

Intercontinental Press

Africa

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75¢



The Bulletin/Brussels

Part of audience at March 4-8 International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women, held in Brussels. Personal testimony and reports

from more than thirty countries condemned discrimination faced by women around the world. For account of proceedings, see p. 494.

1,000 Women Attend International Tribunal

Other Articles:

A Conversation With Leonid Plyushch

Setting Record Straight on Hugo Blanco

Spain: The Lessons of Vitoria

Deepening Social Crisis in Colombia

SWP Candidate Target of Sniper

The 'Loans Scandal' in Australia

Nine Lies on Risks of Nuclear Power

George Novack: Freedom for Philosophy

Solidarity With Palestinians!

Solidarity With the Palestinians!

The brutal repressive measures taken by the Israeli regime in recent weeks against an upsurge in the resistance of the Palestinians in the occupied West Bank have led to international protests.

In New York, the Organization of Arab Students and others are planning to picket the Israeli mission to the United Nations. The action will coincide with a general strike of all Arabs in Israel that has been called for March 30 by an emergency meeting of Palestinian leaders.

The Palestine Liberation Organization is supporting the action.

Hassan Rahman, the deputy representative of the PLO at the United Nations, said in an interview:

"We call on all progressive forces to participate and express their solidarity with the Palestinian people in their struggle against the occupation and against the racist, Zionist establishment."

Peter Camejo and Willie Mae Reid, the candidates of the Socialist Workers party for president and vice-president of the United States, issued a statement March 22 backing the initiative taken by the Organization of Arab Students and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

They called for solidarity actions in the United States on March 30. These actions are particularly important in the country that is the chief imperialist backer of the Israeli regime.

In all likelihood similar actions in other countries are being organized wherever the facts have become known.

The text of the statement by Peter Camejo and Willie Mae Reid is as follows:

* * *

An emergency meeting of Palestinian

Next Week . . .

Stalinist theoretician Hyman Lumer says that "in the socialist Soviet Union the Jewish question has been fully solved."

Avowed opponents of socialism point to the plight of the Jews in the USSR as "proof" that social revolution can only lead to new tyranny.

Zionists try to use the oppression of Soviet Jews to cover up Israel's oppression of the Palestinians.

Read what Marxists have to say in "The Struggle of Soviet Jews Against Stalinist Oppression" by David Frankel. In next week's IP.

leaders has called for a general strike of all Arabs in Israel. The strike is to protest the reign of terror mounted by Israeli troops against the Palestinians living in the occupied area of the West Bank. The date for the strike has been set for March 30.

It is important to organize actions in solidarity with the Palestinians on as wide a basis as possible. These should include picket lines, protest rallies, and teach-ins. For maximum effect the solidarity actions should be held wherever possible on the same day as the projected general strike, that is, March 30.

The background of the situation is as follows:

In recent weeks, the nearly 700,000 West Bank Palestinians have carried out the biggest and most sustained mass struggle against Zionist oppression since the formation of the Israeli state.

The American public has been able to see the reaction of the Israeli government on television—Israeli soldiers beating children aged nine, eleven, and fourteen; Israeli troops firing into the air to terrorize the population; an eleven-year-old boy in critical condition with a bullet in his head. Thanks to the bravery of the Palestinians of the occupied West Bank, the world has been able to see the real nature of the Israeli regime.

The mobilizations against the Israeli occupation began at the end of January; they were answered with heavy fines, beatings, curfews, increased censorship, and travel restrictions. But the protesters refused to be intimidated. Increasingly heavy-handed repression succeeded only in pushing more Palestinians into the struggle.

The pro-Israeli capitalist press has done its best internationally to suppress details and to downplay the significance of the resistance. But even its reports have mentioned demonstrations in every major town on the West Bank, including Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nablus, Jericho, Jenin, Bir Zeit, Hebron, Al Bira, Halhoul, Tulkarm, and Beit Sahur.

On March 7, Israeli troops stormed into the Kadri Touqan school in Nablus, dragging pupils from their desks and beating them. The students had committed the "crime" of shouting slogans against the Zionist occupation.

The response came at once. Nablus was paralyzed by protest strikes, and the entire town council resigned in protest.

An even more brutal attack March 10

on students at Bir Zeit College resulted in the immediate resignation of the mayors and city councils of Ramallah, Al Bira, and Bir Zeit.

As demonstrations continued, the Israeli occupation forces clamped twenty-four-hour curfews on Ramallah, Al Bira, Hebron, and Halhoul. According to *New York Times* correspondent Terence Smith, in Ramallah, "Soldiers fired bursts of machine-gun fire into the air to clear the streets quickly."

In Bethlehem, students barricaded themselves in the university and ran up the Palestinian flag. In the nearby village of Beit Sahur, the mayor resigned, charging that Israeli soldiers had beaten up clerks in the municipal building.

On March 17, Israeli soldiers shot and wounded three demonstrators aged eleven, fourteen, and eighteen on the outskirts of Jerusalem.

In face of the mounting repression, Palestinian leaders called an emergency meeting. Toufik Zayed, the mayor of Nazareth, said: "The government holds us by the throat. We will catch it by the throat. We will demonstrate, stage sit-downs and hunger strikes and shock the television screens of the whole world."

It was this assembly that elected a "Committee for the Defense of the Arab Land" and called for a general strike of Arabs in Israel on March 30.

A few more words should be said about the background.

Most Palestinians were expelled from Israel when it was established during the 1948-49 war. However, with the expansion of Israel, almost 1.5 million Palestinians are now ruled by the Israeli regime.

Not content with expelling hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and stealing their land, the racist Israeli settler-state has announced a plan to "Judaize" the Galilee, 58 percent of whose population is Arab.

It is the constant encroachments of the Israeli regime that have compelled the Palestinians to resist. Their resistance has been met with savage reprisals. Spear-headed by the student youth, the spirit of rebellion against oppression is mounting. The struggle resembles the ones seen in Northern Ireland, in Zimbabwe, in Czechoslovakia, and in the Black ghettos of the United States.

International solidarity actions can offer effective help to the Palestinians.

First of all, they can have a direct effect in limiting the Israeli regime's use of brutal repressive measures.

Secondly, they can help assure the Palestinians that people all over the world support their rights and are on their side in the struggle against Zionist oppression.

All out on March 30!

End the brutal repression!

Down with the Zionist occupation!

Stop the seizures of Arab land! □

Israeli Nuclear Arsenal— Time Bomb in Mideast

By David Frankel

Israel has ten to twenty nuclear bombs "ready and available for use." This estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency was made public March 15.

Numerically, the Israeli nuclear arsenal is far larger than Washington's was at the end of World War II. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that Israeli generals would be satisfied with the prototypes that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It must be assumed that Israeli scientists have incorporated many modern improvements in their bombs.

Just one week before the CIA's estimate of Israel's nuclear strength was leaked, *New York Times* military analyst Drew Middleton reported that the Israeli regime had renewed its request for Pershing missiles, first reported last fall. At that time, Marilyn Berger reported in the September 16, 1975, *Washington Post*:

"The 250 to 400 Pershing missiles the Army has in Europe as part of NATO forces are armed with nuclear warheads of 60 to 400 kilotons, more powerful than the 20-kiloton atomic bomb that destroyed Hiroshima in 1945."

With its 460-mile range, the Pershing missile would enable the Israelis to destroy Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Beirut, and other Arab cities with the push of a button.

But regardless of whether Washington supplies the Pershing missiles that Tel Aviv is asking for, the threat of nuclear devastation will continue to hang over the Middle East. On February 11, former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan pointed out, "We do not need the Pershing to install an atomic warhead, and whoever says so is misleading. An atomic bomb can be dropped from an aircraft."

The racist Israeli settler-state can only maintain its existence through endless war against the Arab masses, and it has repeatedly shown its utter contempt for Arab lives. It is only a matter of time until the Zionist rulers find their backs to the wall as a result of their military adventures.

Can anyone doubt that when this happens they will resort to their nuclear arsenal?

The continuation of the status quo in the Middle East virtually guarantees the outbreak of war and the eventual use of nuclear weapons. Nor is the Middle East alone involved. Such a war could quickly spread to an international holocaust, threatening the entire population of the world.

Nothing short of the dismantling of Israel and its replacement with a democratic, secular Palestine can defuse the nuclear time bomb in the Middle East. □

In This Issue

Closing News Date: March 22, 1976

FEATURES	496	A Conversation With Leonid Plyushch —by Gerry Foley
	506	Freedom for Philosophy—by George Novack
U.S.A.	485	SWP Candidate Target of Sniper
INDIA	487	Dramatic Increase in Poverty
ARGENTINA	488	Strikes Protest Perón's Austerity Plan —by Judy White
	495	New York Picket Scores Perón's Links to AAA
ZIMBABWE	489	Smith Calls for "Thousand Years" of White Rule—by Ernest Harsch
COLOMBIA	490	Elections Scheduled Under State of Siege —by Ben Atwood
SOUTH KOREA	492	Eleven Dissidents Jailed
	500	"Political Prisoners in Asia"
EGYPT	493	Sadat Tears Up Soviet Treaty —by David Frankel
BELGIUM	494	1,000 Attend International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women—by Joanna Rossi
SOUTH AFRICA	501	The Gendarme of Southern Africa —by Ernest Harsch
THAILAND	505	Rightist Terror Attacks Mount
AUSTRALIA	511	The "Loans Scandal"—by Jim Percy
JAPAN	528	Dial-a-Denial
NEWS ANALYSIS	482	Solidarity With the Palestinians!
	483	Israeli Nuclear Arsenal—Time Bomb in Mideast—by David Frankel
DOCUMENTS	484	Setting the Record Straight on Hugo Blanco
	486	For Unity in the Workers Movement to End Francoist Rule!
CAPITALISM FOULS THINGS UP AROUND THE WORLD	512	Nine Lies on Nuclear Risks
DRAWINGS	486	Juan Carlos I; 487, Indira Gandhi; 488, María Estela Martínez de Perón; 489, Ian Smith; 493, Anwar el-Sadat—by Copain
EN ESPAÑOL: PROYECTOS DE RESOLUCION	515	Reunión del Comité Ejecutivo Internacional
	515	Tesis sobre la Revolución Portuguesa

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Setting the Record Straight on Hugo Blanco

[The following statement was issued to the press March 22 by the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners.¹]

* * *

On March 16, in a nationally syndicated column, William F. Buckley, Jr. attacked the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA) and one of its officers, Dr. Benjamin Spock. Buckley went so far as to call Spock "the incarnation of the dupe" for having criticized Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's denial of a visa in the case of Hugo Blanco.

Kissinger's action prevented Blanco, a Peruvian peasant leader, author, and former political prisoner, from honoring speaking commitments at more than a dozen universities, where he was to speak on the plight of political prisoners in Latin America. The speaking tour was being organized by USLA.

Editorials in leading newspapers and other protests from members of Congress, academic associations, and civil libertarians forced Kissinger to reverse his position and recommend to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that it grant Blanco a visa. The INS refused. It is these prominent supporters of the right of the American people to hear all points of view without government censorship who are a special target for Buckley's ire in his column.

Buckley based his information on an exchange of correspondence inserted in the March 1, 1976, *Congressional Record* by Representative Edward I. Koch of New York. [See *Intercontinental Press*, March 15, p. 426.] Involved in the exchange were the USLA and Spock, who wrote Koch asking him to intercede on Blanco's behalf, and Robert J. McCloskey, assistant secretary for congressional relations in the State Department. In a final letter to Spock, Koch indicated he was withdrawing his earlier support for a visa.

In his column Buckley congratulates Koch: "WFB to Koch. Nice going." Buckley quotes selectively from this exchange, excluding evidence or arguments made on behalf of Blanco. He also fails to address himself to the issue involved—of official government censorship of what the American people are allowed to hear—implicitly taking a procensorship attitude.

Why did Koch withdraw his support? He echoes the government position when he writes to Spock, "Don't you agree that if, in fact, he admitted responsibility for the murder of three policemen and advocates the use of violence that those are grounds for rejection?"

The INS refused a visa on the same grounds that the State Department had earlier, stating that "he [Blanco] was found to be ineligible for a visa under Section 212(a) (28) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because of his previous terrorist activities and his affiliation with certain communist organizations."

From the beginning, the different government agencies have consistently maintained a veil of secrecy around the case, refusing to specify what "terrorist activities" or "communist" affiliations Blanco was supposedly guilty of. In a letter to Congressman Koch dated January 29, 1976, for example, McCloskey said that "much of the information available to the Department is classified for reasons of security and therefore cannot be divulged. . . ."

Some of this information must have been "leaked" to Representative Larry McDonald of Georgia, for, in the *Congressional Record* of December 19, 1975, he unleashed a bitter attack on the *Washington Post* and *Boston Globe* for their editorials protesting Blanco's exclusion as undemocratic.

In the article, McDonald describes Blanco's revolutionary-socialist views and his affiliation to the Fourth International, something Blanco himself has made clear in numerous interviews in the international press. However, he then goes on to quote what he calls "secret" documents that he claims prove Blanco is a terrorist in theory and practice. He offers only one instance of "proof," asserting, "In that same year [1962], Blanco led a raid on a police post in Peru to secure weapons. During the raid Blanco shot a police officer to death. He was captured in May 1963, and was eventually sentenced to 20 years imprisonment."

This example was to be used by McCloskey in the January 29 letter to Koch, attributing McDonald as his (McCloskey's) source, although in his account Blanco is alleged to have killed three, not one, policemen! He charges that Blanco made a "declaration that he took full and sole responsibility for the murders of three policemen which occurred during a raid he and his followers made on a police station in Peru during 1962."

In their haste to accept the State

Department and Immigration Service versions of Blanco's history, based on "secret" records, Messrs. Buckley, McDonald, and Koch would have done well to consult the public record. By not doing so they accept a one-sided version of what actually happened, replete with serious errors of fact and errors of omission.

Setting the Record Straight

In a letter to its national sections dated December 1966, Amnesty International announced that "we have sent on behalf of Hugo Blanco an appeal for clemency to President Belaunde Terry of Peru." The letter then went on to give some background to the case, which is worth quoting at length:

Hugo Blanco, now 32 years old, was a student of Agronomy at Lima University when in 1961 he left his studies to organize the Indian peasants of the Alti-plano, the most backward region of Peru. His efforts succeeded in mobilizing the peasantry of the Cuzco region to demand the abolition of enforced labour for the landlord, the redistribution of land and the establishment of wages instead of payment in kind. He also started schools and opened dispensaries.

Peasants marched into abandoned lands and took possession of them without violence invoking an old law by which squatters get right to land after a certain period of time. The *Latifundistas* (large landowners) used their influence and in 1962 the Peruvian Government sent military forces to stop this take-over.

There are conflicting versions of what then happened. According to the prosecution at his trial his band killed three guards during an attack on a police-station. According to Marcel Niedergang in "Le Monde" he was ambushed and only fired in self-defence, subsequently resuming meetings of peasants. It is almost certainly untrue that he was associated with the violent M.I.R. (Revolutionary Movement of the Left), which was only organized after his arrest and from which he publicly dissociated himself.

On December 7, 1966, *Le Monde* took up the question of violence and the Blanco-led land-reform movement:

"No violence occurred at the beginning of this movement, which caught the landowners and the government by surprise. But incidents inevitably flared up and multiplied between the hated 'gamonales' (foremen) and the landless peasants. An order was issued to arrest Hugo Blanco. On November 14, 1962, two policemen fired at the union leader. He fired back, killing a policeman and wounding another."

Buckley et al. neglect to point out that the government lodged what it considered was a far more serious charge against Blanco. As Marcel Niedergang, writing in

1. 853 Broadway, Room 414, New York, New York 10003.

Le Monde, January 28, 1967, reported: "Hugo Blanco was sentenced on two counts: for organizing and directing peasant unions in Valle de la Convención near Cuzco between 1959 and 1962, and for killing two members of the national guard on November 13, 1962." Niedergang also reported that Blanco's lawyer had entered a plea of self-defense in the killing of the two policemen, contradicting McCloskey's assertion that Blanco "took full and sole responsibility for the murders of three policemen."

During his trial Blanco himself said:

... I explained that in all senses and at all times, we had acted only in self-defense; that not only had the origin and activity of the guerrilla band been defensive acts in the face of repression, but also that in our encounters with the police we had saved our lives by firing. This was indisputable. Nor could anyone deny that we never intended to kill anyone, as we proved by our treatment of the policeman who had fired at us in Pujura—after we had disarmed him, we set him free. Nor could our concern in helping the wounded be denied, as was shown by the fact that we forced the town doctor (after getting him out from under his bed, where he had been hiding) to treat the wounded policeman, and that we offered our own scanty medical supplies for first aid; all this was done at grave risk to our safety and lives.

As the Amnesty statement explained, under Peruvian law, land not being used was open to squatting by peasants, who could till it and claim it as their own. The landlords ignored the law and violently attacked the peasants, killing many in different encounters. The peasants demanded police protection only to have the latter side with the landlords in the attacks. In response the peasant unions formed first "Union Defense Brigades," and later militias, and finally a guerrilla band, as the repression escalated. Mass assemblies of thousands of peasants democratically voted to set these up and voted Blanco to head the defense effort. During the union organizing drive, Blanco himself was the object of two assassination attempts.

The Trial

Also not to be found in Buckley's column or the *Congressional Record* are the facts of Blanco's trial:

- Peruvian law required arraignment and charges within six months of arrest. Blanco and his followers were not even charged for more than three years.

- Blanco and other defendants were tortured.

- Blanco was held in solitary confinement for three years prior to his trial.

- The proceedings were held in Spanish, a language four-fifths of the defendants could not speak, since they were Quechua-speaking Indians.

- The trial should have been before a civil court. The law was rewritten to place them under military jurisdiction.

- The military acted as judge, jury, and prosecutor.

- Both of Blanco's lawyers were arrested and harassed in other ways. They were given one day's notice of the trial.

- No defense witnesses were allowed, including police involved in the encounters whom the defense wished to call.

- Prosecution witnesses did not appear either, a violation of law. Statements attributed to them were introduced as "evidence."

- When Blanco appealed his twenty-five-year sentence, the military asked for the death penalty.

Is this Messrs. Buckley, Koch, McDonald, and McCloskey's idea of a fair trial?

Only a worldwide defense campaign supported by Amnesty International, the International League for the Rights of Man, USLA, the Chamber of Deputies of Chile, forty-three Belgian MPs, ten British MPs, Jean-Paul Sartre, and thousands of others stopped the hand of Blanco's executioner.

Is Hugo Blanco, as our government would have us believe, a common criminal? The facts speak for themselves. His "crime" was a political one, the crime of organizing landless peasants in a long overdue land-reform movement that defended itself against repression of the dictatorship of Belaunde Terry.

Later Peruvian governments recognized him as a political prisoner and released him in an amnesty for political prisoners in 1970. The regime of Juan Velasco Alvarado went so far as to offer him a governmental post, a position hardly suited for a "cop-killer."

The ridiculous claim that Blanco is a "terrorist" is merely a diversion. It is a brazen pretext used by Washington to justify its undemocratic exclusion of a former political prisoner whom organizations representing tens of thousands of Americans have demanded the right to hear.


The real issue that Messrs. Buckley, Koch, McDonald, and the government duck is whether the U.S. government should be allowed to censor the views the American people may hear or whether the Bill of Rights will be respected 200 years after the American revolution for independence.

Those agreeing that the American people have a right to hear all points of view, including Hugo Blanco's, without government censorship, are urged to write Messrs. Buckley,² Koch, McDonald,³ and the attorney general, Edward Levi⁴ (who now has jurisdiction of the case). □

2. c/o New York Post, 210 South Street, New York, New York 10002.

3. U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515.

4. Justice Department, Washington, D.C. 20530.



Lou Howort/Militant

CATARINO GARZA

SWP Candidate Target of Sniper

NEW YORK—An attempt was made on the life of Catarino Garza March 16. Garza, a member of the National Committee of the Socialist Workers party, is an SWP candidate for Congress.

At 10:20 a.m. a sniper fired through the window of Garza's tenth-floor apartment on Manhattan's Lower East Side. The .22-caliber bullet came within a foot of hitting one of Garza's campaign supporters, Vangie Eidsvik.

"The shot was meant to kill," Eidsvik said, "and it was obviously intended for Garza." Normally, Garza is the only person in the apartment in the mornings. That day he had left early to take part in a demonstration protesting cutbacks in social services.

Garza is well known in the community as a fighter for Puerto Rican independence, school busing to achieve educational equality, and restoration of cuts in city services.

So far, however, police have refused to treat the shooting as an assassination attempt, claiming that rifle fire into an apartment, even the apartment of a congressional candidate, "happens frequently down in this area."

Vigorous protests over police inaction in the case have been lodged with the city administration. Representatives of the local Democratic party organization, NAACP* chapter, public-school parent associations, and tenant groups have all demanded prompt action.

At a protest rally, scheduled for March 20, community leaders will continue to press for police action to apprehend the would-be assassin. □

* National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

For Unity in the Workers Movement to End Francoist Rule!

[On March 3 Spanish police brutally attacked striking workers in the Basque city of Vitoria. Four workers were killed and about 150 injured. The attack was answered by protests across Spain, in which two more demonstrators were killed by police.]

[In response to these events, the Political Bureau of the Liga Comunista (Communist League), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, is circulating the following statement in Spain. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Since January 9 the workers at Forjas Alavesas, Mevosa, and numerous other factories in Vitoria have conducted a vigorous, exemplary strike to press their just demands. Along with a call for wage increases, basic demands include the rehiring of their fired compañeros, the release of those imprisoned, and the establishment of direct negotiations between the bosses and the authentic representatives of the workers. Such representatives must be elected at assemblies and be subject to recall by them, standing completely outside the rotting hulk of the CNS [Central Nacional Sindicalista—National Federation of Syndicates, the Francoist trade union].

Consciously breaking with the Francoist hierarchical union structure, the workers of Vitoria forced the CNS delegates to resign at Forjas, Mevosa, and Areitio. They elected committees in factory assemblies and established coordination between them. In this way they formed a central strike committee, an “assembly of representatives” made up of the workers commissions and students, which led the struggle.

In face of the hard line taken by the bosses and the authorities, the “assembly of representatives” called on the people of Vitoria to hold a general strike March 3. The working class and the people of Vitoria responded to the call with total unity, paralyzing production and swelling the large demonstrations from the factories and neighborhoods that swept toward the center of the city. The response of [Minister of the Interior Manuel] Fraga's police was a massacre, leaving four compañeros dead and about 150 injured from gunfire.

But Vitoria was not frightened. It responded bravely, conducting a heroic general strike in open confrontation with the repressive forces. Arm in arm with the people of Alava, the whole of Euzkadi (the Basque Country) rose up and went out on a



JUAN CARLOS

general strike March 8, valiantly standing up to the police brutality. All over the country work stoppages and demonstrations of varying intensity took place, with actions in places like Tarragona standing out in particular.

In the course of these mobilizations, the repressive forces claimed new victims. Two compañeros were shot to death and many more were injured, some very seriously. Added to the list of murders were a demonstrator from Elda and a construction worker in Barcelona.

After these crimes there is no longer room for demagoguery about liberalization. The exposure of this criminal government can hardly go further. Because if the speeches and statements of the Ariases, Fragas, and Areilzas,¹ the economic measures, the militarization, and the savage repression were not sufficient—the recent murders leave no room whatsoever for doubt.

But these deaths and the forceful response of the masses have only further exacerbated the disintegration of the government, decisively accelerating the

1. Premier Carlos Arias Navarro, Foreign Minister José María de Areilza.

crisis of a dictatorship stained with blood and tainted with murder.

The new low to which bankrupt monarcho-Francoism has fallen is reflected in the fact that workers struggles have splintered the CNS, that the direct action of the workers and oppressed masses has overwhelmed the repressive apparatus, that a crisis has begun within this apparatus and in the army itself, and that explosive tensions are increasing among the different clans of the regime.

But it is not only the government that stands unmasked before the workers. The bourgeois “democratic opposition”—the Ruiz Giménez, the Tierno Galvans, and the Pujols² who are part of the Junta, the Convergencia, and the Consells³—have also shown their true colors.

In the past, when faced with an offensive by the workers and the oppressed, they called on us to “stop the pressure of strikes on the government” and “not to rock the boat.” Even after Arias's speech to the Cortes,⁴ they continued to talk to us about the “democratic intentions” of the Fragas. Time and again they repeated their calls to us for reconciliation and their applause for the police, jackals of the capitalists. Now, terrified by the advance of the workers and people's mobilization, they echo the government, the capitalists, and the bourgeois press, launching a vile campaign against working-class methods of direct action, strike pickets, and self-defense by the masses in face of the police.

The “Assemblea de Catalunya” [Assembly of Catalonia] reached a new height of cynicism and shamelessness following the murder of the worker in Tarragona, openly opposing the mobilization. It called on the workers and people of Tarragona to cancel the general strike they had projected, and urged those attending the funeral not to gather together or demonstrate after the services, returning instead to their jobs or homes. They argued that there was “no reason to provoke more disturbance”(!).

These bourgeois “oppositionists” have thus shown the true essence of the “demo-

2. Joaquín Ruiz Giménez, a prominent figure in the Convergencia Democrática (Democratic Convergence); Enrique Tierno Galván, leader of the Partido Socialista Popular (People's Socialist party); Jordi Pujol, a prominent figure in the Convergencia Democrática in Catalonia.

3. Junta Democrática (Democratic Junta), Consell de Forces Polítiques de Catalunya (Council of Political Forces of Catalonia).

4. The Francoist parliament.

cratic break" they propose. It is nothing more than a desperate attempt to maintain fundamental aspects of the Francoist dictatorship in such a way as not to endanger the property of the bankers and the monopolists.

But the fundamental problem is not what these people do or say, which in and of itself has no influence in the workers and people's movement. The main problem is that the parties of the working class, with which these people are allied, serve as mouthpieces for their positions within the workers movement, instead of exposing their maneuvers.

The PCE [Partido Comunista de España—Spanish Communist party], for example, was opposed to building a forceful mobilization against the latest crimes. Instead of encouraging work stoppages and demonstrations, it called for "a minute of silence" and for "symbolic" work stoppages. Instead of forcefully combating the reactionary crusade against the methods of direct action, the PCE has served as its most enthusiastic defender.

Thus, in a statement by its Executive Committee, the PSUC [Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya—United Socialist party of Catalonia], the Catalan branch of the PCE, used "the destruction of some telephone booths" as a shameful excuse to openly attack the resolute struggle of the Barcelona construction workers. In a treacherous, criminal manner, the PSUC denounced the picket squads as "groups of fascists and provocateurs alien to the workers movement." This was the same position the Comisión Obrera Nacional de Catalunya [National Workers Commission of Catalonia] adopted—hand in hand with the PSUC—in a public communiqué.

But despite all these difficulties, what the latest events show is that each day of life for the dictatorship is a painful and unbearable burden for the working class and the people. They show in blood that in face of the continued rule of the Juancarlist monarchy, the only way out is the overthrow of the dictatorship through a general strike. The so-called democratic break is nothing but a fraud designed to trick the workers and paralyze their struggle—an obstacle on that road.

Today, the weakness of the dictatorship and the fact that all the exploited and oppressed masses are conscious of both this weakness and their own power make a decisive advance toward a general strike more possible than ever. What is required of all workers parties and organizations is that they set aside positions like the ones we have cited and unify their forces toward this end. We must step up the current offensive of the masses, incorporating the valuable lessons of the recent mobilizations.

The most basic demands must be raised. In the first place, we protest against the crimes and in solidarity with the people of Vitoria. We call for the repeal of sanctions

and firings, and the release of the prisoners. For the dissolution of the repressive bodies. For tribunals, freely elected by the people, to bring to justice those guilty of the crimes of Francoism.

All of this can be achieved in the same way as the demands we have already won—by holding assemblies in the factories and calling joint assemblies, by electing strike committees as centers to organize and lead the struggle, by creating central strike committees like the "assembly of representatives" in Vitoria, by insisting on direct negotiations with the bosses, and by forcing the honest delegates of the Francoist trade union, who ran on the "unitary slates," to resign. These delegates in any case should not give attachment to their posts precedence over the tasks posed by the struggle, over the demands they should raise as fighters in whom the workers have placed their confidence.

These aims can be achieved by holding street demonstrations, by defending these and all actions from repression through picket squads organized by the workers commissions and strike committees, by devoting maximum effort to promoting the present powerful movement for the reconstruction of the workers commissions, and by insisting on the right to hold assemblies in the headquarters of the CNS.

It is necessary to work along the lines we have indicated to prepare for a general day of action and struggle throughout the entire state, encouraging general actions by industry and sector, centralizing them at the local level, and extending them to encompass each nationality. The holding of such a general day of action will leave the government tottering. It will be basic to the winning of our demands, signaling a giant step forward toward a general strike that will finish once and for all with the hated dictatorship.

The plan we put forward is opposed from top to bottom to that of the bourgeois elements and capitalists in the Junta Democrática, Convergencia Democrática, and the Consell. They are terrified by the advance of the workers and are waging a desperate battle to contain and paralyze it.

In the name of the demands being put forward by the workers movement, the PCE, the PSOE [Partido Socialista Obrero Español—Spanish Socialist Workers party, the Social Democrats], the workers commissions, and the rest of the parties and organizations of the working class must break with these bourgeois elements. That is the way to break down the divisions imposed by the class-collaborationist forces; it is the way to achieve unity in the workers movement.

March 11, 1976

India: Dramatic Increase in Poverty



GANDHI: Under her rule poverty is even worse than it was ten years ago.

The number of Indians below the official poverty line has risen from 48 percent in the early 1960s to 59 percent today, according to Ashok Mitra, a leading Indian economist. Mitra was the government's chief economic adviser from 1970 to 1972 and has worked for the United Nations and the World Bank's Development Institute.

Mitra, a critic of the Indira Gandhi regime, said that Gandhi, by maintaining a cheap and docile labor force, was trying to lure foreign corporations to invest in India.

Although the government claims that inflation has been stopped, Mitra cited price increases in coal, steel, electricity, feed grains, cement, and textiles to back his contention that it continues.

Mitra also exposed the fraud of Gandhi's agrarian program, in which she pledged to redistribute "excess" land from large landholders to poor peasants. The 700,000 acres allocated to poor farmers so far is less than 0.2 percent of India's 400 million acres under cultivation.

"The industrialists are very happy, and the big farmers," he said. "They never had it so good. The socialist pretensions of the government have been dissolved." (Quoted in the March 13 *Washington Post*.)

Widespread Strikes Protest Perón's Austerity Plan

By Judy White



ISABEL PERON: Doubled prices overnight on many basic necessities.

Less than two weeks after the announcement of another wage freeze and stiff new price increases, widespread protest forced President Isabel Martínez de Perón to back down on some of the measures. This was the second major attempt to impose an austerity program in Argentina in the last year.

Opposition to the program was spearheaded by striking industrial workers, who idled 70% of productive capacity in the nation's main cities by March 11.

Railroad workers, teachers, civil servants, movie projectionists, seamen, and workers in the telephone, wine, and textile industries had joined the strike wave by March 17.

In some cases the new austerity plan exacerbated frictions between the Peronist union bureaucracy and the rank and file. The 35,000-member San Martín section of the Unión Obrera Metalúrgica (UOM—Metalworkers Union) severely criticized UOM General Secretary Lorenzo Miguel for his support to the plan and carried out a twenty-four-hour strike against it March 12. Metalworkers in Santa Fe, Mendoza, Córdoba, and Greater Buenos Aires also went out on strike to protest the plan.

Warning of "activity by subversives who do not shrink from creating anarchy in

production," Minister of Economy Emilio Mondelli outlined the terms of the austerity plan March 5. He called for "saving" the nation through an 82.5% devaluation of the peso, a freeze on wages and prices, and a 180-day "truce" banning any activity by labor that would interfere with production.

Price increases decreed as part of the plan included: gasoline, 82%; tractor fuel, 135%; electricity rates, 100%; postage, 100%; telephone service, 70%; milk, 50%; wine, 90%; rail fares, 110 to 150%, domestic air fares, 80%; taxi fares, 106%; subway fares, 50%; and basic foodstuffs, 50 to 60%.

In return for the "sacrifice" he was asking of labor, Mondelli offered a national wage increase of 12% effective March 1 and promised to use the police to strictly enforce maximum prices.

However, in response to the strike wave, President Perón was forced to announce March 10 that the regime would boost the wage increase to 20% and open collective-bargaining sessions. She also announced the creation of the Comisión Especial de las Remuneraciones, de la Productividad y la Participación (Special Commission for Wages, Productivity, and Participation). Six days later she signed a decree granting a 24.11% increase to those receiving pensions.

Despite these concessions, enforcement of the modified Mondelli plan would strike heavy new blows against the Argentine working class.

Official statistics set inflation in the country at almost 20% a month for January and February. The new prices, combined with the soaring cost of imports under the new devaluation, mean even further reduced purchasing power for the working class in the coming months.

In addition, there are severe shortages of many staples in retail stores—eggs, soap, sugar, and cooking oil among them. Such items can be bought on the black market but at prices well above the official maximums.

Finally, the creation of the Special Commission for Wages, Productivity, and Participation would mean the repeal of certain sections of the Ley de Contrato de Trabajo (Work Contract Law), Enrique Alonso reported in the March 11 issue of *La Opinión*. The sections involved provide job security and automatic wage increases for certain categories of workers. Their repeal could lead to massive layoffs.

A short-term objective of the Mondelli plan is to curry favor with the International

Monetary Fund (IMF). With less than \$300 million in its reserves, the Argentine government is on the brink of defaulting on international debts of more than \$1 billion that fall due in May.

On March 7, the president of the Argentine central bank, Eduardo Zalduendo, was reported consulting with the IMF. And the *Washington Post* of March 14 stated that the Mondelli plan was "rumored to have been approved in advance by the International Monetary Fund."

The hope is that successful implementation of the austerity program will facilitate aid from the IMF, and as a report in the March 15 air mail edition of the Buenos Aires daily *La Nación* put it:

"As is well known, any agreement from the IMF constitutes the 'green light' for other bodies and international private banking to grant any request for credit assistance."

However, not all sectors of the Argentine business community are convinced that the Mondelli plan provides the answer to the country's economic crisis.

A twenty-four-hour shutdown for the province of Buenos Aires was scheduled for March 18 by retail shops, bakeries, and butcher shops. They were protesting the price freeze, the use of police to control prices, and official inaction against speculation and the black market.

Shopkeepers complained that the lack of products in the wholesale market made it impossible for them to obtain goods for the retail trade. Moreover, in cases in which products were available, wholesale prices were so high that the retailers said they could not afford to distribute the merchandise under the maximum-price guidelines.

Other businessmen's associations are also considering shutdowns, according to reports in the Buenos Aires daily newspapers.

