if there were no fundamental differences—then as now—between the class-collaborationist program of Stalinism and that of Social Democracy, there is a very big difference in another respect. The Social Democrats practice class collaboration in the service of their own national ruling class, whereas the Stalinists practice class collaboration in the attempt to advance the interests of the bureaucracy of a workers state.

Perhaps the best known example of this came in 1939, when Stalin concluded his nonaggression pact with Hitler. The parties of the Comintern changed their line overnight with scarcely a whimper. They stopped warning about the Hitlerite danger and started protesting against the threat of an imperialist war. When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, they flipped back without hesitation and began calling for an all-out war against the fascist menace.

It could be argued that the declarations of the French, Italian, Spanish, and other European Communist parties avowing their independence from Moscow, and their criticisms of various Soviet policies, show that these parties are breaking their links to the Kremlin. If this were the case, they would be well on the way to turning into Social Democratic parties.

In his 1928 discussion of the program of the Comintern, Trotsky did raise the possibility of such a development. He asked how it would be possible for the Kremlin to limit the nationalist perspective it was introducing into the Comintern

merely to *Russian* nationalism.

If it is at all possible to realize socialism in one country, then one can believe in that theory not only *after* but also *before* the conquest of power. If socialism can be realized within the national boundaries of backward Russia, then there is all the more reason to believe that it can be realized in advanced Germany. Tomorrow the leaders of the Communist Party of Germany will undertake to propound this theory. . . . The day after tomorrow the French party will have its turn. It will be the beginning of the disintegration of the Comintern along the lines of social-patriotism.³

Trotsky's expectation of how far the process of social democratization in the Comintern would proceed was linked to his prognosis that either capitalism would be restored within the Soviet Union, or else the working class would overthrow the bureaucracy in relatively short order. He did not expect the Soviet bureaucracy to outlive World War II.

The ability of the bureaucratic caste to prolong its grip has also meant the survival of the political movement associated with it. At the same time, the national-reformist logic of Stalinism has continued to manifest itself.

In fact, it was Stalin himself who took the initiative of informally dissolving the Comintern in 1943. This decision, which had been predicted by Trotsky eight years earlier, was intended as a show of good faith toward Stalin's imperialist allies during World War II.

Although inspired by the bureaucracy itself, the orientation toward the liberal capitalists has created a problem for the Kremlin because it continually generates social democratic wings within the Communist parties. Some examples are the split in the American CP led by John Gates in 1958, and the Garaudy split in France.

However, such social democratic tendencies have never been successful in altering the basic character of a Stalinist party. The basis on which Communist parties must recruit and hold their members in the face of Social Democratic competition is precisely their link with the Soviet Union. The rank and file of these parties are recruited and trained as Soviet patriots. The link with Moscow can be camouflaged for tactical reasons, but to break it would require the type of factional struggle that has not yet occurred.

Moreover, from the point of view of the opportunist bureaucrats, any attempt to sever the link with the Kremlin would be a dangerous adventure. The field of Social Democratic politics is already occupied by sizable formations with their own independent apparatuses. A place for the Stalinist bureaucrats would not necessarily be assured.

It is true that today there is a *degree* of differentiation within the Stalinist movement that would have been unthinkable in Stalin's time. But what was responsible for breaking up the old Stalinist monolith was not the social democratization of the Communist parties but rather the coming to power of Stalinist parties in a number of different countries.

In each of these countries, new bureaucratic castes arose, and in each case their privileges were based on the nationalized property within their own borders. Each of these parties is in favor of "socialism" in one country—its own.

The result of this has been conflict between workers states led by rival national bureaucracies. This has even included armed confrontations, as when Stalin threatened to invade Yugoslavia after his break with Tito, and in the case of the conflicts on the Soviet-Chinese border. The Maoist regime in China has even built a rival international Stalinist movement, although on a smaller scale than that of Moscow's, reflecting the lesser resources of the Peking bureaucrats.

The essence of Stalinist politics is the defense of the interests of a privileged bureaucratic caste. If we use this yardstick, then changes in style and tone in the West European Communist parties pose no special problems. In fact, such changes are wholly compatible with their attempts to be the most effective border guards for the Moscow bureaucrats.

In Khrushchev's Footsteps

One of the basic problems faced by the Stalinists for decades has been the revolution caused by their unflinching support for the crimes of the Kremlin. For the West European parties in particular, this has been a big stumbling block in the way of winning votes and attracting allies in the electoral arena.

In many ways, Stalin's heirs inside the Soviet Union faced a similar problem of how to establish their credibility. They responded to this problem in 1956, when Khrushchev gave his famous secret speech denouncing some of Stalin's crimes. Needless to say, this did not change the nature of the bureaucratic caste in the USSR.

The Stalinist parties were not slow to follow in Khrushchev's footsteps. Palmiro Togliatti, the chief of the Italian CP, coined the term "polycentrism" in this period. Once again, this decision to dissociate themselves from particular crimes of the bureaucratic caste did not change the basic position of the Stalinist parties as defenders of the caste. All of them, for example, backed the suppression of the Hungarian revolution a few months later.

During the 1930s and 1940s, it was

2. *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1935-36)* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), p. 11.

3. *Third International After Lenin*, p. 72.

possible for the mass Stalinist parties in Europe simply to deny reports of many of the crimes attributed to the Kremlin. Today, such a stand is no longer possible, even within their own ranks. If Moscow is unhappy about having its actions in Czechoslovakia or its suppression of dissenters attacked, it is willing to live with this because of the mass influence of Communist parties like the French and Italian.

Détente is the fundamental policy being pursued by Moscow, and it is from the standpoint of détente that the West European Stalinists have worked out their approach. Sergio Segre, one of the main leaders of the Italian CP, spelled this out in an interview with Daniel Yergin, a fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation. Yergin, whose account appeared in the November 1, 1975, issue of the *New Republic*—one of the leading journals of American liberalism—asked:

But what can you say about an Italian Communist party that has carried joining so far that it no longer officially objects to Italian membership in NATO, which, as you will remember, is an anti-Communist alliance headquartered in Brussels? I had to smile when I asked Segre about that.

This is not just a passport to get into the government, Segre said firmly. We realize that Italy is part of the Western sphere, and we have no great interest in detaching it from the Western sphere and putting it into the Eastern sphere—though of course Italy should be allowed an autonomous internal policy. But our view of NATO is based upon a general analysis of détente. There is a strategic equilibrium in Europe. Underlying the process of détente is a gentlemen's agreement not to break that stability.

Yergin was favorably impressed. He concluded, "The PCI is a part of Italian national life and enjoys a broad support the United States needs."

Although Yergin's advice to the imperialist rulers in Washington was doubtlessly well meant, in the past they have shown themselves quite capable of utilizing the support offered by the Stalinists when they feel it necessary. Henry Kissinger, it should be remembered, turned to Moscow and Peking when all else failed in Vietnam. But in this case, Washington has taken a hard line against any governmental role for the West European Stalinists.

Kissinger has repeatedly urged European Social Democrats not to cooperate with the Stalinists. "They haven't heard talk like this since the days of John Foster Dulles," one U.S. official said, according to a report by Craig R. Whitney in the February 5 *New York Times*.

Nor has Washington restricted its intervention to talk, as is shown by the millions of dollars it has pumped into Italy and Portugal to back the opponents of the Stalinist parties there. According to Whit-

ney, Kenneth Rush, the U.S. ambassador to France, went so far as to say that Washington would "not tolerate" participation by the Stalinists in the French government, although what the Ford administration would do was not spelled out.

Of course Kissinger knows that the Stalinists are not interested in overturning European capitalism and would in fact actively oppose any socialist revolution, as they have in the past. Like the Stalinists, he approaches the problem within the framework of détente—but from the opposite side. This was explained by Henry Brandon in the February 8 *London Sunday Times*.

Brandon noted that the Stalinists have tried to avoid the issue of military policy. "Yet this is an issue high on the American list, because détente depends on maintaining military equilibrium; it cannot replace it. It is assumed the communists would join in setting budget priorities, which may damage American interests in preserving [the] over-all balance of power."

In its lead article, the January 17 issue of the *Economist* elaborated on this point. It argued:

... a success for the Communists in Italy and France would affect the defence of western Europe. Even if these parties agreed to keep their countries in the Atlantic alliance, it is inconceivable that they would not try to cut their defence budgets and limit their cooperation with the United States. That would probably encourage the defence-cutters in other European Nato countries ("Why should our defence budget be bigger than theirs"). It would also encourage the faction in the American Congress which says there is no point in sending so many American troops to defend a western Europe unwilling to defend itself.

The attempt of the West European Stalinists to play a bigger role in the détente by refurbishing their electoral image also explains why the French CP chose the present time to dissociate itself from the dictatorship of the proletariat. We have already seen that in terms of Stalinist policy this formal renunciation is forty years overdue.

Marchais, in justifying the move, argued that the dictatorship of the proletariat evokes "the fascist regimes of Hitler, Mussolini, Salazar and Franco."

This is a cynical evasion. In the minds of most workers the dictatorship of the proletariat evokes the brutal police dictatorships of Stalin, Mao, and their imitators. This is one of the great crimes of Stalinism: It has done more than all the capitalist propaganda in the world to falsely identify socialism with the loss of democratic rights.

Unable to lie effectively anymore about the crimes of the Kremlin, Marchais is trying to claim that he, at least, is a real democrat. It is noteworthy that the method

he uses is to slander the Marxist concept of the proletarian dictatorship rather than to say that the Soviet regime is in fact a dictatorship of the parasitic bureaucracy. In doing this, Marchais is helping the bureaucracy to cloak its crimes in the robes of Marx and Lenin, while at the same time disclaiming any responsibility for those crimes.

The fact is that Stalinism is the negation of Marxism and Leninism. The bureaucracy finds it necessary to use the prestige of the Russian revolution in defending its rule, but it has rejected everything that revolution stood for.

Marx and Engels viewed all of class society as the dictatorship of one class over others, regardless of the governmental form at any particular time. What is involved in the dictatorship of the proletariat is the question of what class has real power, not how it exercises that power. The freest capitalist democracy is still a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie from a social point of view.

This theoretical concept takes on immediate political significance in relation to the state. Marxists see the state as an organ of class rule. It is a bureaucratic-military machine controlled by the ruling class, and in times of crisis the state uses its monopoly of armed might to defend the interests of the ruling class, regardless of the wishes of the majority of society.

From this view of the capitalist state follows both the need for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, and also the necessity for the establishment of a workers state to defend the revolution against foreign intervention and any uprisings by the old ruling class. Such a workers state—a dictatorship of the proletariat—would represent the interests of the vast majority of society. It would be more democratic than any capitalist regime could possibly be precisely for that reason.

Marx saw the dictatorship of the proletariat as a temporary stage on the road to a classless society. That road leads through the antibureaucratic revolution in the Stalinized workers states as well as through the social revolution in the capitalist countries.

As for the French CP, in rejecting the dictatorship of the proletariat it is only restating its rejection of the whole perspective of the working class ever coming to power.

In a way, this is an advance; it helps clear away any illusions and misunderstandings about what Stalinism stands for. □

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Chapter 17

The Pentagon March

By Fred Halstead

[First of two parts]

James Bevel was the last speaker at the April 15 New York rally to finish his speech before the downpour. Apparently on the spur of the moment he declared: "We are going to give LBJ one month to stop murdering those folks in Vietnam." Then he announced there would be a confrontation in Washington and massive civil disobedience.¹ This announcement had never been discussed within the committee.

All the speakers were free to express whatever ideas they chose and in this sense Bevel's advocacy of civil disobedience was not out of order. But for the Spring Mobilization Committee's director to commit the group to a controversial action without consultation with the committee was out of order. What is more, it would have been impossible under the circumstances to mount another large action within a month.

The Spring Mobilization Committee, after all, was not an army, or even a trade union with a clearly defined membership and a tradition of disciplined response to a call for action. The committee itself was at most a few hundred individuals, with more or less moral authority within the various constituency organizations. It had taken several months of careful preparation to gather together even that much. It had taken another period of concerted campaigning, publicity, local actions, and the building of local coalitions to arrive at the point where broad, essentially unorganized masses would be attracted to the action.

The Spring Mobilization Committee itself was entirely lacking in direct economic or political power, and most of its members had ideologies which hardly had mass followings. The fact that such a group had called an action that attracted huge numbers of people was itself an indication of the increasing breadth of the antiwar sentiment. It was also an indication of the depth of the default by the traditional reformist leadership, including the bulk of the trade union officialdom.

The call for April 15 had struck a chord that swelled to crescendo because it found echo in the mood of immense masses of people with whom the Spring Mobilization Committee otherwise had no authority or connection. If the chord had been off-key the result would have been entirely different—with a few hundred or a few thousand radicals and pacifists especially committed to the particular event. Indeed, on more than one occasion in the future, precisely that was to be the result when the proposed action or the way it was built missed the mark as far as ordinary people were concerned.

The fact that the responsive chord was struck was not due to the genius or authority of any leader, or of a tendency—though some were more in tune with the popular sentiment than others in their advance projections. The success was due to the process of building the mobilization in which several thousand activists who were working with ordinary people had input, and in which differences were argued out and adjustments made.

All this took place in a particular political context—the

escalation in the war, and the fact that elections were not near at hand. A change in that context—and the very fact of April 15 itself was one such change—would require another building process. Under the existing conditions there was no substitute for renewing the painful process of conferences and working-committee meetings. Any attempt to substitute a small, relatively closed group of decision makers for this could not develop the required momentum. And least of all could the masses of April 15 simply be called into the streets—for civil disobedience no less—by the arbitrary proclamation of a leader.

* * *

A small informal meeting was hastily arranged shortly after Bevel's surprise announcement to discuss what to make of it. Those in attendance included Bevel, Dellinger, Bernard Lafayette, Paul Brooks, who had been one of Bevel's administrative assistants in the building of April 15, Paul Boutelle, Linda Dannenberg, Beverly Sterner, Peter Buch, myself, and one or two others. Dellinger was anxious for a civil disobedience confrontation. I was not, because I thought it would necessarily be small and could not involve the whole coalition. The meeting arrived at a modification of Bevel's announcement which contained two elements that were generally agreed to and which would make the plan viable—that was, to initiate another building process.

First, the Mobilization Committee would not call for a mass demonstration in a month, but for a delegation to confront President Johnson at the White House on May 17, the anniversary of the Supreme Court desegregation decision. The delegation would include speakers from the April 15 demonstration as well as representatives of various groups that had participated. It would demand the war be stopped in the name of those who marched April 15. Those who wished might commit symbolic nonviolent civil disobedience.

Second, on the following weekend, May 20-21, an antiwar conference would be sponsored by the Mobilization Committee in Washington to develop plans for future action.

This plan was announced at a press conference in New York April 18. Bevel declared: "We're going there with the clear message that the American people are against genocide and if he [President Johnson] doesn't stop it, we'll take steps to stop it."²

The *New York Times*, which on April 15 had editorially denounced the demonstration for including immediate withdrawal in its demands, printed a small story on the press conference on an inside page, immediately followed by articles on statements by Mike Mansfield, the Senate Democratic leader, and Leslie M. Fry, commander of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Mansfield, according to the *Times*, "deplored today the burning of draft cards and flags during antiwar demonstrations in New York City and San Francisco last Saturday." Fry, the *Times* said, urged the prosecution "of all those involved in the burning of the flag during Vietnam war protests in New York and elsewhere over the weekend."³

1. "The Spring Mobilization in New York," report by Lou Waronker, New England CNVA mailing. Undated. Copy in Spring Mobilization Committee folder, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.

2. *New York Times*, April 19, 1967.

This pretty much summed up the public stance of the administration's supporters toward the April 15 event. They latched onto any available excuse to avoid admitting, and to divert attention from, the profound fact that the largest demonstration of any kind in the history of the republic had just taken place, in the midst of a war and against the government's involvement in that war.

For his part, President Johnson pretended to continue to ignore the antiwar movement and proceeded to implement the latest phase of the escalation that had already been planned, and was indeed already initiated with the December bombings of Hanoi. At this time the number of American troops in Vietnam was approaching the authorized 470,000 level. According to the Pentagon Papers, General William C. Westmoreland was requesting 200,000 more, though this was not publicly acknowledged at the time.

Within the antiwar movement there were some who were quick to seize on the fact of the escalation to repeat the argument that demonstrations were useless, that the movement as such was powerless to affect events significantly and should therefore be transformed into a multi-issue radical movement. The Pentagon Papers later revealed, however, that the discussions within the administration over Westmoreland's request were heavily concerned about antiwar sentiment and the effect additional troop calls would have on the American people. On May 19, 1967, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sent a memorandum to the president which, according to the Pentagon Papers, "gave a discouraging picture of the military situation and a pessimistic view of the American public's impatience with the war."⁴

This then-secret memorandum was delivered to Johnson while the delegation from the April 15 mobilization was still standing at the gates of the White House and the president was studiously ignoring it. The major media devoted more space to an egg thrown by a heckler, which hit Dr. Spock on the head, than to the delegation's purpose.

Nevertheless, anyone with a serious eye toward the body politic—and this included forces to the right of those that had initiated the Spring Mobilization—could not help but take into account the rising antiwar sentiment that April 15 made manifest. Shortly after April 15 two new projects were announced amid considerable publicity. These were "Negotiations Now" and "Vietnam Summer." The fact that Dr. Spock and Martin Luther King, Jr., issued supporting statements at the initial press conference of each of these campaigns gave rise to some impression that they were interconnected and related to the Spring Mobilization. Actually they were each launched by separate groups and neither was connected with the Mobilization Committee except that they were announced in the wake of April 15 and there was some overlapping sponsorship. And, unlike the mobilization, neither was the result of conferences that were generally open to the movement.

"Negotiations Now" was initiated by the most conservative wing of the old peace forces, the wing that had usually opposed mass actions against government policy and been hostile to both the nonexclusion and immediate withdrawal thrusts of the newer antiwar movement. It had enough financial backing to place large ads in daily newspapers. Its program was contained in a petition for which it sought signatures nationally. The petition called on the U.S. to take the first step and halt the bombing of North Vietnam, and asked Hanoi and the NLF to respond affirmatively and join the U.S. in a standstill cease-fire.

3. Ibid. To my knowledge only one flag was burned April 15. That was in the area of the New York demonstration by individuals unknown to the Mobilization Committee. Msgr. Rice, among others, was convinced it was the work of provocateurs under orders to discredit the demonstration.

4. *The Pentagon Papers*, as published by the *New York Times*. New York: Bantam, 1971, p. 514. The quote is from the *Times*' analysis.

The statement accompanying this petition in advertisements rejected immediate withdrawal, which it said would mean "abandoning responsibility for establishing conditions for a stable peace." The initial signers of the petition included Norman Cousins, who had presided over the purge of SANE in 1960; economist John Kenneth Galbraith; Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., the leading spokesperson of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA); Victor Reuther of the United Auto Workers international affairs office; and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

The efforts of this group were aimed directly at bolstering the "doves" in Congress and the critics of Johnson's war policy within the administration. It could be expected to have little influence with the youth activated around April 15.

Vietnam Summer, on the other hand, was aimed directly at such youth, especially the students. Vietnam Summer's policy committee, which was simply announced with no explanation of how it was chosen, was almost entirely composed of persons who then resided in the greater Boston area. It included Gar Alperovitz, a fellow at Harvard's Kennedy Institute; Harvard Professor Martin Peretz; Harvard Chaplain Richard Mumma; Mike Waltzer, an editor of *Dissent* magazine; Chester Martin, vice-president of Massachusetts Political Action (Mass Pax); Paul Potter, the former SDS president; John Mayer, an old-guard SDS activist; and Ami Roudine, head of the New England draft program of the American Friends Service Committee.

In a printed leaflet the group declared: "We propose a Vietnam Summer. We urge that students consider repeating the Mississippi Summer precedent—this time not by going South, but by staying in their own university areas to organize the community. Door-to-door in the South worked—but it took time. Now we need to look at problems right at home. If we work this summer, by the fall we will have a solid base. We can hit hard in September to turn out a mass movement which is prepared to blast a major opening in 1968."⁵

In a section labeled "Phase III: Political Action," the leaflet said: "Once we have covered the community map, block by block, and have a substantial number of volunteer groups, the really crucial organizing can go forward—both to establish solid bases in the community and to focus sharply on 1968: local candidates (with a long running start); Presidential and other primaries; deeply based multi-issue community organization."⁶

In essence Vietnam Summer was a project of a wing of the Conference on New Politics and old-guard SDS radical-liberals. The latter had begun to grasp that they had made some kind of error in abandoning antiwar leadership back in 1965. But once again they tended to view the antiwar issue, not as a central political responsibility, but as an organizing device for the building of their special conception of a multi-issue political movement.

