

# Intercontinental Press

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## Mass Protest in Peking



Masses carry wreaths honoring Chou En-lai. When Maoist officials removed them from Martyrs'

Monument in Peking April 5, tens of thousands of persons joined a day-long demonstration in reply.

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***Political Crisis in Japan Over Lockheed Bribes***

***Syrian Regime Sides With Rightists in Lebanon***

***Argentine Military Junta Undertakes 'Operation Salvage'***

***Big Business Hails Britain's New Prime Minister***

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## On the Eve of Portuguese Elections

By Gerry Foley

Only two weeks before the April 25 legislative elections in Portugal, the outcome still remains uncertain. The polls published so far indicate that half of the voters remain undecided. At the same time, the rightists are on the advance while the mass workers parties are retreating and capitulating to capitalist pressures.

The retreat is most evident in the case of the Socialist party, which had attracted the broadest forces in the radicalization that followed the fall of Caetano. The SP leaders demanded and obtained the inclusion of the CP in the first provisional government. Even last summer, when the two parties were at dagger's point, the SP leaders continued to defend the perspective of a coalition with the CP despite the protests of their northern European Social Democratic financial backers.

Today these same leaders say that it is impossible to get together with the CP. In the April 1 issue of *Portugal Socialista*, the party organ, Jaime Gama went so far as to write: "When the Communists wrongfully invoke the name of socialism, we have to remember that they have nothing in common with us. Just like national 'socialism,' the 'socialism' of the bureaucratic dictatorships is just an empty word that leaves us cold."

### Soares at American Club

The same issue of *Portugal Socialista* reported a speech by party leader Mário Soares to the American Club in Lisbon in which he pledged that there would be no coalition with the CP after the elections.

The SP propaganda has focused on blaming the "demagogy" of the Gonçalves government for the problems affecting the Portuguese economy. What needs to be done, according to the SP, is to reassure those who were frightened by this demagogy—to make clear that there will be no more nationalizations, that workers

control will not interfere with capitalist management, and that the place of private enterprise will be defended.

The Social Democratic leaders say that their aim is to form an SP government. However, they promise that if they cannot get enough votes to do this, they will accept the "democratic verdict of the Portuguese people" and withdraw into opposition.

In the April 1 issue of *Portugal Socialista*, which set the line of the party's campaign, the SP leadership dropped the distinction that it had previously made between "Socialist" and "Social Democrat." The former was supposed to be a revolutionary form of "democratic socialism," as opposed to the parliamentarianism and reformism of the northern European SPs and labor parties. The SP leaders now associate themselves with such well-known "revolutionists" as West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the Swedish Premier Olof Palme.

The game of the SP leaders is clear. They want to convince the capitalist class in Portugal and abroad that they can be trusted to preside over the recovery and restabilization of the capitalist economy and bourgeois society in their country. Taking their cue from Kissinger's admonitions, they seek to assure the capitalists that there will be no government based on the workers parties alone, no coalition with the CP.

The SP leaders also want to charge the CP with responsibility for the "excesses of the process," that is, the anticapitalist concessions made to the masses in the upsurge following the downfall of Caetano. This, of course, is completely dishonest.

### CP for Capitalism, Too

Even now it is hard to distinguish between the programs of the SP and CP. "We Communists are not against private initiative," Alvaro Cunhal said April 2 over Radiodifusão Portuguesa. "We even think that a quite large sector of our economy should be reserved for private enterprise."

The Stalinist leaders are demanding that the SP commit itself now to an alliance with the CP after the elections. Their argument is that no party will win an overall majority and that the main task is to block a comeback of reaction.

The CP never talks about workers unity

but always about a coalition of "democratic forces." It does not call for unity now in the workers struggles against the capitalist offensive. On this, it takes exactly the same position as the SP, that all "agitation" in the preelectoral period plays into the hands of the right. Furthermore, the CP union leaders have responded to calls raised by militant SP unionists for a united, democratic, trade-union movement by arguing that there is no need for minority rights in unions.

The CP's call for unity amounts to an electoral maneuver and a ploy to split the SP.

The Communist party has become isolated. It has suffered heavy losses. Its periphery is demoralized and, to a certain extent, alienated by the zigzags in policy. A big drop in the CP vote is taken for granted in the Portuguese press. In the absence of any prospect for an SP-CP coalition, many of those who might vote for the Stalinist party will vote for the SP, since the main contest seems to be between it and the Partido Popular Democrático, and faced with this choice they prefer the SP.

In addition to straight anti-Communist propaganda, in the April 1 *Portugal Socialista* the main line of argument advanced against the CP's unity proposals was that the Stalinists' overtures were an attempt to split the party by opposing the ranks to the leadership.

The Stalinists have followed a "united front from below" tactic toward the SP, and used unrepresentative splinter groups as a spearhead for their attacks against the party. Pitching the appeals for "uniting the democratic forces" to the SP "ranks" and not the SP leadership is a dead giveaway that the CP leaders are not acting in good faith. This kind of approach makes it easy for the Social Democratic leaders to create prejudices against the natural demand that the workers parties unite against the capitalist offensive.

The unprincipled factionalism and opportunistic maneuvers of the leaderships of the two big workers parties feed a poisonous growth of sectarianism. That has been clear since last year's elections, when the two parties campaigned under such slogans as "Look and see the power of the CP" and "So you see the might of the SP."

The CP gave a cover to the rabid factionalism of the Frente Socialista Popular against the SP. The SP tended to mingle its banners with fanatical Maoists such as the Partido Comunista Português (ML), which, even now after the open capitulation of the Soares leadership to capitalist pressures, denounces the SP for "conciliationism toward Social Fascism," i.e., the CP and the Kremlin.

In early March, even before the election campaign opened, CP supporters attacked SP meetings in three towns in Alentejo. In the first days of the campaign, two persons

### Next Week. . . .

Seventeen years after the guerrilla fighters led by Fidel Castro marched into Havana, the Cuban Communist party has held its first congress. Don't miss Livio Maitan's analysis in "The First Congress of the Cuban Communist party." In next week's IP.



## Desmond Trotter's Sentence Commuted

International protests have saved Desmond Trotter's life. Patrick John, the premier of Dominica, announced the commutation of Trotter's death sentence April 5. However, Trotter still faces a life prison term on frame-up murder charges.

were wounded in a clash between heavily armed CP and Maoist poster teams.

Sectarian clashes of this kind open the way for the increasing use of terror by rightists who are determined to attack the democratic rights of the masses and discourage them from participating in politics. On April 3, a candidate of the Maoist União Democrática do Povo and a campaign supporter were murdered by rightists who planted a bomb in the car they were using. There has been an escalation of rightist terrorism, but this was the first deliberate political murder.

On March 30, a rightist gang attacked the campaign headquarters of the Trotskyist Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT—Revolutionary Workers party) in the center of Lisbon. The police refused to deal with the attackers, who were eventually driven away by PRT members.

The rightists are obviously testing the ground for similar moves elsewhere and on a rising scale. All the workers parties, including the SP, are finding it more difficult to campaign in areas where the right is strong.

The fact that workers struggles are likewise rising, despite the capitulation of the big workers parties, makes the situation explosive. In the SP news conference opening the campaign on March 26, the party's labor expert, Marcelo Curto, said that workers are tending to get out of control of the union leaders.

He mentioned the case of the building workers, where some locals went out on strike April 1. This proved the need for "representative" leadership, he said. But there is no reason to think that a "representative" SP leadership would have been any more effective in getting the workers to accept a betrayal. And if Curto is inclined to delude himself about this, the capitalists are not.

The crying need is to overcome the divisions in the working class caused by the opportunism of the CP and the SP. This requires an energetic struggle against the anti-Communism of the SP on the one hand and against the CP's bureaucratic control of the unions on the other.

The Trotskyists of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista, who are running a total of 350 candidates in all the mainland constituencies, have focused on these two axes, as they make clear in an article reprinted on page 664 in this issue. □

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# Mass Protest in Peking

By Michael Baumann

On April 5, in the central square of Peking, tens of thousands of persons held a day-long demonstration that startled the world.

The protest action came in the midst of a growing struggle in the Chinese bureaucracy. One of the issues appears to be the succession to Mao Tsetung, now eighty-two years old and reportedly in declining health.

The protest came in reaction to the removal early in the morning of thousands of wreaths placed in honor of Chou En-lai at the Martyrs' Monument in Tien An Men Square the previous day.

Numerous notices had been posted in the square requesting that the wreaths, many of which contained political inscriptions, be left untouched until April 6. The Ching Ming Festival (Day for Remembering the Dead) of April 4 had served as the occasion for the public tribute to Chou.

Correspondent Ross H. Munro of the *Toronto Globe and Mail* was an eyewitness observer at the protests that followed the removal of the wreaths and has provided one of the most detailed accounts of the day's events by a Western reporter. His observations are of some interest, for they differ in several respects from the account of the demonstration provided by the official Chinese news agency Hsinhua April 7 (printed on page 633 in this issue).

He reported the origin of the demonstration as follows:

The crews removing the wreaths worked behind a cordon of hundreds of security men. About 8 o'clock Monday morning, however, large crowds of people began gathering at the cordon. Witnesses then saw a scuffle, policemen's hats going up in the air, and the crowd surge forward. In a short time the police lines were breached in a number of places and tens of thousands of people were on the square.

An April 6 Reuters dispatch from Peking reported that once the demonstrators had gained entrance to the square, secondary-school students placed new wreaths at the monument.

"Cheered on by the crowd," Reuters said, "they raised a photograph of Mr. Chou. The demonstrators then surged across to the steps of the Great Hall of the People, apparently with the intention of presenting a petition.

"They failed, and some skirmishes developed. A car was overturned, and youths danced upon it."

A sizable number of persons sought to enter the Great Hall, where only weeks ago



CHOU: Tens of thousands protested removal of tributes to the late premier.

top Maoist bureaucrats had clinked glasses with former President Nixon. Munro described what happened:

Cordons of unarmed soldiers, policemen, and plainclothes security officers frantically formed and reformed lines in and around Tien An Men Square in an effort to control the crowds.

But there were more than 10,000 people on the steps of the main entrance to the Great Hall alone, chanting "Open the door . . . Long live Chairman Mao . . . Long live Chou En-lai. . . ." With defiance in their voices, they sang the Internationale, the international Communist anthem.

And at the monument to the people's heroes in the center of the square, youths defiantly placed three wreaths honoring the late Premier as the crowd applauded with approval.

Peking Mayor Wu Teh made repeated calls for the protesters to disperse. In a message played over loudspeakers, he blamed the demonstration on a "small minority of ambitious, evil men," on "bad elements" who had become "involved with counterrevolutionary subversive activities."

This theme, along with remarkably detailed accounts of the protesters' alleged "violence," was to become an important focus of attack in the official account of

the demonstration released two days later.

The accounts by Western reporters, while noting occasional scuffles and fights, differ sharply from Peking's account in describing the mood of the crowd.

Munro, a veteran correspondent, reported certain striking similarities with protests he had covered on another continent:

There was a sense of "deja vu" for an observer who had witnessed many essentially nonviolent civil rights and antiwar demonstrations in North America. The mood of the crowd was a combination of excitement, fear, curiosity, and defiance.

The vast majority of the people were not violent and really did not know what to do when they had reached the doors of the Great Hall at the edge of the square or the monument in the middle of the square. They chanted, sang, applauded, and surged back and forth on the massive steps of the Great Hall.

Other reports tell of three motor vehicles being burned and a building, said to be a security headquarters, ransacked and set ablaze. Only the Hsinhua account reports incidents in which "some [demonstrators] even threw knives and daggers at the people's police."

The problem that "foreign analysts" have with the official Hsinhua version, Munro said April 9, is that it is "sometimes at variance with what they themselves saw." He gave the following example:

The Chinese version charges that the homage to Mr. Chou was engineered by "a handful of class enemies," but it neglects to mention that many of the hundreds of thousands of people who came to the square seemed enthusiastic about what was happening.

In the face of this enthusiasm the authorities put an abrupt end to the politically motivated tribute by removing all the wreaths and posters very early Monday morning [April 5], and putting a cordon of security men around the square.

The protest over the removal of the wreaths followed several days of political ferment. According to Reuters, public demonstrations professing support for Chou began April 2, ostensibly as part of the preparations for the Ching Ming Festival.

On April 3, UPI reported, thousands gathered in the square, "carrying [a] huge portrait of the late Chinese Premier Chou En-lai and floral wreaths."

On April 4 the ferment continued. According to Reuters, "huge crowds" rallied in the square, posting placards "praising Mr. Chou." H.D.S. Greenway of the *Washington Post* reported that "crowds estimated to number more than 250,000 people gathered in the square" that day, and that "thousands of wreaths, some of them bearing inscriptions of a decidedly political nature, piled up around the monument."

According to Munro, the inscriptions aroused interest among the participants in the April 5 demonstration, some of whom "diligently tried to decipher the shreds of posters that had been torn down."



On April 6, a few thousand persons returned to the square, occasionally kicking or thumping passing automobiles. Since few private citizens in China have access to autos, these were presumably used by bureaucrats and functionaries.

Also on April 6, thousands of militiamen were brought into Peking, some from great distances according to the license plates on the trucks.

On April 7, Teng Hsiao-ping, formerly presented as Mao's heir apparent, but since Chou's death reviled as an arch "capitalist roader," was ousted by a "unanimous" decision of the Politburo. The Politburo, acting "on the proposal of our great leader, Chairman Mao," stripped Teng of his titles as deputy chairman of the Chinese CP, first deputy prime minister, and commander in chief of the army.

Teng, previously denounced as a "demon" and a "freak" during the Cultural Revolution, was not, however, required to give up his membership in the Communist party, the stated reason being "to see how he will behave himself in the future."

Hua Kuo-feng, a former head of the political police, was elevated to the post of premier and first deputy chairman of the CP, theoretically making him No. 2 in the hierarchy after Mao.

Both announcements were made the evening of April 7. Perhaps the moves were made to stiffen bureaucratic ranks against a frightening threat—an upsurge of the masses.

Throughout that night and the following day, demonstrations were held in Peking, hailing the decision to oust Teng. These were somewhat different in character from those held in Tien An Men Square. An April 8 dispatch to the *Toronto Globe and Mail* reported:

Soon after the announcement, several truckloads of young people, beating drums, cymbals and gongs to celebrate the major change in their country's leadership, moved through the streets of downtown Peking. . . .

Organized demonstrations supporting the leadership changes grew in size through the night. At 3 o'clock this morning, there were hundreds of trucks carrying music-making demonstrators back and forth through central Peking and beginning to fan out over the city.

Organized groups of marchers, some carrying red flags, appeared as if they had just been awakened and brought out on the streets for the occasion. As they marched around the perimeter of Tien An Men Square, monitors occasionally led them in chants. Some of the demonstrators, frequently sleepy looking, had been brought from nearby neighborhoods. Others were members of the militia. . . .

On April 9 these stage-managed demonstrations, now led by senior officials, continued in Peking and spread to other parts of the country.

"Marching in flag-waving columns that stretched for miles," a news dispatch in the April 9 *Washington Post* reported, "the demonstrators banged drums and beat

gongs and cymbals. But the parades seemed to lack spontaneity, and pedestrians watching the marchers failed to match their enthusiasm."

In fact, Japan's Kyodo news service reported April 8, Peking residents "appeared baffled" at the new developments and "apparently harbored a strong sense of bewilderment at the rapid tempo of change."

Much the same could be said of the "China watchers," news commentators, and State Department specialists.

The *New York Post*, for example, ran the following editorial in the April 9 issue:

We regret that we are unable to offer any informed, definitive insights into the Chinese political turmoil. We offer this confession after close study of the conflicting lack of information emerging from Washington and other diplomatic listening posts. . . .

We respect the diligence with which some of our contemporaries have endeavored to analyze events that are obviously as elusive to them as they are to us. When we are convinced we have some valid knowledge to transmit, we will hasten into print.

Meanwhile the only confident judgment we can voice is that the controlled Chinese press is throwing no light on the upheaval.

It is certainly true that the strict censorship exercised over the Chinese press represents a formidable obstacle. The Maoist regime's practice of cloaking its moves in obscurantist verbiage presents another stumbling block, as does its practice of muzzling even the mildest critics.

But part of the confusion is also ascribable to the practice in the Western press of depicting events in China as involving two groupings, labeled as "radical" and "moderate." These designations can be very misleading, as they no more correspond to the reality than does the charge that Teng Hsiao-ping is a "demon" or that the recent mass protest was the work of a tiny handful of "evil men."

Despite the lack of information on the issues, a few conclusions can be drawn about the April 5 demonstration.

First, the protest shows that there is a grouping in opposition to Mao. Its degree of organization or size cannot be determined, because of the censorship.

Second, while it may be possible, as the editors of the *New York Times* among others have speculated, that the removal of the wreaths was a "provocation" arranged by the Maoist forces, the question remains: What was the purpose of the provocation? If it was intended to bring discredit on an opposition grouping, then it must be concluded that an opposition does exist and that it is big enough to cause concern to Mao.

Third, if a provocation was involved, it seems to have touched off a much more explosive reaction than was calculated. This can be explained only on the basis of the existence of issues widely felt by the

masses. As in the Soviet Union, these may extend from the standard of living and working conditions to hatred of the bureaucracy and strong feelings for the right to express political dissidence.

If no provocation was involved, the demonstrations around the placing of wreaths in honor of Chou En-lai are all the more significant. They would testify to the existence of an opposition, whatever its political coloration, that is sufficiently organized to begin appealing directly to the masses with good chances for a favorable response.

Whichever alternative proves to be correct, it is clear that the internal cohesiveness of the Chinese bureaucratic ruling caste is not as strong as the Maoist propagandists would have us believe and that the masses may be readier than expected to step in at an opportune moment to impose *their* solution to the acute problems faced at this stage by the Chinese revolution. □

### CIA Used Nazi Document to Attack German Author

WASHINGTON—Ever since the Warren Commission issued its report on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the FBI and CIA have been critical of books challenging the commission's finding that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin.

A recently released CIA memo shows that in at least one case the agency used a captured Nazi document as the source for derogatory information on Joachim Joesten, German author of a book titled, "Oswald: Assassin or Fall Guy?"

"You will note that the attention of the German security organs was directed at Joesten as early as 1936," the CIA memo said. "At that time the Communist Party had been outlawed in Germany. . . ."

The memo said that in 1937 the Gestapo had accused Joesten of being a Communist.—*Los Angeles Times*, April 4.

### Sharks Battle Pollution

"Examination of the contents of any large shark's stomach . . . seldom fails to produce an interesting and often almost unbelievable collection of articles that even a shark could not digest. Once while on a merchant ship we hooked and brought aboard a large blue shark, 'Prionace glauca.' Along with an evil-smelling mass of partly digested fish and garbage, well over two dozen indigestible articles were counted. Included were such items as an aluminum soup kettle, a carpenter's square, a plastic cigar box, a jar of nails, a flashlight, a length of quarter-inch nylon line, a rubber raincoat, a rubber-soled shoe, tin cans, glass bottles, and a roll of tar paper. The latter was 3 feet wide and when unrolled was found to be 27 feet long."—Excerpt from *Dangerous Sea Creatures*, as quoted in the April 3 *New York Post*.

## The Present Crisis in China

By Greg Benton

[The following article appeared in the March 18 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

\* \* \*

The political crisis presently unfolding in China is essentially a continuation of the Cultural Revolution, but in a different form. The underlying issues, the lineup of forces at the top, the list of charges leveled by the Maoists—all these are broadly speaking unchanged. Mao's 1966 prophecy that monsters and demons would "jump out" every seven or eight years has thus been fulfilled more or less on time, and the predictions of the bourgeois "China-watchers" have been confounded. And yet, many of the features of the present campaign appear to mark it off decisively from the earlier crisis.

The present Maoist offensive represents the sudden sharpening of a struggle that has rumbled on almost continuously in the top leadership bodies of the party ever since the Cultural Revolution and has resulted in their repeated decimation. It was triggered by the death of Chou En-lai, whose political weight and talents as a mediator had previously maintained the balance between the competing factions in the leadership.

Despite the polarizing effect of the Cultural Revolution, the complex pattern of individuals and political groupings in the Chinese Communist party (CCP) leadership still defies any simple classification. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present analysis one can identify a broadly "radical" and a "conservative" faction. The "radical" faction rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolution and is the more homogeneous of the two. The more loosely defined "conservative" layer, with the "number two capitalist roader" Teng Hsiao-ping at its center, has tended to hold a more bureaucratic and institutionalizing view of the state. It would be just as wrong to confuse the Maoist "radicals" with the genuinely antibureaucratic forces active in 1966-68 as it would be to accept the characterization of Teng Hsiao-ping as a "bourgeois restorationist."

Mao's original aim in the Cultural Revolution was to root out his critics from the leadership and wield power through his own "radical" faction. Achievement of this aim was thwarted by the independent evolution of the Red Guard movement and

the growth of a rival power base around Lin Piao, Mao's onetime ally, in the central military leadership. As a result, Mao's "radical" alliance was whittled down to its base in sections of the party apparatus, notably in Shanghai, and in parts of the cultural and press establishment. Mao's bonapartist inclinations automatically ruled out the presence in his political entourage of anyone with genuine independent authority or prestige, whether in China or internationally. This was one more reason why the mass rehabilitation of "pragmatists" like Teng Hsiao-ping became essential after 1972 as the movement to reconstruct the party and administration got under way. Pressure to rehabilitate victims of the Cultural Revolution and to reduce "radical" influence also came from the regional military commanders, whose power grew considerably during the "mopping-up" stages of the Cultural Revolution and after.

The resulting marriage of the two factions was a shaky and even unnatural one. Throughout the past three years the two factions have vied with each other for ascendancy, and the bewildering pattern of events has been complicated still further by the constant rise and fall of the mass movement.

The tenth party congress of August 1973 saw the sudden promotion to number three position (after Mao and Chou) of Wang Hung-wen, the Shanghai leader who had come to prominence as a "radical" after 1966. During the congress, Wang raised radical slogans and put renewed emphasis on the role of the mass movement. Wang's slogans were partially implemented during the subsequent "Criticize Lin Piao, Criticize Confucius" campaign. Wall newspapers reported in Western China revealed widespread official corruption and other abuses, and a wave of strikes and demonstrations hit the country.

In January 1975 the National People's Congress met in Peking. The keynote of the congress was unity and stability. "Radical" representation in the bodies set up by the congress was minimal, and Teng Hsiao-ping and his allies took most of the top posts. Mao himself was demonstratively absent. In February 1975 a new campaign was launched to "restrict bourgeois rights," with the clear aim of prearranging the political outcome of the National People's Congress. The campaign showed that even if Mao was not in position to prevent the rehabilitation of the "capitalist-roaders," he had absolutely no

intention of acquiescing in it. Unlike the nebulous "Criticize Lin Piao, Criticize Confucius" campaign, the new campaign raised inherently subversive issues such as material bureaucratic privileges, the presence of "bourgeois power-holders" in the leadership, and so on. Recent events confirm the suspicion that Teng Hsiao-ping was a main target of the campaign. In the second half of 1975, after a renewed eruption of strikes and illegal mass organization in various parts of China, the campaign clearly lost momentum and the slogan of "unity and stability" was raised. Teng Hsiao-ping, by now a member of the standing committee of the Political Bureau, party vice-chairman, army chief of staff, and permanent stand-in for the dying Chou En-lai, appeared more and more certain to take over as prime minister when the time came.

The announcement on February 8, 1976, that Hua Kuo-feng had been appointed acting premier, Chou's old post, therefore created a sensation. Hua's appointment had all the appearances of a compromise. He has no national power base. He is not known as a "radical," and during the Cultural Revolution he came under ferocious attack from the far-left Sheng-wu-lien group in Hunan. Since Hua is minister of public security, his appointment may also represent a warning to would-be "troublemakers" among the rank and file.

Four days later, a press and wall-newspaper campaign began. Although as of this writing Teng has not been officially named, he is unmistakably the target of the offensive. The charges against Teng and the "rightists" include:

- Launching an "economic typhoon" to "put economics first" on a par with politics. On February 17 *People's Daily* accused the "capitalist-roaders" of "putting on the same footing (1) the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat to combat and prevent revisionism, (2) the promotion of stability and unity and (3) the development of the national economy" (referred to as "taking the three instructions as the link").

- Sowing discord between the party and intellectuals and advocating that "scientific and technical units should be led by experts," that the purpose of the universities is to "train cadres and technicians," and that "a good scholar makes an official" (*People's Daily*, February 13).

- Reversing previous decisions, opposing the rapid ascent of young people, and recruiting personnel "without inquiring into the political and historical situation of the person to be appointed and his or her attitude towards the Cultural Revolution."

- Proposing the widening of the wage-scale from eight to twelve grades.

- Wanting reconciliation with the Kremlin.

- Opposing Mao's principle that "the party should command the army and not vice versa."



Other charges allege that Teng's self-criticisms after the Cultural Revolution were not sincere, that he organized the 1975 National People's Congress against Mao's wishes, that he attempted to suppress the news that Wang Hung-wen was vice-chairman of the party military commission, that he obtained "black material" to use against Chiang Ching (Mao's wife), and that he has advocated class cooperation and capitulation ever since the anti-Japanese war of resistance.

On February 29 *People's Daily* accused the "capitalist-roaders" (openly referred to as a "faction" rather than a "tiny handful") of "unscrupulously splitting the central committee" and warned that they wield "very great power" in the party. Clearly, powerful forces are ranged behind Teng, not only in Peking but also in the provinces. The "rightist" formula of "taking the three instructions as the link" was used extensively in local agricultural conferences in late 1975 (although Hua Kuo-feng avoided using it in his own important speech on agricultural development). Wall newspapers in the provinces have reportedly broadened the attack to include local leaders. In the absence of retreats or compromises, the fighting could therefore easily engulf wide areas of the country.

In such a situation, the role of the army would be decisive. The army, traditionally firmly subordinate to a unified political leadership, split as a result of the Cultural Revolution and was drawn into the factional vortex. During and after the crushing of the Lin Piao group, the regional commanders acquired unprecedented power and influence. The experience of the Cultural Revolution, together with the inherent conservatism of the military hierarchy, gave these commanders a natural inclination toward an alliance with the "conservative" pragmatists in the leadership. Recently the Shanghai party has energetically pushed the idea of a "workers militia" as a counterweight to this alliance, with varying degrees of success. A reshuffling of the regional commands has partly reduced the political influence of the military, but it is still significantly greater than in other workers states and could quickly reemerge as an independent factor in the political situation. The fact that the principle of party control over the army has been raised as an issue in the present campaign may therefore have ominous implications for the future evolution of the power struggle.

