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The Dilemma Peronism Failed to Solve



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Kissinger's Saber Rattling Over Cuba

By Antonio Soto

President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger have raised the pitch and intensity of their attacks against Cuba, utilizing as their pretext the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. In relation to this war-mongering propaganda, the Pentagon has revealed that it is studying plans for a possible attack or, at least, a naval and air blockade of the island.

On March 23, for example, at a news conference in Dallas, Texas, reporters asked Kissinger if his threats against Cuba meant the island would be invaded. Kissinger replied: "You should not draw any conclusions for or against." Up to then, both Kissinger and Ford had refused to specify the nature of the steps they would take against the Cubans if they did not heed the warnings.

Senator Richard C. Clark, who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, claimed that Kissinger was "deadly serious" about the United States being prepared to take "direct action" against the government of Fidel Castro.

Clark's statements appeared in an article in the March 25 issue of the *New York Daily News*, where it was also reported that a Pentagon official had said that various options for a possible attack against Cuba were under consideration.

White House press secretary Ron Nessen and a representative of the Pentagon, William I. Greener, said March 25 that plans were being studied on the type of attack that might be selected. Greener even spoke about meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council to review "possible actions which might be taken with regard to Cuba."

According to the March 24 *New York Times*, "qualified military sources" were considering plans for a naval and air blockade, since a blockade of the 1962 type was outdated in view of the fact that the Cubans now possess air transport of substantial capacity.

Ford's Need to Outflank Reagan

Various analysts have pointed to Ford's problems in the 1976 primary elections as the real source of the saber rattling over Cuba. Kissinger's foreign policy has been severely attacked by Ronald Reagan, Ford's rival for the Republican nomination in the primaries. At stake in the fight is the support of the most reactionary wing of the Republican party.

Under the heading "Kissinger's Vague Warnings," *New York Times* columnist James Reston wrote in the March 24 issue of the influential daily:

"Either they mean nothing more than a bold stand that would please the Reagan supporters in the Presidential campaign, or they mean that the United States has finally decided to draw the line against Soviet and Cuban military intervention."

The references to "Soviet and Cuban intervention," of course, are part of the propaganda designed to hide the most important problem—the precarious status of the white racist regime in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). The rise of the Black nationalist movement threatens the dictatorial government of Ian Smith. It also endangers South African colonial rule over the territory of Namibia, as well as white rule in South Africa itself.

Reston's reference to the elections in the United States is well taken. In the March 15 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, David Frankel called attention to this aspect of Kissinger and Ford's attacks on Cuba:

"[The challenge to imperialist domination over the south of Africa] is the real source of concern in Washington. The attempt to blame the Cubans for stirring up trouble in Africa is a cynical ploy in Ford's campaign for the right-wing vote in the United States. And it is part of the publicity designed to justify more intensive American intervention against the freedom-seeking movements in Africa."

The events that have taken place since Frankel wrote his analysis confirm his evaluation.

As the sparring between Ford and Reagan grew more vigorous, Kissinger escalated his attacks against Fidel Castro.

In stumping for Ford, Kissinger has spoken in many cities ostensibly on the subject of what foreign policy is best for the United States. In his barnstorming, Kissinger has launched attacks against Cuba almost every day. When speaking before rightist audiences, he has advocated a "rougher" foreign policy. The March 10 issue of the *Los Angeles Times* reported that he had come out in favor of using nuclear weapons in the event of "regional" attacks.

At a dinner of 1,500 conservatives in Dallas March 22, Kissinger played on his anti-Cuban theme to an appreciative audience. His references to blocking Cuba and the Soviet Union from intervening



Naranjo/Los Angeles Express

"Henry, an outlaw has passed by here."

against Rhodesia or South Africa were understood to perfection by his white racist listeners, who view foreign policy as an extension of domestic policy.

Difficulties of the Racist Regimes

In fact, Washington considers the situation in southern Africa to be of first-rate concern.

Kissinger and Ford are embarrassed by the fact that they cannot adopt a position openly in favor of their allies in South Africa and Rhodesia, in favor of those minority racist governments. The capitalist press admits that a declared policy along these lines would have disastrous consequences for Washington. In fact, Kissinger feels compelled to insist that he favors a transition to majority rule.

The tub thumping about Fidel Castro's "new military adventures" is designed as a cover for moves to help the threatened white racist regimes in Africa.

Of course, the most conservative sectors of the bourgeois press are demanding that Kissinger go beyond mere words and—as an editorial in the March 26 issue of the *Wall Street Journal* put it—"block exploitation" of the tensions in southern Africa by the "neo-imperialist" powers (referring to the Soviet Union and Cuba). In reality, they are calling for an all-out defense of the racist regimes against the "agitation" ascribable to foreign intervention.

Perhaps they hope that Cuba and the Soviet Union can be persuaded to pressure the Black nationalist movement into giving up its struggle.

It still remains to be seen whether

Kissinger and Ford are actually organizing a military or economic attack against Cuba. But, at least up to now, it seems doubtful that an assault is contemplated before the presidential elections in November.

In the electioneering propaganda poured out by the Ford machine, Havana is charged with contemplating military intervention in Latin America. The hacks who turn out this literature know perfectly well that this is not Havana's policy. It is quite noticeable that Kissinger himself in practice does not seem to be trying to induce Latin American countries to line up for a fresh assault on Cuba.

It was *after* Kissinger's visit that Costa Rica began to trade with Cuba again, and that, despite the fact that Costa Rican Foreign Relations Minister Gonzalo Fascio made statements opposing the presence of Cuban troops in Africa.

It was *after* Kissinger's visit that Alfonso López Michelsen, president of Colombia, announced that he would open relations with the MPLA government in Angola.

Those who criticize Kissinger's statements in the press have pointed out that the Congress has not discussed any belligerent actions against Cuba, and that it opposed U.S. intervention in Angola. This was to be expected during an election year in view of the demonstrated antiwar sentiments of the American people.

The Pentagon, of course, has said it has plans for a blockade or a military intervention against Cuba. These plans have existed for a long time, and will continue to exist as long as the United States remains imperialist and Cuba remains a workers state.

Kissinger, Ford, and the Pentagon certainly are not well disposed toward Cuba, and the very logic of their attacks can draw them into showing that the threats are substantial; that is, a trigger can be squeezed just to demonstrate that the guns are loaded.

Thus the danger cannot be brushed aside. All those who are opposed to a new U.S. military adventure like the one in Vietnam—or the Bay of Pigs—should stay on the alert. □

Puerto Rican Independence Forces To Run Candidates for Governor

The Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño (PIP—Puerto Rican Independence party) announced March 3 that it would run PIP President Rubén Berríos for governor of Puerto Rico in the 1976 elections.

The Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño (PSP—Puerto Rican Socialist party), which decided to participate in the elections at its congress in December of last year, opened its campaign January 11. The PSP is running its general secretary, Juan Mari Brás, for governor, and Carlos Gallisá for Congress.

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Military Junta Seizes Power in Argentina

By Judy White

On March 24 a military coup brought to an end the rule of Isabel Martínez de Perón. The first actions of the junta were to arrest as many as 2,000 persons, institute the death penalty for acts of "sabotage," order "saboteurs" shot on sight, impose a tight censorship on the press, and ban political and trade-union activities.

Rumors of an impending military take-over had been circulating for months. The timing, of course, was known only to the plotters. A retired general said last year:

"When the time comes, the military does not want people to say we did not give the Peronists a real chance. Better an hour later than an hour early."*

In a March 23 dispatch, United Press International reported it had learned from Argentine military sources that planning for the coup began a year ago. By February 26, four weeks before the coup, blueprints for the take-over—including maps and logistics charts—had been completed.

Reports that a coup was about to take place were so widespread in recent weeks that some members of Congress began removing personal effects from their offices.

The March 27 issue of the British *Economist* reported:

"The whole affair has been so open that the mayor of the wealthy Buenos Aires suburb of San Isidro had time to do a bunk with most of the treasury—including advances on property taxes he had imposed only a few weeks earlier."

The date finally decided on for the coup was known even outside Argentina. By March 22, Juan de Onis reported in the *New York Times*, "there were unconfirmed reports that the military chiefs had given Mrs. Perón a choice of resigning by Wednesday night or being overthrown." Wednesday was the day the coup took place.

Francisco Manrique, leader of the conservative Alianza Popular Federalista (Federalist People's Alliance), was quoted by the Bogotá daily *Espectador* as stating on March 23, "Argentina has a dead government that is being dislodged. The country is witnessing the burial of that government."

The political arm of the Peronists in the trade-union movement, the 62 Organizaciones, warned in a March 23 statement

that "a coup at this time is the most irresponsible leap into the void the country could take." Referring to the military's avowed aim of wiping out "subversion," the statement continued, "It could only transform the guerrillas, who today are illegitimate and unpopular, into a legitimate and popular force."

However, neither the 62 Organizaciones nor the Peronist-controlled union federation, the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor), called for a general strike in the event of a coup. The labor lieutenants of Argentine capitalism evidently hoped to continue in their posts under the junta.

UPI said that an assassination attempt against Army Commander in Chief Jorge Rafael Videla on March 15 was what convinced the military to launch the operation.

At 7:40 a.m. March 15 a powerful bomb exploded in a parking lot next to army command headquarters. It killed one person and injured twenty-eight others. About ten automobiles were destroyed and windows in nearby buildings were shattered. The bombing occurred the day before a meeting of all generals in active service.

It was at this meeting that the military allegedly decided to put "Operation Aries" into effect immediately after March 21.

Considerations other than the bomb explosion (an event that may have been included in the scenario) were undoubtedly at the center of the deliberations of the generals.

The Peronist regime was on the brink of defaulting on \$1.1 billion in foreign debts due in May. Attempts to raise the sum through international banking institutions had failed. (The International Monetary Fund, the trend-setter for international and private banks, had offered a loan of a mere \$130 million.)

Attempts to institute a new austerity program March 5 were met by vigorous resistance on the part of the working class. Retail shopkeepers and other businessmen also protested the Mondelli plan in the days preceding the coup. On March 22 housewives marched through the streets of Mendoza for the second time in a week, banging on pots and pans in protest of the high cost of living.

Such protests had already forced the Peronist regime to back down on some of the stipulations of the austerity plan.

In addition, repressive measures instituted by the Peronist regime were proving

insufficient to cow the working class. These measures were not exactly mild. Close to 5,000 "subversives" were in jail. Rightist terror gangs, like the Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (AAA—Argentine Anticomunist Alliance), initiated by the government, had kidnapped and killed hundreds more. During the third week of March, at least thirty students, revolutionists, and trade-union militants were murdered by such gangs.

Finally, the gravity of the economic crisis and the regime's inability to make any headway against it had led to increasing fragmentation of the Peronist movement and to growing disaffection among labor's ranks with the Peronist union bureaucracy.

By March 22, UPI reported, all military installations were on a state of alert. Leaves for all federal police were canceled the following day.

Police activity in Buenos Aires noticeably stepped up March 22, with patrols in different zones of the capital. Infantry troops and marines took positions at some strategic points. Troop movements that night were also reported in Bahía Blanca, Neuquén, Resistencia, San Martín de los Andes, and Junín de los Andes.

By the following day columns of tanks and military assault cars were reported deployed in the center of Buenos Aires. The columns included artillery and trucks of heavily armed soldiers. Similar moves took place also in La Plata, Córdoba, and Mendoza. In Rosario national guard troops were stationed to guard public buildings. The Argentine naval fleet moved out of Puerto Belgrano toward the capital.

A UPI dispatch from Santiago, Chile, dated March 23, reported stepped-up vigilance along the 5,000 kilometer border between Argentina and Chile. Chilean police claimed the measures were strictly "routine," however, and representatives of the Pinochet junta denied they had received any special request from Buenos Aires to take the step.

The only reported armed conflict took place in La Plata. UPI reported a confrontation between guerrillas and the army, marines, and police starting at 9:30 p.m. March 22. The fighting continued until the following morning, when the guerrillas retreated, leaving eleven of their members dead. No reports were released on military or police casualties.

The coup itself took place smoothly. The Caracas daily *El Nacional* reported March 25 that more than 200,000 military and

*Quoted in *Intercontinental Press*, September 8, 1975, p. 1166.

police personnel participated.

Shortly before dawn March 24, President Perón was taken by helicopter from the presidential palace to the Buenos Aires airport. There she was arrested and flown to a private home in the southern province of Neuquen, where she is being held.

Immediately following the seizure of power, the military moved to arrest top bureaucrats of the Peronist trade unions and other government functionaries. Lorenzo Miguel, general secretary of the 62 Organizations; Labor Minister Miguel Unamuno; Osvaldo Papaleo, Perón's press secretary; and Julio González, the president's private secretary, were reported being held in the Patricios regimental headquarters in the capital.

Arrest warrants were out for other top figures associated with the Peronist regime.

As of March 25, the military continued to refuse all comment on the arrests, the March 26 London *Times* reported.

However, continued the *Times*, "arrests throughout the country, which began as the tanks rolled into Buenos Aires on Wednesday morning, were reliably reported to be continuing on a large scale. In the industrial city of Córdoba it was reported that hundreds were arrested last night."

The paper cited estimates of 500 to 2,000 arrests since the coup, many of them prominent figures in the Peronist apparatus.

A Communist party headquarters in downtown Buenos Aires was raided by troops who opened fire on the building March 24. At least three persons were arrested, one of whom was wounded in the raid.

Similar raids were reported on the headquarters of trade unions known for their militancy.

Within hours of the take-over, a three-man military junta was sworn in. Its members are Lt. Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla, Adm. Emilio Eduardo Massera, and Brig. Orlando Ramón Agosti—commanders in chief, respectively, of the army, navy, and air force.

The junta was recognized by the United States, Spain, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile before the day was over.

Congress was dissolved, activity by political parties and trade unions banned, and all provincial and municipal governments removed, as were the members of the supreme court. A provisional cabinet of eight military men was named.

Later on the same day, tight censorship was imposed on all news media. Banks, schools, and government offices were closed. All civilian air traffic was banned. And all foreign embassies were put under guard by troops to prevent refugees from seeking asylum.

The junta announced the institution of the death penalty for acts of sabotage, authorized security forces to shoot saboteurs on sight, and established special war

Argentine Trotskyist Political Prisoners

Prior to the March 24 coup, fifteen members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) were among the estimated 5,000 political prisoners held in Argentine prisons. Owing to the strict censorship, there is as yet no word of their fate, or of whether additional PST members have been arrested.

Although the PST militants have been kept in jail since 1974 in some instances, only two of them have actually been tried. The rest are being held under the state of siege provisions, which means they can be detained indefinitely without charges.

The PST members in prison are Luisa Segura, arrested November 6, 1974; José María Fernández, arrested March 20, 1975; Juan Llanos, arrested November 1974; Juan Carlos López Osornio, arrest-

ed March 22, 1975; Rosendo López, arrested July 7, 1975; Angel Carusso, arrested April 1975; Juan Carlos Herrero, arrested July 1975; Juan Carlos Gilli, arrested October 1975; Osvaldo Caldú, arrested November 1975; José Dante Gianmarini, arrested January 1, 1976; Isabel Mercedes Morillas, arrested November 26, 1975; José Francisco Pérez, arrested January 27, 1976; and Jorge Sprovieri, Conrado Marzoca, and Analia Di Giovanni, all arrested February 11, 1976.

Política Obrera, another group in Argentina that proclaims its adherence to Trotskyism, had seven members in prison as of the end of 1975. They are Jorge Perretti, Jorge Gelman, Mauro Dobruskin, Edgardo Bilsky, Nestor Horacio Correa, Diana Cuatrocchi, and Bernardo Gallitelli.

councils to deal with such cases.

All street demonstrations were banned; all essential public services were placed under military control; all workplaces were defined as "objectives of military interest," thus making interference with them an act of "sabotage"; civilians were ordered to hand over all arms and explosives within forty-eight hours or face ten years imprisonment; all banking transactions and monetary exchange were suspended; all shortwave radio operators were banned from the air; all public gatherings for entertainment were prohibited; and the population was requested to stay off the streets after dark to help the junta maintain "the necessary levels of security."

Throughout all of this, the press reported only occasional shots fired and only three casualties—two individuals injured in raids on the CP and metalworkers union headquarters, and Roberto Alberte, a nephew of Juan Perón who was reported by the Rome daily *Corriere della Sera* to have died in an attempt to escape arrest.

Shops were open for business as usual and all factories were reported operating normally with the exception of some in Córdoba. There, auto workers in some plants walked off the job, according to a March 24 Associated Press dispatch.

The following day, UPI reported some sniper fire directed at police near the university in Córdoba.

Upon taking power, the new junta issued a communiqué, which said in part:

In face of the tremendous power vacuum, which threatens us with disintegration and anarchy; of the demonstrated inability of the national government to mobilize; of the repeated, successive contradictions displayed in the adoption of measures of all sorts; of the regime's lack of an overall strategy to confront subversion; of the lack of solutions for the nation's

basic problems, the result of which has been a continuous increase in all forms of extremism; of the total absence of ethical and moral examples that must be provided by those who direct the state; of the manifest irresponsibility in the management of the economy, which has led to the exhaustion of the productive apparatus; of the generalized speculation and corruption, all of which is transformed into an irretrievable loss of the sense of greatness and faith; the Armed Forces—carrying out an unavoidable obligation—have assumed direction of the state. . . .

In the period beginning today, the Armed Forces will begin an action ruled by totally delineated guidelines. Through order, work, full observance of ethical and moral principles, justice, the integral fulfillment of man, respect for his rights and dignity—thus will the republic achieve unity of the Argentinians and total recuperation of national identity, goals that cannot be renounced, and that to be achieved demand a common effort by all men and women without exception who inhabit this land.

Internationally, the bourgeois press agreed on the nature of the tasks facing the military junta in the months ahead. The March 25 *Wall Street Journal* put it quite succinctly:

"The junta's major task, besides stopping terrorism by both the left and the right, will be reviving an economy plagued by 423% inflation, lagging productivity, declining foreign currency reserves and a \$1 billion payments deficit."

To accomplish the economic miracle, the junta will have to force down the standard of living of the Argentine masses to abysmal levels. Faced with one of the most highly organized and combative working classes in the world, the junta will have no easy job on its hands.

The March 27 issue of the *Economist* reported, "General Videla has told his officers that he wants no bloodshed, no firing squads." Such assurances are not

likely to be honored for long. To impose the Mondelli plan or some other austerity plan will require the use of heavy repression. This is one of the reasons that moved the bourgeoisie to put the military in power.

The lengths to which the junta is

prepared to go are indicated by the fact that part of the advance planning included moving troops into the factories. In his March 22 dispatch to the *New York Times*, Juan de Onis said:

"The military authorities are reported to

be planning to occupy factories where there is resistance from left-wing militants who have been striking against feeble attempts by Mrs. Perón's government to impose wage restraints and price controls." □

Oligarchy's Problem—How to Stave Off a Socialist Revolution

The Dilemma Peronism Failed to Solve

By Gerry Foley

Another interlude of parliamentary government and formal adherence to bourgeois democracy ended in Argentina March 24 with the military coup of General Videla. Such periods have become increasingly tenuous and short-lived in Argentina, particularly since the ouster of the liberal caudillo Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1930 by the military.

Although Yrigoyen was a populist strongman, in many ways a precursor of Perón, he presided over a period of bourgeois democracy that extended roughly from the granting of popular suffrage in 1912 to the onset of the Great Depression. The way was prepared for this type of regime by heavy British investment at the end of the nineteenth century that developed agriculture and transport sufficiently to supply Great Britain's needs for meat and grain. When the imperialists sought to squeeze the country harder because of the depression, they forced the abandonment of such a "luxury" as democracy.

As long ago as 1910, a faction had arisen in the agrarian oligarchy that favored reforms as a way of heading off the threat of a workers revolution. A growing trade-union movement had carried out a number of militant strikes that raised this specter. The attitude of the reform faction was expressed typically in a speech by Ramón J. Cárcano in the Chamber of Deputies in 1911:

For twenty years there has existed in the country an organized popular, dynamic party, which has had as its banner the liberty of the suffrage and which has openly supported revolution as the only way to fulfill its ideals. . . . For a generation both government and nation have lived in a constant state of having either to suppress rebellion or in fear that rebellion is about to break out. . . . A change in the electoral system is not only a change in policy, it is to adopt at this critical hour the only policy which the country is united upon: the policy of disarmament, to eliminate abstention from the elections and rebellion; to incorporate each active political force into the electoral process.*

*See "Radical Populism and the Conservative Elite, 1912-1930," in *Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, David Rock, ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).

The dilemma that faced the oligarchy at that time was much the same as that facing the Argentine ruling class in the months leading up to the March 24 coup that toppled Isabel Perón.

To head off revolution with reforms, the oligarchy is compelled to grant political and economic concessions to the workers and the organizations based on the working class. However, the oligarchy is not in a strong enough economic position to maintain such a policy very long. On the other hand, if force alone is relied upon to maintain capitalist rule, this engenders popular resistance that can overwhelm the system.

In 1912, the conflict was resolved in favor of reforms. The conservatives allowed the Radical party of Yrigoyen to take office, although this party allied itself with sections of the progressive petty bourgeoisie and offered concessions to the workers.

The result of this decision was the Sáenz Peña law that granted the secret ballot and suffrage for native-born males, giving the vote for the first time to a large part of the working class. It was on this basis that the first Radical government was elected in 1916.

However, in his attempts to offer reforms, Yrigoyen quickly ran up against the opposition of foreign capital, which was unwilling to surrender any of its superprofits. Furthermore, the post-World War I crisis and the Russian revolution aroused the fears of the bourgeoisie. Following an abortive general strike in January 1919, paramilitary groups organized by conservative bourgeois forces launched a bloody pogrom against the labor movement and the left.

The relative prosperity that continued allowed the Yrigoyen government to survive the 1920s. But it was unable to head off a series of strikes, and had to resort to force to protect the bourgeoisie's interests, although making more concessions to the workers than previous governments. Thus it could neither win the allegiance of labor nor satisfy the bourgeoisie that it was an "effective guardian of order." With the

onset of the depression, the ruling class took the repressive option and backed the military coup of Gen. José Félix Uriburu in September 1930.

The period from 1930 to 1943 is remembered by the Argentine people as the "Década Infame" (the decade of shame). The ousted Radicals were excluded de facto from elections, and the military tried to gain parliamentary cover for its rule through fraudulent elections. The ruling class tried to solve its economic problems by attacking the living standards of the workers and capitulating to imperialism. The Roca-Runciman Treaty of 1933 subordinated the Argentine economy to the demands of the British market for meat and grain.

The Rise of Peronism

However, the depression weakened the British capitalist system more than it did the American, and Wall Street began to challenge British dominance in Argentina as elsewhere. This conflict opened up the way during the Second World War for the launching of a new and more extensive populist turn—Peronism. The struggle between the forces that favored entering the war as a satellite of Washington, and those that favored a more independent, or even pro-German policy, provided the political opening for Perón. An economic basis was provided by the accumulated demand for agricultural products.

Perón got his start as the most cunning politician among the military figures who staged a coup in 1943 to prevent pro-U.S. forces from dominating the government. He became the vice-president and minister of social welfare under the president, General Edelmiro Farrell. Perón used his office to rally the workers behind the weak neutralist government and save it from being toppled by imperialist pressure, as happened to the similar government of Maj. Gualberto Villarroel in Bolivia.

When Perón took control of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, the union movement was divided into two wings, which corresponded to the fundamental

division in the bourgeoisie between the sectors linked to British capital, on the one hand, and those linked to U.S. capital on the other. The pro-British sector at that time opposed Argentine entry into the war because it foresaw that such a move would increase U.S. influence.

The leaders of CGT 1 (Confederación General de los Trabajadores—General Confederation of Labor) were pro-British. The pro-Yankee CGT 2 was dominated by the Stalinists. As a result of Stalin's wartime line of full collaboration with the "democratic" capitalists, they betrayed strike after strike and lost their influence over important sections of workers.

Perón took full advantage of the opening. To weaken the pro-Yankee forces, he gave tacit encouragement to the independent and militant unions that opposed the Stalinist capitulations. Moreover, while he used his influence to undermine some strikes, he also gave certain concessions, such as Decree 33.302, which established the workers' right to vacations and bonuses.

With the end of the war, the conservatives and pro-U.S. forces moved to force Perón out of office. On October 8, 1945, Gen. Eduardo Avalos demanded that Farrell drop Perón from his cabinet. Perón agreed to resign but managed to get permission to make a farewell speech. On October 10, he spoke on nationwide radio, saying that he left it to the workers to defend the gains he won for them. He also said that he had just signed a decree providing for raises and for a minimum living wage adjusted for inflation. Two days later, he was jailed.

The CGT called a general strike for October 18 to protest. But the CGT leaders, like everyone else in Argentine politics apparently, were caught by surprise by the succeeding events. The historian Félix Luna writes:

It happened chaotically and spontaneously. It is true that after a laborious discussion the CGT called a general strike for the 18th. But this occurred a day before and had nothing to do with the abstruse slogans raised by the union federation. It is also true that Perón's supporters had carried out agitation in the unions. But the most effective agitation could not have achieved such a result. What happened on October 17 left everyone stunned—the weak government; the armed forces; the political parties, who had been portraying a situation of idyllic calm when the country was boiling over; and even Perón himself and his supporters, who were overwhelmed by the advance of the people on Buenos Aires.

Because that was what descended on the Argentine capital, starting in the morning of the 17th. Thousands and thousands of men and women came from the suburban belt and began to flow into the center of the city. Tirelessly they chanted the name of Perón and demanded his release. . . .

Perón in the meantime had returned to Buenos Aires, dejected by his defeat . . . under the pretext of illness he managed to get transferred to the Military Hospital. There, virtually free, he

watched, full of doubts and hesitations, the advance of the masses on the capital.

The military retreated. It released Perón, hoping to win a mandate in the 1946 elections for a "return to normalcy." The Stalinists united with the Radicals, now the party of the liberal petty-bourgeoisie in the Democratic Coalition, against Perón. U.S. Ambassador Spruille Braden openly intervened against him. A few days before the elections the U.S. State Department published a "Blue Book" linking Perón's faction to the Axis. The Industrialists Confederation, it came to light, sent a big check to finance the campaign of the Democratic Coalition.

Perón's supporters raised the slogans of "Braden or Perón" and "Check, check, check." Contrary to the expectations of the "Democrats," who thought that after the Allied victory the wind was in their sails, the workers and urban poor voted massively for "the people's General."

First Peronist Regime

After winning the elections, Perón began constructing a giant machine based on the government agencies, the unions, and other mass organizations, such as the Peronist women's movement. Perón gave the vote to women and mobilized them in support of his regime.

All of these organizations were tightly integrated into the bourgeois state. Facing such a machine, and the fervent support Perón won from the workers by real concessions, his conservative opponents had no hope of ousting him at the polls. He was even strong enough to jail opponents in the military, although he did not dare cut the military caste down to size or expropriate their patrons, the agrarian big bourgeoisie.

Exploiting momentary advantages, Perón was able to weaken the hold of imperialism and increase the workers' standard of living. There was even a redistribution of national income in favor of the workers. In 1952, at the height of Peronist nationalism, the share of wages and salaries in the national income was 46.9%, as against 35.2% in 1971.

Like Yrigoyen, Perón could not maintain such a policy very long in the face of imperialist pressure. But rather than simply increase public spending as his populist predecessor did, he intervened directly in the economy.

The state trading agency, the Instituto Argentino de Promoción de Intercambio (IAPI), held effective control over the export of cereals in the years 1945-49. It bought grain at low domestic prices and sold it at the higher world market prices, thereby diverting a share of the income away from the big ranchers toward the formation of national capital. It contributed substantially toward financing the state bodies that took over the railroads,

telephone companies, as well as the gas and electric utilities.

Substantial investment was needed in the railroads in particular. This nationalization really represented the formal liquidation of an old English investment that had already been more than "repatriated." Nothing was left but worn-out equipment. Furthermore, the British had built the system simply to transport meat and grain from the interior to the ports. The network had to be rebuilt to serve industrialization.

With the decline in the price of grain following the postwar recovery, the IAPI was less and less able to finance Perón's national capital development projects. He began to lose the support of the bourgeois sectors interested in developing local industry. The agrarian bourgeoisie, with the closest connections to the military hierarchy, tended to view the Peronist regime simply as a robber.

By 1952, with the end of the Korean War, Perón's margin for maneuver was narrowing drastically. In 1953, a new investment law was passed favoring foreign capital. The automotive industry was turned over to foreign capital, and the government began to negotiate with Standard Oil of California for the surrender of Argentine oil fields. Reactionary politicians demagogically exploited these capitulations to imperialism to further their campaign against Perón. In addition, the workers' standard of living began to decline, and the regime proved unable to prevent the development of strikes.

The wartime food shortage and the temporary disorganization and division of the imperialist masters of the Argentine economy had enabled Perón to achieve the kind of multiclass populist bloc and control of the workers movement that Yrigoyen dreamed of.

Nonetheless, the cautious strongman did not escape Yrigoyen's fate. In 1955, when Perón's support among the bourgeoisie had waned, the military rose up and overthrew him, ushering in a new "Década Infame."

A New Element in Argentine Politics

However, this time the masses had gained an experience in mobilization and were ready to fight the military. The veteran Argentine Trotskyist Ernesto González, in his book *¿Qué Fue y Qué Es el Peronismo?*, describes what happened:

When General Lonardi took over the government, Perón had already fled to Paraguay, and the CGT leaders had disappeared. Rosario and the entire industrial belt of Greater Buenos Aires was in the hands of the proletariat. There was no leadership, but the dams represented by the Peronist union bureaucracy were also gone. The workers went into the streets in huge demonstrations. Lack of leadership prevented these mobilizations from turning into an insurrection. In Rosario, however, the workers went out on strike on their own.

It was like a repeat of October 17, 1945. But this time the strongman decided not to try to ride the wave of a workers upsurge. He would have had to lead the workers against the bourgeoisie as such, and he was not interested in that.

The Peronists could not mobilize the workers against the military regime without abandoning their bourgeois reformist perspective and connections. On the other hand, they had to put up some kind of a fight to maintain their influence over the workers. It was in this period that the contradictions of Peronism assumed the grotesque form that marked the movement up until the pathetic fall of "El Líder's" third wife and designated heir, Isabel Martínez de Perón.

In order to avoid mobilizing the masses, the Peronist leaders encouraged a massive wave of terrorism. In 1956, they tried an abortive military coup, in the wake of which the generals shot a number of Peronist activists in the first political executions since 1919. At the same time, the Peronist leaders created the myth of the "black airplane," in which Perón was supposed to land and assume command of the popular resistance.

The Peronists retained control of the union movement as a result both of the heroic resistance of the workers and some lower-echelon Peronist leaders, and of maneuvers with the military rulers. A kind of compromise developed, which was personified by Arturo Frondizi.

In 1958, the military permitted new elections, although excluding the Peronists. The Radicals split between a conservative faction led by Ricardo Balbín and a more flexible faction led by Frondizi, who made a deal with Perón. In return for Peronist votes, he would as the new president grant the Peronists certain freedom to reorganize their movement. On the basis of this accord, Frondizi scored an impressive victory.

The Frondizi Interlude

Frondizi's essential policy, making allowances for the different periods, was no different from that of the governments following the 1930 coup—capitulation to imperialism. The program of his economics minister, Raúl Prebisch, was to advance industrial development by welcoming foreign capital to replace what Perón had diverted from the big ranchers via the IAPI. This policy apparently represented the perspective of the national bourgeoisie in this period. It scored some successes.

For example, foreign capitalists, largely European, built up an automotive assembly industry in Córdoba, which was converted from a center of Catholic reaction to the stronghold of the most militant sections of the working class.

However, Frondizi's more timid and dependent "developmentalism" also quickly ran out of steam. The onset of a

recession in 1962 and the multiplication of strikes, once some early wage concessions were wiped out by an inflationary spiral, turned the bourgeoisie and the military toward a more repressive option.

Frondizi's decision to permit limited Peronist participation in elections brought the issue to a head. He had strong reasons for doing this, as the historian Luna noted: "With all the risks entailed in Peronist participation in future electoral confrontations, civic principle demanded this. It was a guarantee against a massive shift toward extremism and violence." However, this was not a time when the military was inclined to make such concessions.

Perón himself opposed participation, but lost control of his followers. After the Peronists won in four provinces, including the decisive one of Buenos Aires, the military decided to oust Frondizi and take over the provincial governments. They did not, however, establish a military regime but turned the vacated office over to the vice-president, José María Guido.

The military was deeply divided. A struggle took place between the "Colorados" (Reds), who favored imposing direct military rule, and the "Azules" (Blues), who opposed this. The latter, led by Gen. Juan Carlos Onganía, who himself subsequently became a military dictator, won; and new elections were held in 1963.

The Azules hoped to achieve some kind of electoral mandate for a "middle of the road" regime in the 1963 elections. They banned participation by the Peronists and backed a new formation led by Gen. Pedro Aramburu, the most prominent personality among the leaders of the 1955 coup.

The voters, however, decisively rejected the "moderate" military candidate, the "Argentine Eisenhower," and gave a slender mandate to the People's Radicals, the most likely non-Peronist alternative to the "liberators." Arturo Illía took the presidency with 30% of the vote.

The Illía government, however, was unable to carry out any decisive policy. By 1966, it was politically eroded. On June 26 of that year, it was easily toppled by the military, who installed General Onganía as dictator.

General Onganía Takes Over

The new military regime tried hard to create an image of a strong government determined to modernize the country. It announced an "Argentine Revolution" and published a number of ambitious-sounding manifestos. Actually, it simply applied the same economic policy as all the post-Perón governments, but with a firmer hand.

Onganía's economics minister, Adalberto Krieger Vasena, offered the same solution as Prebisch: pamper the big ranchers, increase exports by cutting down domestic consumption, encourage foreign investment.