While an attempt to declare President Perón "unfit to rule" failed to win the necessary votes in parliament last month, calls by growing sectors of the divided Peronist movement and other bourgeois forces for her resignation are heard more loudly than ever.

Interspersed with this demand are predictions that if she does not step down, the military will carry out a coup. Fear of a coup has become so widespread, Juan de Onis reported in the March 21 *New York Times*, that "some members of Congress have been quietly removing refrigerators and personal effects from their offices in the Congress building. . . ." □

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Smith Calls for 'Thousand Years' of White Rule

By Ernest Harsch

The negotiations between Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and Zimbabwean nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo, which had been held behind closed doors for three months, were broken off March 19.

At a news conference in Salisbury, the Rhodesian capital, Nkomo said, "In the end the talks broke down on the single and fundamental issue of majority rule now."

The more than six million Blacks of Zimbabwe, who outnumber whites by 20 to 1, have been demanding Black majority rule for more than a decade. However, the white settlers, led by the racist Smith regime, have resisted all steps in that direction. Their privileges and economic position are based on the dispossession and domination of the Black population.

According to Nkomo, Smith was willing to consider accepting majority rule only after a ten- to fifteen-year transition period. The day after the talks were ended, however, Smith reaffirmed his total rejection of Black rule, stating, "I don't believe in black majority rule ever in Rhodesia, not in a thousand years."

Smith said in Salisbury March 19 that the reason for the impasse was Nkomo's insistence on the immediate resignation of the white regime and the dissolution of the Parliament, in which Smith's Rhodesian Front holds all fifty of the white seats (sixteen other seats are reserved for Blacks).

Smith also said that Nkomo called for a change in the racist voting qualifications to allow for the election of a Black parliamentary majority. The present high property and education qualifications in effect deny the right to vote to all but a tiny proportion of the Zimbabwean population.

Following the breakdown of the talks, both Smith and Nkomo called on Britain, the former colonial power in Zimbabwe, to step in.

"It is the goal of Britain to decolonize this country," Nkomo said. "If she is not prepared to play her role, then Britain and the regime have left it to the people themselves."

Smith said, the day the breakdown in talks was announced, "I believe that the British Government should no longer avoid the responsibility which it claims and should now actively participate in resolving the constitutional issue in Rhodesia."

Replying to Smith's appeal, a Foreign Office spokesman in London stated March



SMITH

19, "There is no question of the British Government becoming involved in these talks until it is clear that Mr. Smith accepts that there must be an early transition to majority rule in Rhodesia."

The British daily *Guardian* also rejected coming to Smith's aid. "There can be no rescue operation, diplomatic or military, from this country," it said.

This public rebuff to the Smith regime came on the heels of a similar statement by Washington. Secretary of State Kissinger, speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 16, declared that Washington "will do nothing to help the white minority to exercise authority in Rhodesia."

A State Department official in the Bureau of African Affairs said that Kissinger's remarks were designed to "clarify" White House policy, "to make sure Smith doesn't misunderstand the signals."

Kissinger's clarification followed a warning to Havana and Moscow two weeks earlier not to get involved in the Zimbabwean conflict. That warning had been interpreted by some Rhodesian officials as a sign of support to the Smith regime.

The British and American imperialists have applied some diplomatic and economic pressure on Smith in an effort to compel him to reach a compromise settlement with Nkomo. Their aim is to head off a mass upsurge that may threaten imperialist interests in all of southern Africa.

While ruling out a rescue of Smith, London has at the same time "stepped up its search for an informal bargain—possibly involving the Soviet Union, Cuba, Angola, and South Africa—that would reduce the prospects of a guerrilla invasion of Rhodesia that could, conceivably, lead to wider racial warfare throughout southern Africa," according to correspondent Robert B. Semple in the March 21 *New York Times*.

Guerrilla action in eastern Zimbabwe, along the border with Mozambique, has already risen sharply since the beginning of February. And with the breakdown of the talks, the prospects for an expanded armed conflict are even greater.

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, a leading proponent of a negotiated settlement in Zimbabwe, said March 19 that Africans had no choice but to intensify the armed struggle. He characterized the halt to negotiations as "the gravest hour in the history of our subcontinent."

The faction of the African National Council (ANC) opposed to Nkomo, which is led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, and James Chikere-ma, hailed the breakdown of the talks in a March 20 statement. That wing of the ANC has frequently denounced Nkomo's participation in the talks and has called for the overthrow of the Smith regime through guerrilla warfare.

Issued on behalf of Muzorewa in Nairobi, Kenya, the statement declared that Nkomo was now "irrelevant," although it invited him to "come back to the fold." The statement also called on all Zimbabweans to join the Muzorewa wing of the ANC. □

Washington's Legacy in Vietnam

"MANILA, March 20 (AP)—After 30 years of war, South Vietnam is a land of widespread malaria, bubonic plague, leprosy, tuberculosis, venereal disease and 300,000 prostitutes, according to the World Health Organization.

"When the war ended last year, four of every five soldiers had venereal disease, the incidence of tuberculosis was one of the highest in the world, malaria was on the increase and about 500,000 people were drug addicts, according to a report by the organization.

"It said South Vietnam might be one of the few places on earth where leprosy was spreading and bubonic plague was still taking lives."

Colombian Elections Scheduled Under State of Siege

By Ben Atwood

BOGOTA—Colombia is officially described by its constitution and by its government as a democratic republic. In keeping with this, it is now time for another round of elections, which are scheduled for April 18.

These are not presidential and parliamentary elections, but elections that fall halfway between these major events and that are known as the "Elections of Mitaca." To be elected are members of city councils and departmental assemblies. (Colombia is divided politically into twenty-two *departamentos*, and for island and jungle or barely populated territories, three *intendencias* and five *comisarias*.)

The elected officials can have little formal effect on government policy at any level, since the councils and assemblies are only consultative and debating bodies. *Departamento*, *intendencia*, and *comisaría* governors are appointed directly by the president and have broad powers, as do the mayors, who are also appointed, not elected, officials.

These midterm elections would not normally draw much interest except as a testing ground for different factions of the two major parties, which have either jointly or alternately ruled for decades. But this year it is different.

The traditional capitalist parties are more divided than usual, and although the Stalinized Communist party is still trying to align itself with a significant sector of the ruling class in a "Popular Unity" ploy, new formations are entering the fray. These include groups moving in a revolutionary-socialist direction, which had, as late as two years ago, supported abstention from capitalist electoral farces as the only possible "revolutionary" attitude.

In addition, the elections will take place under "abnormal" conditions—an existing state of siege—and in a period of general economic and social crisis that is reflected in a new upsurge of radicalization and struggle by workers, poor peasants, and students.

The current president, Alfonso López Michelsen, was elected as a Liberal party candidate in April 1974 by a landslide victory. This was the first election following the end of a "National Front" agreement in 1958, duly submitted to national plebiscite and made part of the constitution. The law provided for the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties to cease squabbling and form bipartisan senates and parliaments for the next sixteen years

while alternately providing presidents at four-year intervals.

The last president, Misael Pastrana Borrero, a Conservative, headed a brutally repressive government during some affluent years for the Colombian ruling class. But at society's opposite pole, the working class and poor peasantry suffered a drop in real income estimated at 33 percent during Pastrana's regime.

Antilabor decrees, government-oriented traditional bureaucracies in the unions and persecution of independent unions, ever-present inflation, and full use of the almost ever-present state of siege had for four years successfully shifted a larger share of the social product from the mass of the producers to the capitalist employers and investors, among whom American imperialists play a decisive role.

But by 1974 things had begun to change. Ruling-class prosperity was again threatened. Colombian capitalism was discovering its place in the international crisis of capitalism; imperialism's share of the profits became increasingly burdensome. At the same time markets were drying up, realization of profits became more difficult, investment decreased, and unemployment increased.

Something had to be done. But the masses were becoming restless and obstreperous; it would be difficult to lower living standards even more in face of their growing resentment and resistance.

López Michelsen's 1974 campaign was based on demagogic promises to change all this for the better. He would take a strong stand against imperialist demands for superprofits, he would stand firm against Venezuela's pretensions toward oil-rich territorial waters, he would liberalize the labor laws, increase the toilers' share of the social product, ameliorate the situation of the abjectly poverty-stricken, help the small farmers, end repression in the universities, extend democracy in general, and finally, do two unheard of things: eliminate corruption in government and refrain from resorting to a state of siege following the elections.

López's landslide victory inspired him to proclaim that he had won the people's "clear mandate" (*mandato claro*) to carry out his proposed reforms, a mandate he would wield like a sword against any ill-conceived reactionary opposition. Flushed with victory, he even offered some small liberal reforms in the universities and in the labor code as evidence of his good intentions.

All this bluster kindled many hopes. Although López soon reneged on all his promises and began to "fight inflation" by freezing wages and curtailing already meager social services, the masses retained their hopes, and taking advantage of the first liberal reforms, began to look for other ways to achieve their goals.

By 1975 the beginnings of a new wave of radicalization were evident, affecting broader layers of the masses than the radicalization of the late 1960s that turned the universities into "hotbeds of sedition" and brought new blood and new support to the persecuted rural guerrilla movements in the outlying areas.

Indeed, the university students are again up in arms, and there are plenty of wildly ultraleft and sectarian writings on the university walls. Guerrilla actions, which have a longer historical tradition and which in Colombia better survived the recent downturn than in most other Latin American countries, have increased somewhat.

But of much more importance is the wave of strikes, land seizures, and mass demonstrations by entire communities against failing water supplies and other cuts in public services that threatens to engulf the country. Today, it is these mass struggles that capture the imagination of radicalized students.

Faced with the first indications of such peril to the ruling class, López Michelsen resorted to more tried and true measures for keeping the masses in their place. Thus in June 1975, scarcely a year after winning his "clear mandate," he decreed a "temporary" and "limited" state of siege against the masses who had been beguiled into putting him in office.

Of course López did not say that the state of siege and its courts-martial would be used against the workers, peasants, and students—although such a measure had never before been used against anyone else. He would use it against more ordinary crime: cattle rustling, kidnappings, hijackings, and gangs that robbed taxicab drivers.

But the state of siege has had little effect on these and other crimes that afflict the Colombian poor to a noticeably greater degree than in most other countries. Nor has the campaign against corruption in government and the related successful and lucrative smuggling industry had any notable success.

Colombia is famous as a major source of supply of marijuana and hard drugs for

U.S. consumers. But the large flow of smuggled commodities in the other direction has not received such notoriety, although it is much bulkier and probably even more profitable than the drug traffic. High protective tariffs provide the incentive for the trade, a tradition of government corruption and bribery provides the rest.

Street vendors who sell contraband American cigarettes for a third of their price in the United States are legion, as are vendors of other small contraband items. Vendors of nonsmuggled goods loudly, though falsely, proclaim their merchandise to be contraband in an attempt to convince an unwary customer.

An occasional trailer-truck load of smuggled items is seized and the hapless truckdrivers are ostentatiously held up as trophies in the war against smuggling. But these are small-fry.

The daily papers regularly report discoveries that shiploads of automobiles and other large items, including even oil-tanker loads of petroleum from Ecuador, have mysteriously passed through the country's ports without attracting the attention of customs officials.

When more influential practitioners fall into the hands of the law for some reason, liberal and humane considerations, not the state of siege and courts-martial, are the rule. This week's papers report at least four such liberal and humane decisions by civil and military judges.

One involved a "well-known Liberal party leader" on a local level who is known as "the Colonel" or "the Dove" and is reportedly a major drug dealer. He and six cohorts were arrested three weeks ago at the Bogotá airport after a bloody gunfight in which one of the suspect's bodyguards was killed and a secret-police chief wounded. Today the suspect and his remaining bodyguards are free on their own recognizance and may or may not show up for some future civil trial.

Another succeeded in getting out of military court-martial custody on a writ of "habeas corpus" and has now vanished. Still another, more famous figure, the former national chief of the security police, a retired general charged with misusing his office, is reportedly ill and unable to attend any hearings. It has already been decided that if and when he recovers, he will be tried in the milder civil court.

Meanwhile, two students in Medellín, held by the military since last December on charges of throwing a Molotov cocktail at army forces trying to repress a student demonstration, will definitely be tried by court-martial.

One of them is still recovering from several broken bones that apparently resulted from his capture. But he is not in a private sanatorium; he is recuperating in prison and will not be excused from military justice because of illness.

On February 4, 300 students were

arrested in Medellín and are also threatened with court-martial for participating in an illegal demonstration.

Two days ago a Medellín student, Elkin Eduardo Córdoba Geraldo, was shot and



Alternativa

LOPEZ MICHELSEN: I don't speak Spanish well.

KISSINGER: But I do.

killed during a confrontation with police in a demonstration. At least five others suffered serious gunshot wounds, and a reported ninety-nine persons were arrested.

The dead student's body was brusquely whisked off by the military to a cemetery for burial at the break of dawn yesterday in the hope of avoiding protest funeral demonstrations that would be diplomatically more difficult to attack if the body were actually present.

This murder has provoked widespread protest, leading to plans for protest demonstrations in most of the country's state universities. At the same time, there is no end in sight to the escalating mobilizations of students who have been "corrupted" by a burning desire to fight for social justice—a desire much more dangerous to the prevailing social system than that which drives government officials to accept bribes and participate in other more businesslike corrupt practices.

The present disruption of university life in Medellín began last year when students and professors actively took the side of university workers in demands for better wages and working conditions. The rector and the local mayor were adamant and began a campaign to wipe out "subversion" and drive out "professional agitators."

Many professors and students were kicked out of the university, leading to more demonstrations and, finally, the abrupt closing down of last year's semester. The struggle was renewed this year. Rather than being smashed by the state of siege measures and brutal repression, it has gained more and more support.

Strikes, work stoppages, and threats of strikes for wage demands in small and large factories, sugar mills, and banks also plague the government. A four-month strike in Riopaila, a sugar mill in the rich east-central plain, has been brutally assaulted by government forces but has received broad support from other unions and groups on the left.

The strike began as a wildcat stoppage without approval of the official union federation. Thus it is considered illegal, and the Labor Ministry refuses to put any legal pressure on the owners to negotiate; just the opposite in fact.

Last month a drumhead court-martial was formed in Cali to convict fifteen men and two women strikers of "arson, riot, and conspiracy to commit crime." Many more strikers have had to hide out in the face of military orders for their arrest. Yet the strike remains firm.

Bank workers have for several weeks conducted slowdowns, work stoppages, and protests that finally led to the complete shutdown of some banks. This struggle involves about 20,000 bank workers on a national scale. Some original devices were used by these workers.

In one bank they would all wear white T-shirts bearing their demands, considerably altering the usually formal bank atmosphere. Another method is for all workers suddenly to stop work at a prearranged moment, or at a given signal, and shout their demands in unison for two or three minutes at a stretch.

In some cases, usually where ultraleft former students had influence, attempts were made to occupy the banks without serious preparations and with the resulting military intervention.

The presence of large numbers of uniformed, heavily armed police guarding banks in central parts of Bogotá gives one the feeling of being in an enemy-occupied city during a war.

Other, smaller strikes have been well organized and extremely militant. More than 1,000 workers in the Vanytex textile plant in the heart of Bogotá have kept the plant closed for weeks. The workers, a vast majority of whom are women who earn 40 pesos (US\$1.20) a day, have organized street demonstrations. They have also closed down factory outlets with permanent picket lines—one of which stands guard over a mountain of merchandise piled on the sidewalk that was being removed by the owners in anticipation of a long strike when the pickets arrived.

A ceramic-tile factory, said to belong to López Michelsen himself, was finally occupied and put into production by the workers after a long strike. But financial problems and problems of merchandising their product make the experiment at workers control very difficult. A nervous truce between the workers and the Ministry of Labor is in effect at the moment.

Although the president's campaign

against inflation has successfully eaten into the masses' living standards, it has met with no more success than his other election campaign promises. The government's statistical analyst, Velásquez Cock, is popularly believed to be manipulating figures to give the impression of success. It may be that he remembers what happened to his predecessor in the previous Pastrana regime.

That economist was summarily and vociferously fired for publishing economic statistics that were accurate but not in keeping with the president's claims. The replacement remains in office to serve López. According to news reports, this functionary has decided that even his latest carefully prepared report on the rise in the cost of living should not be made public until after the April 18 elections.

The firmness of López's stand against U.S. imperialism was shaken most recently during Henry Kissinger's February visit. *Alternativa*, a left-wing weekly magazine that carries much useful information not to be found in the daily papers, gave the following ironic report of one aspect of the meeting between the two statesmen:

Our president, Alfonso López Michelsen, tried to show off his independence in the presence of Henry Kissinger, and it turned out very badly. Replying to a question by a gringo reporter on whether his government planned to recognize the Angolan MPLA, López said yes, he would take the "same line as Brazil," which has already recognized the MPLA.

But it so happens that it was Brazil, and not Colombia, that was just named a "great power" by Kissinger. So, a little later the president had to make a retraction, asserting that he had never said such an impertinent thing and had been badly translated. . . .

The more serious thing came later. . . . making a reference to the United States itself, [López] insinuated that Cuba is not the only American country that has intervened in affairs outside this hemisphere. Kissinger interrupted him with a bellowing, "WHAT, WH-A-A-A-T?"

The [U.S.] embassy's translation diplomatically reports that Kissinger, turning to his translator, limited himself to saying: "Do I understand him correctly?"

Then López, turning red, and with his tail between his legs, stutteringly said that no, it was nothing, that Colombia did not have to show off its independence from the United States, nor show submission either. He concluded by saying that the two countries are "on a very satisfactory equal footing."

He did not make clear which of the two found the footing so very satisfying. But Kissinger calmed down, and after briefly shaking his pudgy index finger in an admonishing gesture, began to smile. . . .

Faced with overwhelming problems for the ruling class and imperialism, the president has courageously decided to defend his class and defy tradition by maintaining his "temporary" state of siege throughout the election period—at least.

Recourse to the state of siege decree has proved the most popular "democratic

institution" among Colombian presidents for many years. "Temporary" states of siege have most often become permanent, being temporarily lifted for special purposes like elections to make it easier for the bourgeois candidates to perform their required functions before the public and maintain the façade of democracy.

In an address to assembled legislators this week López announced his new decree strengthening the repressive provisions of the state of siege. He did not direct his attack this time against cattle rustlers and other such enterprising types, who, after all, only emulate in their own limited way the morals and methods of more distinguished leaders of business, industry, and government and represent no real threat to the system.

This time López made it clear that he found "the institutions of democracy in danger" owing to political and social unrest and the rise in the class struggle. And he found the institutions of military dictatorship the only suitable instrument

at hand for defending the threatened democracy.

It will probably become illegal to mention illegal strikes and demonstrations in the public press, but the elections will go on. López promised that the new measures will not affect political propaganda or "responsible" and peaceful gatherings that have applied for and received proper permission from the police.

The reality is that even under the state of siege it will be difficult to stifle expressions of opposition and the socialist campaigns. The groups representing independent working-class political action and presenting this alternative are determined to continue to function and to campaign actively. And if proper advantage is taken of the new opportunities in Colombia, there is no doubt that a strong and viable revolutionary-socialist party with strong ties to the mass movement can soon be built.

March 6, 1976

Eleven Dissidents Jailed in South Korea

Agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) arrested Kim Dae Jung, one of the most prominent South Korean opposition leaders, along with his wife, on March 8. They then searched every room of his house for banned literature. A government spokesman said that Kim was under suspicion of "agitating for antigovernment subversive activities."

Two days later the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee announced that Kim and ten other imprisoned dissidents were to be charged with plotting to overthrow the regime through a "people's uprising." If convicted, the eleven face a minimum sentence of one year in prison and possibly death.

Kim was the 1971 presidential candidate of the opposition New Democratic party (NDP). Although he lost the election, he won 46 percent of the vote, indicating a broad opposition to the Park regime. (The following year Park declared martial law.) Those charged with Kim are four Protestant ministers, three Catholic priests, and three professors.

The regime also announced that nine other opposition figures, including former President Yun Po Sun, were under investigation and may also be charged.

The arrests and charges were the regime's response to the public reading of a protest statement during a mass of 500 persons at the Myondong Cathedral in Seoul March 1.

Signed by Kim, Yun, and ten other religious and civil-rights figures, the statement called for Park's resignation, the release of political prisoners, and the restoration of freedom of speech, press, and assembly. The twelve signers also

criticized the Park regime's economic policies and denounced Japanese economic domination of the country.

The reading of the protest declaration was on the anniversary of the 1919 Korean uprising against Japanese colonial rule. In the declaration, the dissidents affirmed, "We must rekindle the torch first lit in the March 1st [1919] Independence Movement and again in the April 19 [1960] Student Revolt," which overthrew dictator Syngman Rhee.

The call for Park's resignation and for the restoration of democratic rights was in defiance of Emergency Decree No. 9. This decree, enacted in May 1975 after a series of student demonstrations, outlaws virtually all criticism of the Park dictatorship.

Between twenty-five and thirty persons were arrested in the days following the Myondong mass. Some were released after hours or even days of continual KCIA interrogation. A few had to be hospitalized from exhaustion.

At the same time as the crackdown on the religious and civil-rights leaders, Park also moved to isolate university students from dissident faculty members. The March 14 *New York Times* reported that more than 400 professors were either dismissed or forced to resign under the provisions of a new "tenure" law allegedly designed to weed out "idle" and "incompetent" instructors from the country's thirty-one public and sixty-seven private universities.

Some of the ousted professors estimated that three-fourths of the dismissals were for political reasons. President Park personally reviewed the names on the list before it became official. □

Sadat Tears Up Egyptian-Soviet Treaty

By David Frankel

Citing Soviet refusal to reschedule payments on Egypt's debt and to supply spare parts for arms, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat called on March 14 for the cancellation of the treaty of friendship he signed with Moscow in 1971. "In a year to 18 months," Sadat charged, "all the weapons in Egypt will be mere scrap."

Sadat's speech, along with the formal cancellation of the treaty the following day, was the most demonstrative step he has yet taken in his two-and-a-half-year campaign to convince the American imperialists of his reliability.

The new move came less than two weeks after the Ford administration announced it was planning to lift the embargo on U.S. arms to Egypt. To begin, Congress was asked to approve the sale of six C-130 military transport planes to Cairo. "It is clearly in our interest to assist him [Sadat] in defending his policies of moderation against outside pressures," State Department spokesman Robert L. Funseth said.

Even the rabidly pro-Israel *New York Times* agreed, despite protests from the Israeli regime. "On the defensive inside the Arab world, Mr. Sadat needs every encouragement to maintain his relatively moderate policy—including some access to United States military equipment, although there are firm limits to the quality of military aid which this country can supply to Egypt and still maintain its fundamental commitment to Israel's security," the *Times* said in a March 7 editorial.

The *Times* editors further emphasized the shortness of Sadat's leash, saying, "There must be no illusions that Congressional approval for this initial transaction with Egypt would constitute a blank check for further sales of a more menacing character. Each proposed transaction will have to be subjected to close scrutiny for its effects on the military balance among the Middle Eastern belligerents."

Sadat doubtless believes that his dissolution of the formal link between Egypt and the USSR will help him get major quantities of Pentagon weapons. He has indicated that he will be satisfied with 40 percent of what Washington supplies to Israel. His move was also calculated to encourage an influx of Wall Street dollars to bail out Egypt's ailing economy.

The cancellation of the Egyptian-Soviet pact came only one week after U.S. Treasury Secretary William Simon visited Cairo. Simon, who predicted more "short-term grief" for the Egyptian economy, told



SADAT: Willing to settle for 40% of what Pentagon gives Israel.

Sadat that if he wanted U.S. investment it would be necessary to send "a clear signal to the international business community that things have really changed here."

In fact, Cairo has been sending signals to the imperialists for years. Simon himself visited Egypt in July 1974 and signed a treaty that guaranteed U.S. investors that their capital would be safe. The terms, reported in the July 17, 1974, *New York Times*, provided that "if an American company operating in Egypt fails to get satisfaction on a claim arising from a dispute with Egyptian authorities, it can transfer the claim to the United States Government, which will then negotiate it with the Egyptians."

Washington has promised Sadat \$1.85 billion in economic aid over the next two years, but so far the only substantial private U.S. investment in Egypt has been in the petroleum industry. The American imperialists, as Simon made clear during his latest visit, want further Egyptian concessions to ensure their profits.

In a March 7 dispatch from Cairo, *New York Times* correspondent Henry Tanner said, "Up until now American investors have largely stayed away from Egypt because Cairo has not spelled out firm rules on such issues as repatriation of profits and access to hard currency for production needs."

The measures necessary to coax the imperialists to invest in Egypt have resulted in even greater privations for the Egyptian masses, who have an average per capita income of \$250 a year. The removal of restrictions on speculation have resulted in huge increases in rents, shortages of consumer goods, and an inflation rate of about 30 percent.

An estimated one million of Cairo's eight million people live in the City of the Dead—the vast cemetery on the edge of the city—because of lack of housing. In an October 26, 1975, article, Tanner said that even in the villages, "one-room or two-room mud houses are crowded together, almost always along an irrigation canal and hemmed in by fields. An average village may have as many as 50,000 inhabitants.

"There is always a dusty open square with a mosque, a school and a clinic built during the rule of Mr. Nasser."

Now, however, many of the gains won by the masses during Nasser's regime are threatened. For example, Tanner says:

Under law, since Mr. Nasser's time, every Egyptian child has the right to a free education, including university. And every university graduate has the right under the law, to a job. But with the universities feeding hundreds of thousands of young men and women into the ever-growing bureaucracy, the People's Assembly is due to discuss a possible repeal of the law that gives every graduate the right to a job.

One Egyptian legislator has claimed that the country now has 500 millionaires, while an article in the December 10 issue of *Le Monde* estimated the number at 5,000. In any case, as Tanner explained in an October 27, 1975, article, Sadat's "economic liberalization has brought little or no benefits for the mass of the people and has enriched a small urban upper crust. Many foreign diplomats feel there will be large-scale unrest if he does not dramatically improve the lot of the poor and rein in the new rich."

Demonstrations of workers and students protesting inflation and Sadat's economic policies were broken up by Egyptian police in December 1974 and January 1975, and the economic situation has not improved since then. Cairo's overall foreign debt is about \$10 billion, and its balance-of-payments deficit in 1975 was \$3 billion.

So far Sadat has been able to stay afloat, thanks largely to gifts from the Saudi Arabian regime and the smaller Arab oil-exporting states on the Arab-Persian Gulf. But David Holden, summing up the situation in the February 29 London *Sunday Times*, pointed out, "In the past few weeks a combination of statements and leaks has revealed what was previously only hinted: that Egypt is now almost paralysed in military matters, is economically in desperate straits, and is having to battle hard to suppress or divert the threat of social unrest." □

1,000 Attend International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women

By Joanna Rossi

BRUSSELS—Did International Women's Year mark a step forward for the women of the world? The answer is an angry "no," according to some 1,000 women who assembled in the Palais des Congrès here March 4-8, in the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women.

Personal testimony and reports from more than thirty countries brought forward a powerful indictment of the oppression and discrimination women face in all spheres of life, all around the world.

The tribunal opened with the reading of a statement from Simone de Beauvoir, who greeted the assembly as a "historic event . . . in itself an act and the precursor of many others." She called on women to mobilize to struggle against the "scandal of their condition." For the women who attended the conference, there was certainly no doubt that women's lot is indeed scandalous.

Testimony and reports on the first morning centered on medical crimes against women, in areas such as abortion, contraception, forced sterilization, and mistreatment by the medical profession. A common theme of many of these presentations was the fact that the hierarchy of the Catholic church and reactionary groups and parties in many countries are organizing a massive, lavishly funded campaign to deny women the right to abortion and other forms of control over their bodies.

A woman from the Portuguese Women's Liberation Movement estimated that "there are over 180,000 abortions performed in Portugal each year. That, in spite of the law declaring abortion to be illegal and punishable with prison terms from two to eight years. The law dates from 1886."

Protest against lack of control over all aspects of women's lives underlay much of the testimony. The first afternoon session of the tribunal focused on family-related crimes against women—problems of divorce, child custody, unmarried mothers, and overall restrictive family laws.

Joanne Yaron of the Israel Feminist Movement spoke about the concept of a woman being "forever tied to a man." What this means, she explained, is the following:

. . . if a woman is married to a man, whether or not they are living together, she is still his property and she may not form a liaison with any other man. If she does, she is in danger of losing all her rights to her part of the property and even custody of her children. A woman's

Free All Women Political Prisoners in India!

[The following resolution was passed March 7 by the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women.]

The International Tribunal of Crime Against Women, meeting in Brussels on 4-8 March 1976,

Considering the plight of hundreds of women presently detained in the jails of India for their militant political and feminist activities,

Taking into account the appalling conditions of detention within these

prisons, especially the brutal and sadistic torture, to which these women political prisoners are subjected,

Vigorously condemns the repressive government of Indira Gandhi which commits such atrocities to maintain itself in power, and

Calls upon all the progressive and democratic forces to demonstrate their solidarity with their suffering sisters in India through concrete and effective actions.

For the immediate release of all women political prisoners in India! □

position is still lowered by the fact that she may be declared "rebellious" by the rabbinical courts and therefore lose her maintenance, property, and other rights. A woman may not leave the joint domicile without a rabbinical permit lest she be declared rebellious.

Discussion on the second day of the conference centered on economic discrimination, both when women are working and when unemployed. Women from several countries told of high and "hidden" unemployment of women. They hit out at discriminatory firings, pointing out that in times of economic downturn, women are first fired.

A Spanish woman working in Switzerland spoke of the difficulties of immigrant women who live and work in foreign countries, of the problems encountered with language, excessively low wages, inferior health services, and substandard housing.

Women from both Denmark and Britain spoke of laws passed with great fanfare that are supposed to give women equality, but that in fact are seldom enforced. A Norwegian woman elaborated:

In Norway, the legal system has few discriminatory laws. In spite of this, women and men have different tasks. Women are still in the home; they are still a reserve army of labor. Legal equality does not always mean our struggle is over. At first we need more than equality; we need preferential treatment to alter this relationship against women.

The third day of the conference opened with reports from women who are members of oppressed minorities in different parts of the world. An American Black woman described her treatment at the hands of the "racist, sexist" welfare

system in the United States.

An Australian Aborigine related the double oppression of Black women—as women and as Blacks—in a country that has an explicit policy against immigration of non-Europeans.

A South African Black woman spoke of the horror of living in apartheid South Africa:

In a highly tiered society, Black women are at the very bottom. And that's pretty low. Eighty percent of Black women where I come from work in domestic service. That means living in and cleaning up white people's houses. But you don't really live in. You really live in a little hut attached, outside, to the back of the big house. It's not as large as the garage where they park their cars.

Testimony from rape victims followed. Women from several countries recounted the fear, the physical and psychological brutalization, that rape forces on women.

The next morning, under a banner "Release our Sisters in Prison," women from Chile, Iran, and India told of the inhuman treatment of women in the jails and camps of their countries. This was a particularly powerful session of the tribunal.

A Chilean woman described the brutal tortures and prison conditions under the Pinochet dictatorship:

The time spent in the secret prison is the most degrading and brutal period of the physical and mental torture. Here the prisoners live under constant threat to their physical and mental integrity; threats against children are made to put pressure on the prisoners, a method that is used in the extreme against women. Sexual lasciviousness and aggression is another weapon used against the woman.

She described some of the sexual tortures and rapes of women in Pinochet's prisons.

An Indian woman reported on forms of torture and sexual abuses of women political prisoners in India:

After arrest and the usual form of police interrogation, often including beating with hands and rifle butts, suspects are detained in jail. After one month in prison, girls undergo further interrogation. They are stripped naked and made to lie on a table where they are burned with cigarettes on all soft parts of the body, accompanied by all unimaginable humiliations. If they fail to answer questions satisfactorily, an iron ruler is inserted into the rectum. As a result of repeated torture, the rectum and vagina become one.

The tribunal passed several motions condemning the treatment of women prisoners and calling for the immediate release of women political prisoners.

The tribunal then heard a report on Dr. Henry Morgentaler, the Québec doctor who has been jailed for performing abortions and advocating legal abortion in Canada. The tribunal voted to send a statement condemning the Canadian government and calling for the dropping of all charges against Morgentaler.

Testimony and reports were heard on prostitution, wife-beating, and many other topics. Lesbian women outlined the discrimination they face, the physical and verbal abuse they are constantly threatened with. A German lesbian commented, "It didn't happen so much before, when we were quiet and apart. Now that we're organizing, we are really persecuted."

On the final day, an older woman spoke of the "invisibility" of women her age. "We will no longer allow ourselves to be shunted into the corner. We will no longer let ourselves be considered as nonpersons who are just burdens."

During the five days of the conference, there were many disagreements and much criticism of what exactly the tribunal should be and how it should proceed. Some women felt that the feminist movement had gone beyond the need for personal testimony; that the crimes against women were well known, and political strategies and deeper analysis were needed instead.

This often led to heated debates and wrangles on the floor. The final day of the tribunal was devoted to criticisms and suggestions for further actions or conferences. It was decided to attempt to create an international network of communications to plan future activities. Those interested in participating in this effort may write: Tribunal, 165 Boulevard Général Jacques, 1050 Brussels, Belgium.

Despite some of the problems and differences expressed, hundreds of women left the tribunal feeling a sense of greater solidarity, with a deeper awareness of their sisters in other countries, and pledging to continue the struggle until women in all countries are emancipated. □



Allen Arpadi

Protest at consulate demanded freedom for all Argentine political prisoners.

New York Picket Scores Perón's Links to AAA

NEW YORK—As representatives of the Solidarity Committee With the Argentine People (SCAP)¹ and the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA)² delivered a protest to the Argentine consulate here March 13, chants of "End right-wing terror in Argentina" and "Free all political prisoners" could be heard from the eighty pickets two floors below in the street.

The pickets were registering their protest following recent revelations of the Argentine government's complicity with the right-wing terror squad known as the AAA (Alianza Anticomunista Argentina—Argentine Anticommunist Alliance). The AAA has admitted to the murder of several hundred labor, religious, student, socialist, and other leaders in the past year and a half.

In a press release issued January 26, the AAA declared that it plans to murder "all individuals, regardless of their nationality, religion, race, or creed, who obey unpatriotic Marxist, Masonic, anti-Christian, or international reactionary Jewish interests."

Recent revelations have linked the AAA directly to the Peronist government. In testimony before a parliamentary investigating commission February 4, retired army Lieutenant Salvador Horacio Paino testified that he had been recruited to the AAA by the director of public relations and press in the Ministry of Social Welfare, Jorge Conti, who provided him with a governmental post as a cover for his terrorist activities.

1. P.O. Box 4565, Grand Central Station, New York, New York 10017.

2. 853 Broadway, Room 414, New York, New York 10003.