The Conference on New Politics itself was a grouping of reform Democrats and radical liberals who had supported Johnson in the 1964 elections but who simply could not see themselves doing so again in 1968. They were looking around for an alternative. Since it was assumed Johnson would again be the Democratic Party candidate, they were considering a third ticket on the presidential level while they would support "doves" on the Democratic ticket for lesser offices. There was talk of a King-Spock presidential ticket, though neither King nor Spock had declared a willingness to run. Vietnam Summer claimed to have a budget of several hundred thousand dollars and announced it was seeking antiwar students to work full time on its projects.

In a report to the Socialist Workers Party membership, Jack Barnes took a critical stance toward Vietnam Summer, saying it "represents an attempt to essentially buy off the antiwar activists,

5. "Teach Out." (Copy in author's files.)

6. Ibid.

and lay the groundwork for 1968 'independent political action inside and outside the Democratic Party.'"⁷ The first part of this characterization was perhaps a bit unkind in view of the fact that Vietnam Summer was offering only \$25 to \$30 a week for a limited number of full timers. But the characterization of the political thrust was accurate enough. It was clear that Vietnam Summer would be one factor in another period of tension in the same old struggle between those who sought to channel the antiwar movement into liberal electoral politics, and those who sought to keep it independent of the electoral machines and in the streets.

* * *

Prior to April 15 the Student Mobilization Committee had already scheduled a national student antiwar conference for May 13-14 in Chicago. Since its founding in December the SMC had succeeded in organizing significant antiwar activity on hundreds of campuses, made a breakthrough into the high schools, and brought out the largest contingents on the April 15 demonstrations. The old divisions between the NCC Madison office and the *Bring the Troops Home Now Newsletter* had been overcome in the building of the Spring Mobilization. The NCC became a local Wisconsin group and the *Newsletter* simply dissolved itself, turning its mailing lists over to the Student Mobilization Committee. Joan Levinson of the NCC staff came to New York to work on the Spring Mobilization. Gus Horowitz, former editor of the *Newsletter*, joined the original staff of the SMC along with Linda Dannenberg and Paul Friedman, a youth associated with the Communist Party. The national office of SDS never did send a staff person to join the SMC, but Bill Snyder of City College of New York SDS did join the national SMC staff. Maxine Orris, a high school student, headed up the high school work.

The original idea behind the proposal for an SMC conference in May was to map out a summer program of antiwar activity for students. In light of the plan for a national antiwar gathering in Washington May 20-21, however, the student conference one week earlier assumed additional importance. What was decided by the SMC in Chicago could affect what happened a week later at the Washington conference. The opportunity this schedule presented for the mass action perspective was not lost on the YSA.

By this time perhaps the most prominent YSAer in the antiwar movement was Kipp Dawson, who had been the Spring Mobilization executive director for the West Coast. She moved to New York City immediately after April 15 to work in the Student Mobilization Committee national office. She was twenty-one years old at the time. She came from a working-class family that had been close to the Communist Party and she had been a political activist since childhood. Kipp was close to her family, and when they disapproved of her joining the Trotskyist YSA she had to argue out the reasons for her political decision. This contributed to a natural inner toughness and a certain earthy political sophistication which was beyond her years, though these qualities were not apparent in casual conversation and were belied by her diminutive size and appearance of being much younger than she was.

In early May, Dawson circulated a position paper among the national staff of the SMC. It declared: "If April 15th taught anything, it should be the lesson that local organizing and large protests are the two sides of a successful antiwar movement: They are interlinked and dependent upon each other."⁸ After outlining some suggestions for the summer, the paper presented the following proposal:

"We also need to project a place and date—hopefully Washing-

ton, October 21st—for a massive action that would culminate the summer and early fall activity. Washington would be ideal because it offers many ways of tying in a variety of activities around the massive action (e.g. a veterans' action at the Pentagon, lawyers protest at the Department of Justice, etc.), as well as being a good place for showing a united opposition to the government's policy in Vietnam."

Dawson arrived at the suggested date on purely technical grounds. It fell on a Saturday, which would maximize participation in a demonstration. It was not too close to cold weather, but far enough into the fall school semester to allow a few weeks of organizing on campuses after the students reassembled from summer vacation. Dawson distributed her paper at the opening of the Chicago SMC conference, May 13. It contained the following concluding paragraph:

"Because we would need the active participation of adult organizations in carrying out this proposal, we should go to the Spring Mobilization conference in Washington next weekend with the results of our conference and our ideas for a summer project. We should 1) urge them to call for the same kinds of activities within their perspectives for this summer and fall's action and 2) urge them to join us in a call for an October 21st demonstration in Washington, D.C."

In the minds of some, the SMC was merely an adjunct to the Spring Mobilization Committee. From that point of view, the tail was preparing to wag the dog.

* * *

By and large the Student Mobilization Committee conference, held on the University of Chicago campus, went smoothly. There were several debates but the differences tended to cut across old factional lines, were argued on the merits, and there was no power fight for control of the organization.

The conference was more broadly representative than the founding meeting six months earlier. It was attended by some 600 persons, with 490 registered from groups on 90 college-level campuses, 24 high schools, and a variety of political, civil rights, religious, draft resistance, and pacifist organizations.

One debate took place over a motion that the SMC oppose the 2-S draft deferment as discriminatory against nonstudent youth. The idea was to make it clear that antiwar students did not seek special exemption from the draft, but opposed the draft across the board. This position was adopted.

A second debate involved a proposed change in the SMC's statement of aims to include "promoting" draft resistance instead of simply supporting "the right of individuals to refuse to cooperate with the military system."

The change was favored by spokespersons for radical pacifist and draft resistance groups, the Du Bois Clubs, and Youth Against War and Fascism. The YSAers did not favor individual draft resistance because they felt it was not politically effective, would be an obstacle to winning support for the antiwar movement among GIs, and was also a hindrance to developing mass participation. As far as they could see, it was mainly important to the individuals involved, and these should be supported. But they maintained that the SMC should not adopt a position of promoting individual draft refusal as a strategy for ending the war.

In this debate a difference once again appeared between the Du Bois Clubs and the youth section of the Communist Party. Mike Zagarell of the CP youth argued that the proposed change would inhibit the broadening of the coalition. In this sense the CP also had its eye on broader masses, but with a fundamentally different strategy from that of the YSA.

The CP had distributed a position paper to the conference emphasizing its view of the importance of antidraft work, but

7. "Antiwar Report," by Jack Barnes. May 3, 1967. (Copy in author's files.)

8. "Proposal for a Summer and Fall Education and Action Antiwar Campaign," by Kipp Dawson. May 13, 1967. (Copy in author's files.)

along the lines of "the building of a political movement aimed at abolishing the draft."⁹ By implication this was counterposed to a campaign of civil disobedience against the draft. In general the CP's position paper was aimed toward the coming 1968 elections. But their strategy toward these elections faced certain complications.

With Johnson so closely associated with the war and with the assumption that he would be the Democratic Party candidate in 1968, the CP's usual approach of working within the Democratic Party was headed for a crisis. It was similar to the problem faced by the antiwar liberals in the Conference on New Politics. Another complication was the trend within SDS. The new-guard SDSers, now in complete control of the national office, were tending to reject electoral politics entirely. In the context their new slogan "From protest to resistance" contained an implication of this essentially anarchist trend. The CP's position paper was obviously counterposed to this SDS thrust. But the Du Bois Clubs were still accommodating to the trends in SDS. Said the CP's position paper:

"Struggles around the draft, the high cost of living, and against poverty are struggles of protest. The step from varied protest to a political movement is a significant one. We believe it is time to lay the foundation for a movement that will challenge the political power base of the war and racism in the '68 elections. . . . The choice must be given to the people of the United States in an independent presidential candidate for peace and freedom. To launch such a ticket will need the building of grass roots movements around the country that will also be the base for local candidacies. In the fall on our campuses, as well as in the summer in the communities, we must build from below the organization of sentiment for a *choice* in 1968. Consideration should be given to the creation of a National Student Committee for an independent peace and freedom ticket for 1968."

In essence this was a proposal to convert the antiwar movement into a multi-issue reform political movement, or even a new political party. The thrust was similar to that of the Conference on New Politics and Vietnam Summer. If the CP had attempted to have the SMC adopt this perspective at the May 13-14 conference, there would have been a fight with the YSA and others. But they simply presented it as an idea and did not propose it for a vote. And to leave the door open for their conception of broadening the coalition in the electoral direction they opposed putting the promotion of draft resistance into the SMC statement of aims.

Linda Dannenberg, who was then a pacifist and personally favored promoting draft resistance, also spoke against including it in the statement of aims on the grounds that it would be divisive of the existing SMC coalition and national staff. The proposed amendment was defeated by a vote of 173 to 123.

The conference adopted a summer program that included cooperation with draft resistance groups, helping to get antiwar referenda on the ballot in more cities, cooperation with unions where possible, support to antiwar GIs, and research and planning action against campus complicity with the war.

A fall action proposal was adopted that included the essence of Dawson's suggestion for a march on Washington. This was recommended to the Spring Mobilization Committee conference. The date, however, was not specified, that being left to the Washington gathering.

* * *

Shortly after April 15, General William C. Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, made a trip to the United States. The announced purpose was to have talks with the

president, secretary of defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We now know that he presented his case for the additional 200,000 troops at these meetings. It was widely assumed at the time that another reason for the timing of his trip was to counter the antiwar movement.

On April 24 he appeared at a luncheon at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City during a convention of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. Resplendent in his general's uniform and steel grey hair, he made a speech in which he declared the U.S. forces were defeating "the enemy" in Vietnam. He continued:

"And yet, despite staggering combat losses, he clings to the belief that he will defeat us. And through a clever combination of psychological and political warfare, both here and abroad, he has gained support which gives him hope that he can win politically that which he cannot accomplish militarily. . . ." ¹⁰

Westmoreland said U.S. troops in Vietnam "are dismayed, and so am I, by recent unpatriotic acts here at home. Regrettably, I see signs of success in that world arena which he cannot match on the battlefield. He does not understand that American democracy is founded on debate, and he sees every protest as evidence of crumbling morale and diminishing resolve. Thus, discouraged by repeated military defeats but encouraged by what he believes to be popular opposition to our effort in Vietnam, he is determined to continue his aggression from the North. This, inevitably, will cost lives. . . ."

This speech was a repetition of the oft-used administration argument that the antiwar movement was lengthening the war by sowing false illusions among the Vietnamese "enemy." In response to a question on the "Meet the Press" TV show April 16, Secretary of State Dean Rusk had phrased it this way:

"Well, these [demonstrations] have been called 'huge.' I suppose they are large, but remember, we have a population of almost 200 million people and those who speak for the 200 million Americans are the President and the Congress on these issues. We have in our constitutional system an opportunity for lawful and peaceful expression. I am concerned, Mr. [Lawrence] Spivak, that the authorities in Hanoi may misunderstand this sort of thing and that the net effect of these demonstrations will be to prolong the war and not to shorten it." ¹¹

This argument rested on the premise that it would be a good thing for the U.S. to win the Vietnam war. But the masses who marched April 15 didn't think it would be a good thing. They thought it would be a bad thing—for the United States in particular. By and large they had turned out, not for "bread and butter" reasons but for moral reasons. They did not consider their active opposition to a morally bankrupt government policy to be unpatriotic. On the contrary they thought the decent thing for the U.S. to do was to get out of Vietnam and let the Vietnamese settle their own affairs.

As people who were willing to stand up and be counted in the face of considerable government pressure, they no doubt still represented a minority. But the majority itself was full of doubts and not by any means in support of Johnson's policy. To be sure a quick victory would have put the issue out of mind—as it had in the case of the Dominican Republic—but this was impossible to achieve in the military and world-political context. Even such extreme methods as an invasion of North Vietnam or the use of nuclear weapons would not have guaranteed it, and would have raised momentous dangers. In the context Johnson's policy was interminable war. Prowar demonstrations which had the support of daily newspapers, elected politicians, and powerful veterans groups, could muster only a small fraction of what the antiwar movement did. The argument could convincingly be made that the

10. *New York Times*, April 25, 1967.

11. Cited by Thomas Powers, *The War at Home* (New York: Grossman, 1973), p. 184.

9. "A New Movement." Statement of the National Youth Commission, Communist Party, U.S.A., to the National Student Mobilization Conference, May 13-14, 1967. (Copy in author's files.)

April 15 marchers were representative of a far larger percentage of the population on this issue than the president was.

Constitutionally the country is not supposed to be slipped into a war by the secret manipulations of the executive branch. Yet that is exactly what had happened. The war was not even seriously discussed in Congress until steadily increasing military force had been committed over several years. Even then the issue was not seriously discussed until widespread opposition had been manifest among the people, who had been deliberately kept in the dark. Even after that, the congressional critics could not bring themselves to vote against a single war appropriation. The country was clearly in a type of constitutional crisis.

The fact that the courts had consistently refused to touch the constitutional issue—in spite of repeated cases giving them the opportunity to do so—settled nothing. This judicial default and cowardice only compounded the crisis and emphasized its depth. In effect the only part of the constitution still operative on this issue was the Bill of Rights, which with the tradition surrounding its liberties provided some protection for the rights of free speech, assembly, and petition for redress of grievances. And it took considerably more “morale” and “resolve” to use those rights to stand up against the warmakers and all their vast power than it did to go along with them.

A case of resistance in point was Private First Class Howard Petrick, the son of a cafeteria worker and a machinist from Erie, Pennsylvania, who was then stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, and who appeared in uniform at the Chicago SMC conference. He was the first active duty GI to address a national antiwar gathering. By that time there were a number of GI cases being publicized by the antiwar movement, including that of Captain Howard Levy, a medical doctor who was being court-martialed for refusing orders to train Green Berets for Vietnam.

Levy's defense was based in part on his belief that the Green Berets, who were combat specialists, not medics, would use the instruction for purposes that would violate his Hippocratic Oath.

Petrick had also been threatened with court-martial. But his case was unique in one respect. The other publicized GI cases of the time involved individual acts of conscience and some sort of confrontation with legality such as refusal of orders—civil disobedience by soldiers, so to speak. Petrick, on the contrary, had been careful to carry out all army orders to the best of his ability, and had been rated “excellent” by his immediate superiors. (His regular duties were as a cook.) But he also took every available opportunity to spread the antiwar message among his fellow GIs.

He had been active in the antiwar movement before being drafted. He had also been a member of the Young Socialist Alliance and the Socialist Workers Party. He continued receiving antiwar and socialist literature after being inducted, kept it on his barracks shelf and in his locker, and gave it to other soldiers when the topics came up in the course of normal conversation, which the war often did. After he had been in the army nine months, Petrick's literature was confiscated, he was questioned by Army Intelligence, and told he faced possible court-martial for expressing his views. He immediately contacted the YSA, a defense committee was organized, and on April 7, 1967, Petrick issued a public statement that was widely distributed April 15. It said in part:

“I appeal for support from all Americans who agree that GIs are citizens who are entitled to the right of free speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Although I have never disobeyed an order, and have fulfilled all my duties as a soldier, my constitutional rights are now being threatened. All my literature on the Vietnam war, socialism, and other topics (all publicly available in libraries or bookstores) has been confiscated by United States Army Intelligence, my friends and I have been questioned, and I have been assigned an army attorney who informs me of a possible court-martial on charges of disloyal statements or subversion.

“Soldiers are also citizens, and should have the same constitu-

tional rights as civilians to hold and express any opinions, including opposition to the Vietnam war. Your support to me at this time . . . can help insure these constitutional rights to all GIs.”¹²

Petrick did receive widespread support from the antiwar movement and civil libertarians. In mid-May he got a short leave and went to Chicago where he spoke to the SMC conference. “I figured,” he said, “that if General Westmoreland can wear his uniform and speak for the war, I can wear mine and speak against it.”¹³

Columnist Murray Kempton commented: “And in Washington, the Defense Department wonders about court-martialing him. It is understandably slow to decide. To try Howard Petrick will be to confess that the war has turned us into a country where a man can be a criminal not for what he does, but for what he thinks and says when asked.”¹⁴

The Pentagon, however, decided to avoid the test case and the publicity which would have inevitably attended it. Eventually it simply threw Petrick out of the army without an honorable discharge. (He won that years later on appeal.) In one sense Petrick was unique, which is why he was among the first to do what he did. He had more than his share of “morale” and “resolve” and plain cool nerve, though he didn't have a fanatical bone in his body. And he knew he had an organization in the civilian world that would never let him down and that every move the army made against him would be subject to the glaring light of publicity. But in another sense he was not at all unique. He was of a piece with his generation, which would not prove to be as easily manipulated by the warmakers as previous ones had been.

Central to discussions at the time among Westmoreland, the joint chiefs, and the civilian heads of the administration was the question of a general mobilization of the reserves and national guard. Westmoreland suggested this as the source of filling his 200,000 additional troop request. But these units, while already organized and trained to a degree, were generally made up of men who were more an established part of the economic and political life of the country than the young draftees. To pull these part-time soldiers out of their civilian lives and send them off to an unpopular war would have immediate and large political repercussions. It was, according to the Pentagon Papers, a political threshold that Johnson felt he could not cross. He turned down Westmoreland's request and instead authorized only an additional 30,000 men for Vietnam, bringing the total to the half-million mark by the end of 1967. Since each soldier generally served only a one-year tour in Vietnam, the draft and the enlistments resulting from its pressure had to be maintained at a fairly high level to provide the replacements.

Little by little—but in far greater numbers than any radical group could possibly muster—the army became sprinkled with youth who had already been affected by the civilian antiwar movement and by the tradition of free speech which it had revived. And increasingly, these youth would find a receptive audience among their peers in the barracks discussions. There was no conspiracy involved. The warmakers and the drafters would have only themselves to blame.

* * *

The Spring Mobilization Committee conference, held in the Hawthorne School in southwest Washington on the weekend of May 20-21, was attended by some 700 antiwar activists, three times as many as the conference that had called April 15. It was more broadly representative of the general antiwar movement

12. *Militant*, April 17, 1967.

13. *New York Post*, May 19, 1967.

14. *Ibid.*

than any previous national conference. Only the most conservative section of the old peace movement was not represented, having excluded itself. Even Sanford Gottlieb of the national SANE staff attended as well as Dr. Spock, while Gar Alperovitz made a presentation on the Vietnam Summer project.

The spectrum of forces at the conference, however, could not be expected to agree on very much. The call to the gathering summed up the expectations quite accurately: "The purposes of this conference are to evaluate the April 15 Mobilization, improve coordination and communication between various sectors of the movement, and exchange ideas on future programs and actions on the community and national level."¹⁵

The SWP and the YSA approached the conference with one central goal in mind—to come out of it with a definite call for a mass action in the fall. In our view this was vital, because without it the coalition would not hold together. Other forces, while not necessarily opposed to a mass action in the fall, were centrally concerned with other strategies and tactics. The two most important of these were to prepare for the elections in 1968; and to organize civil disobedience, or, as it came to be sloganized, to move "From protest to resistance" or "From dissent to resistance."

On the surface it might appear that these two strategies were mutually exclusive. But some people in the movement were advocates of both, and an even greater number would swing from one to the other depending on the proximity of the elections, the availability of liberal "peace candidates" who seemed to have a chance of winning or at least of making a major impact, and the level of their own outrage and frustration.

These three strategies—mass action in the streets, reform electoral politics, and civil disobedience or "confrontation"—underlay much of the discussion at the May 20-21 conference, and each tended to be pressed in particular workshops.

Sharp discussion took place within the workshop on political action, where the forces interested in electoral politics were themselves divided over which candidates and parties to support. A proposal was made that the Spring Mobilization Committee urge and endorse a King-Spock ticket for 1968. Some of those most closely tied to the Democratic Party were not willing to go along with this. For entirely different reasons neither was the Socialist Workers Party. On principle the SWP would not support a slate which in effect would be a third capitalist party. In the end a motion put by Judy White of the SWP passed. It declared:

"Because of the diversity of opinions within the Spring Mobilization Committee on forms and types of electoral action, the Spring Mobilization Committee takes no stand on any particular candidates, parties or perspective. . . ."¹⁶ The only positive action on which the workshop would agree was to support antiwar referenda.

The question of political action was never discussed in the full sessions of the conference. Instead it was deferred to a special conference later. This meeting, which was small and informal, occurred just prior to the convention of the National Conference on New Politics (NCNP) which took place in Chicago over the Labor Day weekend. In effect, the question of whether the antiwar movement could be transformed into a new multi-issue political movement or party was left to be tested at the NCNP convention itself.