The "Argentine Revolution" ushered in a rapid increase in imperialist domination of the economy. A study published in the September 1973 issue of the newsletter of the North American Congress on Latin America indicates the process:

Bankruptcies grew from 1,647 in 1968 for a total value of 324.7 million new pesos to 2,982 in 1970 for a total value of 1.15 billion new pesos. Local companies which could not compete with the advanced technology of foreign corporations and which could no longer afford expensive capital imports disappeared and automatically gave up their share of the market to the remaining firms.

With the value of the peso cut by inflation, many manufacturing firms could not keep up payments on their foreign patents, so they offered stock instead. In this way, control eventually passed abroad without any inflow of capital.

One of the most important steps taken by Krieger Vasena was law No. 18061, which opened the way for direct financial penetration. According to the NACLA study:

Between 1967 and 1969, 19 local banks were bought out by foreign institutions. The subsidiaries of large U.S. and European banks, whose activities had previously been limited to the Buenos Aires region, used this mechanism of acquisition to engage in branch banking throughout the country. Foreign banks now control 17.5 percent of all deposits, 24 percent of all industrial loans, and 18 percent of commercial loans. More importantly they handle 44 percent of foreign currency and gold transactions.

From 1955 to 1972, the share of Argentine industrial production directly in the hands of foreign companies grew from 8% to 40%. Moreover, this foreign control resulted in the years 1960-70 in a net outflow of capital through profit "repatriation" and payment of dividends. From 1960 to 1971, \$853 million flowed out of Argentina, while only \$811 million came in.

Also unemployment increased, partly as a result of the nature of new foreign investment, which concentrated on capital-intensive projects that brought in quick profits but created few jobs. By 1973, unemployment reached 10%.

The government was able to apply the Krieger Vasena plan because it succeeded in defeating the defensive strikes of the port workers, railroad workers, and sugar-mill workers. Inflation was cut, and the budget balanced. In the capitalists' eyes, Krieger Vasena was a brilliant success. They made him chairman of the International Monetary Fund.

New Upsurge of the Masses

But suddenly the discontent that had been building up below the surface of stability and neocolonialist "prosperity" exploded. The first cracks came in unexpected places. By 1968, even some capital-

ist newspapers began to note that several years of repression had produced some worrying "professional deformations" in Onganía's police. In the December 7, 1968, *New York Times*, for example, correspondent Malcolm Browne reported that police, who had been called to capture a kitten that was believed to be rabid, decided to use tear gas and submachine guns. In the chase, a bystander was killed.

One of the government's austerity measures was to increase the price of food in student cafeterias. In April 1969, a protest developed against this at the University of Corrientes, a rather remote province in the northeast of the country. In line with the government's policy of imposing austerity by force, the police brutally suppressed the demonstration, killing a young student, Juan Cabral.

This incident touched off protests against police violence. An escalation developed, with every protest being more brutally suppressed, and every new police atrocity leading to wider and more militant protests.

On May 17, the police shot down Ramón Bello in a mass demonstration in Rosario. On May 20, the national student association called a nationwide student strike. This gave impetus to a general strike in Rosario on May 21, which revealed how isolated the government had become.

Not only workers and students but a wide gamut of petty-bourgeois layers, including merchants, supported the strike. The overwhelming majority of the population moved into active opposition to the regime of "fiscal responsibility."

In the Rosario strike, the police shot down a fifteen-year-old boy. This new outrage touched off a virtual insurrection.

"It was open warfare," an eyewitness quoted in the *New York Times* said. "After the shooting the police locked themselves up inside headquarters for protection. The students were patrolling the city center."

The upsurge culminated in a general strike in Córdoba that touched off a full-scale insurrection. "At the height of the fighting in Córdoba last night," a dispatch in the *New York Times* said, "Buenos Aires residents watched dramatic sequences [on TV] from the northern industrial city showing waves of policemen firing pistols at close range into an advancing crowd of rock-throwing workers."

The authorities had lost touch with the processes going on among the masses, Malcolm Browne explained in the *New York Times*:

"A general political malaise began to develop and spread. The trains were running on time, but the political life that had been the mainspring of Argentine existence had ceased."

In its June 9, 1969, issue, *Intercontinental Press* said: "Whether or not Onganía has decided to resign . . . it seems certain that his regime has outlived its usefulness."

In essence, the Argentine rulers faced the same dilemma they did before the passage of the Sáenz Peña law. As Browne put it: "Seasoned Argentine political observers saw the Government facing two alternatives: to yield and liberalize the regime, or to apply the 'mano dura' (iron fist) and start erecting firing squad parapets. Either way, the country faced uncertainty, turmoil and possibly civil war." That was a safe prediction, in view of fifty-three years of Argentine history.

However, because of the sharpness of the dilemma, the government tried for several more years to avoid a clear choice. It adopted new repressive measures, setting up military courts and decreeing a new anti-Communist witch-hunt law.

On the other hand, when the unions called a new general strike on June 17, 1969, the authorities treated the strikers cautiously. The government made a turn away from the trigger-happy repression that prevailed before the first Córdoba uprising. In the fall, it released 100 political prisoners. On June 8, 1970, Onganía was removed by a palace coup and replaced by Gen. Roberto Marcelo Levingston.

Córdoba Again Takes the Lead

However, the military paid for its indecisiveness, its attempt to retain repression while making some concessions. Levingston appointed a conservative, José Camilo Uriburu, to rule the rebellious province of Córdoba. The respectful Argentine press could find nothing better to say about the new governor than that he had sired fourteen children.

In his first news conference, Uriburu displayed his authoritarian paternalism. The Buenos Aires magazine *Panorama* asked him what he thought the reasons were for the Córdoba uprising. He said:

I would define it as an occurrence which at a certain time acquired an exaggerated importance. That is, as a domestic tragedy occurring in the bosom of a generally well-behaved family, where a series of factors disturbing the tranquility of this family nucleus assumed the drastic aspects of a scandal.

Then the wife grabbed plates and started throwing them at her husband's head, and the husband broke down the doors of the house. And this home, which was a place of peace, became a "camp of Agramante" [the camp of the turbulent Saracen host in Ariosto's epic poem *Orlando Furioso*].

This bumbling autocrat of the breakfast table, a prize representative of the conservative upper middle class, succeeded only in fanning the workers' hatred of the military regime. *Panorama* said in its March 16, 1971, issue:

Giving the closing speech Sunday March 7 at the National Wheat Festival . . . Uriburu threw several sticks of dynamite into the fire. He spoke with a certain arrogance of "containing avarice" [of the workers], of "inefficiency . . ." of "the

materialist plot" and "the red flag." That was not all. He prayed, one supposes to the cherubim, for a chance to chop off the head of the Marxist serpent tempting the citizens of Córdoba. . . .

Since no one could discern a flaming sword in Uriburu's hands, or even a rusty razor blade, serpents appeared everywhere [on walls]—red ones and white ones, big ones and little ones.

On March 9, the unions began preparations for a general strike to protest Uriburu's appointment. On March 12, workers occupied 130 plants and business establishments. Barricades went up. The second Córdoba uprising had begun, more violent than the first. Fighting raged for days. Now the military had to make a definite choice. They chose to retreat.

On March 23, under threat of a new military coup, Levingston resigned and turned power over to Gen. Alejandro Lanusse. Shortly after, the new dictator began to promise elections.

The Oligarchy Turns to Perón

The solution proposed by the new government was the "Great National Agreement," which in essence offered the Peronist bureaucracy in the mass organizations and unions a share in the government in return for their getting the workers to accept "wage restraint."

Perón seized the offer. The man who had been viewed with hatred and contempt for a decade and a half in the U.S. imperialist press suddenly became "the last hope for Argentina."

Still the shrewd old caudillo delayed his return, so as to maintain room for maneuver by not having to take direct responsibility for anything that happened.

The retreat of the military had the effect that concessions to the masses have generally had in Argentina; it touched off a giant upsurge, which for a time at least could not be controlled.

The Peronists scored a massive victory in the March 11, 1973, elections with the candidates of the military getting only a tiny vote. In the wake of this, the generals were forced to release even the guerrillas jailed on charges of bank robbery, assassinating big capitalist and military figures, and so on.

A wave of occupation strikes swept the country. Without a revolutionary leadership strong enough to challenge Peronist control of the unions, however, the upsurge ebbed in a few months.

Nonetheless, the Trotskyists of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) had been able to take advantage of the elections to run a long slate of militant worker activists. In the face of the Peronist landslide, they managed to draw a large section of the workers vanguard behind them for working-class independence from Perón. The PST increased its size many times and became nationally known. It began to draw violent attacks from the Peronist

leadership and Perón himself.

Once the first upsurge had died down, El Líder decided it was time to return to the country. On June 20, the fabled "black airplane" finally landed at the Ezeiza national airport, where a huge crowd had gathered. But instead of signaling the triumph of the masses who trusted him, the descent of "the Condor" started the slaughter of the radical youth who looked to him to achieve "national liberation."

Rightist goon squads organized by the union bureaucracy opened fire on the leftist contingents, killing hundreds in the worst single massacre in Argentine history. Furthermore, this mass murder marked the beginning of a systematic campaign by these rightist squads of assassinating left and liberal activists.

Whereas throughout his first presidency, Perón was only occasionally accused of using strong-arm methods, his return initiated the consistent use of terror. The reason was clear. There was no longer a world market starved for meat and grain; gold ingots no longer filled the corridors of the national bank. There was no room in the Argentine capitalist economy in the 1970s for major concessions to the workers. And so, military repression against the militant workers was replaced by the gangsterism of the right-wing Peronists.

Nonetheless, the Peronists had plans for expansion. The rise in raw materials prices provided some economic stability in the first period of the new regime, and the Peronists hoped to acquire sources of energy and raw materials in Paraguay and Bolivia. But they lost out to the more powerful U.S.-backed Brazilian capitalists. Furthermore, they had the bad luck to take power just before the start of the deepest economic crisis since the 1930s.

End of the Myth

Shortly after his return, Perón took direct control of the government, forcing the resignation of Héctor Cámpora, who had been elected president in his stead during the "left" phase of Peronism. The caudillo consolidated his personal power by making his wife, Isabel Martínez, vice-president and designated heir.

The disillusionment with El Líder that began to be felt in left and labor circles was reflected in a higher vote for the PST in the new special presidential elections. The Trotskyists won a significant vote in some working-class districts.

After taking office in September 1973, Perón launched a witch-hunt against the left wing of this movement. Nonetheless, he could not overcome the fundamental contradiction within that movement.

This was shown by the Córdoba bus drivers' strike in January 1974, where the union won a 40% increase, breaking Perón's wage guidelines. The government had been blocked in its attempt to break the strike by Atilio López, the deputy

governor of the state, a hero of the underground Peronist labor movement, and one of the leaders of the bus drivers.

The response from the right-wing Peronists was violent. On February 27, the Córdoba police chief ousted the state government by a military coup, which was tacitly endorsed by Perón and the national Peronist leadership. Failing to get El Líder's support, the governor and deputy governor obediently resigned. Even this did not save Atilio López from assassination later by a right-wing Peronist murder gang.

The strongman had another problem in trying to repeat his role as the Argentine bonaparte—mortality. He was seventy-eight years old. Before he could reconsolidate his machine, he died on July 1, 1974.

The union bureaucracy, which had the biggest stake in the Perón myth, tried to immortalize him by filling the newspapers with worshipful advertisements. For example, the union of workers in the state-owned oil fields said:

It was our Lord God's will that Perón return to the land of his birth to show us the road, the road of *National Unity*, and to summon us to accomplish a task, the *Liberation* and the *Reconstruction* of our country. . . .

In this spirit, we pledge to defend the fundamental institutions of the country, loyally and patriotically serving the ideal of *National Unity* in order to achieve the only truth, PERON'S dream of seeing our Fatherland become *la ARGENTINA POTENCIA* [the great-power Argentina].

There were endless vows of allegiance to Perón's widow, who, "according to the principle of centralized command," now became the "leader of the Argentine race." However, the bonapartist charisma of the "fallen Condor," which arose from very specific historical circumstances, could not be transferred to his appointed heir.

Government Uses Terrorist Gangs

With its only credible bonaparte gone, the bourgeoisie was confronted again with the dilemma—give concessions or repress. It chose the second. Rightist gang terror escalated into continual carnage. It was directed by the Rasputin in Isabel de Perón's court, Social Welfare Minister López Rega, an adept of astrology who became known as "el Brujo" (the witch doctor).

In the year and a half following Perón's death, the bodies of hundreds of leftists and liberals turned up mutilated in the Greater Buenos Aires area alone. The left-wing Peronist guerrillas, who allowed themselves to be drawn into a private war with the right, suffered the worst casualties. But the PST was also a target. Even before the fall of the Peronist regime, fifteen Trotskyists had been murdered.

Besides mounting a large-scale campaign of gang terror and staging local coups, the Peronist right began to cut back

formal democratic rights on a national scale.

On November 6, 1974, the Peronist government declared a state of siege, suspending many constitutional rights, including the right of assembly. The democratic interlude was ending. With the exception of election periods, Argentina has been under state-of-siege rules for most of the last thirty years.

In 1975, with the worsening of the world recession, the bottom dropped out of the Argentine economy. Even though by this time, only a very truncated parliamentarism remained, and the government's murder gangs had more blood on their hands than the repressive forces of the dictatorship, such a regime was still insufficient to carry out a drastic reduction of the workers' standard of living.

This was shown in July 1975, when the ranks of the unions compelled their rightist leaders to call a general strike against the austerity program, forcing the government to make a hasty retreat.

For the first ten months of 1975, inflation rose to 287%. The November 16 issue of the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión* reported that real wages had dropped by more than half since June 1975. In December 1975, inflation reached 335%. On December 18, the air force staged a trial run coup d'état.

On March 5, 1976, the government announced a new austerity program, but was forced to immediately retreat. The defeat of the prior plan in July had already shown that a government dependent on union support, however right-wing the union bureaucracy, could not carry out such a policy.

The Argentine rulers felt obliged to resort to the same means as in 1930, 1955, 1962, and 1966; that is, apply the "mano dura."

However, with the sharpening of the dilemma faced by the Argentine ruling class, its repressive measures have become steadily more murderous.

The second Peronist regime was toppled easily, since it had become largely discredited. But the wearing out of Peronism leaves the bourgeoisie, for the first time since the rise of the Radicals, without a "popular party" that it can rely on to draw the masses into the bourgeois political system.

New types of reformism may develop. But with its margin for maneuver constantly decreasing, the Argentine bourgeoisie faces the threat that when this repressive turn, like all the previous ones, begins to become counterproductive, it will find itself without any liberal political alternative or populist cover in the face of an irresistible mass upsurge.

Then, the fears of the promoters of the Sáenz Peña law may be realized, and the masses may turn to a "really advanced party." □

Israeli Occupiers Institute Reign of Terror on West Bank

By David Russell

Hamdan Assad Abu Ramili died in a Jerusalem hospital March 24. He had compound fractures of his legs and arms and a cerebral hemorrhage. He had been beaten to death by Israeli occupation troops in the West Bank town of Hebron.

The thirty-four-year-old Ramili was the third Palestinian killed by Israeli forces in their attempt to crush the mass upsurge on the occupied West Bank that began at the end of January. Ten-year-old Ali Hassan Afana, who was shot down for throwing stones at a vehicle filled with soldiers, died on March 22.

At first, the Israeli occupiers refused to hand Afana's body over to his family in the village of Abu Dis. The villagers, however, refused to be intimidated. Terence Smith described the scene in a March 23 dispatch in the *New York Times*:

Carrying large wreaths and chanting "Palestine is Arab," the mourners marched the length of the village under the eyes of a reinforced contingent of heavily armed Israeli soldiers. . . .

Fearing that the procession might ignite major rioting throughout the West Bank, the Israeli military administration cordoned off the village and refused entry to outsiders.

Foreign and Israeli reporters were stopped at the entrance to the village by soldiers and prevented from covering the ceremony.

Afana's family was finally allowed to bury him at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of March 24.

The third Palestinian to die was a forty-four-year-old man from Salfit, near Nablus. He supposedly suffered a "heart attack" shortly after being arrested by Israeli troops March 23. Palestinians charge that he died following a beating.

Such beatings became an everyday sight on television screens around the world during the height of the Palestinian protests against the Israeli occupation. "In putting down the most recent riots," Terence Smith said in a March 24 dispatch, "Israeli soldiers, many of them teenagers, have used tactics they would themselves denounce in any other situation. . . ."

"The complaint about harsh personal treatment comes up time and again in conversations with West Bankers. In the name of security, they are continually subjected to sudden searches of their home and person. Midnight arrests of suspected trouble-makers are frequent and it is often weeks before charges are lodged."

A specific example of the use of such tactics was given in the March 22 *Jerusalem Post*. Anan Safadi reported:

Solidarity With Palestinians!

Demonstrations in solidarity with the general strike called for March 30 by Palestinians inside Israel are being organized in a number of American cities. In New York, the Organization of Arab Students and others are planning to picket the Israeli mission to the United Nations.

In a March 22 statement Peter Camejo and Willie Mae Reid, the candidates of the Socialist Workers party for president and vice-president, urged that international actions to show solidarity with the Palestinians be organized. They noted that such actions "can have a direct effect in limiting the Israeli regime's use of brutal repressive measures."

The security forces . . . conducted massive comb-outs in Nablus and Halhoul, arresting scores of persons suspected of subversive activity. This was seen as a pre-emptive strike at extremist elements deemed likely to try and accelerate the unrest while the West Bank situation is before the [United Nations] Security Council.

Just like the American racists who tried to blame the movement for Black rights on "outside agitators" and "subversives," the Israeli racists talk about "troublemakers" and "extremist elements." But they know very well that the whole Palestinian population hates the Zionist occupation, and with good cause.

"I was stopped in front of the prison," one civic leader in Nablus told *Washington Post* correspondent Thomas W. Lippman March 22, "and held for three hours out in the pouring rain. We had to stand at attention and there was no smoking. A soldier threw one boy's papers in the water and hit him to make him go get them. The soldier was enjoying himself."

The racism of the Israeli colonial settlers against their Palestinian victims also takes more vicious forms. For example, Jewish settlers at Kiryat Arba, outside Hebron, were encouraged by their leader, Rabbi Moshe Levinger, to "shoot to hit" if they were stoned by Arabs. On March 17, three Palestinians from Hebron were beaten with chains and bitten by dogs after being captured by the Kiryat Arba settlers.

Occurrences of this type led Defense Minister Shimon Peres on March 22 to ban Israeli television crews from covering Palestinian protests in the occupied areas without army permission. Army commanders were also empowered to bar foreign reporters.

In a television review in the March 26 issue of the *Jerusalem Post*, Philip Gillon noted that although Peres's order was "a gross infringement of that liberty of the press so vital for a democratic society, I must confess that I am relieved at not having to watch the sort of thing that has been going on.

"It was a bitter experience to see Israeli soldiers manhandling and beating up Arab children."

While Gillon's "democratic society" is brutalizing and terrorizing the Palestinian population on the West Bank, it is also attacking the democratic rights of those Palestinians who were not expelled from Israel when the Zionist state was established.

Threats of reprisals against Palestinians inside Israel have centered on those connected with the scheduled March 30 countrywide general strike by the Palestinian population. The March 30 action originated as a protest against the expropriation of Arab land in the Galilee area, but the Israeli press has correctly seen it as a move in solidarity with the nationalist upsurge on the West Bank as well.

" . . . some Israelis are said to be worried by this attempt to unite the Arabs of Israel and the Arabs of the West Bank in an anti-government movement," *Washington Post* correspondent Lippman reported March 22.

A March 21 *Jerusalem Post* editorial warned Arab leaders in Israel of the "pitfalls of escalating these protests [against land seizures] in the form of the proposed country-wide strike."

The editors of this racist sheet pointed to "a fine line dividing . . . legitimate interest-group politics from that of radical irredentist politics which seeks not the redress of tangible grievances nor support for constructive policies, but the expression of latent and rabid anti-Israel irredentism. It is easy even for a well-intentioned leadership to lead their followers over this fine line nearly unnoticed."

In Haifa, representatives of industrial and commercial concerns were blunter. Yoel Dar reported in the March 26 *Jerusalem Post* that they "published a statement warning all Arab employees that those



PERES: Stopped Israeli TV from filming troops beating Arab children.

absent from work without sufficient reason on Tuesday [March 30] would be considered as having quit."

Dar reported that thirty-five of the forty-eight chairmen of Arab local councils in the Galilee voted against the strike at a March 25 meeting in Shfaram. Earlier, he said, the government's chief of Arab affairs, Shmuel Toledano, had met with three Arab leaders to pressure them to vote against the strike. Dar also said:

A police force of 200 was posted in order to keep the order, and additional reinforcements were readied outside the town.

The police presence proved necessary when the vote became known—the youngsters [several hundred had assembled outside the meeting] began to throw stones at the Town Hall. When the youngsters began to attack the police, these moved in and began making arrests. At least 12 youths were held.

The Israelis have followed the same policy of mixing intimidation with reliance on conservative, traditional Palestinian leaders both inside Israel and in the West Bank. The recent struggles, however, have done much to undermine the positions of the traditional leaders who have collaborated with Israel. The reaction of the youth in Shfaram is one example of this.

In Hebron, the seventy-one-year-old mayor, Sheikh Mohammed Ali Ja'abari, resigned under the pressure of the mass upsurge on March 20. The following day,

he resumed his post and promised to restore "order" in the town. But Ja'abari, who in the past has served in the Jordanian cabinet, proved unable to keep his promise. On March 23 Israeli troops were back in Hebron, tearing down roadblocks and attacking demonstrators.

On March 25 the Israeli occupation authorities finally felt confident enough to lift the round-the-clock curfew that had been clamped on the 40,000 residents of Ramallah and Al Bira for the previous ten days.

As the third month of Palestinian protests against the Israeli occupation begins, many schools and shops on the West Bank remain closed, and sporadic demonstrations continue despite the vicious repressive measures taken by the occupiers.

Meanwhile, Washington vetoed a UN Security Council resolution March 25 that called on Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula, and to cease its measures against the Palestinian population there.

However, the 14-to-1 vote, in which Washington's partners in France, Italy, Britain, and Japan cast ballots against the Zionist occupation, further emphasized Israel's isolation. Even the American imperialists found it useful to make a statement dissociating themselves from Israel's continuing settlement of occupied Arab territory. □

Interview With Hassan Rahman

'The Palestinian People Have Decided to Resist Occupation'

[The following interview was given to *Intercontinental Press* on March 20 by Hassan Rahman, deputy representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations.]

Question. There has been little news in the American press on the recent events in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Can you describe the extent of the upsurge there and the repression by the Israelis?

Answer. In fact, what is taking place now in the occupied territories—and that includes the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—is a revolt. It is a mass uprising against the forces of occupation by almost all Palestinians—peasants, workers, professionals, students, teachers, mayors, etc. All Palestinians are participating in this uprising.

What does this uprising mean? It means that the Palestinian people have decided to

resist occupation, to reject occupation, and express their solidarity with the struggle of the Palestine Liberation Organization and their brothers and sisters outside of the occupied territory.

The methods of repression vary. There are mass arrests, beatings, terrorization by troops breaking into homes, shooting into the air, and shooting sometimes at the demonstrators themselves. Israel is exposing its real nature as a racist occupation force—there is no difference between what Israel is doing to the Palestinian people and what the Nazi forces did to the peoples of Europe during the Second World War.

The Palestinian people are engaged in a struggle of liberation—they are trying to defend their national identity. These events come at a crucial time. Palestinians have been winning victories internationally on the political front, and militarily they have been able to destroy the conspiracy which was directed against their existence in Lebanon.

The revolt on the West Bank is an indication of the level of Palestinian organization. It shows the determination of Palestinians to continue the struggle until they achieve the liberation of their homeland and the establishment of a secular, democratic state in Palestine as a substitute for the exclusivist, racist state of Israel.

Q. What impact do you think this struggle on the West Bank has had inside Israel—both on Palestinians in Israel and on the Israeli Jews?

A. As far as the Palestinians in what is called Israel, they have no need to be made aware of the atrocities of the Zionist state because they themselves have been the victims of Israel and its racist policies. But the sense of solidarity among the Palestinian people in the two parts of Palestine—Israel and the territories it occupied after 1967—is great, and the indication of that

solidarity will be seen on March 30. On that day all our people in Palestine will carry out a general strike—the first since 1948.

They call that day the day of land. Land in Arabic—*al ard*—is much more than just land in the abstract. It emphasizes the relationship between the peasant and his land, and love for the homeland.

This will teach the Zionist establishment a lesson. Nobody can destroy a whole people.

Q. Do you think a struggle like this will shake some new layers in the Jewish population and begin to make some people rethink the ideas of Zionism?

A. That is our thesis. It has always been the thesis of the Palestine Liberation Organization that the intensification of the struggle of the Palestinian people would eventually lead to an increase in the level of consciousness of the Jewish community in Palestine.

Q. What forces are involved in the March 30 general strike? How are they building it?

A. The information that we have is that all Palestinians from all walks of life—mayors, notables, peasants, workers—will be participating in that struggle, which is opposed to the Israelization of Palestine and the destruction of the national identity of the Palestinians, as well as to the confiscation of their land and property. This will be a day of struggle against Israeli occupation, and we hope that it will initiate a mass struggle among the Palestinians inside Israel.

Q. Have you received any information about the Israelis trying to repress those trying to organize this March 30 general strike?

A. Yes. The Israelis have been intimidating people. One member of the Israeli parliament called for depriving Toufik Zayed [the mayor of Nazareth and a member of parliament] of his parliamentary immunity as a reprisal for his participation in organizing the March 30 action.

They are exerting all kinds of pressure to prevent people from participating in the action—threatening to fire people from their jobs, arrest them, blow up their houses, put them under restrictive detention, etc.

Q. What type of solidarity actions are taking place to support the struggle in the West Bank and the March 30 general strike?

A. There will be solidarity actions to support the struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO in

many American cities. I know that there will be one tomorrow in Detroit. There will be one in Washington, one in Jacksonville, Florida, and others all around the United States.

On March 30 the Organization of Arab Students and other progressive organizations will hold a picket line outside the Israeli mission to the United Nations. We call on all progressive forces to participate and express their solidarity with the Palestinian people in their struggle against the occupation and against the racist, Zionist establishment.

Q. As a result of the upsurge on the West Bank, Israel has been forced to agree to participate in a debate at the United Nations, which the PLO will also take part in. What importance do you think this has?

A. The Security Council is an international organization that supposedly deals with peace and security in the world; it has a responsibility towards the Palestinian people. We will fight the Zionists wherever we can—in the United Nations, in the occupied territories, on the battlefield.

I think that the Zionists will try to distort what is taking place in the West Bank. I would not be surprised if they say that this came about as a result of the decision [allowing Jews to pray at] the Al Aqsa Mosque.

The struggle for Jerusalem is one of the factors, a part of the struggle, but the basic reason for the upsurge is the Israeli occupation as such and the oppression of the Palestinian people. The uprising began after the U.S. veto of the Security Council resolution on Palestine [in January].

Q. I know that there were demonstrations in Bethlehem, which is a Christian town, so this hardly seems to be a religious struggle.

A. Absolutely not! The mayor of Beit Sahur resigned yesterday—that is also a Christian town. The mayor of Ramallah—Karim Khalaf—is also a Christian, and the mayor of a Christian town. The mayor of Bir Zeit, which is also a Christian town, resigned.

Most of the mayors who have resigned so far in protest against the repression against the Palestinian people have been Christian, and many of those taking part in the upsurge have been Christians. We do not think of each other as Christians or non-Christians. We are Palestinians, and our resistance to occupation and our struggle against Zionism unites us.

Q. In Nablus, Jerusalem, and other places, small shopkeepers and merchants went on strike. I saw one statement in which the Israeli authorities said they would not tolerate such strikes. What do they do to stop them?

A. They usually confiscate the shops or impose extremely high fines on people.

Q. What effect do you think this struggle in the West Bank will have on the image the American people and people in other imperialist countries have of Israel?

A. I think that the American people are becoming more and more aware of the nature of the Zionist state and its oppressive practices. These have been hidden from the American people for a long time, but there is nothing new about them. Israel has blown up so far about 19,000 houses; it has expelled millions of Palestinians from their homes and property, and arrested and intimidated thousands. It has shelled Palestinian refugee camps, killing and maiming thousands more. This is what Israel has been doing from its very inception.

We hope that the American people will become more aware of the nature of Israel and solidarize with the struggle of the Palestinian people. We hope that they will pressure their government to stop giving Israel military and economic aid.

Q. Is there anything that you think the Arab governments could do at this point to support the people on the West Bank and the March 30 demonstration?

A. We expect the Arab people to solidarize with the struggle of their brothers under occupation. Not only the Arabs, but all progressive forces all over the world.

Q. And do you expect anything from the Arab governments?

A. As far as I'm concerned it is the Arab people who will solidarize.

Q. What do you think about this [March 15] leak by the CIA that Israel has ten or twenty nuclear weapons ready for use?

A. I would not be surprised if Israel had nuclear weapons. The United States also had nuclear weapons when it fought against the Vietnamese people. This will not intimidate us and will not stop us from continuing our struggle against the Zionist state.

Q. What do you think about Sadat's decision to rely on the United States for military aid?

A. As far as we are concerned, we do not trust the government of the United States and we do not think that the United States government can be a friend of struggling people. The United States government has always been the enemy of people struggling for their liberation and for independence and freedom. □

Plyushch Urges Help for All Political Prisoners

By George Saunders

"I want to say that my presence here as a free man is the result of efforts by many people in the Soviet Union and in the West who publicly spoke up in my behalf. Regimes that persecute people for their views, regardless of their official ideologies, are afraid more than anything of publicity and protests. Therefore I call upon all honest people who cherish human rights to speak out on behalf of prisoners of conscience throughout the world."

This statement by Leonid Plyushch set the tone of the first news conference given by him and his wife, Tatyana Zhitnikova, as they began a four-week tour of the United States and Canada.

Organized by Amnesty International, the news conference was held at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York on March 25. Plyushch and his family, now living in France, were allowed to leave the Soviet Union in January after a worldwide protest campaign against his confinement, since 1973, in a KGB-controlled psychiatric hospital-prison. The U.S. tour is sponsored by Amnesty International, the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, and the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners.

"His case was so well publicized that the usual lies were no longer possible," Tatyana Zhitnikova explained. She was asked what effect protests by members of the U.S. Congress had had. "I'm not a politician," Zhitnikova replied. "I know very little about politics, and I don't want to express an opinion on that—except to say that any action that helps bring freedom is good."

Plyushch stressed, in response to a question about the failure of the United Nations to respond to appeals on behalf of human rights in the USSR, "I do not believe much in the United Nations or any government, but in the conscience of the public, in public opinion."

Plyushch emphasized that "the Soviet authorities are particularly harsh" with people who reveal the details of KGB repression by the use of "special" mental hospitals. He discussed the cases of Vladimir Bukovsky and Kyiv psychiatrist Semyon Gluzman in this connection, and referred to the case of Moscow biologist Sergei Kovalyov, convicted of "anti-Soviet slander" last fall.

Part of the testimony against Kovalyov involved his publicizing facts of "psychiatric repression" in the case of Plyushch himself. This included reports on Plyushch in the samizdat journal *Chronicle of*

Current Events. Plyushch's "doctor," Lyubarskaya, testified that the *Chronicle* had lied about the conditions under which Plyushch was held and the drugs forcibly administered to him. Plyushch declared that on all these details the *Chronicle* was correct. It was Lyubarskaya who lied.

Both Kovalyov and Plyushch were founding members of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR in 1969. "This group," Plyushch said, "legally protested violations of the Soviet constitution and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. At that time there were fifteen members. Now only two are free—Tatyana Velikanova and Tatyana Khodorovich. The others are in camps, have emigrated, or have ceased to be active after serving prison terms. Grigory Podyapolsky, a physicist by profession and a poet, died a few days ago. He died of nervous strain, persecution, and worry about his friends."

Tatyana Zhitnikova paid tribute to the courage of Velikanova and Khodorovich, who refuse to be intimidated and continue their struggle for human rights today, despite threats of arrest or other reprisals. Khodorovich played a particularly important role in Plyushch's defense by compiling a samizdat collection of documents on the facts of his confinement in a psychiatric prison.

In the question-and-answer period, Plyushch discussed Russification in the Ukrainian Republic and the resistance to it by Ukrainian patriots, especially young people in the 1960s. He described the regime's efforts at falsifying, for important foreigners, the extent to which Ukrainian national traditions are discouraged. On one occasion, when Fidel Castro visited Kyiv, students were dressed up in Ukrainian costumes and sent to walk the streets. When a Canadian Communist party delegation came to the Ukraine in the mid-1960s to investigate charges of Russification (there is a large Canadian-Ukrainian element in the Canadian CP), the regime made a special search in schools and universities for students who knew the Ukrainian language well. They were all brought together into special classrooms to impress and deceive the CP delegation from Canada.

Plyushch concluded that Russification was so severe that a genuine Ukrainian culture could only be developed in an independent Ukrainian socialist republic.

In regard to the involvement of students and youth in the resistance movement, he

said he felt the movement has been almost completely crushed at present, but he was confident it would be renewed by the youth.

Plyushch discussed anti-Semitism at length, explaining that it persists among a philistine element and is constantly encouraged by official anti-Semitism. The Ukrainian patriots, the so-called "bourgeois nationalists," he said, make a special point of opposing anti-Semitism and collaborate with the protest movement among Soviet Jews. The official anti-Semitism, Plyushch said, feeds Zionism.

He said that the dissenting elements among the different nationalities try to work together but have weak ties as yet. He mentioned collaboration between Ukrainians, Jews, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Byelorussians, and Armenians, and said that there were reports of a movement among Moldavians for reunification with Romania but no contact had yet been made.

One discordant note was struck in a news conference otherwise centering on the defense of political prisoners, regardless of their views, and in support of national rights.

Andrei Sedykh, chief editor of the New York Russian émigré daily *Novoye Russkoye Slovo*, asked Plyushch, in true witch-hunting fashion, if he "was still a Communist." Significantly, this was the only point in the conference picked up by the *New York Times*, which mentioned not a word about Plyushch's appeal for support to political prisoners.