The exact role of Chou En-lai in the present crisis has yet to be clarified. The March 2, 1976, *Le Monde* reported posters in Canton criticizing Chou for having favored Teng Hsiao-ping's rehabilitation. After Chou's death, the Japanese *Sankei Shimbun* published a remarkable document (subsequently reported by Tass on January 29) purporting to be Chou's

"political testament"; copies were allegedly distributed to members of the Central Committee by Chou's wife, Teng Ying-chao. The main points of the document were: China's diplomacy should be based



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on proletarian internationalism and it should cooperate but not ally with capitalist countries. The party should observe the principle of democratic management "and never again make mistakes like the Cultural Revolution." The economy should be managed by specialists; the emphasis should be placed on heavy industry, and the "workers, peasants and intellectuals must be clearly aware of their mission."

Recently many important documents initially made public outside China have been shown to be authentic. If Chou's testament is also genuine, it shows support for Teng's conceptions. The implications of the document are that Mao's present critics, like all his past opponents, also differ with him on relations with imperialism and the Soviet Union. It seems likely that the "radical" wing of the bureaucracy on domestic matters is often rightist on foreign affairs and the "conservative" wing is more prepared to consider united action with the Soviet Union. It is difficult to gauge the impact on the Chinese masses of the victories in Vietnam and Angola. The Chinese masses, of course, are kept in great ignorance on international questions. But it is hard to believe that these stunning reverses for Mao's line will not have some reverberations in the current political crisis in China. (On this point, see the revised English edition of Livio Maitan's book *Party, Army, and Masses in China*, New Left Books, London. On Chinese foreign policy, see articles in *Inprecor*, Nos. 2, 5/6, 20 and 37.) What is

probably being reflected is an increasing awareness on the part of sections of the leadership of the sterility of a line that designates the Soviet Union as "the main enemy," which has nothing to do with the charges against these elements that they "preach recourse to foreign aid" and "favor imperialist or social-imperialist type modernization." (*People's Daily*, February 29.)

In domestic policy, the main charge against the "rightists" is that they favor professionalism as against class struggle. Similar charges have been leveled at other leaders in the past. Linked to the question of "professionalism" is the alleged proposal for a slight widening of wage differentials. (Note, however, that in autumn 1975 Teng readily associated himself with attacks on high salaries for top state officials.) Despite the one-sidedness of the present "debate" and the improbability of many of the allegations, these two particular charges have the ring of truth.

The background to this policy dispute is the ambitious modernization program announced by Chou En-lai in 1975, which in principle appears to enjoy the support of all sections of the leadership. The implementation of such a program would place tremendous strains on a country as poor and underdeveloped as China, all the more so if the present unfavorable evolution of the terms of China's world trade continues. It will also involve wage freezes and curbs on consumption in a period of rapidly rising output, a situation that breeds resentment and led in 1974-75 to strike movements across China. Obviously, inequality, privilege, corruption, and other symptoms of bureaucratic degeneration will exacerbate this contradiction and threaten the stability of society, as the Cultural Revolution showed.

Mao's instinctive response to the deepening mood of unrest in the country was to launch the 1973-75 campaigns in an attempt to limit bureaucratic abuses somewhat. The proposals of Mao's opponents in the leadership are more classically Stalinist: to allow small increases in the differentials and thus create a narrow privileged layer to act as a cushion between the rule of the bureaucracy and the masses. Such proposals would be warmly welcomed by the lower-level bureaucrats, who were cowed and demoralized by the Cultural Revolution and were frequently accused of deserting their posts in the face of mass pressure during the recent campaigns.

The Maoist offensive against the "professionalist" principle has resulted in the partial reemergence of various forms of workers control in Chinese industry. Throughout the early 1970s press reports spoke of rank-and-file resistance to moves to "strengthen business management" and restore factory discipline. During the 1975 campaign, after the "radical" leaders had urged the workers to "occupy the super-

structures," workers' inspection teams were revived in Shanghai and elsewhere. On February 10, 1976, the Yugoslav press agency Tanjug reported the formation of "workers control teams," although it made it clear that such bodies had no real power over production plans or income distribution.

Tight party control is apparently a common feature of all aspects of the present campaign. The formation of mass struggle organizations has so far been expressly forbidden. *Red Flag* (February 1976) called for the "strengthening of party leadership, so that the mass debate will develop in a planned manner, step by step." BBC-monitored reports from Wuhan (February 9) revealed that "since the debate began there has been no halting of classes or production, no organizing of liaison visits, and no erecting of mountain-strongholds during the movement."

The marked totalitarian bias in recent campaigns contrasts sharply with the classical Maoist themes of equality and participation. The same Mao who in 1966 inspired the Red Guards with rhetorical references to the Paris Commune now eulogizes Chin Shih Huang, China's ruthless first unifier and a practitioner of the reactionary philosophy of legalism. Here Mao stands clearly to the right of his opponents, who despite their hostility to proletarian democracy favor a certain measure of liberalization and differentiation in political, intellectual, and cultural life. (Since Chiang Ching lost her grip on cultural policy in 1973, many hundreds of new books and periodicals have been published, for the first time in several years.)

Will the present crisis deepen into a new Cultural Revolution, and will the Maoists establish their ascendancy in the leadership? The balance of forces at the top today is more heavily weighted against the "radicals" than it was in 1966; without Mao's personal intervention the present campaign would never have got started. Wide sections of the leadership were traumatized by the Cultural Revolution, and Mao can no longer count on the automatic support of the military. (On this point see "Behind the 'Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius' Campaign," *Inprecor*, No. 10, October 17, 1974.)

But since Maoism has always drawn its strength from the mass movement, in the struggle for both state power and for power in the party, is this not therefore an argument for Mao's initiating a new Cultural Revolution? Here a crucial new factor in the situation must be taken into consideration. The course of recent events indicates that the relationship between Maoism and the mass movement has changed qualitatively, and that ever wider sections of Chinese society are prepared to break from the orbit of all wings of the bureaucracy and to strike out for their own independent interests.

First, many of the recent campaign themes originated in the unofficial movement (see Western press reports for June 1974), where they were raised with a



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boldness and immediacy only distantly reflected in the official versions.

Second, whereas working-class political or strike action in past years has invariably developed in the shadow of the student movement or one or another section of the bureaucracy, the strike wave of 1974-75 was remarkable for its apparent independence from all outside influences. As in 1967, official denunciations of "syndicalism" reveal the emergence of independent trade-union-type bodies during these struggles. But while the 1967 Shanghai strike wave was defused by a combination of political persuasion by the Maoist leadership and internal divisions within the mass movement itself, the 1975 Hangchow crisis was ended only by the sending of 10,500 troops under Teng Hsiao-ping, after an unsuccessful attempt at political mediation by Wang Hung-wen. (Hangchow workers are clearly using the present campaign to vent their hatred for Teng. According to the February 28 *Le Monde*, the attacks on him in the city have reached an "astonishing volume.") The growth in worker-peasant representation in leading party and state bodies since 1969 could acquire more than just token significance if independent mass action increases.

The growing maturity and self-confidence of the Chinese working class is partly rooted in the rapid socioeconomic development of the country. The evident disenchantment with Mao's narrow conception of the antibureaucratic struggles springs from the failure of the Cultural

Revolution to fulfill expectations, the seemingly unending series of cynical power struggles in the leadership, the growing secrecy and exclusiveness of the political "debate," and Mao's obvious inability to hit upon a "radical" successor of any real stature in the country. At the same time, the partial relaxation of foreign military pressure on China has probably encouraged the process of internal differentiation. But recent events show that the chairman is still capable of responding to and stimulating the mass movement in a way unique among established ruling groups.

Predictions about the course of Chinese politics are notoriously difficult, doubly so since the thought of "going to meet Marx" could easily embolden Mao to make some last dramatic gesture to confound his opponents. But for the reasons given above it seems that the campaign will remain more or less within official channels, particularly since the price of military intervention to restore order would almost certainly be an even further reduction of "radical" representation at the top.

This explains why the present campaign is coming to a climax so quickly compared with the slow, step-by-step buildup of the anti-Liu campaign during the Cultural Revolution. Whereas the latter involved a genuine, although narrowly conceived, mobilization at the base, the former has up to now been strictly regulated from above. The official press has also broadly hinted that the door is still open for yet another "recantation" by the recidivist Teng, thus allowing for a retreat from all-out confrontation.

Where does the erosion of their mass base leave the Maoists? The measures Mao is now proposing to combat "capitalist restoration" include theoretical study, "all-round dictatorship" (which means in practice the extinction of all elements of proletarian democracy), and the preparation of a handful of close confidants (including his wife and son-in-law) to succeed him—measures which, where not illusory, are downright reactionary in essence. But if a convulsion of the proportions of the Cultural Revolution failed to achieve this aim, then the present campaign is even more clearly doomed.

The inability of the leadership to resolve or even substantially alleviate the contradictions of Chinese society revealed by the Cultural Revolution is now beyond all dispute. The political struggle that has broken out so soon after the death of Chou En-lai has so far remained largely on the level of the bureaucracy. The death of Mao, however, will signal the end of a historical period and will lead eventually to an explosion of pent-up social tensions. In such a situation, the emergence of groups and sectors of society mobilized independently of the bureaucracy will be of decisive importance.

March 10, 1976



## Hsinhua Account of the April 5 Demonstration

[The following account of the April 5 demonstration in Peking's Tien An Men Square was issued April 7 by the official Chinese press agency Hsinhua. We have taken the text from the April 8 *New York Times*.]

\* \* \*

Early April, a handful of class enemies, under the guise of commemorating the late Premier Chou during the Ching Ming Festival, engineered an organized, premeditated and planned counterrevolutionary political incident at Tien An Men Square in the capital. They flagrantly made reactionary speeches, posted reactionary poems and slogans, distributed reactionary leaflets and agitated for the setting up of counterrevolutionary organizations.

By means of insinuation and overt counterrevolutionary language, they brazenly clamored that "the era of Chin Shih Huang is gone."

Openly hoisting the ensign supporting Teng Hsiao-ping, they frenziedly directed their spearhead at our great leader, Chairman Mao, attempted to split the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, tried to change the general orientation of the current struggle to criticize Teng Hsiao-ping and counterattack the right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, and engaged in counterrevolutionary activities.

The counterrevolutionary activities culminated on April 5. At about 8 A.M., a loudspeaker car of the municipal public security bureau was overturned, the body of the car and its loudspeakers smashed.

After 9 A.M., more than 10,000 people gathered in front of the Great Hall of the People. At its maximum the crowd at Tien An Men Square numbered about 100,000 people. Except for a handful of bad elements who were bent on creating disturbances, the majority of the people were passers-by who came over to see what was happening. Some of the people were around the Monument to the People's Heroes; the majority were concentrated on the west side of the square near the eastern gate of the Great Hall of the People.

A dozen young people were beaten up by some bad elements, receiving cuts and bruises on their heads with blood trickling down their swollen faces. The hooligans shouted: "Beat them to death! Beat them to death!" An army guard who tried to stop the hooligans by persuasion had his insignia pulled off, uniform torn and his face beaten to bleed. The bad elements exclaimed: "Who can put this situation under control? Nobody in the Central

Committee can. Should he come today he would not be able to return!"

Their unbridled counterrevolutionary arrogance infuriated the masses, many of them saying: "Ever since liberation, Tien An Men Square has always been the place where our great leader, Chairman Mao, reviews parades of the revolutionary masses. We'll absolutely not tolerate such counterrevolutionary acts happening here!"

Several hundred worker-militiamen who went up the flight of steps leading to the Great Hall of the People to stand guard were broken up into several sections by the hooligans. The latter repeatedly shouted reactionary slogans and savagely beat up anyone in the crowd who opposed them. Some of those who got beaten up were dragged to the monument and forced to kneel down and "confess their crimes."

At 11:05 A.M., many people surged toward the Museum of Chinese History on the east side of the Tien An Men Square. In front of the museum, a woman comrade came forward to dissuade them, and she was immediately manhandled.

At this moment, a bunch of bad elements besieged a People's Liberation Army barrack by the clock tower in the southeast corner of the square. They crushed the door, broke into the building and occupied it. A few bad elements, sporting a crew cut, took turns to incite the people, shouting themselves hoarse through a transistor megaphone.

Toward 12 o'clock, some of the troublemakers proclaimed the inauguration of what they called "Committee of the People of the Capital for Commemorating the Premier." A bad element wearing spectacles had the impudence to announce that the public security bureau must give its reply in 10 minutes. He threatened that if their demands were not met, they would smash the security department.

At 12:30, the P.L.A. fighters on guard duty at Tien An Men Square marched in formation toward their barrack to guard it. The bad elements who were making disturbances shouted in instigation: "The people's army should stand on the side of the people!" and "Those befuddled by others are innocent!"

Later, they overturned a Shanghai sedan car and set it on fire. The firemen and P.L.A. guards who came to the rescue were blocked, and a fire engine was wrecked. These bad elements said that putting out the fire meant "suppressing the mass movement." Several members of the fire brigade were beaten to bleed.

At 12:45, a detachment of people's police came as reinforcement. But they too were

taunted and stopped. The caps of several policemen were snatched by the rioters and thrown to the air. Some even threw knives and daggers at the people's police. Several policemen were rounded up and assaulted.

In the afternoon, the sabotage activities of this handful of counterrevolutionaries became still more frenzied. They burned up four motor vehicles bringing water and food to the worker-militiamen on duty or belonging to the public security department.

Around 1700 [5 P.M.], this gang of bad elements again broke into the barrack, abducted and beat up the sentries, smashed windows and doors on the ground floor and looted everything in the rooms. Radios, quilts, bed sheets, clothing and books were all thrown into the fire by this gang of counterrevolutionaries. They also burned and smashed dozens of bicycles of the Peking worker-militiamen.

Black smoke belched into the sky amid a hubbub of counterrevolutionary clamors. Nearly all the window panes in the barrack were smashed. Then they set the barrack on fire.

The revolutionary masses showed utmost hatred for this counterrevolutionary political incident. Yet the handful of bad elements said glibly: "It manifests the strength of the masses." They went so far as to claim brazenly that "the situation has now got out of hand, it would be of no use even if a regiment or an army was called in," and so on and so forth, showing their unbridled reactionary arrogance.

See how these counterrevolutionaries, using extremely decadent and reactionary language and the trick of insinuation, viciously attacked and slandered our great leader, Chairman Mao, and other leading comrades on the party central committee:

Devils howl as we pour out our grief,  
We weep but the wolves laugh,  
We spill our blood in memory of the hero,  
Raising our brows, we unsheathe our swords,  
China is no longer the China of yore,  
And the people are no longer wrapped in  
sheer ignorance,  
Gone for good in Chin Shih Huang's feudal  
society,  
We believe in Marxism-Leninism,  
To hell with those scholars who  
[line or lines missing from transcript—IP]  
ism!  
What we want is genuine Marxism-Leninism.  
For the sake of genuine Marxism-Leninism,  
We fear not shedding our blood and laying  
down our lives,  
The day modernization in our fields is  
realized,  
We will come back to offer libations and  
sacrifices.

The clamors of these counterrevolutionaries about combating "Chin Shih Huang" and demanding "genuine Marxism-Leninism" were out-and-out counterrevolutionary agitation in the same vein as the language used in Lin Piao's plan for a counterrevolutionary coup d'état, "Outline

of Project 571." By directing their spearhead at our great leader, Chairman Mao, and the party Central Committee headed by Chairman Mao, and lauding Teng Hsiao-ping's counterrevolutionary revisionist line, these counterrevolutionaries laid bare unmistakably their criminal aim to practice revisionism and restore capitalism in China.

In the past few days these elements not only wrote reactionary poems but plastered reactionary posters. They lauded Teng Hsiao-ping and attempted to nominate him to play the role of [Imre] Nagy, the chieftain of the counterrevolutionary incident in Hungary. They talked nonsense, alleging that with Teng Hsiao-ping in charge of the work of the Central Committee, the struggle has won decisive victory "to the great satisfaction of the people throughout the country."

They uttered vile slanders, saying "the recent so-called antiright-deviationist struggle is the act of a handful of careerists to reverse verdicts." They openly opposed the great struggle initiated and led by Chairman Mao to repulse the right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts; their counterrevolutionary arrogance was inflated to the utmost.

However, the time when these counterrevolutionary elements ran rampant coincided with the day of their downfall. Going against the will of the people, they were extremely isolated.

As these bad elements were making disturbances, perpetrating acts of violence and sabotage, many revolutionary people courageously stepped forward to denounce their counterrevolutionary acts and struggled against them. The Peking worker-militia, people's police and army guards on duty at the square and the revolutionary people present at the time worked in close cooperation, and fought bravely in defense of Chairman Mao, of the party Central Committee, Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and the great capital of our socialist motherland.

When the handful of bad elements again set fire to the barrack at 5 P.M., the army guards put out the fire at the risk of their own lives. To safeguard the Great Hall of the People, more than 100 Peking worker-militiamen were injured, a dozen of them seriously wounded. Six army guards were abducted and many wounded. Risking dangers, the people's police persevered in fighting.

Although the barrack was besieged and fire was engulfing the first floor, leading comrades of the Peking worker-militia command persevered in the struggle on the second floor. At this critical moment, the switchboard operator calmly reported the news to leading departments concerned.

At 6:30 P.M., after Comrade Wu Teh's speech was broadcast, most of the onlookers and the masses who had been taken in

quickly dispersed. But a handful of counterrevolutionaries continued their desperate resistance and again posted some reactionary poems on the Monument to the People's Heroes.

Three hours later, on receiving an order from the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, tens of thousands of worker-militiamen, in coordination with the people's police and P.L.A. guards, took resolute measures and enforced proletarian dictatorship. In high morale, the heroic Peking militiamen filed into Tien An Men Square valiantly and mounted powerful counterattacks. They encircled those bad elements who were still creating disturbances and committing crimes in the vicinity of the Monument to the People's Heroes. They detained the active criminals and major suspects.

In the face of powerful proletarian dictatorship, the handful of rioters could not withstand even a single blow. They squatted down, trembling like stray dogs. Some hurriedly handed over their daggers, knives and notebooks on which they had copied the reactionary poems. Several criminals who pulled out their daggers in a vain attempt to put up a last-ditch fight were duly punished.

The revolutionary masses and the people of the whole city supported and acclaimed the revolutionary action of the Peking worker-militia, the people's police and P.L.A. guards. □

## Collapse of the Peronist Pillar of Argentine Capitalism

### Military Junta Undertakes 'Operation Salvage'

By Sergio Martínez

**BUENOS AIRES, March 27**—The entire population had been expecting the military to evict the Peronist rulers from the Casa Rosada, since they could not keep the battered Argentine capitalist system afloat. Nonetheless, it came as a surprise to everyone when on the morning of March 24 the news media reported that Isabel Martínez de Perón was no longer governing the country and that a military junta was ruling in her stead.

A few days before, Balbín, the leader of the Radical party and something of a bard, had said, paraphrasing Alfama: "The dying always get a priest, five minutes before they expire." And on the afternoon of March 23, the Buenos Aires daily *La Razón* ran a banner headline saying: "The End Is Near, the Final Word Has Been Spoken." The paper went on to say: "The power vacuum will be filled by a military government."

Nonetheless, we saw no more military

movements than we were used to seeing. Some trucks drove through Buenos Aires. The guard on the government palace was reinforced. There were accounts of troops being moved from Magdalena toward Buenos Aires. This was not the first time such reports had circulated, and they were explained on this occasion the same way as they had been before. When some members of parliament expressed concern, the minister of defense informed them that the movements were antisubversive operations.

So, coming out of a meeting with the president and Minister of Labor Unamuno, Lorenzo Miguel [head of the Metalworkers Union] and other union leaders, along with the chairman of the Justicialist [Peronist] party, Bittel, told reporters that "there is no coup and will be none." "Don't get upset over isolated incidents, everything is going to be all right."

Forty minutes later the president was

being held prisoner in the same helicopter that was supposed to take her to the residence in Olivos; at the orders of the military it changed course toward Ezeiza airport. The fact was that the crisis was of such magnitude, and the military, under the pretext of fighting terrorism, had gained so much control over the repressive bodies, that the coup was nothing more than a parade.

It is absolutely clear that the Videla-Massera-Agosti team (reportedly with Lanusse standing behind them) carried off the operation in a meticulous way. They did not yield to the pressures from the more impatient sections of the armed forces but waited until the prestige of Peronism was exhausted, and the government, lacking any alternatives for solving the main problems, had shown its incapacity to continue governing. This was necessary to cover up the discredit the army and the armed forces in general had incurred



in the previous period of the "Argentine Revolution" [the dictatorship established in 1966 and presided over respectively by generals Onganía, Levingston, and Lanusse].

Thus, while waiting for ideal conditions to seize the government, the military moved to take over the repressive apparatus, bringing all the police forces, the federal as well as the provincial ones, the intelligence and security services, and so on, under their control. This policy of the armed forces went so far that they managed to get the deputy commander of the First Army (stationed in the government square) named head of the federal police while he retained his military command. Likewise, in the last days before the coup, they carried out a similar operation in Córdoba, where an active-duty general in the Third Army took the post of chief of police.

### Rising Discontent

The situation had become ripe for a coup. The Mondelli plan had failed. The mobilizations of the workers movement made it impossible to implement such a scheme. As a result, the attempt to get credits from the International Monetary Fund was frustrated. The Multipartidaria [Multiparty Conference] came to nothing. By this means, the Radicals had tried to achieve political agreements that could paper over the power vacuum and neutralize the possibilities for a coup. According to all reports in the press, this effort was stillborn. Because of the Mondelli plan, the government was becoming more and more discredited, and with it the union bureaucracy, which supported this policy.

At the same time, there was continual discontent among the workers, which was shown by mobilizations outside the control of the union leaderships. Coordinating committees arose in Córdoba and in sections of Buenos Aires. In the capital, the Chacarita Coordinating Committee shut down an important factory complex and led mobilizations. From the strike-paralyzed western part of the city, the workers tried to march on the center of government.

The same thing happened in the northern and southern zones. Many unions, such as the Health Workers, the Smokehouse Workers, the Public Service Workers, and others, expressed their discontent with slogans such as "Down with the Mondelli Plan," higher wages, and for a price freeze and workers control, the demand raised by the Córdoba Coordinating Committee.

Furthermore, the bureaucracy was divided. While Lorenzo Miguel and Minister of Labor Unamuno talked about a general strike to block the coup, the head of the shipping-industry workers, De Luca, a member of the Congressional Committee on Labor Affairs, was saying, possibly with the support of the wing following

Calabró [a leading right-wing Peronist bureaucrat], that the ones who raised the possibility of a general strike had no right to do so, since they had supported the Mondelli plan for starving the workers



ARGENTINE DICTATOR VIDELA

without consulting the rest of the labor movement. It was already certain, De Luca said, that more than forty unions would not follow such a call.

On the other hand, Calabró had given the go-ahead to the Metalworkers Union in the main areas of Greater Buenos Aires to oppose the Mondelli plan. This included such areas as San Martín and Vicente López, where in each case the union has more than 30,000 members. But when the mobilizations began to spread, Calabró himself [he is also the governor of Buenos Aires Province]\* sent the provincial police to repress them, saying that the workers involved were not in his tendency but represented radicalized leftist sectors.

It was this situation that made March 24 the indicated day for ousting Isabel from the government. By then, this could be done without provoking any confrontation and without the population noticing much had happened. When the masses learned about it, they accepted it, without any enthusiasm, as something inevitable.

Peronism, the ship that they had embarked upon, had become stranded on the reefs; it could no longer take them to any good harbor. And they could not find an alternative ship whose course they could

\*Calabró was appointed governor directly by Juan Perón to replace a liberal Peronist who was not considered harsh enough in repressing leftists.—IP

influence. The middle layers, which had formerly been the vanguard of the process, had been intimidated by the rightist terrorism directed by the government, by the trade-union goon squads, and—despite their denials—by the armed forces.

At the same time, the proletariat was just beginning to go through the long process of breaking with class collaboration. This process was slowed down because the most advanced elements of the proletariat were struck down by fascistlike repression, without the working class as such responding rapidly enough.

Following the shipwreck of Peronism, which in 1972-73 was the instrument for holding back the masses and for replacing the discredited military, today the military officers, although with different faces, have returned to try to rescue crisis-racked capitalism in Argentina.

It is true that the crisis of Peronism and the trade-union bureaucracy opens up immense possibilities in the future for independent working-class organization and for a real workers party. However, in the short run, even though the masses no longer regarded the Peronist government as their own, this seemingly inevitable coup will be a blow for them. The working class is already beginning to realize that military rule will be directed against them, that its purpose is to carry through plans that a Peronist government could not. The attacks on the union structure are not just against the bureaucracy but above all against the workers.

### 'Rule With an Iron Hand'

On March 27, the Buenos Aires daily *La Opinión* made the following comment:

The influential liberal morning paper *O Estado de São Paulo* said in an editorial March 24 that "if any solution is still possible in Argentina, it must be the military stepping in and establishing a dictatorship that will rule with an iron hand." After noting the Chilean case, the editorial continued: "Aware of the example of Pinochet and the campaign whipped up against him, they (the Argentine military) know that they will be new victims of the propaganda machine of international 'progressivism.' Nonetheless, it is their patriotic duty to heroically take power." The editorial concluded by pointing out that the new government would have to force the population to accept the privations resulting from economic shock treatment, since this would be a precondition for recovery, which in turn will require patience and discipline. The editorial, which was written before the events that quickened in the morning of March 24, evidently had the merit of predicting them. However, its reference to Chile has not been in keeping with the events as they have developed so far. In fact, no comparison is possible between the developments eighteen months ago in our neighbor across the Andes and what is happening in Argentina now.

*La Opinión* was right insofar as the immediate, surface facts of the coup are concerned. So far there has not only been no massacre as there was in Chile but

there have not even been any deaths. About 2,000 persons are said to have been arrested. However, up to now the bulk of these have come from groups that a few days ago were in the government, although they have also begun to arrest worker activists right on the job. Nonetheless, we have no doubt that *O Estado de São Paulo* characterized the coup's objectives correctly.