The forces at the May 20-21 conference who were centrally concerned with civil disobedience concentrated in the workshops on draft resistance and on "the strategy and tactics of nonviolence." On recommendation of the draft workshop the conference adopted a position in opposition to the draft, in defense of all draft

resisters, and instructing the Mobilization Committee to "make its facilities available for liaison and coordination with those working to resist the draft."¹⁷ The Mobilization Committee, however, was not viewed as a main organizer of this type of activity. That was left to groups composed entirely of advocates of this tactic.

The workshop on strategy and tactics of nonviolence, however, did propose a special civil disobedience project which, while being carried out by those committed to the tactic, would be a Mobilization Committee project. The plan was to select a "target city" to be the scene of a "nonviolent radical confrontation. . . . to create a social drama that could become the object of national focus."¹⁸ The conference approved this proposal and Washington, D.C., was recommended as the target city. No date was specified for this activity beyond "late summer or early fall." At the time this project was not seen as taking place at the same time as the march on Washington proposed by the SMC. Dave Dellinger was then on a trip to Vietnam and did not attend the May conference. Later he would press for what amounted to a fusing of the two projects.

The workshop on mass action adopted the march on Washington idea overwhelmingly, recommending the date of October 21 and the theme: "Support Our Boys in Vietnam—Bring Them Home!" (The original proposal was for "Bring Them Home Now!" But there was still some forces who objected to the inclusion of "now" in a central slogan. The SMC, however, used the "now" in its publicity and it produced the bulk of the posters, buttons, etc., advertising the event. By the time of the demonstration, the Mobilization Committee itself was including "now" with no objections.)

There was some argument in the workshop over specifying the date. In the wake of the success of April 15, it was not popular at this conference to directly oppose another mass action. Those who either did not really favor it, or who feared it might detract from other projects they were more concerned with, objected to making the project definite by setting a date. This opposition was overcome in the workshop after some discussion and an effective appeal on behalf of the demonstration by Otto Nathan. But the apparently technical detail of specifying the date became the major dispute at the May 20-21 conference, with the SWP insisting on setting the date, and the CP leading the attempt to prevent this.

The reason those of us in the SWP were so adamant on setting the date then and there was that the entire action would otherwise have been left uncertain. We knew from experience that there would be all sorts of hesitations in getting the action off the ground in any case, and much maneuvering within the leading circles of the committee in favor of one or another alternative perspective. If the date wasn't set, the tendency would be to keep putting off preparations until there wasn't adequate time for organizing. Without a specific major action on which to focus, the coalition would tend to dissipate in several directions. A mass demonstration was the only action all the forces in the coalition could support, or at least be pressured into going along with. This was a simple fact of life in so heterogeneous a movement where no tendency had hegemony. But it was not easy for some people to accept, or even to recognize this as a reality.

Another factor in our considerations was that the relationship of forces in favor of mass demonstrations was always much stronger at a large, open conference where rank-and-file activists were present in numbers, than it was in the leadership commit-

17. "Preliminary Report on the National Conference of the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, May 20-21, Washington, D.C." Spring Mobilization Committee mailing. Undated. (Copy in author's files.)

18. *Ibid.*

15. "Draft Call for a National Workshop Conference—Washington, D.C. May 20-21." (Copy in author's files.)

16. *Militant*, May 29, 1967.

tees, where not everyone involved was responsible to, or even sensitive to, a real constituency. Also, an action and a date with the authority of the conference behind it would be much harder to maneuver out of. So we concentrated our efforts on nailing down the date.

The mass action workshop took place on Saturday and the proposal was scheduled to go to the plenary on Sunday. Saturday night a long meeting of the conference steering committee was held at the home of Barbara Bick, a Washington Women Strike for Peace activist. Over the years her home would be the scene of many an all-night session in connection with one antiwar activity or another. In the course of this meeting, objections were raised to the workshop proposal for an October 21 march. The argument was that the demonstration should first be discussed with unionists, the Washington peace groups, and the Washington Black community. Those of us favoring setting the date were willing to set a different one than October 21, but not willing to leave it up in the air for fear the further consultations would be interminable and the action would not come off.

The steering committee failed to agree and it appeared that a major fight was shaping up for the Sunday session. The next morning Harry Ring came up with a compromise amendment to the workshop proposal. It read: "The date of October 21 shall be set with the understanding that if practical necessity dictates it can be revised. The date should be finalized within 30 days on the basis of consultation with the Washington peace movement, unionists and leaders of the Black community."¹⁹ Ring discussed this with Sid Peck who was to chair the session. Peck thought it was a good compromise which would be acceptable to all concerned and agreed to give Ring the microphone to present the amendment as the first speaker on the mass action proposal.

As the session opened Peck showed the amendment to some of the steering committee members who had opposed setting the date and was besieged with such strong objections that he changed his mind.

The whole conference waited while a swirling discussion took

place near the podium between Peck and several of those opposed to setting the date. Finally Ring, who was waiting to be called on, took the microphone on his own and presented the amendment without Peck's support. The issue was at least before the full convention in as clear a form as possible under the circumstances. A full-scale debate ensued. In the course of one major speech against setting the date, the orator asked rhetorically: "What's so sacred about a date?" From the audience came a voice: "April 15!" The convention cheered and the speaker's peroration fell flat.

The voice from the audience was that of Don Gurewitz, a student at Western Reserve University who had been chairman of the Case-Western Reserve SDS chapter and who had recently joined the YSA, largely on the strength of its antiwar activity.

The major speech against the workshop proposal as amended was made by Archie Brown, a San Francisco longshoreman who had been a Communist Party candidate for public office. He was something of a national figure in left-wing circles, having won a case reversing the federal ban on Communists in union office. His oratory, in the old trade union style, was not without effect. He made much of his credentials as a trade unionist and World War II veteran. At one point he took a Vets for Peace hat from his pocket, put it on his head, and proceeded to explain why the workshop proposal would not appeal to veterans.

The next speaker was Leroy Wollins, a leading Vets for Peace activist in Chicago. "I don't like to argue with Archie Brown; I've known him for years," he began. He brought down the house when he added: "As a matter of fact I just sold him that hat a few minutes ago." Wollins, who was known as an independent figure with no particular factional axe to grind, spoke forcefully for the demonstration and by the time he finished the issue was no longer in doubt. The proposal was adopted with only a scattering of votes opposed.

Within weeks the administrative committee finalized the date. It also dropped the "Spring" from the organization's name, changing it to the National Mobilization Committee. There would be a march on Washington on October 21, 1967. Its exact character, however, was yet to be determined.

[To be continued]

19. *Militant*, May 29, 1967.

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AROUND THE WORLD



Charges Dropped in Britain Against Iranian Students

Twenty-one Iranian students were cleared February 16 of charges of conspiracy to trespass at the Iranian embassy in London. The charges were dropped at the Central Criminal Court after the government offered no evidence against them.

The twenty-one defendants were arrested April 29, 1975, after staging a peaceful ten-minute sit-in at the embassy to protest the murder of nine political prisoners by the shah's police.

Lawyers for ten of the defendants said that they would apply for compensation for the harassment and imprisonment the students suffered.

Nixon Doctored Tape Transcripts

Columnists Jack Anderson and Les Whitten say they have solved one of the remaining mysteries of the Watergate affair: Who exactly doctored the transcripts of Nixon's White House tapes?

The former president's fate was sealed in 1974 when it was revealed that the transcripts had been falsified in many spots. The contents of the transcripts were damning enough, but the sleazy cover-up attempt was the last straw for many Americans.

According to Anderson and Whitten in a February 25 column, "The ex-President's loyal, professorial attorney, Fred Buzhardt, was widely blamed for the misrepresentations. But sources with direct knowledge of what happened have told us that Nixon personally altered the incriminating transcripts."

Ethiopian Military Rulers Purge Remnants of Haile Selassie Regime

The Ethiopian government is carrying out a purge of persons suspected of sympathies with the late, deposed Emperor Haile Selassie. Official sources placed the arrest figure at "possibly 150," but other estimates range as high as 2,000.

Among those arrested was Tefarra Deguefe, governor of Ethiopia's national bank.

The government has also dismissed ten civilian cabinet ministers and more than fifty senior officials.

A government statement issued in mid-February warned of "antirevolutionary activities" and "plots." The military rulers are evidently worried about mounting shortages and have linked hoarding and financial uncertainty to rightist agitation.

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry warned merchants against hoarding in a statement issued February 28. The statement promised "stern action" against those involved in "illegal profiteering."

Ford Cuts Off Aid Talks With Gandhi

Washington has broken off talks with India concerning a proposed \$65 million economic development package for this year.

According to a State Department official, "The decision was not linked to any single event, but to India's doing things overall that we're not happy about."

Another official said that "our policy now is not to let any nation get away scot-free with using us as a whipping boy in its domestic politics or in the United Nations."

Peruvian CP Backs 'Austerity' Plan

The Peruvian Communist party has publicly stated its support for the policies of the Morales Bermúdez regime.

Addressing the second congress of the Juventud Comunista del Perú (Communist Youth of Peru) in early February, party General Secretary Jorge del Prado said the CP sees "increasingly clear signs of the process being channeled toward socialism."

According to a report in the February 13 issue of the London weekly *Latin America*, "del Prado pledged Communist support for the government's recent economic austerity measures, and welcomed the appointment of General Jorge Fernández Maldonado as prime minister."

Billions of \$ in Virginia Bunker

A cache of unused paper currency totaling several billion dollars is locked in a vault in a Virginia hillside. The bills are meant to be used to replenish the nation's money supply in the event of a nuclear attack on the United States.

The heavily guarded bunker near Cul-

peper, Virginia, in the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains, would evidently become the new location of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board if such an attack were to occur.

The bunker is one of a series of "relocation centers" set up by the twelve district Federal Reserve banks as part of an "emergency preparedness plan."

More Whites Leaving Rhodesia

More whites emigrated from Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) last year than at any time since 1965, when the racist regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith declared unilateral "independence" from Britain.

According to government figures, 10,500 whites left Rhodesia last year. This does not include those who ostensibly are vacationing abroad but have no intention of returning.

Government statistics indicate that 12,425 whites settled in Rhodesia last year. Many of these are Portuguese who have left Mozambique and Angola.

Emigration from Rhodesia has increased steadily since 1972, when Zimbabwean nationalist resistance to the white settler regime began to mount.

Thai Socialist Party Leader Murdered

Boonsanong Punyodyana, general secretary of the Socialist party of Thailand, was assassinated near his home in Bangkok February 28. At least eight political figures have been killed in Thailand since January, when Premier Kukrit Pramoj dissolved parliament and called new elections for April 4.

Virat Sakchirapong, deputy general secretary of the Socialist party, charged that the assassination may have been carried out by the government's surveillance organization, the Internal Security Operations Command.

Pointing to the threat of a rightist military coup, Virat said, "I'm afraid there will be no elections."

Thailand's closely linked moneyed and military elite have grown increasingly alarmed about internal unrest since the victories last year of liberation forces in Vietnam and Cambodia.

Capitalism Fouls Things Up

SST—Appeal From Residents of Heathrow Airport

[The following appeared as a letter to the editor in the February 24 issue of the *New York Times*.]

The Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise deeply regrets the recent verdict of Secretary of Transportation Coleman to permit the Anglo-French Concorde to fly into J.F.K. and Dulles Airports for a trial period of sixteen months. The aircraft is excessively noisy on approach and takeoff. In London it has been exempted from the requirement to conform to existing noise regulations: a tacit admission by Government that Concorde is the noisiest aircraft ever to enter into commercial service. In practice we have found it to be at least twice as noisy as all other aircraft when measured at points farther than two miles from the end of the runway, and up to six times as noisy within that distance. In low visibility it creates very severe approach noise including a low-frequency reverberation which can cause disturbance ten miles from touchdown.

This is the moment to resist this bird of



Bill Mauldin/*New York Times*

"Love will come later."

prey before it descends on Kennedy. Once SST services are established on a regular basis, it will, with the best will in the world, be extremely difficult to stop them. Both the French and British Government would raise the cry of "unfair competition" and make threats of retaliation based on loss of facility. By the end of the trial period the bulk of the Concorde fleet would be flying to the U.S. If at that time, it is decided to ban supersonic aircraft, British Airways and Air France will have a number of Concordes with nowhere to go. This situation might prompt even more international ill-feeling than a rejection now by the New York Port Authority.

What happens in New York matters in London because the 2.5 million who live around Heathrow Airport have never been consulted in any way as to their reactions to the noise of Concorde. In order to be heard at all, this association was obliged to send our president, the Bishop of Kingston, to the Washington hearings. Our hopes now rest on the citizens of New York, who in protecting your environment might avert worse damage to ours.

John J. Butler

Chairman, Heathrow Association
for the Control of Aircraft Noise
London, February 17, 1976

How Noisy Is the Concorde?

"When the Concorde supersonic jet roared out of Dulles Airport near Washington, DC on a trial run in 1973, it made a distinct impression on the neighbors. One who lived 10 miles from the airport, Mrs. Rosemary Phalen, told a reporter that 'My actual feeling was that a bomb was falling on the house.' As the Concorde passed overhead, she snatched up her children and dived into the basement thinking the plane was about to crash. It didn't, of course. It was merely departing in standard fashion. A neighbor of Heathrow Airport near London described a similar feeling to a reporter of the London *Evening Standard* after hearing a Concorde take off in 1975. He said: 'I was watching television when everything in the house started shaking. I am so used to planes

flying over that I tend to switch off and not hear more than a drone. But this was something new. I couldn't hear the television three yards from me. The roar was so loud I covered my ears. It was genuinely scarifying.'" (From the Washington weekly *New Republic*, February 21.)

18 Received Plutonium Injections

Eighteen patients at four U.S. hospitals were injected with huge doses of bomb-grade plutonium by army scientists between 1945 and 1947. In every case, the injections were made without the patient's knowledge.

According to Dr. James Liverman of the Energy Research and Development Administration, the aim of the "experiments" was to determine safe exposure levels for employees dealing with plutonium during the production of atomic bombs.

Plutonium is one of the world's most toxic substances. Even a small particle is capable of causing cancer in human beings.

Hudson Too Foul for Fishing

Ogden Reid, New York State's commissioner of environmental conservation, banned nearly all commercial fishing in the Hudson River February 25. Reid cited the danger of contamination by polychlorinated biphenyls, commonly called PCBs, as the reason for his decision.

According to marine biologist William L. Dovel, "The implications of this are far-reaching. The Hudson is indisputably a major source of striped bass for the entire East Coast fishery from Massachusetts to Delaware.

"If these fish are not fit to eat when taken from the Hudson, then they are not fit to eat when taken off Long Island, the New Jersey coast and New England. It clearly points to the need for Federal intervention for controlling toxic substances and their effect on man."

The state's Department of Environmental Conservation believes that most of the PCBs come from two General Electric plants in northern New York. GE claims that it is technically unable to meet the



department's demand that it put a stop to all PCB discharges by next September 30.

John Dyson, the state commerce commissioner, has scolded the conservation department, warning that such strict standards may force GE to relocate in another state.

GE's poisoning of the Hudson will mean that at least seventy fishermen will have to seek out another living. Commenting on Reid's decision, Howard Jordan—one of those soon to be out of work—said, "Preventing us from earning a living isn't going to remove PCB's from the Hudson. How can they permit General Electric to continue dumping this stuff into the river? It seems to me they are depriving Americans of their health."

British Air Leaden With Lead

According to a report in the January 11 London *Sunday Times*, approximately 10,000 tons of lead are spewed into the air by British automobiles each year.

What's the effect? "We know that lead can damage the brain, nervous system and heart," the report said, "and that it might cause genetic injury. Symptoms can include headaches, depression, lassitude, anxiety, loss of appetite, bloody-mindedness or even delirium. Children, who are particularly vulnerable, can develop 'disturbed' behaviour."

Tokyo Marchers Protest Export of Pollution

More than 300 picketers marched outside the Tokyo offices of the Japan Chemical Industrial Company January 25 to protest the opening of a new plant in Ulsan, South Korea.

Last year it was revealed that Japan Chemical's Komatsugawa plant was dumping poisonous chrome slag in Tokyo. Japanese antipollution groups charge that the company is moving its operation to Korea because it expects to avoid governmental regulation there.

More on the Pollard Resignation

The Consolidated Edison Company of New York has launched a major publicity campaign to counter the impact of assertions that its nuclear power plants outside New York City are unsafe.

The accusations were made February 9 by Robert D. Pollard, a former safety inspection engineer at the reactors for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Pollard charged government collusion in papering over hazardous conditions at Con Ed's Indian Point No. 2 and Indian Point No. 3 power plants.

At a hearing of Congress's Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which is investi-

gating the causes behind the recent resignations of Pollard and three other experienced nuclear engineers, a top Con Ed executive attempted to defend the two reactors.

The executive, John T. Conway, said that Pollard was a publicity-seeker and that the two reactors, located less than thirty miles from New York City, make "a major contribution to the health and general welfare of the residents of the New York area and the nation at large."

An editorial in the February 12 *New York Times* differed with this evaluation, if for no other reason than the editors' apparent belief that such assurances "won't play well in Peoria"—let alone the Bronx, Manhattan, or Queens.

"If there were full confidence in the Government's certification process, charges of the type now being leveled by nuclear engineers in New York and, quite separately, in California, would be given scant public credence," the editors said. "Unfortunately, the year-old Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not yet fully lived down fears that—like its predecessor agency, the Atomic Energy Commission—it may sometimes understate potential danger spots in reactor design because of eagerness to promote the expansion of nuclear power."

The *Times* concluded, "Enough is at stake in questions of reactor operating safety that judgments must err on the side of hypercaution. Indian Point No. 2 should be shut down until each of the specific points challenged by Mr. Pollard can be fully examined and convincingly corrected."

Japanese Say No to Uranium Imports

A Japanese citizens group called People Against Nuclear Power recently issued an appeal to a visiting Australian official stating its opposition to the importation into Japan of uranium from Australia or anywhere else.

The official, Deputy Prime Minister Douglas Anthony, was in Tokyo to assure the Japanese government that Australia would honor a contract to supply 9,000 tons of uranium during 1976-78.

People Against Nuclear Power believes that the importation of uranium will spur the development of nuclear energy to the detriment of Japan's population and environment.

According to a February 13 *New Asia News* dispatch, the appeal also expressed concern for the safety of Australian uranium miners and supported the right of Australia's aboriginal people to their land, now being exploited for uranium development.



Herblock/New York Post

An Ounce of Prevention . . .

Continuing reports of lead disease among workers at two lead-smelting plants in Indianapolis, Indiana, has spurred the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration to propose stricter standards. OSHA wants to halve the current permissible lead exposure level of 200 micrograms per cubic meter of air.

According to a report in the February 23 *Wall Street Journal*, "Researchers are particularly concerned by evidence suggesting that employers may be treating lead disease with drugs that reduce the blood's lead levels as an alternative to providing adequate controls of lead in the air."

Both smelting works were cited by the Labor Department in 1973 for violations of the 200-microgram limit. At one plant the levels ranged from 680 micrograms to 36,800. At the other, from 390 micrograms to 11,470.

Marcos to Join Nuclear 'Club'

According to a February 20 *New Asia News* report, the government of the Philippines announced in mid-February that contracts have been signed by the state-owned National Power Corporation with Westinghouse Electric Corporation to construct two nuclear power stations near Manila.

The reactors, which will produce a total of 1,240 megawatts when completed, are to be built in the province of Bataan. Although announced as a means of reducing Philippines oil dependency, it is likely that most of the power will be used to serve the needs of foreign multinationals, including Ford and Exxon of the United States, which are located in the nearby Marivales Free Export Zone and surrounding industrial areas.

Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War

Reviewed by Dick Roberts



[The following article appeared in the February 27 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

* * *

The congressional rebuff of President Ford's attempt to openly step up U.S. intervention in Angola is a reflection of Congress's fear of the deep-seated public opposition to new U.S. aggression abroad.

The memory of napalm-scorched babies and B-52-blasted villages in Vietnam is too recent.

Congress knows it would not be easy, especially among Black Americans, to whip up support for open U.S. intervention in Africa on the side of South Africa and its despised apartheid regime.

Nevertheless, Washington continues to intervene in Angola despite the supposed congressional cutoff. Even as late as February 15, when the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) appeared near victory, the director of the CIA refused in a nationally televised interview to rule out the possibility that Washington is still aiding the anti-MPLA forces.

CIA Director George Bush added that the continued U.S. involvement in Angola has been "properly reported" to congressional committees.

What makes the Angolan situation complicated, however, is that it is not simply a case of U.S.-backed South African forces intervening against a national liberation struggle.

In Angola the liberation forces are fighting a civil war among themselves. Moreover, MPLA is heavily reinforced by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War comes to grip with the issues raised by the Angola war. The larger part of it, by *Intercontinental Press* staff writer Ernest Harsch, brings to bear the substantial historical and contemporary documentation that readers of *Intercontinental Press* are accustomed to seeing.