Plyushch answered Sedykh that the purpose of the news conference was to further the struggle for political prisoners in all countries, and that it was not the appropriate place to go into complex questions of philosophy. "I will say," Plyushch added, "that one's ideology should not depend on one's personal fate. I emphasize one's own fate, not the fate of one's nation."

Plyushch's statement ended with the following: "Several scientists and public figures in Paris have suggested establishing an international committee for the struggle against repression in all countries. I appeal to the American public to support this committee."

The call Plyushch referred to and that he has endorsed was made at a rally in Paris March 7. Entitled "Stop Worldwide Repression," it says in part: "We know that numerous committees exist for the purpose of opposing repression in various countries, and we have no desire to take the place of any of these committees, which all have their own responsibilities and goals. But we . . . believe that it is time to assemble all those who are devoted to the unyielding defense of liberty against those forces that are determined to crush it out of existence. We therefore consider it necessary to wage this battle throughout the world." □

First Issue of the 'Daily Rouge' Rolls Off the Press

By F.L. Derry

PARIS—On March 15 the first issue of *Rouge Quotidien* came off the press, converting *Rouge*, the organ of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), the French section of the Fourth International, into a daily.

Planning for the ambitious project began some time ago. A fund-raising campaign was conducted for almost a year, a new, modern printshop was set up, and a full-time staff was organized to put out the paper.

Rouge Quotidien will be competing with several other left dailies. The Communist party, of course, has *l'Humanité* as well as several daily regional papers.

The Socialist party and the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU) have only weeklies. There are two Maoist dailies: *Le Quotidien du Peuple* and *l'Humanité Rouge*. These are both very small; in fact, *l'Humanité Rouge* is little more than a daily four-page leaflet.

Somewhat more substantial is *Libération*, which claims to be "independent." As a "nonparty" paper, *Libération* reflects prejudices of many people on the "far left" who are opposed to the Leninist concept of party building. It will, however, present some rather stiff competition for the daily *Rouge*.

The first press run of *Rouge Quotidien* was 60,000. It is not expected that the run will remain at this level. What is hoped for is a steady level of readers above the estimated minimum of 15,000 daily sales required to sustain the paper. The sales of *Rouge* as a weekly were somewhat over 10,000.

Most sales will be done through newsstands, with a few subscriptions and street sales on weekends. The paper will appear six times a week: five 12-page issues during the week and a 16-page issue on Saturday. Distribution will be handled by Nouvelles Messageries de Presse Parisienne (NMPP), which has virtually a national monopoly in the distribution of papers and magazines to newsstands.

The financial campaign to launch the paper began early last year. The initial goal was to raise 2 million francs (nearly US\$500,000). At the end of the year the initial goal was raised to 2.4 million francs.

A week before the publication date, all but 140,000 francs of the total had been raised. The money came from sympathizers, from a sustainer levied on members of the LCR, and from the sale of calendars, postcards, and other promotional material.

In addition, the LCR organized a large two-day festival last October. However, in spite of the 50,000 persons who attended, little profit was made to aid the paper. Thus, the bulk of the money has come in the form of individual donations.

Much of the fund has already been put to use. A new headquarters has been located, which will serve both as printshop and editorial offices for the paper as well as a national office for the LCR. The old national office at 10 Impasse Guéméné will be used as a Paris headquarters. The building, which has nearly 1,500 square meters of floorspace, is now being rebuilt.

A new Suburban web press is being installed as well as modern typesetting equipment. The press, according to plans, will also be used in the production of books and pamphlets. In addition, a telex has been installed so that articles can be sent in without delay. An Agence France-Presse teletype reports the news directly to the editorial offices.

The paper will be divided up into several different sections: politics, international, social, cultural, and "daily life." In addition, the paper will feature contributions from other political groups in France.

An article in the November 14, 1975, *Rouge* by Ploech, one of the leaders of the LCR, discussed this aspect of the paper under the heading "A Permanent Debate":

While firmly setting forth our political point of view, we will open up our columns broadly to those who do not hold the same kind of revolutionary opinions as we. . .

What is more, the desire for unity on the part of those involved in struggles is becoming stronger and stronger. This is a deeply felt need. As revolutionary crises draw near, sectarian quarrels seem if not outworn at least out of date. Debates, polemics, yes. The scope of the problems justifies that. However, staying huddled up in a defensive position, with only your teeth and claws exposed—the time is passed for that! . . . We decided in advance to make space available regularly in the paper for other currents to express their point of view. Every organization that identifies with the working class can present its positions in open discussion columns that will be real forums of debate and not cynically laid traps.

The first issue of the new daily carried a front-page article on the results of the previous day's cantonal elections in France. Two pages in the culture section reviewed a new film and carried the day's television listings. Other sections included articles on psychiatry, a government-run home for women that resembles a prison, a government project to reform the French



First issue of "Daily Rouge."

educational system, and coverage of a series of strikes of public employees.

Of particular interest was a full-page interview with Leonid Plyushch, the Marxist Ukrainian mathematician recently released from a Russian "psychiatric hospital." A message of greetings to the daily *Rouge* from Rohan Wijeweera and Lionel Bopege was also printed. Wijeweera was the leader of the mass student revolt in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) in 1971 and is still being held in prison.

The launching of a daily is a big step forward for the French Trotskyists. During the presidential election campaign in 1974, in which Alain Krivine ran as the candidate of the LCR, *Rouge* was published on a daily basis for about three weeks. This was the first time that the Trotskyist movement had been able to publish a daily paper in France.

The fact that *Rouge* has moved to publication on a daily basis did not pass unnoticed in the bourgeois press. The March 14-15 *Le Monde*, for instance, reported the event under the succinct heading: "Rouge Wants to Be the Daily of the Whole Far Left." *Le Monde* ought to have added that its chances for success in the enterprise are very good. □

American CP Squirms Over Admissions of French Cousins

By David Frankel



BREZHNEV: "... a piercing laser beam of light."

It is doubtful that anyone outside of a handful of specialists in the 500,000-member French Communist party pays any attention to the decisions of the American CP. The American Stalinists have not even the shadow of a mass base, and there is little that they can say or do that would be likely to have the slightest effect on the French CP.

Unfortunately for the American Stalinists, the reverse does not hold true. They are very much affected by the actions of the mass Communist parties in Western Europe. The recent decisions of the French CP in particular have proved troublesome.

On the one hand, the American CP has consistently argued that the reports about bureaucratic repression in the Soviet Union are rightist fabrications and slander, and that any repression of dissidents that does occur there is justified by the need to defend the Soviet state against imperialist-inspired counterrevolution.

How can this argument be squared with the declarations of French CP leader Georges Marchais at his party's congress early in February? "Paris Red Charges Soviet Repression," was the way the *New York Times* headlined its front-page article on Marchais's opening speech to the congress. It quoted Marchais as saying:

"We cannot accept in effect that the Communist ideal, whose object is the

happiness of man and for which we ask the workers to fight, should be stained by unjust and unjustifiable acts. Such acts are in no way an obligatory consequence of socialism."

Marchais referred to "repressive measures that infringe on freedom of opinion, expression or creativity," leaving little doubt in the minds of most observers that he was including the Soviet Union among the places where such infringements occur. These statements followed a cautiously worded condemnation of the treatment of Leonid Plyushch, the Ukrainian mathematician who was imprisoned in a mental asylum because of his political views.

Two articles in *Intercontinental Press* (March 8, p. 355, and March 22, p. 448) have already dealt with the new-found concern for democracy claimed by the French Stalinist leaders. Their statements were merely vote-getting declarations that did not change the basic relationship between the French Stalinists and the bureaucratic caste in the USSR.

The American CP has no basis for existence except as a defender of the Soviet bureaucracy whose job is to translate the Kremlin line into English. The French Stalinist leaders, in contrast, are obliged to take their own mass base into account; they walk a tightrope between the demands of the Kremlin and the pressure of the workers who follow them.

All this, however, is cold comfort for the American Stalinists. They cannot read the French CP out of the Stalinist movement—the Kremlin itself has been careful to maintain amicable relations with the French CP. At the same time, the American Stalinists are in a position of hearing rhetoric from a "fraternal party" that would earn anyone else a denunciation as a counterrevolutionary agent of imperialism.

Stalinists Resort to Allegories

The statements by Marchais critical of the suppression of human rights in the Soviet Union have been reported throughout the world and have been the subject of considerable discussion both in the capitalist press and in the working-class movement. But the American CP has not yet reported either Marchais's criticisms or the discussion they touched off.

Instead, the American Stalinists have turned to Aesopian allegories to convey their thoughts. For example, the February

14 *Daily World*, the CP newspaper, while remaining silent itself about the international stir created by the French CP congress, published an article on the Belgian CP that said, "The Communist Party of Belgium (CPB) announced last week that it was not going to knuckle under to the increasing anti-Soviet tirades from the ruling circles of this industrial country, neighboring France."

Two days earlier, in its first mention of the French CP congress, the *Daily World* printed the greetings given to the congress by the representative of the American CP. He told the French delegates:

"We say to those in our country who would show concern for freedom and who even talk of morality to look homeward where an outworn capitalism still imprisons its 'dissidents'—as it tried to do with Angela Davis. . . ."

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the American CP would prefer its French cothinkers to follow the model set by the Belgian CP, or, better yet, by the American CP.

The dilemma of the American CP comes through clearly in an article by Mike Zagarell in the March 6 issue of the *Daily World*. Zagarell, in a polemic against the currently pro-Maoist *Guardian* newspaper, says of the *Guardian*:

... it attempts to recapture the illusion of a revolutionary position by focusing criticism on positions of the French Communist Party.

In its article the *Guardian* criticizes the French C.P. for "reformism." It says, "No less important to the ruling class are assurances that all ties to Moscow have been severed. The Italian C.P. under the heading of "historic compromise," has long since undertaken what must be admitted to be a very credible attempt to convince everyone of its reformist good faith. The French CP, however, has been much slower in publicly accentuating and implementing its reformist character. It has been slower in developing general criticism of Soviet society."

The *Guardian* may try now to repaint its rusted image with new paint, but the facts remain. If the French Communists are revisionist because they sever ties with the Soviet Union, and develop attacks on Soviet life, what is the *Guardian*?

After all, the *Guardian* has repeated every bourgeois lie about the Soviet Union.

And what about the French CP? Are they "revisionist because they sever ties with the Soviet Union, and develop attacks on Soviet life"? Zagarell does not say.

In their greetings to the French CP congress, the American Stalinists reminded the French of how such problems

were dealt with in the good old days. "In the bitter but victorious struggle against nazi fascism, the French Communists rejected any and all revisionist theories. . . . We gratefully recall the help given our Party by the venerated Communist leader, Jacques Duclos, whose famous 1945 article in *Cahiers du Communisme* contributed to the restoration of Marxism-Leninism as our guiding principles."

Only those familiar with the history of the so-called Duclos letter can fully appreciate its evocation by the American CP, which today would dearly like to invoke its own version of the Duclos letter against the French Stalinists. The 7,600-word open letter, titled "On the Dissolution of the Communist Party of the United States," appeared in the May 24, 1945, issue of the *Daily Worker*, and was the signal for the ouster of Earl Browder, who had headed the American CP for fifteen years.

Browder a Scapegoat

The Duclos letter claimed that "one is witnessing a notorious revision of Marxism on the part of Browder and his supporters, a revision which is expressed in the concept of a long-term class peace in the U.S., of the possibility of the suppression of the class struggle in the postwar period and of establishment of harmony between labor and capital."

This description of the political line followed by the CP under Browder was completely accurate. But this was not a policy developed independently by the American CP or by Browder, neither one of which had any independent ideas. This was Stalin's policy, and it was followed by



DUCLOS: One poison-pen letter and Earl Browder bit the dust.

every Communist party in the world.

In the Soviet Union itself, a dispatch in the April 2, 1945, *New York Times* reported—nearly two months before the Duclos letter was published—"a sweeping change is being made . . . in Marxist economic dogmas as they have been officially taught in the schools, the press, on the platform and radio. Marx's theory of the exploitation of the proletariat is completely revised and capitalism is declared to be a 'progressive' and not a 'backward' system."

Stalin's problem was that the war was coming to an end, and a shift in emphasis was needed. Browder was used as a scapegoat, and the Duclos letter—which came straight from the Kremlin—was the signal for the shift.

The dumping of Browder was meant as a warning to the capitalist rulers that if the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was broken, the Communist parties would go into opposition. At the same time, the Stalinists promised that their wartime support would be continued if there were no change in policy toward the USSR.

The resolution of the American CP adopted after the appearance of the Duclos letter said: "It is imperative that the American people resolutely support every effort of the Truman administration to carry forward Roosevelt's program for victory, peace, democracy and 60 million jobs."

The immediate task was to "continue uninterrupted war production and uphold labor's no-strike pledge for the duration."

James P. Cannon, the founder of American Trotskyism, discussed the downfall of Browder in an August 1945 speech reprinted in his book *Speeches for Socialism*. Cannon said:


The very same people who spoke so devotedly in echo of Browder in 1944 said the exact opposite in 1945. All, without exception, denounced Browder as a revisionist of Marxism, as a peddler of bourgeois ideas, etc. And Browder, who had unanimous support in May of 1944, had not a single vote in July of 1945.

Now, what kind of a movement is it and what kind of leaders are they who can be unanimously elected one year and unanimously rejected the following year without any change on their part whatsoever? That is the type of leader who is not elected, but is appointed from above. Such people are all the same type; they are fit to run a bureaucratic machine but never to lead a real struggle. . . .

These leaders have no personal authority, no independence. When Stalin wishes to depose one of them as a scapegoat, it is not necessary to do more than send a letter, a note, and the job is completed.

This is the organizational and political tradition that the American CP appeals to and holds up as a model in its greetings to the French Stalinists.

As was to be expected, the French Stalinists have ignored the squirming of their cousins in the United States. In fact, at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the Soviet



Militant

HALL: Wins "one of the most rousing ovations accorded a guest speaker" at Moscow show.

CP, which opened in Moscow at the end of February, the French, Italian, and British Communist party representatives restated their supposed commitment to democracy and independence from the Kremlin.

Gus Hall Wins 'Rousing Ovation'

Gus Hall, the general secretary of the American CP and a leader in the tradition of Browder, rose at the March 1 session of the congress to answer the Stalinist leaders who had not been deferential enough to the Kremlin bureaucrats. Hall, who was awarded with "one of the most rousing ovations accorded a guest speaker" according to the March 4 *Daily World*, explained how, "Like a piercing laser beam of light, the basic theme of Marxism-Leninism runs through the very sober, profound and deeply penetrating assessments and projections of Comrade Brezhnev's report."

Hall is the American CP's presidential candidate, but he had nothing to say about the American political scene beyond a few generalities. The attacks on Black rights in Boston and other cities, the changing political outlook of the American working class, the issue of discriminatory layoffs, the attacks on the right of women to abortion—all this and much more was passed over in silence.

But Hall knew what he was doing—he

was addressing his real constituency, the Stalinist bureaucracy. He said:

In our times, the main ideological pressures of imperialism are in relationship to the socialist world and against the Soviet Union in the first place. . . .

Opportunism breaks through where the ideological pressures of the enemy are the greatest.

Our party has a basic principled position on these matters. We are not going to fight imperialism by their rules. We are not going to use or repeat anti-socialist and anti-Soviet slander to win acceptance, to win respectability or to prove our autonomy.

Much as the Soviet bureaucrats must

have liked Hall's impassioned plea in behalf of their traditional prerogatives, they know that the unconditional backing of the American CP is no substitute for the mass power of the French and Italian parties. Therefore, it appears as if the American CP will just have to live with its dilemma, like it or not. □

Claim April 25 Elections in Portugal Are Endangered

Rise in Strikes Meets With Threats From MFA

By Gerry Foley

The campaign for the April 25 legislative elections in Portugal began in early March under the shadow of reviving workers struggles.

On March 13, nurses went on strike throughout the country. At the same time there was a pharmacists' strike. Transport workers' strikes flared in the major cities. The retail clerks in Oporto went out.

On March 17, the construction workers, who brought the sixth provisional government to the brink of collapse in mid-November when they surrounded the presidential palace to press their demands, threatened to launch another strike on March 22. The objective was to force the government to keep the promises it made during the strike.

At a news conference in Oporto held by the union, one of the journalists raised the question of the political effect of the threatened strike. According to a report in the March 17 *Jornal Novo*, "He pointed out the possibility of a turn to the right resulting from a strike wave in the preelectoral period. The workers present responded that the right turn is the responsibility of the organs of political power, not the workers, whose strike is not aimed at taking power but fighting for better conditions."

The CP-controlled union federation Intersindical at least initially supported the stand of the construction workers. However, the CP denounced the nurses' strike in terms reminiscent of the party's strike-breaking campaign against the postal workers in June 1974.

"The Communist nurses call on their colleagues not to stop work, not to abandon the sick. In this, the Communist nurses are certain that they stand with the overwhelming majority of the profession, which has shown its high level of professional conscientiousness and given a lesson in unity." (*Jornal Novo*, March 17.)

The bosses and government responded to the reviving militancy of the workers by arguing that "peace" on the labor front is needed to assure that the upcoming elections will be held and that the Portuguese

people will be able to make a "free choice."

On March 15, the Council of the Revolution, the supreme body of the ruling Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA—Armed Forces Movement), issued a communiqué saying:

The Council of the Revolution has discussed the present political situation and noted the existence of attempts to destabilize it. In the last analysis, these are aimed at putting in question the elections, which must be a fundamental step forward in building a democratic and socialist society.

In conformity with this, the Council of the Revolution will guarantee the elections for the Assembly of the Republic, using all the instruments at its disposal, including the security and military forces that are now prepared to carry out all tasks assigned to them.

In the face of the present strike wave, which often clearly takes the form of putting pressure on the government, the Council of the Revolution will support the government in applying the strike law. We note in particular that there can be no pay for days on strike.

The antistrike law referred to was issued by the first Gonçalves cabinet in August 1974. It quickly became a dead letter because of the resistance of the workers, in particular the Lisnave shipyard workers, then led by a Maoist group, and the TAP airport workers, then led by the MES (Movimento de Esquerda Socialista—Movement of the Socialist Left), groups that to one degree or another opposed the CP's policy of subordinating labor to the government.

Apparently now, the MFA thinks the government can apply the law. That was the clear meaning of the boasts that the "security and military forces" are now ready for anything.

Such warnings issued by the Council of the Revolution make it clear again who really rules Portugal. The military and the MFA still run the country, despite premature obituaries by impressionistic observers.

The suggestion in the Portuguese bourgeois press, made explicit in the foreign bourgeois papers, is that the CP has

returned to its tactic of using its control of the key industrial unions to pressure the government. This, however, seems to be untrue. In fact, the most important signs point in the other direction—the government is putting pressure on the CP.

After the Gonçalves government fell at the end of August 1975, the CP did shift from opposing strikes toward going along with some worker militancy, even encouraging strikes in some cases. Its aim was to upgrade the importance of its control over the main unions as a bargaining card for recouping some positions in the government.

This two-faced policy was a dangerous one, for the CP itself, and especially for the workers that followed it, since the Stalinists had no intention of waging a determined struggle against the bourgeoisie. When the government maneuvered itself into a position where it could call the bluff on November 25, the Stalinists immediately gave in.

The CP thus lost on both fronts. The government used the pressure tactics of the Stalinists to brand them as subversive and to force them to make abject demonstrations of loyalty. At the same time, they became discredited in the eyes of the followers they had won by cultivating the image of a "tough" opponent of capitalism and the bosses.

Since November 25-27, all signs point to a precipitous decline in CP strength. All the published polls predict that its vote now will be no more than half what it got in the April 1975 Constituent Assembly elections, which themselves marked a grave defeat. Such a vote, 6%, would in fact represent a stunning reverse for the party that emerged from the long years of the Salazarist dictatorship as the only national political organization of any strength, which for nearly two years came close to being the dominant political force in the country.

It is possible that the CP will be forced to take at least a somewhat more militant position on the union front to survive.

However, its stand in the nurses' strike points toward a continuation of the post-November 25 servility.

In the CP national conference March 14 in Lisbon, General Secretary Alvaro Cunhal set a pretty tame tone. *Jornal Novo* summarized his remarks:

Considering that the present trend is toward "division of the right and regroupment of the left," the Communist leader said that "the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party] supports all efforts to establish and maintain discipline in the armed forces aimed at strengthening its morale and determination to defend democracy and national independence." In passing, he said "the spirit of April 25 is still strong enough in the armed forces to stand off the reviving spirit of May 28 [the date of the 1926 coup d'état that laid the basis for the Salazar regime]."

Cunhal said the most important thing was to achieve "unity of the democratic forces, especially the Communist and Socialist parties."

The second objective, Cunhal said, would be "to make possible a democratic majority in the Legislative Assembly." He explained that no party would get the majority in the elections, and so the SP had to "define clearly before the elections what kind of alliances it intends to make afterward."

The "conclusions of the discussion were read by one of the CP's candidates, António Borge: "All Portuguese who want to live in freedom should assure by their votes that a government will be formed that by its composition and policy will express the alliance of the people and the MFA, the unity of the democratic forces and the armed forces. . . ."

Borge launched a special attack on the smaller groups that try to appeal to those looking for an alternative to the left of the CP: "A divisive vote is a wasted vote. . . . The objective of the pseudorevolutionary grouplets participating in the elections is to spread confusion and anti-Communism, and to block a massive vote for the PCP."

As the government has stepped up its pressure, the Stalinists have moved toward more and more abject positions, even praising the threats that are obviously aimed against them, claiming that of course what the MFA has in mind is the "antidemocratic right."

For example, the Soviet press agency Tass made the following comment on the March 15 statement by the Council of the Revolution:

This stern warning . . . to the rightist forces was in essence a response to a call by the Portuguese Communist party for "guaranteeing that all Portuguese citizens throughout the country will be able to exercise their democratic civil rights."

In a March 21 dispatch from Lisbon, *Pravda's* correspondent V. Yermakov supported the government's attacks on the workers who are resisting sharp cuts in their standard of living:

Now a new feature has appeared in the activities of reaction. Portugal is being swept by a powerful strike wave. Strikes have spread to a series of factories, city transport services, hospitals and clinics. The rightists and Maoist extremists, working in collusion, are trying to exploit this struggle for provocative ends. Their main objective, it was pointed out by the [March 15] statement by the Council of the Revolution, is to destabilize the situation, sow panic and unrest, and obstruct the election campaign.

Yermakov quoted a statement by the PCP that said essentially the same thing: "The PCP supports the just struggle of the workers, but at the same time it warns that the most reactionary forces are trying to make some strata of workers into an instrument for destroying stability. . . ."

A March 22 Tass dispatch from Lisbon noted that the construction workers' strike scheduled to begin that day had been called off:

This decision was made after a discussion between President Costa Gomes and representatives of the union. The president expressed concern about the fact that "certain forces, which are not interested in the development of the revolutionary process, might exploit the just struggle of the workers for their own ends."

The SP leaders have rejected the idea of a coalition with the CP, raising the perspective of an SP government. On March 5 the SP leadership released a poll indicating that 25% of the voters favored their party as against 10% for the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—Democratic People's party, the liberal-bourgeois party, which has been moving to the right), 7% for the Centro Democrático Social (CDS—Social Democratic Center, the right-wing bourgeois party), 6% for the CP, and 48% undecided. Thus, if the undecided sector broke down the same way, the SP would win an overall majority. However, other polls have shown the PPD displacing the SP as the largest party.

Most observers so far have assumed that the SP will get less than the 38% it won in April 1975. Its vote is expected to drop as a result of disillusion with the popular-front governments that have ruled under MFA tutelage.

The CDS, and to a lesser extent, the PPD, are clearly hoping to gain from the declining prestige of the MFA's "socialist regime." In a CDS rally March 14 in Elvas in Alentejo, where it had almost no support in the last elections, CDS leader Freitas do Amaral said: "The CDS is the only alternative, because everything else would only mean continuing an experiment that has already failed."

The SP leaders' strategy aims at capturing the "center" of the electoral arena and emerging as the party of "law and order with progress." That explains its choice of "moderate" candidates, hailed in the March 12 issue of *Jornal Novo*, which became the paper of the Portuguese Confederation of Industrialists after the ouster

in early February of its left Social Democratic editor.

The SP slates for the Assembly of the Republic reveal an unquestionable victory for the most moderate forces in this political formation and represent a clear reaffirmation of the dominant line—consolidation of democracy, social stabilization, overcoming the economic crisis, moving closer to Europe, rejection of leftist demagoguery and links with groups such as the PCP and similar formations.

This option for European-style socialism was reflected, for example, in the cold shoulder given men like Kalidas Barreto, Amarino Sabino, or Teles Grilo, who have distinguished themselves recently by workerist speeches . . . that were quite out of harmony with the party's official line and compromised it in the eyes of the electorate.

The conference of European Socialist parties held in Oporto March 13-14 fit into this perspective. It enabled SP leader Mário Soares to hobnob conspicuously with such "respectable" politicians as the West German and Scandinavian SP leaders, figures also who presumably could help Portugal get needed credits and trading advantages, as well as secure better conditions for Portuguese emigrant workers.

The SP's Oporto spectacular evidently upset its rival for the "progressive center," the PPD. The bourgeois liberals denounced the European SPs for "interference in Portugal's internal affairs." At a rally in the northern city, according to a dispatch in the March 15 *New York Times*, PPD leader Francisco Sá Carneiro "devoted most of his speech to an angry attack on the Socialists, calling them Marxists and warning that they would form a coalition with the Communists."

While a CP-SP alliance is obviously to the distaste of the political representatives of the bourgeoisie, neither the CP nor the SP has such a perspective. The SP specifically rejects it. The CP calls for "unity" in very general terms but has done nothing concrete to facilitate it—quite the contrary.

In SP circles the strongest pressure for working-class unity has come from union leaders such as those who met in Aveiro at the end of January and issued a call for a united democratic trade-union movement.

In its March 6 issue *Jornal Novo* gave generous space to CP Intersindical leaders to respond. They concentrated on attacking the proposal to guarantee the right of tendencies, explaining that it was not needed, since "workers have common objectives" and "in the workers movement . . . there is no such thing as majorities and minorities."

The need for class unity, however, will be felt more and more acutely by workers trying to defend themselves from the capitalist offensive. But for the moment, only the Portuguese Trotskyists defend this principle. They are running candidates this time in all election districts, and a campaign concentrating on this theme will certainly have an important impact. □

The Common Market—At a Snail's Pace

By Ernest Mandel

[The following article appeared in the February 19 issue of *Inprecor*, the fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

Ever since its creation, it has been clear that the Common Market represented a transitional stage in the development of West European imperialism. Previously, three successive attempts at "European union" under the hegemony of a single imperialist power—Germany during the period 1900-1918; France on the basis of the Treaty of Versailles during the 1920s, and Germany again during the period 1938-1944—had ended in failure. West European capital then tried to bring this union about no longer on the basis of the military-political domination of a single power, but instead through an alliance of the most important powers.

The *objective necessity* for this union derives from the growing internationalization of the productive forces, that is, the growing contradiction between the maintenance of the national bourgeois state on the one hand and the degree of development of the productive forces, the productive capacity of the large enterprises, the market for their production, and the objective socialization (technical interdependence) of the life of these enterprises beyond national frontiers on the other hand.

The *objective difficulty* in overcoming this contradiction within the framework of the capitalist mode of production during its imperialist stage lies in the fact that private property and competition do not permit the essential particular interests of certain groups of capitalists to be sacrificed to the "common interests" of the bourgeois class. As long as the means of production remain the private property of German, French, British, Italian, Belgian, or Dutch bourgeoisies, the "European bourgeoisie" and "European interests" will remain abstractions lacking the slightest real content.

The *objective possibility* of European union on a capitalist basis thus lies precisely in the level of the *international interpenetration of capital*. To the extent that European multinational corporations emerge, corporations that are no longer the exclusive property of capitalists of a particular nationality but are rather the common property of Dutch and German,

Italian and British, French and Belgian capitalists (provided capitalists of other nationalities are not excessively involved), to that extent the weight of the common interest grows in comparison with that of the particular interest within the European bourgeoisie. Then the concepts of "European capital" and "European bourgeoisie" take on a concrete content.

The EEC appeared when the "European multinationals" were still not very numerous and when their importance was still limited. Since then, their number and weight have increased, but much more slowly than had been predicted by the advocates of a West European federal state. Hence, on the eve of the general economic recession of 1974-75, the EEC had still not gone beyond this intermediary stage.

Federation of States or Federal State?

Nevertheless, during the stage of late capitalism, the state plays an increasingly important role in capitalist economic life. The illusion that the great monopolies, including the multinationals, "no longer need the state" has validity only during periods of rapid economic growth and boom. During an acute economic depression these gentlemen hold out their hands for state subsidies and orders just like the less important firms. (Examples: AKZO, ACEC/Empain and ACEC/Westinghouse in Belgium, British Leyland and Chrysler in Britain, Rhône-Poulenc in France.) Deciding *which* state will come to the aid of *which* monopolies in *what forms* and with *what consequences* is and will remain a decisive question in the context of the international competition that reigns among big capital.

This is also true of the inherent tendency of late capitalism to orient itself toward greater economic cooperation and more active programming between the state and the monopolies. The multinational monopolies have no interest in national economic planning. They could suffer from national protectionism. Rather, what they want is programming and protectionism applied over a broader geographical range.

Thus, for several years now the EEC has found itself midway between an economically strong "national" state and an economically strong sovereign federal state.

But such a weak and loose federation is

not very effective economically and is not in position to intervene on a grand scale. Hence the alternative: Either there is a return to national protectionism in time of crisis or else there is forward motion toward a European federal state.

The present recession has thrown light on this dilemma. But it has not resolved it. The Tindemands report (requested of the Belgian prime minister in 1974 by his eight European colleagues of the EEC) is more a confession of impotence than a clear choice between growing disintegration or definitive consolidation of the EEC.*

Originally, the EEC was a customs union, that is, a region of free circulation of commodities. This led to a shift in the location of factories (from which Belgian capitalism profited extensively during the 1960s), which gave rise to the desire for monetary and economic union.

The six initial members of the EEC (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) wanted to bring this union about by 1980. A common currency (which would serve as the basis of the international monetary system alongside or even in place of the dollar), a common European budget, and a common credit policy would inevitably lead to a common rate of inflation, a common incomes system, and a common policy on investment, employment, and public works. This would thus lead to a common government and a federal state. That was the road that was and still is recommended by the bourgeois federalists and the reformists of the workers movement.

The major precondition for realizing such a project is *the increasing homogenization of economic development*: The growth rates of production, the rates of inflation, and the increases in incomes would have to be comparable in the various countries. During the 1960s this seemed to be increasingly the case. Today, however, it is not at all true of the "nine" (the original six plus Britain, Ireland, Denmark).

Britain and Italy are experiencing much higher rates of inflation, a growing decline in real wages and living standards, and a much lower growth in productivity and industrial production than West Germany, France, and the Benelux countries. Denmark and Ireland are also more fragile economically. This has eliminated the possibility of short- or medium-term monetary union, unless Germany, and to a lesser extent France and the Benelux countries, were prepared to finance the balance of payments deficit of Britain and Italy on a grand scale (among other ways through the creation of a common reserve

*The report, issued January 7, emphasized "realistic and realizable" improvements in cooperation on economic, political, and military matters, rather than moves toward economic and political union.—IP

of gold and money for a common West European currency).

The possibility of a West European monetary union disappeared with the *nyet* of Helmut Schmidt, with the lack of audacity of the West German bourgeoisie in this domain; this bourgeoisie did not dare to propose common gold and currency reserves in exchange for the French, British, and Italian capitalists' giving up their financial and economic sovereignty.

As of 1974 the only remaining solution was a combination of a customs union for the "nine" and an increasingly tight monetary union of the "five rich members" (West Germany, France, the Benelux countries). This intermediary "solution"—*semidisintegration and semiconsolidation*—was advocated by Willy Brandt in Paris.

Since then, it experienced a beginning of realization when the French franc was again added to the monetary "snake," in which the various currencies fluctuate together around the German mark. *The Tindemans report translates this pragmatic intermediary "solution" into practical language.* As was pointed out by the January 15 issue of the German Social Democratic newspaper *Vorwärts*, this report could just as well have been written by Helmut Schmidt himself.

All the rest is just ideological camouflage. Granted, there are passages in the report favoring monetary and general economic union (but the when and how remains vague). In addition, the British bourgeoisie is furious. Granted, there is still an allusion to a European parliament that would have the right of initiative, which disturbs the Gaullists. Granted, there is also a plea for a common foreign policy by the "nine," which soothes these same Gaullists. But all this is just window dressing. What is fundamental is that there is no move toward an economic union. Nor is there any desire to regress to the stage of national protectionism. Thus, things remain in midstream, with the addition of attempts to limit the damages caused by this immobilism. That is the deeper significance of the Tindemans report.

A Real Dilemma

This is a *real dilemma* and not a matter of misunderstanding or indecision on the part of the West European bourgeoisie. The crisis in Britain and Italy is too serious for the German and French bourgeoisies to pay the price of a short-term monetary and economic integration. And this crisis threatens to infect France and Belgium at any moment, which would make the position of the German bourgeoisie, Europe's "rich uncle," untenable. On the other hand, a breakup of the EEC would be a real catastrophe for the West German and Benelux economies. If only because of the loss of markets, which

would throw these economies into a crisis similar to that of Britain. Thus, the bourgeoisie cannot return to the policy of the 1930s. They therefore cling to pragmatic intermediary "solutions"; they try to hold on to what they've got and to prevent the "positive" results of the first phase of the EEC from being lost (which is a very real danger if the coming social and political crisis or the economic recession in Italy, Britain, and France proves to be more serious than those of 1968-69 and 1974-75). No more than that can be done. "Après nous, le deluge," or, as Keynes said

even more clearly, "In the long run, we're all dead."

The working class must have no illusions in the results of this pragmatism. We will vanquish these remnants of the nationalism of the European states, which maintain private property in the means of production and an economy rooted in the monopolies' search for profits.