The take-over was designed to force through a plan lowering real wages, increasing unemployment, and stepping up the rate of exploitation of the workers, that is, widening the share of surplus value going to the employers. What this represents is simply applying the Mondelli plan, with corrections and tougher provisions.

There have been no massacres, because they were not necessary. Nobody defended Isabel's government. Repression will come quickly enough when the workers resist the application of the plans that are already being put forward. Moving ahead in its typical style, the junta is preparing for the battle to cut the real wages of the workers and increase exploitation, putting the unions under military trusteeship, suspending the right to strike or to protest in any other way, and decreeing draconian punishments that go so far as the death penalty for those considered to have carried out acts of sabotage.

In the same way, they have liquidated the collective-bargaining boards and the Special Commission on Wages, a body set up March 10 to make wage adjustments to meet increases in the cost of living. They have also revoked the laws establishing trade-union rights, thereby leaving the union leaders unarmed in the face of the bosses. Along with this, they are already studying the Work Contract Law, no doubt with a view toward changing those sections that benefit the workers.

On Thursday, March 25, barely twenty-four hours after the coup, the IMF approved a credit of \$127.6 million for Argentina, which corresponds to the drop in exports. The previous government had applied for this loan but without success. The speed with which the IMF acted after the coup is an indication of what kind of policy it expects the junta to follow. Moreover, the fact that the junta sent a representative to the IMF the day after the take-over shows what kind of policy it intends to pursue.

In view of the relations the junta established with the IMF the day after the coup, there seems to be substance to the comment of the international news agencies that "Argentina may receive standby credit of \$300 million."

With the prospect of a seal of approval from the IMF, the door is being opened to the junta for foreign loans and renegotiation of the foreign debt. But this standby credit involves accepting the following conditions: cutting real income of the

workers by freezing wages or raises not compensated for by increased productivity, freeing prices or allowing great flexibility for changing prices, balancing the budget through massive layoffs of state workers, increasing the productivity of labor, and returning the 170 enterprises under state trusteeship entirely to private hands.

Moreover, the junta is so thoroughgoing in its steps to push forward superexploitation of the workers that it has banned all political activity, outlawed all political parties, and issued a decree threatening a penalty of fifteen years in prison for anyone who demonstrates or propagandizes against the junta or its decisions.

### Can Junta Crush Working Class?

But even if the junta succeeds for a time in carrying forward its plans for superexploitation of the workers, and manages to increase capitalist accumulation so that—with aid from the international financial institutions—Argentine economic recovery can take place, such recovery will only be temporary.

There are no lasting solutions for Argentine capitalism within the framework of its subordination to imperialism, and still less in the context of the worldwide crisis of capitalism. Moreover, there is no immediate solution for this crisis, although there have been some signs of a cyclical upturn.

Only socialist planning can overcome the periodic crises of Argentine capitalism, which, every time it achieves a temporary recovery thanks to superexploitation of the workers, only falls again into new recessions. The sacrifices the military junta wants to impose on the workers can only produce a momentary upturn in the context of the Argentine economy's constant trend of stagnation.

It will not be at all easy for the military junta to carry its plans forward. The "liberating revolution" of 1955 was unable to crush the Argentine proletariat, as was the so-called Argentine Revolution of 1966. In the first case, the clandestine struggles of the workers through the inter-union committees forced the military to retreat and begin to hand the unions back to the workers in 1957, as well as to turn over the government to civilians.

Once again in 1971-72, the workers struggles forced the military to retreat and restore the legal status of the unions that had been placed under trusteeship. Finally these struggles forced them to call elections. The advance of the workers in the recent period has led to important expressions of working-class political independence, even if only by small vanguard sectors. This is represented in a certain way by the appearance of coordinating committees, factory committees, shop stewards, and activists, who in Córdoba make up the real leadership of the mass movement.

The Achilles' heel of the working class in this situation is the absence of a political

organization able to offer a real class alternative at a time when the workers are abandoning their old Peronist class-collaborationist politics. Unlike the previous periods mentioned, the working class now lacks a political rallying point that can unite it against the dictatorship. Formerly Peronism offered such a pole.

If the revolutionary-socialist groups, the reformist currents in the working class, and independent activists are able to maintain the organization of the class from below through clandestine or semi-clandestine factory or struggle committees and coordinating bodies, and these committees advance through a long process of resistance toward a congress of labor, and of working people in general, possibilities will be created for defeating the dictatorship and presenting a real class alternative. This would also make it possible to build a party of the working class that can lead the way to socialism.

The working class and other proletarianized sectors have not been crushed, although the situation is very difficult. Today they cannot confront the dictatorship, but they can organize from below to build resistance to the plans for superexploitation and to lay the groundwork for a struggle to regain the real wages lost and to reinstall the trade-union organizations.

Moreover, in the stage of the Latin American revolutionary process that is beginning to take shape today, we can see possibilities for an upturn, especially in Bolivia, where mobilizations by students and miners have occurred, and also in Peru and Chile. This will certainly help the morale of the Argentine proletariat.

In the present situation, unity among revolutionary socialists is needed more than ever. This is necessary to help unite the workers around an anticapitalist program, so that we can make whatever accords are required with bourgeois or petty-bourgeois sectors in order to fight the dictatorship without being dragged by these sectors toward new populist formulas or governments that would just represent another capitalist changing of the guard.

### Trade-Union Leaders Arrested in Argentina

Arrests and firings of large numbers of trade-union leaders and rank-and-file activists in Argentina are reported in the first issue of the leftist fortnightly *Manifiesto Obrero* to be published since the March 24 military coup.

At Astilleros Astarsa the day after the coup about seventy shop stewards and activists were arrested as they left work. At Ford, the majority of shop stewards have been arrested, and at Terrabusi the majority of the delegates of the factory commissions were fired or suspended.

Similar occurrences were reported by *Manifiesto Obrero* to have taken place at Mercedes Benz, General Motors, and Wobron.



RACING  
RESULTS-ENTRIES

# Los Angeles Times

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DAILY 15c

# FBI Admits 92 Burglaries

## NEW ATTITUDE


### Israelis Raise Monuments to War Dead

BY WILLIAM J. DRUMMOND  
Times Staff Writer

TEL FAHRS, Occupied Golan Heights—A grim folk art has sprung up on this black volcanic plateau where war rages sporadically between Israel and Syria.

Blasted tanks, rusted submachine guns and other remnants of battle have been turned into surrealistic monuments marking the places where Israeli soldiers died in combat.

Some interpret this phenomenon as a reflection of Israeli humanism. an



## Repeated Break-ins at Socialist Offices Told

WASHINGTON (AP)—The FBI broke into offices of the Socialist Workers Party and its youth affiliate as often as twice a month for a total of 92 post-midnight raids in the early 1960s, according to newly disclosed FBI documents.

Two other FBI burglaries were conducted at the homes of alleged party members in Hamden, Conn. and Los Angeles.

However, the Hamden, Conn., couple named in the documents denied ever having been members of the party and said that, to their knowledge, their home had not been broken into.

The documents show that FBI agents photographed at least 8,700 pages of party files, including financial records and personal letters, during the break-ins. It was not clear from the FBI files whether agents only photographed or whether they removed some papers from the offices.

In compliance with a court order,

## Egypt Urges Intervention in Lebanon

From Times Wire Services

Egypt Sunday urged Arab states to intervene immediately in the Lebanese civil war.

As artillery and rocket battles raged through Lebanon, and right-

## Millions Hear of SWP Fight Against Government Spying

## FBI Burglaries Front-page News Across United States

By Jim Mack

[The following article appeared in the April 16 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

"FBI Admits 92 Burglaries—Repeated Break-ins at Socialist Offices Told," proclaimed a banner headline at the top of page one of the *Los Angeles Times*. "FBI: We Burglarized Socialists 92 Times," read the front page of the *Miami Herald*.

The *New York Times* played the story across three columns at the top of its front page, with a dispatch by its correspondent John Crewdson from Washington and a separate New York story. Between the two stories the editors placed a photograph of SWP presidential candidate Peter Camejo.

The revelations of the FBI burglaries

were given similar treatment by papers across the country, in big cities and small towns alike.

It was also major news internationally. Although we haven't yet received clippings from abroad, we do know that the *International Herald Tribune* front-paged the story.

Somebody with a sense of humor at the *Miami Herald* decided to run a UPI dispatch headlined "FBI Chief Cites Apathy to Crime" as a box inside the story on the burglaries. "Our society is truly beset by a crime wave of unprecedented dimensions," Burglar-in-Chief Clarence Kelley is quoted as saying. "The time has come when citizens must stop talking about how terrible crime is and do something about it."

Tens of millions of people learned about the Socialist Workers party and its fight

against government spying and harassment through radio and television news and features. Syd Stapleton, national secretary of the Political Rights Defense Fund, appeared on the NBC network "Today" show on Monday morning, March 29.

That evening, a Public Broadcasting Service feature on Peter Camejo opened by describing the new revelations about the FBI burglaries. The following morning, SWP leader Linda Jenness appeared on the nationally telecast ABC morning talk show "Good Morning, America."

The release of the FBI documents also prompted editorials supporting the SWP in its fight against government harassment. The *New York Post* denounced the FBI burglaries as "subversive, illegal and an affront to the U.S. Constitution." It noted that "despite its relentless criminal activi-

ty, the FBI was wholly unable to produce any evidence to incriminate the SWP."

The *Miami Herald* called for "a complete and open airing of the federal government's unconstitutional activities against a legitimate political party, with fair recompense for any damages done."

The *Atlanta Constitution* observed, "No wonder people have lost faith in and respect for institutions like the FBI and others. When an agency that is supposed to uphold and enforce the law makes a regular routine of breaking it, sooner or later the public wises up."

The *New York Times*, in a lead editorial, said, "These burglaries were raids against the Constitution. They were carried out by a governmental agency in deliberate disregard of one of the most fundamental rights of citizens in a democracy: to be safe

from illegal search without warrant."

The *Nation*, the country's foremost liberal magazine, ran a major editorial in support of the socialists' lawsuit, urging its readers "who would like to help bring the official criminals in this case of 'legal' burglary to book" to send contributions to the PRDF.

The Black biweekly *Philadelphia Tribune* said in an editorial, "Those who feel this has nothing to do with Blacks should remember that SWP has many Black members and that the FBI carried out [the same kind of] illegal operations against the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and many Black leaders and organizations throughout the 1960's.

"And where are the expressions of outrage at FBI lawlessness by our 'law and order' President, not to mention the

other candidates such as Carter, Jackson, Wallace, Reagan, et al? silence seems to indicate that Watergate still lives, that crimes are only bad if they are committed by poor folks, not if they are committed by the government."

The Maoist weekly *Guardian* published a comprehensive news story. However, the pro-Moscow *Daily World*, blinded by sectarian hostility to the SWP, hasn't written a single word about this major development. This gives the *Daily World* the dubious distinction of being virtually the only paper in this country that saw fit to ignore the story.

Only those who studied journalism in the Stalin school of censorship could feel comfortable covering up one of the biggest revelations of FBI crimes yet. □

## The Frame-up of William Albertson

# How the FBI Puts On a 'Snitch Jacket'

By Larry Seigle

[The following article appeared in the April 16 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

One of the most highly prized disruptive techniques in the secret police arsenal is the planting of false evidence that a member of a political organization is a police informer.

Circulation of this "disinformation" is designed to create an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust inside an organization—a spy mania that can debilitate and even destroy a group that makes the mistake of swallowing the bait.

In FBI parlance this gambit is known as "putting a snitch jacket on."

FBI secret documents describe its use in the FBI's war against the Black Panther party.

On May 11, 1970, FBI headquarters in Washington sent a memo to San Francisco containing "a proposal for a disruptive-disinformation operation targeted against the National office" of the Black Panther party.

"Xerox copies of true documents, documents subtly incorporating false information, and entirely fabricated documents would be periodically anonymously mailed to the residence of a key Panther leader," the memo suggested.

"... A wide variety of alleged authentic police or FBI material could be carefully selected or prepared for furnishing to the Panthers... documents could be pre-

pared pinpointing Panthers as police or FBI informants. . . ."

The Panthers' lack of political experience, combined with their ultraleftism, left them unable to defend themselves against the FBI disruption operations, including the "snitch jacket" ploy.

But the FBI was also able to use this technique with devastating effectiveness against the Stalinist Communist party USA. In fact, in the memo proposing the operation against the Panthers, the FBI noted, "Although this proposal is a relatively simple technique, it has been applied with exceptional results in another area of intelligence interest where the target was of far greater sophistication. . . ."

One of the "exceptional results" the FBI achieved involved the case of William Albertson, a longtime member of the CP National Committee who was expelled in 1964 as an informer for the FBI. The Albertson case is described in an article by Frank Donner in the April-May issue of the *Civil Liberties Review*, a magazine published by the American Civil Liberties Union.

The evidence against Albertson consisted of a document found in a car in which he had ridden. The document, which was made to look like an informer's report, was signed "Bill" and was in handwriting that resembled Albertson's. It ended with a "request for a raise in expenses."

Albertson was booted out of the party. His claims of innocence were brushed aside. Soon after, his wife and his mother were expelled—without even a hearing—

although there was no evidence at all against them.

Albertson, who was then fifty-four, had been a Stalinist functionary for thirty years. For years after the expulsion, he fought in vain to have his name cleared and to be readmitted.

He must have known it would be futile; he himself had participated in the bureaucratic expulsion of too many CPers who committed the crime of expressing a disagreement at a party meeting, or who couldn't follow the twists and turns of the Stalinist line fast enough.

Nonetheless, Albertson had no other life to turn to. He doggedly insisted that he had been framed up.

Donner, who knew some of the people involved, reports: "[Albertson's] three children suffered the stigma and ostracism that have been visited on the children of informers throughout history. The youngest, then eight years old, was denied a private school scholarship [because] his father had ostensibly earned enough money from the FBI to pay the tuition. . . ."

"His widow recalls that . . . he was constantly involved from the day of his expulsion in one appeal after another, in corresponding with the party and doing everything possible to have his name cleared and to be reinstated, to also do his own investigation to try to find out how he had been framed. The most painful thing that I ever had to experience in my whole life was watching a destroyed man trying to save himself."



"Albertson never recovered from the trauma of the frame-up. In February 1972 he was killed in an accident."

In August 1975, a document exposing the case against Albertson as an FBI plot was released to the public, buried in a huge stack of other, unrelated Cointelpro files. The document was a 1965 FBI report boasting that "the most active and efficient functionary of the New York District of the Communist Party USA and leading national officer of the party, through our counterintelligence efforts has been expelled. . . ."

In one of those clerical goofs that turn up occasionally in FBI files "sanitized" for public release, Albertson's name, in one passage, was not blotted out.

The frame-up, of course, would have fallen apart under any objective inquiry at the time. It was just too convenient that the "informer" had signed his report with his real name, instead of a code name, as both FBI policy and common sense would dictate.

But the Stalinists don't make it a policy to allow the accused to defend themselves and confront their accusers—either in the CPUSA or in the Soviet Union. Those who sat in judgment on Albertson were trained in the school of the most monstrous frame-up trials ever, the Moscow trials, where the "guilty" were not merely expelled, but executed as well.

Of course, it is possible that some in the CP body that decided to expel Albertson thought the case was a little weak. If so, you can be sure that the *real* informers, who set the game up in the first place, were among those who argued the loudest and most insistently for Albertson's head.

Naturally, a political party has the duty as well as the right to protect itself from infiltration by agents and enemy spies. But what the Stalinist victims of Cointelpro didn't understand is that a "spy scare" can do more to disrupt the functioning of the party than dozens of informers.

That is exactly what the FBI accomplished by "putting a snitch jacket on" William Albertson. □

### Michelin to Build Factory in Egypt

In the first large-scale economic agreement since Cairo began urging foreign capitalists to invest in Egypt two years ago, the Michelin Group of France has signed a \$50 million agreement to establish a tire factory there. Under the accord, Michelin gets 60 percent and Egypt gets 40 percent ownership of the factory, which will be built near Alexandria. Michelin will be allowed to export 60 percent of the production.

The deal with Michelin was agreed to after negotiations with the American Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. broke down.

## 'Time' Says Israel Was Ready to Drop A-Bombs

### How the 1973 Mideast War Almost Went Nuclear



GOLDA MEIR: Was ready to push nuclear button during 1973 Mideast war.

The April 12 issue of *Time* magazine published a report that "... Israel possesses a nuclear arsenal of 13 atomic bombs, assembled, stored and ready to be dropped on enemy forces from specially equipped Kfir and Phantom fighters or Jericho missiles. These weapons have a 20-kiloton yield, roughly as powerful as those that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

According to the *Time* article, the bombs were assembled after the second day of the October 1973 Middle East war. "At that time, the Egyptians had repulsed the first Israeli counterattacks along the Suez Canal, causing heavy casualties, and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights were retreating in the face of a massive Syrian tank assault. . . . As each bomb was assembled, it was rushed off to waiting air force units. Before any triggers were set, however, the battle on both fronts turned in Israel's favor. The 13 bombs were sent to desert arsenals, where they remain today, still ready for use."

If the *Time* magazine report is accurate, the world came within a hair of a nuclear holocaust.

*Time* asks, "Did Israel's nuclear capability play a part in the U.S. global military alert of Oct. 25, 1973?"

The Israelis, the report noted, were convinced that the Soviet regime knew of

their nuclear moves. *Time* says:

"What is certain is that on Oct. 13, the Russians dispatched nuclear warheads from Nikolaev—the naval base at Odessa—to Alexandria, to be fitted on Russian Scud missiles already based in Egypt. The U.S., in turn, detected the Soviet warheads as the ship carrying them passed through the Bosphorus on Oct. 15 and issued a warning to Moscow by means of a world military alert."

Although the fact is not mentioned in the *Time* article, Odessa itself is only a little more than 1,000 miles from Israel, and other major Soviet cities are even closer. It must have occurred to Soviet military chiefs that Israel's nuclear arsenal is not only a menace to its Arab neighbors, but to the USSR as well.

The ruthlessness of the Israeli rulers is indicated by the report's explanation for the shooting down of a Libyan airliner in 1973. According to *Time*, the plane "lost its way because of a navigational error and flew toward a forbidden area. Israeli fighters tried to turn it back. Then, for security reasons, they shot it down, causing the death of 108 of the 113 people aboard."

Israeli officials have denied the *Time* story, but have not offered to allow inspection of their nuclear facilities. □

### Egyptian Ports Closed to Soviets

Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat announced April 4 that he had canceled the right of the Soviet navy to use Egyptian ports. Sadat said that the cancellation, which involved the Mediterranean ports of Alexandria, Matruh, and Port Said, was implied when he abrogated the Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty in March.

In addition, Sadat charged that the Soviets were planning to establish bases in Libya. He claimed that Libyan President Muammar el-Qaddafi has ordered \$11 billion in Soviet arms, and called Qaddafi "a mental case."

### Correction

In "The Struggle of Soviet Jews Against Stalinist Oppression," by David Frankel, published in our April 12 issue, an error appeared on page 610. The sentence "During the years 1948-49 not one Yiddish book was published in the Soviet Union" should have read "During the years 1948-59 not one Yiddish book was published in the Soviet Union."

## Lynch Mob Attacks Black Attorney in Boston

By Jon Hillson



Stanley Forman/Boston Herald American

BOSTON, April 5. Racist mob attacks Theodore Landsmark outside city hall. Thug with American flag used steel pole to smash

Landsmark in the face, breaking his nose, as another goon sought to pin the Black attorney's arms behind his back.

[The following article appeared in the April 16 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

BOSTON—Amid shrieks of "Get the nigger, kill him!" a frenzied mob of racist white high school students came close to beating the life out of a Black man at the doorstep of Boston's city hall April 5.

The attack came moments after 200 white students left the city council chambers, where they had staged an antibusing demonstration as part of a sweeping racist school boycott.

Having received the blessing of antibusing city council members, including Louise Day Hicks, president of ROAR, Boston's main antibusing group, the mob left the building. They then began taunting pass-

ing Blacks and throwing apples at them.

Leaders of the march spotted a group of four Black men and began shouting racist epithets and imitating apes.

Upwards of fifty of the whites broke away and chased the Blacks, seizing attorney Theodore Landsmark. Landsmark, executive director of the Boston Contractors Association, was on his way to a city hall meeting.

Landsmark was beaten to the ground. He was kicked in the face. His nose was smashed by a steel pole bearing an American flag.

Police broke up the mob, rescuing Landsmark. One assailant was arrested; cops have issued warrants for two others.

Outraged leaders of the Black community responded swiftly to the attack. More than 200 Blacks, encompassing a wide range of community leaders and organizations, turned out for a Massachusetts Legislative Black Caucus news conference

on the city hall steps the next morning.

The spontaneous turnout was like a rally, as people cheered and applauded the angry speakers.

State Sen. William Owens blasted city officials. Their leadership and support of antibusing organizations, he said, was "the cause of racist attacks by white youth on Black adults, youth, and young children."

The racist students the day before "were truant from school to attend a gathering in the city council chambers, where they were given inspiration for this vicious behavior," Owens told reporters.

He indicted Boston Mayor Kevin White for his refusal to provide adequate safety for Blacks. "We must come to the realization that if city and state officials will not protect us, we will ask for federal protection, and short of that we must protect ourselves," he said.

Owens read a Black caucus demand that



state Attorney General Francis Bellotti and U.S. Attorney General Edward Levi "conduct immediate investigations into the roles of those Boston city councilors, school committee persons, and state legislators who are inciting young people to mob violence."

Rev. Rafe Taylor, speaking for the Black Ecumenical Council, described the rise of incidents of racist violence. "They have blown up buses, stoned houses, attacked our children, and harassed Black mothers. The streets of Boston are not safe for people of color. War has been declared on us."

Wayne Budd, president of the Massachusetts Association of Black Lawyers, pledged the organization's full support for Landsmark, a member of the group, in fighting to "bring these mad hoodlum punks to justice."

The shock of the beating forced a response from the Massachusetts governor's mansion. Lew Murray, a Black aide to Gov. Michael Dukakis, told the gathering the governor considered the assault "appalling."

"It is indicative of racism and will not be tolerated," Murray stated. "Acts like these will be stopped." He said Dukakis pledged "all efforts necessary to bring to justice those who carried out the attack."

Maceo Dixon, the project coordinator for the April 24 national march on Boston for school desegregation, told the media, "These criminals tried to kill the first Black citizen they saw because they knew from experience that the police and the elected officials would turn their heads the other way."

"Who's going to be next?" Dixon asked. He called for a "massive public outcry to put these racists in their place. The April 24 March on Boston is a national legal and peaceful demonstration to support school desegregation and busing and to oppose racist attacks on Blacks in the schools and on the streets. This demonstration can be the start of a new, powerful, united movement to counter the antibusers whose voices have been heard so loud and strong these past two years."

A statement by National Student Coalition Against Racism leader Hattie McCutcheon, read by NSCAR staff member Nan Bailey, also backed April 24.

"There is only one way that these attacks will be stopped," Bailey told reporters. "And that is when the Black community and its supporters do something about it. We have to stand up for our rights and fight for them."

Campaign supporters of Socialist Workers congressional candidate James "Mac" Warren distributed a statement in which the Black community activist called for all-out participation in the April 24 march. Warren condemned the "criminal negligence of city officials, whose inaction allowed such attacks to take place on the doorstep of city government."

## Death Threat Sent to Organizers of April 24 March



Lou Howort/Militant

MACEO DIXON: "We will not let these kinds of threats intimidate us!"

BOSTON—"We look forward to fighting scum such as you," read the handwritten note addressed to the Coalition for the April 24 March on Boston. "In fact it is what we live for most right now. Despicable slime like you must be eliminated and it will be."

The racist death threat received April 3 by march organizers was signed by "Michael O'Connor," for the South Boston Defense League, one of the best-organized terrorist gangs in South Boston.

The antiracist coalition began an immediate public campaign to demand that federal, state, and local officials

apprehend those behind the threat. The South Boston Defense League hooligans have participated in assaults on Blacks and antiracist activists during the past year. Last summer these racists mobilized several hundred "Southies" to "protect their neighborhood" in anticipation of protests aimed at making South Boston's beaches safe for Blacks.

The April 3 note was written on the back of a mimeographed warning entitled "'Southie': Beware of Infiltrators."

The flyer has been in existence for about a month, and purports to alert neighborhood bigots to "communists" coming into the area, urging that they be "thrown out."

"These are being posted in all the housing projects, on main and side streets, poles, vacant buildings, bar-rooms and handed to all gangs and groups of our youths in Southie and Charlestown to alert them to the communist filthy swine crawling around this city," the threat written by "O'Connor" stated.

A statement issued by April 24 project coordinator Maceo Dixon demanded official action "to prevent O'Connor and his ilk from making this threat real."

"This threat to our lives and to our civil liberties occurs in the framework of stepped-up attacks against Boston's Black citizens," Dixon stated.

The statement stressed the confidence march organizers have in the peaceful, legal, and orderly character of the upcoming demonstration.

"Hundreds of march participants will be trained in advance as marshals entrusted with the job of ensuring that both the march and rally proceed peacefully," Dixon stated.

"Governor [Michael] Dukakis and Mayor [Kevin] White have a responsibility to immediately ensure that O'Connor is apprehended, prosecuted, and convicted. We will not let these kinds of threats intimidate us!" —JON HILLSON

The city hall assault was not the only racist violence seen by Boston Blacks during the past week. The day before, a predawn explosion gutted a parked school bus in Dorchester. The powerful bomb scattered debris as far as fifty yards.

Later on the same day as Landsmark's beating, two Black brothers were sitting in a car in Charlestown talking to their sister, who was standing outside. A sniper's bullet hit one of the men. As his brother ran for help, he was clubbed, beaten, and robbed by thugs.

The following day, fifty white students

refused to enter the Gavin Middle School in South Boston. They marched to the L Street Annex of South Boston High School, where they stoned an empty school bus, police cars, and a radio news van.

The cops have yet to comment on who was responsible for a midnight bus-wrecking foray that resulted in \$50,000 damage on March 9.

The white student boycott of April 5 was a stunning confirmation of the continuing power of the racists. Built over the preceding weekend by ROAR, it cleared elementary and middle schools in South Boston,

as well as the embattled South Boston High School and Charlestown High School.