Paino also reported that then Social Welfare Minister José López Rega was deeply involved with the terrorist outfit. He disclosed that funds from ministry accounts were used to purchase submachine guns for the murders. To date not a single arrest has been made of an AAA member for any of these murders. This is not surprising in light of the information on the role of Isabel Perón's government.

In a leaflet distributed at the picket line, SCAP called attention to the thousands of political prisoners, many of them labor leaders, imprisoned by the Peronist regime in the last year.

Typical of these, according to the committee, was the case of José Páez, the vice-presidential candidate in the 1973 elections of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party). Páez was arrested January 28 under state of siege regulations, without formal charges. He was a special target because of his role as a leader of the militant auto workers union in the city of Córdoba.

The only response of the Argentine consul, A. Bennini, to the delegation's charges was to characterize the reports in the *New York Times* and other newspapers as "lies" that "slandered the Argentine nation." He denied the existence of any political prisoners or repression of labor militants and other activists.

In an address to the assembled pickets after the meeting with the consul, Gino Lofredo of SCAP pledged that the committee would continue to conduct an educational campaign to reach the American people with the truth about government-inspired terror in Argentina, and to mobilize public opinion to stop the murder, kidnapping, torture, and imprisonment of labor and political activists by the Argentine government. □

A Conversation With Leonid Plyushch

By Gerry Foley

Leonid Plyushch was just finishing a game of chess with his young son when I arrived with a group of socialist journalists from Paris, who were coming to interview him.

The exiled Ukrainian antibureaucratic fighter and his family live in the home of a young French mathematician, one of the leaders of the committee that fought for his release from a psychiatric prison in the Soviet Union. The house is in a small, suburban-looking town about sixty miles southeast of Paris; it was lively with children, cats, and dogs.

I was relieved to see that Plyushch had apparently recovered from his ordeal in the Kremlin's psychiatric wards and his long treatment with disorienting drugs. He was relaxed and thoughtful and obviously enjoyed discussing mathematical logic with his host.

Another journalist who had talked to him before told me that he was especially interested in political discussion. That seemed to be true because he was willing to discuss with us for five straight hours without showing any signs of impatience.

Plyushch is a Marxist and has gone through an intense political experience in the course of defending his principles against the bureaucratic regime that violently suppresses all genuine Marxist thought and activity.

However, he has had little experience of organized political life and discussion. In the small circles that are beginning to challenge Stalinist repression and thought control, political life is still largely personal and individual. Political questions tend to be seen in moral terms.

Plyushch focused on explaining his philosophy. Again and again in the course of the discussion, he stressed that he wanted to work with those who took a principled stand against all repression both in the Soviet Union and under capitalism. He sharply criticized some Ukrainian groups in the United States that claimed to support the antibureaucratic opposition in the USSR and still had ties with agencies of the U.S. government.

Tatyana Plyushch, Leonid's wife, has been so repelled by Stalinist totalitarianism that she rejects Marxism as such. Because of her Jewish background, the virulent anti-Semitism of the retrograde bureaucracy has had a particular impact on her.

She seemed to have been especially impressed by the cynicism of the social life that has developed under the bureaucracy.

Individuals who divert state property for their own profit are not seen as criminals or cheats by most people in the USSR, she said. "They're looked on as intelligent people." She expressed her contempt over and over again for the hypocrisy of the bureaucracy that portrays Jews as "cheats" when it has created a society crooked from top to bottom. And this hypocrisy goes hand in hand with despotic arbitrariness.

"It's so easy for them to fire you from your job. And in a totalitarian society like that, once they fire you, you'll never get another job. Then they jail you for 'social parasitism.'"

It is not hard to see how such experiences could lead oppositionists in the USSR to prefer a "mixed economy." You need revolutionary conviction to look beyond the existing alternatives to democratic control of the planned economy. Even elementary freedoms seem immensely difficult to win in the USSR.

Tatyana is obviously a seasoned and courageous fighter. When some of the journalists present warned her not to say anything that the bureaucracy could use to identify other dissidents, she smiled with warm amusement. "Don't you think we know what we can say and not say?"

Even though she rejects Marxism, she discussed with us on friendly terms. She reflects another characteristic of the democratic opposition in the Soviet Union, which unites persons with widely differing political views, that is, tolerance.

Because of the grim experience of totalitarian repression and massive terror in the Soviet Union, even those oppositionists who identify with Marxism and the traditions of the revolution tend to be skeptical about the Bolshevik leaders, including those who opposed Stalin.

Trotsky's Writings Unobtainable

Leonid said that he admired Trotsky as a historical figure but that some of Trotsky's ideas did not appeal to him. At the same time, he said that he had almost no opportunity to learn about Trotsky's positions. He had read only two works by Trotsky. One, "The Lessons of October," an article published at an early stage of the struggle against Stalin, was given to him by one of the very few surviving supporters of the Left Opposition. The other, an article on "Anti-Semitism and the Thermidorean Bureaucracy," was

given to him by a secret-police provocateur.

Since for fifty years Stalinist propaganda has vilified Trotskyism as an expression of Nazism, imperialism, anarchism, terrorism, and so on, apparently one of the ways the secret police try to incriminate the dissidents today is to link them with the established "original sin" of "anti-Soviet" opposition.

A similar process was followed in the 1930s. First, Trotsky and the Left Opposition were slandered as agents of Germany and Japan, and then, once this amalgam had been established by massive propaganda and terror, the definition of "Trotskyist" was extended to include all elements the bureaucracy was not entirely sure of, or, for whatever reason, wanted to liquidate.

Plyushch expressed his skepticism about Trotsky in a joking way at the beginning of the interview. A Trotskyist journalist had prepared a list of questions.¹ Plyushch responded with a smile: "This is an interrogation just like the KGB. Trotsky was a friend of Dzerzhinsky." (Dzerzhinsky was the first head of the secret police and later a collaborator of Stalin.) The journalist replied by asking if some dissidents had not like Dzerzhinsky broken under political pressure and gone over to the side of the bureaucracy.

This began a long discussion about whether or not the bureaucracy needed to use actual torture to break oppositionists or whether political pressures were sufficient. Trotsky had assumed, for example, that it was the political demoralization of most of the victims in the Moscow trials that enabled Stalin's secret police to extract "confessions" that were obviously untrue. However, Khrushchev referred to the use of torture in his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956.

In the case of dissidents who recanted, such as Dzyuba and Krasin, Plyushch said that he was struck by how similar their statements were to the "confessions" of the Old Bolshevik defendants in the Moscow trials. He thought at first that torture was involved, but became convinced that it was not. He did not try to offer any explanation

1. A transcript of the questions and Plyushch's replies was published in the February 27-March 4 issue of *Informations Ouvrières*, the weekly newspaper of the French Organisation Communiste Internationaliste. For an English translation of this article, see *Intercontinental Press*, March 22, p. 442.

SAUVER LEONID PLYUSHCH



Christian Avril

Speakers' stand at October 1975 meeting of 4,000 in Paris that helped force Kremlin bureaucrats to release Plyushch.

for these recantations. He was apparently still thinking about it and trying to find an explanation.

In the case of Yakir, one of the dissidents who recanted, Plyushch thought the reason was clear. Yakir was a pessimist; he had no hope that the situation in the USSR could be changed for the better. He simply refused to accept the injustices and lies of the bureaucratic system. This purely personal stand could not give him the strength to maintain his principles in the face of an execution threat. He did not see himself as part of a struggle that would not end with his death.

'State Capitalism'

The clearest difference Plyushch expressed with Trotsky and the Trotskyist movement was over the definition of the Soviet state. He rejects the Trotskyist view that it is a "degenerated workers state," which he said was probably "the Trotskyists' biggest error." He calls the USSR "state capitalist." He explained his reasoning this way: "If the workers had any power at all, you might call it a workers state, but they do not."

So, Plyushch apparently believes that calling the Soviet Union a workers state in any sense means acknowledging that the government in some way represents the

workers, and he is unwilling to do that because of powerful experience to the contrary.

This is a reaction common among the Marxist-oriented opponents of the bureaucracy in Eastern Europe. However, this term does not usually have the implications that it does in the West.

In the West, the state-capitalist concept arose in response to clearly identifiable pressures. Although the idea was first raised by sectarian purist groups in the 1920s, it gained importance really only with the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Russo-Finnish war. The liberal procapitalist currents that collaborated with the CPs during the popular-front period were suddenly repelled. This had a powerful impact among radical-minded intellectuals, which was one of the milieus where the small Trotskyist groups of the time had been most active and won the most influence.

Many intellectuals who had identified with Trotskyism came to the conclusion, under the impact of this pressure, and the extreme opportunism of the Soviet bureaucracy—which for a time became an open apologist for Nazism—that there was no longer a fundamental contradiction between the Soviet Union and the imperialist capitalist states. The Soviet Union was not fundamentally different from the imperialist countries, but like Nazi Ger-

many, it was more aggressive and undemocratic.

According to this concept, people who considered themselves revolutionary Marxists could side with the democratic capitalist countries against "both totalitarianisms," or at the very least remain neutral in clashes between the imperialists and the Soviet Union. This was the origin of the state-capitalist current in the West. Its logic was shown by the failure of the British International Socialists to take a clear position opposing U.S. intervention in the Korean War and by the position of the American followers of this current that the Vietnam War represented a struggle between two imperialisms, in which "Soviet imperialism" shared responsibility equally with American imperialism. So, it is not surprising that individuals who claim to be socialists but define the USSR as state-capitalist are sometimes even employed by U.S. government propaganda agencies. In fact, this type of "left" propagandist seems to be more in demand in these agencies since the start of the détente, which requires a more effective propaganda effort.

Obviously, there is a strong tendency for opponents of the bureaucracy in the USSR to be pushed into aligning themselves with the strongest power opposing that regime, U.S. imperialism. A similar tendency in

the West has for decades driven most rebels against capitalism and imperialism into the arms of the Stalinists.

However, in the case of the opponents of the bureaucracy in the Stalinized countries, the state-capitalist concept does not necessarily reflect a capitulation to "democratic" imperialism, as it does in the case of "socialists" in the West, although of course it can lead to that under certain circumstances. It reflects first of all the intransigent opposition of these dissidents to the bureaucracy's claim that it speaks in the name of the workers.

For example, Plyushch has made it clear in a number of interviews that he does not think a new social revolution is necessary or possible in the Soviet Union. Thus, he draws a completely different political conclusion from the Western state capitalists, a conclusion different from that implied by this concept as such. The same was true of the Polish antibureaucratic fighters Kuron and Modzelewski, who also defined the Stalinized countries as state capitalist.

Undermining of Stalinism

I asked Plyushch at the end of the interview how he envisioned the fall of the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union. He told me that he had always been "opposed to prophecies," but nonetheless he outlined a number of tendencies he thought were undermining Stalinist rule.

The first tendency, as he saw it, is that the Western Communist parties are trying to offer a more democratic model of socialism. He hoped that this process would have an impact on the Soviet bureaucracy. In fact, it seems already to have had a very important impact on his personal situation. It was apparently the desire of the French Communist party to be able to present a more democratic image that led it to protest his imprisonment. This may have been decisive in winning his release. The fact that the French CP, up till now the bulwark of Stalinist orthodoxy among the big European parties, has begun to criticize the lack of democracy in the USSR has obviously been a severe blow for the Kremlin.

The Soviet bureaucracy's political justification for its existence depends on the claim that it is leading a worldwide struggle against capitalism and imperialism. Thus, the Kremlin can shrug off protests against its repression by proimperialists. That is just "cold war propaganda." However, protests by anticapitalist and anti-imperialist fighters strike at the fundamental political defense of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

Plyushch told me, for example, that he was especially anxious to see the Black liberation movement in the United States take a position in defense of democratic rights in the Soviet Union and the victims of Stalinist repression. He was sure that

this would have a very powerful effect.

Another tendency that is undermining the bureaucracy, Plyushch said, is the more and more pressing need to improve the functioning of the economy. Bureaucratic management from the top down is proving increasingly cumbersome and is slowing down technological progress. However, the bureaucracy cannot develop a more flexible economic system without democratizing the society as a whole, at least to some extent.

Plyushch also saw hope in the growing role of the technical intelligentsia, who, he said, are striving to increase their influence at the expense of the political bureaucracy. It is true that as far as the people are concerned the technocrats are worse than the bureaucracy, since they are not democratic-minded and are even less sensitive to the political aspirations of the people. However, he did not regard this as an unchangeable fact and he held out the possibility that the technical intelligentsia could be won to democratic views. "Then, as their strength increases, they would put society on a scientific, that is, humanistic basis, and that is socialism."

Oppressed Nationalities

It was not entirely clear what political aspirations Plyushch thought the technical intelligentsia opposed. I did not get a chance to question him further about this. But one of them seemed to be the nationalism of the oppressed minorities in the USSR.

It is true that even many dissident intellectuals in Moscow and Leningrad regard the centralization carried out under the Stalinist regime as irreversible and essentially progressive. Accordingly, they consider demands for national autonomy or independence as reactionary.

Plyushch's attitude toward this problem is quite different. He is a strong defender of the struggles of the oppressed nationalities for autonomy and even independence, if that is necessary to defeat Great Russian chauvinism.

In the provinces, Plyushch said, it is the Marxist current that predominates among the opposition, because the provincial intellectuals stand closer to the masses than their counterparts in Moscow and Leningrad. The most privileged sections of the intelligentsia, of course, live in Moscow and Leningrad. These cities are effectively reserved for the top layers, since there is no freedom of movement in the USSR, and permission is needed to live there, permission that is difficult to obtain and highly prized. Moreover, non-Russians, who make up almost half the population of the Soviet Union, are proportionately more important in "the provinces."

The Ukrainian dissidents, Plyushch stressed, generally come from working-class or peasant origin, whereas the intellectuals in Moscow and Leningrad

usually come from professional families themselves. In the case of the Ukrainian opposition, the conditions of the masses are one of the main motives for their activity. Plyushch thought that among the Baltic peoples also the antibureaucratic fighters had close ties with the masses. "It's a broad national resistance movement."

He knew less about the situation in the Caucasus and Asian areas, he said, because the peoples there were suspicious of all Russians and Europeans and did not believe that any of them could be sincere democrats. But he mentioned contacts with the Crimean Tatars.

The Uzbeks, a mixed Turkish and Mongol people, had developed particularly strong resentments against Europeans. Plyushch said that groups were formed in 1968 dedicated to attacking "whites," that is, Europeans. A number of Europeans were attacked at random on the streets. "It all started with a football match between an Uzbek and Russian team," he said.

I asked Plyushch if the racist themes in the Kremlin's attacks on the Maoist leadership had aroused sympathy with China among the Eastern peoples in the Soviet Union. He said that he had heard that there was sentiment among the Uzbeks for seceding from the USSR to join with China. He thought that any sympathy with Peking was confined to the Eastern peoples. "In all my life, I have met only one Maoist among the Ukrainians and Russians."

Plyushch stressed that the antibureaucratic opposition in the USSR was almost totally cut off from knowledge of what happens in the outside world, since they cannot believe the Kremlin's press or the foreign radio either. This isolation is especially severe for those dissidents like Leonid and Tatyana Plyushch who do not know Western languages. So, they know little about developments in the West such as the youth radicalization and the women's liberation movement.

Women's Liberation

However, when I asked Plyushch about the question of women's rights in the USSR, it was obvious that he had done some thinking about it: "Here in France I have seen that women are often paid less for the same work. That is very disturbing. In the Soviet Union, that never happens. But it is usual, when you see men and women working together, that the men will have automatic hammers and the women only shovels, or if the women have automatic tools, the men will be sitting in the cabins of machines. I think that the Soviet legal code should protect women against hard physical labor."

On the question of the position of women in the USSR in general Plyushch said he agreed with an article by Ukrainian patriot Yevhen Sverstiuk published in 1972

by Smoloskyp Press, a Ukrainian publishing house in the United States that reprints a good deal of material from the opposition in the Ukraine. The article was included in a collection entitled "Wide Sea of Ukraine."² Tatyana had evidently read the article too. She wrote down the name and date of publication in my notebook. She smiled broadly when the question of women's liberation came up, but she did not express any opinions. Perhaps she will later.

I mentioned that many young Ukrainians in the United States and Canada had become radicalized as a result of the developments in North American society in general and were trying to apply their beliefs within the Ukrainian community. I told Plyushch that they were trying to rediscover a Ukrainian revolutionary Marxist tradition that could reconcile their social radicalism with their attachment to the national struggle of their people. He seemed very interested in that, and to consider it a hopeful development. There is no doubt about Plyushch's identification with the Ukrainian people.

Need for Historical Material

Plyushch said that he had tried to find out about the discussions that went on in the Soviet Communist party before it was Stalinized, but that he found it very difficult to obtain documents. Furthermore, secret-police provocateurs sometimes spread false or distorted information about the positions of Lenin toward the Ukrainian revolutionists.

I mentioned that Monad Press in the United States was in the process of reprinting Trotsky's major works in Russian, and that it was about to publish his *History of the Russian Revolution*. He already had a copy of the *Bulletin of the Left Opposition* in Russian also published by Monad and distributed by Pathfinder Press. It was given to him by French Trotskyists.

Up till now, Plyushch said, all of the literature coming into the USSR from the West has been anti-Marxist. The only Marxist material on the period after Stalin took power were those published in Czechoslovakia during the "Prague spring." Apparently, only a brief period of rather limited freedom in one small country in the Soviet bloc had qualitatively widened the political horizons of the opposition in the USSR. Probably this was one of the main reasons the Kremlin became convinced it had to end the "Prague spring" at any cost.

The effect of the Czechoslovak literature, which is obviously the opposite of what the

2. The article, "On Women's Day," attacks the hypocrisy of the bureaucracy that talks about the equality of the sexes while using women as low-paid laborers in the most unattractive jobs.



Norma Andersen

Tatyana and Leonid Plyushch in France.

Kremlin has claimed, also shows the kind of impact the publication of anti-Stalinist Marxist literature in the East European languages can have when the revolutionary Marxist groups are able to circulate it widely enough so that it will find its way into the Soviet bloc.

The fact that only fragments of the history of Bolshevism and the Left Opposition are known by the dissidents means not only that they do not have a complete view of the positions of Trotsky and the other anti-Stalinist revolutionary leaders. From a few fragments, they cannot reconstruct the political process that took place in the years of the revolution and the rise of the bureaucracy.

Thus, political stands and actions cannot be seen in their context but only judged in isolation, and so, inevitably, in a rather subjective way. The revolutionary historical view is lost. Plyushch's thinking, for example, seemed to move back and forth between searching for a morally satisfactory philosophy and vague speculation about general trends. He seemed to lack a view of history that could provide a basis for a consistent revolutionary perspective in both the Stalinized countries and the capitalist world.

Political Level of Workers

He was acutely aware that the antibureaucratic opposition could not achieve its goals if it remained confined to circles of intellectuals, mostly in the provinces. However, he was skeptical about the chances for a mass uprising against the bureaucracy, since "the political consciousness of the workers and peasants is nonexistent."

Nonetheless, he mentioned instances in recent years where large numbers of workers had gone on strike in the face of totalitarian repression and engaged in violent battles with the police. He thought that as long as living standards were rising, however slowly, there was no prospect for a mass uprising.

Yet when the workers had a chance to learn about the real objectives of the opposition, they were sympathetic. He mentioned an example when he had joined with a group of dissidents to protest the jailing of Bogoraz. The authorities sent a special unit of the Communist Youth to carry out a "counterdemonstration." Then, groups of workers, who had obviously been drinking, came by. They used scurrilous anti-Semitic epithets: "Hitler didn't kill enough of you."

Plyushch explained that the authorities had organized propaganda sessions in the factories to inoculate the workers against the influence of the dissidents. The main theme was that they were all "Jews."

However, in the evening when the factories let out, class-conscious workers came by. At first, they were hostile, but they became friendly after the oppositionists explained clearly what their motives were.

Another journalist asked Plyushch: "Are you pessimistic?"

He answered: "No, but the task is to change the situation that exists."

Nonetheless, he did not seem to have any clear idea of how that could be done, or whether it could be done. The facts mentioned by Plyushch indicate that a revolutionary situation could develop very quickly in the USSR; at least that is what is suggested on the basis of previous historical experience. But this experience

seemed to be a closed book for him.

Plyushch's doubts about the chances for a mass workers upsurge against the bureaucratic regime reminded me of the same sort of doubts that were felt by the students who began to radicalize in the West in the early 1960s. Until the events of May-June 1968 in France, only a small minority of the radicalized students and intellectuals in the developed capitalist countries had any confidence in the possibility for a workers upsurge. It was hard for them to imagine this because the only working class they had ever known was a passive and indoctrinated one. In the United States, some sections of the workers, like the drunken anti-Semites who attacked Plyushch and his fellow protesters, had fallen victim to reactionary rabble-rousers like Senator McCarthy.

The experience of the oppositionists in the USSR has convinced them that the Soviet government is an enemy of the workers and socialism. ("For the neo-Marxists," Plyushch told us, "the main motive for their struggle is seeing the gap between the writings of Marxism and the reality of the Soviet Union.")

On the other hand, the experience of the militant workers and oppressed peoples in the West has made them look to the Soviet Union as a potential ally against their enemies, the enemies of socialism.

International Protest Movement

Only a broad, historical revolutionary view can make communication between the two viewpoints possible. But first some kind of common experience is necessary, and that is very hard to develop.

Plyushch is one of the first Marxist oppositionists to be allowed to leave the USSR. His release, furthermore, is an example of what a left-oriented defense of the Soviet dissidents can accomplish. The fact that the French CP, for example, was forced to speak out in his defense is of historic importance. Plyushch is in position to play an important role in beginning to forge unity in the struggle against capitalist repression in the West and bureaucratic repression in the East.

It seemed to me, as I talked to him, that he was aware of this need. He said that he wanted to work with those who opposed repression both in Chile and in the USSR. He realized that protests by Black fighters in the United States would be the most effective support possible for the oppositionists in the USSR. He was anxious to build an international movement in support of democratic rights in the Stalinized countries.

The International Committee of Mathematicians that initiated and built the international campaign in defense of Plyushch had been particularly effective. It seemed to have succeeded in bringing more pressure to bear on the Kremlin than

any previous effort, including those financed and backed by organizations with enormous resources.

The fact that even the most Stalinist of the big CPs, the French CP, was forced to join in the protests against the imprisonment of Plyushch is a testimony to the effectiveness of this committee.

Plyushch evidently hoped that the kind of defense that had forced his release could be built for other political prisoners in the USSR. The committee does offer a good model. It was successful because, with the necessary adjustments for the Soviet situation, it had the same attributes that make committees defending political prisoners in the West successful. It was able to apply moral pressure on the points where the Kremlin is sensitive.

In the first place, scientific exchanges are particularly important for the bureaucracy. The fact that the issue of Plyushch's imprisonment was raised in international conferences of mathematicians thus raised a political problem for the bureaucracy in a sensitive area.

Furthermore, one of the key leaders of the committee, Michel Broué, is a principled fighter for democratic rights who understands the ideals of socialism and the nature of the Soviet bureaucracy. He could not be intimidated by a false spirit of "professional neutrality" from raising the issue of Plyushch in mathematical gatherings. Nor could he be dismissed as a right-wing loudmouth.

Also, there was a core of dedicated activists, who in general can only be found in revolutionary organizations, that could maintain a sustained campaign. Another crucial aspect was that the committee was able to mobilize broad support for Plyushch without compromising itself through unprincipled combinations with right-wing or anti-Soviet forces. For all these reasons, it was able to build up the

kind of moral pressure that could force the Kremlin to retreat.

Both Leonid and Tatyana Plyushch stressed that the bureaucracy fears publicity about its crimes and can be forced to retreat and make important concessions in the area of democratic rights, provided that these protests come from forces that cannot be dismissed as procapitalist and reactionary.

Obviously, however, it will be difficult for Plyushch to chart a clear course to building such a movement. The major political forces militate against it, and general moral principles are not a precise enough guide for finding one's way through the labyrinth of politics in the West, where the forms of government control are more subtle than under the dictatorial rule of the Kremlin.

A key element for Plyushch now is the radicalized youth in the Ukrainian communities outside the Soviet bloc. These youth, who have been breaking with the old sterile anti-Communism of the Ukrainian national movement, have a special opportunity and responsibility. Plyushch looks to them in particular to begin building the kind of movement he wants, and he offers them a chance to build a real alternative to the dead-end anti-Communism they have rejected.

Jiri Pelikan, a leader of the Czechoslovak opposition, summed up what Plyushch symbolizes and can symbolize when he told almost 4,000 persons in the Mutualité in Paris on March 7:

"I am happy to salute Comrade Plyushch here because he has come here as a socialist, a communist. . . . We are all the more happy, I and my comrades in Czechoslovakia, and certainly in the other countries of Eastern Europe, because this is the symbol under which we can advance toward socialism shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet comrades." □

'Political Prisoners in Asia'

Political repression in South Korea is the focus of the current issue of *Political Prisoners in Asia*, published in Tokyo by the Center for Information on Asian Political Prisoners.

The issue, Vol. 2 No. 1, dated January 20, contains the full text of Park Chung Hee's Emergency Measure No. 9, an edict issued May 13, 1975, banning all criticism of the dictatorial regime. It also contains the full text of imprisoned dissident poet Kim Chi Ha's "Declaration of Conscience," smuggled out of his prison cell.

Kim, first arrested and tortured in 1964 as a suspected leader of student demonstrations, was arrested again in 1970, 1972, 1974, and 1975. His most recent arrest followed publication of a series of articles he wrote describing the methods of torture

used by the Park regime against political prisoners.

Other items in the current issue include a statement denouncing the Park dictatorship, issued last November by the Seoul University Students Union; the names of sixty-seven dissidents, mostly students, arrested under Emergency Measure No. 9; and a report on the Korean CIA's efforts to mount a witch-hunt against the sizable Korean community in Japan.

Copies of *Political Prisoners in Asia*, for which a contribution to help cover the costs are welcome, can be obtained by writing to Center for Information on Asian Political Prisoners, Baptist Hall 3F, 2-350 Nishiokubo, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 160, Japan. □

The Gendarme of Southern Africa

By Ernest Harsch

[Last of three articles]

South Africa stands today as the most powerful bastion of white rule remaining on the African continent.

The white settler regime in neighboring Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) is weak and faces mounting Black nationalist opposition. Pretoria's continued control over its colony of Namibia (South-West Africa) has been challenged over the past decade by strikes, protests, and guerrilla resistance. Portuguese colonial rule—a major prop of white power in southern Africa—was ended in Mozambique and Angola in 1975.

The white authorities in Pretoria have so far managed to contain all serious expressions of dissent within the country. But they realize that the mounting class struggle in the rest of southern Africa makes it more difficult for them to prevent the spread of unrest among the more than twenty million Blacks of South Africa itself.

The wave of independence struggles that swept Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s encouraged Blacks in South Africa, who launched a series of mass protests against the apartheid laws. The upsurge in neighboring Mozambique in 1974 was a more recent inspiration.

Two all-Black groups, the South African Students Organisation (SASO) and the Black People's Convention (BPC) organized demonstrations in Durban and Turfloop in September 1974 in solidarity with the Mozambican nationalists. Although the rallies were officially banned, the Durban demonstration drew between 4,000 and 5,000 persons.

Aware of the impact such defiant actions would have on the rest of the Black population, Pretoria cracked down hard. It arrested most of the SASO and BPC leaders who had not gone into exile and launched the largest wave of political trials since the early 1960s.

The labor conditions in South Africa make the country's social conflicts even more explosive. The wages of the more than six million Black workers, despite a slight increase over the past two years, are still far below those of whites. Blacks are required to carry identification passes at all times, are segregated in special dormitories and housing projects, and are barred by the apartheid laws from forming their own trade unions or carrying out strike actions.

After describing conditions in the mines, which employ more than half a million Blacks (many of them migrants from other

countries), Siegfried Hannig said in the July 1975 issue of the Pretoria *Africa Institute Bulletin*, "The labour system and the compound life which is part of it are ready-made for spontaneous combustion. . . . A touch of Black consciousness, the knowledge of a defiant government at home (Malawi) and a home country in the process of liberation (Mocambique) rendered the system even more inflammable."

Hannig quoted Francis Wilson, a professor at the University of Cape Town and author of a study on the gold mines, as saying that "it does seem that, in some mysterious way, the breaking point has now been reached. It would seem as though the events of the past two years or so, including the Durban strikes, the independence of Mocambique, the raising of wages in the mining industry, external detente and other events have served to create a mood of expectation combined with a feeling of hopeless frustration."

The white authorities are preparing to meet the inevitable confrontation. In an interview with *Washington Post* reporter Bernard D. Nossiter in Cape Town February 3, Defense Minister Pieter W. Botha expressed Pretoria's determination to hang on to its apartheid system. "We have no alternative," he said. "We can't run away like the Portuguese from Angola. We've stuck it out for 300 years. We will stick it out for another 300."

'We Are at War'

The apartheid regime has sought to eliminate any independent Black political leadership that arises. For this purpose, it has enacted over the years an extensive array of repressive legislation, including the Sabotage, Suppression of Communism, and Terrorism acts, which outlaw virtually all forms of dissent.

The Terrorism Act, for instance, labels as "terrorist" actions: "obstructing the free movement of traffic," "embarrassing the administration of the affairs of State," "promoting by intimidation the achievement of any object," "endangering the safety of any person," and "prejudicing any undertaking." Speeches and writings may also be considered "terrorist acts."

In 1969 Pretoria set up the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), a powerful secret-police body entrusted with surveillance over all individuals or groups deemed to be even potentially "subversive." It employs agents and informers, both within South

Africa and abroad, and uses infiltration, bugging, and blackmail to obtain information, which can then be used as "evidence" in trials. It is also believed that BOSS has engineered the assassinations of several exiled dissidents.

According to reporter Tad Szulc, in the October 1975 *Esquire*, BOSS and the Central Intelligence Agency cooperate closely under the terms of a secret intelligence agreement similar to those between Washington and the European governments in NATO.

Repression is also carried out on a mass scale against the Black population as a whole. Between 1948 and 1973, for example, about 10.5 million Blacks were arrested and prosecuted for violation of the pass laws. In the one-year period ending on June 30, 1971, alone, a total of 934,600 Blacks were prosecuted for pass-law and other apartheid violations.

The white authorities have taken even more elaborate and extensive precautions to meet future mass upsurges, both within South Africa and without.

The military budget for the 1975-76 fiscal year reached a record \$1.4 billion, twice the figure of two years ago and more than 20 percent of the entire government budget. An additional \$20 million was allocated for BOSS and \$380 million for the regular police force and prison system.

"Interceptor squadrons of the Air Force are being equipped with more modern planes," Kwame Vorkeh reported in the October 1975 *Africa*. "Air defence will be further strengthened by the establishment of an artillery division armed with missiles and anti-aircraft guns. More submarines and high speed naval ships will be built also deploying missiles."

In her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 24, 1975, Jennifer Davis described Pretoria's dual military approach:

South African military strategy is in fact aimed at two fronts—an internal and an external one. Internally and on its borders the South African government is facing an increasingly threatening situation. Thus much military expenditure is designed to enable greater internal control and South Africa is concentrating on developing counterinsurgency capabilities very rapidly. There are numerous reports of regular "COIN" (counter-insurgency) practice operations, and as has already been indicated there is growing expenditure on equipment suitable for such operations—armored cars, light aircraft, helicopters, etc.

Davis added that "South Africa sees independent Africa as threatening primarily in this context—i.e., insofar as it provides a base for 'internal disorder.'"

According to the May 1975 issue of the London monthly *Anti-Apartheid News*, the entire South African army has been reorganized into two main forces, a conventional military force and a counterinsurgency force.

Although Pretoria often tries to justify its military buildup on the grounds that it

needs to "defend" the Cape sea route, some of its pronouncements have been more candid about its real aims.

An official military circular declared in July 1974, three months after the coup in Lisbon that toppled the Salazarist dictatorship, "We are no longer preparing for war, we are at war."

Explaining the role of the South African military, Defense Minister Botha said a few months later, "Our task is to prevent revolt and armed clashes."

While introducing the military budget on March 26, 1975, Minister of Finance Owen Horwood stated, "Although the government hope to achieve *detente* with black Africa, until it is achieved it is imperative to enable the defence forces to defend the republic's borders effectively."

What Horwood meant by defending South Africa's borders became clearer several months later with the South African military intervention in the Angolan civil war and the escalation of operations against the Namibian independence fighters.

The Stakes for Imperialism

Washington's strategy toward the continent as a whole was formulated in the late 1950s, following the rise of the African independence struggles. Hilton P. Goss, one of Washington's strategic planners, said in 1958, one year after Ghana became the first African colony to gain its formal independence:

The vast political changes characteristic of Africa today pose serious threats to international stability and indicate that Africa promises to grow in significance as an area of tension and attention. The potential resources of Africa are needed on the side of the free world to aid in the preservation of U.S. security. These resources are as much political and psychological as they are economic and military. A U.S. policy for Africa and the Africans must be designed and implemented promptly or we shall lose Africa—to obstructive neutralism, to the communists, or to a polarization on the basis of colored vs. white peoples of the world. We still have the opportunity to align this resourceful continent with the rest of the free world—but time is fast running out.⁶

The general American strategy toward Africa was twofold. As the European imperialist powers granted independence to their colonies, Washington, together with the NATO powers, sought to substitute neocolonial relations and to increase their economic dominance. If a new Black government was not to their liking, however, the imperialists did not hesitate to intervene. (The imperialist aggression against the regime of Patrice Lumumba in the former Belgian Congo in 1960 was the first significant example of this.)

6. Quoted by Sean Gervasi in "Western Strategy in Southern Africa" in the October 1972 issue of *Southern Africa* magazine.

Where direct colonial rule continued, Washington sought to maintain the status quo. It backed Portugal's colonial wars until the very end and helped arm the South African regime. The April 1974 coup in Lisbon upset its policy toward the Portuguese colonies, and the civil war in Angola threatened to have serious repercussions on the remaining white regimes of southern Africa.

The strategic considerations advanced in the Kissinger "Tar Baby" policy and various NATO documents stress South Africa's importance for the protection of the Cape sea route, its excellent naval facilities, and its possession of many valuable and strategic minerals.

Another key consideration, however, is the colonial-settler regime's role as a guardian of imperialist interests in southern Africa. Itself an imperialist power, Pretoria has the economic and military strength to protect and advance its own interests and those of its Western allies well beyond its borders.

South Africa, in fact, bears many resemblances to Israel. Like Israel, it is based on the dispossession of the original inhabitants of the area. While the Israeli settlers drove the great majority of the Palestinians out of what is now Israel (relegating those left in the country to the status of second-class citizens), the South Africans carried out the same policy *within* South Africa's borders. The whites expropriated 87 percent of the land in South Africa, including the richest in minerals and the most fertile, and either drove off the original Black inhabitants or forced them to work on the white-owned farms and in the white-owned mines.