The current struggle against Portuguese overlordship in Angola dates to the early 1950s and was part of the tidal wave of

colonial revolution that erupted in World War II and swept Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

But it is necessary to go back to the original imperialist invasion of Angola, more than 400 years ago, to understand the deepest roots of the present civil war.

The "cleavages within the Angolan nationalist struggle are but a reflection of

Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War, by Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas. Edited with an introduction by Malik Miah. New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1976. 160 pp., with maps and bibliography. \$9, cloth; \$2.45, paperback.

Angolan society itself," Harsch writes. "Before the arrival of the Portuguese, the area now known as Angola was dotted with various kingdoms and tribal groupings that spoke different languages and had different cultures and histories. The Portuguese colonialists seized parts of this region. . . . They marked off the borders with no regard for the peoples of the area, in some cases arbitrarily drawing the boundaries through the middle of population centers."

Of the nationalities in "Angola," thus artificially created by the Portuguese, the Bakongo, Mbundu, and Ovimbundu are the largest. The rival liberation movements in Angola today sprang from these major nationalities.

The MPLA is based on the Mbundu, about 25 percent of the population, who live in north-central Angola around Luanda.

The Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA—Angolan National Liberation Front) is based among the Bakongos, also about 25 percent of the population, who live in the northwestern area.

The União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) is based on the Ovimbundu people, living in the central plateau region, who are the largest ethnic group.

Harsch traces the sometimes interlocking history of each of the groups. All three

are real nationalist movements with mass support.

Until the mid-1960s the dominant nationalist organization was not the MPLA, as it is today, but the FNLA, headed by Holden Roberto. Washington's first major intervention in Angola was against Roberto's movement.

"In March 1961," says Harsch, "a massive uprising against Portuguese colonial rule swept northern Angola. It was initiated by . . . a nationalist group led by Holden Roberto. . . . The rebellion was met by a brutal Portuguese counterinsurgency campaign that left tens of thousands of Africans dead and devastated large areas of the north. Although the troops used in those operations were Portuguese, the quartermaster was American."

Washington poured its military and financial aid to the Lisbon dictatorship of António Salazar through NATO.

"Washington also gave one of its favorite weapons—napalm—to the Salazarist dictatorship," writes Harsch. He cites John Marcum: "By January 1962 outside observers could watch Portuguese planes bomb and strafe African villages, visit the charred remains of towns like Mbanza M'Pangu and M'Pangala, and copy the data from 750-pound napalm bomb casings from which the Portuguese had not removed the labels marked 'Property U.S. Air Force.'"

According to Harsch, in this period the FNLA "was the only group carrying out any significant actions within Angola; the MPLA was in virtual disarray. The Portuguese repression had eliminated most of its leaders in Luanda and other cities, and the survivors in the countryside had to contend with the Portuguese troops as well as hostile FNLA guerrillas, who, in their own factional interest, attempted to physically prevent the MPLA from establishing a base within Angola. On occasion, FNLA forces even ambushed and killed MPLA guerrillas."

The UNITA was formed in 1965 after Jonas Savimbi, an Ovimbundu, led a split from the FNLA. The UNITA carried out guerrilla actions beginning in 1966.

Throughout the 1960s and down to the overthrow of the Salazarist regime by

Portuguese officers in 1974, Washington supported the Portuguese colonialists against all of the liberation movements in the African colonies.

Harsch emphasizes that although world public attention focused more and more against the white butchers in southern Africa—and not only in the Portuguese colonies, but also in Rhodesia and South Africa—Washington's position steadily hardened in favor of the white regimes.

By 1970 this policy had been officially formulated in a National Security Council memorandum under Henry Kissinger's direction. Nicknamed "Tar Baby" by the White House staff, the policy held that "the whites are here to stay and the only way constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists."

The central policy remained to aid the Lisbon dictatorship. To this end, the Pentagon not only channeled continued military support through NATO, but also educated Portuguese officers in its various counter guerrilla training schools.

Typical of imperialist policy, Washington also began to channel token funds to various liberation fronts. From 1962 on Roberto obtained a stipend from the CIA.

In 1963, MPLA leader Agostinho Neto came to the United States to solicit backing in the liberation effort, but Neto was turned down. Subsequently, Neto turned to Moscow and the MPLA received the Kremlin's backing beginning in 1964.

Harsch cautions against judging a liberation group on the basis of how it gets money and guns to promote the rebellion. "In their struggle against Portuguese colonialism," he writes, "the Angolan rebels were compelled to follow a policy of seeking material aid, including weapons, from any available source. They had every right to do so.

"The U.S. imperialists, of course, hope to gain political concessions or future influence in return for such aid. . . .

"Making political concessions to such a source of aid as Moscow or Peking could also harm a nationalist struggle. Although the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are not imperialist, the ruling Stalinist bureaucracies in Moscow and Peking have their own foreign policy interests to advance. In exchange for Washington's 'friendship,' they do their best to keep the lid on revolutionary movements around the world."

Drawing help from various sources—primarily other African countries, including Algeria—the liberation groups managed to stay in the field. But they were severely weakened. When General António de Spínola came to power in the 1974 coup,

the new military rulers of Portugal, the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement), believed they would not have to grant independence to the colonies. The MFA undertook to prolong indefinitely the occupation of "their" African colonies by Portuguese troops.

But the liberation forces refused to accept this plan. The struggle was pushed forward with renewed strength when a massive strike wave erupted among Angolan workers.

"The Angolan workers, whose wage demands had been suppressed for years by the colonial authorities, suddenly saw an opportunity to better their lot. Within weeks of the coup, workers started walking off their jobs, particularly in such key sectors as the British-owned Benguela railway and the ports of Luanda and Lobito." The strike wave lasted more than a year.

Against this background—the stepped-up military activities of the liberation movements, similar struggles in the other colonies, and the massive workers' struggles in Portugal itself—the MFA was forced to abandon its initial plans.

The Lisbon government headed by Gen. Francisco da Costa Gomes sought instead to bring the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA into the Angolan administration to use them as political brakes against rising worker unrest in the cities. Cease-fires were signed with the liberation groups and they were invited to open offices in Luanda.

In January 1975 a coalition government was formed between the MFA and the three factions. This agreement underlined the limited aims of the rival groups.

"By accepting posts in the Portuguese-dominated regime," Harsch writes, "and by agreeing to a prolonged timetable for the transition to formal independence, the three nationalist organizations dangerously compromised the independence struggle and fostered illusions about the MFA among the Angolan and Portuguese masses. . . .

"Rather than force a united front to mobilize the Angolan peasants and workers to rid the country of Portuguese and other imperialist domination, they chose to collaborate with imperialism . . . to achieve their goals. This dangerous error was to be repeated and deepened later on as the factional rivalries among the three groups escalated into a full-scale civil war."

One of the lesser-known episodes in the evolution of the Angolan situation into internecine warfare was the all-but-open backing of the MPLA by the Portuguese.

"An important wing of the MFA apparently considered the MPLA, of the three groups, the one in a position to be most

useful in safeguarding Lisbon's interests in Angola," says Harsch.

"Besides the fact that both the MPLA and MFA were adept at using 'socialist' rhetoric to disguise their procapitalist policies, a more important reason that a wing of the MFA decided to back the MPLA was the MPLA's strong political influence on the Luanda workers. . . . The MPLA was viewed as being in a better position to control workers' struggles in Angola's main industrial center than either of its two rivals."

Consequently, in the tortuous maneuvers that were to lead to the MFA's final withdrawal from Angola in November 1975, the MPLA was left in control of the old administrative apparatus of the state in Luanda and with significant munitions that the Portuguese army had abandoned to them.

But the elimination of Portuguese rule found the liberation forces locked in civil war. Most dangerously, the United States and South Africa had moved toward direct penetration of Angola.

It is one thing to use the weapons of the imperialists. It is quite another thing to permit the actual armed forces of the imperialists to intervene. The FNLA-UNITA acceptance of South African troops on their side opened Angolan independence to its most serious threat.

Harsch's two chapters on South Africa are particularly valuable and have a usefulness that extends beyond the present Angolan conflict.

Harsch shows that the South African apartheid regime is dependent on Western imperialism and above all U.S. imperialism for its huge military forces. He documents the extensive U.S. and European investments in South Africa. And he shows why it is certain that South Africa would not have undertaken its aggression in Angola without the Pentagon's backing.

Washington's arming of South Africa was the cornerstone of Kissinger's "Operation Tar Baby." "The military equipment Pretoria obtained from its partners in NATO played a major part in its operations in Angola," Harsch says.

". . . By supplying South Africa with vast amounts of military equipment, the NATO powers are not only bolstering its ability to control the Cape sea route and combat internal 'subversion.' They are also equipping it to act as a powerful counterrevolutionary force throughout southern Africa, capable of furthering Western as well as South African political and economic interests."

Tony Thomas treats in more detail the question of why Soviet and Cuban aid to the MPLA cannot be put on the same plane with the U.S.-South African intervention.

"There is no such thing as Soviet

imperialism," Thomas says, "and all this does is play into the hands of American imperialism. It equates Soviet aid to national liberation movements with attempts by the imperialists to maintain their economic exploitation and social oppression of the colonial countries. . . .

"Our job is to demand that the U.S. government get out. If the Soviet Union stopped sending weapons to the MPLA, would that be a step forward for the Angolan revolution? No. It would embolden imperialism!"

Thomas also sums up the attitude that revolutionists take toward the civil war: "We call for unity, in anti-imperialist action, of the three nationalist organizations or any other similar organizations that may exist in Angola."

At the present moment Washington and Pretoria appear to have been thwarted in their attempt to escalate the Angolan intervention to the level of a new Vietnam. But the Angolan war has unleashed powerful forces that cannot easily be stilled.

- South African forces remain in the border region of southern Angola and Namibia (South-West Africa). Pretoria has by no means abandoned the goal of crushing the Namibian independence movement in this South African colony, and the Namibian struggle has been given new impetus by Angola.

- In the neighboring countries of Zaïre and Zambia the regimes of Presidents Mobutu Sese Seko and Kenneth Kaunda have been shaken, and Kaunda has already launched a crackdown against radical opponents.

- White minority rule in Rhodesia and in South Africa itself will be more and more threatened.

- And in Angola the workers' struggles could be given a new lift. Already there are reports of renewed dock worker protests in Luanda against the MPLA regime.

This explosive situation makes it imperative that world attention remain focused on the counterrevolutionary danger posed by the U.S.-backed imperialist forces of South Africa.

The new Pathfinder book on Angola is an important weapon in the campaign to end all U.S. and South African attempts to crush the African liberation struggle.

It should be in the hands of every individual and every publication supporting the right of Black Africans to self-determination. □

Food Prices Skyrocket in Brazil

Most basic food items in Brazil increased in price well above the official inflation rate of about 30% for 1975. The highest increase was in tapioca, 166%, followed by manioc flour, 130%; meat, 60%; black beans, 45%; maize, 41%; and rice, 25%.

Tells of Torture by Federal Police

Brazilian Journalist Indicts Geisel Regime



GEISEL

Brazilian journalist Rodolfo Konder has publicly charged the Geisel military dictatorship with the torture of political prisoners.

Konder's January 23 statement was published in the São Paulo daily *O Estado* and in Rio de Janeiro's *Jornal do Brasil*. He was arrested last October 24 by three federal police officers while he was alone in his apartment. Konder's wife was in the hospital at the time, recovering from a kidney operation.

Taken with a hood over his head to a special prison for political prisoners on the outskirts of São Paulo, Konder was beaten and then tortured with electric shocks. In an interview with *Los Angeles Times* reporter Leonard Greenwood, Konder said the first session lasted three hours.

"After the first hour I would have signed anything," he said, "but they don't stop. They want to break you."

Between sessions, Konder was put in a cell with fifteen other prisoners. "Most of my cell mates were workers," he said. "When someone well known is arrested, there's an outcry, but these poor bastards get it all the time and no one even knows."

Konder testified that he saw Vladimir Herzog, who had been the news director of São Paulo's cultural television station, both before and after he had undergone torture. The following day he was told Herzog had committed suicide.

Herzog's death, which has received international publicity, was the third reported at the prison within a few weeks. Gen. Eduardo d'Avila Melo, commanding officer in the São Paulo region, was dismissed by the Geisel dictatorship after a fourth death was reported in January.

Greenwood asked why Konder waited until January 23 to tell his story. He had been questioned by officers "investigating" Herzog's death in November.

"Fear," was Konder's answer. "The security unit acts with impunity," he added. "I was warned to say nothing, or else . . . I was terrified of going back. When the (inquiry) colonel asked if I had been tortured, I couldn't speak. I just stared at him."

Konder, thirty-eight years old, was picked up in a sweep against persons suspected of links to the Communist party. He considers himself a Communist but has disagreements with official CP policy and is not politically active. "My father was a hard-line party man, but my brother and I are of another generation," he explained.

"When the Soviet Union tried the writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel in [1966], my brother and I signed a protest. My father nearly had a fit. When the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia, we signed another protest."

Since making his public statement, Konder has not slept at home, moving from the house of one friend to another. He said, "What I got was nothing to what others suffered, but the scars of it will never disappear. □

Chile: The Human Cost of Pinochet's 'Shock Treatment'

A survey carried out last November by the Confederación de Empleados Particulares (Federation of Private-Sector Employees) showed that an average family of one of its members required 1,031 pesos a month (about US\$100 at the current exchange rate) to cover basic necessities—food, rent, clothing, transportation. Average wages, however, total only 574 pesos a month (about US\$57).

According to a report in the February 13 issue of the London weekly *Latin America*, food items deemed necessities in the survey included only milk, oil, sugar, bread, meat, lettuce, tea, rice, potatoes, butter, and oranges. Such "luxury items" as fish, cheese, beans, peas, lentils, biscuits, flour, and coffee were not included.

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11, \$2.50

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Down With the Government of Franco's Heirs!

[The following article appeared in the February 4 issue of *Combate*, the newspaper of the Liga Comunista (LC—Communist League), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain. The translation and footnotes are by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

[Premier Carlos] Arias Navarro's January 28 speech began with the statement: "The legitimacy of the crown . . . is above . . . debate." Thus the monarchy, bearer of the values of July 18, 1936,¹ and keystone in the effort to maintain the dictatorship erected on the destruction of the workers parties and the trade unions, has been declared "undebatable." The content of the speech is based on the same principle—maintenance of the dictatorship.

This was made clear point by point in reference to the needs of the masses. The refusal to grant amnesty and freedom of association to the masses of the oppressed nationalities, the workers, and those in the forefront of the struggle against the dictatorship was reflected in these words: "Neither those who attack the sacred unity of the homeland with one or another form of separatism, nor those who aspire . . . to establish totalitarian Communism . . . can expect to be permitted access to the very freedoms they want to destroy once and for all." The refusal was accompanied by praise for the monstrous bureaucratic and repressive apparatus built by Francoism, as well as for the army of civil war—mortal enemies of the masses and of their most elementary rights and demands.

With regard to the nationalities, Arias Navarro's statement on "the necessity of a strong, unitary state" reaffirmed the traditional Francoist doctrine of forced unity of the peoples of the Spanish state, which denies any rights whatever to the oppressed nationalities.

But Arias, Fraga, and Areilza² are fettered by the powerful national and international mobilizations of the proletariat and the masses against the dictatorship. They had to give the monarchy of

Juan Carlos a "different" look. In talking about "Spanish democracy" and "bicameralism," Arias tried to cover up the reality of "organic democracy." This has as pillars the family, the municipality, and the "Syndicate,"³ and is the opposite of the democratic right of the masses to make the will of the majority felt through free elections and universal suffrage. It gushed from the lips of Arias, who defined "Spanish democracy" as a "representative . . . social democracy . . . combining all forms of representation, territorial and corporatist . . . not strictly formal . . . but integrated . . . into your family . . . your municipality." His mention of a "chamber of deputies" and a "Senate" after speaking about reforming the Cortes⁴ and the Consejo Nacional del Movimiento⁵ doubtless was one of the passages where his effort to cover up for "organic democracy" reached the greatest levels of cynicism.

Each and every one of the demands of the masses was passed over in silence or made a mockery of—amnesty; full freedom for political parties; elections for fully sovereign national and state constituent assemblies, under direct, free, universal suffrage and on the basis of complete elimination of the entire Francoist repressive apparatus; destruction of the CNS; trade-union freedom; improvements in living conditions; an end to shutdowns; and so on. The entire "reformist," "liberalizing" halo the government has attempted to wear has fallen with a clatter. The eyes and ears of millions were riveted to Arias Navarro's words. The workers, youth, and oppressed nationalities have become stronger in their conviction that nothing can be expected of this government.

While thousands of workers fighting for their rights challenged Arias's program on the very day he announced it in the Cortes, the bourgeois figures of the Democratic Opposition scurried to make the speech more palatable. After remaining absolutely silent about the monarchy being "be-

yond debate," Tierno Galván⁶ said, ". . . we are confident that practice will not coincide with theory. . . . We have to believe that the premier has not expressed the opinion of the majority of the government." Ruiz Giménez⁷ added along the same lines, ". . . it [the speech] is not a dogma and thus it can and must be revised as soon as possible, whether from the summit of the Supreme Magistracy of the state or from within the government itself." That came after he spoke of the "positive" aspects of the speech. And at the same time they polished the image of the government they have become accustomed to, these "democrats" kept advising the movement to be patient. Thus Tierno said, "Until they are tested [referring to the government's democratic intentions], we will continue to wait and see."

But the opposition elements in the bourgeoisie are frightened of the mass movement, fearing that it will roll right over the government and finish off the dictatorship to its very foundations. That is why they propose that the government confer legal status on the workers parties, making it possible to reach an agreement with them. In their view "there is a risk of an overflowing of the waters [could the "waters" be the people?] that no one in the government, not even in the opposition, could desire" (Ruiz Giménez).

But unfortunately, instead of denouncing the government and openly urging a mass struggle against it and against the bourgeois elements who hope to build a dike against the "waters" of the people, these workers parties—which have the trust of the great part of the working class and oppressed masses—prefer to give way to the policy of those gentlemen who, without their help, would have no influence among the proletariat and the people.

Thus Solé Tura of the PSUC,⁸ the Catalan branch of the PCE,⁹ after talking about "some positive elements," followed Arias's lead and said nothing about the "indisputable" role of the king. The evolutionists in the government "want to move toward a change," he said, but "in harmony with the most intransigent sectors." He then proposed that the "evolutionists" sign a "constructive pact with the democratic opposition," which "would be the

1. Date of Franco's fascist rising, which initiated the civil war.

2. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, minister of the interior; José María de Areilza, minister of foreign affairs.

3. The official Falangist trade union, the Central Nacional Sindicalista (CNS—National Federation of Syndicates).

4. The Francoist parliament.

5. National Council of the Movement, the Francoist political organization.

6. Enrique Tierno Galván, leader of the Partido Socialista Popular (People's Socialist party).

7. Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, a prominent figure in the "democratic" opposition group, the Convergencia Democrática (Democratic Convergence).

8. Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (United Socialist party of Catalonia).

9. Partido Comunista de España (Spanish Communist party).

best guarantee of a peaceful, orderly change.”

To understand what this leader of the PSUC is saying, it is necessary to look at what this verbiage, which the bourgeoisie has accustomed us to, means for the masses. A “constructive” pact for Fraga can only be one that does not demolish the dictatorship. “Orderly” means without going beyond the limits of legality imposed by the government.

The leaders of the PSOE and the UGT,¹⁰ after following Arias’s advice of not taking up the question of the king, have not said so much as a syllable about the “bicameral” system, that is, against the most obvious swindle to popular sovereignty. Such a system means that above the chambers elected by the population there exist others where the lords or other privileged sectors are seated, with the latter restricting in greater or lesser measure the powers of the elected chambers. At bottom, their European cothinkers serve as the fundamental support of these antidemocratic systems.

To that must be added the statements by Felipe Gonzales¹¹ in Seville: “Fraga is the only member of the government who has a program to carry out.” And without defining whether he considered it good or bad, he spoke of “possible negotiations between the right and the left.”

Far from advancing the aims of the workers, the pacts of the PCE and PSOE with such bourgeois figures and parties, and the demands on them to act like the parties “of order,” merely hold back the workers’ independent struggle. They subordinate the most militant elements of the population—the workers and youth—to vacillating bourgeois elements who favor truces and patience, who discover promises and see reforms where they do not exist, who are concerned with helping the government with its problems as often as they can, and who suffer insomnia when they think about mass mobilizations.