The scope of the boycott and violence broke the uneasy, temporary calm that has permeated the schools for the past two months.

The need for a massive, united action that can focus the rage of the Black

community and the militant solidarity of its white supporters on the government is greater than ever before.

Support for the April 24 march assumes a new importance in the context of the immediate, emergency situation in Boston.

The largest possible turnout on that day can deal a powerful blow to the racists and their violent anti-Black drive. □  
on

## Camejo Urges Massive Turnout for April 24 March

[The following statement was issued April 8 by Peter Camejo and Willie Mae Reid, Socialist Workers party candidates for president and vice-president of the United States.]

\* \* \*

On the night of March 31, in Louisville, Kentucky, a six-foot-tall cross was burned on Nancy Galt-Clayton's front lawn. She is a leader of the pro-school-desegregation movement there.

On the night of April 3, in predominantly white Rosedale, New York, a fire bomb was hurled at the newly purchased home of Sidney Lindsay, a Black man.

Then on April 5, in broad daylight, Boston Mayor Kevin White watched from his city hall window as a gang of antibusing demonstrators tried to run a flagpole through the Black director of the Boston Contractors Association, Theodore Landsmark.

In the face of these vicious attacks on Black rights, not one presidential candi-

date of the capitalist parties has spoken up to condemn the racist violence. Not one has declared, as we do, that if elected they will use all the power at their disposal to defend the law of the land prohibiting segregated housing and schools.

In fact, the very day the shocking picture of the attack on Landsmark was flashed across newspapers around the country, Democratic presidential contender Jimmy Carter chose to come out in defense of segregated housing.

Using "unusually blunt language," according to the April 7 *New York Times*, Carter talked about "'black intrusion' into white neighborhoods." He declared that as president, "I'm not going to use the Federal Government's authority deliberately to circumvent the natural inclination of people to live in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods."

In short, Carter is echoing the racist code words of the flagpole welder and his ilk, who talk about preserving their "neighborhoods" and "neighborhood

schools." Their real message is "Nigger keep out!"

Carter's remarks represent a new low in this year's presidential campaign, which has been marked by a total unwillingness on the part of the capitalist candidates to even speak about much less to the growing crisis facing Blacks—in jobs, housing, and education.

None of these politicians can be relied upon to solve the problems facing the Black community. None of them can even be relied upon to take action to halt the rising wave of out-and-out physical assaults on Blacks.

Where, then, can Blacks and supporters of Black rights turn?

We must turn to each other and organize our own independent power into a massive, visible movement to counter the racist drive and demand that the government enforce the law of the land.

Antiracist forces have a historic opportunity to deliver a message to the racists—and the politicians who refuse to stand up to them—by showing up in massive numbers for the national probusing march on Boston April 24.

Called last month by more than 100 Black and white supporters of desegregation, this demonstration can be a powerful show of solidarity with Boston's embattled Black community, and a rallying point for a renewed effort to defend Black rights across the country.

We urge all our supporters to launch a stepped-up drive to spread the word about the April 24 action—to mobilize people to march on Boston.

All supporters of Black rights are needed to stand up for justice in Boston on April 24! □

## Tens of Thousands March in Rome

## Italian Women Demand Right to Abortion

The biggest feminist demonstration ever to take place in Italy was held in Rome April 3. Estimates of the size of the march, which tied up the city for three hours, ranged from 50,000 to 100,000, according to an Associated Press dispatch from Rome.

Organized on only two day's notice, the protest was a response to the passage of a parliamentary amendment April 1 that would restrict abortion only to cases of rape or danger to a woman's life.

Premier Aldo Moro's Christian Democratic party blocked with the neofascist Italian Social Movement to pass the amendment in the Chamber of Deputies. Moro's government has been attempting to pass a new abortion law in order to forestall a referendum on the present one.

More than 600,000 persons signed peti-

tions for a referendum on repeal of the present law, which was enacted by the fascist regime of Mussolini in 1930 to punish "crimes against the integrity and health of the race." Moro fears that the Christian Democrats will lose the abortion referendum, just as they lost overwhelmingly on the issue of divorce in a 1974 vote.

The World Health Organization estimates that more than one million illegal abortions are performed every year in Italy. The legal denial of decent medical facilities and trained personnel results in about 2,000 deaths a year.

While the government, the Catholic church, and the neofascists have lined up against the right of women to control their own bodies, the Italian Communist party

has tried to find a middle road, in the spirit of its goal of a "historic compromise" with the Christian Democrats.

"Abortion is a social question and one cannot leave it to the will of individuals," CP leader Giancarlo Pajetta said in a recent statement. "Certainly, the greatest room possible for the freedom of the woman, but self-determination, no." (Quoted in the March 27 *Washington Post*.)

The treachery of the Stalinists has not gone unnoticed. The AP report on the April 3 demonstration said:

"Pope Paul VI, the Vatican and Mr. Moro were the targets of sarcasm and profanities in the slogans and streamers. But many in the crowd also denounced the Communist leader, Enrico Berlinguer, for seeking a compromise solution with the Catholics." □



## Syrian Regime Sides With Rightists in Lebanon

By David Frankel

Lebanon's year-old civil war threatens to suck all those around it into the vortex. The latest truce, agreed to April 1, is unlikely to prove any more stable than the twenty-six that have preceded it. In the meantime, Syria and Israel are teetering on the brink of a new Middle East war.

Lebanon itself lies in ruins, with 15,000 to 20,000 dead and at least double that number wounded out of a population of roughly three million. In addition to the dead and maimed—accounting for one Lebanese in fifty—hundreds of thousands have fled the country, and countless more have been left destitute.

The current truce was arranged by Syria's President Hafez al-Assad, who is trying to patch together an accord between the two sides in the civil war. Both Washington and Moscow have endorsed Assad's efforts. His mediation was praised as "a positive element" in an April 8 article in *Pravda*, while the Ford administration has hailed the "constructive role" played by Damascus. Kissinger himself has characterized Assad's intervention as "highly responsible."

However, while praising Assad's attempts to stabilize the situation in Lebanon, the Ford administration has made preparations to intervene with U.S. forces in case Assad proves unable to deliver. Pentagon officials announced March 30 that seven U.S. warships, including the helicopter carrier *Guadalcanal* and a force of 1,700 marines, were cruising in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Washington's excuse for deployment of its gunboats was that they might be needed to evacuate American citizens if the fighting continues. Kissinger sought to allay any suspicions about American intentions by telling a group of diplomats that "there is nothing we can do physically" in Lebanon.

Only the gullible will be reassured by Kissinger's words. U.S. warships were not dispatched to "protect" American citizens during the right-wing coups in Chile and Argentina or during the bloody Indonesian take-over in East Timor. The naval ploy is intended to threaten military intervention.

On April 5, Undersecretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, while testifying before Congress, refused to rule out the possibility of U.S. intervention in Lebanon.

What Ford and Kissinger have in mind was also indicated by the State Department's action in sending L. Dean Brown as a special envoy to Beirut on the same day as the presence of the U.S. warships



ASSAD: Won praise from Kissinger.

off Lebanon was announced. Brown was appointed U.S. ambassador to Jordan in September 1970, just in time for King Hussein's savage drive against the Palestinian liberation movement in Jordan. The Nixon administration was about to throw U.S. troops into that fight when the tide turned against the Palestinians. (See *Intercontinental Press*, September 28, 1970, p. 787, and October 26, 1970, p. 900.)

U.S. forces in the Mediterranean off the coast of Lebanon are complemented by Israeli forces on Lebanon's southern border. A dispatch from Beirut filed by *New York Times* correspondent Henry Tanner March 31—the day after Washington announced its fleet movements and the appointment of Brown as a special envoy—said, "Reports from southern Lebanon during the day said that there was considerable tension there, with Israeli planes making numerous intrusions at low altitude."

Israeli troops were massed on the border. Jonathan C. Randal reported in the March 31 *Washington Post* that "Israel appeared

to be going through the motions of a full-scale border alert. . . ." An *Intercontinental Press* correspondent in Amman reported that Lebanese newspapers featured photographs of Israeli truck convoys moving toward the border.

For the moment, the threats of U.S. and Israeli invasion have receded to the background while Lebanese politicians haggle over the issue of replacing the discredited Suleiman Franjeh with a new president. But the danger of a wider war is far from over.

### What the War Is About

Three fundamental problems are at issue in Lebanon. As long as they remain acute, differences over them tend to flare into civil war. The problems are the following:

- *The discriminatory governmental system.* This is the legacy of French imperialism, which ruled Lebanon by playing off the Christians against the Muslims. Although the Muslim population is now estimated to be a 60 percent majority in Lebanon, the Christians—particularly the Maronite sect—are guaranteed a dominant role in the government.

The historical link between the Maronite rightists and imperialism led to the U.S. invasion of Lebanon in 1958 during a much smaller civil war than the one going on now. By forcibly blocking enactment of the democratic reforms demanded by the Muslim population in 1958, the Eisenhower administration helped set the stage for the bloodbath taking place in Lebanon.

- *Oppression of the Palestinians.* Since the Christian rightists look to imperialism for aid in defending their privileges against the Muslim masses, they naturally oppose the demands of the Palestinian liberation movement for a more active anti-imperialist governmental policy.

There are 300,000 to 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which is the only Arab country in which independent Palestinian organizations can operate freely. The Palestinians have both Muslims and Christians among them, but this makes no difference to the Christian rightists: They demand the suppression of the Palestinian liberation movement in Lebanon. It was an attack by the Maronite Phalangist party on a busload of Palestinians returning from a rally in April 1975 that touched off the civil war.

- *The struggles of the workers and peasants.* One of the events that set the stage for the civil war was an uprising in

Sidon in February 1975. Lebanese fishermen won the support of Palestinian workers in their struggle against the granting of a government fishing monopoly to the Protein Company.

The Protein Company was formed by Camille Chamoun—the president of Lebanon in 1958 and the present minister of the interior—and Tony Franjeh, the son of the current president. This illustrates the fact that the political discrimination against the Muslim majority is intertwined with economic exploitation and oppression in other areas of life. The mass of impoverished Palestinian refugees and workers were natural allies of the Muslim workers and peasants in the struggle against these conditions.

It is important to note, however, that while the bulk of the working class is Muslim and the strongest section of the capitalist class in Lebanon is Christian, the religious and class divisions are not identical by any means. What has happened in the Maronite communities especially is that the mass of the population has been enlisted in a war to defend Christian privileges, and this has submerged the class divisions among the Maronites.

Other sectors of the Christian population have fought beside the Muslims and Palestinians. In March, for example, Muslim tribesmen of the Druse sect fighting in the mountains east of Beirut were trying to link up with villages held by the largely Christian Syrian People's party. These villages were besieged by the Phalangists.

### The Syrian Betrayal

Although the masses who adhere to the Muslim-Palestinian-leftist coalition have been pushed into motion by the issues of religious discrimination, Palestinian liberation, and social and economic needs, their leaders have other things in mind. This becomes clear if we recall the course of events over the last several months.

The intense fighting that raged from September 1975 to January 1976, broken only by brief truces, was ended by the intervention of units of the Palestine Liberation Army stationed in Syria. The PLA intervention was sufficient to swing the fight—which had been stalemated up to then—against the Christian rightists.

But the Assad regime, which had sanctioned the PLA intervention, had no interest in helping the Muslim masses to win the civil war. A total victory for the Muslim side and the establishment of a relatively strong, unified regime would diminish Syria's influence inside Lebanon. Furthermore, Assad was interested in gaining some control over the Palestinian groups inside Lebanon, not in strengthening their independence, since in the past they have sometimes stood as obstacles to Syrian diplomacy.

Therefore, although the Muslim-

Palestinian-leftist coalition was in a position to do away with the old system of religious quotas in public life, Assad pushed through a truce agreement based



JUMBLATT: Wants to be president.

on maintenance of the system with minor changes.

David Russell pointed out at the time that "the truce between the warring factions is based on an attempt to patch up the antiquated and discriminatory system of religious quotas that led to the civil war in the first place. It is an attempt that is sure to break down in the end, bringing the danger of a general Middle East conflict once again to the fore." (*Intercontinental Press*, February 2.)

But Assad reckoned without the stubborn resistance of the Maronite establishment to even the most minor changes. While the Maronite politicians stalled on implementing any reforms at all, realization of the betrayal they had suffered began to sink in among the Muslim masses.

Ahmed el-Khatib, a lieutenant in the 18,000-man Lebanese army, denounced the continuation of the sectarian system. He formed a group called the Lebanese Arab Army, vowing to fight for further changes. As Khatib explained, "The no-victor, no-vanquished compromise in 1958 gave us the harvest we are reaping in 1975-76. A similar result in 1976 will give a similar harvest in 2000."

This appeal fell on fertile ground. One garrison after another began to rebel and join the Lebanese Arab Army, which is now estimated to have between 40 and 70

percent of the old army with it. Maronite soldiers and officers went over to the rightists, and by mid-March the army had disintegrated.

When a column of the Lebanese Arab Army moved toward the presidential palace March 15 to enforce the demand that Franjeh resign as president, they were stopped by dug-in units of Saiqa. Saiqa, a pro-Syrian Palestinian guerrilla group, has acted as an extension of the Assad regime. In January, it launched an armed attack on elements in the Palestinian movement opposed to Assad's policies.

The intervention of Assad's lackeys saved Franjeh, but it was too late to save the cease-fire. On March 16 Kamal Jumblatt added his voice to those denouncing Assad's scheme, saying, "The Syrians should go home."

Jumblatt's decision was a heavy blow to Assad. The leader of the Druse sect, Jumblatt also heads the reformist Parti Socialiste Progressiste (PSP—Progressive Socialist party), and a 7,000-member militia.

### Jumblatt Eyes the Presidency

One of the richest men in Lebanon, Jumblatt helped bring Franjeh to power in 1970. He has served in a number of cabinets under the old discriminatory system. In an interview in the January 27 issue of *Le Monde*, Jumblatt praised the January 22 Syrian-backed cease-fire, saying:

"This agreement is supported by all parties. I hope that it will be implemented in full, considering that it represents a step toward disengagement and the restoration of order. It is also fair to the Muslims inasmuch as it will now enable them to share the assembly seats with the Christians on an equal basis."

But Jumblatt also noted that "we would have preferred to see denominationalism completely abolished and the state secularized." Jumblatt was sincere in this desire. As a Druse, he is excluded from the presidency, which continues to be reserved for the Maronite sect under the terms of the settlement proposed by Damascus.

Thus, when the Lebanese Arab Army opened a breach in the Syrian-imposed truce, Jumblatt seized the opportunity that had been presented to him. He was supported by most Palestinian groups, which have good reason to be distrustful of Assad's intentions.

According to news reports, a number of units of the Syrian army were sent into Lebanon, but they did little or no fighting. Assad would have risked provoking strong opposition at home if he sent Syrian troops to fight openly beside the Maronite rightists. In addition, the Israeli regime has made clear that it would view any sizable Syrian intervention in Lebanon as an opportunity to carry out its own invasion and annex southern Lebanon.

In this situation, the Muslim forces led



by Jumblatt and the Lebanese Arab Army made a series of military gains. In Beirut, the Holiday Inn hotel was taken from its Phalangist defenders on March 21. A week later the Phalangists lost their last strategic position in the hotel district, which left them vulnerable to attack in the Beirut port area and in their stronghold of Ashrafiyeh. The rightist forces also lost ground in the mountains east of Beirut.

The reactionaries retaliated by shelling the Muslim neighborhoods of Beirut indiscriminately with heavy artillery.

#### Another Stab in the Back

Assad, however, had not given up on his attempt to dictate a settlement in Lebanon that would leave him with leverage in that country. On March 29 Jumblatt charged that the Syrian dictator had cut off shipments of arms, food, and medicine to the Palestinian groups that were not going along with his policies. Earlier, the Syrians had stopped a shipment of arms going to Jumblatt.

In the meantime, Assad ordered a buildup of troops on the Lebanese border. The Syrian troop concentration reached 17,000 by April 1. It was on that night that a new truce was agreed to.

But the April 1 truce is a shaky affair at best. The forces of both sides remain in position, and the truce is only for ten days, although it may well be extended. Moreover, even if Franjieh is replaced as president, as is called for by the truce, this will not reduce the sharpness of the underlying issues in the conflict.

In view of the shakiness of the truce, Assad's forces in Lebanon have moved into positions that could be used to strangle the Muslim forces in the event of renewed fighting. It is estimated that Assad has as many as 12,000 troops already in Lebanon who will follow his orders.

On April 4, troops in Saiqa uniforms occupied the Zahrani oil refinery in Sidon. Jumblatt charged that the occupation was the work of Syrian regulars and that their intention was to deny his forces gasoline if the truce broke down.

Jumblatt also charged that Syrian ships were patrolling the coast in an attempt to prevent Muslim forces—but not the rightists—from obtaining any supplies by sea. On April 5 a Syrian vessel opened fire on the *Cheshire Venture*, a British cargo ship, confirming the reports of a sea blockade.

"In Beirut," William Blakemore reported in the April 5 *Christian Science Monitor*, "Syrian-based Palestinian troops of the Saiqa brigade were moved in the dead of night Saturday into strategic positions on roads near the Beirut airport to help control possible arms traffic and troop movements."

James M. Markham of the *New York Times* reported in an April 7 dispatch from

Beirut that "in the last few days, there have been armed clashes between As Saiqa guerrillas and Lebanese leftist and left-wing Palestinian groups, which have been subjected to considerable Syrian pressure to modify their demands for sweeping changes in Lebanon's sectarian political arrangement."

Assad's stab in the back of the Palestinian liberation movement and of the Lebanese masses fighting for elementary democratic rights has been warmly encouraged by Washington. Markham reported April 4:

"Since many American analysts consider Mr. Assad as interested in a negotiated Middle East settlement, Washington seems

eager to buttress his mediation efforts here. One diplomatic source called the American-Syrian exchanges on the Lebanese crisis 'remarkably good.'"

One thing that Assad does not count on is that the American imperialists can stab him in the back just as easily as he has betrayed the Muslim-Palestinian-leftist coalition in Lebanon. If the situation in Lebanon is still boiling when the May 30 renewal of the United Nations truce force in the Golan Heights comes up, Israel may take advantage of the fact to deal a blow at Syria.

Meanwhile, no solution in Lebanon is in sight, and Syrian, Israeli, and U.S. forces remain poised to intervene. □

## Dzhemilev Faces Charges in Omsk

# Soviet Regime to Try Three Dissidents

Mustafa Dzhemilev, imprisoned Crimean Tatar, was scheduled to go on trial April 6 in the Siberian city of Omsk, according to a report by David K. Shipler in the April 7 *New York Times*. Dzhemilev has been repeatedly harassed and arrested by the Stalinist rulers for his activities in defense of the right of the Crimean Tatars to return to their homeland in the Crimea from which they were deported by Stalin in 1944.

The fact that Dzhemilev was scheduled to stand trial was the first official news of his case since he began a hunger strike in Omsk prison in June 1975. The Kremlin bureaucrats had steadfastly refused to allow any of his friends or relatives to visit him in the prison, where he was kept in solitary confinement, in order to confirm whether Dzhemilev was still alive.

This will be Dzhemilev's fourth trial. He was completing his third term of imprisonment in June 1975 when the bureaucrats trumped up a charge of "anti-Soviet slander" against him, prompting his hunger strike.

The trial was not held April 6, however, because Dzhemilev's defense attorney had been informed the trial was April 7 and was not present. Although the trial was then rescheduled for April 7, there has been no subsequent news about it.

Dissident Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov flew to Omsk in order to be able to provide dissidents and foreign correspondents in Moscow with information about Dzhemilev's condition and trial and help publicize his case.

Also scheduled to stand trial April 6 was dissident physicist Andrei Tverdokhlebov, secretary of the Amnesty International group in the USSR. He, too, is charged with "anti-Soviet slander." Tverdokhlebov, who has been an active defender of

arrested dissidents, was himself arrested in April 1975 during a secret-police crackdown on the Amnesty International group. The group was working on the defense of political prisoners in Spain.

Tverdokhlebov's trial was also postponed according to Shipler, "ostensibly because of the illness of the judge."

A third trial, for Valery Marcen, is scheduled for April 14 in Vilnius, Lithuania. He is charged with "refusal to testify" at the trial of Sergei Kovalyov. Kovalyov was tried in December 1975 and sentenced to seven years strict-regime labor camp and three years exile on charges of "anti-Soviet activity."

The bureaucrats sought to link Kovalyov, who has been a prominent Soviet defender of human rights since the 1960s, with distribution of samizdat. Marcen refused to provide testimony that he had received a copy of Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago* from Kovalyov. □

#### Geisel Dumps Two Congressmen

Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel used his dictatorial powers to oust two members of the Brazilian Democratic Movement—the only opposition party allowed in Brazil—from the federal congress March 29.

Nadyr Rossetti and Amaury Muller were accused of offending the government and armed forces. Rossetti, a thirty-eight-year-old lawyer, told a rally of 800 persons in southern Brazil that the regime "doesn't have the people's support." Muller, a thirty-six-year-old economist and newsman, said Brazil is "dominated by a uniformed aristocracy."

## Political Crisis in Japan Over Lockheed Bribes

By Ernest Harsch

On February 4, the night before news of the Lockheed bribes scandal became known in Japan, hundreds of prominent Japanese figures attended a reception organized by Yukiteru Nishiyama at the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. Nishiyama is considered a possible successor to Yoshio Kodama, who is a leader of Japan's ultrarightists, an important underworld boss, and one of the most powerful men behind the ruling Liberal Democratic party (LDP). Kodama was also a "consultant" for the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

The guest list for the reception was impressive and included many close associates of Kodama's. Representatives of all but one of the LDP factions attended, as well as LDP General Secretary Yasuhiro Nakasone and Agriculture and Forestry Minister Shintaro Abe. Also present were leaders of the Seirankai (Young Storm Association), an ultrarightist grouping within the LDP.

Among the prominent businessmen who showed up was Kenji Osano, an important shareholder in several airline companies, a financial backer of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, and another figure in the Lockheed scandal.

The gathering at the Imperial Hotel was not an unusual one. It was just one indicator of the close ties between organized crime, the far right, business circles, and government figures that have characterized bourgeois politics in Japan since the end of the Second World War.

Most of the guests at the reception were probably unaware of the Senate hearings that were being held that very day in Washington on the overseas payoffs of Lockheed.

Not only did the revelations of Lockheed's operations in Japan further expose the methods used by the American imperialists to further their aims, but they also drew attention to the corrupt dealings of the Japanese ruling class. The disclosures led to large protests that threw the LDP into a crisis.

The subsequent exposure in early April of the possible involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency only added to the uproar.

### Lockheed's 'Black Curtain'

The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations revealed that Lockheed paid a total of \$12.6 million to Japanese political and business officials between 1958 and 1975.

Although none of the names of the government officials who received the bribes have been disclosed, the subcommittee did reveal how the money was channeled to them. About \$2.2 million was funneled through the I-D Corporation, headed by Shig Katayama, an American citizen. Another \$3.2 million went to the Marubeni Corporation, which is the third largest of Japan's giant *sogo shosha* (general trading companies) and which served as Lockheed's sales agent.

One of the pieces of evidence in the bribery scandal is a receipt signed by a Marubeni official that read, "I received One Hundred Peanuts." The "100 peanuts" stood for 100 million yen (about US\$333,000).

The largest portion of the bribe money, \$7.1 million, went to Yoshio Kodama, who acted as Lockheed's chief influence peddler in Japan. Kodama is known as a *kuromaku* ("black curtain"), someone who pulls the strings from behind the scenes.

Kodama made his first fortune by plundering platinum, diamonds, and other raw materials from China during World War II. After the Japanese surrender, he was imprisoned by the American occupation authorities for three years as a Class A war criminal. Following his release in 1948 he began his rise to the top of Japan's organized crime network. He also set up a number of armed ultrarightist groups.

In that position he proved quite useful to the Japanese bourgeoisie. Jon Halliday said in his book *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism*:<sup>1</sup>

In 1960 the Kishi government asked Japan's leading rightist, Kodama Yoshio, to mobilize thousands of right-wing thugs to supplement the official police during Eisenhower's planned visit; they were to be given funds, and paramilitary assistance. These groups also provide the personnel for prime ministers' bodyguards. . . .

The use of such groups in Japan far transcends anything known in the West—and this is true not only of operations in and around the actual government, but equally with regard to the LDP and the organization of business, finance and the distribution trades. *Yakuza* (gangsters) are used extensively in shake-downs, raising funds for the LDP, to terrorize workers on the shop floor and outside the factory precincts, against shareholders at company meetings, and against citizens' organizations such as anti-pollution groups.

Although Kodama never held a govern-

1. Jon Halliday, *A Political History of Japanese Capitalism* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), p. 265.

ment post, he had the power to influence the course of bourgeois politics. He admits that he provided the funds that helped create the Liberal party in the late 1940s. In the early 1950s he gave more than \$3.5 million in cash, platinum, and diamonds to Ichiro Hatoyama of the Democratic party.

With Kodama's aid, Hatoyama became prime minister in 1954, and the following year Kodama helped bring the two parties together to form the LDP, now the only significant bourgeois party in Japan. (The powerful employers organization Keidanren<sup>2</sup> also played an important role behind the merger.)

In addition, Kodama's money and influence helped bring at least two other prime ministers to power: Nobosuke Kishi in 1957 and Kakuei Tanaka in 1972.<sup>3</sup>

Clearly, Kodama was a valuable contact for Lockheed's palm-greasing operations.

### 'Peanuts' for Planes

According to the Senate testimony, Kodama was first approached by Lockheed in 1958, at a time when the company was trying to sell its F-104 Starfighters to the Japanese air force. The National Defense Council, headed by Kishi, had already tentatively decided to buy the Grumman F-11F fighter. But Kodama used his influence on Kishi to reverse that decision.

In return for the estimated \$1.5 million Lockheed disbursed in bribes, the company was able to sell 230 of the planes to the Japanese government.