The United States of Europe will mean full employment and will eliminate exploitation and oppression, for they will be the Socialist United States of Europe. □

Doors Closed to Victims of Rightist Terror

Washington's 'Selective Policy' for Refugees

White House policy on admitting political refugees was examined in a feature article by Barbara Koepfel in the February 22 *Los Angeles Times*, prompted by the controversy over the resettlement of pro-American Vietnamese in the United States.

The conclusion she came to was that justice or humanitarianism played little role in government decisions in this field. The main consideration was political.

"The figures from the last few decades speak for themselves," she said. "Approximately 800,000 Eastern Europeans were accepted after World War II as they ran from communism. But before the war—at the height of Hitler's persecution of the Jews, trade unionists and socialists—only 19,500 out of 139,000 who applied in 1938 were admitted. That figure was 10,000 below the quota set for German immigrants. And when a bill was introduced in Congress in 1939 to admit 20,000 German Jewish children over the next two years, it died in committee."

About 500 Haitians who fled to Florida in small boats from the notoriously brutal, repressive regime of Duvalier were jailed in detention centers. They were given summary hearings before immigration authorities in which the translator was linked to Duvalier's secret police.

In contrast with the government gushing over the tens of thousands of refugees who linked their fate to the American army and its puppet regime in Vietnam, eight Vietnamese students who protested against the undemocratic character of the Thieu regime were denied asylum in the United States. They were saved from deportation to their homeland and certain imprisonment or death only by the sudden collapse of the puppet government.

"Even more dramatic than the Haitian or South Vietnamese example is the case

of Chile," Koepfel said. In the wake of the bloody rightist coup of September 1973, when tens of thousands of Chilean workers, peasants, and students were slaughtered or penned up in concentration camps, the foreign embassies in Santiago opened their doors to refugees. Thousands of persons escaped death by this avenue, and every major West European country accepted thousands of refugees from the bloodthirsty Pinochet dictatorship.

"The United States was more cautious however. None were taken into the U.S. Embassy: This country was the only one which did not offer protection. When they asked for asylum in the United States, they were told 'we don't have the machinery' to deal with emergencies and were advised to go through normal channels. Since the coup, only 70 Chileans have worked their way into this country on regular immigrant visas and 19 foreign nationals [resident in Chile at the time of the coup] came on a case-by-case basis."

Special provisions for waiving red tape and admitting whole groups of political refugees were passed by Congress in 1952. These have been used to admit refugees from East Germany, 29,000 Dutch nationals and planters who fled in the face of rising nationalism in Indonesia, and 650,000 anti-Communist Cubans. But they have never been invoked to admit refugees from rightist repression.

In the case of the Chileans, Koepfel quoted one source as saying that given the U.S. interest in the overthrow of the Allende government, "it is obvious that it is not going to fling its doors open to the same people it helped unseat."

That is, having helped to set up a concentration camp regime, Washington does not intend to aid any escapees. In fact, the U.S. Immigration department stands guard on the other side of the barbed wire. □

Uruguayan Army Officer Describes Torture Practices



Amnesty International



Amnesty International

The "flag" and the "trestle." Two secret photos of torture sessions smuggled out by Uruguayan army officer.

"I am an officer in the Uruguayan army," began a letter circulated by Amnesty International* March 1. "If I have reached the decision, which for me is very important, to write this letter, it is for only one reason: the nausea I feel throughout everything I have the misfortune to witness and in some cases—worse still—to participate in. It has become intolerable for me. . . .

"I accompany this letter with two photographic proofs of my statements," the officer continued. "The two were taken in one of the many private homes used for torture and interrogation of political prisoners. They show two forms of torture—one called 'the flag' and one called 'the trestle.' . . .

"The photograph of the flag was taken after the prisoner had been hanging three hours in the sun on a day when the temperature was above 84 degrees. . . ."

The officer stated that he had "hundreds of proofs, of painful personal experiences" of the torture inflicted "systematically" against political and trade-union activists

in Uruguay, torture "carried out almost everywhere," and "not only [by] the army," but also by "the police, the navy, and the air force."

"Women are a separate question," he said. "Officers, noncommissioned officers, and troops comment with elation about the arrival of young women prisoners. Some of them even come in on their days off to participate in the interrogations. . . ."

One of the more common tortures suffered by political prisoners in Uruguay is "the submarine." It was described in a March 10 article in the *New York Times*:

"In Uruguayan prisons there are two kinds of 'submarine.' Both are forms of torture.

"When the 'wet submarine' method is used, the prisoner is immersed, head down, in a tank of putrid water polluted by vomit, excrement and blood. He is suspended until he has almost drowned, a process that is often repeated for hours on end.

"Sometimes it is fatal, as in the case of Alvaro Balbi, a 32-year-old medical student with four children. His mutilated body was delivered to his pregnant wife on July 31, 1975, two days after his arrest, with the official explanation that he, a healthy man with no medical history, had

succumbed to an asthma attack.

"The 'dry submarine' threatens slow suffocation by tying a plastic bag tightly over the victim's head. Nibya Sabalsagaray, a 24-year-old teacher in Montevideo, died that way on June 29, 1974, only ten hours after her arrest. Her relatives were told that she committed suicide."

If prisoners survive the torture, they face prison condition such as those described in the February issue of *Boletín de la Resistencia*, a monthly publication on Uruguay issued in Buenos Aires:

- In the military hospital located on Montevideo's Avenida 8 de Octubre there is a ward for "special sick persons." These are hospitalized prisoners. They are not allowed to have visits from family members or attorneys while in the military hospital. The only exception is if they enter a comatose state, in which case the family is summoned by the hospital administration. Cited is the case of María Elena Curbelo de Mirza, who is paralyzed as a result of a spinal disease. She has been held incommunicado in the military hospital since 1972.

- At the Punta Rieles military jail, where the majority of women political prisoners are held, a woman police officer

* Theobald's Road, London WC1X 8SP, England.

is stationed in each cell to control and monitor the behavior of each prisoner.

In addition, this prison has a special section for prisoners who are considered "dangerous." Two women—Ivonne Trias and Beatriz Stataquis—have been held there in isolation since November 1975 because they refused to make boxes designed to transport munitions for the Uruguayan army.

• A law has been passed establishing forced labor in the prisons for both those

who have been tried and those awaiting trial. Prisoners have been forced to work twelve-hour shifts loading fish in the port of Montevideo.

Amnesty International reports that at least 6,000 persons—about one in every 450 of Uruguay's 2.5 million people—is a political prisoner. During the last few years, one in every 50 persons has been subjected to interrogation, arrest, imprisonment, or torture. □

'They Are Murdering Mustafa Dzhemilev'

[The following appeal is being circulated in defense of imprisoned Crimean Tatar Mustafa Dzhemilev, who has been on a hunger strike since June 19, 1975. It was issued at a press conference organized in Moscow December 3, 1975, by dissident communist Pyotr Grigorenko and physicist Andrei Sakharov.]

[The press conference marked Grigorenko's public reentry into the fight for the rights of Crimean Tatars, for which the Stalinist bureaucrats have already forced him to spend five years in a psychiatric hospital-prison. The translation from the Russian is by Hilary Jaeger.]

* * *

To Secretary General of the United Nations Kurt Waldheim.

To the General Assembly of the United Nations.

To everyone who values life and human dignity.

In May 1944, as the Second World War was coming to an end, the Crimean Tatar people were deported from their historic homeland—the Crimea—and brought to the verge of extinction. At the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party, this was defined as genocide—one of the worst crimes against humanity.

One of the principal charges at the Nuremberg trials against the major war criminals was the crime of genocide. The international investigatory organs and the international tribunal itself, which judged these criminals, included representatives from the Soviet Union.

At the same time, those guilty of such crimes in the USSR were not held accountable. And even worse, those who attempt to fight against the vestiges and consequences of this genocide are terrorized in every way possible and condemned on false charges to long terms of imprisonment.

Right now, one of the most active participants in the movement of Crimean Tatars for return to the land of their ancestors, the talented thirty-two-year-old historian and social activist Mustafa Dzhemilev (Abduldzhemil), is being des-

troyed in Omsk prison. A clearly false charge of distributing "slandorous fabrications discrediting the Soviet social and political system" has been raised. In fact, after five months of investigation, the main point of the indictment is a draft of personal notes found in Mustafa's possession, stating that the task of the Crimean Tatar national movement is to struggle for a return to their homeland in strict conformity with the laws of the land.

They are murdering Dzhemilev in order to break this legal movement and frighten the Crimean Tatar people. The judicial proceedings against Mustafa are not only revenge against an honest and courageous

person, but also a provocation aimed against legality in our country and against the principles that all peoples have solemnly promised to observe. We undertake to prove this.

However, it is only possible to prove it to impartial judges. In this case, only a special investigatory commission, made up (equally) of representatives of the authorities as well as of Crimean Tatars, can be impartial. This commission should conduct a public investigation of the case of Mustafa Dzhemilev.

One of us—A. Sakharov—has twice appealed to the secretary general of the United Nations to intervene in the Dzhemilev case. We are today reiterating that call. What is involved here is saving the life of a person who has become a national hero and is defending the principles of national self-determination and equality proclaimed by the statutes of the United Nations.

People of the world and Soviet people above all:

Demand the immediate release of Mustafa! He has been terribly weakened by being on a hunger strike for almost six months, and we fear for his life.

Support the demand for a public investigation of his case!

Zinaida Grigorenko, Reshat Dzhemilev, Andrei Sakharov, Vasfie Khairova (Mustafa's sister), Pyotr Grigorenko. □

Free Desmond Trotter Now!

[On March 18 the Privy Council in London took less than five minutes to reject the appeal against the death sentence handed down to Dominican militant Desmond Trotter. Trotter, arrested two years ago on a frame-up murder charge, will be hanged unless he is granted a reprieve by the governor of Dominica, Sir Louis Cools-Lartigue. More than fifty members of the British Parliament have signed a petition urging such a reprieve.]

[The following statement on the case was issued March 21 by the Desmond Trotter Defence Committee.*]

* * *

Desmond Trotter, political militant and freedom fighter in the Caribbean island of Dominica is now sitting in jail in that island awaiting death by hanging. Trotter, who is now 21 years old, has been associated with all the progressive political developments in that island in recent years. He has been editor of three major journals in succession, each representing a different stage in the struggle for progressive change and national independence. He is a leading member of the Movement for a New Dominica and edited its organ *Twa-vay*.

In February 1974, Trotter was framed

on a murder charge and later convicted by a jury composed exclusively of the land-owning class and their sympathisers on evidence so slender that one British member of Parliament, Stan Newens, and spokesman for a hundred of his colleagues associated with the anti-colonial organization, Liberation, was moved to the conviction that

anyone reading the account of the trial in a dispassionate manner will be struck by the flimsy nature of the evidence on which he (Trotter) was convicted. Not one civilian in Dominica could be found to give evidence against him, and a sixteen-year-old girl brought back from her home in Antigua had to suffice as far as civilian evidence is concerned.

The Desmond Trotter Defence Committee solicits the support of all freedom-loving people in the struggle to save the life of the young political activist by endorsing the demand for Trotter's immediate release from prison, and for an official enquiry into all circumstances surrounding the case, and for an end to all repression and victimization of political dissidents in the island of Dominica. □

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The Struggle of Soviet Jews Against Stalinist Oppression

By David Frankel

[First of two parts]

Since the late 1960s there has been a growing movement of Jews inside the Soviet Union demanding the right to leave the country. The general response of the Stalinist rulers and their supporters has been to denounce those involved as a handful of malcontents and capitalist agents. They label charges that anti-Semitic practices are widespread in the USSR as Zionist slanders.

"Today this campaign has reached unbelievable depths of vilification, slander and outright fabrication," American Communist party theorist Hyman Lumer said in a typical article.¹ Lumer insisted that "in the socialist Soviet Union the Jewish question has been fully solved—a fact which it is most important for us to shout from the rooftops. . . ."

A more accurate view was given by historian William Korey, who said in the March 1972 *Slavic Review*:

Classical Marxism, in contrast to various forms of utopian socialism, anarchism, and syndicalism, treated anti-Semitism with utter contempt. The German Social Democratic leader August Bebel summed up the prevailing attitude of classical Marxism when he dubbed anti-Semitism the "socialism of fools." Lenin was even sharper in his denunciation: "Shame on those who foment hatred towards the Jews," he cried in March 1919. Yet fifty-five years after the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet Union has become the principal exemplar of the "socialism of fools," with anti-Jewish discrimination practiced in various areas of politics and employment and in the ethnic-cultural field.²

How did this shift come about? What conclusions should be drawn from the record of the Soviet regime? Is the caricature of socialism to be seen under the Stalinist bureaucrats really the logical outcome of the Bolshevik revolution, as both Stalinists and capitalists claim?

Other questions are also posed. What is the relationship between the Zionist oppression of the Palestinian people and the movement of Soviet Jews demanding the right to emigrate from the USSR? What attitude should revolutionists take to the demand for freedom of emigration in light of this? What can be done to end the oppression of Jews in the USSR?

1. Hyman Lumer, "Zionist Slander of a Great Achievement," *Daily World* (December 30, 1972).

2. William Korey, "The Origins and Development of Soviet Anti-Semitism: An Analysis," *Slavic Review* (March 1972), p. 111.

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to go back and look at the actual situation of the Jews under the tsars, under the Bolsheviks, and under Stalinism.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century more than half the Jewish population in the world lived in the Russian Empire as a result of its westward expansion under Catherine the Great. The legacy of tsarist barbarism is the background against which the achievements of the Russian revolution and the later degeneration of the Soviet regime must be judged.

The Great Russians were a minority in the Russian Empire, and the tsars followed a policy of forcible assimilation of the subject nationalities. They were particularly hostile to the Jews because tsarism leaned on the ideological prop of the Orthodox Church and its concept of "Holy Russia."

Furthermore, the traditional identification of the Jews with commerce enabled the tsarist rulers to use them as scapegoats for the economic problems caused by the decay of the old feudal system. The mass of the Jewish population was rapidly being converted into impoverished townspeople employed—if at all—as artisans or in small workshops. But a large enough percentage remained in their traditional economic role of middlemen to give the charge of Jewish profiteering some plausibility in the eyes of the peasantry.

Discrimination and Pogroms

In 1804 the Jews were forbidden to settle in the central provinces of the Russian Empire. This was the origin of the infamous Pale of Settlement. Periodically new cities or provinces would be closed to Jewish residence, and entire Jewish populations forcibly uprooted and deported to the Pale.

In 1827 Tsar Nicholas I decreed a special system of military conscription directed against the Jews. Youths aged twelve to eighteen years were liable to be drafted and taken from their families and villages for up to six years of military education, followed by an additional twenty-five years of military service. Those over eighteen were subject only to the twenty-five year term of service.

Confinement in the Pale and discriminatory taxes helped to pauperize the Jewish population. In the realm of housing, for example, Jews in Kiev Province in the 1840s averaged one-third the living

space of their Christian counterparts. By the end of the 1800s it was estimated that between 30 and 35 percent of the Jewish population of the Pale depended on charity provided by Jewish welfare institutions in order to live.

However, the pogrom, that hallmark of tsarist anti-Semitism, did not become a regular factor in Jewish life until the 1870s. The assassination of Tsar Alexander II in March 1881 ushered in the worst period of persecution against the Jews. This began with a wave of pogroms, mainly in the Ukraine, in the spring and summer of 1881. Unlike the pogroms that had taken place in the past, these were organized and regulated by the government.

In May 1882 Alexander III, the new tsar, prohibited Jews from settling outside of cities and towns even within the Pale of Settlement and from buying or leasing property located outside of cities and towns. In 1887 the infamous quota system was established. This specified that inside the Pale, where Jews comprised 30 to 80 percent of the urban population, they could be admitted to schools only so long as they did not exceed 10 percent of the student population. The quota beyond the Pale was 5 percent, and in the provincial capitals it was set at 3 percent.

The same year Jews were barred from governmental service and the legal professions. By the end of 1887 the tsarist legal code contained 650 laws specifically discriminating against Jews. Conditions for the Jewish population—estimated at about 5 percent of the total population of the Russian Empire—continued to worsen right up until the overthrow of the tsar in 1917. In 1901, for example, the quota for Jewish students was decreased to 7 percent inside the Pale, 3 percent outside of it, and 2 percent in the capitals.

Religion, Emigration, or Revolution

Some Jews, especially among the wealthier layers of the population, attempted to solve their problem by assimilating into tsarist society. But the great majority of Jews reacted in other ways to the savage policy of the tsars.

The largest section simply retreated deeper into religious mysticism, while trying to survive as best they could. In his *History of the Jews* Simon Dubnov describes the narrow, repressive religious

system in which children as young as thirteen were married.

A pupil of the *kheder* often became a husband and father while continuing his studies in the elementary school or the Talmudical academy, finding himself under the threefold supervision of his father, father-in-law, and teacher. . . . The young people toiled under the burden of family cares or the struggle for subsistence. The ancient discipline broke every spirit of protest, and each flicker of youth. The smallest digression from ritual and tradition, and the least "heresy"—that is, wearing of a short-cut coat or a trimmed beard—was severely punished. Reading of a book of the Jewish enlightenment, and particularly of a book in an alien tongue, was penalized.³

Another sector of the Jewish population simply picked up and left. The pogroms of 1881, added to the already unbearable economic difficulties, unleashed a flood of Jewish emigration. Between 1881 and 1914 more than two million Jews left Russia.

Nevertheless, the Jewish population in the Pale continued to grow, and an increasing number of young Jews turned to the revolutionary movement.

The Narodnik, or populist, movement of the 1870s had been based almost entirely on the intelligentsia, particularly the student youth. The Jews did not play an especially big role in this movement. But the decision of the tsarist regime to blame the assassination of Alexander II on the Jews and to distract the attention of the masses with pogroms resulted in a change. When the revolutionary struggle began to revive in the 1890s, following the reaction of the previous decade, Jewish organizations and individuals were in the forefront.

The main organization in this radicalization was the Jewish Bund—the General Jewish Workers Union in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia. In a series of lectures on the history of the Bolshevik party, given in 1923, the Bolshevik leader Gregory Zinoviev described the role of the Bund, which for a time functioned as part of the broader Russian Social Democratic Labor party.

Founded as I have said in 1897, the Bund was at one time, for a period of two to three years, the strongest and most numerous organization of our party. But then when our most important cities like St. Petersburg, Moscow, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Orekhovo-Zuevo awoke and when lower depths of the Russian workers raised themselves up, then the lesser contingent of Jewish craft workers, which had previously in a certain sense occupied the front of the stage, had of course to move into the background. But be that as it may, in the second half of the 1890s the movement of Jewish workers was a very considerable one and the role of the Bund in the party was very great. It is sufficient to say that the main organizer of the First Congress of our party in 1898 was the Bund. And it was not at all an

3. Simon Dubnov, *History of the Jews*, vol. 5—*From the Congress of Vienna to the Emergence of Hitler* (Cranbury, New Jersey: Thomas Yoseff, 1973), p. 199.



Aftermath of a pogrom in Odessa under tsars.

accident that this congress was held at Minsk, a city of the Jewish Pale and on the territory of the Bund's activity.⁴

As late as 1906 the Bund accounted for roughly one-third of the membership of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party. Lenin wrote in that year: "The membership of our Party is now over 100,000: 31,000 were represented at the Unity Congress, and then there are about 26,000 Polish Social-Democrats, about 14,000 Lettish and 33,000 Jewish Social-Democrats."⁵ (By Jewish Social Democrats Lenin means members of the Bund; large numbers of Jews were active in local party organizations that were not affiliated with the Bund.)

'Lion's Share of Youth Is Anti-Zionist'

It is worth noting, in light of the Zionist claim that anti-Zionism is equivalent to

4. Gregory Zinoviev, *History of the Bolshevik Party—A Popular Outline* (London: New Park Publications, 1973), pp. 51-52.

5. V.I. Lenin, *Lenin on the Jewish Question*, ed. Hyman Lumer (New York: International Publishers, 1974), p. 63.

anti-Semitism, that the Bund was adamantly anti-Zionist, as was the socialist movement as a whole. Even Chaim Weizmann, who later became the first president of Israel, had to admit after traveling through Russia in 1903 that the Jewish masses were turning to the revolutionary movement, and not to Zionism. He wrote to Theodore Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement, describing the situation:

In general West European Jewry thinks that the majority of East European Jewish youth belongs to the Zionist camp. Unfortunately, the contrary is true. The lion's share of the youth is anti-Zionist, not from an assimilationist point of view as in West Europe, but rather as a result of their revolutionary mood.

It is impossible to describe how many became the victims of police oppression because of membership in the Jewish Social Democracy—they are sent to jail and left to rot in Siberia; 5,000 are under state surveillance . . . and I am not speaking only of the youth of the proletariat . . . Almost the entire Jewish student body stands firmly behind the revolutionary camp. This revolutionary movement has captured the spirit of the very young. During my stay in Minsk, 200 Jewish Social Democrats were arrested, all of whom were under seventeen years of age.⁶

6. Arie Bober, ed., *The Other Israel* (Garden

The tsarist regime responded to the growing radicalization with the famous promise that it would "drown the revolution in Jewish blood." A new wave of pogroms began in Kishinev in April 1903. Printed leaflets were distributed throughout the city stating that a tsarist edict permitted the massacre of Jews during Easter, and police disarmed Jewish self-defense groups.

Describing the horrible results of the Kishinev pogrom, Dubnov says that "entire Jewish families were left dying in excruciating agony, others had nails driven into their heads or had their eyes gouged out; small children were hurled from upper stories onto the cobblestones, and women had their breasts cut off or were raped."

The pogrom as the defensive reflex of the old regime was "perfected" in response to the revolution of 1905. The organized defenders of tsarism—the "Black Hundreds"—issued the slogan, "Attack the revolutionaries and the Jews!"

A proclamation of the South-Russian Society of Nationalists stated: "The hue and cry, 'Down with Autocracy!' is but the clamor of those bloodsuckers, who are known as Jews, Armenians and Poles. Look out for the Jews. All the evil, and all the misfortune of our life stems from the Jews. Soon we'll have happy days—there won't be any Jews in Russia. Down with the traitors! Down with the constitution!"

In his book *1905* Leon Trotsky describes in vivid detail the reaction of the tsarist authorities to the unsuccessful revolution.

The Soviet brought the strike to an end during those terrible black days when the cries of slaughtered infants, the frenzied curses of mothers, the dying gasps of old people, and savage howls of despair rose to the heavens from every corner of the country. A hundred of Russia's towns and townlets were transformed into hells. A veil of smoke was drawn across the sun. Fires devoured entire streets with their houses and inhabitants. This was the old order's revenge for its humiliation.

It recruited its fighting battalions everywhere, from every alley, every slum. Here was the petty shopkeeper and the beggar, the publican and his perennial clients, the janitor and the police spy, the professional thief and the amateur house-breaker, the small artisan and the brothel doorkeeper, the hungry, dumb muzhik and yesterday's villager deafened by the roar of the machine. . . .

Everyone knows about a coming pogrom in advance. Pogrom proclamations are distributed, bloodthirsty articles come out in the official Provincial Gazettes, sometimes a special newspaper begins to appear. The town governor of Odessa issues a provocational proclamation in his own name. . . .

A patriotic procession starts out, with the clergy in the front, with a portrait of the Tsar taken from police headquarters, with many national flags. A military band plays without cease. At the sides and at the rear of the procession march the police. The governor salutes, the police chief publicly embraces the

leading members of the Black Hundreds. Churches along the way of the procession ring their bells. . . . The band never stops playing "God Save the Tsar," that hymn of the pogroms. . . .

The doss-house tramp is king. . . . Everything is allowed to him, he is capable of anything. . . . If he wants to, he can throw an old woman out of a third-floor window together with a grand piano, he can smash a chair against a baby's head, rape a little girl while the entire crowd looks on, hammer a nail into a living human body. . . . He exterminates whole families, he pours petrol over a house, transforms it into a mass of flames, and if anyone attempts to escape, he finishes him off with a cudgel. . . . He is capable of anything, he dares everything. God save the Tsar!⁷

Millions of roubles were diverted from government funds for the purpose of organizing pogroms, while the tsar exchanged friendly telegrams with the Black Hundred killers. The pogromist League of the Russian People was declared in a royal communiqué to be "the bulwark of the throne"—which it was.

Liberals Look for Compromise

Under such circumstances, it became increasingly clear that only the complete overthrow of the tsarist system could bring relief to the Jewish masses. The liberal bourgeoisie, organized in the Cadet (Constitutional Democratic) party rejected the idea of revolution, putting forward instead the hope of a gradual reform that would not endanger their own position.

In a 1906 article, Lenin described the Cadet position on the pogroms. The occasion was a parliamentary question (interpellation) on a pogrom in Bialystok. Lenin wrote:

. . . one has a deep feeling of dissatisfaction, of indignation at the irresolute terms in which the interpellation is worded.

. . . The authors of the interpellation say: "The inhabitants *fear* that the local authorities and malicious agitators may try to make out the victims themselves to be responsible for the calamity that has befallen them." Yes, the downtrodden and tormented Jewish population is indeed apprehensive of this, and has every reason to be. This is true. But it is *not the whole truth*, gentlemen, members of the Duma [Russian parliament], and authors of the interpellation! You, the people's deputies, who have not yet been assaulted and tormented, know perfectly well that this is not the whole truth. You know that the downtrodden inhabitants will *not dare* to name those who are *really responsible* for the pogrom. *You must name them*. That is what you are people's deputies for. That is why you enjoy even under Russian law—*complete freedom* of speech in the Duma. Then don't stand *between* the reaction and the people, at a time when the armed reaction is strangling, massacring, and mutilating unarmed people. Take your stand *openly and entirely* on the side of the people. . . . Indict the government openly and publicly; as

the *only* means of protection against pogroms." (Emphasis in original.)

The contrast between the attitude of the liberals and the socialists was not limited to debates over what should be done in the Duma. When it came to action, the liberals abstained.

Trotsky said in his book *1905*:

No pogrom took place in Petersburg. But overt preparations for a pogrom went on at full strength. The Jewish population of the capital was in a state of constant dread. After the eighteenth [of October], students, worker agitators, and Jews were beaten up daily in different parts of the city. . . .

The workers made active preparations to defend their city. In certain cases whole plants undertook to go out into the streets at any threat of danger. . . . All plants and workshops having any access to iron or steel began, on their own initiative, to manufacture side-arms. Several thousand hammers were forging daggers, pikes, wire whips and knuckledusters. In the evening, at a meeting of the Soviet, one deputy after another mounted the rostrum, raising their weapons high above their heads and transmitting their electors' solemn undertaking to suppress the pogrom as soon as it flared up. That demonstration alone was bound to paralyze all initiative among rank-and-file pogromists.⁸

The workers did not stop there, however, as Trotsky describes. "Thanks to the united efforts of the typesetters, all purely pogrom literature was excluded from the private print shops, so that appeals to violate were now printed only in the department of police and the directorate of the gendarmerie, with the doors and shutters tightly closed, on hand-operated presses previously confiscated from the revolutionaries."

At the trial of the workers' deputies who had been elected to the Petersburg Soviet, Trotsky, in his speech before the court, did what the Cadet deputies in the Duma, with their parliamentary immunity, were afraid to do. He indicted the tsarist government and the tsar himself as the organizer of the pogroms, and produced evidence to that effect.

The February Revolution

The debate between the capitalist liberals and the socialists over what road would lead to Jewish emancipation was accompanied by debates among the socialists themselves. The Bund, for example, sided with the reformist, or Menshevik, wing of the socialist movement against the Bolsheviks. Furthermore, it had disagreements with both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks on how to approach the struggle for national liberation.

Procapitalist historians invariably advance the theory of how much better

City, New York: Doubleday/Anchor, 1972), p. 152.

7. Leon Trotsky, *1905* (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), pp. 131-34.

8. Lenin, *Lenin on the Jewish Question*, pp. 59-60.

9. Trotsky, *1905*, pp. 137-38.

things would have been if the Bolshevik revolution had never happened. Their counterparts in the field of Jewish history have the same approach, and frequently they point to the Bund as a more "reasonable" alternative to the Bolsheviks. However, their arguments fall to pieces in light of the actual events.

The overthrow of the tsar in February 1917 opened up immense possibilities for change. Change was what the oppressed masses wanted and were demanding, but the reformists struggled instead to preserve the capitalist system.

The utterly utopian perspective of the Bund was summed up in a May 1917 article in its newspaper. "It was clear from the very beginning," the Bundists said, "how the unity of the revolution could be preserved: the bourgeoisie must reject the desire for complete power, the proletariat must abjure the seizure of power. Each of the antagonistic classes limits itself by its good will until the revolution will be strengthened."¹⁰

The Bund supported both the capitalist provisional government set up following the February revolution and the continuation of Russia's participation in World War I. This was not an abstract question to the Jewish people any more than it was to the soldiers fighting in the trenches. In fact, in proportion to population there was a higher percentage of Jews in the Russian army than either Russians or Poles. Furthermore, the main theater of battle between the Austro-German and Russian forces was precisely the area covered by the Jewish Pale.

From 1914 until the end of 1917 the population of the Pale was subjected alternately to pogroms by the Russian troops or the exactions of the German occupation regime. On top of this, the tsarist bureaucracy treated the Jewish population as a security risk, and in late 1914 and the spring of 1915 deportations from strategic areas involving hundreds of thousands of persons were carried out.

Liberal writers on the Jews in Russia tend to gloss over the link between the Provisional Government's policy of continuing Russian participation in World War I and the ordeal of the Jews in the Pale of Settlement. Nevertheless, it was the Jews who suffered from this policy more than any other nationality in Russia.

The main favorable thing the Provisional Government did in regard to the Jews was to repeal the hundreds of discriminatory laws against them. Even in the area of formal legal equality, however, it was left to the Bolsheviks to declare the separation of church and state; the Kerensky regime and its predecessors had refused to end the privileged position of the Russian Orthodox Church.

As far as any positive program of action on behalf of the oppressed nationalities, and the Jews in particular, the Provisional Government did nothing. Furthermore, overt anti-Semitism was rampant among the Cadets and the right wing of the Social Revolutionaries. Some indication of the atmosphere in these circles is given in a passage in *Jews, Wars, and Communism* by Zosa Szajkowski.

Maxim M. Vinaver was strongly criticized by members of the Cadet Party for having made an important speech on Russia's policies at a meeting of the Cadet leadership during the Kerensky regime and for having advised Russia to remain in the camp of the Allies. Even later he was reminded by emigré Cadets that it was not for a Jew to try to save Russia. Boris A. Bakhtmeteff, who had been appointed by the Provisional Government of Russia as Ambassador and was still recognized by Washington as such after the November Revolution, complained to the State Department officials that "there were too many Jews trying to save Russia," i.e., trying to save Russia from the Bolsheviks.¹¹

A Turning Point in History

The Russian revolution of October 1917 was a turning point in human history—the first successful socialist revolution. Beside that event the interimperialist rivalries that led to World War I dwindle into insignificance. Millions saw the possibility of building a new society that would do away with exploitation and oppression.

Just as they had promised, the Bolsheviks carried out the program of distributing the land to the peasants and ending the slaughter in the trenches. However, the hopes for peaceful construction were dashed almost immediately. The new regime was plunged into a fight for its life.

If anything, the civil war between Whites and Reds was worse for the Jewish population than the imperialist war. The reactionary White armies picked up the fallen banner of tsarism. Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, and their lesser imitators all relied on anti-Semitic propaganda in fighting the Bolsheviks and carried out pogroms as a matter of course.

In August 1917 six of the Bolshevik party's twenty-one Central Committee members were of Jewish origin: Kamenev, Sokolnikov, Sverdlov, Trotsky, Uritsky, and Zinoviev. The counterrevolutionary forces made the most of this fact. It is estimated that in the Ukraine alone more than 200,000 Jews were massacred in the course of the civil war.

It was the imperialist democracies of Britain, France, and the United States that armed and financed the pogromist armies. The attitude of the Bolsheviks, in contrast, was to wage uncompromising war against manifestations of anti-

Semitism, no matter what quarter they came from.

James Parkes writes in *The Emergence of the Jewish Problem, 1878-1939* that although there were cases of attacks on Jews by units of the Red Army, "where the soldiers were caught they were severely punished. The Communists had from the first set their faces against antisemitism. . . ."¹²

Dubnov, a virulent anticommunist, admits that "in many cities, Jews welcomed the Bolsheviks as saviors," only a few pages after he writes of "the Bolshevik epidemic," and "the hydra of Bolshevism."

Szajkowski writes: "Considering the vicious antisemitism in East European countries—except Soviet Russia—it was a miracle that the entire Jewish populations in these countries had not become Communist. The example of Soviet Russia, a land where antisemitism was officially regarded a crime, was a tremendous propaganda factor. . . ."

"The poet and novelist, Chaim Grade, relates the story of a Red Army commissar who shot a soldier for having taken a watch from a Jew during the Soviet occupation of Vilna."¹³

The Bolshevik attitude toward anti-Semitism was summed up in a proclamation of the Soviet government signed by Lenin on July 27, 1918:

The bourgeois counter-revolution has taken up the weapon which has slipped from the hands of the Tsar. . . .

In the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, where the principle of self-determination of the toiling masses of all peoples has been proclaimed, there is no room for national oppression. The Jewish bourgeois are our enemies, not as Jews but as bourgeois. The Jewish worker is our brother. . . .

The Council of People's Commissars instructs all Soviet deputies to take uncompromising measures to tear the anti-Semitic movement out by the roots. Pogromists and pogrom-agitators are to be placed outside the law.¹⁴

Although the reformist opponents of the Bolsheviks within the workers movement cannot be accused of leading pogroms, many of them collaborated with the pogromists, or else refused to take a stand against them. Zvi Gitelman, discussing the situation in the Ukraine, gives a telling example in his book *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics*.