If the revolutionary mobilization of the masses forces sectors of the bourgeoisie to take their distance from the coattails of Francoism, the masses will be able to recognize that this was the result of their growing strength and the bourgeoisie’s fear of it. But it is not through the “evolution” of Francoism, nor through pacts with these bourgeois personalities and parties, that the program of the workers will be carried out. Only their united, revolutionary mobilization, only a

united front of the workers and all the oppressed, will demolish Francoism and its institutions to the point that not a stone remains standing. And this will not be for the purposes of forming a coalition government with this pious bourgeoisie, but for

establishing an independent government of the workers and oppressed, of the only ones who really fight, of the only ones really interested in achieving true democracy—a workers government.

January 29

For Independent Action of the Masses to Overthrow the Francoist Dictatorship

[On January 28, Premier Carlos Arias Navarro announced the monarchy’s program for “Spanish democracy.” The February 1 issue of *Combate*, publication of the LCR/ETA-VI,¹ contained a response to that speech, which we reprint below. We have taken the translation from the February 19 issue of *Inprecor*, fortnightly news bulletin of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

1. The programmatic speech of the Arias government was a faithful reflection of the political project that defines it (the Francoist “reform”), of the methods by which the government intends to carry this out, and of the depth to which it has been hit by a month of mass struggles whose geographical and social breadth has been unprecedented. It was, then, a coherent speech. Only those who had harbored absurd illusions about the will and possibility of the government to “change” can be “disappointed” today. And harboring such illusions required previous acceptance of the notion of the evolution of Francoism, at the most hoping to exert pressure to gradually broaden and accelerate that evolution. That is why it was predictable and exemplary that the general staff of the “democratic” bourgeoisie should stand at the head of the army of complainers who are now whining their discontent in the pages of the newspapers.

But while they are complaining, the people are struggling. In the immense and solid ranks of the working class, among all the workers, there was no disillusionment, for there had been no illusions. It took only a few weeks to get to know the “reformers” of Francoism, through their deeds and not their press conferences, in the factories, the neighborhoods, the streets, the schools and universities, the hospitals, and the public services that were militarized or threatened with militarization, and not in

the administrative councils of the capitalist corporations.

The working class and the people are already well acquainted with “democracy, Spanish-style.” The January 28 program simply served to help them to know it better. That is, the better to destroy it, and soon.

2. As we have said on other occasions, the Francoist “reform” is the present political program of Spanish big capital and imperialism; it is aimed at *forestalling* the outbreak of a *prerevolutionary situation* in the country produced by the final assault of the *mass movement* against the dictatorship. The method of this “reform” is the “*controlled evolution*” of the regime toward a caricature of “bourgeois democracy.” The essential objective of the project is to *reverse* the relationship of class forces, which is now favorable to the working class and has been for years. The Francoist dictatorship in its classic form commands only one weapon with which to achieve this objective: repression. But this weapon has only too clearly demonstrated its ineffectiveness, and has even stimulated the strength and combativity of the masses. Having become convinced of this, the bourgeoisie is now trying a different tactic, transforming the political framework. Under the traditional political framework of the Francoist dictatorship, class battles had *direct* and *frontal* expressions. Each struggle, no matter how limited at its outset, immediately clashed with the state. Now it is necessary for the bourgeoisie to establish *channels* to protect the “new” bourgeois state from these direct confrontations and thus to permit the stabilization of that state. These channels are the bourgeois political parties, the historic Social Democracy, a fake parliament, and a *shadow* of legality for the mass movement.

Precisely these channels and no others, for the bourgeoisie knows very well that “the parliamentary representation of an oppressed class considerably reduces its real strength, while on the other hand, the representation of the bourgeoisie, even on the eve of its collapse, is always a mask that conceals its imaginary strength.” But

10. Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers party), the Social Democrats; Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers Union), the PSOE’s trade-union arm.

11. Leader of the PSOE.

1. Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna-VI (Revolutionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-VI), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain.

the bourgeoisie also knows that under the present conditions the working class would not use its liberty *solely or even mainly* to increase its number of parliamentary deputies.

Hence the rejection of amnesty and the refusal to legalize the communist and revolutionary nationalist organizations. All the promises of puppet democracy contained in the government program are not accidental, are not "errors" that are going to be corrected with the passage of time. They are *the very reason for being* of the Francoist "reform," a matter of life and death for that reform. If liberties and democratic rights are to live, the Francoist "reform" must die.

The overthrow of the dictatorship is not a slogan of the past; it is the central slogan of the present period.

3. Thus, it is no alternative to continue to give any sort of confidence, small or great, unconditional or conditional, implicit or explicit, to the Francoist "reformers."

The "democratic" bourgeoisie continues to speak of "democratic break," to reject any "open collaboration" with the government. This is its role; those are the terms of its alliance with the reformist workers organizations, the terms that are supposed to allow them to later become the protagonists of the "broad coalition provisional government," the signers of the "social pact," and the rebuilders of the threatened bourgeois state, *once the working class and the people have destroyed the Francoist "reform."* At the same time, however, the "democratic" bourgeoisie, through Jordi Pujol, one of its most capable spokesmen, claims that "we are not interested in blocking the projects of the present government." They are surely not, because when thousands of workers fight for their demands, it is this government that has to protect the interests of these "democratic" bankers and employers, because they know that this government relies on the support of imperialism, Spanish big capital, and the army, and because this government represents "evolution," *the possibility of the bourgeoisie's organizing freely, while the workers movement cannot, the possibility of "making up for lost time."* Hence, the "democratic" bourgeoisie waits with folded arms, criticizing "sensitively," making its points "discreetly," without clear commitments but also without confrontations with the government, waiting for the time when it will be called upon "to save the fatherland" in the name of "united and indivisible democracy" from the "excesses" of the mass movement on the march toward socialist revolution.

4. But what permits the "democratic" bourgeoisie to hope to play this political role are the alliances it has with workers

organizations. Thus, the line of class collaboration offers the reins of the mobilization of the workers to those who aspire only to control the workers more effectively, in another manner. Such is the result of this line.

The PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español—Spanish Socialist Workers party, the Social Democracy) has to go further than the "democratic" bourgeoisie in its verbal criticism of the government and has to be more active, to occupy some position in the struggles of the workers. *The Social Democracy can assume its political role, can appear as an effective administrator of the bourgeois order, only if it is able to rely on a fundamentally working-class social base.* The bureaucracy of the PSOE knows this and also knows that it does not yet command such a base. In order to develop it, the PSOE has to make it seem that it is not entering into any compromise with the government, but has also to put itself in position to "utilize" the legality it is being offered, the possibility of becoming the only workers organization that is legal in practice. The Social Democracy also has some "lost time" to make up. Under the conditions of the class struggle in our country, this "utilization" requires some ideological alibis, which provide samples of the project of the PSOE leadership. The PSOE secretary-general has gone so far as to assert that the farcical municipal elections scheduled to be held at the end of this year can play "the same role as the elections of April 1931."² This is not just parliamentary cretinism, it is worse. It is pre-parliamentary cretinism. In the present political situation, it is obvious that *the mass mobilization that will destroy Francoism may be sparked* by the most varied of factors. Thus, it cannot be excluded that one of these factors might be the government's convoking of an electoral farce. But, in the midst of the greatest mass struggles of the postwar period, to consider that "democracy" can be achieved by winning the majority in sham municipal elections that will take place ten months from now, if indeed they take place at all, is to carry electoralism to its ultimate and most nefarious conclusions. The bureaucracy of the PSOE dreams of ending forty

2. In 1930, following the resignation of dictator Primo de Rivera under mass pressure, King Alfonso XIII called for municipal elections to be held in April 1931. The vote went heavily against the monarchist and clerical parties. Unprepared for this outcome, the king went into exile. A republic was declared, resting on a coalition of liberal-bourgeois parties and the Spanish Socialist party of Francisco Largo Caballero and Indalecio Prieto. This bloc of parties was the forerunner of the Popular Front government that was to lead the republic from the elections of February 1936 through the civil war.—IP

years of dictatorship through a victory in elections organized by the heirs of that very dictatorship. Luckily for the PSOE leaders, while they are busy dreaming, the working class and the people are throwing themselves into their final battle with Francoism, and they will win that battle; if things were otherwise, the Social Democrats would awaken from their dreams in prison.

5. And the Communist party (PCE—Partido Comunista de España)? What is the alternative put forward by the largest workers organization in the country, which has been expressly excluded from the projects of the Francoist "reform"? Here is what Jordi Solé-Turá, a member of the PSUC (the Communist party in Catalonia), had to say about the government program: "The basic problem is that . . . they want to make this change by reaching an agreement with the camarilla instead of with a democratic opposition that represents the population's genuine desire for change." Thus, the "democratic alternative" to the government's program is to reach an agreement with the government! It would be ridiculous if it were not so tragic, if these words were not spoken in the name of the workers party that holds hegemony in the country, if they were not consistent with the overall line of the PCE, if they were not the logical consequence of the theory of "peaceful transition." Each time the crisis of power of the Spanish bourgeoisie deepens an inch, the Spanish Communist party responds by descending one more step down the ladder of capitulation. From the "pact until the day of the fall of Francoism" we have moved to the "pact for the whole constituent period," from the "political pact" to the "social pact," and now, from the "pact against the dictatorship" to the "pact against the camarilla." What does the PCE have in store for tomorrow? If every previous "advance" down the road to the "unity of the democratic opposition" has had its price, what price is the PCE prepared to pay for reaching an agreement with Fraga (the present minister of the interior)?

The alternative of the PCE boils down to attaining two objectives: First, to convince big capital that it is not possible to stabilize a bourgeois state in Spain while *refusing* to legalize the PCE; second, to convince big capital that it is possible to achieve this sort of stabilization with the collaboration of a legal PCE. Anything is valid in pursuit of these objectives, including, as we have just recently seen, reducing the PCE's own program to this miserable "desire for change," sufficiently modest to be shared with and agreed to by Francoist reformism.

On the day when the mass movement brings down the dictatorship, the PCE will

have apparently achieved the two objectives mentioned above: Big capital will urgently call upon the PCE to collaborate in the reconstruction of its state. But the "triumph" of the PCE will be only apparent. What will have convinced big capital will not have been "peaceful mobilizations of citizens" or mythical "national democratic action," but rather the independent action of the masses breaking down the ramparts of class collaboration in practice.

6. In spite of the important differences that exist among them, the Maoist organizations, the PTE, ORT, and MCE,³ share a similar conception of the "democratic alternative," very close or even identical to the conceptions of the PCE and the PSOE. There is only one difference among them on this score: The PTE, ORT, and MCE's faith in democracy is the faith of the converted, and they believe heart and soul in the words of the united "democratic" appeals. Thus, they believe that a great "antifascist" alliance can be forged between the "bourgeois-democratic current" and the "popular democratic current" (that is, themselves), that this alliance can bring about a "national democratic action" of "peaceful citizens," which will carry out the "democratic break" and open up a constituent process guaranteed by a provisional government "without exclusion or obligation" (that is, in which they will not be compelled to participate). This storybook vision of what the overthrow of the dictatorship will be like turns them into leftist appendages of interclass pacts in whose calls, proclamations, and programs nobody believes except the Maoists themselves. For in reality, the person who consistently upholds the "democratic break" is the secretary-general of the PSOE, when he asserts: "I see the democratic break as a *gradual* conquest of liberty." And the one who defined the provisional government in a consistent manner was Gil Robles, when he said: "Our party will stand at the head of the forces that will *reconstruct* the new Spanish state," And the consistent definition of the "antifascist alliance" was offered by Solé-Turá in the passage we quoted above. And the consistent definition of what the attitude of the "democratic opposition" toward mass struggles has to be was provided by Ruiz Jiménez, when he said, during the strike of more than 250,000 Madrid workers: "We will do everything possible to see that popular mobilization is peaceful and sectoral and does not obstruct

the normal activities of the Spanish people."

These phrases reveal the real logic of the "democratic alternative." In practice, the PTE, ORT, and MCE stand rather far



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removed from this logic. In practice, in the activity of the masses, these organizations can find thousands of arguments by which to make their own break with the "democratic break."

7. Let us take a good look at our country. While Arias was recounting his program to the Francoist carrion, how many thousands of workers, toilers, students, men and women of our people were struggling or preparing for struggle, thinking about the experiences of the past strikes and demonstrations, or thinking about and expressing solidarity with the comrades who are fighting in other sectors, other cities, other nations of the state, in the Francoist prisons and in exile? The response to Arias's program is to be found among them. The program that inspires their struggles, that assembles all their demands, all their rights, including, most especially, those rights and demands that will never be granted in any form by even the most "democratic" of the bourgeois political factions—that is our program.

The road must be chosen: Either the point is to put "pressure" on the government and the Francoist monarchy or else the point is to destroy them.

Here Is the Road We Have Chosen:

- Against the farcical amnesty of November and against any other amnesty that entails the slightest restriction: Amnesty, freedom for all political prisoners, return of all exiles.

- Against the caricature of "democracy" in the Arias program: Freedom of assembly, association, and the press; freedom to demonstrate, for the right to strike without any restriction whatsoever.

- Against the fraud of the "constitutional reform," the "democratic disguise" of Francoism: Elections to a constituent assembly on the basis of universal suffrage with the right to vote at age sixteen.

- Against all the limitations on freedom of artistic creation: Abolition of all forms of censorship.

- Against the prevailing hypocritical and repressive sexual "morality": Full sexual freedom, right to sexual information, free and legal distribution of contraceptives, free abortion on demand.

- Against the oppression of women socially and on the job: Abolition of all discrimination against women.

- Against the "independence and mutual respect" between the church and the dictatorship: Complete separation of church and state.

- Against the "institutional organization of the regions" called for in the Arias program in order to maintain national oppression: Immediate election by universal suffrage exercised by all the inhabitants of the territory of each oppressed nationality of a sovereign national constituent assembly that organizes the free exercise of the right of self-determination.

- To carry the overthrow of the dictatorship through to the end, to prevent a single Francoist virus from reinfesting the country: Dissolution of the special repressive bodies and the Francoist tribunals. Abolition of all repressive legislation of the dictatorship. Exact responsibility for the crimes of Francoism. Throw the reactionary commanders and officers out of the army. Dissolution of the mercenary and colonial brigades. Democratic rights for soldiers.

- Against the wage freeze, unemployment, incomes policy; and any form of "social pact," against the constant degradation of the living and working conditions of the masses: For the demands of the workers. Against the militarization of public services. For a sliding scale of wages and hours.

- Against fake bankruptcies and factory shutdowns, daily manifestations of the "formidable force of private initiative" to which the government's program pays homage: Workers control of production. Nationalization without compensation of all factories that are shut down and reactivation of these factories under workers control. Nationalization of key industries without compensation and under workers control.

- Against capitalist commercialization of education: For free, secular, bilingual,

3. Partido del Trabajo de España (Labor party of Spain); Organización Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores (Revolutionary Workers Organization); Movimiento Comunista de España (Communist Movement of Spain).

rounded, compulsory education until eighteen years of age. For the demands of the employees in education.

- Against class medicine: For social security financed by the state and the companies that includes the entire population and covers all illnesses. For all the demands of the health workers.

- Against the totally disastrous agricultural policy of the dictatorship: Radical agrarian reform. Expropriation without compensation of the landlords and big capitalists in the countryside. Abolition of all forms of separation between ownership and cultivation of land: Land to those who till it. Nationalization of the trade networks of agricultural production and their administration by delegates elected by the agricultural workers, the agrarian cooperatives, and the small peasants.

- Against the promised "fiscal reform," which actually amounts to an institutionalization of capitalist fiscal fraud and the robbery of the workers: No taxes on wages. All fiscal revenues to be paid by the capitalists.

- Against the CNS (the government "trade union"), fascist trade union, and any "reform" of it, which in no case can or even seeks to change its essential reactionary content: For a united class trade union in which the right of tendency is recognized, which stimulates workers democracy (through its two fundamental instruments, the assembly and the elected and revocable strike committee), and whose organization is defined by a constituent trade-union congress of delegates democratically elected in the factories.

- Against the projects of integration into the political and military alliances of imperialism, protector of the Francoist "reform"; against the new agreement with Yankee imperialism; against the traditional Francoist demagogy on Gibraltar: Break all imperialist pacts and alliances, including the secret pacts of police collaboration of the Fraga-Poniatowski type. Yankee bases out. Immediate restitution of Gibraltar to the Spanish state.

- Against the Francoist colonial policy and the occupation of Moroccan territory in North Africa, directly responsible for the present slaughter of the Saharan people: Independence for Sahara. Recognition of the Polisario Front as the sole legitimate representative of the Saharan people. Immediate restitution to Morocco of all occupied territories in North Africa.

Unlike the "minimum programs," which serve only for bargaining with big capital, this body of slogans is intended to serve as an overall orientation for the independent action of the masses. Hence, it must be translated, transformed, and broadened according to the needs of this action. In addition—and this is fundamental—it has

a foundation that is clearly lacking in all the "democratic alternatives": *This foundation is the self-organization of the working class and the entire mass movement*; the organization of struggles by the fighters themselves is the basic organizational consequence of the line of class independence. For it is not simply a matter of mobilizing the masses, but also of the masses' providing themselves with their own organs, holding discussions in assemblies about what direction to lend the struggle, electing and controlling their own representatives, forming strike committees and pickets to extend and defend strikes, vigilance committees and purge committees against all forms of counterrevolution, popular tribunals that exact justice from those responsible for Francoist crimes, soldiers committees, and so on. And all these organs must be coordinated and centralized, *thus advancing on the road to organs of workers power.*

The forms and names these bodies may adopt are of little importance. *The important thing is that the mass movement see them as instruments of struggle.* In the mobilizations that are going on right now we see the thousand forms that self-organization can take, the thousand roads that lead to the coordination of the struggle, to its extension, to the organization of solidarity, and to the drawing of new sectors into the fight. *The point, then, is to struggle within all, absolutely all of them, to develop the content of mass self-organization that exists in all these forms, no matter how embryonic their present reality may be.* The point is to advance in this way toward organs that directly represent the masses in the struggle and are thus immediately in the service of the struggle, the organs of the *workers united front* from top to bottom. And to construct this united front it is necessary to pose to the workers and revolutionary nationalist organizations, through slogans and above all through action, the cry that sums up the battle against class collaboration:

Break with the bourgeoisie!

The various "democratic alternatives" always conclude with the slogan that sums up class collaboration: the "broad coalition" provisional government charged with reconstructing the Spanish bourgeois state in a "democratic" form. The central slogan of our program is precisely the government capable of carrying out our program, whose task is to satisfy the demands of the working class and the people unconditionally, which would be based on the combat organs of the masses, the organs that have been established to bring down Francoism, that embody the battle against exploitation, repression, and national and social oppression.

We call this government the *workers government.*

Between their *provisional government* and our *workers government* there is much more than simply a difference over the type of "coalition," although the workers government obviously cannot contain *even the shadow of the bourgeoisie.* Above all, there is a difference of *function* between the two governments. The function of the provisional government is to reconstruct the bourgeois order; *the function of the workers government is to destroy it forever.*

Some comrades, militants of other organizations and vanguard fighters, often tell us: "But you are not realistic. You don't take account of the fact that there *is going to be* a provisional coalition government, that the masses want it. It is necessary to be in that government, or to be close to it, in order to avert 'rightist' maneuvers. Your workers government is a slogan that is not understood, that has nothing to do with the present concerns of the masses."

So, are we "idealists" or "ultraleftists"? Not at all. We are communists, which is the only revolutionary way to be realistic. And we know that there is going to be a "provisional government." And we know that the majority of the mass movement believes, *is made to believe*, that this "provisional government" is the "alternative" to Francoism. But we do not deduce a political line from these two facts. In developing a political line, we have to ask ourselves, Why do the masses believe in this provisional government? The answer is quite clear: Because they believe that such a government will satisfy their *political, economic, and social* demands. The masses *do not adapt their demands* to this or that sort of government—that is the business of the reformists—but on the contrary "adapt" the government to their demands, which are the things that really count for them. Thus, we have to ask ourselves another question: Would an interclass government want or be able to satisfy the demands of the masses; is that the function of the "broad coalition provisional government"? And we must answer, categorically: *No; it does not want to, it cannot, and that is not its function.* And thus, we come to the decisive question: If that is the case, what should the attitude of revolutionaries be? To foster the illusions of the masses in the "provisional government" in order "not to be isolated," thus collaborating in the *real function* of this government? This would be a typically opportunistic attitude.