And just as Israel serves imperialism as a bulwark against the Arab revolution, the apartheid South African regime is the strongest bastion of imperialist rule in Africa.

In an advertisement placed in the February 22 *New York Times Magazine*, Jan S. Marais, the chairman of the Trust Bank of Africa Group and president of the South African Foundation, stressed this aspect of South Africa's importance to the West. He said that the Angolan war proved the need for "the great Western powers, especially the U.S.A. to make sure of a solid foothold in Africa, especially Southern Africa. And what is a better and more congenial foothold than South Africa?"

The Western powers are also concerned about the possible effects on capitalist property relations on the continent if the white regime is overthrown.

In other African countries, Washington and the major European powers accepted, and in some cases even preferred, a transition to neocolonial methods of rule. Although this meant the loss of power and privilege for the local white settlers—as in Algeria, Kenya, Mozambique, and Angola—the imperialist companies and banks were able to maintain and often

expand their economic domination.

The situation in South Africa, however, is qualitatively different. South African capitalism rests on the foundation of apartheid. The position of the white ruling class is so closely tied to that of the Western imperialists that the end of white political power would seriously endanger continued imperialist economic control.

The class dynamic of the Black struggles in South Africa will also be different from those in other African countries. They will be more proletarian.

No Black bourgeois layers have been able to arise under the restrictions of the rigid and all-encompassing system of racial segregation. The centuries of white conquest and domination have destroyed or weakened much of the Black peasantry. At the same time, the industrial development of South Africa has fostered the rapid growth of a powerful Black working class. For instance, in the manufacturing sector alone the number of Black workers rose from 433,000 in 1960 to more than a million by 1975 (out of a total Black work force of more than six million).

The active participation of this working class in the battle against white rule will make it much more difficult for the imperialist interests to channel the independence struggle in a neocolonial direction. A social revolution in South Africa, moreover, would have a tremendous liberating effect on the African masses in the rest of the continent, spurring forward the struggle for real independence from foreign control.

'Convergence' and Intervention

The main justification presented by White House officials for the American intervention in the Angolan civil war was Washington's need to keep Moscow from picking up diplomatic "bargaining chips." As they presented it, an MPLA⁷ victory as a result of heavy Soviet backing could strengthen the Kremlin's political hand in its relations with the U.S. and West European powers.

Another reason for the American intervention on the side of the FNLA and UNITA⁸—through the sending of arms and the dispatching of CIA-recruited mercenaries—was to perpetuate the civil war in order to weaken the entire Angolan nationalist struggle.

A third reason, voiced by some CIA and State Department officials in testimony before Senate committees, was the possible

7. Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

8. Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (Angolan National Liberation Front). União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

effect of the Angolan civil war on white rule in the rest of southern Africa. In a column in the December 30, 1975, *New York Times*, Graham Hovey, a member of the *Times*'s editorial board, said that these officials contended that "a victory for M.P.L.A. would make catastrophic war between whites and blacks in southern Africa more likely.

"They say a victorious M.P.L.A. could give maximum help to the guerrilla organization known as S.W.A.P.O., which carries out intermittent raids on Namibia (South-West Africa). They envision an alliance of M.P.L.A., S.W.A.P.O., the revolutionary Government of Mozambique and the more radical black Rhodesian faction bent on settling the issue in Namibia, Rhodesia and finally South Africa itself by force, rather than by negotiation."

While Kissinger concentrated on the Soviet involvement and did not himself cite the danger of unrest in southern Africa as a justification for intervention in Angola, it appears that he also held such a view. According to Leslie H. Gelb in the December 20 *New York Times*, "On Mr. Kissinger's instructions, Administration officials have been telling Congressional committees of their concern not only about the Russians, but also about dangers to black-white relations and South Africa if the Popular Movement wins in Angola."

The apartheid regime shared Washington's overall political considerations when it intervened in Angola. But some of its own immediate interests were also at stake.

It sought to take advantage of the Angolan civil war to strike out at the guerrilla bases of the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) located in southern Angola. SWAPO gets much of its support from the Ovambo people of northern Namibia. About 100,000 Ovambos also live across the border in southern Angola, and the bases in that country are crucial for SWAPO's continued guerrilla operations into Namibia.

The January 26, 1976, issue of the *American Business Week* commented:

Success for the MPLA is bound to put fresh heart—and perhaps weapons—into the independence movement in South-West Africa (Namibia), where such big foreign concerns as Britain's Rio Tinto and the U.S.'s AMAX and Newmont Mining have interests. And from there, many South Africans fear, it may be only a short step to agitation in South Africa itself. Such a sequence raises the prospect of an uprising by South Africa's 15 million blacks against the 4 million whites who rule them. "Down here," says a worried executive for a major mining company in Cape Town, "there is a feeling that things are closing in."

Although White House officials publicly denied any direct contact with the racist white minority regime over the South African intervention in Angola, the collaboration between the two imperialist powers was so apparent that U.S. Amba-

sador to the United Nations Patrick Moynihan tried to minimize it by stating December 14, 1975, that there was only a "convergence of policy" between the two



London Sunday Times

governments. While still denying any coordination of the U.S. and South African operations, he added, "We are doing the same thing, sort of."

Moynihan was lying when he said there was no contact with Pretoria. Several South African officials have indicated that Washington actually encouraged Pretoria to send in its troops.

Defense Minister Botha hinted as much in an interview with *Washington Post* correspondent Bernard D. Nossiter in Cape Town February 3. He said that at least one "free world" power had given its blessing to the South African intervention. Although repeatedly questioned, he refused to identify that power as Washington, stating, "I would be the last man to destroy our diplomatic relations with the United States."

When asked about reports in the press that the intervention in Angola was arranged by the CIA and BOSS, Botha remarked, "If it were so, it was not the only channel."

Citing an unnamed South African "high official," Henry Kamm reported in the February 6 *New York Times* that the South African drive into Angola was initiated "on the understanding that the United States would rush sufficient supplies to make it possible to counter the Soviet-supported movement."

That understanding, the official said, had been based on contacts with American officials. "We had been in touch," he said. "We felt if we could give them a lapse of time they could find ways and means." Earlier in the interview, he remarked, "We accepted the utterances of Mr. Kissinger and others. We felt surely he had the necessary pull to come forward with the goods."

The U.S. collaboration with the South African intervention was not limited to encouragement. According to Senator Richard Clark, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Afri-

ca, Washington and Pretoria exchanged information on the Angolan war. And citing "high sources in the Defense Department," Sean Gervasi, a consultant to the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, revealed in a December 19 report that U.S. cargo planes had air-dropped supplies to South African columns operating in Angola.

Washington's earlier supply of U.S. planes to Pretoria was another aspect of its complicity with the racist regime's military operation. The January 8 issue of the *Long Island, New York, Newsday* reported that the South Africans used four C-141 Starlifter transport planes, bought from the United States during the previous two years, to ferry troops and matériel to at least three sites within Angola. While South African troops were fighting in central Angola, the January 18 *Johannesburg Sunday Times* reported that Pretoria had also bought six Lockheed Hercules transport planes from the United States.

The other NATO powers, which had also helped fill Pretoria's arsenal, were similarly involved. An editorial in the December 19, 1975, *Le Monde*, for instance, pointed out, "France, in particular, cannot ignore the fact that the helicopters, mortars, machine guns, and other weapons used in the conflict by South Africa were either furnished by Paris or manufactured under French license."

Washington had given Pretoria its encouragement and had shown its willingness to pour in arms and mercenaries to achieve its aims in Angola and to back up the South African forces. But the antiwar sentiment of the American people and the overwhelming pro-Black African feelings of Black Americans, together with the pressure this placed on Congress, greatly limited Kissinger's ability to "come forward with the goods."

Pretoria's pleas for greater Western involvement and its pullback from central Angola when that escalated intervention failed to materialize indicated that the South African regime was still basically dependent on Western backing for any large-scale military operations beyond its borders.

Vorster's 'Détente'

Another factor that influenced Pretoria's decision to intervene in the civil war was the possible effect that the Angolan conflict could have on Prime Minister Vorster's drive to establish "détente" with some of the Black African states.

Vorster's principal aim in launching the "détente" policy in late 1974 was to enlist the cooperation of bourgeois African leaders, such as Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, in helping to curb the activities of Black guerrillas based in their countries. Vorster also sought to gain help in defusing the potentially explosive conflict in Zimbabwe.

Since late 1974, Kaunda and Vorster cooperated closely in an effort to engineer

a political "solution" to the Zimbabwean crisis. Vorster put some pressure on Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to make a few compromises with Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, while Kaunda arrested and harassed those Zimbabweans based in Zambia who favored mobilizing against the Smith regime, rather than negotiating with it. This crackdown against Zimbabweans in Zambia was directed principally at members and leaders of the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU).

The underlying consideration of the Kaunda regime in trying to foist a settlement on the Zimbabweans is the destabilizing impact that a successful liberation struggle in Zimbabwe could have on Zambia itself.

In 1966, a year after the Rhodesian white supremacist regime announced its Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain, Kaunda stated, "Geographically, we are contiguous to Rhodesia; economically, we are tied together. For these reasons alone we could not possibly remain indifferent to any commotion, internal or external, racking such a close neighbour."

As with the unrest in Angola, Vorster's main concern with the Zimbabwean struggle for independence is the potential effect it could have on the Black population of South Africa.

Another important motivation for the South African "détente" policy is economic. With the rapid expansion of South Africa's industry, internal pressures have been building up for an extension of external outlets for its manufactured goods. (The extremely low income of the Black population of South Africa greatly limits the internal market.) The competitive position of Pretoria's manufactured products, however, is relatively weak on the world market in comparison with those of the imperialist companies of North America, Europe, and Japan.

The London *Economist*, in its June 29, 1968, issue, pointed out that it was to Black-ruled Africa "that the Republic must hope to sell most of its growing exports of manufactured goods: if black Africa is willing."

Africa is also an obvious field for South African investors, particularly for its mining concerns. Such conglomerates as the Anglo American Corporation have important investments in a number of Black-ruled African countries.

In a 1966 interview, Vorster expressed Pretoria's interest in expanding economically into the rest of Africa: "In many respects we have, with respect to much of Africa south of the Sahara, a responsibility for assisting in development—comparable to the responsibility which the United States has undertaken on a much larger scale with respect to the underdeveloped areas of the world as a whole. Although we do not publicize it, we are

already doing quite a lot in this field."⁹

Two of Pretoria's principal targets for this export and investment drive in Black-ruled Africa over the past few years have been Zambia and Zaïre (Pretoria already made substantial investments in Angola and Mozambique while they were still colonies of Portugal).

In October 1975, Pretoria reportedly signed an agreement with the Zambian regime to extend credits covering up to 125 million rand (about US\$140 million) worth of South African exports. According to an article in the November 27, 1975, *Johannesburg Financial Mail*, South Africa may already be Zambia's top foreign supplier.

The January 26, 1976, *Business Week* reported, "South African Rys. is hauling refined oil to Zaïre, and a Johannesburg construction company recently landed a contract in Kinshasa. South Africa is providing loans to the Central African Republic, and Johannesburg's Anglo American Corp. continues to give technical assistance to Zambia's nationalized copper mines."

Harry F. Oppenheimer, the head of Anglo American, is one of the strongest supporters of "détente." In an advertisement placed in the May 15, 1975, *London Financial Times*, he stated, "We in the Anglo American Corporation Group have long had important interests in virtually every country in this vast area and are therefore perhaps more conscious than most of the high cost of division and strife, and of the benefits which would flow to all its peoples from a relaxation of tension and co-operation on a regional basis."

The Angolan civil war threatened to upset Pretoria's lucrative "détente" schemes. Reporter Stanley Uys commented in a dispatch in the January 15 *Washington Post* that among official circles in Pretoria:

... there is anxiety, too, over the effect that control of Angola by the Popular Movement could have on two of South Africa's detente partners, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre.

Both Zambia and Zaïre are experiencing serious financial problems, caused partly by the closing of the railway line that runs between the port of Benguela and Teixeira de Sousa in eastern Angola, and it is feared that this economic instability could ripple out into political instability. . . .

The anxiety that nags in Pretoria is that either Mobutu and Kaunda could be overthrown because of their "moderate" attitude toward South Africa, or that they could extricate themselves from detente . . . to protect their positions.

Pretoria may have calculated in October 1975 that by striking quickly into Angola it could tip the balance in favor of the FNLA and UNITA, which were backed by the Mobutu and Kaunda regimes. Moreover, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi had

9. Quoted by Arrighi and Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*, pp. 59-60.

already expressed his willingness to go along with the "détente" schemes several months earlier.

In an interview in the April 28, 1975, *Luanda Portuguese Africa*, Savimbi declared that "economic cooperation with South Africa is only realism, however much we may be opposed to the inhumanity and injustice of apartheid." The May 2 issue of the same publication reported that "Dr Savimbi said he was in favour of detente and of dialogue as a means of solving problems, and that he did not believe, in the present Southern African context, that armed liberation wars were necessarily the solution for the problems of Namibia and Zimbabwe."

It remains to be seen what the full effects of the failure of the U.S. and South African intervention in Angola will be on Pretoria's "détente" policies, including its efforts to defuse the Zimbabwean conflict and to expand its political and economic influence in the rest of the continent.

One certain result of that failure will be a greater confidence among the African masses that Pretoria—and its backers in the United States and Europe—can be defeated.

After discussions with Robert Sobukwe, a banned¹⁰ leader of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, *Washington Post* correspondent Nossiter reported from Kimberley, South Africa, February 2:

Sobukwe thinks Mozambique was a turning point. There rural blacks far less sophisticated than the urban millions of South Africa routed a white Portuguese army on South Africa's border. That shattered the myth of white invincibility. What was left of the image of white power received another blow from the South African military pullback in Angola.

Now, Sobukwe understands, young South African blacks greet each other in the segregated townships with clenched fists, the symbol of black power.

Pretoria's Warning to Africa

By intervening in Angola, Pretoria demonstrated to the rest of Africa that it was ready and determined to strike beyond its borders if it felt that its interests and those of its Western allies were threatened. In effect, Pretoria was presenting the threat of military confrontation as the other side of "détente."

In case this implicit warning was overlooked, Defense Minister Botha spelled it out in a January 26 speech before the South African Parliament: "In the past we hit back with small forces. If necessary, we will retaliate with greater force."

During the South African intervention in Angola, officials in Pretoria enunciated a policy of "hot pursuit" against Black

10. A banning order prohibits a person from attending gatherings of three or more persons, traveling outside his or her town, receiving visitors, or publishing or helping to prepare anything for publication.

nationalist rebels who launched raids into South African-controlled territory. Claiming a right to pursue freedom fighters up to 200 miles beyond the borders of South Africa and Namibia, Pretoria used this policy as a justification for its operations in Angola.

Besides SWAPO, the immediate targets of this warning were the Angolan nationalists. All three of the nationalist groups, the UNITA in particular, had maintained ties with SWAPO in the past, providing it with sanctuary and occasional military aid. Following the MPLA's victory in the civil war, Pretoria made it clear that its price for the recognition of the MPLA regime and the withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola was an end to such backing for SWAPO and the closing of the Angola-Namibia border to the "terrorists."

Le Monde correspondent Jean-Claude Pomonti commented in the January 30 issue of the Paris daily:

By reinforcing its defense and maintaining its cavalry units along the Namibian border, the government intends to prove that it is no "paper tiger"—despite the withdrawal of its troops from the front lines in Angola—and that it is ready for all contingencies. By extending the length of service for draftees and by assembling at Bloemfontein the seventh motorized infantry division of the Republic, the regime is giving the impression that the failure of its military intervention in Angola has not persuaded it to give up its dynamic—to say the least—concept of defense of its own borders and those of Namibia.

Although the "hot pursuit" policy was specifically directed at the Angolan nationalists, it is also a threat to the other Black regimes of southern Africa—those in Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania—that now provide sanctuary for guerrillas or that may do so in the future.

South African President Nicolaas Dierichs, on January 22, linked this military posture to Pretoria's "détente" policy. "Our policy of détente," he said, "and the maintenance of a strong national defense are complementary and in no way contradictory."

Although Pretoria had sent forces into Zimbabwe in 1967 to help the Smith regime combat Black freedom fighters, the intervention in Angola was the first time it launched a major operation in direct collaboration with its American and European allies. That intervention underlined its role as a local guardian of the joint South African and Western imperialist interests in southern Africa.

Following the pullback from central Angola in late January, Pretoria indicated that the intervention in that country may not be the last large-scale military drive outside its borders. The South African imperialists also broadened their concept of a "dynamic defense" beyond the 200-mile hot-pursuit perimeter.

A bill presented before the South African Parliament January 28 would authorize

the government to use troops "to prevent or suppress all armed conflicts outside of the Republic that are or could become threats to the Republic's security."

Pretoria's field of military operations, according to the bill, was to be extended to the Equator, which lies 1,200 miles north of the Angola-Namibia border and passes through Gabon, the Congo Republic, Zaïre, Uganda, and Kenya.

Pretoria's military buildup and the extension of its interventionist policies are a clear threat to the struggles of the African masses for genuine independence.

But while the danger from Pretoria is a serious one in its own right, it cannot be separated from the danger emanating from Washington, the main bastion of

imperialism and racism on a world scale. The American aggression in Angola—side by side with its South African ally—showed that the U.S. rulers are just as eager to intervene against struggles for self-determination in Africa as they are anywhere else in the world.

The antiwar sentiment among the American people severely handicapped Washington's ability to intervene in Angola, dealing an important setback to its counterrevolutionary aims. But the American aggression against the African masses continues.

It is necessary to press forward with a broad campaign to keep the U.S. imperialists out of Angola and the rest of Africa and to demand an end to all military aid to the racist South African regime. □

Socialist Party Leader Gunned Down

Rightist Terror Attacks Mount in Thailand

Boonsanong Punyodyana, the general secretary of the Socialist party of Thailand, was shot to death on February 28. He was the most prominent victim so far of the wave of rightist terror attacks that has been mounting in Thailand over the past two years.

About 4,000 students and others staged a funeral march through the streets of Bangkok with banners reading, "Carry on Boonsanong's ideals." The Socialist party released a statement that said, "The Socialist Party of Thailand firmly believes that the assassination of Dr Boonsanong was carried out by the enemies of the people. This great loss is another example of the barbarism and inhumanity of exploiters and the ruling class."

On March 3, a bomb exploded at a Bangkok technical school, killing five students. Two men reportedly declared while detonating the charge, "This will be a lesson for the leftists." The director of the school, a member of the Socialist party Central Committee, had been shot and seriously wounded three months earlier.

According to the March 12 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Boonsanong's assassination brought the death toll of leftist political figures to about thirty-five, mostly members or sympathizers of the Socialist party. The October-December 1975 issue of the Tokyo quarterly *Ampo* listed the names of twenty-two peasant leaders murdered in the period up to August 3, 1975, including Intha Sriboonruang, vice-president of the Peasants Federation of Thailand.

Many of the assassinations are thought to have been carried out by members of two rightist groups, the Red Gaurs and Navapol. Two men arrested in the killing

of a leader of the National Students Center of Thailand in early February admitted that they were members of Navapol. And an assailant who blew himself up during a bomb attack on the headquarters of the New Force party a few days earlier carried a Red Gaur membership card.

These rightist terror groups have close links with the Thai military. One leader of Navapol is Gen. Wallop Rojanawisut, a retired head of Thai military intelligence. *Far Eastern Economic Review* correspondent Norman Peagam, reporting in the July 25, 1975, issue, said that he had recognized the leader of the Red Gaurs as Col. Sudsai Hasdin, an official of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), which coordinates counterinsurgency operations. ISOC was formerly known as the Communist Suppression Operations Command.

Peagam reported in the March 12 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "According to some observers these attacks, apparently aimed at all groups which stand for social and economic reform, could be designed to contribute to an atmosphere of chaos, instability and insecurity in order to serve as a pretext for military intervention." □

Some South African Troops Leave Southern Angola

South African Defense Minister Pieter W. Botha announced March 12 that South African troops in the region of Pereira d'Eça (Ngiva), in southern Angola, have been withdrawn. He added, however, that South African forces continued to occupy the Cunene hydroelectric dam project and several camps in Angola housing Portuguese refugees.

Freedom for Philosophy

By George Novack

Recent developments in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and China have called attention to the status of philosophy in the postcapitalist countries and sharply posed the question of the relations between the Marxist world outlook and the unhampered exercise of philosophic inquiry.

Collisions between state and clerical authorities and philosophers long antedate the advent of the Communist regimes in the twentieth century. They are almost as old as philosophizing itself, which is inclined to be critical of established ideas and institutions. Anaxagoras was banished from Athens for impiously declaring that the moon was not divine but made of stone. Socrates had to drink the hemlock after being accused of corrupting the youth with his teachings.

The Inquisition condemned Bruno as a heretic, imprisoned him for eight years, and burned him alive. In the seventeenth century Descartes and Spinoza were persecuted for their unorthodox views, while the English government imprisoned the free-thinking deists Peter Anset and Thomas Woolston, on the charge of blasphemy for questioning the credibility of miracles and other biblical doctrines.

After the separation of church and state, ecclesiastical controls over free thought were loosened in most Western countries. For instance, the clerical grip upon the teaching of philosophy in the denominational colleges since colonial times began to break up in the United States. After the Civil War the flourishing of competitive capitalism and the elevation of philosophy into a professional academic discipline were conducive to a comparable competitiveness in the ideological marketplace. Harvard under President Charles Eliot set the pattern for this diversity in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. According to Santayana, who benefited from this liberalism, the administrators would have invited a Buddhist, a Muslim, and a Catholic scholastic to the philosophic faculty if they had found suitable candidates.

However, this permissiveness had its limits. Peirce was not allowed to lecture to the Harvard students because of his irregular marital relations; political radicalism was unwelcome. As Professor Barrows Dunham, who was himself victimized by the Haverford College administration during the reign of McCarthyism, observed in *Thinkers and Treasurers*, the boundaries of free enterprise in ideas "are

medieval philosophy on the one hand and Marxist philosophy on the other. The life of Western philosophy and the lives of its philosophers are spent in trying not to go back to the thirteenth century, and not to go forward to the twenty-first."

American universities nowadays pride themselves upon upholding unrestricted freedom of thought, including its philosophic expression. Yet few university philosophical departments treat dialectical materialism seriously, even though this world view has the broadest international influence and has been espoused by some of the keenest minds of this century. They usually have an opponent rather than a qualified and convinced advocate present its ideas to students.

Like other democratic rights under capitalist rule, freedom of philosophic inquiry is accorded in the abstract and abridged in reality. While the discrimination against adherents of Marxism is normally more tacit than explicit, it now and then becomes exposed to view. In recent years the exclusions of the Stalinist Angela Davis from the University of California Los Angeles and the Trotskyist professor Morris Starsky at the Arizona State and Calstate Dominguez Hills campuses demonstrate that though theoretical agreement with certain Marxist doctrines may be tolerated, political activism can bring about victimization by witch-hunting administrators.

In the ideological atmosphere of Western Europe and Britain the situation is somewhat less restrictive. There avowed socialists, Communists, and even Maoists and Trotskyists are to be found on university faculties and incur fewer penalties for their theoretical views and political affiliations. However, in West Germany, where professors are state employees, revolutionists are by law liable to be ousted for their ideas. This is an old tradition; after getting his diploma as a Doctor of Philosophy at Jena in 1842, Marx was prevented by the stifling reactionary atmosphere from obtaining an academic post.

Thus it is apparent, in the capitalist democracies as elsewhere, that politics does affect the functioning of philosophy, whether or not its professional practitioners care to recognize the fact. Indeed, the prevailing view among most academic philosophers in the United States is that their specialty has little or nothing to do with politics and the mutual estrangement of the two is normal and desirable.

They are content to leave the practice, if

not the theory, of politics to representatives of the men of property and power. Such tendencies as the linguistic analysts, the existentialists, and the idealists maintain that while individual thinkers may in their private capacity as citizens be occupied with political issues and activities, their philosophic work as such has no intrinsic connection or concern with politics. Since the politicians reciprocate this indifference, philosophy nowadays has no perceptible effect on the course of politics and does not even influence political discussions.

Such a disjunction between philosophy and politics is anathema to Marxism, which bases itself upon the unity of theory and practice in all spheres and whose founder proclaimed that it is not enough for a thinker to explain the world, the point is to change it along revolutionary lines.

Moreover, such indifferentism to political action even runs counter to the recommendations of John Dewey's instrumentalism, which provided a rationale for the mass reform movement of Progressivism before and after the First World War. After Dewey's death in 1952, his pupil, Sidney Hook, sought to step into his shoes. As a right-wing Social Democrat, he became an apologist for the U.S. State Department's policies. In a collection issued by his fellow scholars in honor of his sixty-fifth birthday, Hook was acclaimed as "without peer, the leading philosopher deeply involved in social affairs." This happens to be the case so far as the holders of academic chairs in this country are concerned.

This fact tells a great deal about the state of American philosophy in this generation. France has Jean-Paul Sartre as its premier philosopher, Poland its Leszek Kolakowski, England had its Bertrand Russell—and we, alas, have Sidney Hook! The three Europeans stand out as fierce critics of their society, defenders of rebel youth, and partisans of the oppressed. The American Hook has been the favorite philosopher of the *New York Times* and of that corrupt witch-hunter, the late Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut. He has been one of the most energetic cold warriors in intellectual circles, urging in 1949 that Communists be barred as conspirators from teaching in the schools and universities. This ex-revolutionist voted for Nixon in 1972.

* * *

The widespread belief that philosophy and politics are alien pursuits is not the only misconception about their proper relationship. No less erroneous is the antithetical notion, commonly maintained under tyrannical, clerical, and totalitarian regimes, that philosophy must serve as a counselor for the policies of the ruling class or a bureaucratic caste.

Such a view was predominant in feudal Europe, where philosophy was the hand-

maiden of theology. More recently, the servile role assigned to philosophy was crassly exhibited in fascist Italy. Mussolini and his blackshirt gangs seized power in 1922 without benefit of any ideology beyond chauvinism and anti-Communism. After consolidating his hold, he felt the need for some more elaborate creed as a figleaf for his naked personal dictatorship on behalf of the Italian capitalists.

In 1929 Il Duce decided that fascism must "provide itself with a body of doctrine." He accordingly ordered his official philosopher, the former Minister of Public Instruction Giovanni Gentile, to have it ready in two months "between now and the National Congress" of his party.

Hitlerism had greater power but fewer philosophical pretensions than its Italian precursor. The Nazis made do in the domain of ideology with ultranationalism and racial mysticism combined with the suppression of all independent philosophic thought. The Hitlerite treatment of philosophy was dramatically symbolized by two acts in 1933: the capitulation of Martin Heidegger, the principal theoretician of existentialism in the German university system, to the Nazi authorities and party, and the bonfires that burned the heretical literatures of Marxism and liberalism.

It is understandable that fascism, the mortal foe of liberal democracy as well as proletarian socialism, could not allow philosophy to function freely in a critical atmosphere. If such freedom were permitted in that one area, it could not easily be prevented from spilling over into others. The fascists know by instinct that every philosophy has political implications. Muzzling mouths and manacled minds is as indispensable as terrorist gangs to ensure the maximum of totalitarian "coordination."

But it has been quite unexpected that regimes ruling in the name of socialism and professing to adhere to Marxism have also totally subordinated philosophy to the dictates of the state power. This first happened in the bureaucratic reaction to the Russian revolution that usurped power after Lenin's death.

Under Stalin, teachers and historians of philosophy could not deviate an iota from the officially sanctioned interpretations of Marxist doctrine. They had to parrot the prescribed formulas in dealing with problems of theory if they wanted to hold their posts, publish their writings, and even stay out of jail.

Held in a bureaucratic vise, Marxist philosophy had all life-giving juices squeezed out of it and became converted into its opposite. Instead of being a flexible instrument of critical analysis to deal with the development of the contradictory elements in all things, dialectical materialism hardened into a set of dogmatic formulas that disregarded the complexities of the historical process and was used to justify the shifting course and counterrevo-

lutionary policies of the all-powerful bureaucracy.

This resulted in the now generally admitted ossification and distortion of Marxist thought. It set up the opinions of one individual, Stalin, as the irrefutable standard of truth. Anyone who refused to acknowledge the infallibility of the words uttered by the oracle in the Kremlin was subject to correction, not by superior argument, but by the intervention of the secret police.

This vassalization of philosophic thought to the arbitrary requirements of bureaucratic despotism seriously handicapped the development of the natural and social sciences. The dismissal of the verified results of genetics; the misjudgment of Einstein's theory of relativity and its philosophical implications; the initial disparagement of cybernetics (information theory); the denial of the validity of formal logic within its limits; and the derogations of Freud's contributions to depth psychology and psychopathology, whatever his misconceptions on other matters, testify to the harm inflicted by Stalinist dogmatism and intellectual terrorism upon Soviet sciences and philosophy.

In the past fifteen years, some of this burden has been lightened, though far from being lifted, in the Soviet Union. Natural scientists can proceed within the bounds of their specialties with little fear of punishment for "dangerous thoughts" frowned upon by the authorities. The situation has also somewhat eased in the field of philosophy, though Soviet philosophers are far from enjoying freedom of expression even within the framework of the Marxist world outlook.

Unfortunately, the cult of the individual in philosophy did not die with Stalin. After being buried in Moscow, it has been resurrected in Peking. Maoism prescribes that politics—and bureaucratic politics at that!—takes command of philosophy as totally as it does everything else, including the arts and sciences.

"The great red banner of Mao's thought" covers the entire field of philosophy and is virtually a substitute for it in the People's Republic. Mao is awarded the same monopoly in philosophy as Stalin once held—and with as little justification. It was reported in 1971 that Professor Fung Yulan of Peking University, who was then seventy-six years old and considered to be the most eminent Chinese philosopher, was rewriting Chinese philosophy from the standpoint of Mao Tsetung Thought. The journal *Philosophical Research*, published by the Institute of Philosophy in Peking, the highest faculty in China, was discontinued in 1966 at the beginning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution on the ground that only 5.1 percent of the institute's time was spent on the study of Mao's writings.

Neither Stalin nor his most prominent imitator deserve such eminence on the

basis of their contributions to philosophy in general or to Marxist theory in particular. Stalin's writings on philosophical questions were a watered down, often vulgarized, version of some of the elementary ideas of dialectical and historical materialism he had garnered from Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, and Lenin. In opposition to them Stalin expunged the negation of the negation from his exposition of the laws of dialectical development. This surgical operation was especially reprehensible because it omitted any logical explanation for the progressive nature of evolution at that climactic revolutionary point where the new replaces the old and lifts things to a higher stage.

Mao learned his philosophy as a pupil of the Stalinist school. His two essays on the subject—*On Practice* and *On Contradiction*—are in large measure paraphrases of what he derived from the standard Stalinized texts, with some sprinkling of illustrative examples drawn from Chinese life and literature.

The method of dialectical materialism should expose fetishes wherever they are to be found—from political economy to the state and religion. Yet many naïve radicals have fallen victim to fetishism through the mistaken notion that the possession of state power, and personal command of the state apparatus, invests those who exercise it with exceptional capacities of theoretical insight. They have an almost hypnotic adoration for the philosophic prowess of a Stalin or Mao. This illusion serves as a supplementary prop of their rule and induces the devotees to acquiesce in the subjection of philosophy to the needs of the state, which violates the critical essence of the dialectical method.

* * *

The friction between heterodox philosophers and the Stalinized regimes has flared up most openly in Eastern Europe, where the philosophical faculties of universities in capitals from East Berlin to Budapest have been centers of ideological opposition to bureaucratic rule and censorship. The late Georg Lukács's speeches against the harm done by the dogmatism of the Stalin era during the debates organized by the Petöfi Circle in June 1956 featured the ferment that exploded in the Hungarian revolt that October. Lukács became minister of culture in the ill-fated Nagy government, was deported to Romania after its overthrow, and only permitted to return the following spring. Yet today under the Kadar administration his followers, such as Agnes Heller, cannot get their works published.

In Czechoslovakia, on April 28, 1975, police raided the home of the philosopher Karel Kosik and confiscated a thousand pages of an unpublished manuscript. They accused him of concealing writings that would show he was engaged in criminal

action of "subversion against the Republic," a charge that carries a one- to five-year sentence. They did the same to his friend, the noted writer Ludvig Vaculik.

Kosik, a longtime member of the Communist party, was expelled in 1969 after Moscow's occupation of his homeland and was removed the next year from the faculty of philosophy at Prague's Charles University. In a letter to Jean-Paul Sartre, Kosik said he felt as though he was "buried alive." Since his publications are banned from bookshops and public libraries, he is unable to attend scholarly meetings and cannot accept invitations to lecture at European universities. He is one of thousands of oppositional intellectuals under attack by the Husak government.

The tribulations of the two best-known Marxist philosophers in Poland, Leszek Kolakowski and Adam Schaff, exemplify the situation in that country. The young Kolakowski, the rising star of Polish philosophy, became the most popular voice among the dissenting intellectuals in the antibureaucratic resistance leading up to the "little October" of 1956. In a satirical poem entitled "What Is Socialism?" he defined the Stalinized state as a place "where philosophers and writers always say the same thing as the generals and ministers, but always after them."

When he persisted in criticizing the lack of political and cultural liberties under Gomulka as under his predecessor, Kolakowski was deprived of his chair in the philosophic faculty at Warsaw University in 1968, blacklisted by the authorities, and forced into exile. He now teaches at Oxford.

The little leeway allowed for the expression of theoretical differences has been underscored by the milder punishment meted out to Adam Schaff, the foremost Polish Communist philosopher and a member of the party's Central Committee since 1959. As a guardian of party orthodoxy, Schaff scored Kolakowski for his heresies and in 1959 was instrumental in having him removed as editor in chief of *Philosophical Studies*.

Six years later Schaff published a book, *Marxism and the Human Individual*, that expressed some of the same sentiments and made certain concessions to the trend of thought initiated by his former pupil. He there propounded the thesis that the abolition of private property does not signify the end of all forms of alienation in postcapitalist societies but only some of them. "Socialism," he wrote, "has not completely overcome any one of the known forms of alienation—not even the economic one." He went on to castigate the chauvinism, anti-Semitism, privileges, bureaucratism, and limitations upon freedom of science and critical thought in Poland. He even argued that a fully fledged socialist society will retain certain kinds of alienation stemming from the complex tasks, extensive administrative apparatus,

and specializations of labor bound up with modern industrialization.

Gomulka's henchmen condemned Schaff for these views. They were especially alarmed by his recommendations for liberalizing intellectual life. He was expelled from the Central Committee in 1968 and now divides his teaching year between the Universities of Warsaw and Vienna.