The Mensheviks still had a majority in the Ukrainian soviets at the time of the October revolution. They responded to the revolution by declaring an independent

10. Zvi Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 83.

11. Zosa Szajkowski, *Jews, Wars, and Communism*, vol. 1 (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1972), p. xviii.

12. James Parkes, *The Emergence of the Jewish Problem, 1878-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 175.

13. Szajkowski, *Jews, Wars, and Communism*, p. xvii.

14. Lenin, *Lenin on the Jewish Question*, pp. 141-42.

Ukraine under the government of the Rada (Soviet). Gitelman writes:

In December 1917 the Rada's Vice-Secretary for Jewish Affairs, Moishe Zilberfarb, urged the members of the Central Rada to take effective measures against the pogroms, and Bundist representatives tried to have resolutions passed by the Rada condemning pogroms. But the Rada was afraid of antagonizing its local organs, which it could not effectively control anyway, and it did not want to risk losing mass support by condemning anti-Jewish outbreaks. Anti-Semitism manifested itself even in the central government. In January 1918 it was proposed to the Rada that all those who had settled in Kiev during the previous two years—in effect, Jewish war refugees—be expelled.¹⁵

The Ukraine was occupied by German forces from February 1918 to the autumn of that year. After their withdrawal Simon Petliura, a member of the original Rada, set up a new government with French support. The Bund had remained in the Rada, and many in it would have liked to support Petliura against the Bolsheviks, but, as Gitelman notes, "As time went on, it became clear that Jews could not support the Petliura regime."

Along with the rest of the counterrevolution, Petliura's armies made it a practice to massacre Jews.

'There Was No Discrimination'

The refusal of the Bolsheviks to bow to anti-Semitism during the civil war was an important test. While fighting for its very life, the fledgling Soviet government refused to abandon its principles and pick up the weapon of its enemies. But the Soviet regime did not stop with the task of protecting the Jewish population against pogroms. It did more than any government, before or since, to consciously combat anti-Semitism, and it did this in a backward country that had been devastated by seven years of war.

Abram L. Sachar writes in *A History of the Jews*:

A determined effort was made by the Soviet officials to root out the curse of anti-Semitism. . . .

After the first terrifying years of readjustment, most of the two and one-half million Jews who lived under the jurisdiction of the Hammer and the Sickle became an integral part of the Soviet social order. They lived on a plane with every other group, for there was no discrimination against them as Jews.¹⁶

Describing the Soviet campaign against anti-Semitism, William Korey writes in *The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia*:

During the twenties and especially in the latter part of that decade, the regime continued to make strong efforts to contain the virus of

anti-Jewish bigotry. The RSFSR Criminal Code of 1922 provided a minimum of one year's solitary confinement (and death in time of war) for "agitation and propaganda arousing national enmities and dissensions." The Criminal Code of 1927 was even more encompassing. . . . Even the mere possession of hate literature was subject to the above penalties. If the appropriate section of the criminal codes was infrequently invoked and if severe sentences for anti-Semitic offenses were rare, nonetheless educational

campaigns were energetically conducted by Party organs, and various pedagogical efforts were undertaken. Close to a hundred books and brochures—an extraordinary number—dealing with anti-Semitism were published by state organs.¹⁷

[To be continued]

17. William Korey, *The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 65.

Ten Released on Bail

Five Egyptian 'Trotskyists' Still in Prison

[The following report appeared in the March 18 issue of *Inprecor*, fortnightly news bulletin of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

More information has been received about the revolutionary militants who were arrested in Egypt last summer. Initial reports from the official Egyptian press had said that twenty persons had been arrested in early July 1975 and charged with being members of the International Communist League, a revolutionary Marxist organization. (See *Inprecor*, No. 33, September 11, 1975.) [See also *Intercontinental Press*, September 8, 1975, p. 1163, and March 22, 1976, p. 434.] The Egyptian press reported that the arrested militants would be charged with having made contact with the Revolutionary Communist Group in Lebanon and the Fourth International and with having organized to "overthrow the political and economic regime" in Egypt and replace it with an "extremist Trotskyist Communist regime."

The latest information is as follows:

The regime issued twenty-one arrest warrants. Sixteen people were arrested and imprisoned, while five of the twenty-one could not be found. One of the sixteen has been released. Ten others have been released on bail and may be arrested again at any time, although no formal charges have been placed against them. Five militants are still being held in prison. They are: Abdel Kazim Shahit Mahmoud and Muzahim Muhi el-Takriti, both of whom are Iraqi teachers; Reda Ibrahim Farag, a student; Mahmoud el-Sayid Muhammed el-Sayid, a worker; and Rashad Mansour Mustafa el-Bedawi, also a worker. These militants are still awaiting formal charges, and a long delay in the disposition of their case is possible, since the government can hold them in prison indefinitely. It is not known what penalties they may face, but a law passed in 1971 provides for sentences of up to life imprisonment for any political activity conducted outside the framework of the Arab Socialist Union, the sole legal party in the country.

The ten militants who have been re-

leased provisionally are: Dr. Muhammed Abdu Bayuni, a veterinarian; Ibrahim Abdel Azziz Azzam, a student; Muhammed el-Bashir Abdel Fu'ad el-Sibai, an employee in the Egyptian news agency; Kemal Fu'ad Nagib Muftah; Muhammed Ali Tayil, a student; Muhammed Na'man Hashim Tawfal; Randa Abdel Ghaffar el-Baasi and her brother, Najwa el-Baasi, both students; Ali Mahmoud Khalil, an employee; and Shawki Muhammed Rashad Abdel-Ghanni.

Further, it has been confirmed that Ahmad Nabil el-Hilali, a well-known Egyptian lawyer, is defending the imprisoned militants.

The meaning of the status of the militants under attack in Egypt is contradictory. On the one hand, the fact that some of the comrades have been released, even if only provisionally, shows that the Sadat regime, which is now trying to polish up its "liberal" image, is susceptible to international pressure on the question of political prisoners. On the other hand, the fact that five militants have been held in prison for more than eight months without even being formally charged indicates that the regime may well intend to hold them indefinitely, refusing to risk a political trial but also refusing to release the prisoners. It is thus clear that the fate of the comrades depends on two factors: the internal political situation in Egypt and the degree to which international solidarity is organized in their defense. The latter factor is particularly important in the case of the two Iraqi militants, who could be deported to Iraq, where they would face almost certain death at the hands of the ultrarepressive Baathist regime.

But solidarity is not purely political. Several of the imprisoned militants are workers whose families are deprived of any income as long as they are held in jail. These families are in an extremely difficult financial situation, and aid is needed. Contributions may be sent to Gisela Scholtz, Postal Account Number CCP000-1085001-56, Brussels, Belgium. Notice of contributions should be sent to *Inprecor*, 76 rue Antoine Dansaert, Brussels 1000 Belgium. □

15. Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics*, pp. 158-59.

16. Abram L. Sachar, *A History of the Jews* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 383.

For a Boycott of the Francoist Trade-Union Congress!

[The following is an editorial scheduled for publication in issue No. 43 of *Combate*, the newspaper of the Liga Comunista (LC—Communist League), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain. The translation and footnotes are by *Intercontinental Press*.]

1. The recent mobilization of hundreds of thousands of workers has confronted the fascist Sindicato¹ with the most serious crisis in its history.

Its attempt to divide the workers by the way it signs contracts—preventing them from expressing any of their trade-union rights to strike, meet, and negotiate freely—has been answered by the broadest mobilization of the workers and people since 1937. In defiance of the verticalist union structure and anti-working-class legislation, the working masses have gone ahead to hold assemblies and strikes, huge gatherings and demonstrations. They have elected committees, subject to recall, to lead the struggle and carry out direct negotiations with the bosses. They have strengthened the workers commissions.

Despite the fact that the Francoist union structure is tottering, it continues to stand, blocking the establishment of strike committees, direct negotiations, and free assemblies. All of this is ascribable fundamentally to the desperate efforts of the “unitary democratic slates”² to subordinate the workers struggles to CNS channels.

The changed relationship of forces brought about by the workers mobilization creates conditions more favorable than ever for the workers struggle. In face of the mortal weakness of the dictatorship, it enables the workers to establish de facto legality for their organizations. It shows the need and possibility for the working class to break out of the framework of the fascist CNS apparatus and begin the process of building their own trade union.

This process will take place through assemblies of all workers in each factory who want to be unionized. It will take place through constituent congresses on a local level and by nationality—moving toward a general constituent congress.

In this process we Trotskyists will

defend the perspective of a single trade union of the workers—democratic, with the right to form tendencies, and independent of the bosses, the state, and the church.

2. The dictatorship is fully aware of the crisis of the CNS. It knows that its own existence depends on maintaining the verticalist union structure, and it is desperately trying to prolong the life of the CNS. It is escalating its demagoguery in an effort to refurbish the image of the fascist trade-union structure. It speaks of “broadening the autonomy of the professional organizations,” but on the basis of maintaining intact the entire hierarchical machinery and chain of command. As the consummation of this maneuver, Martín Villa³ is preparing the farcical spring congress of the fascist trade union—an open provocation to the aspirations of the working class.

Nor does the alternative offered by the PCE⁴ meet the needs of the workers. Carried away by its alliance with the capitalists, in the trade-union arena it prefers to sign a pact with the “progressive” supporters of the Francoist trade union, a pact that maintains the fundamental aspects of the hierarchical trade union rather than dismantling it from top to bottom.

This orientation was the one proposed by the General Coordinating Committee of the Workers Commissions in its “manifesto on trade-union unity.” There it called on the top leaders of the Francoist trade union “whose activity in the CNS has not been a pretext for gaining privileges and soft jobs” to facilitate “the creation of democratic trade unions with the least possible trauma and confrontation.”

3. The fascist trade-union congress is a maneuver to maintain the verticalist trade-union structure. It represents an absolute denial of workers trade-union freedom and all their trade-union rights. It is a full-scale attack that requires the most forceful response.

Out with the congress of the Francoist trade union!

Down with the CNS!

Trade-union freedom!

For a trade-union constituent congress in which the workers decide what kind of union they want!

These demands should serve as guide-

lines for the broadest possible boycott of the fascist congress. The workers should organize massive assemblies in which they denounce the congress and speak in favor of the kind of trade union they want. They should resolve to hold generalized work stoppages, and to organize and centralize massive demonstrations in the streets.

They should call on all the honest delegates to the Francoist trade union to resign from the “unitary democratic slates.” This is a basic condition for incorporating themselves massively in the drive for a constituent trade-union congress, giving decisive impetus to this response to the dictatorship’s provocation.

The General Coordinating Committee of the Workers Commissions, encompassing all political tendencies within the workers commissions (Euzkadi Coordinating Committee of Workers Commissions, Barcelona Local, and so forth), should take the initiative now to hold a general meeting with the UGT and USO,⁵ with the aim of encouraging and paving the way for a joint campaign to mount a massive boycott of the CNS congress.

The workers commissions, which are indisputably the organizations with the most influence in the workers movement, because of their role as a unifying and independent force, bear responsibility for carrying out this fundamental task. At the same time, this task must be accompanied by a determined effort on the part of the ranks to rebuild the commissions. Taking advantage of the tremendous possibilities opened up by the struggles, the workers commissions should propose and make efforts to integrate the UGT and USO, guaranteeing them the right to form tendencies. In any case they should coordinate activities within each plant at all levels with these trade-union organizations.

4. This is the historic responsibility that today falls on the shoulders of the parties and organizations of the working class. There can be no excuse for not carrying it out. This is the task of all workers—metalworkers, bricklayers, bank workers, teachers, sanitation workers, and others—and it should meet with the enthusiastic support and solidarity of the youth and all the oppressed.

Political Bureau of the Liga Comunista
March 4, 1976

1. Another name for the Central Nacional Sindicalista (CNS—National Federation of Syndicates), the Francoist trade-union structure.

2. Slates of candidates consisting of representatives of the workers commissions that participated in the June 1975 CNS elections.

3. D. Rodolfo Martín Villa, minister of trade-union relations.

4. Partido Comunista de España (Spanish Communist party).

5. Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers Union, the Social Democrats’ trade-union arm), Unión Sindical Obrera (Workers Trade Union, part of the Asamblea Democrática de Euzkadi—Euzkadi Democratic Assembly).

Capitalism Fouls Things Up

Plutonium-Powered Coffee Pots



[On October 17, 1975, Dr. John W. Gofman of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in California debated Dr. Edward Teller, the "father of the H-bomb," on the hazards of nuclear power plants and the advisability of turning to alternative solutions to the energy problem. The debate, which was held in California, was attended by 4,000 persons.

[This week we are publishing a second excerpt from the paper, "Alice in Blunderland," that Gofman presented during the debate (see *Intercontinental Press*, March 29, p. 512, for the initial excerpt). Copies of the full text of the paper may be obtained from the Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Box 332, Yachats, Oregon 97498.]

* * *

Just how toxic is plutonium? Dr. Dixie Lee Ray, ex-Chairperson of the now defunct Atomic Energy Commission, travels widely insisting that botulism toxin is more poisonous than plutonium, weight for weight. She may be correct in that happy-go-lucky insistence. But what would you think of anyone planning to build our energy future on something like botulism toxin, assuming energy could be derived from it? I've recently published two papers on the production of lung cancer by plutonium. For the plutonium produced by power reactors, I estimate about 21 billion lung cancer doses per pound if it is finely divided into small particles that can be inhaled. (This would be the case for distribution into a population of $\frac{1}{2}$ cigarette smokers, $\frac{1}{2}$ non-smokers, the smokers being much more susceptible). I think my estimate may be 2 times too high, and it is about equally likely that my estimate may be 2 times too low.

"Aha," says the nuclear industry, "that's if it gets inhaled, but how will it get inhaled?"

"Aha," says the nuclear industry, "we've seen 5 tons of plutonium distributed all over the globe by weapons testing fallout and we don't know of a single death caused by plutonium inhalation."

Is that really so? I am prepared to defend, before any scientific body, and under oath, in full public view, my estimate that 1 million people (perhaps only 500,000 or as many as 2 million) in the

Northern Hemisphere have been irreversibly condemned to die of lung cancer from those 5 tons of plutonium. The very same people who used to tell you that nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere was "Safe," when it really meant a million deaths from lung cancer due to plutonium, are now telling you they will put 440 million pounds of plutonium through the nuclear cycle safely in a full plutonium breeder economy. Let's now ask how well they must do to make good on this promise. If they contain the plutonium well enough to prevent 99.99% from getting airborne (quite a feat), it will still mean about 500,000 additional fatal lung cancers per year in the United States alone. That represents some six times the current death rate from lung cancer from all causes combined.

I've debated this point with some nuclear experts and they have one stock answer, "We'll prevent any more than one part in a billion from getting out." If that answer doesn't strain your credulity, let me give you some facts.

At Rocky Flats, Colorado, plutonium is handled in quantities of 100's of kilograms. Let's look at their record. They do many of the same operations that will be done in a plutonium energy economy plus some additional work on plutonium metal required for weapons fabrication.

(1) In 1969 they had a fire that finally was estimated to have cost \$45,000,000, the largest industrial fire in U.S. history. Why did they have this fire?—because the heat-sensors for a glove box containing plutonium metal were placed in a location where they were well-insulated from the heat of spontaneously burning plutonium. As a result the fire was raging by the time alarms sounded. (A small oversight, said management after the fire.)

(2) Colorado environmentalists asked whether any appreciable amount of plutonium had been released offsite by the fire.

(3) "No," said AEC and the Dow management, "our air samplers show that very little escaped beyond the site boundary."

(4) So, Dr. Edward Martell of the Colorado Environmental Committee made measurements and found that about $\frac{1}{2}$ pound of plutonium was on the ground east of the Rocky Flats plant.

(5) First Dr. Martell's measurements were ridiculed. Then several independent sources, plus AEC's Health and Safety Laboratories, confirmed that Dr. Martell was certainly in the right ballpark about how much was on the ground outside the plant.

(6) Then came the real frosting on the cake. AEC insisted that this very large amount of plutonium that had gotten out really didn't come from the fire. Instead it came from the wind stirring up plutonium that had leaked out of some 5,500 storage barrels that were sitting around rusting on the Plant site. Although they knew by 1962 that the barrels were leaking, they continued to put more plutonium-containing barrels out to rust for an additional six years. And to save money they used old barrels. I think it was in 1972 that someone there suggested it might be wise to store wastes in *new* barrels.

(7) There have been innumerable additional spills at Rocky Flats, both inside and outside buildings. This experience is by no means unique to Rocky Flats. I would urge you to read Robert Gillette's classic articles in *Science* about plutonium spills, about plutonium tracked out by workers, about plutonium accidentally discovered on the ground and elsewhere in numerous plants handling plutonium, and finally, about some plutonium that found its way to a restaurant in one instance and to the local sheriff's office in another. To borrow a recent phrase from Hubert Humphrey, I would say that the credibility of the nuclear industry's ability to control plutonium to one part in a billion is about equal to that of a \$3 Confederate Bill made in Germany. The Dow Company managers of Rocky Flats have been forever digging up parts of the Rocky Flats site and shipping plutonium-contaminated soil to Idaho to bury it there. They estimated in a recent report that with their current ability to make shipments to Idaho, they could ship the contaminated soil out of Rocky Flats to Idaho within 349 years.

After we spilled plutonium in Spain we spent over 50 million dollars digging up a good part of the countryside and bringing the contaminated soil back to South Carolina for burial. At the rate the nuclear industry messes up on a small scale, it will be digging up half the United States to

bury on the other half, in a full-fledged plutonium economy.

"But," says the nuclear industry, "we are very concerned about your health. We hire large numbers of health physicists to protect the public." Let me give you three illustrations of the marvelous protection that provides.

(1) At Rocky Flats recently, as a result of much adverse publicity about the sloppy handling of plutonium, a health physicist introduced a marvelous solution to the plutonium problem there. He suggested they re-define the word. Contamination. Contamination, he suggested, should only be used when the spill is above some arbitrarily defined level. All spills below that level are to be described either as "A plutonium infiltration has occurred," or as "Plutonium has taken up residence at Site XYZ." As a result of this miraculous solution of the containment problem, plutonium contamination has declined dramatically at Rocky Flats. What wonders marvels the English language can accomplish.

(2) Dr. Dade Moeller, in his inaugural presidential address to the society of health physicists, was describing the opportunities for health physicists in the burgeoning nuclear industry. In discussing the hazards of radiation with the health physicists, he exhorted his conferees with these exact words, "Put your mouth where your money is."

(3) Recently the State of New York discovered that air shipments of multi-kilogram quantities of plutonium oxide were being made into Kennedy Airport. This particulate form of plutonium oxide is the worse conceivable form for lung cancer production. The New York Attorney General sued the U.S. Government to stop the air shipments. He was indeed concerned after Dr. Marvin Reznikoff and I calculated that a crash with dispersal of plutonium could kill all 8,000,000 people in New York City.

Dr. Robert Baker, Health Physicist at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, submitted an affidavit in rebuttal to Dr. Reznikoff's dispersal calculations. I quote this health physicist's affidavit.

"The wind blows in a northwesterly direction, toward Manhattan, on the average only about 3% of the time." (Emphasis added.)

Isn't that elegant protection offered by a health physicist?

Fortunately, Representative Scheuer introduced a bill into the U.S. Congress to stop this particular instance of the plutonium madness licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Both houses of Congress passed the bill and President Ford signed it into law!

Occasionally even the U.S. Congress comes to life if the idiocy of the situation is sufficient.

"But," say the nuclear proponents, "why do you worry about dispersing plutonium when there is so much more radium per

square mile of earth than the plutonium we expect to deposit?"

To this nonsense there are at least two sufficient answers:

(1) It is the airborne plutonium settling to the ground that is the real inhalation hazard. What radium is six inches or twelve inches below the surface of the earth is irrelevant so long as it stays there. I certainly hope the nuclear industry has no plans to dig up the top foot of soil of the world, extract the radium, and spread it around on the surface in order to show that plutonium is safe.

(2) It is from the surface that the second hazard of plutonium dispersal comes, namely resuspension of plutonium by wind and movement. Now, a three-inch boulder containing some radium is not very likely to become airborne. If it does, inhalation of the boulder just would be a bit difficult. So much for the ridiculous assertions about that top foot of earth and its radium content.

Radioactive Waste

I won't bore you with the very long time that radioactive waste must be isolated from people. Everyone by now knows all about that. Instead I prefer to regale you with some of the marvelous proposals of the nuclear energy advocates for dealing with the problem.

Since this stuff is dangerous enough to wipe out every man, woman, and child on earth many times over if it gets around, many have proposed careful burial of the waste. "But," say some of the nuclear advocates, "why bury it and guard it? This material is too valuable to bury. Instead [we] will use it in many, many ways in our economy, in our industries, and even in our homes." One early suggestion was to make plutonium-powered coffee pots. (Look, mom, no electric cord for the percolator.)

There is certainly one marvelous solution for solving the radioactive waste problem—just use it everywhere in the USA. I shall leave to you to calculate the expectancy that 1% won't get out with this superbly brilliant scheme.

Why Are Nuclear Proponents So at Ease About Radiation?

In closing, let me examine why the nuclear proponents are so relaxed about the health hazards of radiation. Dr. E.F. Schumacher, the brilliant economist-philosopher, has said it isn't science and technology that any thinking person should oppose. Science and technology can indeed do marvelous things for us. But Dr. Schumacher has suggested he'd like to see "Science and technology with a human face."

A million cancer deaths is, after all, just a number. Scientists deal with numbers all the time, so 1,000,000 isn't a disturbing number per se. In my earlier medical

career, I used to work with cancer and leukemia patients extensively. I served as personal physician to some 30 or 40 of them in the last one to six months of their lives. It might help if every scientist and engineer had that opportunity as part of his (her) education. It is good to know what lives, and breathes, and dies behind a statistic.

Later, I spent two years doing studies on trace elements in a variety of mentally retarded children at Sonoma State Hospital. I had a couple of days a week in the wards, seeing the human results of genetic damage. These children didn't look at all like statistics.

In 1969, after my colleague, Dr. Tamplin, and I had said that 32,000 extra cancer deaths per year in this country would be caused if people received the allowable dose of radiation from nuclear energy, we recommended that the radiation standards should be made much tighter. Dr. Michael May, then Director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory where I worked, visited me in my office. Clearly he had experienced intense pressure from the AEC. In all my experiences with Dr. May, I had found him to be a fine person and a first-class scientist.

"Jack," he said, "I defend absolutely your right, in fact your duty, to calculate that a certain amount of radiation will cause 32,000 extra deaths per year from cancer."


But, to my disappointment, he then asked: what makes you think that 32,000 would be too many? I presume he was thinking in terms of the hoped-for benefits of nuclear power . . . technology without a human face.

"Mike," I said, "the reason is very simple. If I find myself thinking that 32,000 cancer deaths per year is not too many, I'll dust off my medical diploma, take it back to the Dean of the Medical School where I graduated, hand the diploma to the Dean and say, 'I don't deserve this diploma.'" □

Tenderfoot Canadians

Residents of smoggy cities eventually become immune to the ill effects of air pollution, experiments conducted at the Pancho Los Amigos Hospital in Los Angeles show. Says Dr. Jack Hackney, who conducted the tests, "We compared the effects of smog on a group of people from Los Angeles and a group of healthy, age-matched residents from less-polluted Canadian areas. When exposed to smog-alert-level doses of pollution, the Canadians developed coughs, chest spasms, air passage irritation, marked changes in blood cells and loss of lung function. The Los Angeles group hardly reacted at all."—*Moneysworth*, March 29.

AROUND THE WORLD



Hanoi Calls for Increased Struggle Throughout Southeast Asia

An article in *Nhan Dan*, the daily newspaper of the North Vietnamese Communist party, called for increased efforts to overthrow capitalist governments in Southeast Asia, according to a February 29 United Press International dispatch from Bangkok.

The article, signed by "Commentator," said that Hanoi would give full support to such efforts, pointing out that Communist victories and U.S. setbacks in the area had combined to create the most favorable conditions ever for revolt in Southeast Asia.


Manoel da Conceição Freed

Peasant leader Manoel da Conceição was released from prison by Brazilian authorities and went into exile in Switzerland in early March.

A native of northeast Brazil, Conceição became active in the peasant movement there in the mid-1950s. In 1968 he was arrested during a struggle by peasants who were protesting exorbitant rents being charged by big landowners.

At the time of his arrest, Conceição was shot in the leg. Gangrene developed because of lack of medical treatment, and he had to have the limb amputated.

Protests by local peasants forced the Brazilian government to release him, but he was rearrested in 1972 and barbarically tortured.



USLA Reporter

MANOEL DA CONCEICAO

The U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners, one of the groups participating in the international campaign that finally won Conceição's release, commented in the spring 1976 issue of its newsletter, *USLA Reporter*, "Manoel's latest release is an inspiring victory for all those who worked for his freedom."

At the same time, the committee pointed to the cases of hundreds of other political prisoners in Brazil and pledged ongoing efforts to win their release as well.

Russell Tribunal Reaches Verdict on Repression in Latin America

Concluding more than two years of proceedings, the Second Russell Tribunal on Repression in Latin America held its concluding session in Rome January 17.

The jury heard more than 200 reporters and witnesses describe the denials of human rights experienced as "a constant reality" by the peoples of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay.

Sitting on the jury were former Dominican President Juan Bosch, international attorney François Rigaux, Greek political figure Andreas Papandreou, U.S. sociology professor James Petras, Latin American author Gabriel García Márquez, Italian Senator Lelio Basso, Yugoslav political figure Vladimir Dedejer, former Chilean Ambassador to Peking Armando Uribe, Harvard professor George Wald, trade-union researcher Giulio Girardi, and Latin American writer Julio Cortázar.

Reports and testimony from the tribunal's first session, held in Rome in 1974, are now available in a 163-page book entitled *Repression in Latin America*, published by Spokesman Books. It can be ordered by sending £2.90 (US\$5.57) to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Bertrand Russell House, Gamble Street, Nottingham NG7 4ET, England.

Sadat Warns 'Hostile Elements'

"I say that we have five more years of sweat and toil to improve our economy," Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat said in Cairo March 27.

Sadat warned against "conspiratorial-type behavior by hostile elements which

are exploiting our sad economic plight." He attacked those who were supposedly inciting strikes and sit-ins by Egyptian workers, and according to a United Press International dispatch, turned to his minister in charge of police and said: "From this day, attempts at sabotage and chaos will be met with the utmost severity."

Sadat's threats against those who "incite one group against another or one class against another" coincided with a protest by 17,000 textile workers in Damietta, at the mouth of the Nile. The workers reportedly clashed with police during a three-day period, protesting the failure of the state-owned textile company to give them an annual incentive payment.

Sadat Seeks Advice From Rockefeller

Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat has requested David Rockefeller, chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, to advise him on how to make Egypt more attractive to foreign investors. Rockefeller agreed to do so in an "informal" capacity.

The *Boston Globe*, which reported the agreement in its March 22 issue, noted that Chase Manhattan is also the chief fiscal agent for the state of Israel.

Defense Committee Demands Release of Political Prisoners in Zambia

The Defence of University of Zambia Detainees (DUNZAD) has launched a campaign for the release of five lecturers and at least fourteen students arrested by the Kenneth Kaunda regime in January and February.

The arrests followed a student demonstration at the university January 15 in support of the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which the Kaunda regime opposed during the Angolan civil war. On January 29, Kaunda declared a state of emergency in the country.

The first professor arrested was Lionel Cliffe, a former director of development studies at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and a founding editor of the *Review of African Political Economy*, published in London.

Within days of Cliffe's arrest, George Siemensma, A. Lulat, Klaus van der Berg, Robert Molteno, Dario Longhi, and more

than a dozen unnamed students were detained. Three students were later released and Longhi was deported.

The released students said that prison conditions were poor and that they had been interrogated for long periods. Cliffe was reported to have been interrogated for up to forty hours at a time without food or drink. Molteno was questioned for up to twenty-seven hours. They are kept in solitary confinement without reading matter and are denied lawyers.

Protest letters and petitions calling for the release of the lecturers and students should be sent to President Kenneth Kaunda, State House, Lusaka, Zambia; Vice Chancellor, University of Zambia, P.O. Box 2379, Lusaka; or to Zambian embassies abroad.

Copies of such protests should be sent to DUNZAD, Basement, 103 Gower Street, London WC1E 6AW, England.

Turkish Premier Accused of Covering Up Fraud

Turkish Premier Suleyman Demirel has been accused by the parliamentary opposition of trying to cover up his nephew's effort to defraud the government of \$1.5 million.

According to a report in the March 1 issue of the British daily the *Guardian*, the nephew, Yahya Demirel, is said to have received the funds from the treasury in the form of a tax rebate for the export of some nonexistent furniture. A warrant for his arrest was issued February 29.

21 'Outlaws' Reported Killed in Chad

Twenty-one "outlaws" and nine government troops were killed in a clash near Faya, in northwestern Chad, according to a communiqué released by the regime's Higher Military Council in late February. An estimated 200 "outlaws" were said to have attacked the garrison town on the night of February 17-18.

Although the Chadian regime did not specify who the "outlaws" were, an Agence France-Presse dispatch from Ndjamená, the capital, indicated that they may have been Muslim rebels of the Front de Libération Nationale (Frolinat—National Liberation Front) led by Hissene Habre.

Saigon Encourages Private Enterprise

Private enterprise will be encouraged in South Vietnam as part of a "long-range" policy, Saigon Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh said in a March 5 interview granted in Moscow.

Binh described a five-tier economic system that would maintain private ownership of farms and factories operated "with the capital of the national bourgeoisie

at home and foreign investments."

Such enterprises would be taxed but would be allowed "an adequate amount of profit so they would be encouraged to continue," she stated.

Saigon views the five-tier scheme as the best way "to give full play to all possibilities for the population to heal the wounds of war rapidly and to restore the economy," according to Binh. She reported that the major difficulty facing the new regime is unemployment. About three million in a population of eighteen million are out of work.

The foreign minister also called for substantial aid from Washington for "the reconstruction of Vietnam after the war."

American Library Association Urges Visa for Hugo Blanco

The Council of the American Library Association, the professional association representing more than 30,000 librarians in the United States, adopted a resolution January 23 that states in part:

"Whereas, The U.S. Department of State has denied a visa to Mr. Hugo Blanco, widely known Peruvian author, because of allegations which remain undocumented, thereby preventing Mr. Blanco from fulfilling a lecture tour commitment in this country, and

"Whereas, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, proclaimed that 'freedom of thought and freedom of expression are rights basic to all,' and . . .

"Whereas, This action denies citizens of the United States right of access to information as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution . . . therefore, be it

"Resolved, That the American Library Association urge the U.S. Department of State to issue a visa to Mr. Hugo Blanco. . . ."

Pinochet's Beauticians Fail to Spruce Up Image

In a fresh attempt to improve the image of his blood-soaked regime, Augusto Pinochet on January 28 announced a series of measures designed to counter worldwide protests against the torture and mutilation of Chilean political prisoners.

The measures specify that only three detention camps will be legally recognized; that police and soldiers making arrests must identify themselves and produce a warrant detailing the charges; that the closest relatives of the prisoner must be advised of the arrest within forty-eight hours; that the prisoner will be released or turned over to the courts within five days; and that doctors will examine the prisoner immediately before and after detention.

However, a case filed a few days after



Barbe/Informations Ouvrières
PINOCHET

the announcement of the new measures charged that the intelligence services had violated every one of the provisions.

Ximena de la Luz Ferrada said that four persons entered her home February 5 and beat up and arrested her husband. They did not identify themselves or disclose any charges against the victim.

Later, when Ferrada went to ask the military authorities in charge of political prisoners about her husband's status, they denied knowledge of his whereabouts and said there was no warrant for his arrest.

On February 23 Ferrada located her husband at Tres Alamos, one of the centers the government names as a legal detention site for political suspects. He had been held incommunicado eighteen days and did not receive a medical examination until thirteen days after his arrest.

The Pinochet junta acknowledges that more than 45,000 persons passed through its jails following the September 1973 military coup and admits to holding 3,900 political prisoners at present.

Church sources believe, however, that total detentions are double the 45,000 figure, numbering about 1 percent of the country's population of nine million.

Chilean authorities disclaim all knowledge of more than 1,000 other prisoners, but church sources and human-rights lawyers believe many of these have died under torture.

Nikos Sampson Arrested in Cyprus

Nikos Sampson, leader of the military coup that overthrew the Makarios regime in Cyprus in July 1974, was arrested March 16 in Nicosia for his role in the events that led in a few weeks' time to the Turkish invasion of the island and the fall of the Athens junta.

In its March 17 issue, *Aughe*, the daily newspaper of the Greek Communist party (interior), called for making Sampson's arrest the start of a wide-ranging investigation of the former Ioannides junta's operation against the Cypriot Greek government.

The Fight Against Fascism in the USA

Reviewed by David Frankel



In October 1974, a racist lynch mob went after a young Black man in the streets of Boston. It was only by chance that the victim was able to escape with his life.

Jean-Louis Yvon, a Haitian immigrant, had simply been driving through a white neighborhood when the racists pulled him from his car.

This ugly incident, which made headlines around the world, reflected the racist hysteria that has been built up in the United States around the issue of busing children in a school desegregation program. It also represented something deeper—an important shift that is beginning to take place in the American political scene.

During the Vietnam War the government—as has been shown by its own secret documents—did its best to incite and organize right-wing violence against the antiwar movement. Although right-wing attacks were common, the government failed in its attempt to build a right-wing movement to counter the antiwar forces. Rightist groups remained isolated and on the defensive.

This has begun to change. Today, the United States is entering a period of prolonged economic crisis and instability, which are creating a class polarization. Right-wing groups are expanding, while growing layers of the working class are beginning to radicalize.

The reactionary forces have been encouraged by the attempts of the ruling class to whip up racist sentiment against immigrant workers, Blacks, and Hispanics. The offensive against Blacks in relation to school desegregation and job discrimination has been especially menacing.

In Boston, the racists organized in ROAR (Restore Our Alienated Rights) have been able to terrorize whole communities and mobilize thousands in opposition to Black rights. Elsewhere, the Ku Klux Klan has become increasingly aggressive, speaking on campuses, running candidates, and picketing socialist headquarters in New Orleans and Houston.