According to the records now available, the next time Lockheed availed itself of Kodama's services was in 1969. As in the earlier deal, Lockheed was competing with another American airline company, this time to sell the L-1011 TriStar, a passenger airplane. In January 1969 Kodama was signed up as a "consultant," at a \$138,000 yearly fee. He was promised \$4 million for any order of three to six TriStars he managed to place with a domestic airline

2. Keizai Dantai Rengokai (Federation of Economic Organizations).

3. Yoko Kitazawa reported in the Autumn 1973 issue of the Tokyo quarterly *Ampo* that Kodama also has close ties with South Korean dictator Park Chung Hee and may have been involved in the kidnapping of Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from Tokyo in August 1973 by agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.



company. Although the sale was to be commercial, government officials had the final authority on the choice of plane.

Kodama was unable to accomplish much until early 1972. He enlisted the aid of Kenji Osano, an important shareholder of airline stock and a backer of Kakuei Tanaka, who was at that time minister of international trade and industry. Kodama asked Osano to arrange a meeting between Tanaka and A.C. Kotchian, the president of Lockheed, to discuss the TriStar deal. Kotchian and Tanaka met in January 1972.

The deal was not consummated, however, until President Nixon personally intervened on behalf of Lockheed.

Richard Halloran reported in the March 1 *New York Times*:

After Mr. Tanaka became Prime Minister in July 1972, things began to move. He met with President Nixon in Hawaii in September to discuss the large United States deficit in trade with Japan and promised, among other things, that Japan would import \$320 million worth of civil aircraft.

Japanese officials aware of those conversations have said that Mr. Nixon suggested that the aircraft come from Lockheed, whose headquarters is in his home state of California.

In October, All Nippon Airways announced that it was buying six TriStars at about \$18 million apiece.

Lockheed documents show that the company moved large amounts of money through covert channels to its Tokyo office. Within several days in October, Kodama signed receipts for more than \$3 million.

Shortly after, Tanaka dissolved the Diet (parliament) and called general elections. "Elections here cost enormous sums," Halloran said. "Mr. Tanaka, who is known to have spent a large amount to be elected Prime Minister, needed more to pass out to his followers for their campaigns."

Lockheed promised Kodama nearly \$8 million more for two other TriStar deals, but both of them fell through.

The airline company also sought to sell its P-3C Orion antisubmarine plane to the Japanese air force, offering Kodama \$9 million, partly for himself and partly for bribe expenses. The sale of the 100 planes, worth \$1 billion, would have been Lockheed's most lucrative order in Japan so far.

Kodama again worked through Osano, Tanaka's backer. In addition, Lockheed funneled \$2.1 million into Japan between May 1973 and February 1974, first through the I-D Corporation of Shig Katayama to the Marubeni Corporation, and then from Marubeni to unnamed Japanese government officials.

"The evidence that has surfaced so far," Halloran reported, "suggests that the funds went somewhere in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party for the 1974 upper house election campaign." (Lockheed's campaign contribution, however,

was but a small fraction of the total. The major Japanese corporations raised about \$100 million for the election.)

The Orion deal was just about to go through when Lockheed's secret dealings were exposed.

### 'We Are Angry'

The response of the Japanese people to the Lockheed disclosures was immediate.

The country's largest labor federation, Sohyo,<sup>4</sup> brought workers out into the streets to demand a thorough investigation of the affair and the full disclosure of who was involved. According to the April 12 *Business Week*, unionists stormed the offices of the Marubeni Corporation to protest the Lockheed payoffs.

On March 8, about 14,000 demonstrators marched through Tokyo to press for a full investigation. About 500 protesters, many of them women, staged a one-hour sit-in in front of the LDP headquarters March 27, calling for the dissolution of the party because its leaders were suspected of receiving Lockheed money. The group clashed briefly with the police and one demonstrator was arrested.

The following day, 55,000 persons attended a rally in a suburban park to denounce the government over the scandal and to demand action against inflation. The protesters then marched to the center of Tokyo.

"The Japanese public, according to a recent newspaper poll, is vitally concerned," Halloran reported in a March 8 dispatch from Tokyo. "The poll showed that 88 percent expressed interest. Fully 90 percent said that they did not believe the denials of those allegedly involved."

Derek Davies reported in the March 19 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "A recent survey taken by a Kobe newspaper revealed an almost unanimous feeling that the public will not be satisfied unless some very high heads roll. . . ."

The March 6 *Washington Post* quoted some of the typical responses to the news of the Lockheed payoffs. "Isn't it terrible?" a neighborhood grocery store owner in Yokohama said. "We ordinary people work so hard and make so little and have to pay taxes. And Kodama and the politicians take millions in bribes."

A housewife in the store added, "We knew that very important shadow people controlled business and politics, but now it is apparent and the sums are huge, so we are angry."

The four opposition parties, the Socialist, Communist, Komei (Clean Government), and Social Democratic parties, boycotted sessions of the Diet, bringing legislative activity to a virtual halt and blocking the passage of a new government budget. The Socialist party, the strongest of the four,

4. Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogikai (General Council of Japanese Trade Unions)

demanded full disclosure of the names of the bribe takers, the resignation of Prime Minister Takeo Miki, and the calling of general elections.

The chairman of Marubeni, Hiro Hiya-ma, and two other company officials were forced to resign because of their involvement in the payoffs. The public reaction to the scandal has forced more than forty local jurisdictions to break off commercial dealings with Marubeni. Many of these local governments are controlled by opposition parties, such as the cities of Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe, as well as Hokkaido Prefecture. Marubeni lost a contract for a public monorail system in Sapporo, the capital of Hokkaido.

The uproar over the Lockheed scandal even had an impact within ultrarightist circles. One major gang was reported to have been given a contract to kill Kodama, and some of his former associates called on him to commit ritual suicide for having taken foreign money. On March 23, a rightist actor, Mitsuyasu Maeno, flew a plane into Kodama's home in the tradition of the kamikaze pilots of World War II. Kodama narrowly escaped, while Maeno was killed.

### The CIA in the Wings?

The revelations in early April of the CIA's possible involvement in the Lockheed scandal can only heighten the furor within Japan.

In the April 10 issue of the *New Republic*, reporter Tad Szulc disclosed that according to intelligence sources the CIA had a "working relationship" with Kodama since the gangster's release from prison in 1948.

"According to knowledgeable sources," Ann Crittenden reported in the April 2 *New York Times*, "Mr. Kodama, a powerful ultrarightist who for years exerted a significant covert influence on politicians of Japan's ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, also had links with American Embassy officials in Japan. On several occasions, former C.I.A. officials say, Mr. Kodama was the recipient of agency funds."

On one of those occasions, in the early 1950s, Kodama reportedly got \$150,000 from the American embassy to smuggle a shipment of tungsten out of mainland China on Kuomintang warships. Although the tungsten was to have been delivered to American officials in Tokyo, Kodama claimed that the ship had sunk.

Documents obtained by Szulc showed that most of Lockheed's secret payments to Japanese officials between 1969 and 1975 were transmitted through Deak & Co., a New York-based company of international money dealers. In those six years an estimated \$8.3 million was transferred through Deak on twenty-seven separate occasions. The first transfer through Deak was made in June 1969, only a few months after Lockheed signed the contract with

Kodama making him an official "consultant."

Citing intelligence sources, Szulc also disclosed that Deak & Co. has served as a conduit for CIA funds for the past twenty-five years.

"With headquarters in New York City," Szulc said, ". . . the company operates through some 20 offices in the US and abroad. These include Zurich, Geneva, Vienna, London, Tokyo, Hong Kong, Macao, Honolulu, Guam, San Juan, Washington, DC, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Miami, Vancouver and Toronto. It thus offers an ideal network for what is known in the trade as 'discreet' transactions, and, according to reliable sources, the CIA had repeatedly availed itself of Deak's help."

In light of the evidence pointing toward links between the Lockheed payoffs and the CIA, Szulc commented, "It appears that the Nixon and Ford administrations, and specifically CIA, may have used Lockheed as a leading edge in the execution of secret American policies in Japan, particularly in support of ultraconservative groups."

In her April 2 *New York Times* article, Crittenden cited a former CIA agent as saying that Washington spent large amounts of money to subsidize ultrarightist groups in Japan. Ivan Morris, a professor of Japanese at Columbia University and an expert on the Japanese far right, has said that "enormous" American financial support was given to rightist elements in 1947 and 1948.

"In those years," Crittenden said, "Japanese politics could have turned in a different direction, Professor Morris maintained. 'A lot was done to prevent that,' he said, 'and successfully.'"

"Among other things, American occupation authorities in the late 1940's and the 1950's used extreme right-wing former military officers to provide information on and to disrupt left-wing groups."

Washington did not limit itself to the ultrarightist groups. According to Szulc's sources, the CIA played a major part in helping to create the LDP and has backed the party ever since. A former CIA agent cited by Crittenden revealed that the CIA had heavily funded the 1958 election campaign in which Nobusuke Kishi was reelected as prime minister.

Shig Katayama, the Japanese-American businessman whose I-D Corporation channeled more than \$2 million in Lockheed bribes, may also be connected with the CIA. According to a March 19 *New Asia News* dispatch from Tokyo by Susumu Takaoka, Katayama worked for G2, the military intelligence section of General Headquarters in Tokyo during the postwar U.S. occupation.

In response to the revelations, the LDP government moved at once to douse the inflammable material. As one high government official said in Tokyo, an investiga-

tion into the names of the bribed officials could "start a fire that might grow too big for us to control." (Quoted in the March 1 *Newsweek*.)

Koji Nakamura reported in the March 5



MIKI: Target of demonstrations.

*Far Eastern Economic Review*, "While the country continued to agonize over the little it knew of the Lockheed payoffs, a massive pre-emptive campaign to keep the scandal clear of Japan's inner political sanctuary seemed to be under way.

"For many the proof lay in the way in which taxation authorities set their sights firmly on two principal, but not political, targets—the ailing Yoshio Kodama and the Marubeni Corporation."

The Miki government made a big show of police raids on the offices of Marubeni, carting off crates of documents for tax investigations. The investigation of Kodama and the seizure of \$5 million worth of his assets for tax evasion was also carefully staged to give the appearance that the government was doing something about the bribe revelations.

Under the pressure of the public uproar, Miki also asked Washington to provide the names of the Japanese officials who had received the bribes. In a letter to Miki March 11, President Ford replied that the names would only be supplied to Tokyo if they remained secret until actual criminal cases against the officials were brought to court. Miki quickly agreed to these conditions.

Correspondent Sam Jameson noted in the March 13 *Los Angeles Times* that since

no receipts were actually signed by the bribe takers, but only by middlemen like Kodama and the Marubeni officials, criminal prosecution of the government officials involved appeared unlikely. Under the Ford conditions, the names of those officials would thus be kept secret.

The LDP government has every reason to try to cover up the full extent of the scandal. Many of the most powerful leaders of the party may be implicated.

Despite his resignation as prime minister in November 1974 following the exposure of some of his shady financial dealings, Kakuei Tanaka remains one of the most powerful figures in the LDP, heading its largest faction. Because of his central role in the TriStar deal with Lockheed in 1972, Tanaka is a prime suspect in the scandal.

Three other LDP leaders, Deputy Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, Finance Minister Masayoshi Ohira, and LDP General Secretary Yasuhiro Nakasone, are also known to have had close dealings with Kodama. All three are leaders of important LDP factions. Ohira, moreover, has ties with the Marubeni Corporation.

Even Prime Minister Miki, who has been dubbed "Mr. Clean" by his supporters, may not escape charges of corruption. Although nothing so far indicates that he was involved in the Lockheed scandal, he has been implicated in other cases of graft.

In the 1972 presidential elections, Miki is reported to have raised 500 million yen (about US\$1.6 million) from Toshio Komoto, the present minister of international trade and industry in Miki's cabinet. In addition, Ryoichi Sasakawa, a rightist tycoon and a rival of Kodama's, said in 1975 that he offered "aid and assistance" to Miki's election as LDP president, which automatically made him prime minister.

One indication of how closely the "investigation" resembles a whitewash was given by Shig Katayama. The April 5 *Newsweek* reported that Katayama had told the magazine "that police have grilled him over and over, but haven't once asked him if he knew anything about bribes to government officials."

The government's attempts to cover up the scandal may backfire, however, leading to even greater unrest. A Japanese sociologist was quoted in the March 19 *Far Eastern Economic Review* as commenting, "Full disclosure may rock this Government and may topple several well-known leaders. But a hush-up could bring the whole somewhat fragile structure crashing down and could only benefit the communist parties."

Already the public support for the LDP has plummeted. Before the disclosure of the scandal it stood at 40 percent, but afterward dropped to 15 percent. As the only significant bourgeois party in Japan, such a decline in confidence in the LDP could throw the entire system of bourgeois rule into its deepest crisis so far. □



## Why the Secrecy on Lockheed Bribe Takers in Japan?

By Ernest Harsch

Two months after the Lockheed bribes scandal first hit Japan, the names of the high government officials implicated in the affair remain secret.

One of the central demands raised at many of the protests, marches, and rallies throughout the country has been for full disclosure of those names. The protesters, as well as the opposition parties, have denounced the American government for attempting to cover up the scandal in collusion with Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic party (LDP).

On April 7, a group of twenty-four Japanese television personalities, writers, artists, editors, comedians, and scholars placed an advertisement in the *New York Times* demanding that Washington release the names. Calling themselves the Ad Hoc Committee of Citizens to Uncover the Lockheed Scandal, they addressed the appeal to President Ford, as well as to the American people:

The great majority of the Japanese are deeply disturbed by the Lockheed scandal, and are eager to investigate it in order to thoroughly reveal the guilty parties and lay the blame where it belongs.

The Japanese have a suspicion that our government is not seriously attempting to elucidate the event to the extent of even hiding the truth. In addition, another suspicion which is increasing among the Japanese is that the American government may be cooperating with the Japanese government in covering up the truth.

Because of the strict conditions of secrecy placed by America on the transfer of evidence to Japan relating to the alleged bribery of Japanese high government officials in the Lockheed affair, the possibility that the data may not be opened to the public is highly increasing.

Ford's aim in trying to cover up the full extent of the scandal is to protect Nixon-type figures in the Japanese government. Ford also wants to prevent the role of the American government in the affair from coming to light. Since the first revelations of Lockheed's payoffs to foreign officials in mid-1975, the White House has tried, every step of the way, to halt the disclosure of the details.

On August 1, 1975, Lockheed decided that its earlier denials were inoperative and admitted during a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations that it had paid out at least \$22 million in bribes to foreign officials and political parties since 1970.

It also admitted that it paid its foreign "consultants" an additional \$202 million

in the same period. Lockheed tried to justify the bribes by claiming that "they were necessary in consummating certain foreign sales."

While making this limited admission, Lockheed at the same time refused to name the officials or even the countries involved. Lockheed's lawyers argued that the disclosure of the names could have a "serious adverse impact" on the company's foreign contracts.

A few weeks later, Lockheed Chairman Daniel J. Haughton testified, "Attempting to establish names of recipients or attempting to prove that payments had been received in specific foreign countries would be unfair, would serve no useful purpose and would cause a maximum amount of harm."

Lockheed received a sympathetic response to its refusal to reveal the names from the very government bodies assigned to "investigate" foreign payoffs. A panel spokesman for the subcommittee on multinational corporations, headed by Senator Frank Church, said, "The subcommittee will be reasonable about nondisclosure of specific recipients of payoffs." (Quoted in the August 6, 1975, *Wall Street Journal*.)

The Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, which is chaired by Treasury Secretary William E. Simon and which administers the government's insurance of \$195 million in bank loans to Lockheed, did not ask the company the names or the countries in which the payoffs were made. "If we got this information and it were disclosed, the company might go under," a board official said in February.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), a government body that regulates the stock market and investigates corporate fraud, sought through a court order to force Lockheed to reveal the names. But it said it would not publicly reveal them until its investigations were over. Despite this assurance, Lockheed fought the court order because it feared that the information might leak out or that someone might force its disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

In fact, it was only by accident that Lockheed revealed some of the specific information on the bribes at all. In September 1975, several boxes containing documents on the overseas sales of Lockheed's L-1011 TriStar passenger planes were inadvertently delivered to the Senate subcommittee by Lockheed's accounting firm. When Lockheed pleaded for their return, the subcommittee, which had

already issued a subpoena to the company for the turn-over of the documents, refused.

Although Senator Church's committee had the names of some of the bribe recipients at that point, it refused to disclose any of them until February.

The first exposure of one of the figures involved in the scandal came not from any government body, but from a former Lockheed employee. The December 4 *Wall Street Journal* cited Ernest F. Hauser, who worked for Lockheed in West Germany and the Netherlands in the early 1960s, as naming Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands as one of the bribe recipients. Hauser also named Franz Josef Strauss, the head of the right-wing Christian Social Union in West Germany.

About a week after the disclosure of Prince Bernhard's involvement, Secretary of State Kissinger publicly threw his weight behind the efforts to prevent any further revelations.

A letter by Kissinger to Attorney General Edward Levi arguing against disclosure was filed with Judge John H. Pratt December 11. Pratt was in the process of ruling on the SEC subpoena to Lockheed requiring delivery of the bribe documents.

In his letter, Kissinger declared: "We reiterate our strong condemnation of such payments, but we must note that premature disclosure to third parties of certain of the names and nationalities of foreign officials at this preliminary stage of the proceedings in the present case would cause damage to United States foreign relations."

Kissinger said he would be willing to have State Department officials meet privately with Judge Pratt to explain to him "the precise limits of the department's area of concern . . . a very small number of documents."

Based on the Kissinger letter, the Justice Department proposed that the documents turned over by Lockheed be kept in the possession of the court, rather than be given directly to the SEC. Such a step would have presumably prevented their disclosure under a possible Freedom of Information Act suit.

Judge Pratt rejected the Justice Department suggestion and ruled December 15 that Lockheed turn over the files directly to the SEC. But in his ruling, Pratt included a clause giving Lockheed and the State Department some protection against complete disclosure. He provided that before any of the information could be released, Lockheed and the government

were to be given a ten-day notice to allow them to obtain a court order barring the disclosure of any evidence deemed damaging to Washington's interests.

Pratt also noted that none of the documents could be released under the Freedom of Information Act while the SEC was continuing its investigations, a process that could take many months.

When the Senate subcommittee did finally disclose some of the Lockheed documents on February 4, it made public only the names of some of the middlemen involved in the Japanese payoffs, such as Yoshio Kodama, Shig Katayama, and the officials of the Marubeni Corporation.

At the request of Lockheed—and perhaps also of the White House—the subcommittee deleted the names of the Japanese government officials involved.

The role of Senator Church in the Lockheed scandal has been similar to the one he played as head of the Senate committee investigating the Central Intelligence Agency. In both cases he carefully released explosive information in a controlled manner designed to ensure the least amount of damage to the government and its agencies.

When he revealed Lockheed's corrupt relations with the Japanese right-wing gangster, Kodama, Church sought to steer suspicion away from the White House. "In effect," he said, "we have had a foreign policy of the United States Government which has vigorously opposed this political line in Japan and a Lockheed foreign policy which has helped to keep it alive through large financial subsidies in support of the company's sales efforts."

By presenting Lockheed's aid to the Japanese ultrarightists and militarists as contradictory to U.S. foreign policy, Church was trying to cover up Washington's actual support of such elements so as to deflect any embarrassing questions about the government's possible involvement in the payoffs.

Following the Church committee's limited disclosures, Kissinger again intervened to halt any further revelations. According to the February 14 *Washington Post*, Kissinger said February 12 "that he has urged against identifying officials suspected of taking bribes because it could impair the political stability of the countries involved."

Under pressure from Japan and the Congress, however, the State Department adopted a different approach less than three weeks later. On March 5 Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll told Senator William Proxmire, the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, that Washington would be willing to turn over the names to the Japanese and Dutch governments, but only after the SEC had finished its investigations. Ingersoll conceded that those investigations could take more than six months.

The sharp response within Japan to

Ingersoll's proposal forced the administration to backtrack some more. In a March 11 letter to Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Miki, President Ford agreed to turn over the names to the Japanese administration "on a confidential basis." Ford also repeated Kissinger's warnings about "pre-mature disclosure."

On March 23, the U.S. Justice Department signed an agreement with its Japanese counterpart providing for the turn-over of the names on the condition that they would not be publicly disclosed until—and if—the Japanese government filed criminal charges against the officials involved.

Jerome Alan Cohen, a specialist in East Asian law and politics at Harvard University, pointed out in a column in the March 29 *New York Times* that this condition would bar the Japanese Diet (parliament) from using the information for its own investigations. Moreover, since it is unlikely that high government officials actually signed receipts for the bribes, Japanese commentators considered it probable that no criminal cases would ever be brought against them. Thus their names would remain secret if Ford's conditions were adhered to.

To ensure that the Japanese government does not disclose the names anyway, the Justice Department said that they would only be turned over gradually, halting the process if any of the details leaked out.

It is not yet clear what all of Washington's considerations are behind its attempts to cover up the Lockheed scandal. Some of the major ones, however, are apparent.

Lockheed has traditionally had very close ties with the Pentagon and is its No. 1 military contractor. According to Tad Szulc in the April 10 *New Republic*, Lockheed has also built classified equipment and spy planes for the CIA.

When Nixon saved Lockheed from bankruptcy in 1971 by having the government underwrite \$195 million in loans to the company, one of the reasons given by officials was that Lockheed's continued existence was vital to the U.S. military.

The relationship between Lockheed and the government has been so close over the years that officials easily move from positions in one to positions in the other. For instance, the current American ambassador to Japan, James Hodgson, is a former Lockheed vice-president. Lockheed's chief lawyer in the bribery investigations is William P. Rogers, who was secretary of state when the government bailed Lockheed out of its financial difficulties in 1971.

As Kissinger has already indicated, Washington is also concerned about the impact of the Lockheed scandal on Japan. Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. imperialists have established a particularly close alliance with their Japanese counterparts. Japan, moreover, as a center of imperialist power in Asia, plays a vital

role in helping to maintain capitalism there. A full disclosure of everyone who accepted Lockheed bribes could lead to ouster of the LDP government.

In addition, Washington is anxious to keep its clandestine activities in Japan from coming to light. It has already been disclosed that the CIA has had a "working relationship" with Kodama, Lockheed's chief influence peddler in Japan, for many years. The CIA has also funded ultrarightist elements, as well as the ruling party, and has sought to disrupt unions and leftist groups.

A full investigation of Lockheed's Japanese payoffs might reveal that Washington actually had a hand in them. Szulc quoted an intelligence source as pointing out, "Lockheed, who had been paying fees anyway to the Japanese to sell planes, would have been a perfect channel for the CIA to move funds secretly to people like Kodama."

If it was found that Lockheed actually served as a conduit for CIA money in Japan, the question would be raised of similar activities of the CIA elsewhere. Were Lockheed and other companies used as channels for payoffs by the CIA to government officials and political parties in other parts of the world?

Reporter Ann Crittenden noted in the February 15 *New York Times* that most of the companies known to have given foreign bribes are in industries such as oil and aerospace that are heavily dependent on the government in its role of customer or regulator. Some of the evidence that has surfaced in other bribe cases also points to possible links with the CIA. For instance, one of Northrop's "consultants," Kermit Roosevelt, was a former CIA employee.

Crittenden also noted that the payoffs by arms and aircraft manufacturers appear to be in harmony with the government's policy of encouraging foreign military sales. Between 1972 and 1976 arms sales to other countries jumped from \$3.3 billion to \$9.8 billion. The value of American airplane exports is now second only to that of agricultural products.

"Aside from the arms sale question," Crittenden added, "the bribes appear to have been consistent with a second aspect of American foreign policy. Most of the money has gone to support such anti-Communist parties and powers as the ruling Christian Democratic Party in Italy and the Park regime in South Korea." □

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## Israeli Regime Praises Trigger-happy Troops

By David Russell

New details on the March 30 general strike by the Arab population in Israel continue to appear.

Israeli officials claim that the effectiveness of the strike was limited to as little as 20 percent of the Arab workers in Israel and to fewer than half of the 107 Arab villages in the country. Other observers did not agree.

"In the event," reported an article in the April 3 issue of the British *Economist*, "rather less than half the Arab labour force of 120,000 respected the strike."

William J. Drummond said in a dispatch from Nazareth in the March 31 *Los Angeles Times*, "The strike in Galilee was remarkably effective, considering the all-out effort by Israeli authorities to discourage participation. . . ."

"The Ministry of Education last week-end sent a circular to school principals in Arab settlements warning them that a strike would have serious consequences."

Drummond said that Nazareth, the center of the strike and a town of 43,000, "was virtually shut down." He added, "In Western Galilee, observers estimated it [the strike] to be 50% effective, while in Southern Galilee, it was 35% effective." More than half of the nearly 500,000 Arabs inside Israel's pre-1967 borders live in the Galilee region.

Israeli officials also claim that the six persons gunned down during the strike were shot by police and soldiers acting in self-defense. "Arabs angrily challenge the government version of what happened," said a report in the April 12 issue of *Time* magazine.

*Time's* Jerusalem bureau chief Donald Neff visited the village of Sakhnin on March 31, the day after three residents were shot dead by Israeli troops. His report was quoted in the *Time* story:

The villagers claim that the night before the planned strike, about 300 soldiers drove into Sakhnin, firing rifles and machine guns into the air and then into houses. The townsmen insist that they set up roadblocks to keep the soldiers out of the village; when soldiers tried to enter homes, the villagers pelted them with stones. In response the government clamped curfews on Sakhnin and two neighboring communities. . . .

Many of Sakhnin's residents did not know about the sudden curfew, the Arabs claim. Thus early in the morning, when a woman left her house, she was shot without warning. When a neighbor rushed to help her, he was shot dead. Then, according to the villagers, two others were killed.

Bullet pock marks on the outside and inside of houses along Sakhnin's main street, broken windows, battered cars and splotches of dried



Newsweek

Israeli troops in action against Palestinian demonstrators.

blood on the roadway grimly testify to the shootings of the previous day.

One villager in Arrabe, another town where Israeli forces opened fire and killed a protester, told reporters for *Newsweek*, "When we tried to take the wounded to the hospital, the police held up our cars at a roadblock."

In a March 31 dispatch in the *International Herald Tribune*, William J. Drummond described one angry Palestinian "tossing his blood-soaked jacket inside a reporter's car window and muttering, 'This is what the Israeli government gives us.'"

Drummond described the vicious attack by Israeli soldiers on the house of Toufik Zayad, the mayor of Nazareth. "When it was over, Mrs. Zayad surveyed the wreckage of her porch and said, in perfect Hebrew, 'This is the face of Israeli democracy.'"