The most stubborn and protracted struggle has taken place in Yugoslavia, where for several years Marshal Tito's government sought to dismiss from Belgrade University's philosophy department a group of eight Marxist professors who were founders and contributors to the philosophical journal *Praxis*. This review has been internationally celebrated as the foremost medium for the exchange of philosophic views in the entire Soviet bloc. It was adamantly opposed to the ideological regimentation of Stalinism and stood for the elaboration of a socialist humanism. It organized yearly seminars at Korcula, where noted left thinkers of such diverse persuasions as Lucien Goldmann, Lukács, Bloch, Marcuse, Fromm, and Ernest Mandel participated. Since February 1975 it has been unable to appear because of the government's attitude toward it.

The measures taken against the critical-minded professors spring from an ongoing struggle between the state officials, who want to maintain and reinforce their monopoly of control over intellectual and political life, and the democratizing forces among the youth, the intellectuals, and the workers striving for policies of a more socialist character. All have been known as dissidents since 1968 when they supported the students who occupied the University of Belgrade and set forth a list of economic and political demands that included the establishment of genuine workers self-management in state enterprises and a protest against social inequalities.

Tito himself accused the professors of being "anarcho-liberal" defiers of party discipline and doctrine, and in April 1973 Peter Stambolic, a member of the CP's Presidium, said that the view they upheld "tends to undermine confidence among young people in the organizational and leadership qualities of the Communist Party."

For a time the professors successfully resisted the regime, thanks to the support of students, fellow faculty members in various Yugoslav cities, and colleagues abroad. However, legislation on the political and ideological "fitness" of teaching personnel, adopted in early 1975 by the government, stated that professors must agree with the program of the ruling party. Following its adoption, the six professors and two teaching assistants were accused of engaging in "anti-self-management" and "antisocialist" activities and threatened with removal from their posts.

On January 28, 1975, the eight dissidents were dismissed by the Serbian legislature. According to Vladimir Stankovitch, minister of education, they had "abused their function as educators by preparing and orienting youth toward political confrontation and revolt."

In an open letter the professors describe their dismissal as an arbitrary action contrary "to all the principles of self-management." They detail the long campaign against them, including the withdrawal of passports, attempts to compromise their intellectual and moral integrity, and even "the sentencing to forced labor of students who dared to defend us."

The group had earlier been accused by the central party organ *Kommunist* of establishing links with West European "Trotskyists." Their open letter acknowledged that they do have "relations abroad"—not "with financial magnates, businessmen, generals, intelligence services, kings, or emperors, but with philosophers, thinkers, well-known intellectuals, that is, with men who are not, as the official propaganda claims, enemies of socialism and our country, but quite the contrary, their tested friends."

The charge of unpatriotic activities, the professors note, has always been invoked by "police with a Stalinist mentality" as a cover for stifling opinions they do not agree with.

They also pointed out that the accusation of corrupting the youth is almost as old as philosophy itself. And so, the persecution of philosophical heretics has come full circle from ancient Athens to Yugoslavia today.

* * *

After these horrible examples of the subjection of philosophizing to reactionary politics from the history of both East and West over the past fifty years, it is necessary to ask what the relations of philosophy to the state and society should be according to genuine Marxist standards. The adversaries of Marxism contend that freedom of thought and expression cannot be expected of any regime professing revolutionary socialism since it must be totalitarian by nature. It presumably cannot abide unorthodox ideas and must impose stringent controls upon all dissent from official doctrine.

These preachers of original sin fail to distinguish between a monolithic bureaucratized workers state that fears dissent like a plague and an authentically Marxist regime that would not simply tolerate but welcome and encourage free inquiry and the confrontation of differing views in all spheres.

Trotsky once remarked that "politics is the culture of the proletariat" on the road to power. However, this does not mean that the proletarian party or state—or any other—and its considerations of political

expediency should dictate the writing or rewriting of the history of philosophy, dominate its life, or prescribe its course of development.

It is perfectly in order for a Marxist party or a government guided by such a party to propagate the doctrines and method of dialectical materialism openly and consistently along with its program and proposals. Indeed, it is obligated to do so in order to give the rising generation a correct lead in the field of generalized thought and oppose whatever is reactionary, obsolescent, and wrong among the ideas implanted in the minds of the people.

But that is entirely different from adopting a state philosophy and then compelling everyone from the scholars and teachers in the universities to schoolchildren to pay obeisance to that viewpoint. That is as bad as enforcing a state religion. In fact the two are not very far apart. A philosophic standpoint or system that is imposed by official compulsion upon the minds of a people takes on the traits of a religion: blind faith, hypocrisy, discrepancy between theory and practice, dogmatism, and the withering of critical thought.

It can also lead to censoring and prohibiting alternative trends of thought. These restraints upon the clash and confrontation of contending opinions react back upon the orthodox philosophy and further enfeeble it. When it encounters no strong and serious open challenges to its positions and formulas, official thought grows dull, slothful, and unsure of itself. It inclines to evade the most burning, sensitive, and complicated questions of everyday life that are on the minds of the people, troubling their conscience. It begins to lose the allegiance of the best minds among the mature and alienates the flower of the youth. It ceases to progress.

This process of degradation has afflicted philosophy in the Soviet bloc under Stalin. It is the source of the grave, still unresolved crisis in the realm of philosophy felt throughout the Communist world. More and more of the keenest thinkers in the Soviet bloc are dissatisfied with the post-Stalin dogmatism and keep hacking away at it, though in most cases with dull weapons and inconclusive results. Mao-style ideas, turned into a catechism to be repeated by rote, have made a travesty of dialectical materialism in China.

Even if the philosophy was authentically Marxist in spirit, its enforced prescription by the state would have harmful effects; it is even worse when a falsified version is imposed. A living and effective philosophy must earn and win conviction by the force of its arguments rather than by arguments of force. It must gain assent by its concordance with the facts of experience, the insight of its analyses, and the truth of its conclusions. It must evolve, change, and advance in the light of practice.

Genuine Marxism is such a philosophy. It has no fear of opposing or divergent views. Why should it shrink from any competition of ideas? Despite innumerable attempts to repress them, the ideas of scientific socialism have gained a worldwide hearing and adherence over the past hundred years. No one can claim to be politically literate today without some acquaintance with them. True ideas are like nails; the harder they're struck the deeper they go.

Dialectical materialism wants free competition in philosophy as well as in the arts and sciences, just as its politics favors a plurality of parties in a socialist democracy. This would foster the most propitious atmosphere for the advancement of creative thought and endeavor in all fields.

Having made this clear, it is necessary to note that there is no shade of philosophy without class bias and political implications and effects. Even where a philosophy sincerely proclaims that it has nothing to do with public affairs or political questions and contends that its ideas have no necessary applications to practical life, that does not preclude politics from having something to do with it, as the German professors in their academic hideouts discovered when Hitlerism took over, or American thinkers felt when McCarthyism was rampant.

Philosophy is not a purely intellectual exercise dealing exclusively with some esoteric regions inaccessible to ordinary mortals or with subjects locked up in the minds of Ph.D.'s. Its ideas are shaped not only by the existing state of social development and inventory of culture and science, but by the world outlook, material needs, vital aims and aspirations of diverse sectors of society. Philosophy has social functions, and its use and influence extend beyond college courses and professional journals. Its methods of thought serve as tools of social forces and as weapons in the struggles of contending classes. John Dewey's instrumentalism was the expression and instrument of the liberal reformers of the Progressive movement, just as Marxism is the theory and method of revolutionary socialism.

* * *

Marxists will draw different conclusions from the *via dolorosa* of philosophy in the Soviet bloc than the anti-Marxists, who take these repeated instances of repression as proof positive of the inherent incompatibility of freedom for critical thought with any postcapitalist regime. The Marxist approach looks forward to the norms of a socialist democracy rather than turning back toward the outlook of a decaying bourgeois liberalism.

First of all, it is imperative to defend all those scholars who have been penalized for their oppositional ideas, whether or not one agrees with their views. This is an indispensable act of solidarity with the

protest movements, which demand observance of the elementary human rights explicitly incorporated in the constitutions of their countries and often in their government's international agreements.

When I presented this point of view at an Australian university, a Maoist philosophy professor scornfully remarked that I sounded more like the John Stuart Mill of *On Liberty* than a Marxist. (He should more accurately have said a Stalinist.) His point had more pertinence than he realized.

The citizens living under malignant bureaucratic dictatorships do not enjoy even those democratic rights that the revolutionary forces fought for and to some degree won during the rise of bourgeois society. It is an irony of history—and an illustration of the contradictory course of social progress—that advocates of "socialism with a human face" have to demand freedom of opinion and the right of expression against official inquisition and censorship, just as bourgeois democrats previously fought for the separation of church from state and freedom of religious belief, along with other liberties.

Their cause is just and fully worthy of support, for the sake of both democracy and socialism. Marxism agrees with liberalism that freedom of thought and expression are goods to be cherished and a right of the people to be safeguarded against restriction by reactionary forces.

The two schools of thought diverge when the struggle for power between contending classes arrives at the point of confrontation between revolution and counterrevolution. Classical liberalism elevates bourgeois-democratic rights above the concrete conditions and necessities of the class struggle and regards them as supreme commandments that like Kant's categorical imperative are never under any circumstances to be curtailed or violated.

Historical materialists take a more realistic and relativistic approach to this question, as to others. They deny that there are any sacrosanct principles of social organization and conduct that are binding upon everyone at all times and in all cases and that must be strictly adhered to, come what may. There can be exceptions to all rules. In determining what position to adopt on any particular issue and in any specific situation, the Marxist takes into account not only the relevant general principles, but more decisively, what class interests are at stake. Behind every abstraction put forward by the forces involved in a conflicting situation, it is necessary to discern the material interests each side is protecting and promoting.

In the academic field, for example, departmental autonomy is considered essential for maintaining high quality standards of scholarship and shielding the faculty from adverse outside interference. Is this rule never to be breached?

In Yugoslavia where the state authorities have grossly trampled upon the autonomy of the philosophical faculty, this principle has to be upheld and defended. It is otherwise when the same principle is invoked in the United States to protect the privileged positions of an elite of white male professors.

Thus Sidney Hook was outraged when repeated documented complaints forced the office of Civil Rights of the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare to file legal suits against the pattern of discrimination in regard to numbers, salaries, and positions in colleges receiving federal funds. The professor complained that "the effect of ultimata to the universities to hire blacks and women under threat of losing crucial financial support is to compel them to hire unqualified Negroes and women and to discriminate against qualified non-blacks and men." His arguments against affirmative action to eliminate the effects of longstanding discrimination under cover of faculty freedom bear the same reactionary stamp as the efforts of building-trade bureaucrats to maintain the job monopoly of privileged white craftsmen against the entry of members of the oppressed minorities.

Similar considerations apply in cases of civil war and other life and death situations for the revolutionary cause. Under such exceptional circumstances it may be warranted and sometimes imperative for a workers regime to restrict ordinary civil rights for a time. Proletarian revolutions are not unique in this respect. Curbs on legal and civil rights were instituted during all the major revolutions of the bourgeois era, including our own War of Independence and the Civil War. The worker-peasant revolutions of the twentieth century have been compelled to do the same in the conquest and consolidation of their power.

Notwithstanding this necessity, the leadership of the revolution and its state is duty bound to recognize that these are temporary wartime expedients and should not be perpetuated once the new regime is stabilized and national and civil peace restored. Such restraints are not the norm for a workers state, as the Stalinists hold, but abnormal and episodic measures that should be lifted as soon as feasible. What was done by the liberal-bourgeois parliamentary regimes in the nineteenth century along this line is all the more incumbent upon the workers states in ours, which should not only promise but actually achieve expanded freedoms in all areas for its citizens, and which can do so without the restrictions imposed by the private ownership of social wealth that abridges and corrupts so many guaranteed rights.

The Marxist approach to this touchy question has been well stated by Roy Medvedev, the noted Soviet historian and dissident, whose own family has been the

target of repression by high government officials. "The right of dissent should not be thought peculiar to bourgeois democracy. It is a most important feature of any democracy. There are exceptional situations in which certain important democratic freedoms, including freedom of speech and opposition, can be temporarily restricted. Such a situation really did exist in our country during the first years of Soviet rule, but there was no reason for the state of emergency to apply during the building of socialism and communism. In today's world, fifty-three years after the October Revolution, it is certainly both absurd and extremely harmful to be intolerant toward dissent and opposition, political or otherwise." (*A Question of Madness*, by Zhores and Roy Medvedev, p. 209.)

In an article written in 1938 Leon Trotsky agreed that the proletariat in power might, for a certain time during a civil war, have to take special measures against the actively counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, such as curtailing freedom of the press. "Naturally, if you are forced to use artillery and planes against the enemy, you cannot permit this same enemy to maintain his own centers of news and propaganda within the armed camp of the proletariat. Nonetheless, in this instance, too, if the special measures are extended until they become an enduring pattern, they in themselves carry the danger of getting out of hand and of the workers bureaucracy gaining a political monopoly that would be one of the sources of its degeneration. . . .

"The real tasks of the workers state lie not in clamping a police gag on public opinion but rather in freeing it from the yoke of capital. This can be done only by placing the means of production, including the production of public information, in the hands of society as a whole. Once this fundamental socialist step has been taken, all currents of public opinion that have not taken up arms against the dictatorship of the proletariat must be given the opportunity to express themselves freely. It is the duty of the workers state to make available to them all, in proportion to their numbers, the technical means they may require, such as presses, paper, and transport. One of the main causes of the degeneration of the state apparatus is the Stalinist bureaucracy's monopolization of the press, which threatens to reduce all the gains of the October Revolution to utter ruin." (See "Freedom of the Press and the Working Class," *Intercontinental Press*, June 9, 1975, pp. 799-800.)

It will be retorted that the necessity to ward off counterrevolution and the forces of capitalist restoration and imperialism is the reason advanced by the Soviet government and its emulators for maintaining censorship and suppressing other civil rights. There is not a single element of Marxism that the bureaucrats do not pervert, including this one. Just as healthy

lungs need fresh air to breathe, so the free exchange of ideas and circulation of information is indispensable to the citizens of any country if their political and cultural life is to flourish.

The Soviet Union has already existed for fifty-seven years and is not threatened by civil war or the near prospect of military invasion. Its progress is actually threatened by the stifling of domestic freedoms. Its peoples are entitled to the rights guaranteed by their constitution. It is one thing for the police power to be used against counterrevolutionaries engaged in activities directly aimed at overthrowing the socioeconomic gains since 1917; it is an entirely different matter to wield them against artists, writers, philosophers, or plain workers and peasants who think differently than the powers that be.

A strong and healthy workers state cannot be undermined by open criticism frankly expressed; it can only be morally and intellectually benefited by its ventilation. In fact, the restrictions are imposed by the bureaucrats not to defend the institutions of the revolution, but to shield their material privileges and autocratic power from public scrutiny and accountability. They are the greatest menace today to the gains made through the October revolution.

* * *

Some members of the Frankfurt school maintain that the philosopher must by the very nature of his activity be hostile to society and the state, regardless of its content and direction, because their reason for existence is to be critical of what exists. They view the philosopher as an eternal and unchangeable adversary of all institutions. This smacks more of anarchism than Marxism.

Yet the observation does contain a grain of truth. Discontent with things as they are has been the psychic motive force of all human progress—and in philosophy as well. Philosophy as a rational scientific approach to the world emerged out of the criticism of religion and mythology. To philosophize is to criticize—and the dialectical method is essentially polemical and vigorously critical because it is predicated upon the contradictory nature of changing reality and takes no state of affairs or stage of knowledge as fixed or final.

All the same, the Frankfurt conception of the functioning of philosophy erects into an absolute an office that is relative to the surrounding historical conditions. There need not be unbridgeable antagonism between intellectuals and the state, however uncomfortable their cohabitation. Philosophers holding the most varied views can uninhibitedly proceed with their inquiries if the social and political order is basically progressive and more responsive to human welfare than its predecessor, if the regime permits the free exercise of

thought and expression, and if its policies promote social and scientific advancement.

For its own material and moral advantage a healthy workers state would take pains to ensure that no impediments whatsoever are placed upon intellectual expression and scientific research and that their fruits are made accessible to all. The

socialist movement aims to provide more democratic rights for the collectivity and the individual than has ever been extended under the most liberal capitalism. So long as this obligation is unfulfilled, it will have fallen short of its historical mission and failed to realize the potential of its revolutionary humanism.

March 1, 1976

Some People Never Learn

The 'Loans Scandal' in Australia

By Jim Percy

[The following article appeared in the March 11 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in Sydney.]

* * *

The Labor party executive can only blame themselves for the sorry outcome of the Iraqi "loans affair." The executive is composed of people who have now and consistently in the past refused to fight the interests behind the press barons' attacks on the ALP [Australian Labor party].

The ALP national executive did not fight after Whitlam's sacking on November 11,¹ to call a general strike, to adopt a socialist program. Nor did they fight against the right-wing, procapitalist policies of the Whitlam government, which allowed massive unemployment and gave generous benefits to big business.

Moreover the national executive did not condemn the manner in which the last loans scandal was used to remove Cairns and Connor.²

In fact, the ALP national executive and other leaders of the party have become so terrified of the power of the press that they seem unable to stand up to any attack on themselves, but rather collapse under any pressure.

So vulnerable are our erstwhile "leaders"

1. On November 11, 1975, the queen's representative, Governor General Sir John Kerr, dismissed the Whitlam Labor party government from office.—IP

2. The original loans scandal developed around attempts by the Labor government to borrow money from Arab countries through "unorthodox" channels, in order to buy back Australia's mineral resources from overseas companies. Ensuing publicity in the press led to the dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister James F. Cairns July 2, 1975, and the resignation of Reginald F.X. Connor, minister of minerals and energy, October 14, 1975.—IP

that they are unable to trust each other in the most intimate dealings, especially in that ever delicate subject of money. Of course, in this case the problem was worsened by the presence of [ALP President Robert] Hawke and his well-known anti-Arab and pro-Israeli views.

And so the executive has met and decided to "condemn in the strongest terms" the actions of Whitlam, Combe, and Hartley. The press has got something of what they want—and they will continue the campaign for Whitlam's dismissal.

As the *Sydney Morning Herald* put it on March 8 in its editorial: "The severity of the ALP national executive's censure leaves Mr Whitlam no practical alternative but to resign his party leadership." *Granny Herald* goes on to promise more scandals if he doesn't: "Were there other deals, other attempts to get foreign money—Japanese money, for example, which have not been revealed?"

What is involved here is the firm intention of the press and their corporate backers to tame the Labor party, to assert their right to choose the leader and then to keep him in line. Whitlam is being shown that he can't get away with even his modest show of independence after and before November 11. The press, particularly the Murdoch press, feel that they made him in 1972 and that they can break him too—in favor of their new favorite Bob Hawke.

And this process will go on and on while Labor refuses to adopt a fighting socialist program and until Labor tells the press and their big business backers just what they can do to themselves. Moreover, the side effect of this continuing surrender to big business will be the lack of internal trust and cohesion in the ALP leadership.

There *was* another course of action possible after November 11. The executive could have met and issued a statement that in view of the extraordinary circumstances of the election, the massive attack on democracy by reaction in this country,

the ALP was launching an international appeal for funds. Given the Liberals' multimillion dollar war chest, the ALP feels justified in calling for support from anywhere.

But instead they are so bluffed by the press that they sneak about to look for money. They leave the door open for reactionary and racist hysteria. For instance, from the same *Herald* editorial we find: "... "What went on for instance at Mr Whitlam's extraordinary breakfast session with two representatives of the bloody-minded rulers of Irak."

The *Herald* can get away with this after the Australian government has just feted King Hussein for a week—the bloody-handed butcher of 20,000 Palestinians in September 1970!

Let's stress again: there's nothing wrong in principle in talking to Irak on any topic or getting money from them. In the circumstances, Whitlam made a tactical error. But there is nothing wrong with a tactical error, provided it is corrected.

However, the ALP executive statement leaves all this unclear. It implies that there is some moral wrong in talking to, or getting money from, Irak. Otherwise, why "strongly condemn?" Why fall for this and then not worry about meeting the butcher Hussein?

The problem is that the ALP national executive is working within the fake moral values of the capitalists. And look what hypocrites the ruling class were about these "values" on November 11! Once again, we emphasize, you can't beat the system by sticking within its confines. The whole setup is stacked against the Labor party and the working people.

No, Whitlam should not resign at the demand of the bosses' press. No more than Cairns or Connor should have been forced out. Rather, the rank and file of the Labor movement are the ones who need to settle scores. Not with Whitlam or Ducker or Hawke or anyone else personally, but collectively for the antilabor policies they have pursued and continue to pursue.

Only a Labor party fighting on socialist principles can promote the solidarity among its members and the will to confront the bosses and their press that will be necessary to defend the working people of this country. □

Mozambique Seeks UN Aid for Rhodesian Sanctions

Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim A. Chissano appealed to the United Nations March 16 to provide about \$50 million in aid a year to Mozambique to enable it to maintain an economic embargo against the racist Rhodesian regime. According to press reports, sources in the UN Security Council said that the council was expected to adopt a resolution calling for international economic assistance to Mozambique.

Capitalism Fouls Things Up

Nine Lies on Nuclear Risks



[On October 17, 1975, Dr. John W. Gofman of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in California debated Dr. Edward Teller, the "father of the H-bomb," on the hazards of nuclear power plants and the advisability of turning to alternative solutions to the energy problem. The debate, which was held in California, was attended by 4,000 persons.

[The following is an excerpt from the paper, "Alice in Blunderland," that Gofman presented during the debate. Copies of the full text may be obtained from the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Box 332, Yachats, Oregon 97498.]

Now let us turn our attention to the health and safety aspects of nuclear power. Particularly let us examine what, if anything, can be believed out of the nuclear establishment.

1. Up to 1969 the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] and the nuclear industry, with elaborate public relations campaigns, promoted the idea that below a certain level, radiation would do no harm to humans. There never was, and there is not now, any evidence for a "safe" amount of radiation. Every responsible organization studying radiation injury now holds that cancer, leukemia and genetic damage must be considered to be essentially proportional to dose down to the very lowest radiation doses.

What can you trust of an industry and bureaucracy that actively promotes such a vicious, harmful doctrine to the public?

2. In 1969 Dr. Tamplin and I said, in a scientific paper, that the existing so-called "safe" standards for public exposure would cause 3200 extra cancer deaths per year, if the public were exposed to the legal limit. The genetic consequences, after several generations, could be between 100,000 and 1,000,000 extra deaths per year.

For the ensuing two years, the AEC and the nuclear industry attempted ridicule and denial. Indeed, AEC and industry scientists vied with each other for who could show we were wrong by the largest factor. So the numbers went from "wrong by 100 times," "wrong by 1000 times," to even "wrong by 10,000 times." Sadly for their credibility, many of these enthusiastic apologists put their statements in print.

Finally, a committee of the National

Academy of Sciences completed a two-year study of the question and reported, among other findings, that

(1) We were correct that no evidence at all exists for a safe amount of radiation.

(2) We might be 4 to 10 times too high in our cancer estimates. In the fine print of the report the Committee admitted that all the evidence was not in, and that they might have to raise their estimates toward ours.

What are you to believe from an industry and bureaucracy that talks of 0 to 3 cancers per year from a dose that the National Academy of Sciences admits will cost many thousands of extra cancer deaths per year?

3. Faced with total discrediting by the National Academy of Sciences report, the AEC and the nuclear industry retreated to a new position. They shouted loudly, "We'll never give you the dose permitted by the regulations. In fact we'll never give you more than one two-hundredth of the dose permitted by the regulations. We won't give you more than one millirem per year from the entire nuclear power industry even after it grows to its size expected in the year 2000."

How very attractive. When innumerable people suggested lowering the standards for allowable exposure, the industry fought this tooth and nail—and they still fight it today. The industry spokesmen say repeatedly, "Why lower the standards when we don't plan to give you that dose anyhow."

What can you believe of that industry?

Moreover, they then picked out one minuscule portion of the places and ways that the nuclear power industry can irradiate you and they agreed for that minuscule portion to lower the allowable dose, isn't that charitable of them?

Incredible as it may seem, some of the scientific supporters of nuclear power babble this same nonsense. For example—"You can stand next to a nuclear power plant and get less radiation than you do from the radioactive potassium in your body (K^{40})."

Some of them are even more cute and they say, "Your wife's K^{40} will give you more radiation in bed than you'd get standing next to a nuclear power plant."

Probably today every third grader understands that if you put enough steel and concrete between yourself and a radiation source, you'll get very little radiation. But that is a ridiculous statement of the real issue at hand. Certainly when a reactor is operating perfectly and there is enough steel and concrete, of course there is no dose of consequence at that point. But let us suppose the reactor is not operating perfectly, will you still promise those same beautifully low doses? "Oh no," says the industry and government bureaucracy, "under those circumstances we are to have a 'variance' for unplanned events." So any doses delivered beyond those promised simply don't count at all because they fall into the categories of unplanned or abnormal circumstances.

What are you to think of an industry and bureaucracy that sets up a perfect Catch 22 to be able to give you any dose they give you, depending upon how well or poorly their systems operate, by the simple expedient of calling all overdoses "unplanned"?

4. Next, the promoters say, "Why worry about nuclear power? We live in a sea of radioactivity. Even Mom's apple pie is radioactive. The average exposure from natural radiation sources is 100 millirems per year and man has come a long way in spite of that exposure throughout his history. Why worry about a small addition to the 100 millirems?"

Let's consider natural radiation for a moment. A dose of 100 millirems is that dose, whether it comes from natural or man-made sources. So the anticipated costs in the USA of natural radiation are estimated to be approximately 19,000 extra cancer deaths per year and between 58,000 and 580,000 genetic deaths per year. But it isn't easy to move from the Earth. So we must suffer these tragic consequences of natural radiation. It would represent sheer idiocy to add unnecessary deaths from cancer and genetic diseases to these already high numbers. If anything, the effect of natural radiation is so bad that we should do everything possible to avoid making it worse.

Next the advocates of nuclear power say, "If you're worried about all those people being killed by radiation, why do you

tolerate unnecessary medical radiation, which amounts to 1/2 to 2/3 of natural radiation?" On this point I must say I find myself in total agreement with the nuclear industry. Medical radiation can and must be reduced.

5. The next argument is that all the deaths that will occur from nuclear power will only cause a loss of minutes or hours from your life-span. Isn't it worth a few minutes or hours to enjoy abundant electric power?

How very reasonable. Let me explain how this estimate is arrived at. Suppose a person is victimized by nuclear power radiation and dies at age 20 of a radiation-induced cancer. If everyone in the population makes a loan of some seconds, then the loss of life-span is drastically reduced. The only difficulty is that this particular banking transaction or averaging can't be worked out, so the 20-year-old victim has still lost 45 years or so of life span.

Is this the kind of industry that you can believe?

6. Let us now examine some of those promised small doses and look at what is really one of the most pernicious frauds on health yet perpetrated by the nuclear industry. No one disagrees that genetic injury from ionizing radiation is a most serious consequence, and as a result numerous geneticists have recommended that the nuclear power industry never be permitted to deliver more than one percent of the dose received from natural sources. The National Academy of Sciences report advised limitation to a few percent of natural radiation and the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] has recently concurred in this advice. Why worry, says the nuclear industry, we never plan to deliver more than one percent of natural radiation. But what the nuclear industry does not highlight or even mention is that one route of genetic exposure to the public will in all likelihood deliver some eight times this much radiation even if everything else goes perfectly. From published AEC reports the data are available for the radiation exposure received by occupational workers in the nuclear industry. As the nuclear plants have increased in size, this exposure has increased, and there is a possibility it may increase even further as plants age. Even if it doesn't increase per plant, and if we accept the projected number of plants for the year 2000, then the effect of such occupational exposure will be the same as giving the entire population approximately eight percent of the natural radiation dose—a dose eight times as high as promised by the nuclear industry. From the viewpoint of genetic injury, the human species will suffer just as much if the genetic damage is produced in fertile occupational workers as if the same amount of radiation dose were introduced into the population as a whole. But the public is unaware of this fact of life concerning genetic damage, and the

nuclear industry isn't about to inform the public. Instead, the nuclear industry and the government bureaucracies which support it simply ignore the occupational exposure when they calculate population exposure. They refuse to consider workers in the nuclear industry as part of the population—a simply marvelous ruse. So clever are they with this device that when they have a particularly "dirty" task to perform, and when the regular workers are already at the legal exposure limit, they bring in workers (as many as 2000 for a single job) to work for a few minutes or hours, during which they may get three months of legal exposure. But this exposure doesn't count as public exposure because, by their definition, "any person inside the boundary of the plant is no longer a member of the population." Incredible as it may seem, the EPA supports this "definition."

Certainly these facts must magnify your confidence in the nuclear industry and the government bureaucracy that supports it.

7. Another common fraudulent argument of the nuclear industry relates to the occurrence of cancer in regions that vary from each other in natural radiation levels. There are places in the world (such as Denver) where the radiation exposure from natural sources is twice as high as the average. Some places are even higher. The nuclear industry is fond of saying, "The people residing in such areas don't suffer from the extra radiation that they receive." Such a statement is an absolute, unequivocal lie. What the nuclear bureaucracy means is that no valid scientific study has ever looked for such injury. It does not mean the injury is not occurring. For the nuclear industry and its advocates, no test is the same as no harm. Credibility?

8. Another favorite nuclear cliché is "The nuclear industry is so safe that not a single radiation casualty has yet occurred." Another scientifically fraudulent statement, on several separate grounds. The nuclear industry is terribly prone to forget crucial parts of the entire nuclear power cycle.

The cycle starts with uranium mining. One hundred miners are already dead of radiation-induced lung cancer. The estimates are that another 1000 may die of exposure they have already had, even if they stop uranium mining now. Among radiation workers at plants, the doses received and documented are going to result in 100's of cancers, even though the symptoms have not yet appeared. These people have already had their radiation death warrant sealed. How does the bureaucracy treat these deaths? Very simple, they just deny them. All medical scientists know that once a cancer occurs, it is impossible to say which of several possible cancer-provoking agents caused that particular case. The cancers don't sprout a little flag announcing which agent caused the cancer. So the nuclear

industry just says, "Prove that radiation caused this case—" and it perpetrates this outrageous deception. But this is not a new technique. Even though medicine knows that cigarette smoking causes some 90 percent of lung cancers, the cigarette companies have not lost any lawsuits yet. They simply say, "Prove that our cigarettes caused this case." Lastly it is known and documented that radiation releases are planned and occur regularly at operating nuclear facilities and that population exposure occurs as a result. Since there is no dose of radiation safe with respect to cancer production, it follows that the number of cancer deaths caused by this so-called "safe" industry is directly proportional to the dose it has delivered. This doesn't begin to include all the accidental spills and unmeasured releases of radioactivity. In this industry the fox guards the chicken coop. The nuclear industry itself tells us how much radioactivity it has released. On every occasion where an independent measurement was made, the nuclear industry was caught short!

Is this an industry you can trust?

9. It is important to examine how well the nuclear industry must contain its monstrous radioactive garbage to avoid giving the population quite high doses. The containment must be at least 99.9 percent perfect, under both routine and nonroutine operating circumstances. I leave it to you to decide whether you believe they will accomplish this particular miracle, among the many miracles they promise. □

Can't Miss

Lead shot used by American hunters kills millions of ducks, geese, swans, and coots every year—without ever hitting them—according to an environmental study reported in the February 24 *New York Times*.

Three thousand tons of lead are dumped into the wetlands every year by hunters who miss their mark, poisoning two million waterfowl who scoop the spent ammunition from the bottoms of lakes and marshes as they feed.

Look Before You Leap

"An eleven-year-old boy tried to jump across a snow-covered creek, sank into the muddy bank opposite, and suffered extreme burns from caustic soda which is in the creek and is concentrated in nearby soil; a St. Louis Post-Dispatch photographer who went to photograph the creek also was burned. A total of five children and two adults were burned by the creek, located near Granite City, Illinois, in the St. Louis area, before the local pollution control agency posted guards at the creek. The caustic soda was traced to leaks from a tank kept by the Apex Oil Company, which had been fined in 1971 and 1975 for causing oil spills on the Mississippi River." —March issue of *Environment*.

AROUND THE WORLD



Peking Backs Kissinger's Threats

In an article on Kissinger's recent Latin American tour, the March 12 *Peking Review* backed up his threats against Cuba. The magazine, which is one of the official publications of the Maoist regime, said:

"Recently, Soviet social-imperialism has intensified its penetration into Latin America under the pretext of giving 'support to national-liberation movements.' Its dispatch of mercenaries from Latin America to invade Angola has caused widespread suspicion and anxiety in Latin America and has been strongly denounced by the Latin American people. At a luncheon given by Costa Rican President Daniel Oduber on February 24, Kissinger said: 'The United States will not tolerate a challenge to the solemn (Rio de Janeiro) treaty principle of non-intervention in this hemisphere.' Western news agencies pointed out that, in the wake of Soviet armed intervention in Angola with mercenaries, this remark was an indication to the Soviet Union that the United States would not tolerate a repetition of the Angolan affair in Latin America."

Amnesty International Denounces Political Repression in Singapore

Amnesty International issued a report February 29 charging that in Singapore some political prisoners have been held more than thirteen years without trial. The report also criticized other violations of human rights in Singapore, including frequent imposition of the death penalty; use of caning, which leaves permanent scars, as punishment for some criminal offenses; and manipulation of certain laws to repress political opposition.

Paris Police Attack Student Protest

Several hundred student protesters were attacked by police and riot-control forces in Paris March 17. The students attempted to march from the University of Paris to the Ministry of Education but were blocked at St.-Germain-des-Prés, in the heart of the Latin Quarter. The police attacked the students and sprayed them with tear gas.

The students were protesting the government's proposed changes in the education system, which are designed to funnel more students into business and industry. The

changes also would allow the participation of local industrial and business officials in the preparation of curriculums.

The Paris demonstration was only one of several that have been held recently. Earlier, students set up a roadblock near Bordeaux, occupied the offices of the University of Rennes, temporarily detained a high university official at Clermont-Ferrand, and conducted a sit-in at a state employment center in Lyon.

Women's Rights Action Draws 1,500 in Montréal

More than 1,500 persons participated in an International Women's Day demonstration in Montréal, Québec, March 8. The action was organized by the women's commissions of the three main Québec trade-union federations and had nearly thirty sponsors, including unions, women's groups, and political organizations.

One of the central themes of the action was support to women public employees in Québec, who are demanding equal pay for equal work, child-care facilities, and paid maternity leave.

Dr. Henry Morgentaler, the Montréal doctor who has been victimized by the police and courts for his opposition to federal anti-abortion laws, made an unexpected appearance at the rally. "I proclaim my solidarity with women's demands," he told the rally.

South African Regime Predicts Rising Protests by Black Students

The racist South African regime says it is "alarmed" by the findings of a recent study on the attitudes of Black students.