Another reflection of this developing polarization has been the evolution of the National Caucus of Labor Committees (U.S. Labor party), a group that originated in the radical student movement of the 1960s. It has become a fascist organization, coupling leftist demagoguery with vio-

lent attacks on various groups in the working-class movement.

These are only indications of the class polarization that is building in the United

The Fight Against Fascism in the USA: Forty Years of Struggle Described by Participants, by James P. Cannon, Farrell Dobbs, Vincent R. Dunne, Joseph Hansen, Malik Miah, and others. New York: National Education Department Socialist Workers Party, 1976. 55 pp. \$1.35 paper.

States, but they are important nonetheless. Marxists have always started from the understanding that America, despite all its wealth, is not immune from the economic and social crises that arise from the contradictions built into the capitalist economy.

It can safely be predicted that as the class struggle develops in the United States and masses of workers turn to socialism for answers to their problems, the American capitalists will begin to back fascist demagogues in the tradition of Hitler and Mussolini.

In this regard, James P. Cannon, the founder of the Trotskyist movement in the United States, pointed out that "American capitalism is not in love with democracy. . . . The only principle the American capitalists have is the exploitation of labor, the extraction of profits, and the enrichment of themselves at the expense of the workers."

In his book *America's Road to Socialism*, Cannon said that as the class struggle in the United States heats up, "Fascist bands will be subsidized and armed and hurled against the strikers, against the union halls and all other workers' gathering places and institutions. The workers, for their part, will have no choice, if they don't want to be defeated and enslaved, as the German workers were defeated and enslaved under Hitler—they will have no choice but to organize their own defense guards, meet the fascist bands on their own terms and carry the battle to them."

The Fight Against Fascism in the USA is a handbook for revolutionists on how to "meet the fascist bands . . . and carry the

battle to them." It summarizes the Socialist Workers party's forty years of experience in fighting American fascism in the words of participants in that struggle.

In essence, fascism is a mass right-wing movement that aims to smash the organizations of the working class through extralegal violence. The Trotskyist strategy in fighting fascism flows from this understanding.

As Murry Weiss explained in a 1945 article describing the SWP's response to a fascist campaign in Los Angeles: "It is not a question of can we 'get by' with some small picket lines of the 'radical' parties. It is a question of how to mobilize masses of workers for struggle, without ignoring the reality of their existing organizations and leadership. Every party venture, every party tactic must be calculated to further this end."

The mobilization of a mass response—that is what revolutionists aim for in combating right-wing and fascist demagogues. The success of this strategy at any given time will, of course, depend on specific circumstances. In the struggle against racist violence in Boston, for example, the size of antiracist demonstrations will vary from time to time. This does not change the necessity of outmobilizing the racists in the streets to show them that they are a minority and cannot intimidate the opponents of racism.

In his 1945 article, Weiss shows how the small Trotskyist forces in Los Angeles were able to apply this strategy of mass mobilization and beat back a campaign by Gerald L.K. Smith to establish a base there for his Christian National Front. The first problem was to alert the workers of the danger facing them. As Weiss said:

Smith's movement is not the isolated German-American Bund, wearing storm-troopers' uniforms and meeting in the Deutsches-Haus. He moves behind a heavy defensive covering of "Christians Unite" and "Against Fascism and Communism!" He works through the churches, the old age pension movement, and every other possible defensive camouflage. Thus when we formulated the policy of our antifascist campaign, our central thought was to force the organized working class into consciousness of who Smith was and the necessity of fighting him. In the first period this was the main need.

A similar problem faces revolutionists today in dealing with the racist offensive

against Blacks. Groups like ROAR and figures like Arthur Jensen and William Shockley—academicians who spread the doctrine of the genetic inferiority of Blacks—are not fascist, but they are laying the groundwork for the emergence of a genuine American fascist movement.

Malik Miah, one of the contributors to *The Fight Against Fascism in the USA*, points out that "it is likely that an American fascist movement will not simply ape the German or Italian fascists, as the American Nazis do. It won't identify with hated figures like Hitler. It will be camouflaged, its features emerging from the American class struggle and American prejudices."

Miah goes on to say:

The Jensens and ROARs are not looked on by masses of Americans as the reactionaries they are. They are not seen as a threat to the whole working class. All too many white people even share their blatant prejudices.

The Nazis, on the other hand, are widely viewed as dangerous, or even "un-American."

The Jensens and the ROARs are the main threat today. They are the ones who are spearheading the government's racist offensive, which is affecting the entire Black community with discriminatory layoffs and cutbacks. Their racist theories of Black inferiority and their demand for racial segregation of schools gain a sympathetic response from millions of whites. Their demagoguery must be seriously answered and exposed before the mass of students and of American working people.

In confronting the ultraright and racist forces such as ROAR and Jensen, the Trotskyists in the Socialist Workers party and Young Socialist Alliance have had to argue against the approach of others on the left. For example, *The Fight Against Fascism in the USA* includes an appendix with material by the Spartacus Youth League, a small sectarian group that organizes small demonstrations of radicals around the demand of "No platform for fascists."

The "no platform" demand gets in the way of mobilizing a mass response to the ultrarightists. As Miah says, "Instead of coming across for what it really is—a struggle in defense of the democratic rights of the working class and oppressed minorities—the struggle is turned into a sterile dispute over the 'rights' of the fascists."

At the same time that the "no platform" demand makes it appear as if the antifascists are attacking democratic rights instead of defending them, it helps foster the idea that government or campus authorities can be relied on as a force to stop the fascists. The American Communist party, in fact, calls directly on the government to outlaw fascist organizations.

This question was taken up by Leon Trotsky in an article titled "Why I Consented to Appear Before the Dies Committee." Dies was the head of the House Un-

American Activities Committee in 1939, when this article appeared. In discussing why he opposed the aims of the Dies committee, Trotsky said:

Being an irreconcilable opponent not only of fascism but also of the present-day Comintern, I am at the same time decidedly against the suppression of either of them.

The outlawing of fascist groups would inevitably have a fictitious character: as reactionary organizations they can easily change color and adapt themselves to any kind of organizational form since the influential sections of the ruling class and of the government apparatus sympathize considerably with them and these sympathies inevitably increase during times of political crisis. . . .

However, the question is not exhausted by this consideration. Under the conditions of the bourgeois regime, all suppression of political rights and freedom, no matter whom they are directed against in the beginning, in the end inevitably bear down upon the working class, particularly its most advanced elements. That is a law of history. The workers must learn how to distinguish between their friends and their enemies according to their own judgment and not according to the hints of the police.

. . . the working class in the capitalist countries, threatened with their own enslavement, must stand in defense of freedom for all political

tendencies including their own irreconcilable enemies.

While revolutionists uphold the democratic rights of *everyone*, this does not mean that violent attacks on the workers movement and oppressed minorities by fascists and ultrarightists have to be tolerated. Farrell Dobbs, for example, describes how the Minneapolis Teamsters union formed a workers defense guard to counter the threat of fascist attacks in 1938. Such defense guards, built as part of the mass working-class movement, will play a central role as fascist organizations grow and the government shows its unwillingness to defend the victims of their attacks.

Today, however, it is the struggle against the government-sponsored racist offensive that is the key to handing the ultraright a setback. Success in building a mass antiracist movement in the United States will be an important step in preparing the working class and its allies for future battles against fascist demagogues and their backers in the ruling class. *The Fight Against Fascism in the USA* will be a valuable weapon in this fight. □

'Go Yankee, Go All the Way Home'

U.S. Forces Begin Withdrawal From Thailand

Under pressure from continuing protests by Thai students, the U.S. military forces in Thailand ended all operations at Thai bases March 21 in preparation for the withdrawal of nearly all American military personnel by July.

The giant air base at Utapao is to be turned over to the Thai military, and the surveillance centers at Ramasun, Chiang Mai, and Kok Kha, which were used to monitor radio communications in the rest of Southeast Asia, are to be dismantled.

The 4,000 American personnel in Thailand were the last significant U.S. force in Indochina. At the height of the Vietnam War, more than 50,000 U.S. troops were stationed in Thailand at seven air bases. Many of the murderous bombing raids over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were launched from Washington's Thai bases.

The withdrawal of American forces from Thailand was ordered by the regime of Premier Kukrit Pramoj March 20 after Washington refused to accept the Thai government's conditions for their continued presence.

About 270 American advisers are to remain in Thailand to administer the \$54.1 million American military assistance program.

Kukrit's call for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces came about two weeks before the scheduled elections on April 4, in

which the presence of the American forces is an important issue.

Thai students have vigorously demanded the immediate withdrawal of all American forces in a series of demonstrations in Bangkok. The National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), which played a major role in launching the mass upsurge in October 1973 that toppled the old military dictatorship, was the main organizer of the protests.

A few days before Kukrit called for the American withdrawal, several thousand students rallied, carrying signs that read "Go Yankee, Go All the Way Home!" and "U.S.-Thai As Equals Not Puppets!"

About 10,000 students and others marched to the American embassy in Bangkok March 21. One of their banners read, "Solidarity with the American people but not with Kissinger's militarism."

A bomb thrown into the procession by unknown assailants killed four students and wounded at least eighty-two others. The day before, a grenade and three plastic bombs were thrown at the NSCT general secretary while he was speaking to a rally. Before these most recent terror attacks, the leader of the rightist Navapol, which has links to Thai military figures, told reporters that he had "definite plans to counter the university students movement." □

PROYECTOS DE RESOLUCION

La Revolución Portuguesa: una Prueba Política

[El texto original, en inglés, de la siguiente resolución apareció en la edición del 22 de marzo de 1976 de *Intercontinental Press* y fue presentada por la Fracción Leninista Trotskista a la reunión de febrero del Comité Ejecutivo Internacional. Recibió la siguiente votación: 17 a favor, 45 en contra y 0 abstenciones.

[Una traducción al español de la resolución presentada por la Tendencia de la Mayoría Internacional puede encontrarse en la edición del 29 de marzo de *Intercontinental Press*.

[La siguiente traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

I. Lecciones del Intento Golpista del 25 de Noviembre, 1975

El intento de golpe del 25 de noviembre de 1975 marcó un cambio decisivo en la revolución portuguesa que ha tenido amplias repercusiones tanto nacional como internamente.

El resultado de la aventura fue el fortalecimiento del gobierno capitalista. Tras el aplastamiento del intento de golpe, el régimen ha incrementado su ofensiva contra la clase trabajadora. Aunque procede cautelosamente por temor a provocar un nuevo ascenso, el gobierno piensa restringir y revertir las conquistas económicas y políticas obtenidas por las masas portuguesas desde el golpe de abril de 1974 que derribó a la dictadura salazarista.

Aunque no se conocen todavía algunos detalles de los acontecimientos del 25 de noviembre, el cuadro general se ha aclarado más a partir de la publicación de varios informes.

El Gobierno Prepara una Trampa

Hay bastante evidencia como para afirmar que el régimen militar pensó que podría provocar a los oficiales "izquierdistas" a emprender una acción aventurera.

Algunos dirigentes del gobierno y del Partido Socialista habían estado emitiendo advertencias contra un intento de golpe "izquierdista" durante el período que precedió al 25 de noviembre. El gobierno anunció públicamente ciertos planes para tratar con semejante eventualidad, como por ejemplo trasladar el centro de comunicaciones al norte. Las acciones del gobierno fueron facilitadas por el curso del Partido Revolucionario del Proletariado (PRP) y el Movimiento de Izquierda Socialista (MES), que habían adoptado una política de "insurrección." El PRP le dió publicidad a sus llamamientos a una insurrección en un futuro inmediato, bajo la forma de una campaña.

Durante la semana que precedió al intento de golpe el gobierno estaba debilitado, pero fingió una debilidad aún mayor, afirmando que no podía gobernar porque no recibía apoyo suficiente del comando

militar de la región de Lisboa. El gobierno se lanzó a la "huelga" para exigir la destitución de Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho como comandante de la región de Lisboa.

Sus acusaciones contra Carvalho partieron de la huelga de los obreros de la construcción a principios de noviembre. Los obreros de la construcción habían rodeado el Palacio de São Bento, atrapando en su interior al Primer Ministro Azevedo hasta que el gobierno concediera sus demandas de aumentos salariales. Esta manifestación masiva y militante fue la primera acción a ese grado que desafiará el programa de austeridad del gobierno. Expresaba la profundización de la decisión de la clase trabajadora para defender sus intereses contra el gobierno capitalista. El peligro desde el punto de vista del régimen era que la victoria de los obreros de la construcción animaría a otros sectores poderosos de trabajadores a seguir su ejemplo.

Carvalho se negó a enviar tropas a dispersar a los obreros de la construcción. Sus razones personales pueden haber tenido algo que ver con sus intentos de renovar su imagen "izquierdista." En realidad, aparentemente ya se había aliado con el Partido Comunista. Pero más importante aún fue el hecho de que cualquier intento de enviar tropas radicalizadas contra la acción masiva de los obreros de la construcción podría haber fracasado. Podría haber encendido una reacción entre los soldados. El gobierno no tomó medidas contra Carvalho en esos momentos, ya que le interesaba provocar una aventura como la del 25 de noviembre, y no una confrontación con la clase obrera misma.

El Consejo de la Revolución, el organismo militar que empuña el verdadero poder en Portugal, en una reunión en la noche del 24 al 25 de noviembre, destituyó a Carvalho de su puesto como comandante de la región de Lisboa. Evidentemente, el régimen pensó que esto sería interpretado como una provocación por el Partido

Comunista, los grupos centristas de la "extrema izquierda" y los oficiales "izquierdistas." La destitución de Carvalho significó una reducción aún mayor del poder de estos oficiales; o sea, aquéllos que intentaban basarse parcialmente en el apoyo del PC y de los centristas.

Los oficiales "izquierdistas" cayeron en la trampa del gobierno. Aparentemente habían preparado un plan anticipando esta acción del Consejo de la Revolución y la noche del 24 al 25 de noviembre lo trataron de llevar a cabo.

El Partido Comunista hizo un llamado a la movilización contra el "giro de derecha." Sin embargo, aunque su participación en la planificación y ejecución del golpe no está clara aún, definitivamente no movilizó a las fuerzas que dirige en un intento coordinado por tomar el poder.

El PRP, el MES y demás grupos que se dicen de izquierda revolucionaria al parecer fueron sorprendidos. Según su propia versión de los acontecimientos, el PRP "se unió al movimiento" sólo después de que había escuchado los llamados a la movilización por parte del PC y de que había recibido una llamada de una delegación de militares "izquierdistas."

Durante la noche, paracaidistas bajo las órdenes de sus sargentos primeros ocuparon cuatro bases de la fuerza aérea. Muchos de los sargentos primeros eran conocidos por sus subordinados como pro-PC. Los portavoces de los paracaidistas exigieron que Carvalho fuera restituido y que el General José Morais e Silva fuese destituido de la comandancia de la fuerza aérea.

Los paracaidistas, hasta unas cuantas semanas antes, habían sido considerados entre las unidades más conservadoras de las fuerzas armadas. Estuvieron con las unidades en las cuales el General Spínola había dependido para su abortado intento golpista del 11 de marzo de 1975. Estas tropas fueron utilizadas por el gobierno para dinamitar los transmisores de Rádio Renascença el 7 de noviembre. Los paracaidistas de la tropa reaccionaron contra la manipulación a la cual habían sido sujetos y afirmaron que el gobierno los había engañado. Cuando el General Morais e Silva habló ante una asamblea de los paracaidistas en la base de Tancos, intentando justificar el asunto de Rádio Renascença, y amenazándolos con la desmovilización, éstos expulsaron a sus oficiales.

Al principio, cuando los paracaidistas ocuparon las cuatro bases, los soldados razos no sabían que se trataba de un

intento de golpe. Pensaban que estaban efectuando una acción militante para exigir la destitución de Morais e Silva como comandante de la fuerza aérea. Una vez movilizados, participaron en el intento.

Cuando ya se había iniciado la acción de los paracaidistas, algunas unidades bajo control "izquierdista" entraron en acción. La policía militar de Lisboa ocupó varios edificios. El Regimiento de Artillería Ligera de Lisboa, en las afueras de la ciudad, montó guardia con vehículos blindados y cañones sin reculada en las entradas del norte de la ciudad. El comando de seguridad militar de Carvalho tomó control de la emisora nacional.

Los oficiales pro-PC de la ya desbandada Quinta División marcharon a las estaciones de televisión. Se encontraba con ellos el que había sido el jefe de la red nacional de televisión bajo el régimen de Vasco Gonçalves. Anunció a los trabajadores de la estación que "el poder popular va a dar las órdenes de ahora en adelante."

Se Cierra la Trampa

El paso tomado por estos oficiales pro-PC y de "extrema izquierda" era lo que el gobierno había anticipado y estaba esperando. El Consejo Militar de la Revolución, con el apoyo de la dirección del PS, se movilizó rápidamente para cerrar la trampa. Usando comandos que habían sido puestos a prueba en varias situaciones para saber si podía contar con ellos, el régimen aplastó rápidamente este desafío, aisló a los paracaidistas y esperó su rendición. Después de todo, el "poder popular" no fue capaz de dar muchas órdenes que digamos.

Básicamente, los obreros no tuvieron nada que ver con el asunto. Observaron desde fuera.

El PC, que no buscaba una confrontación con el grueso de las fuerzas de los militares, al ver como iban las cosas dió marcha atrás, canceló la movilización de sus seguidores y de los sindicatos que dirige, e hizo llamamientos a la "serenidad."

El gobierno pudo presentar sus medidas de emergencia contra la libertad de prensa, de reunión y otros derechos democráticos como si se tratara de medidas para defender la "democracia" contra una asonada provocada por aventureros.

El régimen se movilizó rápidamente para propinar otros golpes en favor de "la ley y el orden" capitalistas. Se proclamó un estado de sitio durante seis días y los militares contaban con los atributos para llevar a cabo arrestos sumarios. Se establecieron cortes militares para tratar con "crímenes contra la paz pública." Se prohibieron las reuniones públicas y las manifestaciones, y se impuso la censura.

El gobierno anunció una congelación de salarios que, entre otras cosas, anulaba la victoria de los obreros de la construcción en el plano económico.

Los partidos políticos fueron proscritos de las fuerzas armadas, como parte de una campaña para restaurar la disciplina jerárquica tradicional.

El gobierno adoptó medidas para purgar la influencia del PC en la prensa nacionalizada.

Una Ofensiva Capitalista

Con un sólo golpe certero, el gobierno fue capaz de recobrar la iniciativa contra los trabajadores. La creciente decisión de los obreros para luchar en pos de satisfacer sus necesidades básicas, que se vió en la manifestación de los trabajadores de la construcción, fue cortada bruscamente.

El 20 de diciembre, Azevedo hizo un llamado para que la población "aceptara voluntaria y conscientemente los sacrificios." En un discurso televisado tres días después, advirtió que: "Las demandas salariales irreales y una tasa de empleo exageradamente alta han causado el cierre de muchas empresas."

Desde que ascendieron al poder en abril de 1974, en todos los gobiernos provisionales, los militares, con el apoyo de sus aliados del PC y del PS, han estado tratando de obligar a las masas a pagar por la crisis económica capitalista. En determinado momento este objetivo fue disfrazado con el llamado demagógico para ganar la "batalla de la producción." Actualmente Azevedo define el mismo objetivo más abiertamente, cuando habla de "una tasa de empleo exageradamente alta" y cuando el 13 por ciento de la fuerza de trabajo se encuentra sin empleo.

El gobierno eliminó los subsidios a los productos de primera necesidad, con el consecuente aumento en los precios, mientras que controlaba fuertemente los aumentos salariales.

Otro aspecto de la ofensiva del gobierno se manifestó el 9 de enero cuando éste anunció que de ninguna manera se aplicaría el programa de reforma agraria en las dos terceras partes del norte de Portugal ni en algunas regiones del sur.

El régimen también lanzó nuevos ataques contra los derechos de reunión y de disensión. Para probar el curso que había adoptado, escogió una manifestación realizada el día primero de enero en Oporto, que fue organizada para exigir la libertad de 140 personas detenidas después de la aventura del 25 de noviembre.

Miembros de la Guardia Nacional Republicana abrieron fuego sobre una multitud de 3,000 personas, matando a tres e hiriendo a varios otros, uno de los cuales murió posteriormente. Una manifestación parecida fue disuelta en Lisboa por los comandos, que dispersaron a la multitud con autos blindados y disparando sobre sus cabezas.

El 13 de enero, el imperante Consejo de la Revolución propuso un plan que aseguraría la permanencia del gobierno militar

en Portugal hasta 1980.

La fuerzas derechistas se han envalentado y se están organizando más abiertamente. A fines de enero, el régimen liberó de la prisión a los principales verdugos del régimen salazarista.

Golpe contra los Trabajadores

Los trabajadores han sido quienes más han sufrido las consecuencias de la aventura perpetrada por los oficiales pro-PC y por la "extrema izquierda" el 25 de noviembre. La culpa de este revés recae principalmente sobre las direcciones de los partidos Socialista y Comunista. Los dirigentes de las fuerzas que se consideran "la izquierda revolucionaria" también comparten gran parte de la responsabilidad.

Los oficiales "izquierdistas" que llevaron a cabo la aventura no exigían un gobierno de los trabajadores para reemplazar al régimen capitalista. Sólo exigían la retención del mando por un oficial "izquierdista," Carvalho, y el despido de Morais e Silva. La lógica de su desafío, de haber tenido éxito, hubiera sido la de cambiar la composición del Consejo de la Revolución y del gobierno, colocando en posiciones claves a diversos oficiales vinculados al PC. Esto equivaldría a regresar a una situación similar a la que existía durante el quinto gobierno provisional, bajo Gonçalves, el verano pasado, cuando el PC jugó el papel de socio menor favorecido por el Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas (MFA).

No fue un intento por establecer un gobierno que excluyera a las fuerzas políticas burguesas como el MFA o el Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), un gobierno que representara los intereses de la clase obrera y los campesinos pobres.

La aventura del 25 de noviembre, por lo tanto, no representó un intento por ir más allá de la política colaboracionista de clase seguida por los estalinistas y los socialdemócratas. Ambos han intentado mantener a los trabajadores que influyen subordinados a los militares. Al mismo tiempo, estos partidos compiten para comprobar qué tan indispensables son para la clase capitalista portuguesa.

El Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas

Ante el ascenso de las masas protuguesas tras el derrocamiento de la dictadura salazarista en abril de 1974, la clase capitalista portuguesa se encontró en una posición política débil. Virtualmente, el MFA fue la única fuerza que surgió del viejo régimen gozando de credibilidad entre las masas. El MFA era el brazo político de la casta rebelde de oficiales.

Desde el principio, el objetivo del MFA no era el de derribar al sistema capitalista y comenzar a construir el socialismo. Todo lo contrario.

El MFA cultivó la imagen de estar por

encima de las clases, de una manera bonapartista. A medida que se profundizaba la radicalización entre la población civil y entre las fuerzas armadas, el MFA se vio obligado a adoptar en mayor medida una retórica "socialista" y "antimperialista" para poder conservar su apoyo. Combinó intentos de represión selectiva con concesiones y promesas diplomáticas a las masas.

En cada etapa han aparecido divisiones y conflictos agudos dentro del MFA sobre qué método hay que usar: la zanahoria o el palo. Algunos sectores del MFA llegaron a ser identificados con el Partido Socialista, el Partido Comunista, o con partidos burgueses. Algunos oficiales como el Presidente, el General Costa Gomes, lograron mantener la apariencia de estar "por encima de todo," al mismo tiempo que utilizaban todas estas fuerzas, cambiando de bando de acuerdo a la situación. De principio a fin, el MFA permaneció como un instrumento político *capitalista*.

Atribuyéndose el papel de árbitro bonapartista de la lucha de clases, el MFA encontró que requería más y más del arbitraje para resolver sus diferencias internas. Las luchas dentro del MFA conllevan siempre la amenaza implícita de violencia por parte de fracciones rivales. Hubo incluso dos intentos golpistas derechistas (septiembre de 1974 y marzo de 1975) y ahora un intento de golpe "izquierdista." Se ha concentrado más y más poder en manos del Consejo de la Revolución. Actualmente, todas las decisiones claves son tomadas por el Consejo, sin convocar a los 200 o más oficiales de la asamblea general del MFA.

El verdadero poder en Portugal ha permanecido en manos de los militares. Los diversos gobiernos provisionales fueron erigidos principalmente para incorporar a los partidos obreros más grandes, el PS y el PC, como colaboradores. La política de los dirigentes de ambos partidos ha sido la de coadyuvar dentro de este esquema y de practicar el colaboracionismo con los militares burgueses, impidiendo el desarrollo del impulso que llevaban los trabajadores hacia la formación de su propio gobierno.

Uno de los objetivos del régimen militar era el de dividir a la clase obrera para desmoralizar y desmovilizar progresivamente a los trabajadores y disipar la amenaza de una acción unida, que podría conducir hacia una revolución socialista.

Con este fin, el MFA realizó un trabajo encaminado a crear enemistades entre el Partido Comunista y el Partido Socialista. La política de ambos partidos, competir por el puesto de socio menor favorecido de los militares, los hizo caer rotundamente en manos del MFA.

Al principio, los militares se apoyaban más en el PC. Los estalinistas tenían un aparato eficaz que habían colocado a disposición del MFA. El PC llegó a ser el polizonte de los militares en el movimiento

laboral, planteando la "batalla de la producción" como si se tratara de algo en interés de los trabajadores y del socialismo.

A cambio, como parte de un ataque contra la independencia sindical, sostuvo a los estalinistas en la posición que ocupaban dentro del movimiento laboral. Por ejemplo, la Ley de Unidad Sindical, aprobada a principios de 1975, garantizó el control del PC sobre la estructura sindical.

Antes de las elecciones para la Asamblea Constituyente el pasado abril, el PS el PC firmaron un "pacto" con los militares, que garantizaba la continuación del dominio castrense independientemente del resultado en las elecciones. En la votación, el PS y el PC obtuvieron juntos una mayoría. Los partidos burgueses obtuvieron una clara minoría de los votos. El PS recibió el porcentaje más alto entre todos los partidos; o sea, el 38 por ciento. Los resultados de las elecciones reflejan el deseo de las masas por el socialismo, y constituyeron un mandato para empujar en esta dirección.

En respuesta al revés sufrido por las fuerzas capitalistas en las elecciones, el MFA lanzó una campaña demagógica contra la Asamblea Constituyente. El MFA comenzó a promulgar un programa para lo que llamaba el "poder popular," que supuestamente podría ser una forma más alta de democracia que la Asamblea Constituyente. Este plan llamaba a la creación de "asambleas populares" bajo el control del MFA. El plan en sí nunca fue impulsado; esto es, a un grado significativo.

Al mismo tiempo, el MFA intentó profundizar la división en la clase obrera, denunciando al PS y acusándolo de ser el "peligro principal" para el socialismo. Los estalinistas fueron los partidarios y los organizadores de esta campaña. Presentaron la bajísima votación a su favor—en comparación con el PS—como un simple ejemplo de los siniestros resultados que se pueden esperar de la "democracia burguesa," y atacaron a la Asamblea Constituyente para así favorecer el falso plan de "poder popular" del MFA. Incluso resucitaron por un tiempo la línea estalinista de principios de los años treinta cuando atacaron al PS de "socialfascista," o de algo muy parecido.

Ataques a los Derechos Democráticos

El PC apoyó plenamente la toma del periódico *República* de manos de sus redactores del Partido Socialista. Intentó sin éxito, junto con el MFA y la "extrema izquierda," bloquear las movilizaciones de masas llamadas por el PS para protestar contra las restricciones gubernamentales de los derechos democráticos, incluso la toma de su periódico.

La popularidad de los estalinistas ya había decaído, lo que fue evidente por la

cantidad de votos que obtuvieron en las elecciones para la Asamblea Constituyente, ya que recibieron aproximadamente el 13 por ciento del total. En gran medida, esto podría ser atribuido a su apoyo a la intensificación del ritmo de trabajo en las fábricas y sus métodos burocráticos en el movimiento obrero. Conforme incrementaba su campaña contra el PS y contra los derechos democráticos de la mayoría de los trabajadores que apoyaba al PS, su popularidad decayó aún más. Y, a medida que ocurría esto, el PC empezó a depender más y más en el MFA para defender las posiciones que mantenía en el movimiento laboral. La postura que defendía era en el sentido que el avance al socialismo debería ser estrictamente controlado por una minoría—por el PC en alianza con el MFA—impidiendo cualquier interferencia por parte de la "mayoría moderada" de los trabajadores que apoyaban al PS.

La campaña del PC en torno a la "batalla de la producción" y contra los derechos democráticos ayudó a abrirle el camino a la restauración de uno de los pilares del dominio capitalista: el temor de las masas de que el socialismo constituye una amenaza a sus derechos y la subyugación a la tiranía.

La campaña estalinista cayó en el juego de las fuerzas reaccionarias. Por primera vez desde el golpe de abril de 1974, los derechistas pudieron movilizar pandillas a fines de julio y en agosto que atacaron y quemaron los locales del PC, especialmente en el norte. Los dirigentes del PS dijeron estar en contra de esas maniobras reaccionarias, pero no hicieron movilizaciones en contra.

Los dirigentes del PS se aprovecharon plenamente de la bandera que se les entregaba. Los trabajadores y capas de la pequeña burguesía radicalizados se inclinaban más y más hacia el PS como resultado de la campaña estalinista. En julio, el PS renunció al gobierno. Lo hizo no por un deseo revolucionario de defender los derechos democráticos de las masas bajo el ataque de un gobierno capitalista; tampoco tenía la intención de luchar por una ruptura de clase con el MFA, por un frente unido de los trabajadores en defensa de sus derechos e intereses contra los capitalistas.

El objetivo de la dirección del PS era el de adelantar su propia campaña para desplazar al PC como el partido obrero dominante en el gobierno capitalista de coalición. Persiguiendo este objetivo, los socialdemócratas profundizaron la división en la clase obrera.

Bajo el impacto de las movilizaciones de los trabajadores del PS y sus partidarios, el MFA decidió hacer un cambio. A principios de septiembre, los oficiales identificados más estrechamente con el PC, como el Primer Ministro General Gonçalves, fueron echados del Consejo de la Revolución. Los oficiales que favorecían una alianza con el PS, por lo menos

temporal, fueron ascendidos. Junto con este cambio en la composición del órgano supremo del MFA, se instaló un nuevo gobierno provisional (el sexto) de colaboración con el capital portugués. El PC fue reducido a un papel simbólico, y el papel principal de socio menor de los militares fue llenado por el PS.

El Sexto Gobierno Provisional

El nuevo gobierno, utilizando la profunda división en la clase obrera, hizo renovados esfuerzos por impulsar el programa de austeridad de los militares. Al igual que su predecesor, proclamaba la necesidad del orden y la disciplina capitalistas en las fábricas y cuarteles.

Pero la continua combatividad de la clase obrera interfirió con sus planes. A principios de septiembre se dieron importantes manifestaciones de soldados, organizadas por Soldados Unidos Vencerán (SUV). El SUV fue organizado independientemente del control del MFA. Aunque abarcaba a sólo una pequeña minoría de los soldados, el SUV reflejaba la continua radicalización entre la tropa, que apuntaba hacia un creciente resquebrajamiento de la disciplina militar.

La huelga militante de los obreros de la construcción en noviembre fue un indicio de la creciente disponibilidad de los obreros a luchar por sus intereses.

La dirección del PC brindó su apoyo a un grado u otro a las manifestaciones del SUV, a la acción de los trabajadores de la construcción y a la movilización de masas el 16 de noviembre, que fue convocada por las comisiones obreras en Lisboa bajo la dirección del PC.

La postura opositora del PC, como la del PS durante la etapa previa, proveyó aperturas a las masas. Su apoyo a los obreros de la construcción por ejemplo, iba directamente en contra de su política, durante el quinto gobierno, de oposición a semejantes luchas en aras de la "batalla de la producción."

Pero su apoyo a las movilizaciones contra el sexto gobierno no señaló ninguna ruptura con su política de subordinación a los militares. Durante estas acciones los estalinistas no hicieron un llamamiento para una ruptura clasista con todas las fuerzas burguesas, incluyendo al MFA. Al contrario, pidieron el regreso de Vasco Gonçalves, que en esencia era un regreso al quinto gobierno provisional.

Así, la aventura del 25 de noviembre ocurrió dentro del marco de la rivalidad entre los dirigentes del PS y los del PC, en cuanto a cuál de los dos podía mejor entregar a los trabajadores al régimen militar.

El FUR también Tiene la Responsabilidad

Los dirigentes de los grupos que se autodenominan la "izquierda revolucionaria" comparten la responsabilidad con los

estalinistas y socialdemócratas en el revés que significaron los acontecimientos del 25 de noviembre y sus consecuencias para los trabajadores.

Los más grandes de estos grupos son el PRP y el MES. Pero lejos de ser la "izquierda revolucionaria," son formaciones centristas. Los repele el oportunismo de los estalinistas y socialdemócratas. Pero no contraponen un programa marxista basado en principios clasistas al oportunismo de los dirigentes de los partidos Socialista y Comunista. En cambio, adoptan una posición "superizquierdista," lanzan esquemas sectarios y acciones aventureras, como atajos a través de los cuales esperan pasarse por encima del problema político de ganar a la mayoría de la clase obrera que apoya al PS y al PC. Al hacer a un lado los principios de independencia de clase, están abiertos a los proyectos colaboracionistas disfrazados con una fraseología "izquierdista." Así, oscilan entre—y a veces combinan—el oportunismo puro y el aventurerismo desenfrenado. El único elemento que permanece constante en su política es el desprecio sectario hacia la mayoría de los trabajadores que todavía siguen al PS or al PC. Colocan sus propios intereses por encima de las necesidades del proletariado y sus aliados.