The regime of Premier Yitzhak Rabin has served notice that it intends to go ahead with the expropriation of Arab land in the Galilee, which was one of the issues that sparked the protests. Rabin passed off the anti-Palestinian pogrom carried out by Israeli forces with the remark that the use of force had been necessary "to assure the well-being of the public."

A cabinet statement declared that the Israeli forces had taken "correct and

required action" during the March 30 protest.

Taking its cue from the government, the right-wing Gush Emunim (Fidelity Bloc) has called for an April 18-19 march on the West Bank as an answer to the March 30 protest. This rightist movement, which has sponsored a number of settlements on the West Bank as a way of pushing for the area's annexation to Israel, said that its march will proclaim "the inalienable right of every Jew to every part of the land of Israel."

But such actions are not likely to intimidate the Palestinians fighting for their rights. As one resident of the village of Tamra told reporter Thomas W. Lippman: "For 28 years we have been treated as second-class citizens. But the new generation is not scared like the old people." (*Washington Post*, April 5.)

Lippman quoted another Tamra resident, who said: "We would be happy to advance to the status of second-class citizens. Now we are fourth or fifth class, behind the Jews from Arab countries who are second-class."

This sentiment was expressed more succinctly by the mourners at the funeral of one of those gunned down by the Israelis March 30. They chanted, "There is no Israel here—only Palestine." □

## Big Business Hails Britain's New Prime Minister

By Michael Baumann

Within minutes after Harold Wilson made the surprise announcement of his resignation March 16 (only the queen had been warned in advance), British and international capital registered its dismay.

In what a report in the March 17 *Wall Street Journal* described as "chaotic" trading, the London stock market initially plummeted fifteen points on the news. Even after a slight rally, London shares lost \$2 billion in value, with the decline continuing the following day.

The pound, which had dropped below the \$2 level on March 5 for the first time, fell nearly a point to close at \$1.9135.

The March 17 London *Times*, an authoritative voice of British capital, summed up boardroom sentiment: Wilson "can be ill spared at this time."

But when the Parliamentary Labour party announced April 5 that it had chosen Foreign Secretary James Callaghan to succeed Wilson, the stock market rallied briskly, adding \$2 billion to the value of its shares the following day.

Within hours of assuming office, Callaghan made clear where he stood on the most pressing issues facing British workers—inflation and unemployment.

In a brief nationwide address the evening of April 5, the new prime minister warned workers that they "are still not earning the standard of living" they are "enjoying."

The following day, in the budget delivered to Parliament, he outlined the steps that would be taken to ensure greater sacrifices.

The budget, presented by Wilson's chancellor of the exchequer, Denis Healey, whom Callaghan kept on in the new cabinet, called for the following austerity measures:

- A limit of 3% in pay increases in the coming year, allegedly to be coupled with some reductions in income taxes.

- Higher taxes on gasoline, liquor, and cigarettes.

- Tax breaks for corporations, in particular the removal of all taxes on profits reinvested in manufacturing.

The main objectives of the new budget, Healey declared, are to increase productivity and keep wages low.

"Industry comes out vastly better than its employees," *New York Times* correspondent Peter T. Kilborn observed April 6.

"Public services and social welfare, hallmarks of government policy for a generation, came out second best."

The *Financial Times* industrial share



CALLAGHAN: \$2 billion vote of confidence from British stock market.

index jumped 7.1 points on the news of the pay curbs. The budget "is just plain good news for the stock market," the April 7 *Wall Street Journal* quoted one broker as saying.

Although Healey tried to claim that the 3% wage increase, when coupled with proposed cuts in income taxes, would protect workers from the ravages of inflation, no pocket calculator is necessary to see through this lie.

Inflation in Britain is up 50% over the last two years, seventeen times the proposed limit on wage increases. Furthermore, it can be expected to continue at a high rate. The declining value of the pound pushes inexorably higher the prices British consumers must pay for imported food, goods, and fuel.

Tory leader Margaret Thatcher predictably denounced the new budget as not going far enough, concentrating particular fire on a provision that allows the leadership of Britain's unions to choose whether their membership be shot or hanged. Under Callaghan's scheme, if the unions press for a wage increase higher than 3%, the scheduled tax cuts will be altered accordingly.

Bankers and brokers were more circumspect. The *Financial Times* gave its endorsement to the budget, professing worry only about whether it can be sold to the unions.

The editors of the *New York Times* viewed the budget as an excellent prescription for ailing British profits.

"It may seem paradoxical," they said April 8, "that a Labor Government can make the stock market rise, when the Conservatives have, with considerable justice, accused the Government of treating with the labor unions as the arbiters of national tax policy."

"But it may be that only a Labor Government could make the sort of deal to stop wage-push inflation that Mr. Healey is now proposing, and at the same time offer a significant package of tax incentives and subsidies to industry. It will be a remarkable achievement if the new Government can persuade British labor to accept the deal. . . ."

Callaghan's "first major task as Prime Minister," they concluded, "will be to use his credit with the unions to bring them aboard."

Some labor leaders were quick to make the record with their opposition to the 3% pay-increase limit. John Lyons, general secretary of the Electrical Power Engineers' Association, called the wage limit "impossible." William McLean, Scottish-area secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers, said his response was "almost unprintable . . . a reaction of anger."

However, Len Murray, general secretary of the Trades Union Congress, declined to comment when asked for his view of the pay curb. He was instrumental in lining up support for the Wilson government's £6 pay limit in current contracts.

The British economy is in the throes of its deepest postwar slump. Its inflation is currently the highest in Europe. Unemployment, officially recorded at 1.2 million, is not only one of the highest in Europe but the worst Britain has seen since the Great Depression.

The Labour party leadership and its well-wishers in the corporation boardrooms are clearly counting on the depth of unemployment to temper workers' demands. Strike statistics may be encouraging this view. Strikes were down sharply in 1975, as the following figures show:

1975	5.9 million workdays lost
	.8 million workers involved
	2,263 strikes



1974 19.7 million workdays lost  
1.6 million workers involved  
2,900 strikes

As the editors of the *New York Times* pointed out, Callaghan will be expected to use his "credit" with the unions to assure that such "labor peace" continues.

In Callaghan, the Labour party leadership has pushed forward a suitable figure to fill Wilson's role as chief labor lieutenant of British capital.

Notable items in his biography include

the fact that as home minister he further tightened racist immigration laws in 1968 and sent the first British troops to Northern Ireland in 1969.

He will have little difficulty in continuing cordial relations with Britain's imperialist allies. A report in the April 6 *Christian Science Monitor* noted his "unusually warm" relations with Henry Kissinger and reported that "Dr. Kissinger is known to look on the bluff Briton as his closest ally in Europe."

"No one who has dealt with him [Callaghan] can doubt that he is a patriotic and responsible political leader," the editors of the *London Times* commented March 26. Furthermore, they added, "he is not lacking in the necessary resources of political cunning."

But a biographical sketch in the March 21 *London Sunday Times* may have summed up Callaghan best, in recording an anonymous comment.

Callaghan? He is a "Wilson writ small."

## The Case of the Disappearing Letters

# British Postal Authorities Cover Up for Moscow Censorship

According to the rules of the Universal Postal Union, postal authorities are required to pay compensation for registered letters lost in transit. When two countries are involved, the postal service in the country where the letter originated is expected to pay compensation and to collect later from the postal service that was responsible for losing the letter.

Until recently, the system appeared to be working. British postal authorities, however, have begun to encounter an unexpected drain on their budget as a result of the £5.50 (£1=US\$1.84) they pay out for each registered letter lost under this agreement.

The problem came to light when the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, after having received almost £500 for lost letters, was informed by British postal officials that compensation for other lost letters would not be paid.

The Russell Foundation had been attempting to correspond with Soviet dissidents. In a January 30 letter to the Russell Foundation, L. Moakes of the British Post Office Operations Department took up the problem of the high mortality rate of the foundation's letters to persons in the USSR. Moakes informed the Russell Foundation that the Soviet postal administration:

... have now stated quite clearly that they will not accept liability for registered letters confiscated or destroyed because of their contents. They have informed us that, in their view, the persons sending such letters are using the postal service for activity incompatible with the domestic legislation of the USSR. . . . In these circumstances, the British Post Office is not prepared to pay compensation in these cases since no fault attaches to it.

Post Office officials have made a great effort to assist posters to the USSR and we really cannot do more. Whatever we may think about this hindrance of communications to Soviet citizens, there is little doubt that the USSR authorities are acting in this matter within their own laws and we are unfortunately in no position to challenge them on this.

But as the Russell Foundation was quick

to point out, the Soviet regime was in fact acting in flagrant violation of its own laws. Article 128 of the Soviet constitution says that "secrecy of correspondence is guaranteed by law." Article 135 of the criminal code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic further stipulates that violation of secrecy of correspondence by individual persons and state departments is liable to prosecution under the law.

In a February 3 letter replying to L. Moakes, Kenneth J. Fleet of the Russell Foundation insisted that the British postal officials really could do more. He said:

If the Soviet authorities believe that our letters are, as you say, "incompatible with the domestic legislation of the USSR" then it is quite clear that they are confessing to having read them. In this manner, they are violating their own constitution. We think that the very least regard for the principles of human rights would require you to press the Soviet postal authorities on this matter. They should be asked who has authorized the illegal reading of our mail, so that appropriate action can be pressed against the individual or state department responsible.

Soviet law lays down that the mails may not be intercepted without an order from the procurator, which may only be granted in certain clearly defined circumstances. Which procurators issued the order to intercept which of our letters? We cannot accept your claim that you are not responsible for the loss of our registered letters until you are prepared to furnish us with this crucial information.

Further, the charge that our letters contained material which was "incompatible with domestic legislation of the USSR" is quite wrong. It is not illegal in the USSR to discuss this or that aspect of governmental policy more or less critically.

An idea of the type of material that the Stalinist censors are interested in keeping out of the hands of Soviet citizens was given when Ken Coates, the director of the Russell Foundation, wrote to twenty-seven dissidents February 5. Coates was informed that all twenty-seven letters had been mysteriously "lost" by Soviet postal authorities.

What was in the letters that made their

"loss" so desirable to the Soviet secret police?

The twenty-seven letters contained copies of articles from the *Morning Star*, the newspaper of the British Communist party. Some of the *Morning Star* articles dealt with a film shown in Europe that detailed conditions in Soviet labor camps. The film, which had been smuggled out of the USSR, provoked a protest against the treatment of political prisoners from the French CP, among others.

Also included in the censored packets was a *Morning Star* digest of an article by former British CP leader John Gollan that criticized the lack of democratic rights in the USSR.

Coates had written to the dissidents asking if they would care to comment on the articles "in order to help the discussion forward," and had promised to publish any replies.

In this way, the French and British Communist parties have apparently joined others whose written views are "incompatible with the domestic legislation of the USSR."

The Russell Foundation, in the meantime, is continuing to press its demand that British postal authorities either ensure delivery of the letters that have been sent, or else pay the required compensation. On November 27, 1975, a West German court ruled in favor of the plaintiff in a similar case brought by a leader of the Action Committee for Jews in the Soviet Union. According to the rules of the European Economic Community, a decision in a court of any one member country can be cited as a precedent in the courts of any other member country. □

### Now If They Will Observe It

Equal pay for equal work, a workweek shortened from forty-eight to forty-four hours, and a raise in the minimum working age from fourteen to sixteen years are among the provisions of a law passed by the Spanish Cortes (parliament) April 6.

### Plyushch Featured Speaker at New York Meeting

By Marilyn Vogt

Leonid Plyushch was the featured speaker at a panel discussion on "The Left and the Soviet Union" held April 3 in New York.

Other panelists were British historian E.P. Thompson; author and peace activist Grace Paley; Daniel Berrigan, a well-known figure in the anti-Vietnam War movement; the Iranian poet and former political prisoner Reza Baraheni; and George Saunders, editor of the book *Samizdat: Voices of the Soviet Opposition*.

Baraheni said that as a former political prisoner of the shah he solidarized himself with the Turkish-speaking fighter in the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatar Mustafa Dzhemilev. Dzhemilev was jailed by the Stalinist bureaucrats because of his defense of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people.

"The Kremlin bureaucrats should know," Baraheni said, "that the Third World, Turks all over the world, and especially the whole of the Islamic world will never forgive the bureaucracy if anything should happen to this modern hero of the Turks."

Baraheni then read one of his poems, which he dedicated to Dzhemilev.

Three questions were taken up by the panelists: "Is a broad-based left-wing defense of Soviet political prisoners possible? What is the nature of Soviet society? What is the nature of the dissident movement in the USSR?"

Plyushch directed part of his remarks toward leftists who think that the USSR is "heaven on earth."

He said: "Many believe that the Light Comes from the East. The Light is not coming from any direction now. Making the Light Shine is our common task in both the East and the West. . . . Our civilization is ill, insane. We must try to find medicine for it. The USSR is a prison for peoples and individuals; a deceitful, police-run, bureaucratic, exploitative system. . . . We must look truth in the face."

Among other things, he pointed to the crushing of the proletarian revolutions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The victims of the Kremlin bureaucrats, he said, are the ones who really represent the defense of the right to self-determination for oppressed peoples. They are the true internationalists.

"I was acquainted with many Ukrainian patriots who are now in prisons and psychiatric asylums and almost all of them, except the foolish ones, are defending the rights of Jews, Chileans, Blacks, and other oppressed peoples."



Susan Ellis/Militant

LEONID PLYUSHCH

On the kind of defense these dissidents want, he said: "They have not been blinded by hatred of Russia and do not want to be supported by anti-Soviet, chauvinist states."

Grace Paley spoke of her experiences when she met with Soviet dissident physicist Andrei Sakharov in 1974. She was in Moscow at the time, serving as a representative of the War Resisters League at the World Peace Conference. She explained to Sakharov the murderous foreign policy of the U.S. government in Vietnam, Chile, and elsewhere.

Daniel Berrigan described some face-to-face meetings he had with Soviet officials as a representative of the American peace movement. He told them he was against the persecution of dissidents in the USSR. They replied that the dissidents were merely "parasites" and "criminals." Berrigan explained that government officials also called protesters in the United States by such names. Berrigan said we have seen betrayed revolutions in both the USA and the USSR and that American dissidents must support Soviet dissidents who are working for a new beginning.

George Saunders held that not only was a broad left defense of Soviet dissidents possible, as projected by Plyushch; "it is the only proper way to defend these political prisoners."

Defense work, he maintained, should not

be linked with the organs or politicians of the capitalist class. He gave four reasons for this.

First, when people like the Jacksons, Fords, Humphreys, and Nixons—those responsible for such things as the massive bombing of Vietnam—say they are for the rights of Soviet dissidents, they are obviously hypocritical. "They are only expressing their ultimate hope to someday extend the power of the American war machine into new territory."

Second, he said, if defense work is linked with the capitalist class, "the Stalinist propaganda machine will have the truth on its side if it rejects the protests of the Jacksons and exposes their real intentions."

However, if those who are protesting are real defenders of democratic rights, people like Joan Baez and Daniel Ellsberg, the Stalinist propaganda machine cannot simply dismiss their protests, and the Soviet people will know that the protests are not simply part of the preparation for World War III.

Third, as a result of the Watergate revelations and the exposure of CIA and FBI activities, the American people suspect the intentions of capitalist politicians. However, they will respond to a movement that rejects any implication of subordination to such figures or furthering their aims.

Fourth, if the left makes a bloc with cold warriors, it "lets the American Communist party off the hook." There are, however, many people around and even within the American Communist party who felt the pressure when the Italian and French Communist parties spoke out in defense of Soviet political prisoners. A left-wing defense in the United States can intensify that pressure, and many rank-and-file trade-union members, civil-rights activists, and democratic-minded people can be won to active support for Soviet political prisoners.

Saunders called for the left to mobilize for international days of protest like those held as a result of the call initiated by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation in 1974 and 1975, focusing on freeing Mustafa Dzhemilev, Vladimir Bukovsky, Semyon Gluzman, and Valentyn Moroz.

During the discussion period, several persons argued that the left must first agree on the nature of Soviet society before undertaking to defend Soviet political prisoners.

E.P. Thompson responded by saying that what is involved in defense work is fighting for the right of the Soviet people themselves to decide such questions. We do not, he said, have to agree on that among ourselves beforehand.

Tatyana Zhitnikova, Plyushch's wife, who played a key role in securing his release from the psychiatric hospital, tended to support Thompson's position.

She said: "I have never spoken before at



political meetings. I am not a political person. I am not a Marxist, although I did graduate from the Marxist-Leninist University. I have never read Trotsky's writings. They are banned in our country. . . . But I want to say that a meeting like this one is considered 'anti-Soviet propaganda' and gets you twelve years imprisonment."

Plyushch corrected her, saying it would be considered "anti-Soviet organization" and get you a fifteen-year term.

Plyushch's opinion was that "the question [of the nature of Soviet society] is so complicated that we cannot solve it right here. We must keep in mind the question of the political prisoners. We must understand the nature of the Soviet state but for that we need a special discussion on that one question.

"If the left starts to talk about the nature of the state, they will quarrel and never come to agreement on the defense of Soviet political prisoners. Maybe we can come to agreement on what the Soviet Union is not. It is not socialist. It is not humanist. It is not internationalist. It is not democracy."

Saunders stated that what makes the defense a "left" defense is determined not by agreement on a particular "left" definition of Soviet society but by who is doing the defending.

"If the representatives of the civil-rights movement, the Black and women's liberation movements, the students, and all oppressed nationalities in this country, and the rank-and-file trade unionist movement speak out, they are objectively opposed to the capitalist class of this

country and are not linked to the imperialist war machine. That is what makes it a left defense."

He added that a rich literature is available on the nature of Soviet society resulting from the debate the left has carried out on the topic since the 1920s. This is not a problem that can be solved in one night. It requires study and an individual decision.

The meeting was sponsored by the Committee for the Defense of Soviet Political Prisoners, and endorsed by Americans for Democratic Action, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee, the Jewish Socialist Youth Bund, Socialist Party U.S.A., War Resisters League, *New Politics* magazine, and the *New York Review of Books*. □

## An Interview With Leonid Plyushch

# What the Soviet Dissidents Want and Who They Represent

[The following interview with the Ukrainian dissident Leonid Plyushch, recently released from a Soviet "psychiatric" prison, was obtained for *Intercontinental Press* by George Saunders on April 2, during Plyushch's current tour of the United States and Canada.]

\* \* \*

*Question. Can you tell us how you became a dissenter, what activities you engaged in, what were the first steps in your active struggle for political freedoms and national and social rights?*

*Answer.* I grew up in a family that was on the poorest level, in terms of Soviet society. My mother was barely able to support my sister and me. I knew this. Nearly all my school friends were equally poor, and some were even poorer. And so it was natural that my first action was one of social protest.

But since we were raised in the spirit of Stalin, it was not a protest against the government. It was an act of blind protest. And as you know, a blind national or social protest quite often takes the form of anti-Semitism. And so for me the first step on the road of dissent was none other than anti-Semitism. And only when I became conscious of official anti-Semitism, only after I learned about Stalin and "Stalin's gang" (to use Khrushchev's words), did I understand what a senseless and foolish kind of protest that had been. And I began to feel sympathy for the Jews, whom the government was harassing in various ways.

Later on, about 1963 or 1964, I began to

write articles for samizdat. In 1968, when the trial of Ginzburg and Galanskov began and I heard about Pavel Litvinov's appeal to world public opinion, I understood that I could not remain silent. I expressed my protest against what was going on in the country openly and publicly then, for the first time.

*Q. Can you describe the relations and links between various individual dissenters and representatives of different currents in the dissident movement in various cities around the Soviet Union?*

*A.* A great many oppositionists meet one another in different cities, not only in Moscow. Muscovites travel to Kyiv, just as Kyivans go to Moscow. Dissidents come to Moscow from the Baltic region, Armenia, and other republics.

But the important thing to emphasize is that almost all dissidents dislike the idea of leaders. Even the word "leader" has fallen into disrepute and is distasteful to everyone, so that virtually no one wants to be a leader. Unfortunately, however, there are people who want to have a leader and they push this or that person forward as a leader. This is usually not good. I observed this in the case of Ivan Dzyuba [who simply wanted to remain a writer]. Many Ukrainian patriots made him into a symbol of Ukraine, an ideological leader, and so forth. I can testify to this—I was one who talked with him about this. It was extremely unpleasant for Dzyuba.

Of course there are people who are afflicted with "leaderism," who want to be leaders, but they are very few. Generally

they are not respected. They may enjoy respect for a certain length of time, but usually they eventually display the completely distasteful features of "leaderism" and people are repelled by them.

On the other hand there is the problem of discipline. In the Soviet Union, an organized, disciplined, centralized organization is impossible. Because such an organization would be ideal for the KGB. That way the KGB could sweep away hundreds or thousands of people at one blow. For this reason many people understand, instinctively or consciously, that it is better to have a kind of *unorganized* organization. A *paradoxical* kind of organization.

The same is true in the question of discipline. We have been instructed officially so much in the idea that we must subordinate ourselves to someone else's opinion, that an individual's opinion is nothing, while the opinion of the state, of the party, of an organization, is everything, that the idea of discipline among dissidents arouses protest—perhaps even somewhat exaggerated protest—because discipline is still necessary, a certain amount of it.

Therefore everyone seeks to think independently, to discover their own road in the struggle for human rights.

I should stress that I find the mutual ties among Ukrainian patriots especially pleasant, especially attractive. As a rule, relations are very courteous, warm, friendly, and human. Not of the formal party-organizational type. Here again there is even a certain excess, a certain softness toward those who do not conduct them-

selves quite properly on the political plane, and so forth.

*Q. Can you describe the character and activities of the Initiative Group of which you were a founding member in 1969?*

A. The Initiative Group is an attempt at collaboration by several groups, several tendencies, who have certain goals, certain methods, and certain aims in common. But it has no leaders and no discipline that would require some members to subordinate themselves to other members.

The Initiative Group was formed by people of various nationalities, various religious or atheist convictions, and various political views. It included Marxists and people who were anti-Marxist in their views. And there were people who were pure democrats, who simply considered any kind of political activity harmful. They acted simply out of moral considerations, from the standpoint of the defense of human rights and the defense of political prisoners.

*Q. What is your opinion of the samizdat essay that criticizes what it calls the 1968 "liberal" campaign of public protests and that was signed with the pseudonym "Mikhailov"?*

A. That is a very interesting question. It seems to me that any idea into which an effort of thought has gone (*vystradannaya mysl*)—even if it is a kind of extremist idea—in fact always carries a certain imprint of the truth, reflects a certain part of reality. Many of my Moscow friends were indignant over this essay. In particular they said, "What moral right does he have [to criticize us] when he does nothing for the movement, faces no threat of imprisonment because he does nothing, etc." (They knew who the author was.)

But I defended the author on the grounds that simply because a person risks prison or goes to prison does not mean he is right. Everyone can express their opinion, including nonfighters.

It seems to me there were sensible ideas in Mikhailov's article, especially the idea that the democratic movement paid too little attention to social problems. In the article Mikhailov asks the question, How can the dissidents have any pretensions in regard to the workers if we take no interest in the workers' problems? Why should the workers be interested in the problem of civil liberties, which concerns the intellectuals most of all?

Mikhailov was answered by a certain K. Dyomov. This fellow was a Cadet, that is, had ideas like those of the old bourgeois constitutional party of tsarist times, which took the position that even the monarchy could remain, just as long as there was a constitution. Dyomov's main idea is that the KGB can remain, the present authorities can remain, just as long as the laws on the books are implemented in practice.

That, he said, is our main aim, not the revolutionary ideas of Mikhailov.

What Dyomov had to say also made a certain amount of sense—although I am closer to Mikhailov in my thinking. The main goal for us is the struggle to have the constitution observed in practice, for the guarantees in the constitution to be respected.

The next step after that would be to demand a new constitution that would correspond to the new stage, because the present constitution was written under Stalin and was simply a façade for the terror against the people.

*Q. Is it true that the workers do not now participate in the democratic movement?*

A. No, that is not quite right. It is true that the purely democratic movement, that is, the movement that is fighting primarily for political and human rights, is fundamentally a movement of the intelligentsia. It is too remote from the workers and peasants. But for example, the national movement is much closer to the people. That is especially true in the Baltic region and among the Crimean Tatars, but it also exists in Ukraine, this closeness to the people.

The same can be said about the religious movements, which embrace both the intelligentsia and the workers and peasants.

*Q. Do you think that the workers and peasants have a stake in the struggle for civil liberties, for political freedoms?*

A. Yes. This is something I observed during the trial of those who had protested in Red Square against the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The head of the KGB unit assigned to the courthouse [outside of which sympathizers with the defendants had gathered] had placed pseudoworkers (actually KGB employees) in the vicinity to heckle and harass us.

Later on, some genuine workers came along, and the KGB tried to make use of them against us. At first they spoke out against us, from purely social and economic positions, arguing that we were intellectual parasites and that the entire intelligentsia in general was a Soviet bourgeoisie and a bunch of parasites.

We argued with them and explained that it was not true, that in order for the workers to gain their economic rights, there had to be freedom to demonstrate, freedom of assembly, the right to strike, and so on. Without these political freedoms there could not be economic freedoms. If the working class is gagged, it cannot struggle for its economic rights.

And it must be said that most of the workers who took part in those discussions outside the courthouse, in the end, came to sympathize with us.

*Q. Can you tell us something about the samizdat essay "The State and Social-*

*ism"? As I understand it this was a program supported by a neo-Leninist group in Gorky.*

A. This was not a program. It was simply an essay in samizdat that tried to show the difference between the basic ideas in Lenin's *State and Revolution* and present-day Soviet reality, and from this position to show that the state we have in the Soviet Union has nothing in common with socialism.

The fact is that the majority of neo-Marxists begin their thinking, their protesting, precisely from the standpoint of this work of Lenin's, *State and Revolution*. And the central point in this work is the question of what guarantees there should be against the servant of the people evolving into an enemy of the people, its master, i.e., against bureaucratism.

Lenin indicates in his work what these guarantees are. Above all, they involve the power to recall bureaucrats, immediate recall at any time, and full public disclosure of all government affairs, for if the people do not know what this or that bureaucrat is doing they cannot take a stand for or against.