The study, conducted by South African Supreme Court Justice Johannes H. Snyman, concluded that Black students openly hated whites.

Snyman focused his inquiry on the all-Black Turfloop African University in Transvaal. According to a report in the March 1 *Christian Science Monitor*, he found that "virtually without exception," Black students rejected the government's policy of apartheid, or racial separation. He also found that most students at Turfloop supported the South African Students Organisation. Nine leaders of the SASO are now being tried in Pretoria under provisions of the Terrorism Act.

Snyman claimed that the main aim of

the SASO was "the promotion of hatred of the whites, the destruction of the separate universities for blacks, and incitement to armed revolution."

The activities of the SASO, combined with Black opposition to racial discrimination, would lead to greater Black pressure on the government, "accompanied by countrywide revolutionary activities, and the disruptions of the black universities," Snyman predicted.

He also pointed out that the attitudes of Blacks at Turfloop University were not unique, but rather reflected what was happening in South African society as a whole.

Eighteen Million Unemployed

The International Labor Organization has found 18 million persons unemployed in a survey of twenty-three countries. The jobless count, taken last December, is the highest since the 1930s. It represented an overall increase of 5 million unemployed in one year.

The ILO statistics covered eighteen European countries outside the Soviet bloc, plus the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.

Of the total of unemployed, more than 7 million, or 41 percent, were under the age of twenty-five, although this age group represents only 22 percent of the labor force in the countries surveyed.

Women were also represented in disproportionate numbers. The 7.3 million women workers who were without jobs in December accounted for 40 percent of the unemployed, although women make up only 35 percent of the labor force in the countries surveyed.

6,600 Egyptians Expelled From Libya

Egyptian officials announced March 14 that 6,600 Egyptians had been expelled from Libya on the orders of Libyan head of state Col. Muammar Qaddafi. The semi-official Cairo daily *Al Ahram* quoted some of the expelled Egyptians as saying that an additional twenty Libyan trucks loaded with Egyptians were heading for the border.

The mass expulsion was thought to have been in retaliation for the arrest of twenty-seven Libyans in Egypt, allegedly sent to kidnap or assassinate two Libyan officials who took refuge in Egypt several months ago.

PROYECTOS DE RESOLUCION

Reunión del Comité Ejecutivo Internacional

[El siguiente comunicado de prensa fue emitido por el Secretariado Unificado de la Cuarta Internacional.]

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A mediados de febrero de 1976, se llevó a cabo en Europa una sesión plenaria del Comité Ejecutivo Internacional de la Cuarta Internacional. Miembros del CEI y observadores de secciones simpatizantes provenientes de unos treinta países estuvieron presentes.

Las discusiones políticas en el CEI se centraron en torno a los problemas de la revolución portuguesa y de la guerra civil en Angola. Surgieron tres tendencias sobre la primera cuestión y dos sobre la segunda. Por gran mayoría de votos se adoptaron las tesis sobre un balance intermedio de la revolución portuguesa y una resolución que apoya al campo militar del MPLA en contra de sus oponentes en la guerra civil. Estos documentos están en proceso de ser publicados por la prensa de la Cuarta Internacional [ver Tesis sobre la Revolución Portuguesa en la edición del 11 de marzo de *Inprecor*; la resolución sobre Angola será publicada en el siguiente número de *Inprecor*].

El Pleno del CEI también escuchó informes con carácter informativo sobre los desarrollos actuales en España y sobre la guerra civil en Líbano. Conmemoró la muerte del camarada Georg Jungclas, un miembro fundador de la Cuarta Internacional y de su sección alemana, quien fue miembro del CEI durante treinta y cinco años; también votó mociones de homenaje a dos camaradas angoleños muertos en la guerra civil en Angola, un camarada árabe muerto en la guerra civil en Líbano y los camaradas argentinos asesinados por la reacción.

El Pleno del CEI resolvió algunas disputas organizativas que surgieron en las filas de la Cuarta Internacional en varios países; fue electo un nuevo y más amplio Secretariado Unificado; se emitió un llamado al Onceavo Congreso Mundial de la Cuarta Internacional (quinto congreso desde la reunificación), y se fijaron un orden del día para el congreso y las modalidades de la discusión escrita pre-congreso.

Todas estas cuestiones fueron decididas con votaciones unánimes. Una vez más, la Cuarta Internacional ha mostrado que ha aprendido a combinar un franco y enérgico debate político—aun cuando es llevado a

cabo en público—con la preservación de la unidad organizativa y el fortalecimiento de un marco organizativo común del movimiento.

El orden del día provisional para el Onceavo Congreso Mundial es como sigue:

1. La situación política mundial.
2. Un balance intermedio de la revolución portuguesa.
3. Documento sobre las perspectivas europeas.
4. Tesis sobre la revolución árabe.
5. Balance de la revolución indochina.
6. Tesis sobre la opresión de las mujeres y el movimiento de liberación de la mujer.
7. Normas organizativas de la Cuarta Internacional.
8. Informe de la dirección internacional saliente.
9. Elección del Comité Ejecutivo Internacional.

Si irrumpe una situación revolucionaria en España antes del Onceavo Congreso Mundial, España será un punto especial en el orden del día del Onceavo Congreso. Asimismo, cualquier cambio importante en la situación mundial puede conducir ya sea al Secretariado Unificado o a los delegados del Congreso Mundial mismos a agregar puntos adicionales en el orden del día. □

Tesis sobre la Revolución Portuguesa

[La siguiente resolución, presentada por la Tendencia de la Mayoría Internacional en la reunión del Comité Ejecutivo Internacional de la Cuarta Internacional verificada en febrero, obtuvo la siguiente votación: 40 a favor, 21 en contra y una abstención.]

[La traducción fue tomada del número 45, 11 de marzo de 1976, de *Inprecor* en español. Hemos corregido ciertos errores obvios de esta traducción con respecto a la versión original en inglés.]

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El 25 de noviembre se abrió una *nueva etapa* en el "proceso revolucionario" de Portugal. Amplios sectores de los trabajadores han comprendido que cualquier nuevo progreso de la revolución portuguesa depende de la capacidad de la clase obrera para reforzar su grado de autoorganización y para avanzar en la extensión y centralización de las comisiones de trabajadores, así como en la generalización del control obrero a fin de imponer sus

soluciones en el plano económico y político, independientemente de la correlación de fuerzas entre las diversas fracciones del ejército.

A pesar de los efectos desmoralizadores que sobre una capa de trabajadores tuvo la derrota de los oficiales de la llamada "izquierda militar" y de una parte de la vanguardia de los soldados, ésta no puede ser considerada como una derrota de las masas trabajadoras. Actualmente se realiza en el seno del movimiento obrero una importante recomposición. El "proceso revolucionario" atraviesa un período de "retirada limitada," pero la clase obrera no ha sufrido ningún revés en una batalla abierta y frontal contra los patrones y su Estado.

Después de haber llegado, durante las semanas precedentes, a su punto más elevado de movilización, no ha perdido ni su capacidad de resistencia contra los ataques del Estado burgués, ni su potencial de combatividad. Los factores que, desde diciembre de 1974, han determinado

el perfil de la revolución portuguesa no han desaparecido, *aunque hayan cambiado sus relaciones dialécticas mutuas y ahora se manifiesten radicalmente los límites del movimiento semiespontáneo y semiconsiente de las masas, que dominó durante la primera fase.* La clase obrera portuguesa aún tiene la posibilidad de recuperar sus fuerzas, y después de una pausa inevitable, de reorganizar sus filas y lanzar sus ataques contra el régimen capitalista. Pero la burguesía, con la ayuda del imperialismo, dispone ahora de muchos más medios políticos, económicos y represivos para tratar de hacer retroceder, y luego ahogar en sangre, al proceso revolucionario.

Es así que la dinámica actual implica toda una serie de pruebas de fuerza. Es para estas pruebas que los marxistas revolucionarios deben prepararse a sí mismos y preparar a las masas trabajadoras. Es indispensable que la experiencia del 25 de noviembre de 1975 sirva y ayude a la clase obrera a concentrar sus fuerzas y

a organizar la preparación de estas batallas decisivas.

I

A partir de diciembre de 1974, y más radicalmente después de marzo de 1975, el ascenso revolucionario fue adquiriendo cada vez más los rasgos característicos de todas las revoluciones en los países imperialistas. Las líneas de fuerza fueron modeladas por la combinación de cuatro factores—cuyo peso específico y relaciones recíprocas fueron modificadas el 25 de noviembre—que manifestarán nuevamente sus efectos en la próxima etapa de la revolución portuguesa:

1. La multiplicación de las huelgas salvajes en el período que siguió al 25 de abril; las acciones de depuración (*saneamientos*) como respuesta al sabotaje económico, y las iniciativas de vigilancia popular (septiembre de 1974 y marzo de 1975) demostraron el surgimiento de una *vanguardia obrera amplia* dispuesta a actuar independientemente de los aparatos reformistas, tanto socialdemócratas como stalinistas. Esta vanguardia reúne en su seno tanto a los cuadros experimentados de las clases obreras como a una nueva generación de trabajadores que ingresa a las filas del proletariado en los años de decadencia y crisis del régimen salazarista. La política abiertamente antihuelgas del PCP—durante los primeros meses después de abril de 1974—, así como la debilidad cualitativa y cuantitativa de sus cuadros, permitieron el desarrollo y la expresión del rol de la vanguardia obrera amplia en las fábricas estratégicas de la región de Lisboa y también, aunque de manera menos masiva, en la región de Oporto. Esta va a retomar a nivel más elevado, y de manera generalizada, las experiencias de la última fase de las luchas obreras en la Europa capitalista: comisiones de trabajadores, experiencias de control obrero, unión con los soldados, etc. Será la iniciadora de un proceso que se ampliará y desplegará desde el fin de 1974 hasta el inicio de 1975.

2. El impacto de la vanguardia obrera— a pesar de tener relativamente pocos efectivos, de sus divisiones, su confusión política—debe ser comprendido en relación con la *dinámica objetiva de las luchas obreras*, determinada: por la debilidad misma del imperialismo portugués; por la profunda crisis estructural de sectores completos de la industria, agudizada, a su vez, por la recesión capitalista internacional. El impulso del movimiento reivindicativo, articulado inicialmente sobre la base de reivindicaciones salariales y de disminución de las jornadas de trabajo, desemboca en un ataque brutal contra la tasa de ganancia de un capitalismo con un desarrollo basado en los bajos salarios, las larguísimas jornadas de trabajo y cuya

producción está orientada a la exportación. Los desequilibrios que esto produjo, acentuados enormemente por el deliberado sabotaje económico, pusieron a la orden del día las iniciativas de ocupación, de control obrero y las reivindicaciones de nacionalización. Desde principios de 1975 se acentúan los despidos y el desempleo. El proceso acumulativo de huelgas, ocupaciones, control obrero, desbordará las fronteras de las empresas más grandes de la región de la capital para llegar a las ramas en que dominan las pequeñas y medianas empresas, el sector de la distribución, así como el de los bancos y las aseguradoras. La conjugación de este hervidero de luchas y la movilización de marzo de 1975, desembocará en la oleada de nacionalizaciones, que a su vez estimulará la aparición de reivindicaciones más avanzadas y reforzará el peso de la vanguardia obrera. La *interacción* de este avance del “proceso revolucionario” y la crisis estructural y coyuntural de la economía portuguesa, producirá una situación en la que el funcionamiento normal capitalista es de hecho, inoperante, pero en la que no han sido suprimidos los rasgos dominantes de una economía de mercado. Es esta la raíz de las reivindicaciones de conjunto avanzadas por el ala más activa del proletariado portugués: reorientación de la producción de ramas enteras de la economía, planificación socialista, control obrero organizado. Además, esta situación incita a un sinnúmero de comisiones de trabajadores (de la STENAVE, la LISNAVE, la Sacor, por ejemplo) a iniciar un debate sobre la naturaleza de la economía socialista, la función del control obrero, así como sobre la posibilidad, y necesidad, de una centralización de los órganos embrionarios de dualidad de poderes.

3. La rápida sucesión de acontecimientos políticos, de crisis ministeriales, de choques más o menos violentos entre las fuerzas políticas y clases sociales fundamentales, van a conducir al movimiento de masas a la escena política y a asegurar su *creciente politización*, y esto a pesar del condicionamiento de 48 años de dominación del régimen corporativista y la inexistencia de experiencias de movilizaciones a escala nacional. La gravedad de la crisis económica y social, la naturaleza misma de los incidentes políticos sucesivos (debate sobre la Intersindical, sobre el asunto *República*, sobre los diversos documentos del MFA, sobre el papel de los “órganos de poder popular” durante la salida del PS y del PPD del gobierno, etc.) hacen que el proceso de *politización comience a enraizarse en los órganos creados por los trabajadores* en el transcurso de su lucha: comisiones de trabajadores, comisiones de moradores, ligas campesinas. Durante las manifestaciones que se llevaron a cabo del 20 de agosto al 16 de noviembre de 1975, este fenómeno se expresó con una evidencia innegable (sus repercusiones en el seno

del PC explican en gran parte los vaivenes de su dirección) y constituye uno de los elementos que podría facilitar la *transformación de estos instrumentos en estructuras efectivas de dualidad de poderes*.

El impulso de estas fuerzas hizo que el *ritmo de desarrollo de las luchas obreras fuera muy rápido*. Ahora bien, por primera vez después de cuatro décadas, la clase obrera podía manifestarse en tanto que clase y constituir un movimiento obrero independiente. Esto hará que la dialéctica que se inicia entre la estructura de la clase obrera, su historia y el repentino hervidero de luchas—en un cuadro de hundimiento del dispositivo de control social del antiguo régimen y sin que nada lo remplace—se exprese por medio de un *profundo desarrollo desigual de la conciencia de clase, en un proceso combinado* de reconstrucción de órganos tradicionales del movimiento obrero (sindicatos y partidos) y de instrumentos propios de los trabajadores (comisiones de trabajadores, comisiones de moradores), en una fluidez de las *influencias* políticas en el seno de las masas trabajadoras.

La comprensión errónea de estos rasgos dominantes del ascenso revolucionario conduce a dos errores. El primero consiste en perder de vista la importancia decisiva de esta vanguardia obrera fuertemente enraizada en las empresas más importantes, la modificación de la correlación de fuerzas entre los aparatos reformistas, stalinista y socialdemócrata, y esta vanguardia obrera, así como las posibilidades de iniciativa que de allí se desprenden, y el papel creciente, y cada vez más determinante, de los órganos de democracia proletaria. El segundo se sitúa en una gran subestimación de la influencia—todavía mayoritaria—de los aparatos reformistas sobre la clase obrera, de la necesidad de ganarse a la mayoría de ésta, de la importancia de una política correcta de frente único dirigida a las organizaciones reformistas y de la necesidad de realizar una batalla política sobre todos estos temas en el seno mismo de la extrema izquierda, de la capacidad de maniobra y de recuperación de los partidos reformistas, incrementada por la confusión política de esta vanguardia amplia y de la debilidad de la organización marxista revolucionaria.

4. La interacción entre la dinámica de las luchas obreras y la crisis del ejército—producto de la función de encuadramiento de la vida política y social que le atribuyeron su papel el 25 de abril y la debilidad de las estructuras de dominación política de que disponía la burguesía—facilitó la penetración en las filas de los soldados del proceso de auto organización que se consolidaba en la clase obrera.

Los dos intentos de golpe de Estado (septiembre de 1974 y marzo de 1975) introdujeron un primer elemento de ruptura en las relaciones jerárquicas entre los

soldados y los oficiales. La disciplina militar comenzó a ser cuestionada. Las opciones políticas de los comandantes justificaban a los ojos de los soldados la aceptación o el rechazo de un orden. El debate político vino, poco a poco, a hacerse paralelo al sistema de autoridad militar. Las escisiones en la jerarquía, las confrontaciones en el seno del MFA (sometido a los efectos de la polarización social), estimulan las tendencias centrífugas. En la región militar de Lisboa, los órganos de integración creados por el MFA desde octubre de 1974, especialmente las asambleas de delegados de unidad, no pueden cumplir sino parcialmente su función, dada la radicalización del ejército. Así, se abre, para los soldados, la vía de la búsqueda de canales propios de expresión, tanto para sus reivindicaciones materiales como para la determinación de sus opciones políticas ante las decisiones de la jerarquía. Desde septiembre de 1975, el movimiento autónomo de los soldados se convertirá en un elemento nuevo y determinante de la profunda crisis que atraviesa al Estado burgués.

A su vez, la desintegración y parálisis relativas del ejército hicieron posible que el movimiento de masas tomara innumerables iniciativas, sin tener que enfrentarse a un imponente y eficaz aparato represivo. La descomposición de estos instrumentos de represión amplió el espacio propicio para la multiplicación de avanzadísimas experiencias (ocupación de empresas, ocupación de tierras, primeras experiencias de creación de órganos de autodefensa, utilización de la radio por parte de la Asociación de Mutilados de las Fuerzas Armadas (AFDA), sitio del Ministerio de Trabajo por parte de los metalúrgicos, asedio de São Benito por los trabajadores de la construcción, etc.). Pero, paralelamente, esto produce una ilusión sobre el grado de parálisis de este ejército y una subestimación de las capacidades de iniciativa militar de parte de la jerarquía. En consecuencia, se debilitan los elementos objetivos de presión en favor del desarrollo máximo de la autodefensa. Finalmente, esta crisis favoreció la supremacía de la orientación de los reformistas y de los centristas, quienes situaron, engañosamente, el centro de gravedad del "proceso revolucionario" en el seno mismo del ejército, sacrificando la independencia y autonomía del movimiento de las masas trabajadoras.

II

5. En julio y agosto de 1975, ante la profundización del ascenso revolucionario, que se expresa en el reforzamiento de las comisiones de trabajadores, de las comisiones de moradores, etc., en la desorganización de un ejército que se había transformado en la arena política y en la aguda crisis de dirección política de la burguesía, el campo burgués se empeña esencialmente en la restauración de un instrumento

coherente de autoridad política y de un aparato de represión dotado de cierta eficacia.

La creciente polarización de las fuerzas sociales precipita la crisis del MFA. Este, bajo la embestida de los trabajadores, no puede cumplir plenamente su función bonapartista, su unidad es abiertamente rota y es, pues, incapaz de iniciar una política de represión. Mientras tanto, la mayoría de oficiales se reagrupa y lanza una ofensiva que logra una recomposición de las fuerzas en la jerarquía militar, lo cual le permitirá contar con una fuerza represiva de choque y realizar la estabilización de las instituciones del Estado burgués.

La clase dominante no dispone de un aparato de Estado o de estructuras políticas capaces de impedir el ascenso del movimiento de masas, pero, simultáneamente, el nivel de autoorganización y de conciencia de las masas es todavía insuficiente como para permitir un salto cualitativo del "proceso revolucionario." En este momento, la *ofensiva de reconstrucción del orden burgués por la vía legal y parlamentaria* se convierte en el objetivo central de la burguesía.

La campaña lanzada por la dirección Soares del PS, se inscribe parcialmente en este proyecto de afirmación de la autoridad de la Asamblea Constituyente y de las instituciones del Estado burgués *contra* las comisiones de trabajadores, las comisiones de moradores y todo aquello que, según las propias palabras del PS, constituye un "poder paralelo" al aparato de Estado burgués. En el terreno de la lucha contra el "anarco populismo," el PPD lo mismo que el "grupo de los nueve" van a la zaga del PS.

La división en la clase obrera, provocada por la dirección del PS y alimentada por la orientación, así como los métodos de la dirección stalinista del PCP, obstaculiza un nuevo salto de la revolución. Esto favorece la reaparición abierta de la derecha y la extrema derecha, sin una respuesta decidida de la clase obrera. Los ataques contra los locales del PCP, de la Intersindical, de la extrema izquierda y la organización de iniciativas terroristas de derecha indican cual sería la dinámica de esta *inversión* del "proceso revolucionario," iniciada por la dirección del PS, si ésta se prolongara y concretara.

En un primer momento, las grandes maniobras de Costa Gomes, Soares y del "grupo de los nueve," parecen tener cierto éxito. En el campo burgués se realiza un proceso de recomposición de las fuerzas: en el plano militar, las llamadas a la disciplina reciben un eco favorable en una jerarquía que recupera la confianza en sí misma y trata de reforzar sus posiciones comenzando por las bases de que dispone en el Norte. La pequeña burguesía, más particularmente el pequeño campesinado del Norte, ofrece un punto de apoyo social a los defensores del "orden" contra la

"anarquía." En efecto, los pequeños campesinos son duramente afectados por la crisis económica y por la ineptitud del gobierno para responder a sus problemas más inmediatos (precio de los abonos, de las semillas, créditos, precio de compra de los productos en relación con los precios de venta, etc.), todo ello agudizado por el incumplimiento de las ventajas ofrecidas por el MFA en su "campaña de dinamización." Las ramificaciones entre el pequeño campesinado y las clase obrera del Norte, crearon también un terreno favorable para aumentar la audiencia de los temas desarrollados por la dirección del PS en el seno de las capas de trabajadores políticamente atrasados e integrados en ramas de la industria que atravesaban una profunda crisis. La grave división política del proletariado expresa aquí sus aspectos más negativos, en la medida en que el desarrollo desigual de la conciencia de clase confirma, y coincide, con una dicotomía entre las diversas regiones del país.

6. En el momento en que la contraofensiva burguesa parece obtener un primer éxito con la renuncia del quinto Gobierno y el establecimiento del de Pinheiro de Azevedo, se desarrolla en el campo del proletariado un nuevo impulso que va a conjugar la *afirmación de la vanguardia obrera amplia en la escena política*, el desarrollo del *movimiento autónomo* de los soldados independientemente de toda referencia al MFA—e incluso contra él—así como el desencadenamiento de una oleada reivindicativa de sectores enteros de la clase (metalurgia, construcción, textil, trabajadores agrícolas). En este contexto, la crisis del quinto Gobierno de Vasco Gonçalves, defensor de un programa que combinaba las reformas y las medidas de austeridad, no debe ser analizado solamente en función de la ofensiva de la burguesía hacia la restauración de la autoridad de las instituciones del Estado burgués, sino que también en relación con el empuje instintivo de importantes sectores del movimiento de masas hacia la democracia obrera, hacia el reforzamiento de las comisiones de trabajadores y de las comisiones de moradores y de los soldados hacia las comisiones de soldados.

La conjugación de estos diferentes movimientos pondrá en evidencia la correlación de las fuerzas sociales fundamentales, que hasta ese momento, habían sido oscurecidas por la división en el seno del movimiento obrero, las peripecias en el plano gubernamental y los reajustes de fuerzas a nivel de la jerarquía militar. *El período que se abre en agosto de 1975 está, pues, marcado por la confluencia, en su punto más elevado, de los factores que condicionan la dinámica de la revolución portuguesa:*

a. En el Norte, bajo el estímulo de las iniciativas del SUV, estalla el movimiento autónomo de los soldados (agrupación unitaria de la vanguardia que luchaba por

la creación de comisiones de soldados y su unión con las comisiones de trabajadores y de moradores). El SUV cumple coyunturalmente cierto rol unificador de la clase obrera y facilita un nuevo auge de las movilizaciones. En septiembre, en Lisboa, funcionan también como mediación entre la vanguardia obrera y el grueso de las filas obreras. Pero, esencialmente, desarticulan el eje del proyecto de todos aquéllos a quienes representa Pinheiro de Azevedo: un ejército capaz de aplicar las decisiones de un gobierno de "orden y disciplina." Contribuyen al fracaso de la tentativa de reconstitución de una fuerza militar de choque: el AMI.

b. Se refuerza el impulso instintivo de las masas hacia la creación de órganos de democracia proletaria. Surgen, a nivel de ciertas ramas, coordinadoras de las comisiones de trabajadores. Regionalmente, se dan los primeros pasos hacia la constitución de intercomisiones de moradores y asambleas populares. Ahora bien, dada la inexistencia de un partido revolucionario, la falta de tradiciones del movimiento obrero, la heterogeneidad social y política de la clase obrera, este movimiento es muy desigual. La representatividad y función asumidas por las comisiones de trabajadores son muy desiguales.

Las divisiones en el seno del movimiento obrero se reproducirán en estos órganos y, frecuentemente, conducirán a una proliferación de comisiones de moradores en los barrios, transformándolas así en simples apéndices de organizaciones políticas que las integrarán en maniobras sectarias, cuestionando así su aptitud para centralizarse y tomar a su cargo las iniciativas de "control social."

El desarrollo de las comisiones de moradores llega muy rápidamente a su límite; después de haber tomado su impulso en la organización de las ocupaciones de viviendas, las comisiones de moradores se demostraron incapaces de proporcionar soluciones a otros problemas sociales: transportes, salud, abastecimientos, crisis estructural de la vivienda, etc. Para comenzar a resolver tales cuestiones era necesario un nivel superior de centralización.

Aquí se agota el ascenso semiespontáneo del movimiento de masas. Solamente una política de una amplia unidad de acción hubiera permitido el dar los primeros pasos en el sentido de la centralización; el sectarismo de las organizaciones centristas y reformistas lo hizo imposible.

Pero, más específicamente, al nivel de las comisiones de trabajadores, la tendencia de fondo es hacia una creciente homogeneización, a una extensión de su representatividad y a una ampliación de su función. En efecto, las comisiones de trabajadores son mucho más aptas para proporcionar soluciones parciales, incluso a nivel de ramas de la industria y, además, el cuadro en que se desarrollan restringe los efectos de las divisiones políticas y

hacen más factible su centralización inicial (CUF, textil . . .).

c. La recuperación del movimiento reivindicativo se articula con estos dos procesos. En primer lugar, la convergencia del nivel de autoorganización y la profundidad de las crisis de la economía, refuerza la posición estratégica de las comisiones de trabajadores en la definición y concretización de las reivindicaciones de readaptación, de planificación socialista y de las iniciativas de control obrero. En segundo lugar, las capas más atrasadas de la clase obrera adoptan las reivindicaciones y formas de acción más radicales. Y, en tercer lugar, el movimiento reivindicativo se enfrenta, por primera vez, frontalmente al gobierno y asimila esta nueva dimensión.

La parálisis del sexto Gobierno ante estas movilizaciones indica la profundidad de la crisis del ejército y, por consiguiente, la imposibilidad de utilizarlo en un ataque directo contra el movimiento de masas. La "captura" del Palacio de São Benito y la "huelga" del gobierno de Pinheiro de Azevedo simbolizan la profundidad de la crisis del Estado burgués y de la dirección política de la burguesía.

Los rasgos dominantes de la situación general son entonces los siguientes: desarticulación del aparato estatal que llega a un punto muy elevado—bajo los golpes asestados por el movimiento autónomo de los soldados, el mismo que "gangrena," incluso, a las tropas consideradas como las más seguras. El ascenso revolucionario no encuentra fuerza represiva capaz de contenerlo. Pero, simultáneamente, no se materializa en organismos de poder obrero lo suficientemente generalizados y, sobre todo, centralizados. *Es en esta desincronización en donde reside la especificidad del período, que no puede ser sino extremadamente transitorio.* Esta falta de generalización y centralización de los órganos propios de las masas trabajadoras, acentúa las dificultades para contrarrestar el desarrollo desigual de la conciencia y de las formas de organización de la clase obrera, para soldar las diferentes componentes de ésta a la columna vertebral que forman los trabajadores del cinturón industrial de Lisboa y el proletariado agrícola del Alentejo, y para responder a las divisiones políticas de las masas trabajadoras.

En la medida en que la unidad de acción del 28 de septiembre de 1974 y del 11 de marzo de 1975 no puede institucionalizarse en órganos efectivos de democracia proletaria, esta división crea una circunstancia favorable a la instrumentalización—por la reacción—de la pequeña burguesía—la cual el 11 de marzo se encontraba a la expectativa—y le permite consolidar, en ciertas regiones, un real bloque social como punta de lanza de la contrarrevolución.

7. Desde marzo de 1975, en el momento en que se plantea con claridad la pregunta ¿qué clase va a ejercer el poder? el PS revela abiertamente su función contrarre-

volucionaria. La forma y el alcance de la contraofensiva del PS son determinadas por las características mismas del ascenso revolucionario: nivel alcanzado por las acciones anticapitalistas espontáneas de las masas; afirmación de los órganos embrionarios de poder obrero; debilidad del aparato de Estado burgués, incapaz de contener al movimiento de masas, y fragilidad de los instrumentos de dominación política de la burguesía.

So pretexto del respeto y la defensa de la "voluntad popular," el PS se compromete en un apoyo deliberado a las instituciones y la autoridad del Estado burgués, *contra* las formas de autoorganización y de expresión directa de los trabajadores en las fábricas, las explotaciones agrícolas, los barrios y el ejército. En este momento, el PS se afirma como la punta de lanza de la contrarrevolución; pretende asegurar el difícil tránsito de la caída del estado corporativista a la creación de una democracia burguesa parlamentaria. Trotsky caracterizaba de la manera siguiente un proceso análogo: "En cuanto a la revolución alemana de 1918, ésta no es en absoluto la conclusión democrática de una revolución burguesa, es una revolución proletaria decapitada por la socialdemocracia; más exactamente, es una *contrarrevolución burguesa*, la cual, después de su victoria sobre el proletariado, se ha visto en la necesidad de conservar las falaces apariencias de la democracia."

En la tradición de la socialdemocracia alemana de 1919, la dirección de Soares se ha convertido en el artífice de lo que podría ser calificado de "contrarrevolución democrática"; la defensa y la consolidación de un Estado burgués, pasando por la eliminación de los órganos propios de los trabajadores, manteniendo, sin embargo, la posibilidad de acción y la libertad de expresión para los partidos reformistas del movimiento obrero.

Un marco parlamentario aseguraría, entonces, a un PS fuerte en el plano electoral, un rol intermediario entre la burguesía y la clase obrera. Tal operación, cualesquiera que sean las posibilidades de éxito (históricamente ha servido de punto de partida para un avance rápido de la reacción), constituye el proyecto fundamental de Soares, Rêgo, Zenha. . . . Por esta razón, el capital portugués y el imperialismo europeo han apoyado unánimemente el contraataque lanzado por la dirección del PS.

Es cierto que en junio y julio de 1975 algunos sectores de los trabajadores participan en las manifestaciones del PS, pero lo hacen a partir de motivaciones que no pueden ser asimiladas al proyecto efectivo y coherente de la dirección de éste. Se combina en ellos una voluntad anticapitalista y una reacción ante los métodos burocráticos y antidemocráticos del PCP, tanto en el plano sindical como en el de las municipalidades que pudo instrumentalizar la dirección socialdemócrata. Así,

desde este ángulo, estas manifestaciones poseen un carácter contradictorio que expresa, a la vez, el profundamente desigual desarrollo de la conciencia de clase y las consecuencias de la sectaria orientación del PC.

La ofensiva de Soares se hizo más incisiva en el preciso momento en que el MFA (después del 25 de abril), bajo los efectos de la polarización social, revelaba su incapacidad de jugar el rol de eje en la construcción del aparato estatal. La Asamblea del MFA realizada en junio, es un reflejo de los enfrentamientos políticos que atravesaron a la sociedad y el ejército y que repercutían en el MFA. La adopción por parte de esta Asamblea del documento sobre el "poder popular"—un "poder popular" destinado a integrarse en las estructuras del aparato de Estado burgués y no a destruirlo—expresa su incapacidad para oponerse eficazmente a un movimiento de masas que él mismo parecía avalar.

Esta campaña contra el "anarco populismo" condujo lógicamente al PS a apoyar las intervenciones del sexto Gobierno, las que van desde la ocupación de las radios y la televisión, hasta la depuración de los oficiales radicalizados, pasando por la destrucción del emisor de Rádio Renascença. Y no sólo eso, también va a oponerse frontalmente al movimiento reivindicativo, el que, desde septiembre de 1975, impulsa a la acción a distintos sectores de la clase obrera a escala nacional (metalurgia, construcción).

La conjugación entre la dinámica encadenada por las movilizaciones del PS y la división en la clase obrera, crea las condiciones favorables a una reaparición, con más bríos, de los partidos burgueses. Instrumentalizando a distintos sectores de la pequeña burguesía, el CDS y, particularmente, el PPD, hacen una aparición notable en la escena política y se presentan como los defensores más consecuentes del orden capitalista.

En el Norte, esto se traducirá por el papel clave que juegan estos partidos en los mítines por el "orden y la disciplina." Desde noviembre de 1975, estas movilizaciones de la reacción pasan del terreno político a la organización de una batalla masiva contra la reforma agraria (primera concentración de medianos, pequeños y grandes propietarios de Rio Maior), en la cual la extrema derecha asume un papel cada vez más activo.

En la víspera del 25 de noviembre, el PS comienza a desequilibrarse bajo la presión de la creciente polarización entre las dos clases sociales fundamentales. Por un lado, en el Norte, el PPD y el CDS toman la iniciativa y transforman las movilizaciones de apoyo al VI gobierno en manifestaciones de la reacción, mientras que el PS demuestra ser cada vez más incapaz de movilizar a su base obrera en apoyo de Pinheiro de Azevedo. Por otra parte en el sur, industrial y agrícola, al enfrentarse a las movilizaciones masivas ve como sus

vínculos con la clase obrera, los trabajadores agrícolas y los pequeños campesinos, se hacen cada día más difusos.

Hubo muchas razones por las cuales no se concretó en una crisis abierta el potencial para una ruptura entre la dirección de Soares y la base organizada o influida por el PS, que se hubiera expresado en el surgimiento de tendencias sobre lineamientos precisos o en escisiones significantes.

En primer lugar, la política sectaria del PCP—que llegó a su punto culminante con la construcción de las "barricadas" contra la manifestación del PS en el mes de julio—aglutina a la base socialdemócrata en torno a su dirección. En segundo lugar, el control burocrático del PCP sobre la Intersindical, su manipulación de la prensa y de los grandes medios de comunicación, su brutal acaparamiento de las municipalidades, conceden credibilidad a las proclamas democráticas del PS. Además, el rumbo ultraizquierdista seguido por la mayoría de las organizaciones de la llamada "izquierda revolucionaria" frena la separación del PS de los trabajadores críticos frente a la política de su dirección y hostiles a los métodos burocráticos del PCP. Finalmente, la propia historia del PS, su falta de tradición como partido organizado en la clase obrera, y el bajo nivel político de sus miembros, limitan la manifestación de sus contradicciones internas en términos de orientaciones políticas diferentes y favorecen las maniobras anticomunistas de la dirección.

8. *El proyecto reformista global del PCP* consiste en copar el aparato del Estado burgués para someterlo a un proceso de "democratización," lo que implicaría objetivamente su supervivencia. Cualesquiera que sean los virajes tácticos, el proyecto global del PCP sigue siendo la instauración de una "democracia avanzada"; el MFA no es sino un elemento utilizable a la hora de concretar este proyecto, incluso aunque durante un periodo aquél adquiriera una mayor importancia. En esta perspectiva, el movimiento de masas se ve, pues, desprovisto de toda autonomía y sólo sirve de base a este proyecto.