The attitude of revolutionaries consists in fighting so that the masses, through their own experience, put forward their own demands, gain confidence in their own strength, acquire an absolute determination to realize their aspirations, and

actually do so through their own action, constructing the organs best suited to achieving these objectives. Within this fight and linked to it, it is necessary to propagate the slogans of class independence, and in particular of the workers government. If the majority of the mass movement places its struggles under the banner of an interclass provisional government, *we will continue to oppose this slogan and all its consequences, yielding no concession.* No one will be able to accuse us of "dividing" the movement. First, because the basis of the unity of the workers lies in the agreement to defend the workers' demands against capitalist exploitation and against the dictatorship. The disagreements, even principled ones, over the composition of the government that should be established after the fall of the dictatorship should not affect the united combat of the masses. Second, because those who foster the division of the movement are those who try to subordinate the struggles of the movement to pacts with the bourgeoisie. Third, because we will always defend the unity in action of the workers, whatever may be the orientation that the majority of the workers adopt.

In the end, the orientations and slogans of the various workers organizations must be subjected to the test of practice, to the heat of the united struggle of the working class and the people. We are certain that the line of class collaboration will melt like wax in this heat, while the line of class independence will be forged like steel. When the forge has done its work, *the masses will give liberty its real name. They will call it socialism, and the workers government will stand at the head of the offensive toward the achievement of the classless society. We are fighting right now for that day to come about.*

8. That is our general position in a debate that is of fundamental importance, but which must not divert one ounce of strength for one second from *the essential task of the moment: the organization of a general strike against the Francoist monarchy, against the dictatorship.* The necessity of concentrating, of centralizing all the will for freedom that exists in the country today into a united effort was never so within reach, never so necessary, and never so well understood and desired by the working class and the people as it is today. Beginning from the mobilizations for amnesty, the days of struggle, the solidarity with workers strikes like the strikes of the education and health workers, with the comrades of the militarized sectors—*forward to the general strike against the dictatorship!*

January 30, 1976

A Prison House of Nations

[The following statement condemning the Kremlin bureaucracy's policy of Russification of oppressed minorities in the Soviet Union was issued by dissident Vladimir Bukovsky. It was written in mid-1975 from his cell in the notorious Vladimir prison, where he is still confined.]

[Bukovsky, who is thirty-three years old, has spent most of his adult life in Soviet prisons and camps because of his activities in defense of democratic rights. He is currently serving a twelve-year term (seven years in prison and five years of internal exile) because he made available abroad documented evidence of the Soviet authorities' practice of placing dissidents in mental hospitals.]

[While in prison he has conducted numerous protests and hunger strikes against the oppressive conditions. He has been subjected to particularly harsh treatment because he has resisted pressure to recant his views.]

[The translation from the Russian is by Kenneth Greer.]

Citizen Chairman of the Council of Ministers:

Recent concrete facts that have lately become known to me compel me to put aside my own principles temporarily and appeal to you, knowing in advance the practical futility of doing so. No one has even succeeded in bringing you down from your transcendental existence within the Kremlin heights over the fate of political prisoners in the USSR, whom you call especially dangerous political criminals. Neither hunger strikes nor illnesses nor suicides have succeeded. But I am not a politically minded person and even though my words will change nothing, today I am obliged to speak out. It is my duty—my duty as a Russian.

In April 1975, in the Ural concentration camp VS 389/35, a conversation took place between the deputy chief of institution VS 389, Captain Sharikov, and my comrade, Chekalin. Sharikov unequivocally suggested chauvinistic attitudes to Chekalin, demanding that he, as a Russian, break off relations with Yids, Ukrainians, and others.

I am a Russian and I am sorry for my country that official figures openly preach chauvinism and that Russification has been promoted to the rank of governmental policy. The civil marriage between Soviet power and electrification turned out to be a fruitless relationship; it did not give the people internationalism.

Why would a Czechoslovakian or Polish student or a Lithuanian or Ukrainian peasant love me, a Russian?

It is possible to demoralize Ivan Dzyuba, but Dzyuba did not cause the Russification of the Ukraine, rather Russification gave

rise to Dzyuba.

It pains me that Russia is a prison house of nations on a greater scale than it was sixty years ago. And no one lives in a prison voluntarily.

I, a Russian by nationality, culture, and language, declare: National discrimination and compulsory Russification exist in the USSR; years of camps and prisons have convinced me of this.

Thus, in only one year of imprisonment in camp VS 389/35, I was a witness to many examples of this. Your *oprichniki* ["Ivan the Terrible's" bodyguards] in blue epaulets from the Skalpinsky Regional KGB—Afanasov, Krapapachuk, and Ulita—repeatedly disseminated anti-Semitic misinformation through their agency, using a carrot-and-stick approach to implant international dissension in the zone. In December 1974, they tried to take physical reprisals against Jewish prisoners through their police agents—murderers and bullies. In February 1975, Captain Utiro openly expressed his anti-Semitic attitudes to Yagman personally and even tried to substantiate them theoretically.

Forced Russification is put into practice not only by exporting Ukrainians, Armenians, Lithuanians, and others for "correction" in Russia, but also by conscious "reeducation" in small ways: by delaying letters in the national languages, by prohibiting all languages except Russian during meetings, and so forth. The principle of "divide and rule" is the basis for the practice of "reeducation" of political prisoners in the USSR. There are regular attempts to incite Russians against Ukrainians, Armenians, etc.; everyone against the Russians; Jews against Ukrainians . . .

Internationalism does, however, exist. It is to be found right in the midst of the "bourgeois nationalists" who are the majority of the political prisoners. And if Budaryan, Altman, Kalinichenko, Svitlychny, Shakhverdyan, Lukyanenko, Gluzman, and Antonyuk are nationalists, then I am a nationalist. I am a Ukrainian, an Armenian, a Jew, a Lithuanian, a Czech, a Pole, a New Zealander, a Peruvian. Because democracy means individual as well as national freedom.

Unfortunately, I must end here; they are hurrying me.

Vladimir Bukovsky
(Vladimir Prison)

June-July 1975

P.S. Excuse me, but understandable considerations force me to send this open letter in a far from "open" manner. Your prisons are not the best place for frank letters. □

Desacuerdo Táctico con Trotsky

Por Farrell Dobbs

[Lo que sigue es una selección¹ tomada del tercer capítulo de *Teamster Bureaucracy* (La Burocracia del Sindicato de los Teamsters), un libro por Farrell Dobbs, próximo a publicarse. Este es el último volumen de una serie de cuatro.² Los primeros tres volúmenes relatan cómo la International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Hermandad Internacional de Camioneros), de un débil sindicato de oficio, creció durante los años treinta para convertirse en el sindicato más grande en los Estados Unidos. La punta de lanza en este crecimiento fue la combativa sección de los Teamsters en Minneapolis, bajo la dirección de varios veteranos del movimiento trotskista.

[Dobbs, figura clave durante la primera campaña de sindicalización sobre la marcha que organizaron los Teamsters, nos narra en este volumen el ataque perpetrado por Roosevelt contra el movimiento de los trabajadores norteamericanos, que fue un paso preparatorio para llevar a los Estados Unidos hacia el baño de sangre imperialista. Aparecen versiones sobre la campaña del periódico de los Teamsters, *Northwest Organizer* (El Organizador del Noroeste), en contra de la guerra; el papel jugado por el FBI en la estratagema legal llevada a cabo contra militantes de los Teamsters en algunos juicios locales; y el ataque de Roosevelt en contra de los dirigentes de la Sección Minneapolis de los Teamsters, el Local 544, y del Socialist Workers Party (SWP: Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores), culminando con el notorio juicio de 1941 en base al Acta Smith y la subsecuente sentencia dictada contra ocho dirigentes de los Teamsters y de SWP, que fueron enviados a prisión por su oposición a la guerra.

[Además del interés histórico que pueda despertar este libro, debido a que es un relato narrado por un protagonista, esta selección es valiosa por su descripción de la forma en que Trotsky y la dirección del SWP manejaron un desacuerdo sobre una cuestión táctica, que era de fundamental importancia debido a que Roosevelt estaba llevando a cabo sus preparativos para la guerra: qué curso habría que seguir en las elecciones presidenciales venideras de 1940.

[La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

En enero de 1940, mi esposa Marvel Scholl y yo viajamos a México para visitar a León Trotsky y a su compañera, Natalia Sedova. Acababa yo de renunciar a mi puesto como parte del personal organizativo de la International Brotherhood of Teamsters, con el fin de poder concentrarme en mi actividad política como Secretario Nacional de asuntos laborales del Socialist Workers Party. El sentir del partido era que, mientras hacía el cambio, sería útil que fuera a hablar con Trotsky. Acogimos la oportunidad de conocer al famoso revolucionario.

Uno de los temas que discutimos con él fue el de las elecciones venideras en los Estados Unidos. Nos brindó sugerencias prácticas al respecto, introduciendo el tema con un bosquejo de las

consideraciones objetivas que tenía que ver con éste. Trotsky hacía la observación de que se estaban ejerciendo grandes presiones para alinear al movimiento obrero en apoyo a los preparativos bélicos del gobierno capitalista. Como resultado, se presentó una situación peligrosa para los trabajadores debido a las tendencias capituladoras que existían en el seno de su movimiento, tendencias que adoptaban la forma general de un apoyo a la reelección del Presidente Roosevelt. Entonces, los revolucionarios deberían usar cualquier medio a su alcance para contrarrestar esta tendencia, por medio de un impulso a la acción política independiente de la clase trabajadora.

Para proyectar este curso se requería, más aún, que el programa obrero fuera concretado en torno a una serie de demandas de transición. Se deberían hacer llamados a que se adoptaran medidas para proteger el poder de compra de los trabajadores y para asegurarles sus empleos. Los trabajadores deberían también exigir el derecho a vivir en paz con otras naciones, a controlar la producción, a examinar los libros de contabilidad de los capitalistas y a expropiar sus propiedades, etc. Una plataforma electoral proyectada sobre estos lineamientos no sólo trazaría un curso tendiente a la solución de los problemas inmediatos de los trabajadores, sino que prepararía el camino a éstos para que aprendieran de experiencias ulteriores que sus intereses de clase podrían ser defendidos sólo arrebatando el control del gobierno de manos de los capitalistas.

Para asegurar que las cuestiones programáticas claves fueran impulsadas durante las elecciones, Trotsky instaba al SWP para que presentara un candidato en contra de Roosevelt. Paralelamente a esta acción se debería hacer la proposición al movimiento sindical para que presentara su propia planilla presidencial; y para ayudar a enfatizar esta idea, los Teamsters de Minneapolis deberían sugerir la nominación de Daniel J. Tobin, el dirigente principal de la IBT, como candidato a la presidencia.

Cuando llegué al local central del partido, en Nueva York, se efectuó una reunión especial de la dirección para que yo presentara mi informe acerca de las discusiones con Trotsky. Sobre la cuestión de la política electoral, todos los presentes estuvieron de acuerdo en que las proposiciones eran buenas, pero en la situación imperante otra serie de asuntos interfirieron en la implementación práctica de estas proposiciones.

Por supuesto, nuestra propaganda en general incluía demandas del mismo tipo de las que Trotsky había mencionado. Hacíamos esto consecuentemente desde que la Cuarta Internacional adoptó un amplio programa de transición en 1938. Sin embargo, esas demandas no fueron concretadas como puntos para una plataforma electoral debido a una serie de dificultades.

El SWP era pequeño y sus recursos financieros limitados. Además, teníamos frente a nosotros las leyes electorales discriminatorias, confeccionadas contra los partidos radicales. En aquellas circunstancias, para lanzar una planilla presidencial era necesario un esfuerzo total por parte de la organización.

Existía también otra complicación. Una intensa lucha fraccional se había desarrollado en el seno del partido, surgida de las presiones que los capitalistas ejercían en torno a la cuestión de la guerra. Una minoría pequeñoburguesa estaba exigiéndole al SWP que abandonara su política de defensa de la Unión Soviética, un estado obrero, contra los ataques imperialistas. La disputa involucraba principios revolucionarios y una mayoría de los miembros luchó por conservar éstos. El resultado fue una

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2. Los tres volúmenes ya impresos son los siguientes: *Teamster Rebellion* [Rebelión de los Teamsters] (1972), *Teamster Power* [Poder de los Teamsters] (1973) y *Teamster Politics* [Política de los Teamsters] (1975), todos ellos publicados por Monad Press. (Los libros de Monad Press son distribuidos exclusivamente por Pathfinder Press, Inc., 410 West Street, New York, New York 10014. También pueden ser adquiridos en Pathfinder Press, 47 The Cut, London SE1 8LL.)

profunda escisión durante la primavera de ese año.

Hasta entonces, la lucha fraccional absorbió la mayor parte de la atención de la dirección del partido. Entonces, después de la escisión, tuvimos que concentrar grandes esfuerzos para volver a consolidar la organización, que había sufrido una severa pérdida en cuanto a su fuerza numérica. Debido a estas preocupaciones, los dirigentes nacionales le dedicaron una atención insuficiente a la actividad electoral y no adoptaron las iniciativas necesarias. Por eso no se llevó a cabo actividad alguna, ya sea para desarrollar una forma de levantar una planilla presidencial del SWP, o para proponer a través de la acción de los Teamsters la nominación de Tobin en contra de Roosevelt.

Así estaba la situación en junio de 1940, cuando una delegación de dirigentes del partido fue a consultar con Trotsky acerca de varios problemas. La delegación consistía de James P. Cannon, Sam Gordon, Joseph Hansen y yo. Tres miembros de base del partido—Charles Cornell y Harold Robins, quienes se encontraban en la guardia de Trotsky, y Antoinette Konikow, que había ido allí por motivos personales—estuvieron presentes durante las pláticas.³

Cuando llegamos al punto de la orden del día que versaba sobre las elecciones en los Estados Unidos, Trotsky resumió de la siguiente manera la situación imperante: no había habido una campaña en la prensa del partido por la nominación de un candidato presidencial por parte del movimiento sindical. Sobre este asunto, nada había aparecido en el *Northwest Organizer*. El SWP no había levantado su propio candidato y ya era demasiado tarde para hacerlo. Como resultado de todo lo anterior, el partido no tenía una respuesta cuando los trabajadores hacían la pregunta: ¿Por quién debemos votar? No se había desarrollado una forma concreta de insistir—en aquellos sindicatos donde teníamos influencia—que Roosevelt no era nuestro propio candidato.

Una abstención completa de la campaña, enfatizó, no sería recomendable en forma alguna. En vez de adoptar una postura negativa, necesitábamos aplicar una política dinámica. Como partido independiente, era imperioso que tuviéramos una línea hacia la campaña presidencial.

Como no contábamos con nuestra propia planilla, continuó Trotsky, teníamos que escoger entre Earl Browder, que encabezaba la fórmula presidencial del Partido Comunista, y Norman Thomas, el candidato presidencial del Partido Socialista. Thomas estaba descartado, sin embargo, por sus vínculos con aquellos socialdemócratas que se encontraban en el extremo izquierdo de los defensores del imperialismo norteamericano. Así que las opciones se reducían a Browder y Roosevelt.

Trotsky nos recordó que no nos había propuesto el apoyo crítico a Browder al presentar sus recomendaciones sobre la política electoral el pasado enero. Pero ahora pensaba que deberíamos adoptar este curso, ya que parecía que no nos quedaba otra alternativa. Un paso como este no debería ser visto, sin embargo, como el comienzo de toda una política estratégica, de largo plazo. Debería ser considerado simplemente como una línea táctica para las actuales elecciones presidenciales.

Al darle apoyo crítico a Browder, agregó Trotsky, podíamos manejar más efectivamente un problema adicional. Con la firma del pacto entre Alemania y la URSS en 1939, los dirigentes del PC habían comenzado a levantar una oposición a la entrada de los EUA en la guerra. En abstracto, se había desarrollado una similitud entre sus consignas y las nuestras. Además, ellos contaban con una organización más grande, y podían gritar más fuerte que nosotros. Como resultado de lo anterior, se habían convertido en un serio obstáculo en la lucha del SWP por conquistar la dirección de aquellos sindicalistas que se oponían a

la política exterior de Roosevelt. Al mismo tiempo, un muro se interponía a cualquier intento de nuestra parte por influir a los trabajadores estalinistas en torno a la cuestión de la guerra.

Entonces, deberíamos tener presente que era sólo cuestión de tiempo para que el Partido Comunista girara hacia el apoyo al imperialismo de los EUA, para poder satisfacer las cambiantes necesidades diplomáticas de Moscú. Cuando eso sucediera, podríamos esperar una explosión interna en el PC. Los trabajadores en las filas de ese partido habían recibido con beneplácito el cambio de 1939 con respecto a la línea frentepopulista a favor de la guerra, ya que estos trabajadores se habían radicalizado a través de una experiencia en la lucha de clases. Muchos de ellos resentirían un nuevo cambio para regresar a una postura patriótica, y podríamos introducir una cuña para que algunos de ellos comenzaran a moverse hacia nosotros cuando su partido revirtiera nuevamente su línea. Al mismo tiempo que le dábamos apoyo crítico a su candidato presidencial, sobre la base de una coincidencia transitoria en las consignas antibélicas, prevendríamos a los trabajadores estalinistas que serían traicionados nuevamente por sus dirigentes. Mientras tanto, pasaríamos por una experiencia común con estos trabajadores en la lucha contra la guerra, de tal manera que estaríamos en mejor posición para atraerlos políticamente más adelante.

Después de impulsar su proposición como lo hemos descrito más arriba, Trotsky hizo la observación que se trataba de una tarea osada. Creía, sin embargo, que la cohesión de nuestro partido era tal que podría salir airoso en esta maniobra, que sería de corto plazo y que se llevaría a cabo con una fuerte crítica al PC.

La delegación del SWP no estuvo de acuerdo con la táctica del apoyo crítico a Browder. Sentíamos que chocaría con la indignación de los militantes antiestalinistas en los sindicatos. Al mismo tiempo que hasta cierto punto habría prejuicios reaccionarios involucrados, existía también una buena cantidad de odio sincero y legítimo hacia el Partido Comunista. Este odio surgía de los graves crímenes que el PC había cometido, tales como las violaciones a la democracia sindical y las traiciones a las luchas de los obreros en contra de los patrones.

En varias industrias estábamos construyendo frentes de trabajo del partido en base a la oposición al control estalinista. Para tal propósito, se habían formado bloques tácitos con elementos que podrían ser clasificados como sindicalistas progresistas. Aunque numéricamente débiles, políticamente éramos fuertes; y esta cualidad nos había permitido jugar un notable papel de dirección en bloques de esa naturaleza, a través de los cuales gradualmente se estaban fortaleciendo nuestras fuerzas. Entonces, creíamos, el adoptar la táctica que se nos proponía daría al traste con nuestro trabajo sindical, al darle a los militantes antiestalinistas la falsa impresión de que nos estábamos moviendo hacia la colaboración con el PC.

Especialmente en Minnesota, pensamos, la táctica sería ampliamente malinterpretada en vista de los antecedentes criminales de los estalinistas. Entre las cuentas en su contra, estaban las operaciones de irrupción en el Farmer-Labor Party [Partido de los Trabajadores y de Pequeños Propietarios Agrícolas, que en el Estado de Minnesota contaba con apoyo considerable y que incluso había ganado varias veces la gubernatura], los atentados contra el movimiento sindical y el sabotaje de las luchas en contra de la clase patronal.

Bajo estas circunstancias, la delegación del SWP argumentó, las ganancias que puedan ser obtenidas a través del método propuesto para acercarnos a los miembros obreros del PC serían más que compensadas por la pérdida de influencia entre los militantes sindicales antiestalinistas.

Trotsky respondió que su proposición tenía la intención de combinar dos objetivos: o sea, el de proveernos, como partido independiente, con una línea para la campaña presidencial; y para apoyar al trabajador estalinista en contra de sus dirigentes traidores, con la esperanza de atraerlo. Este último objetivo, nos

3. Una versión taquigráfica de esta discusión, en inglés, aparece en *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1939-40)* [Escritos de León Trotsky (1939-40)], segunda edición, Pathfinder Press, 1973, pág. 251.

dijo, no significaba que deberíamos alejarnos de los sindicalistas progresistas. La maniobra de penetrar el movimiento de masas con su ayuda había sido correcta. Esa fase nos abría algunas puertas en los sindicatos, pero al mismo tiempo corríamos algunos peligros.

El veía la situación de la siguiente manera: los progresistas se encontraban principalmente en la dirección de los sindicatos, más que representar una corriente de base. Si para llegar al éxito contábamos con impresionar a estos elementos políticamente, podría resultar fatal. Si los funcionarios estaban adoptando una postura progresista, se trataba de un reflejo del nuevo movimiento sindical que había surgido durante la crisis social de los años treinta. Estos funcionarios no eran un reflejo directo de la base. Su línea era el resultado de las presiones ejercidas, de un lado, por las necesidades de los trabajadores y del otro, por el miedo a los estalinistas, que querían construir su propia burocracia en los sindicatos. Fundamentalmente, los funcionarios que eran amistosos hacia nosotros buscaban asesoría en su lucha en contra del PC.