Also involved are economic measures. It is necessary to achieve an arrangement in which government officeholders do not have any special privileges and in which there would be no material advantages in maintaining one's position as a bureaucrat.

Lenin emphasized that this was the basic question in regard to the proletarian state, and we neo-Marxists, at least many of us—I cannot speak for all—feel that this is indeed the fundamental question. We became convinced that Lenin was right on the basis of the history of our state.<sup>1</sup>

*Q. What are the primary motive forces*

1. Leonid Plyushch was familiar with a number of other neo-Marxist works that circulate in samizdat but that have not become available outside the Soviet Union, apparently. In addition to *The State and Socialism*, described here, I asked him about the samizdat essay *Transformation of Bolshevism*, which was described briefly in the *Chronicle of Current Events* in 1970. (See *Intercontinental Press*, April 13, 1970, p. 318, and July 27, 1970, p. 700.)

Plyushch said the *Transformation of Bolshevism* was the same kind of work as *The State and Socialism*, and that it was after reading such samizdat works that he himself began writing for samizdat along the same lines.

His articles, too, have failed as yet to appear outside the USSR, to my knowledge.

I asked Plyushch why it was that precisely such neo-Marxist, neo-Leninist documents—out of all the wealth of samizdat materials that has come out—have never reached the workers movement outside the Soviet Union.

He answered that samizdat materials are passed along to the outside world primarily through human-rights activists in Moscow. Most of these people simply find neo-Marxist material boring and uninteresting and for that reason don't bother to send it out.



in the dissident movement, in your opinion?

A. For the intelligentsia the primary motivating forces are moral ones. So loathsome is the system of lies that reigns in the Soviet Union, so loathsome is the fear that reigns there, so loathsome is the repression meted out to people, so ghastly is the recollection of the fate that befell the October revolution, that the intelligentsia is mainly motivated by moral forces.

Of course a second important feature is the fact that the intelligentsia cannot advance in its creative work without freedom of speech and the press. Without freedom of speech there can be no development of literature, art, science. This is especially important for the humanities and social sciences. But even for the natural sciences it is very important.

Everyone knows the fate of genetics in the Soviet Union, and the fate of cybernetics. The same type of thing happened at one time, under Stalin, in regard to relativity theory: For a time relativity theory was called a "bourgeois science."

Nowadays it seems as though everything is in good shape in regard to these sciences. But there is a whole spectrum of sciences that still have the need for free discussion and freedom of publication in order to advance further.

For example, psychology. Soviet psychology essentially disappeared as such. Only recently have the works of the great Soviet Russian psychologist Vygotsky<sup>2</sup> been remembered. A Vygotsky school of psychology is starting to take shape. I am familiar with the work of his followers and I can say that even today they are forced to omit things, leave them unsaid or use imprecise formulations, in order to avoid being accused of some sort of "bourgeois psychologism," what kind exactly I don't know, perhaps Freudianism, to which Vygotsky was rather close.

Even worse is the situation in psychiatry, especially in regard to psychoanalysis. Because psychoanalysis is one of the greatest achievements of the twentieth century, but for the Soviet Union it is a bourgeois science, an apolitical science, an imperialist science, and so forth.

This is terrible because it seems to me that without psychoanalysis there can be no development in psychology, or in psychiatry, or even in such fields as social psychology and sociology.

And so, those are the concerns of the intelligentsia.

2. Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky (1896-1934), Soviet psychologist best known for his theories on the separate roots of thought and language and their dialectical interpenetration. His ideas were in disfavor from 1936 to 1956, Stalin himself denouncing them as "absolutely wrong." In the post-Stalin era his works have been reprinted and praised as well as criticized. (See Loren Graham, *Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union*, New York, 1972, p. 368 ff.)

Naturally, for the working class—which does not have a continuous, systematic movement for its rights—only isolated outbursts, eruptions of anger and protest have occurred. For the working class the main motive forces are purely economic demands.

They seek to win the right to strike, and so forth. And thus far it has rarely happened that they have linked these economic demands with political ones.

But there was an interesting incident in Kyiv. The workers at the Kyiv Hydroelectric Plant demanded that they be moved into decent housing, because they were living in terrible conditions. They were supported by an official teacher who lived in the same housing complex, a retired major, Hryshchuk. They demonstrated, carrying placards that said, "Give Full Power to the Soviets."

Hryshchuk, as I later learned, was imprisoned and no one knows today what happened to him. But precisely this slogan, "All Power to the Soviets," in my view as a neo-Marxist, is truly the most important slogan.

*Q. How can the neo-Marxists in the democratic movement establish ties and links with the workers?*

A. The history of the revolutionary movement in prerevolutionary Russia has some relevance to this. At that time, under the influence of the revolutionary democrats—such ideologists as Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov, and so forth—a very powerful body of progressive, democratic opinion grew up among the intelligentsia. And there came to be so many of them that they were able to go to the people and bring certain ideas to them.

Today among the intelligentsia democratic political ideas are not strong enough. It seems to me the first task is for the intelligentsia to gain consciousness of their tasks. And when a large layer of politically conscious intellectuals has developed, then the question of how the intelligentsia can carry on revolutionary propaganda among the workers will inevitably arise.

But even now, it seems to me, the democratic-minded intellectuals must know about all the revolts, all the strikes that occur in the country, and support them as much as they can. Above all, by giving them publicity, appealing to the government to meet the workers' demands, and calling on public opinion in the West to support the workers, and so on.

That will show the working class that the Soviet intelligentsia is not a new bourgeoisie. (This is notoriously untrue, because some sections of the intelligentsia live under worse conditions than the workers. But such prejudices do exist among the workers.)

This is the kind of support that will show the workers that the intelligentsia

are on their side and not on the side of the bureaucracy.

*Q. Have there been any occasions in which the intellectuals have spoken out in this way in support of the workers, in samizdat or otherwise?*

A. Only isolated incidents. The case of Major Hryshchuk for example. The KGB has also suspected all along—and I should say, with justification—that the Ukrainian patriots were involved in those events at the Kyiv Hydroelectric Plant.

I cannot mention the names of those who were involved. But there were some rather amusing circumstances. For example, Chornovil at one time had been the secretary of the Communist League of Youth (Komsomol) organization at the power plant. And when these events occurred, the KGB immediately interrogated the older workers about Chornovil. The workers said, "Yes, there used to be a Komsomol orator here by that name; he was always agitating and stirring us up (*vsyo vremya propagandiroval nas*)."

This is amusing and ironic, because it shows that honest and sincere Young Communists inevitably end up in the opposition.

*Q. And so there have only been isolated instances and, in your opinion, what is needed is that this become the overall orientation and direction of the democratic movement?*

A. Yes, this is a necessity for the democratic movement. I believe that in the final analysis even the pure democrats, that is, those who are only interested in political rights, will come to the conclusion that economic rights are just as important to people as political ones.

*Q. Recently academician Sakharov made an appeal in behalf of Martin Sostre, a Black Puerto Rican activist in the United States who was imprisoned for seven years in New York State for political reasons. Sakharov's statement helped win Sostre's release. What is your opinion of the possibilities for mutual support between members of the dissident movement in the USSR and people active in movements for social justice in the United States, especially the Black liberation movement?*

A. This is a very complex problem. Because we see before us two states in conflict, neither of which is truly interested in supporting oppressed peoples. They are interested only in supporting certain national minorities against the opponent state. The Soviet Union especially operates in this way. It supports all national liberation movements that are directed against the Americans, British, and so on. But the Soviet government itself oppresses its own minorities.

I would not say, either, that the Soviet

government is less oppressive. Look at what they have done to the Crimean Tatars and others. This is absolutely monstrous. It is hard to find an analogous case, where entire peoples have been removed from their homeland on completely vile and absurd charges—betrayal of their homeland. How can an entire population be a traitor? It is an absolutely monstrous charge.

And I would like to see this situation explained so that it becomes more widely known, so that national minorities everywhere would place no confidence in support from the Soviet government. Such support is false and self-interested. The fate of Czechoslovakia should be a warning to all peoples. Beware of these "friends." These friends will bring you new oppression, which will in no way be less heavy than your previous oppression.

In my opinion, all oppressed nations must rely upon themselves, on their own forces, and not upon the predators of one kind or the other.

And in my opinion it is very important that all of us Soviet oppositionists, Russian, Jewish, Ukrainian, Tatar, etc., give our support to oppositionists in the West and East, and support oppressed nations and oppressed classes.

*Q. What are your opinions in regard to racial conflicts in the USSR and discrimination against African students there?*

A. The question should be posed more broadly. What we are talking about is the problem of so-called Soviet internationalism. What lies hidden behind this alleged internationalism?

Take the example of the Moldavians who want to go to Romania because Romania is closer to them in language and culture. The Baltic peoples also are struggling to preserve their culture and traditions. The same can be said of the Ukrainians who are more and more becoming aware that they are a distinct people, not "little Russians." They don't want their history to be falsified, because a people's knowledge of its own history is an assurance that it will develop further, that the national culture will develop consciously.

In Central Asia live the Crimean Tatars [deported from their homeland in the Crimea]. They are a highly developed people, very politically conscious, a very noble and wise people. They, unlike some other, less politically developed national minorities in the USSR, do not resort to violence, do not use knives on people, as some others do.

Influenced by the struggle of the Crimean Tatars, the Uzbeks rebelled, in 1968, because of a "soccer incident," when the referees decided in favor of a Russian team against an Uzbek team. The Uzbeks began attacking all whites with knives. They made no distinction between whites who were Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish, or any

other nationality. Some of the Crimean Tatars who had "white" features had to explain, "I'm a Crimean Tatar; don't attack me."

The situation is very difficult, especially for the smallest peoples of Siberia and the Far East, for example, the Yakuts, who are in danger of dying out physically. When diamonds were discovered in Yakutia a great many predators of every kind—Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and other whites, the dregs of these great peoples—came rushing there. And suddenly the incidence of prostitution, venereal disease, alcoholism, and so forth, increased dramatically. And now in fact the Yakuts are concerned, not just about independent cultural development. They are worried about sheer physical survival.

General Grigorenko, who was in the Far East for several years and who learned about the fate of the Chukchi and Kamchadal peoples, told me that these peoples have also been unable to adapt to white civilization and are physically dying out. They are stricken by diseases and what have you.

Unfortunately this is not only a Soviet problem. It is a general feature of so-called white civilization, which has been vilely imposed upon many nonwhite peoples.

Very interesting, too, is the attitude toward Blacks in the Soviet Union. As long as there were no Blacks in the Soviet Union, all Soviet people loved them and sympathized with them against white oppression. But there is a paradoxical phenomenon—when many Black, Arab, Vietnamese, and Chinese students (there are no more Chinese now, but there were) appeared in the Soviet Union, savage hatred toward them suddenly erupted for some reason. It is true that they do not behave according to Soviet customs; they have their own manners, their own culture, and so on. And among Soviet philistines, and even among Soviet students, many took offense at this.

But the outburst of contempt and hatred against them was simply shocking. Behind the mask of the internationalist suddenly appeared the chauvinist's snout. I won't say the Russian chauvinist, but simply the Soviet chauvinist.

Cases are known in which Black and Arab students were not only beaten but killed, such is the hatred for them. I know of cases when whites, that is, Soviet students, were outraged when a Black student had the audacity to go for a walk with a white girl, or still worse, to kiss her. This thoroughly shocked the "white sensibilities" of the Soviet internationalists.

There is an interesting phenomenon that I have heard of now in Odessa. Odessa was always famous for its anti-Semitism. Many Jews lived there. But recently, with the growing contact with the Arab world and aid to the Arabs, there has begun to spread among the Odessa sailors a new kind of anti-Semitism, anti-Arab anti-Semitism. For the Arabs too are Semites.

*Q. A few years ago the Ukrainian dissident Svyatoslav Karavansky appealed to the then head of the Polish government, Gomulka, for support for an independent Ukraine, for a formally separate socialist state, such as Poland is. How widespread are such ideas in favor of an independent socialist Ukraine? Are there similar demands for an independent socialist Lithuania, Estonia, Armenia, etc.?*

A. The idea that an independent Ukraine is necessary does exist, but it is not widespread because for the most part the Ukrainian patriots are struggling for correct observance of the constitution and implementation of the law passed in the 1920s for Ukrainization, a law that was never formally repealed and that therefore serves as a basis from which to demand that Ukrainization be carried out. But it is precisely those who demand such implementation who are thrown into prison, although according to law those who violate Ukrainization should be the ones imprisoned.

But on the whole, few Ukrainian patriots now talk about the independence of Ukraine, because they feel that if the possibility of developing Ukrainian culture can be achieved, that would be good enough. I think that life itself will force them to become more radical, that they will reach the conclusion that only in an independent Ukraine will it be possible to build a just socialist society and to fully develop the national culture.

It is an interesting fact that the idea of an independent Ukraine is expressed not by the pure nationalists, the anti-Marxists, but precisely by the Marxists. The first Ukrainian patriot, as far as I know, to express this idea was a Communist, a party member, a propagandist of the Lviv regional committee of the party, Lev Lukyanenko. It was for expressing this idea that he was falsely charged with wanting an armed insurrection, and an armed underground organization supposedly linked with the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). So much do they fear this idea that they accused him of these things and sentenced him to be shot, and only later reduced his sentence to fifteen years.

I was quite pleased by the fact that they [Lukyanenko and his friends] were Marxists, for it is very difficult to accuse Marxists of nationalism; they did not proceed from narrow national considerations, but arrived at the conclusion that independence is necessary because of social considerations.

I do not know people from the Baltic region well, and have only spoken with one of them. He told me, "If Ukraine rises up, we, the Baltic peoples, will support it, but we ourselves are too weak; our task is to preserve and develop our own culture—that is our primary task."

And of course we neo-Marxists are for



the independence of the Baltic republics, of Georgia, Armenia, etc. That is, we do not say that this *must* happen. That is something that each people, in each of these republics, must decide for itself. But we are for the right of these republics to consider the question; we are for their self-determination.

*Q. You use the terms "patriots" and "nationalists." What distinction do you draw between them?*

*A. I distinguish between three different concepts: patriotism, nationalism, and chauvinism. Patriotism is love of one's country and the realization that one's country is not something closed off, that in fact your nation is closely linked with all other nations, that its fate depends on the fate of other peoples.*

*Nationalists, in contrast to patriots, limit their interests and goals solely to national questions. However paradoxical it may seem, they limit these questions simply to those of culture and language and do not, for the most part, consider social problems. But without considering social problems, the problems of national culture cannot be solved.*

*Finally, chauvinists are people who simply hate other nations. In short, chauvinism is a very bad thing. But in the Soviet Union these three concepts are all mixed up. Thus, if we take a Russian chauvinist, he calls himself a Russian patriot and that is supposed to be all right. But when you say you are a Ukrainian patriot, in the eyes of the authorities that is a synonym for a Ukrainian chauvinist, a fascist, and so on.*

*That is the spirit of Russian "internationalism." Ivan Dzyuba has written about that very well in his book *Internationalism or Russification?*<sup>3</sup>*

*In my opinion one of the basic principles of true patriotism is that it is synonymous with internationalism, because internationalism without patriotism is nothing but cosmopolitanism. That is something else again. Cosmopolitanism is mere indifference to all peoples, including one's own. But internationalism is concern for all peoples, especially one's own.*

*The best expression of the patriotic thinking typical of the opposition movement in the Soviet Union today are the words of the poet Aleksandr Galich:*

*"Citizens, our country is in danger.*

*Our tanks are in another people's land."*

*(Grazhdane, otechestvo v opasnosti Nashi tanki na chuzhoi zemle)*

*It is very easy to be a patriot when war is being waged against you. You simply defend your homeland against the enemy. But it is very difficult to be a patriot when your country acts as an oppressor. Then you have to oppose your own government,*

*your own oppressor. And to me that is patriotism of the highest order.*

*"Citizens, our country is in danger*

*Our tanks are in another people's land."*

*This was written in regard to Czechoslovakia. And the true patriots were those like Larissa Bogoraz, Dremlyuga, Delone, Babitsky, Litvinov, and Gorbanevskaya who went out onto Red Square, although they were only a handful, and defended the honor of the Russians and the Jews and the Ukrainians. (Dremlyuga is Ukrainian.)*

*Q. Is it possible in your opinion to call for worldwide days of protest in defense of certain political prisoners such as Moroz, Bukovsky, Mustafa Dzhemilev, and Gluzman?*

*A. This is a very difficult moral question, to single out certain individuals and not others. But what can you do? You have to deal with the practical problem that you can't defend everyone at once, and you have to concentrate on a few.*

*It would seem that these should be people who are in the worst situation or whose life is in danger, and such people as Moroz, Bukovsky, Dzhemilev, and Gluzman fall into this category.*

*In this connection it seems to me very important to appeal to the broadest possible range of public opinion, regardless of political ideas. It is necessary to appeal not so much to people's political ideas as to their conscience. And this is complicated, because in our world, conscience is buried under a mountain of concerns, problems, mutual animosities, and so forth, of all kinds.*

*It is especially important, I think, to draw in religious people, because many religions assert that they are concerned with the individual, base themselves on moral principles, and so on. In particular, Christianity is a religion whose basic principle is supposed to be "Love your neighbor."*

*It seems to me necessary to appeal to the Christian churches and say, "If you claim to love your neighbor, then, please, love him regardless of whether he is a leftist or rightist, an atheist or a Christian, a Muslim or a Jew. And demonstrate in action that you are truly a consistent believer and adherent of the teachings of Christ."*

*I also think that it is necessary to demand of every government that it raise the question of the Declaration of Human Rights in a serious way in the United Nations, and the problem of the Helsinki declaration. And that each government should force other governments to transform the promises made in all these declarations into juridically enforceable documents. We must try to have the Universal Declaration of Human Rights become *law*, become part of the constitution of every country.*

*Q. Are there plans to continue the*

*activities of the Initiative Group in exile, now that so many of its members are outside the USSR?*

*A. Both the Initiative Group and the Moscow Human Rights Committee stand on the principle that within the Soviet Union we must fight for our rights. And if members end up outside the Soviet Union, they can no longer take into account all the problems, all the subtleties, of what is going on inside the country. Such people, unfortunately, are already outcasts (*yzhe vybroshennye liudi*).*

*Of course such members of the Initiative Group or Human Rights Committee should continue the struggle, but now it must be in new forms, new organizations. This means, to me, primarily the international committee I have endorsed or Amnesty International.*

*These are organizations in which it is possible to work, to continue the same type of activity, and thus to show that in fighting for the democratization of our country, we do not support any dictatorship in any other country in any way. We are fighting for universal democratization in all countries. □*

### **Imperialists Complain About Cuban Forces In Red Sea Area**

*Imperialist military specialists, who have long complained about a supposed Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean-Red Sea area, have now begun charging that Cuban forces have joined the Soviets.*

*"British sources report that about 650 Cuban troops have been flown into Somalia where there are already some 2,500 Soviet military advisers and a large stock of naval and air force supplies," Drew Middleton reported in the April 5 *New York Times*.*

*Middleton also said, "Cuban pilots are reported to be training airmen in Southern Yemen, and Cuban advisers are working with guerrilla rebels in the Dhofar district of Oman fighting the Omani forces."*

*Apparently the "British sources" had nothing to say about the 500 British advisers and 4,000 Iranian soldiers in Oman, or the huge U.S.-backed military buildup in Iran.*

*Middleton also noted the concern of "Israeli sources" about the growing military strength of the pro-American monarchy in Saudi Arabia. The Israelis told Middleton that Saudi arms could reinforce other Arab countries in the event of another Middle East war.*

*"A secondary danger to the Israelis lies in a possible overthrow of the present Saudi Arabian Government by radical left-wing forces, a possibility that is taken very seriously in Tel Aviv."*

3. See the paperback edition by Monad Press, 1974, distributed by Pathfinder Press, New York.

## Chapter 17

### The Pentagon March

By Fred Halstead

[*Second of three parts*]

On June 23, 1967, President Johnson spoke to a \$500-a-plate Democratic Party fund-raising dinner at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles. The local Peace Action Council (PAC) and the Student Mobilization Committee had called an antiwar demonstration for the occasion. The event began in the afternoon with a "Peace-In" at Cheviot Hills Park featuring rock bands, folk singers, and literature tables. This was followed by a rally that heard SNCC Chairman H. Rap Brown, Dr. Spock, and heavy-weight boxing champion Muhammad Ali, who had recently been convicted on a charge of draft refusal. After the assembly there was to be a march to the hotel where Johnson was speaking.

Toward the end of the rally, police distributed to a small part of the crowd copies of an injunction that had just been handed down by a local court. It contained a long list of prohibitions, including a key point that was not part of the permit obtained by the organizers. The march would not be allowed to stop in front of the hotel but would have to proceed past it without stopping. The organizers decided to obey the injunction, but many of the marchers were unaware of the change in plans.

As a further complication, the organizers had planned to lead the march with sound trucks that could give last-minute

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instructions to the marchers. But the police forbade the use of trucks. One group—composed largely of Progressive Labor Party members in SDS—had brought their own sound truck and attempted to pull it into the street and begin the march about twenty minutes before the scheduled starting time of 7:30 p.m. A few police moved in to stop it and one of them said the truck ran over his foot. The police then smashed the truck's windows, pulled out the driver and passengers, and beat them with clubs.

The main march started on schedule and most of the crowd, which had not seen the encounter, was in a peaceful, even festive mood as it proceeded to the hotel. The turnout was 20,000, by far the largest antiwar gathering yet to occur in Los Angeles. Most of the people were attending their first demonstration. They were largely students and middle-income adults, some with children in strollers. It was certainly not a threatening group.

As the march reached the hotel, some fifty demonstrators, including a number who had been angered by the destruction of the PL-SDS sound truck, sat down in the street, blocking the way. They did this over the protest of the march organizers.

The demonstration monitors attempted to lead the march around the sit-downers, so it could proceed on past the hotel. But the police prevented this by blocking off the entire road. They then declared the entire demonstration an "unlawful assembly," and broke it up violently, using motorcycles followed by a charge of hundreds of cops swinging clubs who emerged from the parking

lot under the hotel. All told, 1,200 city police were used in the operation, which was obviously carefully prepared.

More than fifty demonstrators were arrested, hundreds were injured, sixty were sent to the hospital, and some were chased all the way to the border between Los Angeles and Beverly Hills. Most of the crowd reacted in shocked disbelief and there was a stampede in close quarters, since the police also blocked off the road further back, toward the rear of the march. The police clubbed several radio and TV personnel and one had his arm broken. The TV coverage was not sympathetic to the police action.

Los Angeles Chief of Police Tom Reddin boasted that it was a perfect police exercise and he was backed by Mayor Sam Yorty. The city council voted ten to five against hearing spokespersons for the antiwar movement who demanded that the "City of Los Angeles respect the Constitution of the United States, including the Bill of Rights, specifically that section which allows peaceful assembly."<sup>20</sup>

This was the first major antiwar demonstration in the country to be broken up by police. The PAC and the SMC held a meeting immediately after the attack. Mike McCabe, an SMC activist at the time, recalls:

"After making arrangements for bail and for following up on the people in hospitals, it was decided to have a press conference the next morning. Some people wanted to denounce PL for acting provocatively. It was decided, however, that as inappropriate as the tactics by PL had been, it was clearly the police who had used violence and broken up the demonstration, which was not a threat to either people or property. Publicly pointing the finger of blame at PL would disorient and split the movement when it was necessary to unite against the police attack.

"The next morning PL showed up at the press conference anticipating a public attack on them by the PAC and SMC. That didn't happen. PL tried to explain its own tactics, but the other spokespersons concentrated fire on the police attack."<sup>21</sup>

Within the movement, however, a problem was recognized. There was no way of guaranteeing that the police would not have attacked the demonstration anyway, but the sit-down had certainly made the attack more likely and presented an excuse to the authorities, who were obviously prepared to take advantage of it. A small group of people had precipitated a physical confrontation that involved a much larger group that had not agreed to it, and was not prepared for it. It was a problem that would occur more frequently and the movement would have to learn how to handle.

After Century Plaza it became imperative that the antiwar movement in Los Angeles show it was not to be intimidated. The PAC and SMC called another demonstration for Hiroshima Day, August 6. This time they made careful preparations, including a public campaign in defense of civil liberties and more adequate training and recruitment of monitors, medics, and legal observers.

More than 10,000 people turned out for the August 6 march, which moved in good order down Wilshire Blvd. to a rally at

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20. *Militant*, July 10, 1967.

21. Taped interview with Mike McCabe, November 10, 1975.



Lafayette Park. The march was twice physically attacked by ultraright groups, first by a small band of American Nazis, and then by some 200 anti-Castro Cubans who charged into the head of the parade armed with wooden stakes. The attackers were surrounded by parade monitors and moved off. This time the police did not interfere with the demonstration. But for years the memory of Century Plaza made it difficult to organize mass demonstrations in Los Angeles.

\* \* \*

The summer of 1967 saw widespread antiwar activity on a local level, much of it in new places. There was some national coordination through Vietnam Summer and the Student Mobilization Committee, and attempts were made to put antiwar referenda on the ballot in a number of cities. However, as fall approached, only the SMC was seriously publicizing the October 21 march on Washington.

SDS, at its national convention June 25–July 2, gave only grudging support to October 21, if it could be called support at all. It passed a resolution on “Antiwar Activities” which began: “The National Convention of SDS regrets the decision of the National Mobilization Committee to call for a March on Washington in October.” It urged SDS chapters to use the demonstration “only as a tool for organizing” and declared: “We feel that these large demonstrations—which are just public expressions of belief—can have no significant effect on American policy in Vietnam. Further they delude many participants into thinking that the ‘democratic’ process in America functions in a meaningful way.”<sup>22</sup>

The National Mobilization Committee itself was in the doldrums. Bevel became ill and in effect dropped out of Mobilization Committee activity. Much time in the group’s administrative committee meetings was taken up in soul-searching discussions over how to relate to the spontaneous uprisings that had hit the Newark, Detroit, and other Black ghettos that summer. There was little the committee as such could offer beyond sympathy.