El papel decisivo jugado por el MFA en el derrocamiento del Estado corporativista y la naturaleza de la crisis de las instituciones del viejo régimen provocada por el 25 de abril, determinan las formas concretas de la estrategia del PCP y ponen de relieve su táctica de penetración en las instituciones del aparato de Estado. Este pondrá en primer término la monopolización de las municipalidades, de los grandes medios de información, el control de la estructura sindical heredada del antiguo régimen (ley de unidad sindical) y, sobre todo, la conquista de una influencia en el MFA, fundamentalmente en sus órganos de dirección: la Asamblea del MFA, y el Consejo de la Revolución.

Por ello, el PCP pondrá sistemáticamente

el acento en la necesidad del mantenimiento de la unidad del MFA, presentando a éste como motor y garante del proceso de "democratización" del aparato de Estado y canalizador del movimiento de masas. Se sacrifica de este modo la independencia de clase del movimiento obrero y la correlación de fuerzas en el plano militar se convierte en el factor determinante de todas las iniciativas de movilización de los trabajadores. En el contexto de profundización de una situación prerrevolucionaria tienen, necesariamente, que ser muchas las oscilaciones en la aplicación de tal orientación, aparte de que sus modalidades estarán determinadas por diversos factores.

La crisis del MFA, puesta de manifiesto por la asamblea de Tancos y por la aparición del movimiento autónomo de los soldados, obligará al PCP a revisar absolutamente la formulación de su orientación: de hecho, pretende utilizar al movimiento de soldados para lograr un realineamiento de fuerzas en el seno del MFA, e incluso, su recomposición. Paralelamente, el ascenso del movimiento de masas, su cada vez mayor grado de autoorganización, combinados con el cuestionamiento parcial de su control sobre la Intersindical, le obligan a reajustar su táctica y a adaptarse a esta radicalización. Al respecto creará el Secretariado Provisional de las Comisiones de Trabajadores del Cinturón Industrial de Lisboa, para la contención del impulso hacia el reforzamiento de los órganos autónomos y dirigirlo hacia objetivos de modificación de las instancias del poder a nivel civil y militar. Las Comisiones de Trabajadores están destinadas a ser, en esta perspectiva, consejos de cogestión de la industria nacionalizada, y las comisiones de moradores, elementos complementarios del aparato de Estado burgués a nivel local, en el sentido en que las había "legalizado" el documento del MFA de junio de 1975.

Estas adaptaciones tácticas no son solamente producto de una política de maniobras, sino también de las presiones que se hacen sentir en las filas mismas del PCP en favor del desarrollo de formas de organizaciones democráticas, de representación directa y de iniciativas de control obrero. Este empuje puede reflejarse tanto más fácilmente en el seno del PCP en cuanto que es muy reducido el número de cuadros capaces de defender su orientación fundamental y de encuadrar a una base militante joven que se interpenetra con la vanguardia obrera amplia y los militantes de la extrema izquierda, multiplicando sus experiencias de lucha.

Además, la ausencia de una práctica prolongada de colaboración dentro del marco de la democracia parlamentaria burguesa, la carencia de tradiciones legalistas entre las filas del partido y las consecuencias de la lucha contra la dictadura corporativista, resultan en una cierta adaptación por parte de los cuadros del PC

al espíritu de las masas trabajadoras, lo que ha dado pábulo a que surjan ilusiones entre las corrientes centristas en torno a la verdadera naturaleza de la orientación estratégica del PC.

El desarrollo de la lucha de clases durante este período va a minar el proyecto del PCP; el comienzo de la crisis—fines de agosto, septiembre—del PCP es el producto de la dinámica de enfrentamiento entre las clases. Por un lado, sus vínculos con la burocracia soviética, su independencia en tanto que estructura frente a la burguesía, sus relaciones con la clase obrera, no lo hace, al contrario que el PS, un instrumento confiable frente al inicio de una contraofensiva en favor de la afirmación de la autoridad del Estado burgués. Por el otro, su programa de “democratización” del Estado burgués, su oposición a la autonomía del movimiento de masas, su hostilidad a la democracia obrera, lo colocan en contradicción con la actividad y las aspiraciones del ala más activa de éste.

9. Ligado a la importancia cuantitativa, al lugar ocupado en sectores claves del proceso de producción, y a la capacidad de iniciativa de la vanguardia obrera, la *influencia de la extrema izquierda* en el período actual se va a ver incrementada notablemente. El rápido ritmo de la radicalización de las capas jóvenes de trabajadores, el clima de debate político permanente difundido por los grandes medios de comunicación, la disposición de importantes sectores de las masas a la discusión política, el surgimiento del movimiento autónomo de los soldados y el espacio creado por la desagregación del aparato de represión, crean las condiciones propicias para una extensión de la audiencia de las organizaciones de la llamada “izquierda revolucionaria.” Sin embargo, esta influencia no se sustenta en su capacidad de educar y de organizar a las capas de trabajadores dispuestas a asociarse a las movilizaciones por ella impulsadas.

La coincidencia entre la crisis del PCP (aún bajo los efectos del choque que le produjo la brutal división del MFA) y la aparición en la escena política de una vanguardia obrera amplia, proporciona a la extrema izquierda (las organizaciones del FUR (Frente de Unidad Revolucionaria) y la UDP) la oportunidad de estimular, de manera autónoma, manifestaciones de cierta amplitud (julio, agosto y septiembre del 1975). No obstante, su división, y sobretodo, su confusión política, constituyen obstáculos mayores, tanto para desencadenar un proceso de unificación y centralización de los órganos embrionarios de dualidad de poderes como para minar la influencia de los partidos reformistas. La debilidad de los marxistas revolucionarios no permite proporcionar los elementos de clarificación política susceptibles de responder a estas dos exigencias. Y esto los hace incluso sensibles a la presión centrista:

a. La firma, el 25 de agosto de 1975 del acuerdo entre el PCP, el MDP, el FSP, la LUAR, la LCI, el MES y el PRP reflejó este doble fenómeno. Por un lado, con el fin de canalizar y utilizar en su beneficio la combatividad y la capacidad de iniciativa de la vanguardia obrera, el PCP firma, con estas organizaciones políticas, un acuerdo cuyo contenido se adecúa a sus concepciones, políticas. Por el otro, las organizaciones son políticamente incapaces de explotar la necesidad en la que se encuentra el PCP de efectuar esta maniobra para lanzar una ofensiva de unidad de acción con objetivos precisos que respondiera a las necesidades de las masas trabajadoras, a sus aspiraciones unitarias y propias para el desarrollo, unificación, coordinación y centralización de los órganos autónomos de los trabajadores. Por el contrario, cuales quiera que hayan sido sus reservas, las organizaciones firmantes avalaron una concepción que *negaba toda autonomía* a las comisiones de trabajadores, a las comisiones de moradores, a las asambleas populares, que quedaban así situadas al mismo nivel y en el mismo frente que el MFA y los partidos políticos. Además, el acuerdo se pronuncia por un apoyo al quinto Gobierno de colaboración de clases, que preconizaba una política de austeridad y una integración de los órganos autónomos en el aparato de Estado, el en preciso momento en que maduraban las posibilidades objetivas para que se realizara un salto cualitativo hacia su constitución como órganos de dualidad de poder. Finalmente, mientras que el MFA se desmembra por todas partes y surge el movimiento autónomo de soldados, el FUR se presenta como un garante del MFA. El acuerdo del 25 de agosto refleja, de manera deformada, la nueva correlación de fuerzas entre la vanguardia obrera amplia y los aparatos reformistas, entre los revolucionarios y las direcciones tradicionales; sin embargo, su firma condujo a avalar una orientación divergente con la dinámica del movimiento de masas que crea las condiciones objetivas de su ejecución.

b. Tras la exclusión-renuncia del PCP, el 29 de agosto, la cuestión de las relaciones entre las organizaciones firmantes del acuerdo del 25 de agosto se plantea bajo una nueva forma. La insistencia sobre la unidad de acción podría contribuir a superar parcialmente los límites de la intervención de la extrema izquierda: dispersión de las alternativas, incapacidad de hacer sentir todo el peso de la vanguardia obrera amplia en favor del reforzamiento de los órganos autónomos y el desarrollo del movimiento de soldados, esto es, la carencia de propuestas de acción que tuvieran eco favorable en las filas de las organizaciones obreras reformistas.

Ahora bien, la plataforma del FUR del 10 de septiembre no proporciona las bases para tal unidad de acción, sino que está encaminada a la constitución de un frente.

La agrupación de organizaciones que gozaban de la lealtad de sólo una minoría de la clase trabajadora, aun en la vanguardia obrera amplia, se identificó con “la unificación y organización de la vanguardia de la clase.” Esto condujo lógicamente a descartar cualquier acción de frente único dirigida hacia otras corrientes políticas de la vanguardia obrera (como la UDP) o hacia los partidos reformistas. Y esto a pesar de que una política por la más amplia unidad de acción, centrada en el desarrollo de órganos de democracia obrera y vinculada a la lucha por objetivos concretos sentidos por las masas hubiera sido capaz de fortalecer a la vanguardia obrera, de permitirle arrastrar a sus movilizaciones a las capas más atrasadas de la clase obrera y responder a la división en las filas de los trabajadores.

A esta concepción “frentista,” que impediría que se concretara una política efectiva de frente único, hay que agregar la caracterización que el FUR aplicaba al PS. Este es considerado como un partido burgués, la verdadera “avanzada del fascismo” ¡a la que hay que vencer antes de poder aplastar a la reacción!

Además el FUR despliega una visión triunfalista de la correlación de fuerzas, alimentando ante el PCP un sectarismo y un ultimatismo sólo comparable a la ilusión de que éste se alinearía tras sus iniciativas, obligado por la supuesta fuerza del FUR y la de sus contactos militares.

Esta línea se ve favorecida por una sobreestimación total del grado de conciencia política adquirido por los trabajadores, incluso en los sectores más combativos, a través de *experiencias parciales* y del nivel de “desarrollo de los órganos de poder popular,” formulación que, de hecho, oculta diversas ambigüedades sobre la naturaleza de la dualidad de poder y del salto cualitativo que implica la destrucción del Estado burgués. En esta situación, los principales componentes del FUR abandonan la búsqueda consciente y sistemática del apoyo directo de las amplias masas a las iniciativas de la vanguardia, la necesidad imperativa de atraer o de ganar a la mayoría de los trabajadores. En realidad la política del FUR conduce *al aislamiento de la vanguardia y a la consolidación de la división de la clase obrera*, lo que reforzará las tendencias sustitucionistas y aventureras.

En última instancia, en el FUR domina la concepción espontaneista del paso automático del nivel de conciencia adquirido por la vanguardia obrera en las experiencias de lucha de los últimos 18 meses al exigido para el cumplimiento de las tareas de la revolución socialista.

Finalmente, la concepción de las relaciones *entre los órganos autónomos y los partidos*, así como la ausencia de una *defensa consecuente de los principios de la democracia obrera*, supone un obstáculo adicional a la posibilidad de oponerse a la división e impulsar una orientación de

frente único. Al negar, so pretexto del "apartidismo" el derecho de expresión, en tanto que tales, a las organizaciones obreras en los órganos de democracia proletaria, el FUR retrasa el proceso de maduración política, ligado a la libre confrontación de las ideas de todas las corrientes del movimiento obrero y, por consiguiente, impide la unión de las capas más atrasadas y la vanguardia.

Al no proclamar el derecho inalienable de todas las tendencias del movimiento obrero a disponer de medios de organización y de expresión adecuados, a tener acceso a los grandes medios de comunicación, a ser representados en los embriones de poder obrero, las organizaciones del FUR no ofrecen una alternativa a la demagogia democrática del PS ni a los métodos burocráticos de los estalinistas.

En este ascenso revolucionario en el que se conjugan la movilización de los sectores atrasados de la clase obrera y la extensión de la autoorganización en las fábricas y en el ejército, la crisis del factor subjetivo se revela en toda su amplitud. La inexistencia de un partido revolucionario, aunque tuviera unas reducidas dimensiones, impide la generalización y centralización de las experiencias de lucha y, por consiguiente, el que la conciencia de las masas experimente un salto cualitativo.

Además, ni siquiera existe un polo de referencia políticamente creíble que pueda contribuir, con sus análisis, sus proposiciones y su intervención, a realizar la clarificación política en una vanguardia dominada por las corrientes centristas (MES, PRP . . .) y maoístas (UDP). En este sentido, el hecho de que la LCI firmara la plataforma del 10 de septiembre, y su adaptación a las ideas dominantes en el FUR (sobre el PS y el frente único) representan un grave error político que no podía sino retrasar la construcción y la consolidación de la organización trotskista en Portugal. Los acontecimientos del 25 de noviembre sancionan brutalmente esta errónea concepción.

III

10. El desfase entre la crisis profunda del aparato estatal y la inexistencia de centralización de los órganos embrionarios de dualidad de poder, no podía prolongarse por mucho tiempo.

Tal situación, de hecho, contenía las siguientes alternativas:

—O bien se realizaba una centralización de los instrumentos de democracia proletaria (esencialmente a nivel de las comisiones de trabajadores) y se desembocaba en una situación de dualidad de poder generalizada;

—O bien, la burguesía era capaz de reconstituir, más o menos completamente, los instrumentos de represión que le ofrecieran la posibilidad de reprimir las expresiones más avanzadas del empuje proletario.

Esta alternativa no significa que deba operarse inmediatamente un cambio radical en uno u otro sentido, sino que los medios de que disponen los dos campos opuestos modifican los términos de las futuras pruebas de fuerza.

Las implicaciones de esta desincronización son múltiples:

- A pesar de su extrema debilidad y de su crisis de dirección, la burguesía dispone de elementos de centralización de su voluntad política, con los que de ningún modo dispone la clase obrera. El equívoco de los centristas al confundir la parálisis gubernamental ("huelga" del sexto Gobierno) con la desintegración total del aparato estatal burgués, expresa su completa incompreensión de ese fenómeno y su desconcierto ante la respuesta burguesa, preparada con rápida y relativa eficacia, entre el 25 y el 26 de noviembre.

- En el plano militar, la multiplicación de las rupturas en el sistema jerárquico no corresponde con el desarrollo de las comisiones de soldados y, sobre todo, con su coordinación y unión con los órganos de los trabajadores. Además, la extensión de la autoorganización de los soldados es muy desigual entre el Norte y el Sur, lo cual favorece las maniobras de la jerarquía. A esto se añade el desfase entre la crisis del ejército y la falta de una salida política, como la que ofrecería la centralización de las comisiones de trabajadores, que empuja a una parte de los soldados y oficiales radicalizados a buscar esta salida política en una solución militar.

Finalmente, la desintegración del ejército, en la medida en que gran parte de los soldados está de parte del movimiento de masas, suscita en éste la ilusión de que tiene asegurado de antemano el resultado de una eventual prueba de fuerza. Por ello, una mayoría de los trabajadores, incluso los más avanzados, se olvida la necesidad de la autodefensa de los órganos propios de las masas trabajadoras, el armamento del proletariado.

- La dispersión de las estructuras de autoorganización no permite que las masas realicen las experiencias que favorecen la elevación cualitativa de la conciencia de clase. Sólo con la más amplia y directa participación de las masas trabajadoras en la discusión de sus problemas, en la búsqueda de solución a los mismos, así como en el debate sobre la ejecución de un plan general, todo ello unido a la centralización de los órganos autónomos, se pueden crear las condiciones propicias para una superación de las ilusiones democráticas en la mayoría activa de la clase obrera y hacerla pasar al lado de los consejos obreros contra la democracia burguesa parlamentaria. Sólo a partir de ese momento se puede abordar el problema de la búsqueda de las formas de paso hacia la revolución proletaria propiamente dicha. Al ocultar la función de una situación de dualidad de poder sobre el desarrollo de la conciencia de clase de la mayoría de los

trabajadores, y al difundir el mito de la existencia de un real "poder popular" que sólo necesitaba extenderse un poco más (cuando en realidad no son más que embriones dispersos de órganos de poder popular que precisan de un mayor desarrollo), los centristas (PRP, MES) se van a ver obligados a presentar la insurrección como una precondition para el salto cualitativo del movimiento de masas, que entonces podría ser ganado a la revolución socialista. ¡Se había invertido la marcha de la revolución socialista!

11. Los enfrentamientos del 25 y del 26 de noviembre deben ser comprendidos en esta perspectiva. La burguesía necesita salir forzosamente y a corto plazo del *impasse* en que la han arrinconado los fracasos de sus intervenciones, la degradación del ejército y los éxitos obtenidos por los trabajadores de la metalurgia y de la construcción. Sus objetivos prioritarios son, por una parte, poner fin a la efervescencia política en el ejército, a fin de neutralizar una serie de unidades y de reconstruir una fuerza militar policiaca y, por otra, recuperar el control de los grandes medios de comunicación, que amplifican la resonancia de las movilizaciones de los trabajadores, incluso las sectoriales, y que proporcionan a éstos un elemento parcial de coordinación.

Esta trata, pues, de provocar una prueba de fuerza sobre un terreno bien preciso: la Comandancia de la Región Militar de Lisboa. La "huelga" del Gobierno crea un clima favorable para tal operación, dejando la responsabilidad de su desarrollo a los militares y concentrando los poderes de decisión en un círculo que dispone de posiciones dominantes en el Estado Mayor y en el Consejo de la Revolución. La nominación de Vasco Lourenço representa una provocación que permite la preparación de un plan de contraataque ante cualquier tentativa de un sector del ejército de impedir la aplicación de tal medida.

En lugar de responder con el desarrollo de una red de comisiones de soldados capaces de neutralizar en la práctica la iniciativa de la mayoría del Consejo de la Revolución, los llamados "oficiales revolucionarios" y la corriente gonzalvista replican en el terreno elegido por sus adversarios. En este nivel confluyen objetivamente las concepciones "insurgentes" de los centristas (MES y PRP)—mezcladas con las posiciones militaristas de los "oficiales revolucionarios"—y la voluntad de sectores gonzalvistas del ejército de emprender un golpe de fuerza que respondiera al progreso de la jerarquía militar reaccionaria, a fin de reorganizar las instancias del poder militar. La campaña del PCP en favor del "retorno de los militares revolucionarios" al Consejo de la Revolución y su apoyo a Carvalho a la cabeza de la Región Militar de Lisboa, da de hecho el visto bueno a estos planes y sugiere la organización de un apoyo de

masas a su posible puesta en práctica, lo que refuerza a su vez las ilusiones de los centristas en las opciones de la dirección de Cunhal.

La precipitada intervención de los paracaidistas de la base de Tancos acelera la puesta en práctica, por parte de la izquierda militar, de un plan inacabado. Por el contrario, la "respuesta" de Costa Gomes obedece a una preparación meticulosa y se desarrolla simultáneamente en el plano militar gracias a las fuerzas de los Comandos de Amadora, en el político con el voto de la Asamblea Constituyente por el estado de sitio y en el de la información con la inmediata transferencia a Oporto de las emisoras de radio y televisión, asegurándose, con ello el control absoluto de las telecomunicaciones. ¡El verdadero golpe de la reacción no estaba improvisado!

Dentro de la lógica de su campaña de "orden y disciplina," el PS apoya abiertamente la instauración del estado de sitio y las medidas policíacas que lo acompañan. De hecho las apoya cuando son sometidas a la Constituyente.

En cuanto al PCP, sus intenciones se sitúan en el marco estricto de la reorganización del Consejo de la Revolución y, más tarde, del Gobierno. A lo sumo, trata de utilizar las modificaciones de la correlación de fuerzas que hubieran podido imponer los paracaidistas de Tancos en el seno del bastión reaccionario de la Fuerza Aérea, con el fin de facilitar la implementación de sus planes. En ningún caso la dirección de Cunhal está dispuesta a involucrarse en un "golpe de estado." Su constante, antes y después del 25 de noviembre, es la búsqueda de un compromiso dentro del marco de una "revolución democrática." A pesar de la posición que mantuvo durante el debate en la Asamblea Constituyente, el PCP no llevó a cabo movilizaciones contra el estado de sitio. Inmediatamente movió el eje de sus alianzas un grado a la derecha. Lo esencial siguió siendo aferrarse a sus posiciones en el aparato de Estado, esperando encontrar nuevos puntos de apoyo.

Los centristas, en particular el PRP y el MES, a la par que manifestaban una total incompetencia en el terreno que ellos mismos habían escogido, declararon que "había llegado la hora de darle a la burguesía una lección definitiva." Su separación del verdadero movimiento de masas fue drásticamente revelada. Su denuncia de la traición del PCP correspondía con sus ilusiones, tanto de la orientación estratégica de los estalinistas como sobre la correlación de fuerzas que mantenían con los aparatos reformistas.

La clase obrera no participará en ningún momento en ese abortado golpe, llegando a lo sumo a manifestar reflejos autodefensivos con respecto a sus conquistas, movilizándose en las empresas. Tanto la forma como los objetivos de la rebelión del 25 de noviembre no pueden más que hacer imposible la movilización de las masas y

situar en ellas la mayor incertidumbre y confusión. Los soldados permanecerán a la expectativa. No están dispuestos, aislados del movimiento de masas, a lanzarse a una batalla cuyas implicaciones desconocen.

12. La "victoria ofensiva" en el plano militar da a la burguesía la oportunidad de iniciar un proceso de reconstrucción del aparato de Estado, precondición de cualquier posibilidad de un restablecimiento parcial del orden en las fábricas y en el campo y de concretar el plan económico, cuyas líneas generales fueron definidas a principios de noviembre. Por ello pondrá en primer lugar el acento en:

—control de las existencias de armas y constitución de un aparato de represión concentrado en la PSP y la GNR, transformados en fuerza operacional (poniendo de este modo en práctica una idea original del sexto Gobierno, que aún no se había atrevido a poner frente a soldados y trabajadores).

—cambios en los cuerpos de oficiales con el fin de asegurar el control de la ola de nuevos reclutas, y una reducción de los efectivos, tendiente a la profesionalización de cierto número de unidades estratégicas.

—y por último, un control de la radio y de la televisión, así como una reestructuración de la prensa, con el fin de poner a disposición del Gobierno los medios de manipulación de la opinión pública y de restringir el eco de las luchas, incluso parciales, que repercutía en la prensa escrita y hablada, y poner fin a los debates políticos permanentes que estos favorecían.

Utilizando sus puntos de apoyo en el ejército y en el aparato de Estado en general, la burguesía intenta hacer sentir, en el terreno social, su recobrada iniciativa. El Gobierno prolonga el período de suspensión de los contratos y con ello cuestiona las conquistas de los movimientos reivindicativos de los meses de octubre y noviembre de 1975. La CIP (Confederación de la Industria Portuguesa) reaparece proponiéndole al gobierno un plan de austeridad, la congelación de los salarios y el restablecimiento del poder patronal en las empresas. La derecha y la extrema derecha aprovechan esta ruptura para cuestionar—apoyados por la movilización de los propietarios—no sólo las ocupaciones de tierras sino también el principio mismo de la reforma agraria. Se perfila un proceso de reestructuración de las fuerzas de la burguesía y su centro de gravedad se desplaza claramente hacia la derecha: los spinolistas y las corrientes análogas conquistan puestos claves en el mando militar; el bloque social de la reacción consolida sus posiciones en regiones enteras y busca transformarlas en fortalezas para una futura prueba de fuerza; la extrema derecha reaparece en la escena política y se hacen visibles sus vínculos con los partidos oficiales de la burguesía y un sector de la jerarquía militar. El 25 de

noviembre le ha dado, pues, nuevamente confianza a la burguesía; ésta reorganiza sus fuerzas y confecciona un aparato de Estado apto, susceptible de reprimir, a corto plazo, al movimiento de masas, y de contener las luchas más avanzadas.

La primera fase de esta ofensiva se sitúa en el nivel preciso en que se afirmó el éxito de la burguesía. En el terreno social, trata de maniobrar posponiendo el plazo de una verdadera batalla frontal y no por ello dejando de preparar los elementos de una ofensiva de conjunto. La clase obrera no fue una protagonista del 25 de noviembre, la burguesía es consciente de que aún tiene que arreglar cuentas con los trabajadores. Por ello, como la prueba del 25 de noviembre no proporcionó pruebas del estado de las fuerzas repectivas, algunos sectores de la burguesía perciben la posibilidad de una discordancia entre el reforzamiento inicial del aparato de Estado, y la capacidad de imponer de forma duradera una serie de medidas antiobreras. Esto se refleja en las divergencias que atraviesan al PPD, y en las divisiones en el seno de los partidos burgueses sobre la cuestión de las alianzas con los partidos reformistas de la clase obrera, así como las fisuras, aunque limitadas, en el seno del cuerpo de oficiales.

Sin embargo, la crisis en el funcionamiento del sistema capitalista, así como de la profundidad de la recesión y del hundimiento de ciertas ramas industriales, casi no le permiten a la burguesía posponer los ataques contra las conquistas de las masas trabajadoras y restringirlas rigurosamente. Los decretos gubernamentales de los meses de diciembre 1975 y enero de 1976 presagian esta tendencia.

Es allí donde reside la contradicción fundamental entre las necesidades objetivas desde el punto de vista de la burguesía—que condiciona la naturaleza de las medidas a tomar para frenar al movimiento de masas y asegurar una reactivación de las inversiones—y la correlación de las fuerzas sociales que resulta de la fase anterior, las cuales apenas han sido modificadas de forma cualitativa por los efectos de la derrota militar de un sector del ejército.

En efecto, la ayuda imperialista podría permitir la realización de diversas inversiones, por ejemplo, en trabajos públicos, ya que esto tiene un efecto inmediato sobre el desempleo, y dar de esta manera, un cierto respiro. Pero esto no elimina la cuestión del funcionamiento del sistema capitalista, es decir, del restablecimiento del orden patronal (supresión del control obrero, aumento de la productividad, detención de las ocupaciones de fábricas enteras, aumento de la jornada de trabajo, reducción de los salarios reales para permitir una reactivación de la cuota de ganancia . . .). Por el contrario, todo esto se halla en función de lo anterior. En este sentido, parecen inevitables toda una serie

de confrontaciones bastante rápidas en este terreno.

Todo esto indica la imposibilidad de una estabilización real sin inflingir una profunda derrota al proletariado. Incluso en el caso de que se realizara el poco probable escalonamiento de brutales medidas contra el nivel de vida de los trabajadores (que exigiría una amplia movilización de las reservas internas y la intervención imperialista) y se combinara con vacilaciones importantes en el campo obrero, no podrían prolongarse por mucho tiempo los plazos de una nueva prueba de fuerza en el terreno social y político.

13. La transferencia de la derrota de una parte de los soldados y de los "oficiales revolucionarios" al plano de la correlación de fuerzas sociales no ha tenido por efecto su modificación de manera cualitativa. Sin embargo, esta derrota actúa como un revelador de las debilidades políticas y organizativas del ascenso obrero, semiespontáneo y semiconsciente, y pone al desnudo las desigualdades del desarrollo de la combatividad y de la conciencia de éste. Lo cual no implica que haya que cambiar la opinión sobre la naturaleza de la correlación de fuerzas anteriores al 25 de noviembre. Durante 18 meses, éstas se modificaron en favor de la clase obrera y en contra de las clases dominantes, hasta tal punto que, durante el otoño de 1975 los trabajadores contradijeron las principales decisiones de un Gobierno que se pretendía de "orden y disciplina" (la ocupación de las radios por orden de Pinheiro de Azevedo se vuelve contra el objetivo gubernamental; cuestionamiento de la AMI; derrotas infringidas al Ministerio de Trabajo . . .). De hecho, la misma madurez de la situación objetiva hacía indispensable, para asegurar cualquier paso hacia adelante, una estrategia global anticapitalista, una extensión y centralización de los órganos propios de los trabajadores. Subrayaba los límites del ascenso espontáneo y empírico del movimiento de masas. La debilidad del factor subjetivo va, pues, a revelarse con fuerza y a modificar la evolución de la correlación de fuerzas.

Después del 25 de noviembre de 1975, el retroceso limitado del "proceso revolucionario" va a expresarse, entre otras cosas, en un complejo desarrollo de la recomposición del movimiento obrero organizado.

a. Las capas de trabajadores más atrasados, que entraron en la lucha con ocasión del movimiento reivindicativo del otoño de 1975, experimentaron una radicalización y una politización aceleradas y superficiales, lo cual los hace vulnerables a la ofensiva burguesa. Su dependencia en relación a los aparatos reformistas aumenta cuando el ataque gubernamental se sitúa precisamente al nivel en que estas organizaciones juegan un papel decisivo para la organización de una respuesta de conjunto. El retroceso del movimiento obrero hace pues, resurgir con más fuerza

las diferencias en la madurez política de la clase obrera dependiendo de sus diferentes regiones y ramas industriales. El desnivel existente entre el proletariado del cinturón industrial de Lisboa y del Alentejo y el del resto de la masa de trabajadores podría aumentar si los sectores que ven suspendidos sus contratos no dan, en el terreno económico, una respuesta eficaz. *El retraso de los trabajadores en la organización de la respuesta podría combinarse con las movilizaciones y un cambio de actitud por parte de la pequeña burguesía y suscitar una modificación de la correlación de las fuerzas sociales en su conjunto.*

b. La falta de centralización de los órganos propios de los trabajadores—que no permite, en período de ascenso contrarrestar el desarrollo desigual de la conciencia y el grado de auto organización—revela crudamente las *diferencias cualitativas entre las comisiones de moradores y las comisiones de trabajadores* y los diferentes niveles de representatividad de las segundas. Este proceso facilita una operación de recuperación y de integración a la estructura sindical de las comisiones de trabajadores por parte de los reformistas tanto más cuanto que éstos son los únicos que disponen de coordinadoras y de los medios de realizar cierta centralización, además de que poseen una influencia determinante en la Intersindical.

Paralelamente, en este período de recuperación de las fuerzas de la clase obrera, se refuerza el peso de las organizaciones sindicales. Se abre una nueva etapa en la extensión de la sindicalización. Esta combina tres aspectos: a la penetración más profunda de las organizaciones sindicales en los sectores que nunca, en el período anterior al 25 de abril de 1974, habían sido sindicalizados (profesores, servicios públicos); la ampliación de los sindicatos de profesionistas que salieron del antiguo sistema "sindical" con carácter corporativista; y el nacimiento y la expansión de los sindicatos por rama (metalurgia, construcción civil, correos). Después del 25 de noviembre de 1975, algunos sindicatos con dirección socialista se integran a la Intersindical. Así se abre un nuevo debate, tanto en lo que respecta al tipo de réplica que requieren las medidas tomadas por el gobierno, como en lo referente al funcionamiento democrático de los sindicatos. Este proceso atenta contra el control burocrático del PCP y tiende a agravar las contradicciones en un PS que se sabe la clave del gobierno.

c. La naturaleza misma del ascenso obrero, escalonado y sin encontrar mayores obstáculos, favorecía una capacidad de iniciativa y una audiencia reales de la vanguardia obrera amplia. Sin embargo, el carácter semiespontáneo y semiconsciente del movimiento se refleja en la distorsión entre el nivel de organización política de esta vanguardia y su amplitud. En esta misma lógica, la identificación de las victorias de los soldados y la de los

trabajadores, constituye un rasgo determinante de su percepción política y explica el impacto que ha tenido sobre ella la derrota de una parte de los soldados.

Así, durante el repliegue, se revela la debilidad cuantitativa de la fracción organizada de esta vanguardia obrera amplia, su confusión política afloja los vínculos con la periferia y facilita así un control de la fuerza organizada de los reformistas (especialmente el PCP) sobre esta última. La inexistencia de una organización revolucionaria creíble capaz de extraer las lecciones del 25 de noviembre, de hacer que esta vanguardia obrera amplia asimilara esta experiencia, y de utilizar los elementos educativos de los enfrentamientos para reforzar la autonomía de clase, aumenta su desconcierto, frena sus ritmos de recuperación y limita su capacidad de encabezar una respuesta decidida a la ofensiva gubernamental en el plano económico.

d. Las conclusiones del 25 de noviembre extraídas por el PCP, cuya estrategia está condicionada esencialmente por un proyecto reformista de "revolución democrática" y por la preocupación de mantener sus posiciones en el aparato de Estado y, más especialmente en el aparato militar, lo conducen lógicamente a un viraje derechista. Otorga nuevamente la prioridad a la lucha antifascista en la perspectiva de la construcción de un régimen democrático. Por ello, insiste en la alianza con el PS, a la par que realiza aperturas hacia la escisión del PPD, en el contexto de la búsqueda de una alianza con la pequeña burguesía urbana y de algunos sectores de las clases medias.

La debilidad y la confusión de la "izquierda revolucionaria"—que no ha logrado capitalizar las tensiones en el seno del PCP después del 25 de noviembre—facilita la instrumentalización de los órganos autónomos por la corriente stalinista. Esto puede permitirle, sin mayores riesgos, retroceder respecto a ciertas conquistas de las masas. Pero sus vínculos con la clase obrera y la combatividad de gran parte de sus militantes obreros, le obligarán a responder en el terreno económico tratando de canalizar al movimiento en el marco sindical, a fin de impedir un resurgimiento de las comisiones de trabajadores como órganos embrionarios de dualidad de poderes. Así mismo, difícilmente podrá guardar silencio ante la represión gubernamental sin correr el riesgo de suscitar tensiones internas y de restringir aún más su influencia entre los militantes de izquierda, por lo que tratará de evitar, a toda costa, nuevos choques, y sus declaraciones de oposición a la política económica y social del gobierno no serán seguidas de indicaciones precisas sobre las formas que debería tomar la respuesta.

e. Al apoyar la represión y los decretos gubernamentales, el PS ha dado un paso más en su carrera contrarrevolucionaria. Ahora bien, el reagrupamiento a la derecha de la jerarquía militar, la ofensiva

contra la reforma agraria, las proclamas reaccionarias del PPD y del CDS indican quiénes son los beneficiarios de la estabilización del Estado burgués, de las medidas necesarias para la reactivación de una economía de mercado, y quiénes son los verdaderos artífices de un restablecimiento del orden capitalista. La naturaleza del PS, sus relaciones con la clase obrera, no lo hacen un instrumento funcional para asegurar la aplicación de medidas de ataque frontales contra el nivel de vida de los trabajadores. La contienda electoral, así como la situación política, lo obligan a reforzar su presencia organizada en el movimiento obrero. Paralelamente, para competir por la clientela electoral pequeño-burguesa con el PPD, debe afirmarse como factor de orden. Estas dos exigencias contradictorias, así como los ataques del gobierno contra las conquistas de los trabajadores, entre otros, de los organizados sindicalmente e influenciados por el PS, pueden hacer surgir las contradicciones internas que habían quedado ocultas por la lucha contra el PCP y permitir el desprendimiento de tendencias opositoras. Finalmente, el peligro confirmado de un reforzamiento de la extrema derecha reactiva las aspiraciones unitarias en el seno del movimiento obrero y puede poner en una situación difícil a la dirección de Soares.

f. La discrepancia entre el desarrollo real de la lucha de clases y las perspectivas trazadas por las corrientes centristas y ultraizquierdistas determina una profunda crisis de estas organizaciones. El viraje del MES y del PRP los conduce a desarrollar una línea antifascista cuya dinámica está cargada de adaptaciones oportunistas dirigidas al PCP; incluso, hay sectores que siguen la dirección de la "izquierda del MFA." En cuanto a la UDP, ésta refuerza su actitud hipersectaria hacia el PCP, que es caracterizado como socialfascista y preconiza la formación de un "frente antifascista" apoyado en los "órganos de voluntad popular."