El PRP y el MES dominaron políticamente el Frente de Unidad Revolucionaria (FUR) que se formó el pasado agosto. El PC estuvo brevemente en este frente como parte de su campaña para salvar al quinto gobierno. A pesar de ser una organización controlada por el PC, el Movimiento Democrático Portugués (MDP) permaneció adentro. Además del PRP, MES y otros grupos centristas, la Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI), organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional, era miembro del FUR.

El FUR fue formado sobre la base oportunista de apoyo crítico al quinto gobierno provisional y de apoyo al plan del COPCON [Comando Operativo del Continente, el contingente interior del ejército portugués, comandado por Carvalho] por construir comités de "poder popular" bajo control del MFA. La LCI, aunque criticaba el apoyo brindado por el FUR a un gobierno capitalista, sostuvo que este apoyo no podía ser un obstáculo para la participación en sí en el FUR.

El intento de golpe del 25 de noviembre desacreditó al conjunto de la "extrema izquierda" y condujo a la desintegración del FUR, mostrando que desde el punto de vista revolucionario no había nada que ganar de la participación en éste.

Las razones que dieron los centristas para justificar su apoyo crítico al quinto gobierno provisional eran diferentes a las de los estalinistas. Su punto de vista era que un gobierno del MFA de "izquierda," de "unidad revolucionaria," debería ser establecido en lugar del sexto gobierno. Este gobierno le entregaría entonces el poder a "los trabajadores organizados en

una estructura que culminaría en una Asamblea Popular Nacional," en las palabras del PRP en el número del 21 de noviembre de su periódico.

El MES declaró, más o menos al mismo tiempo: "Debemos crear las condiciones para la formación de un gobierno de unidad revolucionaria que tenga el poder hasta la creación de la Asamblea Popular Nacional."

Este esquema equivale a tener fe en que un gobierno capitalista "de izquierda" le entregaría el poder a los obreros.

Para comprender esta utopía reaccionaria, tenemos que examinar los conceptos de los centristas sobre la construcción de "soviets."

Estos grupos presentaron una idea falsa de la verdadera extensión de la formación de soviets en Portugal.

Las comisiones obreras que aparecieron durante el periodo posterior a la caída de la dictadura salazarista anunciaron el desarrollo de organizaciones tipo consejo, en caso de que el ascenso no fuera desviado o bloqueado políticamente. Las comisiones obreras fueron formadas en respuesta a la necesidad de organizaciones económicas que representaran a todos los trabajadores de una empresa, una necesidad que sentían agudamente los trabajadores debido a la fragmentación de las organizaciones sindicales bajo la dictadura. Hasta el presente, estos organismos que surgieron en la mayoría de las fábricas han permanecido generalmente dentro del marco de las organizaciones de la lucha económica, y no han funcionado como soviets. O sea, en general no discuten ni actúan en torno a los amplios problemas sociales y políticos que enfrentan la clase obrera y sus aliados.

Las comisiones obreras han sido limitadas y debilitadas aún más por la división en la clase trabajadora. Cualquier avance en el desarrollo del potencial de las comisiones obreras por convertirse en amplios consejos de fábrica que apunten hacia la formación de soviets, depende del éxito en la construcción de frentes unidos de acción y la inclusión de amplios problemas sociales y políticos en su orden del día, tales como los intereses legítimos de estas comisiones.

Algunos de los grupos centristas han creado sus propios "soviets." Estos no son más que agrupaciones de sus propios partidarios. Las comisiones de barrio están aun más fragmentadas: a veces incluso surgen varias comisiones en el mismo barrio, cada una controlada por una tendencia distinta.

El desafío más directo a la autoridad del gobierno capitalista que haya aparecido hasta ahora en Portugal fueron las asambleas y comités de soldados y marineros que surgieron en ciertas ocasiones en varias unidades. Sin embargo, no llegaron a ser comités permanentes a nivel nacional.

Por lo tanto, es incorrecto decir que se

haya alcanzado la etapa del poder dual en Portugal. Organos tipo soviets o consejo, abarcando a las masas de trabajadores y comenzando a funcionar como centros de autoridad y poder en relación a todos los problemas económicos y sociales, paralelos a, y compitiendo con, el gobierno no han surgido en Portugal hasta el momento.

Los fraseólogos revolucionarios hicieron de la propaganda para la "construcción de soviets" el eje de su trabajo, planteando al mismo tiempo una línea política que sólo profundizaba las divisiones en la clase obrera y bloqueaba el camino hacia acciones unitarias y comités de acción tipo frente unido que podrían conducir hacia la creación de verdaderas organizaciones de tipo consejo. Esto condujo al PRP a establecer sus propios "soviets" sectarios, y convirtió a los centristas en víctimas de la demagogia del MFA acerca del "poder popular."

Cuando el MFA anunció su plan de "poder popular" durante el verano, los grupos centristas pensaron que había pasado a adoptar su posición sobre la construcción de "soviets." El 16 de julio, los centristas, ultraizquierdistas y maoístas organizaron una manifestación en apoyo al "poder popular" que marchó a la Asamblea Constituyente bajo las consignas: "MFA, Poder Popular" y "Disolución de la Asamblea Constituyente."

Durante esta campaña de apoyo al MFA, los centristas jugaron el papel de instrumento "izquierdista" para los estalinistas. La Mayoría de los trabajadores portugueses, para quienes las elecciones a la Asamblea Constituyente fueron las primeras y únicas elecciones nacionales en las cuales habían podido participar durante cinco décadas, tan sólo pudieron interpretar esta campaña como algo que iba en contra de sus intereses y derechos.

Al contraponer el "poder popular del MFA" a la Asamblea Constituyente no sólo reforzaron las ilusiones de que el MFA dirigía la lucha por el socialismo. Presentaron la idea de que la democracia obrera—la democracia socialista—contradice la defensa y la extensión de los derechos democráticos que los trabajadores necesitan en su lucha para derrocar al capitalismo.

Los trabajadores del Partido Socialista tan sólo podían interpretar la campaña por abolir la Asamblea Constituyente como una campaña dirigida en contra de ellos, porque su partido había ganado una fuerte mayoría relativa en las elecciones.

El "contingente revolucionario" de grupos centristas, maoístas y ultraizquierdistas apoyó una campaña estalinista que tuvo como consecuencia el fortalecimiento de las fuerzas reaccionarias y burguesas en general, así como el de la dirección colaboracionista del PS.

Estos sectarios no lograron en general comprender la relación entre la democracia burguesa, la democracia proletaria y la revolución socialista. Para ellos continúa siendo un misterio el precepto de Lenin

según el cual la revolución proletaria "... significa una *extensión* gigantesca a nivel histórico y mundial de la democracia, su transformación de falacia en verdad, la liberación de la humanidad de las cadenas del capital, que *distorsiona* y trunca cualquier, aun la más 'democrática' y republicana de las democracias *burguesas*" (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 371, subrayados en el original).

Se unieron a la campaña estalinista contra los derechos democráticos. Apoyaron un ataque contra los legítimos derechos de un partido de los trabajadores, perpetrado por un régimen burgués, en el caso de *República*, afirmando que la toma representaba el camino hacia el control obrero de la producción. Hicieron un llamamiento para que el régimen militar capitalista aboliera la Asamblea Constituyente, como si eso fuera a ayudar al avance hacia la democracia soviética.

Y depositaron confianza en la capacidad y voluntad de por lo menos un ala del MFA para dirigir la lucha por el socialismo. Ignoraron el hecho de que la transición de un régimen burgués a una democracia proletaria se da por medio de una revolución que desarma el aparato de estado capitalista y lo reemplaza con el nuevo poder de un estado obrero; que es fatal mantener ilusiones en que este paso será llevado a cabo por un sector del aparato de estado capitalista, no importa cuánto hablen sus representantes acerca del "poder popular."

Sectarismo

Los grupos que dominaban al FUR combinaron este oportunismo descarado con el sectarismo y el aventurerismo extremos. Atacaron al Partido Socialista como una "fase en la transición hacia el fascismo," y emitieron un llamado para una insurrección contra el sexto gobierno provisional.

A principios de noviembre, el MES escribió: "Por lo tanto, las fuerzas socialdemócratas sirven al avance de las fuerzas fascistas; por lo tanto, no podemos separar nuestra consigna 'Muerte al ELP [Ejército de Liberación Portuguesa, un grupo terrorista de extrema derecha] y a aquéllos que lo apoyan,' de la consigna 'Abajo con la Socialdemocracia.' Es por eso, camaradas, que el MES dice—y es más correcto que nunca y cada día se hace más claro—que la socialdemocracia es una fase en la transición hacia el fascismo."

Esta campaña sectaria, destilando su desprecio por la clase obrera, también clarifica más exactamente qué quieren decir los pequeños grupos centristas con "soviets." Su concepto no tiene nada que ver con los verdaderos soviets, que surgen de comités de lucha de tipo frente único.

Su campaña era por "centralizar" las comisiones y comités que, lejos de haber ganado la lealtad de la mayoría de los trabajadores, fueron vistas por ellos a

menudo como las organizaciones que dirigían la lucha contra sus derechos democráticos.

Su campaña era parte de una ofensiva política que impidió el desarrollo de una lucha de frente unido contra el gobierno capitalista y que coartó la formación de verdaderos consejos obreros para organizar y generalizar estas luchas.

Los consejos obreros o soviets representan la forma más elevada del frente unido: buscan aglutinar a todos los trabajadores de todas las tendencias, dirigirlos en acciones contra la clase enemiga y proveer una arena donde todas las corrientes en el movimiento obrero puedan intentar ganar a una mayoría a sus planteamientos.

Pero los "revolucionarios" de la nueva izquierda del FUR habían renunciado al frente unido en la práctica a través de su campaña sectaria contra la mayoría de los trabajadores que apoyan al Partido Socialista.

Sólo se pueden construir verdaderos soviets en base a la lucha por la unidad de la clase obrera en torno a problemas y demandas concretos, no por medio de llamados a "centralizar" las organizaciones en las cuales la mayoría de la clase obrera no tiene confianza.

Aventurerismo

Los dirigentes del FUR tienen la concepción ultraizquierdista sectaria de una *revolución minoritaria*. Habían consignado a la mayoría de los trabajadores a la extrema derecha. Los partidarios británicos del PRP expresan este punto de vista abiertamente. En una reciente declaración a la prensa, los miembros del International Socialists británicos declararon: "Estamos completamente en desacuerdo con aquéllos, como Lutte Ouvrière [de Francia], que tienen esperanzas en la cooperación—a cualquier nivel—con el Partido Socialista Portugués. Es Mário Soares quien trata de organizar pandillas de tropas de asalto ... para ahogar a la revolución en sangre. Es el PS, su *dirección* y su *base*, quien aplaude que la transmisora de Rádio Renascença—símbolo del control obrero—haya sido dinamitada" (el subrayado es nuestro).

Los revolucionarios pequeñoburgueses del FUR *no creen* que la tarea fundamental en Portugal sigue siendo la de ganar a la mayoría de los trabajadores, quienes actualmente siguen la política de los dirigentes colaboracionistas del PS y del PC y que mantienen ilusiones en el MFA.

Rechazan el concepto marxista de que esto se tiene que lograr antes de que se pueda poner en la orden del día el problema del poder. Creen que la acción resuelta de una "minoría militante" puede provocar a la mayoría a actuar, o impulsarla para dar apoyo tácito a su "insurrección."

Un concepto incorrecto del papel de los soldados se relaciona con esto. El PRP y el

MES veían a la radicalización que se desarrollaba entre los soldados, y que se profundizó durante octubre y noviembre, como una precondition suficiente para la revolución. Suponen que si los soldados revolucionarios dieran un paso audaz, los trabajadores los apoyarían.

Esto era especialmente cierto, creían ellos, ya que según el punto de vista impresionista de los dirigentes del FUR el gobierno era impotente. El 10 de noviembre la dirigente del PRP Isabel do Carmo declaró en una conferencia de prensa: "En estos momentos para nosotros no existe otra solución que la insurrección armada. Como lo demuestra la historia, la burguesía desata una guerra civil cada vez que quiere defender sus intereses. Afortunadamente, las fuerzas derechistas no tienen ejército alguno en Portugal."

Los centristas invirtieron la verdadera relación que existe entre los trabajadores y los soldados en una revolución genuina. En su *Historia de la Revolución Rusa*, Trotsky discutió con aquéllos que presentaban al bolchevismo "como un movimiento de soldados."

Trotsky les contestó: Aquí fueron ignorados los hechos históricos fundamentales: que el proletariado había sido el primero en pasar al bando de los bolcheviques; que los obreros de Petrogrado señalaron el

camino a los obreros de todos los países; que la guarnición y el frente, durante bastante tiempo, permanecieron como bastiones de los conciliadores; que los socialistas revolucionarios y los mencheviques introdujeron en los soviets toda clase de privilegios para el soldado, en perjuicio del obrero, lucharon contra el armamento de los trabajadores e incitaron a los soldados contra ellos; que sólo bajo la influencia de los obreros se produjo el cambio entre las tropas; que en el momento decisivo la dirección de los soldados estuvo en manos de los obreros. . ."

Tras el intento golpista, los centristas criticaron la traición del PC.

El PC sí les dio la espalda a las fuerzas que habían impulsado la acción del 25 de noviembre, lo cual incrementa su papel criminal en el asunto. Pero los bobos del FUR pensaron que el PC era capaz de seguir un curso revolucionario y ayudaron a alentar ilusiones en los estalinistas.

A principios de noviembre, el MES escribió: "No es la 'izquierda revolucionaria' la que es arrastrada por el Partido Comunista, sino que es el Partido Comunista el que sistemáticamente, desde que le dio su apoyo al documento del COPCON, en momentos decisivos de la lucha ha sido arrastrado tras la izquierda revolucionaria."

II. Balance de la Línea de la TMI

Desde mediados de 1975, hasta la víspera de la aventura del 25 de noviembre, la dirección de la Tendencia de la Mayoría Internacional sostuvo que el peligro principal para la revolución portuguesa era la "contrarrevolución democrática." Su esquema fue resumido por el camarada Charles Michaloux en el número del 31 de julio de *Inprecor*. Michaloux declaró que el MFA "ya no podía jugar adecuadamente" el papel de restablecer "un instrumento coherente y eficaz de autoridad política y los elementos iniciales de un aparato represivo activo" porque su "autoridad había sido minada dentro de la burguesía y el proletariado."

"Bajo estas condiciones," continúa, "en una fase inicial, la burguesía ha optado a favor de la reconstitución del orden burgués a través de vías parlamentarias legales. . . . Ese es el sentido de la ofensiva de Mário Soares, que propone a la Asamblea Constituyente en contraposición no a una 'dictadura militar' inexistente, sino (explícitamente) a la 'anarquía' y a la 'ausencia de autoridad gubernamental,' que conducirían a una 'dictadura comunista' si continuaban."

"La burguesía portuguesa e internacional en su conjunto apoya esta maniobra."

El esquema de la TMI estaba equivocado en cada uno de estos puntos. El MFA no fue abandonado por "la burguesía portuguesa e internacional en su conjunto," a favor de una "contrarrevolución democrá-

tica" basada en la Asamblea Constituyente. Todo lo contrario, el MFA era y permanece "el instrumento político esencial de la burguesía imperialista portuguesa," tal como insistió la Fracción Leninista Trotskista en su declaración de agosto de 1975, "Los Problemas Claves de la Revolución Portuguesa."

El sexto gobierno provisional no se basa en la Asamblea Constituyente. Este gobierno no fue erigido por "vías parlamentarias legales." La Asamblea Constituyente no ha reemplazado al gobierno militar, sino que ha quedado maniatada por el pacto-programa. El Consejo de la Revolución del MFA sique siendo el verdadero poder, y éste está lejos de ser "inexistente." Está, en realidad, llevando a cabo una ofensiva contra la clase obrera tras la aventura del 25 de noviembre.

Además de señalar que el MFA era el instrumento político esencial de la clase capitalista portuguesa ante el ascenso de masas, la FLT denunció precisamente el colaboracionismo de los estalinistas y socialdemócratas, expresado en la situación concreta de Portugal como *subordinación al MFA*. La FLT señaló que esto era clave para que el MFA mantuviera su habilidad de jugar un papel bonapartista para la burguesía.

La TMI virtualmente ignoró este obstáculo político central para la movilización independiente de la clase obrera y la necesidad de montar una campaña para

superarlo. Por lo tanto, no logró ver que un elemento primordial en la traición de los socialdemócratas durante el verano fue su subordinación al MFA, no una "contrarrevolución democrática" para reemplazar al MFA con un gobierno basado en la Asamblea Constituyente.

El esquema de la "contrarrevolución democrática" fue complementado por la concepción de la existencia de "dos campos," el "campo" de la "contrarrevolución democrática" y el "campo" de aquéllos que se oponían a este peligro. Ya que a la burguesía en su conjunto se le colocó en el campo de la "contrarrevolución democrática," el otro campo era el de la clase obrera. Así, el esquema de los dos campos fue presentado como un "análisis de clase."

"La jerarquía militar, la dirección del PS y la burguesía portuguesa e internacional estaban todas alineadas en un sólo campo, mientras que un sector creciente de los obreros portugueses, soldados y campesinos pobres se encontraba en el campo opuesto," escriben los camaradas Mandel, Maitan y Frank en "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Portugal." [*Intercontinental Press*, December 15 1975, p. 1769.]

Al nivel gubernamental, veían un retroceso para el campo de la clase obrera: "La ofensiva en la que Soares era la punta de lanza tuvo éxito a nivel gubernamental. El gobierno de Gonçalves fue derribado."

¿En qué campo colocaba la TMI a los estalinistas? ¿Dónde colocaba al gobierno de Gonçalves? ¿Al ala Gonçalves del MFA? ¿Al ala COPCON del MFA? Ya que estas fuerzas se oponían a la "ofensiva en la que Soares era la punta de lanza," han de haber estado en el campo de los "obreros, soldados y campesinos pobres."

El esquema de los "dos campos" no es un "análisis de clase." Es un *substituto* para el análisis de clase de los acontecimientos políticos en Portugal y para llegar a una línea clasista independiente. Cuando los estalinistas y el quinto gobierno provisional lanzaron un ataque contra los derechos democráticos del Partido Socialista, la TMI no vislbró que se trataba de un ataque contra la clase obrera misma. Se opuso a una campaña directa que defendiera los derechos del Partido Socialista, al mismo tiempo que se opusiera a las perspectivas colaboracionistas de la dirección del PS. No veía la necesidad de oponerse a la campaña contra el PS llevada a cabo por el gobierno capitalista militar apoyada por los estalinistas, oponiéndose al mismo tiempo a los objetivos contrarrevolucionarios de los socialdemócratas. Estaban en contra de participar en las grandes manifestaciones del 18 y 19 de julio en defensa de los derechos democráticos de estos últimos; favorecieron las contramanifestaciones organizadas por los estalinistas y la "extrema izquierda," que la mayoría de los trabajadores veía correctamente como manifestaciones dirigidas en contra de sus derechos. No lograron ver que las masas se aprovecharon de la

oportunidad provista por la postura opositora del PS en las manifestaciones del 18 y 19 de julio, para luchar en defensa de sus propios intereses a pesar de la dirección del PS. La TMI no hizo distinción alguna entre semejantes manifestaciones y aquellas llamadas por el PS para apoyar al "grupo de los nueve." En lugar de intentar encontrar una apertura para la intervención de los marxistas revolucionarios con su propio programa en la situación creada por la postura opositora del PS, la TMI apoyó las manifestaciones que tenían como principal objetivo la defensa del quinto gobierno provisional, como la manifestación del 20 de agosto en Lisboa.

Juzgando la realidad desde el punto de vista simplista de los "dos campos," la TMI dedujo que una posición política basada en los intereses de los trabajadores, independiente de ambas alas del MFA y de los estalinistas y socialdemócratas, realmente significaba colocarse en el "campo" de la burguesía. Así caracterizaron la negativa de la FLT a alinearse con ellos en el "campo" de los oficiales "izquierdistas" del MFA.

El que la TMI no lograra proyectar una línea clasista independiente condujo a otras desviaciones. Contrapusieron la "construcción de soviets" a la Asamblea Constituyente, perdiendo de vista el hecho de que las masas necesitan aprender a través de sus propias experiencias que las formas soviéticas de organización son superiores a cualquier forma de democracia burguesa. La TMI se negó a proyectar una línea clasista en relación a la Asamblea Constituyente por temor a fomentar "ilusiones" en ésta, lo que ayudaría a la "contrarrevolución democrática." En las elecciones a la Asamblea Constituyente en las cuales el PS y el PC recibieron una mayoría, rechazaron el uso de este resultado favorable para propagandizar un gobierno de los trabajadores y campesinos, exigiendo que el PS y el PC rompieran su pacto con el MFA burgués.

Los camaradas Mandel, Maitan y Frank rechazaron la demanda por un gobierno PC-PS, que es una concreción de la demanda por la unidad de clase y la independencia al nivel gubernamental, en base a que "las masas no pueden comprender y no comprenderán la consigna por 'un gobierno PC-PS' más que como un gobierno basado en la Asamblea Constituyente; o sea, la reconstrucción del aparato de estado burgués, del 'orden público' burgués. Ese es precisamente el objetivo inmediato de la contrarrevolución burguesa; tenemos que oponernos a ésta con todas nuestras fuerzas." ("Revolution and Counterrevolution in Portugal.")

Encontramos aquí una expresión significativa de la fraseología revolucionaria. El aparato de estado prácticamente se ha derrumbado. El "objetivo inmediato" de la contrarrevolución burguesa es el de reconstruirlo a través de la "Asamblea Constituyente." Hay que oponernos a este objetivo

burgués "con todas nuestras fuerzas."

Todo está volteado de cabeza. En vez de comenzar con las necesidades reales de las masas de trabajadores, romper con el MFA y todas las formaciones burguesas, la TMI comienza con un plan que posiblemente pudo haber sido contemplado por la burguesía, y deduce de esta posibilidad que es peligroso llamar a un gobierno PC-PS como parte de la lucha contra el frentepopulismo de las direcciones del PC y del PS.

"El llamado que debemos hacer," escriben los camaradas Mandel, Maitan y Frank, "es por un gobierno de los trabajadores y campesinos basado en una asamblea obrera nacional." La demanda por un gobierno PC-PS crea "otro obstáculo en el camino hacia la formación de la asamblea obrera nacional (a asamblea popular nacional). . . ." Nos dicen que la consigna por un gobierno PC-PS podría ser aplicable "si realmente se convoca una asamblea obrera nacional y si ésta tuviera una mayoría del PC y del PS; o sea, en el caso de que se dé una situación parecida a la de Rusia después de la convocatoria al Primer Congreso de los Soviets. En ese caso, el llamado por un gobierno PC-PS estaría de acuerdo con un llamado para formar el poder soviético, tal como sucedió en Rusia de abril a julio de 1917, y sería totalmente correcto."

Esto hace que la formación de soviets que aún no existen y la convocatoria a una asamblea obrera nacional se conviertan en una *precondición* para luchar contra la política frentepopulista de los estalinistas y socialdemócratas a nivel gubernamental. El obstáculo principal para la movilización independiente de la clase obrera permanece sin ser cuestionado, y los marxistas revolucionarios se quedan sin respuesta ante uno de los problemas centrales de la revolución portuguesa.

En respuesta a los camaradas Foley, Hansen y Novack, los autores de "Revolución y Contrarrevolución en Portugal" escriben: "No estamos de acuerdo con ellos cuando dicen que 'la clave para construir el poder obrero es política,' si lo que están tratando de decir con 'construir el poder obrero' es el desarrollo de una situación de poder dual generalizado y no la conquista en sí del poder, que viene después. Lejos de poder surgir de los 'problemas políticos nacionales' y de la agitación en torno a consignas tales como 'Gobierno PC-PS' o 'Por una Asamblea Constituyente Soberana,' los verdaderos consejos obreros están surgiendo actualmente y seguirán surgiendo en torno a todos los problemas de las luchas inmediatas de las masas. Estas luchas combinan problemas políticos específicos—tales como la lucha contra las conspiraciones fascistas, la defensa de los derechos políticos y actividades de los soldados y la lucha contra la censura impuesta por el gobierno—con problemas que en gran medida son económicos y sociales. *La síntesis política vendrá al final, no al principio*" (los subrayados son

de Mandel, Maitan y Frank).

Estamos de acuerdo en que los soviets pueden surgir del desarrollo de comités de acción, de frente unido, que luchan en torno a problemas de interés inmediato para las masas, mucho antes de que la mayoría de los trabajadores rompa con el frentepopulismo de los estalinistas y socialdemócratas. Pero la clave para hacer avanzar las acciones de frente unido y las luchas es política. Los camaradas Mandel, Maitan y Frank sostienen la posición de que los marxistas revolucionarios deben esperar a que surja una situación de poder dual antes de exigir que los partidos apoyados por la gran mayoría de los trabajadores portugueses rompan políticamente con la burguesía y se lancen a una lucha por un gobierno obrero y campesino. Esta innovación es falsa y perniciosa.

El Programa de Transición señala que la "tarea central de la Cuarta Internacional consiste en liberar al proletariado de la vieja dirección, cuyo espíritu conservador está en completa contradicción con la situación catastrófica del capitalismo en decadencia y que es el freno principal del progreso histórico. La acusación capital que la Cuarta Internacional lanza contra las organizaciones tradicionales del proletariado, es la de que no quieren separarse del semicadáver político de la burguesía. En estas condiciones la demanda dirigida sistemáticamente a la vieja dirección: '¡Romped con la burguesía, tomad el poder!', es un instrumento extremadamente importante para desenmascarar el carácter traidor de los partidos y organizaciones de la Segunda y la Tercera Internacionales, así como también de la Internacional de Amsterdam. . . ."

"Nosotros exigimos de todos los partidos y organizaciones que se apoyan en los obreros y campesinos, que rompan políticamente con la burguesía y tomen el camino de la lucha por el poder de los trabajadores y campesinos. En este camino les prometemos un completo apoyo contra la reacción capitalista. Al mismo tiempo desarrollamos una incansable agitación en torno a las reivindicaciones que deben constituir, en nuestra opinión, el programa del 'gobierno obrero y campesino.'"

Al mismo tiempo que luchan por la política de frente unido en las comisiones obreras, en los sindicatos, en los comités de acción, etc., los trotskistas en Portugal deben centrar desde un principio su trabajo contra el colaboracionismo de clase de las "organizaciones tradicionales del proletariado," y eso requiere una consigna gubernamental dirigida hacia los dos grandes partidos de trabajadores. Lejos de entrar en contradicción con nuestra política de frente único, que apunta hacia la construcción de órganos de poder obrero, la demanda por un gobierno PC-PS favorece a esa política. En 1922, al escribir sobre la necesidad de que el nuevo Partido Comunista francés planteara la demanda por un gobierno de los trabajadores en relación a

la socialdemocracia, Trotsky explicó: "En estos momentos, provee una perspectiva general para el conjunto de la lucha por demandas inmediatas, provee una perspectiva general para la lucha, no sólo la de los trabajadores comunistas, sino para la de las amplias masas que todavía no se adhieren al comunismo, relacionándolas y uniéndolas a los comunistas a través del efecto unificador de una tarea común. Esta fórmula es el apogeo de la política del frente unido." ("The Case for a Workers Government in France" [Por qué Debemos Plantear un Gobierno de los Trabajadores en Francia], en *The Workers and Farmers Government*, Education for Socialists, p. 46.)

Actualmente es esencial plantear la consigna por un gobierno PC-PS en Portugal para que tenga éxito la tarea de construir un partido revolucionario basado en un programa clasista, en oposición al colaboracionismo de las demás tendencias políticas.

La idea de que el plantear la demanda por un gobierno PC-PS constituye un "obstáculo" para la construcción de soviets, porque "crearía ilusiones en la Asamblea Constituyente, debe ser clasificada como sectarismo ultraizquierdista puro. Incluso, cuando existieron verdaderos soviets en Rusia, los bolcheviques no los contrapusieron a la consigna por una Asamblea Constituyente. Tomaron una actitud clasista hacia la cuestión de la Asamblea Constituyente, defendiéndola contra la burguesía y los conciliadores. El realismo revolucionario exige que sólo cuando *verdaderamente* surge un gobierno revolucionario soviético en el transcurso de la lucha real, es cuando los seguidores de los bolcheviques deben contraponerlo a un gobierno burgués basado en una asamblea constituyente.

Vale la pena recordar la política de los revolucionarios rusos sobre esta cuestión: "Pero también los bolcheviques, a pesar de no encontrar una salida por el camino de la democracia formal, todavía no habían renunciado a la idea de la Asamblea Constituyente. Además, no lo podían hacer sin abandonar el realismo revolucionario. El que el futuro curso de los acontecimientos creara las condiciones para una rotunda victoria del proletariado, no podía ser previsto con absoluta certeza. Pero fuera de la dictadura de los soviets, y hasta llegar a esta dictadura, la Asamblea Constituyente sería la conquista suprema de la revolución. Exactamente de la misma manera en que los bolcheviques defendieron a los soviets conciliadores y a los municipios democráticos contra Kornilov, así mismo estaban listos para defender a la Asamblea Constituyente contra las intenciones de la burguesía" (Trotsky, *Historia de la Revolución Rusa*).

Siguiendo la tradición de los bolcheviques, la FLT favorecía el llamar a los partidos Socialista y Comunista a tomar el poder, sobre la base del mandato que

habían ganado en las elecciones para la Asamblea Constituyente. Favorecíamos el plantear esta consigna como un paso para establecer un gobierno de tipo soviético. Por supuesto, nos oponíamos rotundamente a darle confianza política alguna a esta Asamblea Constituyente, ya que se trata de una institución burguesa.

La TMI adoptó como eje de su posición la supuesta estrategia de construir el poder dual. El "siguiente paso hacia adelante," según los camaradas Mandel, Maitan y Frank, es el "generalizar, coordinar y centralizar los órganos de poder obrero, y no el de transmitir el poder a la Asamblea Constituyente."

En esta frase, los dirigentes de la TMI parecen estar diciendo que ya existen órganos de poder obrero. En otras partes hablan de formas "embrionarias" de semejantes órganos, y afirman que el poder dual no existe aún en Portugal. En todo caso, en la etapa que precedió al intento golpista del 25 de noviembre, la TMI presentó la situación como si el poder dual empezara rápidamente a surgir. Por ejemplo, un artículo en el número del 25 de julio de *Rouge* declaró: "En el seno del MFA mismo, las diferencias se profundizan. La derecha, que por el momento se ha refugiado en el apoyo a la política del PS, intenta dominar y controlar a los elementos progresivos del MFA, que son arrastrados por el torrente de la revolución y que buscan confusamente una nueva base de poder en los comités. Es en el surgimiento de estos comités donde se encuentra la clave de la situación actual. Como órganos de poder dual nacientes, están haciendo que surja la más alta unidad de la clase obrera, el frente único obrero."

Durante esta campaña, la TMI confundió elementos de carácter muy distinto. Mezclaron el muy importante desarrollo de las comisiones obreras y de los comités de soldados y marineros que aparecieron en determinadas unidades en diferentes momentos, con los "soviets" sectarios erigidos por los grupos centristas, así como con el plan del "poder popular" propagandizado por el MFA.

Las comisiones obreras eran consejos de fábrica embrionarios. Los comités de soldados y marineros eran consejos embrionarios dentro de las fuerzas armadas. Apuntaban hacia formaciones de tipo soviético. Cualquier avance hacia la construcción de verdaderas organizaciones tipo consejo dependía de un curso político correcto. Parte de ese curso político correcto era explicar que los "soviets" sectarios establecidos por los seguidores de los grupos centristas eran obstáculos para la construcción de verdaderos soviets que abarcaran amplios círculos de trabajadores en un verdadero frente unido. Otro elemento esencial de un curso político correcto era desenmascarar el plan de poder popular del MFA como un obstáculo para la construcción de soviets. Aun otro elemento esencial era defender a la Asam-

blea Constituyente intransigentemente contra los intentos por parte del gobierno capitalista para exterminarla.

La TMI hizo lo contrario. Presentó a los "soviets" sectarios como verdaderos soviets, como aquéllos que se encontraban entre los "órganos de poder obrero" que hay que "generalizar," y "coordinar," y "centralizar." El número de *La Gauche* del 17 de julio dice en su editorial: "Nuestros camaradas de la LCI ya han establecido un frente unido con los socialistas izquierdistas del MES que populariza e *inicia* el establecimiento, generalización y coordinación de semejantes consejos" (subrayado nuestro).

Mas no se pueden crear verdaderos soviets sólo a través de la iniciativa de pequeños grupos. Tienen que surgir de verdaderas luchas de frente unido, comités de acción, etc., que los pequeños grupos pueden ayudar a iniciar, si tienen una línea correcta. Los "soviets" lanzados por los centristas—como lo demostró la proliferación de los comités de barrio—no fueron siquiera embrionarios. Nacieron muertos.

Lo que realmente estaba tras la posición de la TMI de que el doble poder florecía en Portugal era su esperanza de que el plan del gobierno capitalista de construir comités de base para apoyarse podría ser utilizado para construir soviets. El mismo editorial de *La Gauche* declara: "El reciente plan 'MFA-Pueblo' hace un llamado para el establecimiento generalizado de comités de masas (con el objetivo de mantener y expandir la base social del MFA en los cuarteles, las fábricas y los barrios). Este llamado crea la base para que toda la población de las masas trabajadoras se organice y se arme en los consejos de obreros, campesinos, consejos de barrio y consejos de soldados, INDEPENDIENTEMENTE del aparato de estado capitalista."

La cita del número del 25 de julio de *Rouge* que señalamos anteriormente iba en el mismo sentido. En el mismo número de *Rouge* un artículo declaraba: "Actualmente se multiplican las asambleas populares, tras la decisión de la Asamblea del MFA. La siguiente etapa podría ser la convocatoria de una Asamblea Popular Nacional, un paso decisivo hacia la creación de un estado obrero en Portugal."

En el número del 18 de julio de *Rouge*, el camarada Michaloux escribió: "... en Portugal, el poder gubernamental titubea, mientras que el poder de las bases comienza a tomar forma. Ya tiene nombre: asambleas populares, que elegirán una Asamblea Nacional de los obreros y soldados. La Asamblea Nacional creará un gobierno obrero y campesino. . . ."