El papel de consejeros de los burócratas progresistas, señalaba Trotsky, no era muy prometedor a largo plazo. Aunque éstos se estuvieran oponiendo a los estalinistas, no parecía que estuviéramos ganando a muchos de ellos a nuestro partido. En general, eran partidarios de Roosevelt y se volverían contra nosotros tan pronto los EUA entraran a la guerra. Nuestro verdadero papel, agregó, debería ser el de un tercer contendiente, tanto en contra de los burócratas como de los estalinistas.

Estábamos de acuerdo, por supuesto, en la necesidad de crear nuestras propias fuerzas independientes para competir por la dirección de la clase trabajadora. Sin embargo, estábamos en desacuerdo con las implicaciones, en el sentido de que estuviéramos actuando principalmente como los abogados de los funcionarios sindicales progresistas. Entre los progresistas, contestamos, había sindicalistas de base a quienes nosotros mismos habíamos organizado. Eran militantes que contaban con buenas razones para oponerse a los estalinistas, y nuestra principal línea debería estar dirigida hacia estos trabajadores, con el fin de ganarlos políticamente. Insistimos que donde estaban involucradas relaciones con burócratas progresistas no se trataba de otra cosa más que de un bloque sobre la política a seguir en los sindicatos; no era un bloque sobre política nacional.

Trotsky respondió que lo que habíamos bosquejado nosotros era una política sindical, no una política bolchevique. Al mismo tiempo que el partido había logrado obtener algunas conquistas por medio de cierta adaptación a la realidad de los sindicatos, se requerían medidas que compensaran por los peligros inevitables. Parecía que muchos camaradas se habían llegado a interesar más en el trabajo sindical que en la actividad del partido, y que hasta cierto grado nos estábamos adaptando políticamente a la burocracia sindical.

La política bolchevique, enfatizó, comienza fuera de los sindicatos. El obrero es un sindicalista honesto que se puede desarrollar políticamente, pero esto no es lo mismo que ser un bolchevique. El atraso político en las filas de los trabajadores requiere de un cierto grado de adaptación por parte de los miembros del partido que están involucrados en la actividad sindical. Esta es la razón por la cual la presión de los elementos atrasados se refleja al interior del partido. Esta es también la razón por la cual los funcionarios sindicales, especialmente, tienden a ser el ala derecha del partido; y síntomas de esta naturaleza habían llegado a notarse dentro del SWP.

Era necesario un mayor énfasis en el partido, nos aconsejó; un entrenamiento teórico más sistemático, un maniobreo más agudo. Primero que nada los camaradas deberían considerarse miembros del partido y sólo en un sentido secundario como sindicalistas.

Después de horas de discusión, fue claro que estábamos en un *impasse* en cuanto a darle apoyo crítico a Browder. Trotsky, quien podía ser rudo en la discusión, nos dio entonces una prueba

adicional de su habilidad para pensar objetivamente. Lo que estaba en juego no era una cuestión de principios. Nuestras diferencias se centraban exclusivamente en una cuestión táctica, y aunque la candidatura de Browder era un asunto importante los desacuerdos de este tipo no eran poco frecuentes en la elaboración de planes para la actividad cotidiana. Se debería tomar en cuenta también el hecho de que íbamos a llevar a la práctica cualquier decisión que alcanzáramos. Así que decidió no presionar más sobre la cuestión del apoyo crítico a Browder.

Para que una táctica sea válida para un partido de la clase obrera, debe estar de acuerdo con los principios revolucionarios y servir a las necesidades estratégicas de la lucha por el socialismo. La proposición de Trotsky, por supuesto, estaba en concordancia con ambos requisitos. Pero esto no quiere decir que el paso que recomendaba fuera a producir seguramente los resultados esperados en caso de llevarse a la práctica. Las maniobras tácticas son diseñadas para obtener ciertos resultados limitados, en situaciones concretas, de momento. Entonces, el potencial de una maniobra dada no puede ser determinado definitivamente a menos que sea aplicado a la situación específica para la que fue creada, de tal manera que los resultados reales sean evidentes. Tomando en cuenta lo anterior, uno puede sólo especular en cuanto a si hubiera sido aconsejable para el Socialist Workers Party darle la oportunidad de ser puesta en práctica a la táctica de apoyo crítico a Browder, como nos instaba Trotsky.

Después de examinar esta cuestión retrospectivamente, hoy en día pienso que deberíamos haberlo hecho. No porque en aquellos tiempos hubiera existido un serio peligro de que las camaradas del partido sucumbieran al medio sindical. Esa prueba la pasaron con bandera en alto cuando el SWP fue sometido a un severo ataque en 1941. Sí existía una tendencia, sin embargo, a darle un peso desproporcionado a las consideraciones "prácticas" cuando enfocábamos las tareas políticas en el movimiento de masas, y creo que la táctica de apoyo crítico a Browder hubiera ayudado a corregir esta deficiencia.

Si éramos aceptados como dirigentes sindicales se debía principalmente a nuestra manifiesta habilidad de luchar contra los patrones y a hacerle frente a las perjudiciales maniobras de los estalinistas. Mientras que el ganar papeles dirigentes sobre esta base nos colocaba en una posición favorable para propagar nuestros puntos de vista revolucionarios, persistía la necesidad de usar todos los medios posibles para acelerar el desarrollo político de los militantes obreros. Vista de esta manera, la proposición de Trotsky hacía algo más que presentarnos ciertas dificultades en nuestro trabajo: nos abría una oportunidad política. Aunque existía un sentimiento anti-Roosevelt extendido entre las bases de los sindicatos, los más altos burócratas—la mayoría de los cuales favorecían su reelección—rechazaban la idea de nominar a un candidato de los trabajadores. Entonces, si los trabajadores que se oponían a los traficantes de guerra de la Casa Blanca iban a contar con una alternativa concreta, ésta tendría que ser Browder.

Los militantes antiestalinistas hubieran, por supuesto, rechazado la idea de darle apoyo crítico al candidato del traicionero PC, pero no parece estar excluido que las reacciones iniciales de este tipo podrían haber sido superadas hasta cierto punto. Hubiéramos sido capaces de enfatizar la importancia de distinguir entre los incondicionales estalinistas y aquellos trabajadores que hubieran sido atrapados por los primeros. Se hubiera podido explicar cuidadosa y precisamente qué es lo que quiere decir apoyo crítico, por qué se desarrolló esta táctica en el transcurso de la historia del movimiento obrero y acerca de cómo se podía aplicar de una forma principista para facilitar la presente lucha contra la guerra imperialista. Para presentar tales explicaciones, más aún, los sindicalistas del partido hubieran tenido que empaparse de algunos preceptos marxistas fundamentales, y de esta manera hubieran profundizado su propia educación política. Las posibilidades de influir a los miembros del Partido

Comunista también existían, al parecer, por esas fechas. El PC había reclutado a miles de trabajadores, especialmente a los miembros del Congress of Industrial Organizations [CIO—Congreso de Organizaciones Industriales, la confederación que surgió en los treinta en contraposición a los sindicatos por oficio] en las industrias básicas, y no todos habían sido estalinizados plenamente. Cuando el PC cambió su línea después de la firma del pacto entre Alemania y la URSS, muchos de ellos se entusiasmaron ante la idea de conducir una lucha en contra de la guerra imperialista. Si nos hubiéramos solidarizado con estos trabajadores para realizar este esfuerzo, a través del apoyo crítico a Browder, algunos de ellos muy posiblemente hubieran tomado una actitud abierta hacia nosotros. Además, eran más políticos que la mayoría de los combatientes sindicales, aunque su pensamiento estaba deformado por los conceptos estalinistas. Así que el prospecto de discutir con ellos con objetivos determinados no estaba excluido.

Entre los temas que hubiéramos podido explorar estaban las razones de la nueva actitud del Kremlin hacia los Nazis, lo que había causado cierta inquietud dentro del PC. Con un poco de habilidad, la discusión podría haber sido conducida hacia una reseña crítica de la política estalinista, como se había reflejado en la incapacidad del PC alemán para evitar que Hitler tomara el poder. De esa manera, hubiéramos podido encontrar una apertura—sin ser provocativos—para predecir que los incondicionales estalinistas en este país iban otra vez a traicionar a los trabajadores en la cuestión de la guerra, como de hecho lo harían en 1941. Uno no puede decir con seguridad si es que este enfoque nos hubiera permitido ganar a una cantidad substancial de trabajadores estalinistas. Sin embargo, parece factible que los hubiéramos influido a un grado significativo, y en cualquier caso los sindicalistas del SWP hubieran enriquecido su propia comprensión de la política revolucionaria al llevar a cabo el intento.

Debido a que el Socialist Workers Party no tenía su propio candidato presidencial, hay otra razón más por la cual ahora creo que debimos haberle dado apoyo crítico a Browder. El haber fallado en dar ese paso nos dejó con varios problemas importantes para encontrar la manera de diferenciarnos de los partidarios de Roosevelt en los sindicatos. Entre los Teamsters de Minneapolis apareció una de las más viscosas dificultades de esta naturaleza, un tema que trataré más adelante.

Con respecto al resultado de la discusión de junio de 1940, el dirigente principal de la Cuarta Internacional mostró una comprensión total de sus responsabilidades para con nosotros, como dirigentes de una sección nacional. Trotsky sabía lo costoso que podía resultar para el movimiento el hecho de que él utilizara su gran autoridad de tal forma en que minara nuestra habilidad para llevar a cabo las tareas de dirección que la membresía del SWP nos había asignado. Entonces, aunque tenía confianza en que su posición sobre la cuestión de Browder era correcta, Trotsky tuvo el cuidado de evitar hacer algo que implicara una ruptura con nosotros. En vez, tomó la iniciativa de proponer un compromiso.

Llegamos a este acuerdo como sigue: haríamos un intento de acercarnos a los trabajadores estalinistas a través de proposiciones de frente unido en contra de los preparativos imperialistas para la guerra, en defensa de los derechos de los obreros, etc.; llevaríamos a cabo una campaña por la nominación de una planilla por parte de los sindicatos para las elecciones presidenciales.

Poco tiempo después, el *Northwest Organizer* planteó la cuestión de la necesidad de una planilla sindical independiente para la presidencia y otros puestos gubernamentales. El 18 de julio publicó un editorial que decía: “El otro día, los diarios informaron que cierto diputado de los EUA estaba garabateando frenéticamente un principio programático ‘por la defensa de la democracia’ para ser incluido en la plataforma del partido Republicano o Demócrata, se nos ha olvidado cual de los dos. . . .

“Los derechos democráticos están divididos, a grandes rasgos, en tres grandes grupos.

“(1) El primer grupo consiste de aquellos ‘derechos’ especiales que defienden las relaciones de propiedad capitalistas. . . .

“(2) El segundo grupo de derechos democráticos . . . incluye muchas de las libertades democráticas: la libertad de expresión, la de reunión . . .

“(3) El tercer grupo de los derechos que existen bajo la democracia capitalista no son propiamente derechos ‘democráticos’ en forma alguna, sino derechos de la clase trabajadora, que han sido conquistados en la lucha de los trabajadores en contra de los patronos. . . .

“El único grupo de derechos democráticos que los capitalistas defienden de todo corazón es el primero, el que salvaguarda las relaciones de propiedad capitalistas. El segundo grupo de derechos democráticos es manipulado por los capitalistas de acuerdo a su conveniencia. Los capitalistas son manifiestamente hostiles al tercer grupo de libertades y buscan siempre coartarlas y abolirlas totalmente en la práctica. . . .

“Hasta donde concierne al pueblo trabajador, no tenemos interés alguno en defender el primer grupo de derechos ‘democráticos,’ que protegen las relaciones de propiedad en interés de los adinerados monopolistas.

“Pero la clase trabajadora, más que cualquier otro grupo en la sociedad, tiene un claro interés en proteger el segundo y el tercer grupos de libertades que constituyen la democracia.

“Los trabajadores no pueden defender estos derechos democráticos por medio de brindarles su apoyo a uno de los dos partidos políticos dominados por los patronos. . . .

“Los trabajadores sólo pueden defender la democracia por medio de reforzar sus propios sindicatos, asegurándose que éstos sean controlados democráticamente, que sigan una política combativa. Y así de importante y necesario es que los trabajadores tengan SU PROPIO PARTIDO POLITICO, un partido laborista nacional, basado en y dirigido por los sindicatos, para retar a los partidos Demócrata y Republicano. . . .

“Para comenzar, quisiéramos nominar a Daniel Tobin, presidente de la International Brotherhood of Teamsters, para la presidencia de los Estados Unidos. Y nos gustaría ver que los sindicatos en cada uno de los estados nominaran sindicalistas leales para cada puesto en las elecciones, incluyendo el de senador, el de diputado y el de gobernador.”

Número tras número, el periódico de los Teamsters contenía propaganda con estos lineamientos, y Trotsky expresó su acuerdo con los pasos que se habían dado. En una carta fechada el 20 de agosto de 1940, escrita a Henry Schultz en torno a otros asuntos, agregaba: “El *Northwest Organizer* se está haciendo más preciso—más agresivo—más político. Lo gozamos mucho.”

Nuestra campaña por una planilla sindical coincidió con un ataque desde otro bando al Partido Demócrata. El 31 de enero de 1940, el Presidente de la CIO John L. Lewis denunció públicamente a Roosevelt por “engañar a los trabajadores.” Lewis, quien era sensible al creciente descontento entre los sindicalistas, quería impedir el desarrollo de una revuelta en contra de su política colaboracionista. Comenzó exigiéndole a Roosevelt unas cuantas concesiones para los trabajadores, como el precio que tenía que pagar para mantener el apoyo de los sindicatos a los demócratas.

Durante los meses siguientes, sin embargo, la Casa Blanca sólo prestó oídos sordos a las súplicas del líder de la CIO. Y, como una semana antes del día de las elecciones, Lewis habló nacionalmente por la radio para hacer un llamamiento, que había sido propagandizado ampliamente con anterioridad. Abrió su discurso con una enérgica acusación de Roosevelt. Había trabajadores combativos en todo el país que escuchaban ansiosos, esperando que lo anterior fuera seguido por un sonoro llamado a que construyeran su propio partido en oposición a la farsa capitalista bipartidaria. En vez, el cabecilla de la CIO se retiró del aire, no

con un estruendo sino con un susurro. "Recomiendo," les dijo a los militantes obreros que se encontraban amargamente desilusionados, "la elección de Wendell L. Willkie [el oponente republicano de Roosevelt] como próximo presidente de los Estados Unidos."

En estas circunstancias, los trabajadores no tenían su propio candidato para la presidencia, y no estaban como para seguir los consejos de Lewis y apoyar a los republicanos. Así que terminaron votando por Roosevelt, considerándolo como un mal menor en comparación con Willie. En Minneapolis, la American Federation of Labor Central Labor Union [AFL CLU—Central Sindical local en Minneapolis, afiliada a la Federación Laboral Norteamericana] adoptó la misma posición. Al mismo tiempo que apoyaba una planilla compuesta puramente por candidatos del Farmer-Labor Party en las elecciones estatales, la CLU será recordada por su apoyo a la planilla demócrata en las elecciones nacionales.

Esto planteaba un problema para los trotskistas, debido a que el *Northwest Organizer* estaba formalmente controlado por el Teamsters Joint Council [TJC—Consejo Conjunto de los Teamsters, formado por todos los locales de los Teamsters en el área y afiliados con el CLU]. Siendo nosotros la excepción, el TJC generalmente apoyaba al CLU en su posición sobre las elecciones presidenciales, de la misma manera que lo hacían muchos miembros del Local 544. De todos estos lados llegaron demandas pidiendo que el periódico de los Teamsters apoyara a Roosevelt. Poníamos objeciones, pidiendo que—en vista de las diferencias sobre esta cuestión—no debería aparecer posición alguna en el órgano oficial del TJC. Nuestra petición fue rechazada, sin embargo, debido en parte a la presión de Tobin. Como Presidente del Democratic National Committee's Labor Committee [Comité Laboral del Comité Nacional del Partido Demócrata], el máximo dirigente de la IBT insistió en que todas las unidades de los Teamsters deberían apoyar la planilla demócrata.

Después de mucha discusión en el TJC, llegamos a un acuerdo. Se acordó publicar un informe con los hechos sobre la posición adoptada por la AFL en Minneapolis, mas no habría un editorial en favor de los demócratas. Una versión de estas noticias apareció en el *Northwest Organizer* el 31 de octubre de 1940. El párrafo clave de este artículo decía: "Sin esconder sus diferencias con Roosevelt o sus críticas a ciertas acciones del Farmer-Labor Party, surgidas en años recientes, la Central Labor Union de Minneapolis siente que sirve a los mejores intereses de los trabajadores organizados el que cada miembro de los sindicatos apoye la planilla del Farmer-Labor Party y nacionalmente apoye la fórmula Roosevelt-Wallace."

Debido a que el asunto había sido manejado de tal forma en que no nos comprometía con el apoyo a un candidato de los capitalistas, el acuerdo no involucraba un rompimiento con los principios revolucionarios. Era aconsejable, sin embargo, estar doblemente seguros de que nuestra posición no se prestaba a malas interpretaciones. En el siguiente número del periódico de los Teamsters se dieron pasos con este fin. A través de un editorial, y en una columna escrita por el editor, Miles Dunne, enfatizamos una y otra vez nuestra proposición de formar un partido laborista nacional.

Si le hubiéramos brindado nuestro apoyo crítico a Browder, como lo aconsejaba Trotsky, nuestro problema en Minneapolis seguramente hubiera sido menos complicado. No quiero dar a entender que una mayoría de los Teamsters pudo haber sido atraída para aceptar esa táctica. En mi opinión, había fuerzas en el TJC que de todas maneras hubieran presionado para que su postura pro-demócrata en las elecciones presidenciales se hubiera expresado de alguna forma en el periódico del sindicato. Pero un arreglo del mismo tipo del que acordamos hubiera dado lugar a muy poca o a nula confusión. Casi todo el mundo hubiera entendido claramente que los dirigentes del Local 544 se mantenían crasamente opuestos a Roosevelt.

Además, podríamos haber realizado algún progreso político entre los trabajadores estalinistas, entre los cuales los trotskistas

hubieran podido establecer un contacto a través del apoyo crítico a la candidatura de Browder. Su campaña no tenía nada de anticapitalista. Hasta donde el Partido Comunista se oponía a Roosevelt, lo hacía por medio de darle un apoyo velado a Willkie; y esto sucedió especialmente después de que Lewis salió en apoyo del candidato republicano. Subrepticamente apoyando la línea pro-Willkie del principal dirigente de la CIO, el *Daily Worker* [el diario del Partido Comunista] llamaba a dar "apoyo total a la dirección de John L. Lewis en el CIO." De esta manera se había abierto la oportunidad para plantear una serie de preguntas acerca de los tortuosos métodos del PC, al mismo tiempo que conversábamos con trabajadores de su base y discutíamos con ellos acerca de la política de principios en los sindicatos. Parece probable que hubiéramos podido ayudar a algunos de ellos para enderezar su pensamiento.

Careciendo de medios directos como para oponernos a Roosevelt en las elecciones, los cuadros del Socialist Workers Party en Minnesota hicieron lo que pudieron con el lanzamiento de una candidato para el Senado de los Estados Unidos. Grace Carlson fue nominada. Un precepto técnico en las leyes electorales le impedía aparecer como la candidato por el SWP. Así que una campaña de recabación de firmas fue lanzada, con todo éxito, para que quedara registrada en las boletas electorales a nombre del Trotskyist Antiwar Party [Partido Trotskista Antibélico].

La campaña de Carlson estaba centrada fundamentalmente en torno a problemas relacionados con la guerra. Entre los puntos claves de su plataforma estaban incluidos los siguientes: en contra de la guerra imperialista; por el control sindical del entrenamiento militar; salarios y horarios sindicales en todos los programas de defensa y de obras públicas; por la semana de 30 horas; por la defensa y extensión de las libertades democráticas y de los derechos de los trabajadores; por un partido laborista nacional basado en y controlado por los sindicatos; defensa de la Unión Soviética en contra del imperialismo y de estalinismo.

Se distribuyeron copias de la plataforma por los miles, principalmente en las ciudades importantes del estado. Con el sentimiento antibélico entre las masas en ascenso, el material de la campaña del SWP fue bien recibido.