La crisis de las organizaciones centristas del tipo PRP y MES, combinada a la debilidad del polo trotskista, deja en el futuro inmediato cierto espacio a las corrientes como la UDP.

La adopción por todas estas corrientes de la línea antifascista, cualesquiera que sean las motivaciones, aumenta la incertidumbre en la clase obrera, la desmoralización de su vanguardia y contribuye a diluir las necesarias consignas de respuesta al ataque económico de la burguesía en una confusa óptica de "lucha antifascista."

14. La nueva etapa abierta por el 25 de noviembre de 1975 no se caracteriza por una modificación cualitativa de la correlación de fuerzas sociales entre la burguesía y el proletariado. Sin embargo, termina el período caracterizado por una crisis profundizada del aparato de Estado, el que por lo demás, ya no se ve enfrentado a la

centralización de los órganos de dualidad de poderes. Los rasgos dominantes siguen siendo los de una situación prerrevolucionaria. La burguesía ha recuperado cierta iniciativa política y ha comenzado una restructuración de su aparato de Estado, sin haber infligido una derrota a la clase obrera, ni superado su crisis de dirección política. Las divisiones en el PPD, en la jerarquía militar, así como los debates entre CDS y PPD reflejan esta crisis. El CDS quiere aparecer como el único defensor consecuente de los intereses de la burguesía y trata de afirmarse como dirección alternativa en el campo burgués, tratando de instrumentalizar a distintas capas de la pequeña burguesía—la que también proporciona sus tropas a la extrema derecha—para asentar su base social.

El proletariado industrial y agrícola, cuyo potencial de combate es muy importante, se enfrenta, por primera vez, a un cuestionamiento de sus principales conquistas, disponiendo de importantes puntos de apoyo (sindicatos, comisiones de trabajadores, ligas campesinas, partidos) y de una rica experiencia de luchas que le permiten responder a la ofensiva burguesa e iniciar, a corto plazo, luchas económicas. Una reactivación del movimiento reivindicativo ante los atentados contra el nivel de vida permitiría reactivar los órganos autónomos de las masas, cuya columna vertebral sería constituida por las comisiones de trabajadores. Nuevamente, su centralización y su transformación en órganos de dualidad de poderes se convertiría en un objetivo inmediato.

Una provocación económica o política de la burguesía, o de algunos de sus sectores ciegos (por confiados), podría, no solamente acelerar tal respuesta, sino incitar a una forma masiva y unitaria de movilización que podría terminar con los efectos de consolidación del aparato de Estado y pondría de nuevo, y objetivamente, a la orden del día la cuestión del poder de las masas trabajadoras.

Un retraso en la realización de la contraofensiva obrera favorecería la consolidación de los instrumentos de la burguesía para entrar en una nueva prueba de fuerzas, quizás un poco pospuesta, pero no por ello menos decisiva.

La dinámica, los ritmos y los plazos de la situación política portuguesa están también determinados por la profundización de la crisis de sucesión del franquismo y la entrada en la escena política de las masas obreras en España. En un plazo relativamente corto podría agregarse, pues, un elemento de desequilibrio a los factores estructurales de inestabilidad propios de Portugal.

Las tareas a las cuales debe hacer frente el proletariado en esta nueva etapa subrayan la urgencia de la necesidad de la construcción de una dirección revolucionaria capaz de asegurar una elevación de la conciencia de clase y conducir al proleta-

riado y sus aliados a la conquista del poder.

IV

15. Cualesquiera que sean las fluctuaciones del "proceso revolucionario," nada evitará la prueba de fuerza decisiva entre las dos clases fundamentales. Revolución y contrarrevolución, victoria de la clase obrera y establecimiento de un Estado obrero o aplastamiento político de los trabajadores e instauración de un "régimen fuerte" (dictadura militar, dictadura fascista o semifascista . . .): esta es la alternativa real que se presenta a las masas trabajadoras portuguesas. La LCI debe hacer todo lo posible por preparar a las masas para tal conflicto, apoyándose en las múltiples y ricas experiencias efectuadas por los trabajadores antes del 25 de noviembre, esforzándose porque la mayoría de las capas de la clase obrera asimile las lecciones del 25 de noviembre, proporcionando un proyecto político de conjunto creíble a los ojos de las masas trabajadoras para transformar la respuesta inicial a los ataques burgueses contra las conquistas de las masas en una ofensiva generalizada.

a. Aprovechando la política reformista de las direcciones del movimiento obrero, la burguesía trata de traducir al plano social la victoria política y militar obtenida el 25 de noviembre. En este contexto, la tarea prioritaria de los marxistas revolucionarios consiste en estimular, por medio de la propaganda, la agitación y las iniciativas prácticas, el contraataque más unitario y más radical contra los efectos del plan de austeridad del gobierno, contra el cuestionamiento del control obrero y de todas las manifestaciones de contestación del poder patronal en las empresas, así como contra los atentados contra la reforma agraria.

La correlación de las fuerzas sociales, el potencial de combatividad, los instrumentos de que disponen la clase obrera y los trabajadores agrícolas, les permiten infligir un categórico desmentido a la actual ofensiva patronal y gubernamental. Un retraso de los plazos de respuesta puede acentuar la desorientación limitada de los trabajadores, aumentar la influencia reformista, vaciar de su contenido a las estructuras de auto organización—Comisiones de Trabajadores—y ampliar el espacio que favorece un reagrupamiento de las fuerzas en el campo burgués, así como la afirmación de una dirección en su seno. Las elecciones de abril, en esas condiciones, podrían acelerar y consolidar este proceso.

Los marxistas revolucionarios deben, pues, dar una gran importancia tanto a la organización de la solidaridad como a la de la popularización de las luchas parciales y radicales que se están desarrollando desde ahora, en oposición a la política de las direcciones reformistas que contribu-

yen a aislarlas. Esto puede constituir un factor que favorezca las movilizaciones más amplias, demostrando que es posible la victoria y, permitiendo, sobre todo, el volver a poner a la orden del día las formas de lucha más avanzadas de la fase anterior.

En la actual coyuntura, la batalla central se desarrollará contra las medidas de suspensión de los contratos, es decir, de negación de las conquistas obtenidas por el movimiento reivindicativo del otoño de 1975. Al suspender los contratos, el gobierno sondea las reacciones del grueso de la clase obrera, al mismo tiempo que golpea con más fuerza en el punto en que la respuesta de los trabajadores está fuertemente determinada por la política de las organizaciones sindicales y, por consiguiente, de los aparatos reformistas. Dada la conjunción de la amplitud del ataque al nivel de vida y el potencial de lucha mantenido en las filas obreras, es muy poco probable que el gobierno—incluso aprovechando la orientación de las organizaciones reformistas—logre hacer pasar el conjunto de sus medidas. Una respuesta muy fragmentada podría permitirle al gobierno, incapaz de hacer avanzar todos sus peones en todas las casillas del tablero, el llevar sus esfuerzos a los sectores políticamente más atrasados, así como más débilmente organizados y obtener algunos éxitos. De esta manera podría aumentar la división de la clase obrera entre diversos sectores y regiones. Es por ello que los marxistas revolucionarios, a partir de las movilizaciones que se desarrollarán en una rama u otra, insistirán en la necesidad de la *coordinación y la generalización de la respuesta*, para hacer fracasar los ataques que efectivamente golpean a la clase obrera.

Sin embargo, un movimiento reivindicativo de gran envergadura para impedir las medidas de austeridad, plantea agudamente la cuestión del funcionamiento de conjunto de una economía capitalista confrontada a una grave crisis coyuntural y estructural. Para cualquier respuesta de conjunto, pero sobre todo si la lucha *mantiene* un nivel elevado, son necesarias perspectivas globales claras, así como una solución articulada desde el punto de vista de la clase obrera. Por ello, es imprescindible para los marxistas revolucionarios la elaboración de un *cuerpo de reivindicaciones y un plan de lucha* que constituyan una respuesta concreta a los problemas sociales y económicos del país, afirmando-se como una alternativa ante las soluciones reformistas de todo tipo. Tal proyecto debe ser el soporte de la intervención de la LCI.

Es necesario combinar, en las luchas parciales, la propaganda por estas soluciones de conjunto, con el fin de aumentar todas sus posibilidades de traducción en iniciativas de masa.

b. La aplicación del plan gubernamental de austeridad implica el cuestionamiento

de las libertades de organización y de expresión arrancadas por los trabajadores en el transcurso de 18 meses de lucha.

Por el momento, el gobierno aún no está en la posibilidad de desplegar una amplia ofensiva represiva, limitándose a la aplicación de medidas selectivas destinadas a preparar el terreno para golpear más duramente a la vanguardia. Estas medidas toman tanta más significación política cuanto que los soldados y oficiales arrestados el 25 de noviembre son mantenidos en prisión, mientras que los participantes en el complot del 11 de marzo y el personal policíaco del régimen salazarista han sido liberados.

Todo el movimiento obrero debe organizar una amplia campaña *por la liberación de los prisioneros políticos* que haga retroceder a la burguesía y su gobierno y le impida atentar contra los derechos de expresión y organización del movimiento obrero. Al mismo tiempo, es necesario que se exija, ante la gran cantidad de reincorporaciones de ex-agentes del régimen corporativista a sus funciones, su depuración inmediata, y que se tomen medidas en este sentido, donde quiera que esto sea posible y pueda, a su vez, ser motivo de una adhesión popular.

La recuperación y funcionamiento de los efectivos y de los medios de la GNR y de la PSP (Guardia Nacional Republicana y Policía de Seguridad Pública, respectivamente), fuerzas de choque del viejo régimen, ponen a la orden del día la necesidad de realizar una extensa agitación *por el desarme y la disolución de estos cuerpos represivos*.

En la actual coyuntura, el gobierno puede tratar de apoyarse en una legislación antiobrera (ley sobre la prensa, sobre el derecho de huelga), no aplicada hasta ahora, debido al ascenso del movimiento de masas. Esto convierte en primordial la lucha por la derogación de estos decretos ley y por la defensa incondicional del derecho de manifestación y de huelga de los trabajadores, del derecho de expresión y organización de todas las tendencias del movimiento obrero y de las estructuras propias de las masas trabajadoras. Es en esta perspectiva que debe situarse la *campaña contra el pacto* propuesto por el Consejo de la Revolución, el que trata de consolidar sus posiciones, incluso por medio de una operación presidencialista, para desarrollar una política antiobrera y cuestionar las conquistas de los trabajadores.

c. Las comisiones de trabajadores y los sindicatos siguen siendo los instrumentos privilegiados para la realización de una respuesta de masas al ataque patronal y gubernamental contra las conquistas obreras y populares. La orientación defendida por los marxistas revolucionarios en las comisiones de trabajadores y en los sindicatos debe evitar cualquier oposición de estos entre sí y debe subrayar su *carácter complementario*. Ante el proyecto reformis-

ta de integración de las comisiones de trabajadores en la estructura sindical, de la negación de su autonomía y de su función específica, es necesario poner el acento en la preservación de esta autonomía y en su representatividad de masas. Esto no puede desprenderse sino de la demostración efectiva de que las comisiones de trabajadores asumen tareas que se inscriben en el marco general del control obrero, concebido como medio de una verdadera defensa de los intereses de la clase y de un inicio de realización de sus aspiraciones. Las decisiones gubernamentales y el proceso de recomposición del movimiento obrero confieren a los sindicatos un papel más importante y subrayan la necesidad de desarrollar en ellos un trabajo sistemático para la construcción de una tendencia revolucionaria. Este trabajo sindical debe permitir el que penetren en los sectores atrasados una serie de reivindicaciones transitorias y un debate sobre los temas ligados al control obrero. Además, la presencia a escala nacional en los sindicatos y su animación por parte de los militantes revolucionarios puede impedir el aislamiento de las comisiones de trabajadores en ciertas ramas industriales.

En el plano sindical, el objetivo estratégico sigue siendo el de la construcción de una *central sindical única independiente, organizada por ramas industriales* y que funcione *según las normas de la más grande democracia obrera*. La batalla por este funcionamiento democrático y por la liquidación de las estructuras corporativistas puede combinarse con el desarrollo y reforzamiento de las comisiones de trabajadores e incluso facilitar su centralización por ramas.

Ante la crisis económica y los decretos gubernamentales, la definición de opciones globales para consolidar el contraataque sindical exige la más libre discusión de las diferentes orientaciones y pone de relieve la importancia de un *congreso sindical democrático*. La expresión de las necesidades, la formulación de las reivindicaciones y la definición de una estrategia de lucha necesitan de la existencia del derecho de tendencia, es decir, la posibilidad de un debate sin obstáculos, en donde cada corriente del movimiento obrero pueda hacer valer sus soluciones ante el conjunto de los trabajadores. Esta confrontación de ideas constituye la precondition real del respeto y puesta en práctica de las decisiones tomadas por la mayoría. Esto debe ser presentado constantemente como una alternativa a la práctica manipuladora de las direcciones reformistas en los sindicatos y particularmente del PCP en el aparato nacional de la Intersindical.

d. Los marxistas revolucionarios afirman el *papel decisivo que para el futuro de la revolución portuguesa tienen las comisiones de trabajadores*, que son el fruto del movimiento propio de las masas, y han permitido superar las divisiones de los sindicatos por oficio, asumir las tareas

permanentes de control obrero y, embrionariamente, de autodefensa, asegurar la unión de las masas populares y tomar iniciativas radicalmente anticapitalistas (principios de readaptación de la economía, vínculos entre los trabajadores agrícolas e industriales, etc.)

Las comisiones de trabajadores se imponen como un eje a partir de:

—la necesidad de unidad en la lucha experimentada por los trabajadores en las empresas;

—la necesidad de la generalización del control obrero, especialmente en el sector nacionalizado;

—la necesidad, ya expresada en las plataformas reivindicativas de algunas empresas, de un plan de lucha de conjunto contra el desempleo, por la readaptación de ramas enteras de la economía, por el establecimiento de vínculos directos entre los diversos sectores de la producción industrial y entre éstos y la agricultura, para la definición de las prioridades de producción del sector nacionalizado.

El objetivo sigue siendo, pues, *el desarrollo, la coordinación y la centralización de las comisiones de trabajadores* como eje central del desarrollo de los órganos de dualidad de poderes.

En esta perspectiva, la coordinación a nivel de ramas puede constituir una mediación para llegar a un *congreso central nacional de comisiones de trabajadores* y desembocar en una *situación de dualidad de poderes*.

La propaganda y la agitación por la centralización se enraza en las luchas y las necesidades concretas de los trabajadores; su dinámica revolucionaria reside en el hecho de que atribuye a las comisiones de trabajadores las funciones de los consejos obreros y de que las conducen a conflictos directos con el gobierno de coalición y la maquinaria del Estado burgués.

El congreso nacional de comisiones debe ser presentado como el marco organizativo más adecuado para la confrontación de las experiencias diseminadas, para el recuento de las informaciones necesarias para la elaboración de un plan obrero de reorganización de la economía portuguesa, para asegurar las condiciones de ejecución de las decisiones tomadas. La elaboración de este plan debe conjugarse con el desarrollo del control obrero. En efecto, este plan se basa en el balance de las capacidades de producción de las empresas agrícolas e industriales, del estado de los medios de comunicación y de los transportes y en un recuento de las necesidades de consumo privado y colectivo de las masas trabajadoras, así como las necesidades de bienes productivos. De tal suerte que un congreso nacional de las comisiones de trabajadores surja como elemento central de una respuesta autónoma de la clase obrera a la crisis social, económica y política y pueda permitir el soldar en torno al proletariado

a sus aliados de entre las masas urbanas y rurales.

La tarea determinante para la realización de estos objetivos—que requieren una *unificación de la clase obrera* y una transformación de los órganos propios de los trabajadores en verdaderos órganos de frente único al nivel más elevado—es la defensa, por parte de los marxistas revolucionarios, del pleno ejercicio de la *democracia obrera* en la constitución y funcionamiento de las Comisiones de Trabajadores.

Para ello, es necesario destacar los siguientes puntos:

—La elección libre y democrática de los delegados de las comisiones de trabajadores, así como su revocabilidad por la base y no su designación por los partidos según proporciones arbitrarias y fijas.

—El derecho de los delegados a agruparse en corrientes y tendencias políticas y a debatir todos los problemas según su ideología propia.

Es sólo en función de la amplitud y del resultado de tal campaña de explicación como puede desplazarse del espíritu de los trabajadores la falsa polarización provocada por los dirigentes del PS a la vez que favorecida por la orientación y los métodos burocráticos de la dirección del PCP, entre un Estado “democrático” situado de hecho en el marco del sistema capitalista y una “dictadura comunista” que destruiría las libertades. La experiencia masiva de democracia obrera, tanto en las comisiones de trabajadores como a nivel de un congreso de rama o un congreso nacional, es lo único que puede permitir la recomposición de la unidad del frente proletario y convencer a los trabajadores de que un Estado obrero, basado en los Consejos, garantizaría las libertades democráticas cualitativamente superiores a las que concede la democracia burguesa tradicional.

Finalmente, un incremento de la actividad de las comisiones de trabajadores en esta dirección puede proporcionar una referencia que facilite un *resurgimiento de las comisiones de moradores* como órganos propios de las masas trabajadoras en los barrios y las localidades y eliminar la tendencia estimulada por los reformistas de convertirlas en apéndices del aparato estatal (municipalidades). Las tentativas de la burguesía de recuperar los edificios ocupados durante la oleada que siguió al 11 de marzo y los atentados a las condiciones de vida de las masas ofrecen en este momento una ocasión favorable para revivir y extender las comisiones de moradores. Uno de los centros de gravedad de su intervención debe ser la toma de iniciativas de control de los precios, de vinculación con las cooperativas agrícolas para la venta de productos y la lucha contra las redes capitalistas de distribución así como contra las operaciones especulativas de acaparamiento de bienes de consumo.

e. Después de haber organizado el apoyo

al intento de golpe de estado del 28 septiembre de 1974, los terratenientes opusieron una resistencia dispersa a la progresión de la reforma agraria, sin ser capaces de organizar una movilización de masas.

La negativa a aplicar la ley de reforma agraria, el secuestro de ganado y material agrícola, la no reparación de máquinas, el incendio de las cosechas, los atentados individuales, siguieron siendo las armas preferidas de los latifundistas. Pero ante la agravación de la lucha de clases en el campo (ocupación de tierras, bajo el quinto y sexto Gobiernos, unión de los trabajadores de la metalurgia del Sur, los asalariados agrícolas y los pequeños campesinos pobres . . .), la segunda “concentración de agricultores” de Rio Maior, realizada en noviembre de 1975, marca un progreso importante de la reacción capitalista. Además de las ocupaciones de tierras se ataca a la reforma agraria en tanto que tal. En esta ocasión los latifundistas expropiados logran reunir a los pequeños y medianos comerciantes (cuyas especulaciones se ven amenazadas por la racionalización de los circuitos comerciales debido a la reforma agraria), así como a los campesinos ricos y a los pequeños y medianos del Norte y del Oeste.

La tentativa de cristalización de un bloque social por parte de la reacción, especialmente en el Norte y el Centro, constituye una amenaza para la revolución portuguesa. El movimiento obrero no puede pensar en la posibilidad de una salida victoriosa a la hora de una prueba de fuerzas con la burguesía si no es a condición de que se desintegre, por lo menos parcialmente, tal bloque y de que amplíe su propia base de apoyo.

Pero, para lograrlo, hay que poner el acento sobre todas las medidas que los sindicatos y comisiones de trabajadores de los sectores industriales y bancarios pueden tomar para proporcionar una respuesta a las necesidades inmediatas de los trabajadores agrícolas y de los pequeños campesinos (abonos, créditos, máquinas, etc.). Luego hay que demostrar la comunidad de intereses que los liga al progreso de la revolución, haciendo evidente que solamente una planificación central, bajo control obrero, de la producción de abonos, máquinas y herramientas agrícolas, así como la utilización central del crédito, pueden permitir, tanto una ayuda a las cooperativas y a las tierras expropiadas y a las transformadas en propiedades colectivas de Estado, como una readaptación planificada de los cultivos y de la producción agrícola.

Una modificación de la correlación de fuerzas en el campo exige un reforzamiento de los sindicatos agrícolas, de las ligas de campesinos pobres, de las comisiones de trabajadores agrícolas, así como un incremento del peso de los campesinos pobres, los arrendatarios y los aparceros, en el seno de los consejos de aldea en las zonas

de la pequeña propiedad.

Esta consolidación de la organización propia de los trabajadores de la tierra debe reforzar la unión entre estos órganos y los de los trabajadores industriales, bancarios y del comercio, para asegurar la aplicación y profundización de la reforma agraria, independientemente de la estructura del Estado burgués. Finalmente, deben ser reforzados los instrumentos de autodefensa para contrarrestar las operaciones de recuperación de las tierras y de intimidación desplegadas por los latifundistas y sus milicias armadas.

16. a. Los marxistas revolucionarios aprovecharán la lección del 25 de noviembre para combatir las concepciones aventureras y minoritarias y desarrollar la propaganda por la autodefensa de las masas como prolongación de los *órganos embrionarios del poder proletario* y para la protección de todas las organizaciones políticas y sindicales de movimiento obrero. Sólo esta óptica puede preparar a amplios sectores de los trabajadores para responder a cualquier tentativa reaccionaria.

En lo inmediato, las maniobras de la extrema derecha así como la utilización de la GNR-PSP o, eventualmente, de unidades militares especializadas, da un relieve particular a la organización de *piquetes de autodefensa*.

Además, a la luz de la importancia concedida por la propia jerarquía a la recuperación de los arsenales, hay que explotar las experiencias, anteriores al 25 de noviembre, de control de los depósitos de armas y todas las iniciativas tomadas en el sector de las fábricas de armamento, para desarrollar una propaganda concreta sobre el tema del control, por parte de los trabajadores y los comités de soldados, de los depósitos así como de la utilización de las armas.

b. La contraofensiva de la jerarquía militar, aunque modifica profundamente las condiciones de movilización de los soldados, no por ello suprime todas las posibilidades de lucha en los cuarteles, nutridos por la experiencia vivida por muchos de ellos. La audiencia de los movimientos pasados entre los nuevos reclutas puede facilitar la resistencia a la disciplina militarista. La actividad de los militantes revolucionarios en el ejército tiene por objeto la defensa de los *derechos democráticos*, de organización y de expresión de los soldados. En torno a este eje pueden volver a tomar forma las estructuras propias de los soldados que conduzcan al resurgimiento de un movimiento autónomo.

Tal movimiento constituye la mayor seguridad de que el gobierno no podrá utilizar a la tropa contra los trabajadores. Los revolucionarios deben hacer todo lo posible para que se perpetúe lo que constituía una de las conquistas más importantes del movimiento de los solda-

dos: su negativa masiva a volverse contra los trabajadores. Sobre esta base, hay que insistir en la necesidad de la unión entre los órganos de los soldados y los de la clase obrera y sobre la discusión previa de las órdenes, lo que, ulteriormente, puede facilitar la agitación en favor de la elección de los oficiales por los propios soldados.

La propaganda antimilitarista debe integrarse en los diferentes aspectos del trabajo de masas (en los sindicatos, en las comisiones de trabajadores y las comisiones de moradores). La de los marxistas revolucionarios debe diferenciarse radicalmente del pacifismo de los reformistas y debe tratar de que los trabajadores abandonen cualquier esperanza de clemencia de parte de una burguesía "demócrata" cuando ésta haya decidido pasar de las maniobras políticas a un decidido ataque contra la clase obrera y sus aliados. *El principio del desarme de la burguesía y del armamento del proletariado* debe constituir la base de toda nuestra propaganda antimilitarista, fuera y dentro de los cuarteles.

c. El ataque contra el nivel de vida de los trabajadores, así como el reforzamiento de las medidas reaccionarias, con los peligros que implica para la clase obrera, no solamente crean las condiciones objetivas que exigen una sólida unidad del frente proletario, sino que agudizan la aspiración unitaria. Las consignas unificadoras que respondan a las necesidades más importantes del proletariado, deben servir de instrumentos para la realización en la lucha de un *frente único* contra la reacción económica y política. La táctica del frente único obrero constituye la clave de cualquier tentativa real de iniciar acciones de masas y comprometerse así en la vía de la *conquista de la mayoría de la clase obrera*. No se desprende de esta orientación que haya que subordinar toda iniciativa a un acuerdo previo de las direcciones reformistas del movimiento obrero. En efecto, hay que buscar la unidad de acción con todas las fuerzas políticas dispuestas a entablar, sin esperar, la lucha, tanto en el terreno de la defensa de las conquistas de masas contra la represión gubernamental y patronal, como en favor del desarrollo y coordinación de las comisiones de trabajadores, y ocasionalmente, de las comisiones de moradores. Paralelamente, en el plano sindical, hay que poner el acento en las reivindicaciones unitarias; la constitución de reagrupamientos (con listas sindicales comunes por ejemplo) puede convertirse en un importante incentivo para presentar soluciones alternativas a las avanzadas por los reformistas que se encuentran a la cabeza de los sindicatos.

Tal orientación—que puede reactivar a la vanguardia obrera amplia y encontrar una audiencia en las filas reformistas (especialmente el PCP)—debe articularse permanentemente con una propaganda unitaria hacia las direcciones reformistas y la multiplicación de las proposiciones

tendientes a implicar en la acción a los trabajadores influenciados por el PS y el PCP.

Esta propaganda y esta agitación permanentes por el frente único, la afirmación de una voluntad unitaria incluso a contracorriente de la sensibilidad inmediata de ciertas capas de vanguardia influidas por el izquierdismo, pueden preparar la respuesta unitaria ante una provocación política, militar o económica de la reacción. Tal réplica podría, a su vez, permitir la realización de un nuevo paso hacia adelante en la construcción de órganos de democracia proletaria. Los éxitos concretos en este terreno son la condición para que se abra de nuevo una perspectiva de dualidad de poderes.

17. Los rasgos dominantes de la situación política y social siguen siendo los de una profunda inestabilidad. Por otra parte la prueba de la correlación de fuerzas entre las dos clases fundamentales de la sociedad portuguesa *aún no se ha efectuado*, y probablemente se efectúe en torno a la suspensión de los contratos de las principales cuestiones económicas (inflación y desempleo, del control obrero, y de la reforma agraria).

Por ello, los marxistas revolucionarios pondrán el acento en la propaganda de gobierno obrero y campesino, en el programa que este debería aplicar para defender las conquistas de la clase obrera y satisfacer las necesidades y aspiraciones de las masas trabajadoras. Además, indicarán que solamente apoyándose en la *movilización y la autoorganización del proletariado*, encontrarán la fuerza necesaria para resistir al sabotaje de la burguesía y para llevar a la práctica sus decisiones.

La concreción de la fórmula gubernamental en la agitación depende esencialmente del grado de movilización, de unidad de acción de las masas y de la dinámica de desarrollo de un movimiento con objetivos inicialmente defensivos. En esta fase transitoria, el objetivo de una consigna de gobierno sigue siendo el de oponer políticamente a la clase obrera en tanto que tal, a todas las demás clases, es decir, a todas las coaliciones gubernamentales que emanen del sistema político burgués.

En el caso de que se acentúe la ofensiva capitalista reaccionaria o de que se refuerce entre las masas la credibilidad de un acercamiento entre el PCP y el PS, la fórmula de gobierno deberá incorporar y expresar inmediatamente estos datos por medio de la reivindicación gobierno PC-PS que aplique un programa de defensa y extensión de las conquistas obreras. En el contexto actual, las iniciativas de frente único hacia el PCP y el PS deben articularse con la exigencia dirigida a las direcciones socialdemócrata y stalinista de que "rompan con la burguesía," es decir, que rompan con la colaboración con los partidos burgueses y las instancias que preser-

van los intereses de la burguesía, particularmente el Consejo de la Revolución.

Si un nuevo impulso del movimiento y de la autoorganización de las masas tomara forma en la posibilidad o en la realización de un Congreso Democrático de los Sindicatos (rebasando la pura y simple problemática sindical) y de un congreso nacional de las comisiones de trabajadores, entonces se manifestarían las condiciones para la organización y la expresión propias de la clase obrera ante los proyectos del capital y del Gobierno. Estos hechos deben entonces ser integrados a la consigna gubernamental para permitir traducir, en términos de poder, los objetivos de las masas.

A esta orientación responde la fórmula general de propaganda *gobierno obrero y campesino* responsable ante las organizaciones de masas de los trabajadores.

Esta fórmula deberá ser concretada en cada etapa precisa en relación con la evolución de la correlación de fuerzas, los cambios de la situación política y la recomposición del movimiento obrero que de allí se desprende.

18. Durante el otoño de 1975 el desfase entre el estado de espíritu de las masas y su falta de percepción de una clara salida política, así como su débil nivel de organización, reflejaba la falta dramática de una dirección revolucionaria. La situación que siguió al 25 de noviembre pone a la orden del día una recomposición del movimiento obrero y de sus fuerzas políticas. Los marxistas revolucionarios pueden jugar un papel importante en ese proceso si son capaces de crear un polo político de referencia partiendo de sus fuerzas limitadas y realizando una verdadera reorientación política.

Esto requiere una intervención pública y sistemática que demuestre la capacidad de los militantes trotskistas de proporcionar un análisis y perspectivas para el desarrollo de las luchas. Sólo entonces podrán ser parte activa en la lucha e impulsar el debate de una unidad de acción en la extrema izquierda y desarrollar una ofensiva política hacia los trabajadores del PS y del PCP, desorientados por la política de su dirección.

Esta actividad central no podrá tener todo su impacto sino a condición de realizarse con un esfuerzo permanente y paciente de *implantación en la vanguardia obrera*, ganando para la organización trotskista a trabajadores avanzados que dispongan de capacidad de iniciativa, audacia y que puedan reforzar su influencia y su autoridad en las filas obreras.

Además, la extensión de la fuerza de choque de los marxistas revolucionarios exige la reagrupación de todas las fuerzas trotskistas en una misma organización, la sección portuguesa de la IV Internacional. Esto implica que la LCI busque una unidad de acción prioritaria con el PRT

(Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores) con miras a una fusión.

19. Los militantes trotskistas estarán a la cabeza de las movilizaciones de solidaridad con las *masas angoleñas* que han combatido por la defensa de la independencia durante 15 años de obstinada lucha. Deben defender la *República Popular de Angola*, contra la santa alianza de los imperialistas, los racistas y los reaccionarios locales, así como apoyar la lucha del FRETILIN contra la invasión de Timor por las tropas indonesias.

Los vínculos entre las luchas de los trabajadores de España y Portugal representan la necesidad de una campaña de solidaridad con los combates del proletariado español contra el régimen de Juan Carlos, dada sus repercusiones objetivas sobre el desarrollo de la situación en Portugal. Además, esta campaña proporciona un apoyo de gran valor para los militantes de la revolución española. Las estrechas relaciones que deben mantener

Dial-a-Denial

The Lockheed bribe scandal has prompted the secretary general of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic party to tape-record a message denying any involvement in the affair.

According to a report in the March 18 *Wall Street Journal*, the following are excerpts of what residents of Takasaki, Japan, could hear by dialing 27-1212:

"Hello, everybody. This is Yasuhiro Nakasone. I'm sticking to my job . . . in good spirits, managing to hold out despite the enormous amount of work I have to do every day. . . .

"I should like to repeat once again that I am totally uninvolved in the Lockheed scandal; and I have never received any hush money. I swear to this in the name of Heaven and Earth. . . .

"The various factions within our party . . . are pestering the executives with complaints, and there is nothing more arduous in this difficult world of ours than to settle such disputes. . . .

"Should our Party overcome its present troubles, I am sure that I will be known as 'the admirable Secretary General.' . . ."

Italian Social Democratic Leader Deposed in Lockheed Scandal

Mario Tanassi, the head of the Italian Social Democratic party, was dismissed March 16 during a party congress. Tanassi, who was charged by party delegates with moving the party too far to the right, had been accused of taking bribes in the Lockheed scandal.

Tanassi, the party leader for the last

los militantes de la Península Ibérica constituye un apoyo estable a esta actividad internacionalista.

Cualquiera que sea la dimensión del retroceso limitado resultante de los acontecimientos del 25 de noviembre, la revolución portuguesa sigue encarnando para centenas de millares de trabajadores la esperanza de la revolución socialista en la Europa capitalista. Frente a los plazos decisivos que se avecinan en el curso de la revolución portuguesa, *la solidaridad internacional militante* de los trabajadores de Europa con sus hermanos portugueses va a tener una grandísima importancia en el desarrollo de los futuros combates de los obreros portugueses.

La IV Internacional participa plenamente en la construcción de este movimiento de solidaridad, uno de cuyos objetivos centrales es la liberación de todos los militantes y soldados golpeados por la represión a partir del 25 de noviembre.

2 de diciembre de 1975

four years, was minister of defense during negotiations between Rome and Lockheed over the purchase of fourteen C-130 transports. At the party congress he was greeted with shouts of "Lockheed!" from the public gallery.

Prince Bernhard Linked to \$12 Million Bribe to Juan Perón

Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, who has been accused of taking bribes in the Lockheed scandal, has now been accused of giving them as well. According to the Amsterdam *De Telegraaf*, the prince was involved in passing on a \$12 million bribe to Argentine President Juan Perón in 1951.

The bribe is said to have been authorized by the Dutch State Bank and approved by the government to assure the sale of \$100 million worth of railroad rolling stock. Part of the package included a deluxe presidential train for the caudillo and \$12,000 in jewelry for his second wife, Evita.

Also implicated in the bribe is Marinus Holtrop, who was president of the Dutch State Bank at the time. The latter disclosure may prove particularly embarrassing to the Netherlands government, since Holtrop himself was appointed by Premier Joop den Uyl to investigate Prince Bernhard's involvement in the Lockheed scandal.

In Buenos Aires, the regime of Isabel Perón claimed the story was an attempt "to besmirch" her late husband.