El *Red Weekly*, *Was Tun* y los demás periódicos que se adhieren a la línea de la TMI expresaron la misma conclusión: el plan del gobierno capitalista no era un obstáculo para la construcción de soviets, sino que abría el camino para ello. La TMI se convirtió, quiéralo o no, en un portador

de la demagogia del MFA.

El verdadero objetivo del plan del MFA era profundizar la división en la clase obrera. El falso esquema del "poder popular" era parte de la campaña del quinto gobierno provisional contra el Partido Socialista y la Asamblea Constituyente. Al apoyar este plan, la "estrategia" de la TMI "por construir el poder dual" ayudó a profundizar la división de la clase trabajadora en beneficio de la burguesía. La mayoría de los obreros y la pequeña burguesía radicalizados vieron el plan como algo que iba en contra de sus derechos. Así, la campaña de la TMI era indistinguible de la de los centristas y ultraizquierdistas, y dificultó aún más, por lo tanto, la construcción del frente único y de los verdaderos soviets.

La única forma en que se podrían fortalecer los consejos de fábrica embrionarios y los comités de soldados y marineros, el crear comités de acción y formaciones de tipo frente unido, que apuntaran hacia la formación de soviets, sería planteando una política de frente unido sobre líneas clasistas; o sea, sobre las líneas expresadas en el Programa de Transición, utilizando las demandas inmediatas, democráticas y de transición hasta, e incluyendo, la consigna de los soviets.

La campaña de la TMI por "generalizar, coordinar y centralizar los órganos de poder obrero" no siguió el método del Programa de Transición. La TMI aisló la consigna de los soviets del contexto del programa; o sea, intentó impulsarlo sin ligarlo a la lucha política viva a través de un programa clasista. Esto los llevó a apoyar las campañas sectarias de los centristas y ultraizquierdistas por construir sus propios "soviets" y, finalmente, a apoyar un truco demagógico de un régimen capitalista que ayudó a bloquear la formación de soviets. La consigna de los soviets *corona* el Programa de Transición, no lo *sustituye*.

La TMI actuó como si realmente creyera que al ignorarse los problemas políticos principales se podrían construir los soviets, y que tal vez incluso esto lo haría el MFA (que no obstante tomaron por impotente). Los trabajadores del PC y los trabajadores "moderados" del PS entrarían en masa a estos organismos ejemplares una vez erigidos, y los obstáculos políticos objetivos serían evitados.

Errores del PRT

Los camaradas del Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores portugués (PRT) cambiaron su posición política, que previamente había sido correcta, sobre el carácter burgués del MFA en una "autocrítica" impresa el 10 de julio. Su autocrítica incluía la siguiente declaración: "Es el MFA el que introduce otra organización, otro poder, en las fuerzas armadas burguesas, un poder dual." En la práctica, el PRT se alejó de las implicaciones de su posición sobre el MFA, negándose a entrar al FUR

debido a su plataforma frentepopulista. Pero nunca corrigió explícitamente su error.

Al mismo tiempo, los camaradas del PRT han hecho, como la TMI, un llamamiento para la "centralización" de los embriones de poder dual como el eje central de su trabajo. El PRT afirma que una situación de "poder dual atomizado" existe en Portugal. Pero el mismo término "poder dual atomizado" se contradice. El poder dual se refiere a la existencia de dos poderes de clase, paralelos y rivales. Aunque la burguesía definitivamente tiene su poder, tiene su gobierno (que no está atomizado), todavía no hay ningún poder paralelo de los trabajadores. El poder no puede ser atomizado. Por naturaleza está centralizado, en tanto que sea poder. El "poder dual atomizado" es un poder tan pulverizado que más bien es "poder dual impotente."

El Giro del 'Noveno Congreso Mundial'

Se puede trazar el origen de la línea de la TMI sobre Portugal al giro ultraizquierdista emprendido por la mayoría de los delegados en el Noveno Congreso Mundial. Este giro fue codificado para Europa en el documento titulado: "La Construcción de Partidos Revolucionarios en Europa Capitalista."

La resolución sobre Europa de la TMI consideraba tres "tácticas" para construir el partido en el período actual. A saber: entrismo *sui generis*; "un crecimiento orgánico masivo" (el documento rechazaba estas primeras dos tácticas, en favor de una tercera); y la tercera táctica, que fue descrita como "ganar la hegemonía" en la "nueva vanguardia de masas" para "transformarla, convirtiéndola en el instrumento adecuado para recomponer al movimiento obrero organizado." Para poder impulsar esta "táctica," el documento planteaba "organizar campañas políticas nacionales en torno a problemas cuidadosamente seleccionados que correspondan a las necesidades de la nueva vanguardia de masas, que no vayan contra la corriente de las luchas de masas y que ofrezcan la oportunidad para demostrar una capacidad para la iniciativa eficaz. . . ."

La minoría del CEI, que posteriormente formó la Tendencia Leninista Trotskista, votó a favor de un contrainforme a la resolución de la TMI sobre Europa, presentado por la camarada Mary-Alice Waters en la reunión del CEI en diciembre de 1972. Este contrainforme advertía que la línea proyectada por la resolución de la TMI se alejaba del método del Programa de Transición:

"En otras palabras, el documento proponía que las secciones de la Cuarta Internacional deberían determinar las acciones que iban a iniciar tomando como punto de partida los 'intereses de la vanguardia' ¡y asegurándose después que

tales acciones no entrarían en contradicción con las luchas de las masas!

"¿Qué tiene de equivocado semejante proyecto?"

"El punto de partida para los marxistas revolucionarios no consiste en nuestros propios intereses subjetivos o las perspectivas inmediatas de la 'vanguardia.' Empezamos con los intereses objetivos de los sectores más amplios de las masas trabajadoras y lo que hay que hacer para avanzar la lucha de clases nacional e internacionalmente. Nunca empezamos con la vanguardia, tratando entonces de hacer compatibles sus intereses y preocupaciones con las necesidades de la clase obrera. Hacemos todo lo contrario. Partimos de las necesidades objetivas de las masas. Entonces movilizamos las fuerzas más amplias que podemos alcanzar e influenciar y las dirigimos en la lucha para ganar las reivindicaciones concretas que correspondan a las necesidades y la conciencia de las amplias masas, y que puedan avanzar la lucha y así elevar su nivel de conciencia. Usamos métodos de lucha que incrementan la confianza de las masas en sí mismas y las enseñan a depender de su propio poder independiente.

"La diferencia entre estos dos puntos de partida—los intereses de la vanguardia o las necesidades objetivas de las masas trabajadoras—no es ni pequeña ni quisquillosa. De estos dos puntos de partida surgen dos cursos divergentes de acción. Uno tiende hacia las demandas maximalistas y las denominadas acciones 'militantes,' que supuestamente reflejan el nivel de conciencia de la 'vanguardia.' En realidad, son adaptaciones al atrazo político de ésta. El otro se basa firmemente en el *método* del Programa de Transición, que apunta hacia movilizar a las masas en lucha, cualquiera que sea su nivel de conciencia, y moverlas hacia la revolución socialista.

"Aun cuando no podemos movilizar a las masas obreras tras nuestra bandera (o la bandera del frente único en el cual participamos), aun si sólo la 'vanguardia' nos sigue, de todos modos organizamos esa 'vanguardia,' grande o pequeña, en acciones que expresan las necesidades y la conciencia de las masas, no los intereses de la 'vanguardia.' No procedemos de acuerdo con una teoría etapista: hoy ganamos a la vanguardia, mañana a la clase obrera. Los dos aspectos de nuestra intervención están totalmente interrelacionados y proceden simultáneamente. Para ganar reclutas a nuestras secciones de entre elementos de vanguardia debemos convencerlos de lo correcto de nuestro programa para las masas."

La advertencia hecha por la minoría del CEI en el sentido de que la línea de la TMI anunciaba una adaptación a la línea política de la "nueva vanguardia de masas" se cumplió, desafortunadamente, en Portugal. La "nueva vanguardia de masas" (también llamada "extrema izquierda," o "izquierda revolucionaria")

resultó estar compuesta por grupos centristas o izquierdistas. La línea de la TMI fue adaptada para acoplarse al curso actual de estas formaciones heterogéneas, aunque la adherencia formal de la TMI al programa trotskista impidió que cayera en los peores errores sectarios u oportunistas.

El "generalizar, coordinar y centralizar los órganos de poder obrero," como lo usó la TMI en Portugal, no fue un ejemplo de presentación de la consigna de los soviets tal como fue promulgada en el Programa de Transición, sino una reducción de esa consigna a un nivel sectario. La campaña de la TMI fue recortada para ajustarse a las "preocupaciones" de los centristas. El tema de la TMI en torno a "iniciativas minoritarias" se centró en el apoyo a los pequeños "soviets" iniciados por los centristas y ultraizquierdistas. Se reflejaba en su apoyo a la acción de la "vanguardia" el 16 de julio convocada por los falsos "soviets" para exigir que el gobierno burgués disolviera la Asamblea Constituyente.

La concepción de la TMI acerca de la "violencia minoritaria," o de "acciones ejemplares" llevadas a cabo por un pequeño grupo, que encaja con el giro adoptado por la mayoría de los delegados en el Noveno Congreso Mundial hacia elevar la táctica de la guerra de guerrillas a una estrategia en América Latina, y que fue codificado en el Décimo Congreso Mundial en el documento de la TMI sobre la lucha armada, encajó con los llamamientos de los centristas y ultraizquierdistas para una "insurrección" minoritaria en la víspera de la intentona del 25 de noviembre. La TMI se diferenció de estos llamados en particular (aunque mucho más vigorosamente después del 25 de noviembre que antes de esta fecha), pero permaneció partidaria del FUR mientras que los componentes principales de ese bloque sin principios cayeron en el juego del régimen capitalista con sus peligrosas demandas pequeñoburguesas en pos de una "insurrección."

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La concepción de la TMI sobre una "contrarrevolución democrática" y sobre la peligrosa Asamblea Constituyente que había que bloquear, correspondía con la campaña del FUR pequeñoburgués bajo la influencia de los estalinistas. Fue esta "vanguardia" la que contrapuso los "soviets" a la Asamblea Constituyente, la que vio a la lucha como si se tratara de "dos campos," creyó que el gobierno militar existente no representaba ningún peligro y fomentó ilusiones en los oficiales "izquierdistas" del MFA y en los estalinistas.

Fue esta "vanguardia" la que se opuso al llamado por un gobierno PC-PS. Exigía la expulsión del PS de todas partes y relacionó a la socialdemocracia con el fascismo. La negativa de la TMI a llamar a un gobierno PC-PS fue una adaptación a esta "preocupación." Fueron los centristas y ultraizquierdistas en Portugal quienes no pensaron que era necesario o posible ganar a la mayoría de las masas del colaboracionismo de sus dirigentes estalinistas y socialdemócratas. La TMI reflejaba esta posición. Los camaradas Mandel, Maitan y Frank incluso se refirieron desdeñosamente a la mayoría "moderada" de la clase obrera, en contraposición a la vanguardia "revolucionaria" compuesta por los grupos centristas y ultraizquierdistas pequeñoburgueses.

Por las razones que fueran, intencionalmente o no, la resolución de la TMI sobre Europa y sus escritos sobre Portugal permanecen vagos en su descripción política de la "vanguardia."

Podemos hablar de una vanguardia social general, tal como la vanguardia de la clase obrera y el papel que juega en la transición hacia el socialismo.

Los marxistas enfatizan el papel de vanguardia que ciertas capas juegan a veces dentro de la clase obrera en su conjunto: la juventud, las mujeres, las nacionalidades oprimidas, etc.

En virtud de sus luchas, ciertos sectores de la clase obrera empiezan a destacar e inspiran a otros sectores. Los obreros de la construcción en noviembre, por ejemplo, dirigieron la lucha contra el programa de austeridad del gobierno aunque formaban parte de la supuesta "mayoría moderada."

La palabra "vanguardia" se usa en otro sentido para referirse a la *vanguardia política* de la clase obrera. La vanguardia política sólo pueden ser aquéllos que están organizados en base al programa marxista revolucionario.

La vaguedad de la TMI en cuanto de qué vanguardia están hablando sirve para enmascarar su adaptación política a los centristas y ultraizquierdistas cuyas frases y tácticas "revolucionarias" los atraen. Esto oscurece la línea que ha de ser trazada entre los centristas y aventureros y el programa del trotskismo.

La línea de la TMI de transformar a la "nueva vanguardia de masas" en "un instrumento adecuado para recomponer al movimiento obrero organizado," o, en las

palabras del camarada Mandel en su informe sobre el documento Europeo de la TMI en la reunión del CEI en 1972, para "reagrupar a la vanguardia como una fuerza de combate seria dentro del movimiento obrero para dirigir a las masas en una confrontación global con el capitalismo que tiene la posibilidad de triunfar" fue puesta a prueba con la formación del FUR, que en la práctica reagrupó o "recompuso" a la "vanguardia."

Al unirse al Frente Unido Popular (FUP), como se llamó inicialmente al FUR antes de que se retirara el PC, la LCI llevó a cabo la línea de la TMI, aunque lo hizo de una manera extrema. La TMI criticó a la LCI por haber firmado la plataforma del FUP, pero estuvo de acuerdo en que la LCI permaneciera en el FUP y posteriormente en el FUR. La TMI apoyó la noción de que el realizar un frente unido con los estalinistas era un logro importante aunque se dio en base al apoyo al programa colaboracionista y los objetivos sectarios del PC. Así, veía el programa frentepopulista del FUP y del FUR—y la TMI se diferenció, por supuesto, de esa plataforma—como secundaria al logro positivo del "reagrupamiento en sí."

El apoyo crítico brindado por la TMI al FUR fue una expresión clara del adaptacionismo a los grupos centristas y ultraizquierdistas. Con la retirada del PC, el FUR publicó un manifiesto que incluía una denuncia de las elecciones a la Asamblea Constituyente como parte de una "ofensiva reaccionaria burguesa," y exigió la "disolución de la Asamblea Constituyente y el desenmascaramiento de su carácter burgués." El manifiesto relacionó a la socialdemocracia con el fascismo e hizo un llamado para purgar a "todos los putchistas fascistas y socialdemócratas de las fuerzas armadas." Defendía a la Quinta División del Estado Mayor General. Se adhirió al nacionalismo reaccionario de un país imperialista. En la práctica, los grupos dominantes en el FUR lanzaron una campaña sectaria y aventurera, junto con una concepción colaboracionista de formar un gobierno "izquierdista" del MFA. Al apoyar esta formación, no importa que tan críticamente, la TMI ayudó a bloquear el desarrollo de la vanguardia política basado en el programa clasista del marxismo revolucionario.

El giro adoptado por la mayoría de los delegados en el Noveno Congreso Mundial elevó una táctica—la guerra de guerrillas—al nivel de una estrategia, reemplazando a la estrategia leninista de la construcción del partido basada en el método indicado en el Programa de Transición. Esta desviación ultraizquierdista de la estrategia marxista fue profundizada y extendida, y más tarde codificada por la TMI en su documento de perspectivas europeas y otros documentos adoptados por la TMI en el Décimo Congreso Mundial.

Las consecuencias se dejaron sentir el 25

de noviembre. Ese fracaso también constituyó una derrota para la resolución europea de la TMI. Este fue el veredicto de una revolución proletaria en curso. En la práctica, la desviación ultraizquierdista de la TMI, que indicó un alejamiento del

método y la estrategia del Programa de Transición, condujo a la TMI a adaptarse al centrismo y al ultraizquierdismo en Portugal. A su vez, esto significó adaptarse a los estalinistas y finalmente al mismo MFA.

III. La Línea Estratégica de Avance de los Trabajadores

Desde el 25 de noviembre, los militares han intentado afirmar su autoridad y usurpar lo más posible las conquistas de los trabajadores. Qué tan lejos puede llegar este proceso depende de la respuesta de las masas. Los trabajadores no han sido derrotados, ni sus organizaciones han sido desmanteladas. Como demostró la manifestación de los obreros de la construcción, hay una profunda oposición a la política del MFA de obligar a la clase obrera a aguantar y pagar por la inflación y el desempleo crecientes.

Los trabajadores, después del intento golpista, se andan con cautela y están confundidos. Todavía queda por verse cuándo y cómo recuperarán sus fuerzas para un nuevo ascenso de la lucha capaz de revertir los planes del régimen para reestablecer el orden y la disciplina capitalistas.

Las direcciones del PC y del PS han renovado su promesa de lealtad a los militares. Los esquemas sectarios y la palabrería izquierdista del FUR han demostrado que sólo son capaces de conducir hacia las aventuras y la desmoralización a los trabajadores portugueses.

Al frente de la estrategia revolucionaria en Portugal tiene que estar una campaña para movilizar a los trabajadores y sus aliados en acciones unidas en defensa de sus intereses básicos, sus conquistas económicas y sus derechos democráticos. Este frente unido es imprescindible para sobreponerse a las amargas divisiones sectarias en la clase obrera, para fortalecer la defensa de los trabajadores contra la creciente amenaza del régimen bonapartista y para preparar el terreno para una nueva ola de ascensos de las masas trabajadoras.

El proceso revolucionario no ha alcanzado todavía el punto donde hayan surgido palpablemente formas de poder obrero. El ascenso ha conducido a estas alturas a iniciativas esporádicas y dispersas de masas, comités de fábrica y elementos de control obrero. Estos acontecimientos señalan el camino hacia el surgimiento de comités de acción más amplios y eventualmente el poder dual. El avance sobre este camino depende de un curso político correcto. La tarea política fundamental es la de arrancar a los trabajadores del curso colaboracionista de los estalinistas y socialdemócratas, colaboración que significa subordinación al Movimiento de las Fuerzas Armadas. Es preciso reafirmar el derecho que tienen los trabajadores a colocar en el poder un gobierno que

defienda sus intereses y luche por ellos, un gobierno de los trabajadores y campesinos.

El desarrollo de la lucha revolucionaria hacia una victoria socialista en Portugal por parte de los trabajadores y de sus aliados requiere de una defensa de los intereses económicos y de los derechos democráticos de las masas, en combinación con demandas y pasos organizativos de transición que vayan más allá de la estructura política y económica del capitalismo. La línea de avance estratégico puede ser resumida de la siguiente manera:

1. La defensa de las conquistas de los trabajadores y otras capas de las masas contra los intentos por parte del gobierno capitalista de hacer que éstos carguen el fardo del estancamiento económico y la inflación. Esto incluye la lucha por un programa gubernamental de emergencia para la creación de empleos, por una reducción de las horas de trabajo sin reducción en los salarios para distribuir el trabajo disponible y por la estipulación de cláusulas de escala móvil de salarios en los contratos colectivos, para proteger a los trabajadores de la inflación capitalista.

La lucha de los trabajadores de la construcción demuestra la necesidad de comprender una lucha resuelta en este frente y también demuestra el potencial existente para movilizar a los trabajadores en torno a estos problemas.

Hay que exigir una reforma agraria radical para satisfacer las necesidades de los pequeños propietarios, promover cooperativas con ayuda estatal y granjas estatales para las áreas de cultivo extensivo. La necesidad de luchar por apoyo estatal al pequeño agricultor se ha tornado especialmente aguda, dado que la dilación y las traiciones del gobierno capitalista—apoyadas por las direcciones del PC y del PS—han sido identificadas con el “socialismo,” lo que ha empujado a muchos de estos pequeños agricultores hacia la derecha.

Además, es necesaria una especial atención a la defensa y extensión de los derechos y conquistas que han sido conquistadas por las mujeres y la juventud.

2. La defensa de los derechos democráticos en las fuerzas armadas. El MFA trata de utilizar como pretexto el intento de golpe aventurero del 25 de noviembre para suprimir todos los derechos democráticos de los soldados y marineros. Es necesario rechazar la propaganda sectaria y aventurera. La tropa necesita organizarse en defensa de sus derechos democráticos. Las amplias masas tienen que ser educadas en que los ciudadanos en uniforme deben

gozar de todos los derechos básicos para organizarse independientemente de los militares en la vida política del país.

3. La defensa de los derechos democráticos de los soldados-ciudadanos está estrechamente vinculada a la defensa de los derechos democráticos y la toma de decisiones libremente por las masas. En repetidas ocasiones los derechos políticos de la mayoría de las organizaciones que se encuentran en el movimiento obrero han sido atacados, incluso los de ambos partidos reformistas de masas. Ahora el MFA utiliza el intento de golpe aventurero para seguir atacando los derechos democráticos. El principio de la solidaridad entre el conjunto del movimiento obrero contra semejantes ataques debe ser vigorosamente planteado.

4. Oposición a cualquier intento por parte del gobierno capitalista de intervenir en los asuntos de sus ex-colonias.

5. Defensa de los intereses elementales de los trabajadores. Las comisiones obreras y los núcleos de sindicatos industriales que se han desarrollado son incapaces todavía de montar una defensa eficaz a nivel nacional de los intereses elementales de los trabajadores. Para superar este defecto, los revolucionarios deben propagandizar y agitar en torno a la consigna de formar sindicatos industriales, por una estructura sindical unida y democrática, libre de toda intervención gubernamental, como la que representa la Ley de Unidad Sindical. La lucha por transformar las comisiones obreras en comités de acción tipo frente unido, que sean capaces de movilizar y representar a los trabajadores y masas indigentes en los centros industriales, se combinan estrechamente con otras tareas revolucionarias.

6. Extensión de la nacionalización de las propiedades capitalistas. La expropiación de las industrias claves es un prerequisite para la existencia de la economía planificada del socialismo.

7. La lucha por el control obrero, bajo las actuales condiciones, también encaja con estas tareas. En varios casos los trabajadores ya han afirmado su control para proteger sus intereses específicos ante los asaltos por parte del gobierno, el sabotaje por los patrones y el desempleo y la inflación crecientes. Se requiere el control obrero para obtener la información económica necesaria para defender los empleos, para prevenir la fuga de capitales, para luchar contra la inflación y para poder administrar una escala móvil de horas y salarios.

El control obrero no puede cumplir sus fines a menos que los trabajadores dejen en claro que no aceptan ninguna responsabilidad por el funcionamiento de la economía hasta que lleguen a tener un verdadero poder político sobre ella. Esto significa que hay que luchar contra el “control obrero” promulgado por el gobierno militar y que fue apoyado por las direcciones del PS y del PC, “control obrero” que equivale

a que los trabajadores acepten en forma disciplinada el programa de austeridad de los capitalistas.

8. Hacer avanzar la lucha por un gobierno de los trabajadores y campesinos. En el plano político, los trabajadores en su gran mayoría buscan su dirección entre el Partido Socialista, el Partido Comunista y la Intersindical, que es la federación sindical. Actualmente no hay alternativa alguna a estas organizaciones de masas que goce de credibilidad entre amplias capas de trabajadores. Tampoco es posible desarrollar alternativa política alguna hasta que las masas aprendan en la práctica las limitaciones de las actuales direcciones colaboracionistas de esas organizaciones.

Concretamente, en la etapa actual la lucha por un gobierno de los trabajadores y campesinos incluye el llamar a los partidos Socialista y Comunista—como representantes de los trabajadores portugueses y de la mayoría del pueblo portugués—a romper con el pacto-programa que codificó su capitulación a la junta militar. Significa llamar al establecimiento de un nuevo gobierno sin fuerzas o partidos burgueses, con las direcciones del PC y del PS ejerciendo su mayoría en la Asamblea Constituyente y llamando a los obreros, a los campesinos y a la tropa de las fuerzas armadas a movilizarse en apoyo de éste. Significa, como lo afirma el Programa de Transición: “Al mismo tiempo debemos desarrollar una agitación incansable en torno a aquellas demandas de transición que en nuestra opinión conforman el programa del gobierno de los trabajadores y campesinos.”

La Intersindical debe mantenerse independiente de cualquier gobierno, incluso un gobierno obrero y campesino, porque los sindicatos deben ser los defensores más directos de los intereses económicos de los trabajadores.

El único organismo nacional políticamente representativo electo por los trabajadores y masas portuguesas hasta ahora es la Asamblea Constituyente, en la cual los partidos obreros tienen una mayoría absoluta. La lucha por un gobierno de los trabajadores y campesinos no se puede dar sin defender la soberanía popular y todas las conquistas democráticas, contra los esfuerzos por parte de la clase dominante de restringirlos. Concretamente, esto significa defender la Asamblea Constituyente contra los intentos de la junta militar de abolirla. Y también significa que debemos exigir al PS y al PC que repudien su pacto con el MFA, pacto que ha sujetado a la Asamblea Constituyente y a la mayoría que tienen estos partidos en ésta al control de los militares.

Como parte fundamental de una campaña de lucha de frente unido, la demanda por que los dos partidos reformistas de la clase trabajadora formen un gobierno de los trabajadores y campesinos es una parte esencial del proceso de plantear una

alternativa gubernamental de la clase obrera al régimen militar y revelar la incapacidad de estos partidos de proveer semejante alternativa.

Los órganos incipientes de poder obrero sólo pueden surgir de luchas unidas de masas en torno a estos lineamientos. Los consejos obreros y las formas soviéticas no pueden ser impuestos a los trabajadores.

Para que el proletariado pueda cumplir sus tareas en la lucha de clases en este período y triunfar en una confrontación con la burguesía, es necesario hacer avanzar la organización independiente de la clase obrera. Esto significa impulsar formas más y más amplias de organización de los trabajadores, la estructura sindical industrial, comités de acción y comités de fábrica democráticos que puedan unir y movilizar a las amplias masas de trabajadores en las zonas industriales y atraer a otras capas explotadas. Este proceso culminaría en congresos regionales y nacionales de las organizaciones de los trabajadores que puedan adoptar una política general y conducir a las masas trabajadoras en la toma de iniciativas decisivas.

El armamento de las masas para la defensa de sus derechos democráticos contra los ataques reaccionarios tampoco puede ser alcanzado independientemente de la construcción de luchas de frente

unido en torno a estos lineamientos. Ninguna minoría, no importa qué tan heroica sea, puede substituir a las masas en la batalla decisiva.

Esta línea estratégica de avance comienza con las necesidades inmediatas, y las más elementales, de la clase obrera y conduce al establecimiento de un gobierno de los trabajadores y campesinos y la organización de soviets como la base de un estado obrero.

La política traidora del PC y del PS y los esquemas sectarios de los centristas y ultraizquierdistas han tenido consecuencias funestas. Un curso marxista basado en la organización independiente y la movilización de las masas trabajadoras asumen una importancia cada día mayor. La construcción de un partido revolucionario para proveer una dirección correcta se hace cada vez más urgente. Tal partido todavía no existe en Portugal. Deberá ser creado al fragor de la lucha misma.

Pero aun un pequeño núcleo de revolucionarios, armados con un programa y una estrategia adecuados, puede lograr rápidos avances. Al luchar en torno a los ejes básicos señalados, un núcleo así puede jugar un papel decisivo en la construcción del partido revolucionario necesario para resolver la crisis de dirección en la revolución portuguesa. □

Libertad Inmediata a Desmond Trotter

[El 18 de marzo, al Privy Council (máximo organismo de apelación judicial en la Gran Bretaña) le tomó menos de cinco minutos rechazar la apelación contra la sentencia a muerte que se le dictó al militante dominicano Desmond Trotter. Trotter, arrestado hace dos años en una estratagema legal para involucrarlo en un asesinato, será ahorcado a menos que el gobernador de Dominica, Louis Coombs-Lartigue, le conceda un indulto. Más de cincuenta miembros del Parlamento británico han firmado una petición urgiendo tal indulto.]

[La siguiente declaración sobre el caso fue emitida el 21 de marzo por el Comité de Defensa de Desmond Trotter.* La traducción del texto en inglés, que aparece en este mismo número, es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

Desmond Trotter, militante político y luchador por la libertad en la isla Dominica en el Caribe, está encarcelado en esa isla esperando la muerte en la horca. Trotter, que cuenta con 21 años, ha sido asociado con todos los desarrollos políticos progresivos en esa isla durante los últimos años. Ha sido el editor de tres publicaciones sucesivamente, cada una representando una etapa diferente en la lucha por un

cambio progresivo y la independencia nacional. Es un miembro dirigente del Movimiento por una Nueva Dominica y editaba su órgano *Twaway*.

En febrero de 1974, Trotter fue la víctima de una estratagema legal bajo el cargo de homicidio y más tarde condenado por un jurado compuesto exclusivamente por elementos de la clase terrateniente y sus simpatizantes. La evidencia fue tan débil que un miembro del Parlamento británico, Stan Newens, y voceros que hablaban a nombre de cien de sus colegas asociados con la organización anticolonial Liberation, fueron convencidos que

cualquiera que lea el relato del juicio desapasionadamente será sorprendido por la débil naturaleza de la evidencia sobre la que (Trotter) fue condenado. No se pudo encontrar un sólo civil en Dominica que viera evidencia en contra de él y una muchacha de diez y seis años que fue llevada desde su hogar en Antigua tuvo que bastar hasta donde concierne la evidencia civil.

El Comité de Defensa de Desmond Trotter solicita el apoyo de todos aquéllos que aman la libertad en la lucha para salvarle la vida al joven activista político al firmar la demanda por la excarcelación inmediata de Trotter y por una investigación oficial inmediata de todas las circunstancias que rodean al caso, y por ponerle fin a toda la represión y victimización de los disidentes políticos en la isla de Dominica. □

*La dirección de este comité es: 546 West 114 Street, Apt. 1 New York, N.Y. 10025, USA.

FROM OUR READERS

From Bogotá, Colombia, we received an appreciative letter from which we quote the following:

"Please give our congratulations to the comrades who are translating articles into Spanish. Today we received the copy containing the translation of the article by Farrell Dobbs 'A Disagreement with Trotsky Over Tactics' [March 8 issue], which we liked very much, not only for what it says about elections, but also for what it shows about a leader of Trotsky's magnitude, who, without failing in his political responsibilities to the American party and without overlooking his important differences (even if at a tactical level), did not try to use his authority to rudely go over the heads of an elected national leadership. . . . Congratulations also go to Comrade Farrell, who wrote this great and useful article, as well as to the editors."

One of our readers in Barcelona, Spain, sent us some clippings from the Spanish press and some leaflets distributed by various tendencies in the streets, all of which have proved useful in our coverage of the sharpening class struggle in that country. He adds:

"Take care comrades. I.P. is so great to read during these tenuous times! Keep up the great work!

"Question: Why is so much space devoted to environmental pollution vis-à-vis other areas?"

Which leads us to ask: Why no clippings about pollution in Barcelona? Has the city solved the problem? If so, we would appreciate some clippings about that.

In its issue of March 17, the *Buffalo*

Challenger, a Black weekly published in Buffalo, New York, reviewed *Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War*, which was recently released by Pathfinder Press.

The reviewer describes the authors as follows:

"Ernie Harsch is a staff person for one of the most up-to-date socialist organs in the world today, *Intercontinental Press*, the weekly voice of enlightened socialists.

"In addition, Mr. Harsch made a worthwhile contribution to a recently released Pathfinder Book entitled: *Life in Capitalist America—Private Profit and Social Decay*. . . .

"Mr. Thomas, on the other hand, is none other than 'Tony T' of the Socialist Workers Party; a staff writer for the . . . *Militant* and an editor of *Black Liberation and Socialism*."

The reviewer offers high praise of the book:

"Mr. Harsch and Mr. Thomas spared no source in their painstaking research in compiling, by far, the most up-to-date report on yet another hidden aspect of our history. . . .

"Together, these two gentlemen have amassed a work which is a must for any reader of African History."

The *Buffalo Challenger* is not uncritical of the book. For instance, it considers the authors' criticisms of the MPLA to be "a classic example of the white mentality trying to give a proper analysis of a Black situation. It is unfortunate because the work (Part 1) was by far the most informative work by an American on the hidden war."

The *Buffalo Challenger* also considers an analogy between the Freedom Fighters of MPLA and "the gangsters of 1776 in America" to be inappropriate. "The same holds true for Emancipation (Lincoln) and Freedom."

Nonetheless, the reviewer repeats that the book is "must reading." The authors, he says, "have uncovered the repressive acts of the Imperialist monster that is America today."

The January-February issue of *Israel & Palestine*, a left Zionist monthly review published in Paris, reprinted an article by David Frankel, "The CIA and the Kurdish Struggle in Iraq," that appeared in the November 17, 1975, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

The editors of *I&P* do not, of course, agree with the political positions on which *Intercontinental Press* stands. Their explanation of why they decided to reprint the article may thus be of some interest to our readers:



Herblock/New York Post

"I&P does not, usually, feature reprints from other papers. If we stray from our usual line, reprinting hereafter a feature by David Frankel taken from *INTERCONTINENTAL PRESS* of 17 November 75, it is not because we agree with the views of the Fourth (Trotskyite) International on the Middle East in general, or on its views concerning the Israeli-Palestinian question in particular. Trotskyism has adopted a doctrine, not to say Stalinist approach to the question 'What makes a Nation?', i.e., the problem of how an entity is created and which entities to support. I&P's editor has stated this paper's non-exclusivist approach to this problem in *I&P* No. 44/45 ('Zionism, Anti-Semitism and Self-Determination'). It is the precise opposite of asking 'Are they a Nation?' Nonetheless, we consider the following article to be a very important contribution to understanding the Kurdish problem. We are grateful to the author and the publication in which it first saw light."

Have you been experiencing irregularities in receiving your copy of *Intercontinental Press*? Please write us. We want to know. In addition, we will do everything we can to help overcome them.

Among the new hazards in regular delivery are the automatic machines the Postal Service has been installing under a \$1 billion contract. The machines break up packages.

The postal authorities are, of course, quite apologetic and offer a convincing explanation; namely, they had been studying the wrong statistics.

Another hazard is that mail in some centers has been inadvertently mixed with trash and carted to the dump. However, the authorities promise to do better on this and have ordered trash to be examined before it is carted away.

For other hazards, please study the cartoons by Herb Block. □



Herblock/New York Post