Los oponentes de Carlson en la carrera para senador eran Elmer Benson, un secuaz estalinista que había ganado la nominación del Farmer-Labor Party en las elecciones primarias; Henrik Shipstead, un renegado del Farmer-Labor Party que había desertado de éste para unirse a los republicanos; y John Regan, un demócrata. Al enfrentarse a éstos, la candidato del SWP ponía énfasis en que la guerra era el problema contral de la campaña; en que la capacidad de los candidatos para resolver los problemas planteados por la guerra constituían la vara básica con la cual se podrían medir las aptitudes de éstos para defender a los trabajadores y a los pequeños propietarios del campo contra la línea imperialista de Roosevelt.

Cuando se obtuvieron los resultados de las elecciones de noviembre, la suma total de los votos para los candidatos radicales fue de 17,000: más del doble del total de 1936. Partido por partido, las cifras claves fueron las siguientes: para senador de los Estados Unidos, Carlson obtuvo 8,761 y Carl Winter, el candidato no registrado del Partido Comunista, 256. Entre los candidatos presidenciales, Norman Thomas del Partido Socialista obtuvo 5,454 votos en Minnesota, y Earl Browder del PC recibió 2,711. Además de estas cifras específicas, el conjunto de los votos a favor de candidatos radicales incluía boletas a favor de otros candidatos de partidos más pequeños.

Carlson no sólo obtuvo más votos que Winter. La votación a su favor era mayor que el total a escala estatal que obtuvieron Thomas y Browder en la contienda presidencial. Como mostraron los resultados, el SWP había pasado a la cabeza de los partidos que apelaban a los trabajadores radicalizados en esta área; y muchos se estaban acercando a la organización cuando se enteraban de su programa. □

¡Por un Salario Mínimo en Puerto Rico!

[El siguiente artículo apareció en el número de enero-febrero de *La Verdad*,¹ un periódico marxista revolucionario publicado en Puerto Rico.]

* * *

El pasado año culminó con broche de oro para la Asociación de Banqueros. Ofrecieron a la prensa información donde indicaban que los bancos han obtenido excelentes ganancias en el último año. Han tenido lugar aumentos en el ahorro y en sus ingresos por concepto de intereses sobre préstamos para el financiamiento de automóviles y hogares, el crédito alcanzó la suma de \$1,240 millones.

La mayoría de las corporaciones han tenido un ahorro que se eleva a la cifra de \$3,400 millones. Estas ganancias aumentan debido a que no pagan casi contribuciones sobre dichos ingresos. Mientras tanto a nosotros los trabajadores, el gobierno nos impone un aumento provisional "por tres años" de contribución sobre ingresos. Este dictamina la congelación de salarios a empleados públicos, impone el "principio de mérito" y para culminar nos quiere someter a las recomendaciones del Informe de Tobin.²

Nos hablan de un presupuesto deficitario para justificar una mayor austeridad y supuestamente evitar más despidos. Sin embargo, se está hablando de posibles despidos en la AFF [Autoridad de las Fuentes Fluviales] y quedaron sin empleo 729 trabajadores en el Departamento de Salud.

Hernández Colón exhortó a la alianza con los patrones privados y públicos—el Estado—para llevar a cabo la necesaria recuperación económica. El Presidente de la Asociación de Industriales Ramón B. Rodríguez ha dicho: "En tiempos buenos, la legislación social hace que el trabajador participe de la riqueza. No obstante, estos tiempos no son de riqueza. Ni tan siquiera son normales. Son momentos que requieren un sacrificio de los que trabajan por los

que necesitan un trabajo."

Este sacrificio consiste en soportar el aumento galopante en el costo de la vida y la congelación general de salarios; además del control de los sindicatos (arma fundamental de los trabajadores organizados) por medio de la aplicación del Proyecto de Sindicalización Helfeld³ en el sector privado, reprimiendo al liderato sindical honesto y a los trabajadores que muestran más preocupación por el bienestar de sus compañeros.

Veamos los beneficios de los patrones públicos con esta posible alianza.

Los bancos seguirán pagando una contribución casi nula. Esto se basa en su alegado "derecho a la ganancia." Estos vampiros plantean no tener nada que ver con la crisis económica, y por lo tanto, no es a ellos a quienes hay que pedir sacrificios.

A las petroquímicas, farmacéuticas y otras corporaciones privadas se les mantendrá la exención contributiva. Las que ni tienen exención seguirán pagando una contribución muy inferior a sus ganancias. Se les mantendrá además una tarifa de agua y luz en una proporción de costo muy inferior al del consumidor promedio. Estas medidas defienden el alegado derecho de las corporaciones a aumentar sus ganancias.

En caso de huelga seguirán teniendo protección de la policía para los rompehuelgas. Tienen una "Junta Nacional de Relaciones del Trabajo" que responde directamente a los dictados e intereses de la clase patronal. Por otro lado el gobierno está presto a movilizar la Guardia Nacional contra los trabajadores en el momento que se lo soliciten los patrones, claro está, "en defensa del interés nacional."

A estas corporaciones se les ayudaría también a tratar de mantener el salario de los trabajadores a casi la mitad del salario correspondiente en los E.E.U.U. Aún para 1973 el salario por hora de los trabajadores puertorriqueños en la industria de efectos eléctricos era de \$2.25, comparado al de \$3.79 del trabajador en los Estados Unidos. La diferencia es de \$1.54 por hora.

Definitivamente, el aumento continuo en el costo de la vida a quienes menos amenaza es a las grandes corporaciones.

3. Un proyecto que restringe los derechos de los empleados públicos, el sector más estable de la fuerza laboral puertorriqueña.—IP

Los beneficios que obtendrán los patrones públicos se verán reflejados en sus salarios y gastos de representación, claro está, y otros beneficios marginales por su "sacrificada labor" de continuar pisoteando al pueblo trabajador. No habrá congelación de salarios para legisladores, ejecutivos de agencias y directores de corporaciones públicas. Han incorporado el principio de "Mérito" (que implica que podrán ascender, trasladar o suspender un trabajador cuando les parezca conveniente). El aumento en el costo de la vida no presenta ningún problema para la subsistencia de "nuestros sacrificados" gobernantes. Lo han asegurado a costa del pueblo asalariado.

¿Alguna Desventaja de esta Santa Alianza de la Libre Empresa para los Patrones?

Las desventajas de esta posible alianza son todas para el trabajador. Se le impondrá la congelación de salarios para así echarle sobre sus hombros la carga del déficit presupuestario. Tobin ha propuesto por otro lado la implementación de nuevos impuestos. Esto provocaría un aumento en el nivel de pobreza en que se encuentran las grandes masas obreras, producto del aumento galopante del costo de la vida en el país.

Las viviendas exentas cuyo costo sea menor y en exceso de 15 mil dólares, sufrirán un aumento en contribución sobre la renta.

Los trabajadores sindicalizados corren el peligro de la posible eliminación del taller cerrado y el taller sindicalizado en las corporaciones públicas, lo cual pondría en peligro de muerte los sindicatos allí existentes. Este nuevo atentado contra la clase obrera está propuesto en el llamado Proyecto de Sindicalización Helfeld.

¡Exijamos un Salario Decente y Trabajo para Todos!

Para hacer real esta consigna necesitamos un programa de acción. Esta es nuestra sugerencia:

Exigir en los convenios colectivos a negociar una cláusula, que partiendo del salario mínimo negociado, establezca un mecanismo donde se aumente automáticamente el salario de acuerdo al índice de aumento en el costo de la vida.

Debemos presionar para que todo trabajador en Puerto Rico no gane menos de \$3.00 por hora, ya que éste es el salario de subsistencia.

Cada sindicato luchará con todas sus fuerzas para negociar un convenio, que asegure un aumento ajustado al aumento en el costo de la vida, partiendo de los sueldos devengados actualmente en cada caso particular.

El índice de aumento en el costo de la vida estaría medido por una Junta de

1. El precio de una suscripción por seis meses a *La Verdad* es: Puerto Rico: \$1.80 (EEUU); EEUU, Canadá, México, Caribe y Centroamérica: \$3.00; Europa y Sudamérica: \$4.00.

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2. Un programa de austeridad proyectado para Puerto Rico.—IP

Indice de Precios, compuesta de economistas y de otros investigadores, al servicio de los trabajadores. Para esto, llamamos a una reunión de sindicatos y de uniones independientes, que harían las gestiones necesarias para crear esta Junta de Índice de Precios. Esta Junta se hace necesaria, porque hace tiempo sabemos que el DACO [Departamento de Asuntos del Consumidor] no tiene ninguna fuerza real de control de precios, pues es un instrumento del propio gobierno.

Es necesario además, que los sindicatos llamen a movilizaciones de la clase obrera, organizada y no organizada y de los desempleados, para oponernos a los intentos de aprobar más legislación antiobrera, como el Proyecto de Sindicalización Helfeld, el cual es un intento del estado de controlar las Uniones. ¡Luchemos por los logros que hemos alcanzado hasta ahora! Además, opongamos un proyecto de sindicalización obrera sin trabas para todos los empleados públicos y el resto de los trabajadores.

Necesitamos movilizarnos para exigir que los bancos, financieras, petroquímicas y otras corporaciones multimillonarias paguen lo justo por sus ganancias ¡Que los patronos paguen el déficit presupuestario!

Que uniones y sindicatos llamen a asambleas donde, entre todos los trabajadores, se decidan acciones para luchar contra el alto costo de la vida y contra las leyes antiobreras aprobadas y las que el gobierno quiere aprobar que surjan de ahí comisiones permanentes que se encarguen de informar a toda la matrícula a diario. Que el sindicato o unión tire un boletín con ese mismo propósito.

¡Aumento de salario de acuerdo al aumento en el costo de la vida! □

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Debemos Exigir Empleo para Todos en Puerto Rico

[El siguiente artículo apareció en el número de enero-febrero de *La Verdad*, un periódico marxista revolucionario publicado en Río Piedras, Puerto Rico.]

Durante el año fiscal 1974-1975, los trabajadores puertorriqueños perdieron 37,000 empleos, según informó la Junta de Planificación al finalizar el año. El Departamento del Trabajo presenta que sólo un 18.8% de trabajadores en la isla están desempleados, el equivalente a 166,000 trabajadores. Dicho porcentaje no incluye los empleos a tiempo parcial, los cuales sumaron 157,000 de octubre de 1974 a octubre de 1975. Tampoco incluye a aquellos desempleados que según el gobierno han dejado de buscar trabajo.

Si sumamos al 18.8% oficial estas últimas cifras encontraremos que actualmente entre el grupo trabajador existe más de un 35% de desempleados.

Para comienzos de este año, el gobierno venía preparándose para este panorama, legislando medidas de control y austeridad para la empleomanía gubernamental y demás sectores trabajadores. Algunas de estas medidas son la nueva Ley de Personal, la Ley de Reducción de Jornada,¹ y por otro lado los aumentos en los precios del agua, luz y teléfono.

Estas medidas pretenden echar sobre las espaldas de los trabajadores la crisis del sistema, sin tocar a la clase patronal. Significa que los administradores deciden si retienen al trabajador o lo ponen en la calle. Esta es una de las disposiciones de la Ley de Personal.

Para no permitir la implementación de la Ley Federal de Salario Mínimo, que aumentaría el mínimo actual a \$2.20, a los empleados que decidan retener les reduce la jornada para congelarse el sueldo. Con la aplicación del Salario Mínimo Federal el salario de los empleados gubernamentales habría aumentado \$27.00 según la Directora de Personal Milagros Guzmán, para diciembre 3 del año pasado.

El gobierno se niega a conceder cualquier aumento, inclusive a 5,000 de sus trabajadores que reciben la mísera paga de menos de \$350.00 mensuales.

Echando la carga de la crisis sobre la espalda de los trabajadores, el Departamento de la Vivienda despidió a 108 trabajadores en lo que va del año. Por otra parte, el Departamento de Salud ha despedido sobre 700 empleados entre obreros, enfermeras y médicos, agudizando la crisis en los servicios médicos.

Esto ha provocado la amenaza de huelga

reciente de estos trabajadores, para defender su empleo y la eficiencia de los servicios.

Igual sucede en el Departamento de Instrucción, donde se han dejado cientos de maestros cesantes y se han reducido los recursos educativos—libros, material audio-visual, papel y otros.

También los trabajadores de la Autoridad de las Fuentes Fluviales se están preparando para combatir los despidos de obreros clasificados como temporeros. En el sector de la industria privada, la construcción pondrá en la calle a 20,000 obreros que representan la mitad del total que actualmente trabaja en dicha industria.

En todas las agencias del gobierno la situación es tensa. El año pasado los trabajadores perdieron 37,000 empleos por causa de la "austeridad" del gobierno y las supuestas 280 quiebras en las industrias.

Mientras que día a día vemos amenazados nuestros empleos, para los patronos esto significa la oportunidad de mantener más bajos los costos en la mano de obra. Los desempleados le sirven como ejército de reserva para ocupar las vacantes de los que tienen el rendimiento exigido por la aceleración de la producción (speed up).

Para los trabajadores, el desempleo significa la negativa de nuestro derecho a disfrutar de una vida decente, de enfrentar trabajador contra trabajador para disputarse un puesto y disminuir nuestro nivel de vida. Es por lo tanto necesario uniros y exigir nuestros sindicatos, protestas, piquetes, huelgas y todo lo necesario para no permitir que esta situación continúe. No podemos creer que los cupones nos van a sacar del atolladero.²

Solamente estableciendo compromisos mutuos de solidaridad entre los que trabajan y los que no disponen de él, se puede detener la amenaza del desempleo sobre nuestra clase. El trabajo existente debe ser repartido entre todos los trabajadores capacitados para trabajar. De esta forma se establecerá la duración de la semana de trabajo. El salario debe ser igual al que se recibe actualmente por la jornada de trabajo.

Dicha medida conocida como escala móvil de horas de trabajo, puede implementarse como cláusula de negociación en el convenio colectivo. Su posibilidad dependerá de la movilización que contrapongan los sindicatos y demás sectores de lucha de las clase obrera. No permitamos más despidos exigiendo trabajo para todos. □

1. Leyes que frenan el derecho de los empleados del sector público a la sindicalización y que imponen un congelamiento de salarios y empleos a este mismo sector.—IP

2. Más del 70 por ciento del pueblo puertorriqueño depende de los subsidios norteamericanos para los alimentos, que toman la forma de cupones de alimentos.—IP

Juan Carlos Encuentra Huelgas y Protestas en Barcelona

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Juan Carlos Met by Strikes and Protests in Barcelona" que apareció en el número del 1 de marzo de *Intercontinental Press*. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

El Rey Juan Carlos I llegó a Barcelona el 16 de febrero para comenzar una gira oficial de Cataluña. Su llegada coincidió con una huelga de 7,000 trabajadores municipales y repetidas protestas en contra de su régimen.

El viaje del monarca se realizó tras grandes manifestaciones en Barcelona el 1 y 8 de febrero en las cuales se exigían la amnistía para los presos políticos, los derechos democráticos y la autonomía para Cataluña.

Los trotskistas de la Liga Comunista, una organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional, calcularon que unas 60,000 personas participaron en la manifestación del 1 de febrero. En el número del 4 de febrero de su periódico, *Combate*, describen "la actitud totalmente solidaria de la población, que aplaudía desde los balcones, o que interponía sus coches para impedir el avance de la policía."

Aunque las protestas del 1 y 8 de febrero no se repitieron durante la visita del Rey, desde el punto de vista de Juan Carlos eso fue lo único bueno que sucedió. Según un despacho publicado por el *New York Times* el 16 de febrero, que describe la llegada del Rey, "Parecía haber más gente el día de hoy expresando su descontento que la que manifestaba su solidaridad con el Rey."

"Al mismo tiempo que el Alcalde Joaquín Viola recibía al Rey y a la Reina en la vieja sala del trono de los reyes catalanes, a unos 150 metros en la plaza principal, se encontraban manifestando policías municipales, bomberos, profesores, enfermeras y cientos de empleados públicos frente al Palacio Municipal en protesta contra su negativa a negociar con ellos."

El día siguiente, con la esperanza de evadir las protestas en Barcelona, los monarcas visitaron el monasterio benedictino de Monserrat. Sin embargo, el abad del monasterio presentó un sermón en el que hizo un llamado a la amnistía y "al pleno reconocimiento de los derechos de nuestro pueblo."

Aparentemente, Juan Carlos tuvo suficiente "democratización" por una semana. Esa noche los policías antimotines se lanzaron contra el Palacio Municipal de Barcelona, dispersando a los empleados con gases lacrimógenos. Siguiendo este curso, el día 18 de febrero el Rey firmó una orden de conscripción de los bomberos y policías municipales al ejército español.

"La segunda ciudad de España y la

capital de una de sus regiones más disidentes parecía estar sitiada cuando la policía federal, lista para el combate, recorrió las calles para eliminar cualquier brote de agitación por parte de diversos grupos, tales como los empleados municipales, los trabajadores de la construcción, profesores y estudiantes," informa Henry Giniger en el *New York Times* el 19 de febrero.

Según Giniger, "... miles de trabajadores de la construcción en huelga ... intentaron concentrarse en frente de las oficinas de la Organización Sindical controlada por el gobierno para exigir aumentos salariales y para protestar contra el alto nivel de desempleo."

Los intentos oficiales de organizar manifestaciones de masas para demostrar su "adherencia y cariño" al Rey fracasaron rotundamente. Sin embargo, el día 20 de

febrero se reunió el gabinete para reaudar sus intentos de conseguir apoyo para la monarquía española. Nombró una comisión para estudiar el establecimiento de un gobierno especial que cubriera las cuatro provincias catalanas de Barcelona, Lérida, Tarragona y Gerona.

Es muy improbable que estas medidas tan débiles satisfagan al pueblo catalán. Los verdaderos planes del gobierno son ampliamente conocidos, debido a que han sido bosquejados públicamente por el Primer Ministro Carlos Arias Navarro el 28 de enero. Según *Combate*, "Respecto de las nacionalidades, su afirmación sobre 'la necesidad de un estado unitario y fuerte' reafirmaba la tradicional doctrina franquista de la unidad forzada de los pueblos del estado español, de la negativa a cualquier derecho de las nacionalidades oprimidas." □

Un Fundador del Movimiento Trotskista en Chile

Llamamiento por Humberto Valenzuela Montero

[La siguiente declaración fue emitida el 20 de febrero por el U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA: Comité Norteamericano de Justicia para los Presos Políticos Latinoamericanos). La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

Miles de chilenos han huido a Argentina para escapar de los verdugos y los campos de concentración del régimen de Pinochet. Un caso típico es el de Humberto Valenzuela Montero, uno de los fundadores del movimiento trotskista en Chile. Entró en Argentina en febrero de 1974, cuando huía de la persecución de la junta.

Humberto Valenzuela Montero no ha podido trabajar. Su condición se agrava aún más con el impresionante nivel de inflación en Argentina. Necesita apoyo económico para poder sobrevivir.

Nacido en Santiago en 1910, Valenzuela ha sido sindicalista desde la edad de catorce años, cuando asumió su primer puesto en un sindicato. Después de haber sido organizador y dirigente de varios sindicatos durante los años treinta, fue electo en 1945 al consejo administrativo local de los Obreros Municipales de Santiago.

En 1953 Valenzuela fue delegado al congreso de fundación de la Central Unica de Trabajadores, la principal federación sindical en Chile, y de 1955 a 1956, fue director de la CUT en la provincia de Santiago. De 1954 a 1957 Valenzuela fue el dirigente nacional de los Obreros Municipales.

Además de haber sido sindicalista, Valenzuela es un dirigente revolucionario veterano. Se afilió al Partido Comunista en 1926, y en 1931 se alineó con la Oposición de Izquierda. El año siguiente fue uno de los fundadores de la Izquierda Comunista, el primer grupo trotskista en Chile y uno de los primeros en toda América Latina.

Con la fundación de la Cuarta Internacional en 1938, el Partido Obrero Revolucionario, que Valenzuela había ayudado a formar, se convirtió en la sección chilena del movimiento trotskista mundial. Valenzuela era miembro del Comité Central del POR de 1941 a 1965, y secretario general del partido desde 1955 hasta 1965. Se lanzó como el candidato presidencial por parte del POR en 1941.

Desde 1965 hasta 1969 Valenzuela trabajó en el Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), el cual ayudó a fundar. Era miembro de su Secretariado Nacional y Comité Central hasta 1965. En 1969, cuando se escindió el MIR, Valenzuela ayudó a organizar el Partido Socialista Revolucionario, la actual sección chilena de la Cuarta Internacional.

Humberto Valenzuela, quien se encuentra exiliado y sin ninguna posibilidad de conseguir empleo, necesita ayuda económica urgentemente. Cualquier contribución será muy agradecida. Se pueden enviar contribuciones al USLA Justice Committee (Humberto Valenzuela Fund), 853 Broadway, Room 414, New York, N.Y. 10003. □