On August 12 the administrative committee held a meeting in Philadelphia at which Eric Weinberger, the treasurer, reported: “Cash on hand \$485.01 and a deficit of \$12,050.06. The situation is still critical, i.e., people on the staff are hungry.”<sup>23</sup>

The group still had no definite plans for October 21 and no project director for the action. By this time it had been agreed to combine some sort of nonviolent confrontation with the mass demonstration, and it was assumed that the march would be on the capitol. There was a standing rule against demonstrators getting any closer than 500 feet to the capitol and the committee considered committing civil disobedience by going further. Abe Weisburd, of Trade Unionists for Peace, moved that the demonstration attempt to enter the capitol itself. According to the minutes, Arnold Johnson “suggested we make it clear we meant the gallery and not the floor of Congress which could be considered insurrection.”<sup>24</sup>

The meeting droned on with no enthusiasm and little real agreement. Finally, another meeting was set for August 26 in Washington.

The whole action was hung up waiting for a project director who could at least inspire the committee to get off dead center. In a kind of desperation, I telephoned around the country seeking suggestions. One of these calls was to Peter Camejo in Berkeley, who had been working on something called the Peace Torch Marathon. This involved a torch that had been lit in Hiroshima on August 6, then flown to San Francisco. The idea, originated by a group of moderates in Palo Alto, was to carry the torch by runner across the country to Washington for October 21, with local groups participating in different legs of the marathon. Jerry

22. Resolutions, *New Left Notes*, July 10, 1967.

23. Minutes of National Mobilization Committee administrative committee, August 12, 1967. (Copy in author’s files.)

24. *Ibid.*

Rubin had also been working on this, but by the time I called Camejo both he and Rubin had been thrown off the project because they were too radical for the others involved. Camejo told me Rubin was just then at loose ends and might be interested in the Washington project.

I raised this at a small meeting at Norma Becker’s apartment, and Dellinger picked right up on it. He called Rubin and asked him to come to New York; Rubin agreed.

In his book on the Pentagon march, Norman Mailer says:

“Some most radical possibilities were already in Dellinger’s mind, but to call on Rubin was in effect to call upon the most militant, unpredictable, creative—therefore dangerous—hippie-oriented leader available on the New Left. It is to Dellinger’s credit that he most probably did not do this to save the March, since there was no doubt that, doldrums or no, a peaceful demonstration of large proportions could always have been gotten together; the invitation to Rubin was rather an expression of Dellinger’s faith in the possibility—a most difficult possibility which only his own untested gifts as conciliator could have enabled him to envisage—of a combined conventional mass protest and civil disobedience which might help to unify the scattered elements of the peace movement.”<sup>25</sup>

True enough as far as Dellinger was concerned. But a large peaceful demonstration was by no means as automatic or easy to achieve as Mailer assumes. I suggested Rubin in the first place for precisely the reason Mailer dismisses. I was soon to have mixed feelings about this initiative.

Rubin came to New York with Stew Albert and Karen Wald, buddies from the Berkeley street scene who immediately joined the mobilization staff. I hadn’t seen Rubin since March 1966 when he still wore a modest haircut and the white shirt and slacks common among students. This time I hardly recognized him. He sported wild, curly hair that stood out half a foot in all directions and he seemed less relaxed than before. He gave a contradictory impression: almost deadly serious and full of outrageous humor at the same time.

Rubin came convinced that the demonstration should go to the Pentagon, an idea he said had already been discussed among street-scene radicals in Berkeley and San Francisco. When I told him I preferred the capitol he gave me a lecture on the mystical practices of certain Native American tribes who were said to use a hallucinogenic drug in their ceremonies and for whom five-sided figures were the symbol of evil. The Pentagon, he declared, was obviously the most famous, biggest, most ominous five-sided figure in the world. It we “exorcise” that, said Rubin, that will really inspire people.

Rubin viewed me as an impossibly straight, “Old Left” type, and at first I thought he was putting me on when he came across with mystical stuff like that. But after working with him a while I wasn’t sure he didn’t believe it himself.

\* \* \*

The idea of an antiwar demonstration at the Pentagon was not really new. At least five smaller ones had already been organized by pacifists: one by the Quakers in 1960 and four by the Committee for Nonviolent Action. Norman Morrison, a thirty-two-year-old Quaker from Baltimore had burned himself to death with gasoline on the steps of the Pentagon on November 2, 1965. The most recent Pentagon protest was the CNVA Boston-to-Pentagon Walk which passed through New York on April 15 and was part of the activities connected with the 1967 spring mobilization.

It was Rubin who insisted that it be the focus for the October 21 mass action. Greenblatt and most of the pacifists tended to agree right away. I still preferred the capitol but accompanied Greenblatt and Rubin to the Pentagon to check out the physical circumstances. As it turned out, Rubin didn’t even know the Pentagon wasn’t in the city of Washington but across the

25. Norman Mailer, *The Armies of the Night* (New York: New American Library, 1968), p. 225.

Potomac river in Virginia. If the authorities blocked the bridges, the demonstration would never get there.

Rubin was undismayed and entertained us with a description of crossing the river in rowboats dressed up like George Washington's revolutionary soldiers crossing the Delaware. For different reasons I viewed the river as no particular problem. It was unlikely the authorities would not let the demonstration cross. A confrontation in the city of Washington would present more problems to them than one on the Virginia side, where there were open fields for miles except for the Arlington national cemetery and the Pentagon itself, which they could easily defend. We agreed that a march on the Pentagon was technically feasible and the August 26 administrative committee meeting decided to go ahead, with Rubin as project director. A press conference was set for August 28 in New York.

\* \* \*

One of the first things Rubin did when he got to New York from Berkeley was to check out the Greenwich Village street scene. He soon ran across Abbie Hoffman and involved him in the Pentagon project. Hoffman had been a SNCC activist who, like the other whites in SNCC, had been unceremoniously separated from the organization when it developed its Black power thrust along nationalist lines. Hoffman took this quite personally and made some bitter comments on the subject in the *Village Voice*. He soon merged with the Village street scene, however, developing a cultural-radical approach similar to Rubin's. By the time the two got together Hoffman was already a central figure in this Greenwich Village milieu. Like Rubin he had a flair for publicity and was a master of the put-on. He was also a natural clown with the agility of a gymnast and the face of a mime. He had an unerring ability to get under the skin of those who took seriously whatever he chose to make the butt of a joke. I admit he got under mine from time to time.

Rubin invited Hoffman to speak at the August 28 news conference. There was some discussion beforehand on what the official statement to the press should say. I sat there in dismay listening to the dreams being spun about how the movement was finally about to take steps to actually stop the war machine and the proposals that we should announce we were going to "shut down" the Pentagon. At one point I shouted: "We don't have the tanks and machine guns to shut down the Pentagon. Let's be serious and not make any statements we can't possibly live up to."

Dellinger replied to the effect that of course we don't have the physical power to shut down the Pentagon but that was our moral intent and it was necessary to state this in order to make clear the movement was going forward to a newer, more serious level of commitment.

Essentially this was the argument behind the whole idea of "from protest to resistance," or "from dissent to resistance." It was common among radical pacifists and new-guard SDSers at the time. It was usually stated as a given, self-evident fact. Somehow the very act of throwing down the gauntlet was expected to spark the masses to action, or result in the development of real power for the antiwar movement.

The approach was wrong in my view because it made a fetish out of a tactic. It attributed some mystical power to the fact of approaching a situation of combat, whether nonviolently or otherwise. I had been through enough of that in labor strikes to know there is nothing magical about facing up to a line of cops. Such confrontations are inevitable at times in the class struggle and ought to be taken seriously, but they are no substitute for program and organization.

My view did not prevail in these discussions and the official press statement contained the following language:

"The National Mobilization Committee today announces that it is beginning to organize a confrontation in Washington on October 21-22 which will shut down the Pentagon. We will fill the hallways and block the entrances. Thousands of people will disrupt the center of the American war machine. In the name of

humanity we will call the warmakers to task."<sup>26</sup>

The press conference certainly made the news. The statement was read by Rev. Thomas Lee Hayes of the Episcopal Peace Fellowship. Among the movement figures present were Amy Swerdlow of Women Strike for Peace; Msgr. Rice; Dick Gregory; Gary Rader, an ex-member of the Green Beret reserve who was then an organizer of the Chicago Area Draft Resisters (CADRE); William Pepper, executive director of the National Conference for New Politics; Carl Davidson of SDS; Lincoln Lynch of CORE; Fred Rosen of Resistance; Lee Webb, the old-guard SDSer who was now codirector of Vietnam Summer; H. Rap Brown of SNCC; Dellinger, Rubin, and myself. But it was Rubin and Hoffman who stole the show with their descriptions of a hippie exorcism and "levitation" of the Pentagon and other hallucinogenic projections.

"We're going to raise the Pentagon three hundred feet in the air,"<sup>27</sup> said Hoffman. And Rubin declared: "We're now in the business of wholesale disruption and widespread resistance and dislocation of the American society."<sup>28</sup> Even Dellinger got a bit carried away in describing the small-scale civil disobedience actions of the Target City project scheduled to begin September 11 and go to October 21. "There will be no government building left unattacked," he declared.<sup>29</sup> It was great theater for the evening TV audiences, though it was bound to exacerbate tensions in the coalition. At least the action was finally off the ground, announced with fairly broad support and considerable publicity. With luck the rank-and-file antiwar activists—on whom the building of the action really depended—would have enough sense of humor not to be sidetracked.

\* \* \*

Immediately after the press conference Dellinger left for another trip overseas and some of the rest of us went to Chicago where the National Conference for New Politics convention was about to begin on August 29. The prospect of turning the antiwar movement into a new multi-issue political formation for the 1968 elections went up in smoke at this gathering, which was an unmitigated disaster for its organizers.

At its start the five-day convention at the Palmer House hotel was the largest gathering of left-wing groups since the birth of the new antiwar movement. Except for the SWP and the YSA—which sent only observers—and a few groups and individuals like Dellinger who were not interested in electoral politics, it was the most broadly representative conference yet, with 3,602 registered participants from 372 groups. The delegates carried bloc votes which theoretically represented 56,000 persons.

At first the idea of a King-Spock ticket got a boost when Dr. Spock indicated he was willing and Martin Luther King appeared for a speech at the opening rally. But King's speech did not deal with the NCNP and he immediately left town without a single public comment on the convention itself.

At the same time a split occurred among the Blacks in attendance as some 350 of them left the gathering and organized a simultaneous Black People's Convention elsewhere in town. This group consisted mainly of the more Black-nationalist-oriented delegates. A position paper circulated by them explained:

"Political coalition is a process that implies the total readiness of both sides involved. . . . Black people are not ready for this coalition on many levels, and neither are the so-called white radicals caught up in their psychological, rhetorical and ideological 'hang-ups' that have been flourishing since the '30s. We are now immediately aware of the need to begin initiating positive

26. Press statement of National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, for release at Overseas Press Club, New York City, August 28, 1967. (Copy in author's files.)

27. Mailer, p. 234.

28. Loc. cit.

29. Loc. cit.



action rather than reacting to various white maneuvers, whether they are establishment oriented or otherwise."<sup>30</sup>

A number of the Blacks remaining at the convention organized a Black Caucus which, partly in an attempt to outflank the rival meeting across town, adopted a militant thirteen-point program. This was done with the understanding that if the NCNP convention didn't adopt it, the Black Caucus would also leave. More than one point among the thirteen was not welcomed by the liberals, but the thorniest was point five which referred to the recent Mideast June War as follows: "Condemn the imperialistic Zionist war; this condemnation does not imply anti-Semitism."<sup>31</sup> Martin Peretz, one of the main fund-raisers for Vietnam Summer and the NCNP, threatened his own walkout over this.

The Black Caucus resolution was adopted, but not as a result of a serious discussion of the issues. Though that would not have led to full agreement, it would at least have been educational. As it was, white paternalism was much in evidence and significant forces supported the motion cynically, just to keep the Black Caucus in the convention. The vote came after a speech in support of the motion by Ed Greer of New Haven in which he said: "People will little note the wording of the resolutions we pass here."<sup>32</sup> Unfortunately for those who by such methods hoped to patch up the unpatchable, the next day newspapers prominently featured the convention's adoption of the anti-Zionist stand, and more of the liberals hit the ceiling.

Meanwhile the convention divided into three blocs over electoral strategy for 1968: those favoring a "third ticket" for president and vice-president, those for launching a new party, and those for no national commitment who favored concentrating on "community organizing" including local electoral campaigns. The Communist Party was the most determined of the "third ticket" forces, the Independent Socialist Clubs led the fight for a new party, and youth from SDS and Vietnam Summer sparked the "community organizing" position. This last was also supported by those who saw a "third ticket" as diversionary from their emphasis on reforming the Democratic Party.

The fight was bitter and when the three positions were put to a vote none had a majority. The new party position was eliminated and a runoff vote taken between the other two. The convention, using a system of weighted proxy votes, divided down the middle: 13,517 votes for a "third ticket" and 13,519 for "community organizing." A compromise, worked out by the California delegation, was passed. It put the convention on record in favor of a "third ticket" in those states "where local groups and organizations want to run a campaign and feel there is a basis therefor."<sup>33</sup> Since there would be no unified national effort it was a defeat for the "third ticket" forces.

But some of them had another trick up their sleeves, involving the Black Caucus, which by now had shrunk in size and, according to the corridor grapevine, come under the domination of Blacks favoring the "third ticket" position. One of the points of the previously passed Black Caucus resolution called for 50 percent Black representation on all convention committees. A majority of the credentials committee brought in a proposal to implement this by considering the convention itself a committee of the whole and giving to the Black Caucus 28,000 votes, half the total originally extant. The Communist Party and the Du Bois Clubs vigorously supported this proposal. One view of the reason is offered by Thomas Powers in his book *The War at Home*:

"If no third-party [or third ticket] effort were mounted, the only antiwar candidate would be run by the Socialist Workers Party, the organ of Trotskyism. The Communists were not about to allow all those antiwar votes, not to mention the publicity, money, and volunteers to go to Trotskyists. If the Black Caucus had 50 percent

of the conference votes, some kind of third-party [or third ticket] effort backed by the Communists would obviously be approved. Hence their maneuver."<sup>34</sup>

Be that as it may, the majority of the delegates were not thinking in those terms. The White Radical Caucus, led by youth from Vietnam Summer and SDS, was strongly behind the "community organizing" position, but it too supported giving the Black Caucus half the votes. Once again the debate was shot through with liberal paternalism and cynicism. Renata Adler reported a conversation between Simon Casady, one of the chief organizers of the convention, and *Ramparts* editor Warren Hinckle. Said Casady: "I guess what they're asking is to let them hold our wallet, and we might as well let them." Replied Hinckle: "Especially since there's nothing in it."<sup>35</sup>

The motion to give the Black Caucus half the votes passed. Immediately afterward a delegate from the Du Bois Clubs moved to reconsider the "third ticket" issue "now that our black brothers have rejoined the convention on the basis of equality."<sup>36</sup> Pandemonium ensued and a recess was called for caucusing, but the whole thing left such a bad taste that few took the conference seriously after that.

With it all there had apparently been a miscalculation. After the recess the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party delegation—the major serious force left in the Black Caucus—announced it was opposed to a "third ticket." The spokesperson for the Black Caucus then declared there was no need for reconsideration, and the California compromise was reconfirmed.

The rest was anticlimax. The conference faded out in a mood of demoralization and disgust. Marvin Garson expressed it thus:

"Does anyone still remember the daily leaflets and rallies of the Free Speech Movement, which gave the rank and file a pound of solid fact and reasoning for every ounce of rhetoric? The FSM operated under the principle that any bit of dishonesty or opportunism, however innocuous it might seem at the moment, would grow like a cancer until it killed the movement. . . . The NCNP did not suddenly falsify what had been an honest movement; the style of the movement had been disintegrating for years. Still, it came as a shock to me to listen to the press conference that the new board held at the convention was breaking up. They had boxed themselves in so thoroughly that there was hardly a single question they could answer honestly. . . ."<sup>37</sup>

The "New Politics" turned out to be like the old politics of the Democratic and Republican parties where dodging questions is the name of the game. But to be disillusioned one must have illusions in the first place. The NCNP convention failed because the failure was built into the attempt. The movement was simply too heterogeneous in its class composition as well as in the political perspectives of its tendencies, to agree on a single multi-issue program. Any attempt to overcome this problem by mere maneuvers—instead of by the more long-term educational clash of ideas and the tests of experience—was bound to bog down in a swamp.

In a few states "third ticket" presidential campaigns were mounted. (The Peace and Freedom Party in California was the most important.) But the backers couldn't even agree on a common program or the same candidates for all of these. The NCNP itself soon disappeared.

This fiasco confirmed the fact that mass demonstrations against the war in Vietnam remained the only national tactic that could unify the antiwar movement.

The SWPers and YSAers who attended the NCNP convention

34. Thomas Powers, *The War at Home* (New York: Grossman, 1973), p. 264.

35. Renata Adler, "Letter from the Palmer House," *New Yorker*, September 23, 1967.

36. *Militant*, September 11, 1967.

37. *Berkeley Barb*, September 15, 1967.

30. *Militant*, September 11, 1967.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*

did so without voice or vote and played no role in the proceedings or caucuses. On the face of it there was no possibility of this convention launching a united socialist or independent working class electoral campaign. We thus did not associate with its stated purpose and attended only as observers.

Paul Boutelle and I had just been nominated as the vice-presidential and presidential candidates respectively of the Socialist Workers Party for the 1968 elections. Our campaign committee rented a room in the convention hotel where we set up coffee and doughnuts and gave the delegates an opportunity to

meet the socialist candidates. Boutelle also dropped in on the Black People's Convention.

At one point C. Clark Kissinger cracked to me: "Everybody's arguing about Black power, student power, community power. But you're picking up the pieces with doughnut power." He had a point. We were probably the only tendency at the convention that actually made friends in the course of it, and for a change got none of the blame for the faction fighting.

[To be continued]

## DOCUMENTS

### The Portuguese Communist Party and the Elections

[The following article was published in the February 25 issue of *Luta Proletária*, the paper of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League), the Portuguese sympathizing group of the Fourth International. The LCI is running candidates in every constituency in mainland Portugal in the April 25 legislative elections. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

In Alvaro Cunhal's recent press conference and in the most recent rallies held by the PCP [Partido Comunista Português—Portuguese Communist party], one theme has predominated. The stress has been put on appealing to the SP for unity. Concretely, this is supposed to take the form of setting up a CP-SP government following the elections.

In our opinion, as communists, unity of the workers movement, which depends primarily on unity between these two political organizations, is a necessary and indispensable precondition for defeating the capitalist offensive.

However, unity by itself, in the abstract, is not sufficient. In the name of unity, the PCP and the SP have collaborated with the military and the bourgeois parties in successive governments that have tried to block the anticapitalist momentum of the workers struggles.

According to the Stalinist leaders, the central task at the moment is to bar the road to fascist and terrorist reaction in order to build a "democratic" and "independent" Portugal. As these same leaders see it, the elections will be the next decisive step in institutionalizing the advance in this direction.

As for the fundamental tasks, it is clear that they lie in struggling against the antilabor austerity policy. This policy is the main enemy of the workers at the moment.

But who is conducting this policy, who is attacking the agrarian reform, who is

facilitating and encouraging the return of the bosses, if not the sixth provisional government? This government, like its predecessors, is one whose policy centers on attacking the workers. It is also a government that while attacking the small peasants and their interests, drives them into the arms of the reactionaries because it acts in the name of socialism. In this way, it is additionally encouraging the fascist terrorists to bolder and bolder adventures. Therefore, it is against the sixth government that the workers should direct their united strength.

On this point, the PCP answers that the sixth government is the most left government possible at the moment. Moreover, they say that we will only have to wait two more months and then the elections may lead to the formation of a left government. In short, we just have to wait patiently for the polls to deliver their final verdict.

But the class struggle is not waiting for the elections. The sixth government and the "authorities" are responsible for the discontent of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, who are threatened with impoverishment by its policies. So, in the two months that remain before the elections only two alternatives are posed. The workers can follow the "sensible" advice of the Stalinist leaders, patiently tolerate a government that is against labor and against the poor, and thus facilitate the work of the bourgeoisie.

Or the workers movement can carry its anticapitalist offensive to the final consequences, forcing the formation of a government that will expropriate the multinational corporations under workers control and establish a sliding scale of wages and hours and a minimum wage of 6,000 escudos a month [US\$204], a government that will put an end to the layoffs, that will freeze prices and lift wage controls and the suspension of collective bargaining, that will satisfy the demands of the small peasants in the North and the agricultural workers in Alentejo, and finally that will

concentrate on carrying out a plan of struggle democratically decided on by the workers themselves.

The PCP will tell us that such a government is impossible. But we cannot help wondering if the hundreds of thousands of workers who have mobilized firmly and expressed opposition in no uncertain terms to the austerity measures and to "capitalist recovery" do not want such a government, which would only be an executive body for carrying out their demands. What better way could there be to block the manipulation of the poor peasants in the North by the reactionaries than to satisfy these peasants' just demands?

What could better solve the problems of these small peasants than a workers and peasants government not concerned about the private property of the capitalists and big landowners. Such a government could solve the peasants' problems by granting them interest-free loans, putting agricultural machinery at their disposal free of charge, and selling them fertilizer at low prices through the workers commissions in the plants where it is produced.

It could set up channels for direct distribution of produce and consumers cooperatives that could eliminate the middlemen and pay fair prices to the peasants. Who could oppose such a government but the capitalists and big landowners? And aren't they only a small minority of the population?

Contrary to what the PCP leaders may claim, the basis for such a government, for such unity, exists—it is precisely the program we laid out above. The PCP will repeat that the fascists are on the march and that the task is to defend democracy and not advance toward socialism.

However, we repeat that if the antilabor policy of the preceding governments has enabled the fascists to begin to win an important base of social support, then is it best to fight them by appealing to the "authorities" that are responsible for their growth? Or, once again, isn't our task to



build a workers power in opposition to these "authorities," a power capable of offering the peasants solutions to their problems that can no longer be provided by the bourgeois state?

The foundations of such a power exist—the workers commissions. If they are able to exercise full power of decision and control in the factories, they certainly can also do this on the national level. In order to accomplish this, all they need do is unite and form a national workers commission that will control the biggest factory of all, the national economy. This national workers commission will be simply a national congress of workers commissions that by centralizing control of the economy under its direction will also be able to plan it and end capitalist anarchy and waste.

The Stalinist leaders will argue that the SP will not agree to initiating such a process. We think this is a false way of posing the question. The SP workers are suffering the effects of the capitalist economic offensive just like all the others. Therefore, they are also looking for a way out that will make it possible to extend workers control. And the SP leadership, however dishonest it may be, cannot tell the ranks that are involved today in the workers commissions and in workers control that they should stop doing this and turn the economy over to the capitalists. This is all the more true since the SP itself has already participated in attempts to set up national coordination of the workers commissions (e.g., the "national" congress in Covilhã pushed by the MRPP\*).

This is true above all if there is a genuinely democratic discussion of the problems affecting the workers. And what the PCP will not tolerate is the workers discussing among themselves and making their own decisions. For this reason the PCP is refusing to support a free democratic and representative national congress of workers commissions. It prefers to group together "its" workers commissions in bureaucratic secretariats subordinated to the unions.

The Stalinist leaders have announced the start of a "broad process of democratic discussion" of a plan of struggle. We welcome this. However, we stress that the place for such a discussion is in a democratic congress of all the unions, in which not only all the union leaderships can participate but all the workers and political tendencies with positions on the questions in debate. And this congress should be preceded by a preliminary debate and by democratic election of all the delegates. However, the PCP rejects this. □

\* Movimento Reorganizado do Partido do Proletariado—Movement to Reorganize the Proletarian Party, a Maoist group interested in an alliance with the SP, since it sees the greatest danger in "Soviet social fascism" represented by the Social Democrats' rival, the PCP.

## The Slander Campaign Against Americans Who Demand Right to Hear Hugo Blanco

[The following letter was sent to Congressman Edward I. Koch April 1 by Michael D. Kelly, national coordinator of the United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners.<sup>1</sup>]

\* \* \*

Dear Congressman Koch,

I have enclosed a copy of a special fact sheet<sup>2</sup> our committee has published in answer to the government's charges against Hugo Blanco contained in letters to numerous prominent individuals and organizations and reprinted in the Congressional Record<sup>3</sup> by yourself and later in a nationally syndicated column by William F. Buckley.

It is unfortunate that you chose to insert the exchange of correspondence in the Record without first checking into the charges made against Mr. Blanco. Our committee or various Latin American scholars in the area would have been glad to provide information on what actually happened in Peru in the early 1960's, information which directly contradicts the government's charge that Mr. Blanco is a "terrorist."

Although your insertion into the Record contained the *entire* exchange of correspondence while Mr. Buckley chose to reprint only bits of the exchange that seem to reflect badly on Dr. Spock's judgment, it still gave only the government's side of the crucial charge that Mr. Blanco was a "terrorist." The effect has been to lend your name and reputation to a right-wing slander campaign against Dr. Spock and many other sincere individuals who lend their support to civil liberties causes such as our own.

The factual record here will make it clear that our government has lied. Mr. Blanco is not and never has been a "terrorist." The government's retreat to the grounds of "national security" as a reason for not releasing its "proof" should have set off warning signals for all concerned. It is a cover for the fact that there is no "proof" of this charge. The real reason for the exclusion is political. Our government does not agree with what Mr. Blanco has to say about torture and repression under the dictatorial regimes it has put into power or maintains therein. His eyewitness testimony in public meetings across the

1. 853 Broadway, Suite 414, New York, New York 10003.

2. Reprinted in *Intercontinental Press*, March 29, p. 484.

3. Reprinted in *Intercontinental Press*, March 15, p. 426.

breadth of the United States would be highly embarrassing to those in power.

Dr. Spock is ridiculed by yourself and Mr. Buckley for having trusted our committee and distrusted Dr. Kissinger. This case once more shows that there are ample grounds for the American people to distrust their government and not accept charges such as made against Mr. Blanco on faith alone. After all hasn't the public learned that the government lies time and again to hide what it is really doing in Vietnam, Chile or elsewhere? Isn't this one of the lessons of the Pentagon papers, Chile revelations or the Cointelpro FBI exposes?

In your exchange of correspondence with Dr. Spock and the government you gave the impression of searching for the truth in this matter. May we ask, in the name of fairness, that you insert our response to the government's charges in that same forum you chose, the Congressional Record?

Sincerely,  
Michael D. Kelly  
National Coordinator, USLA

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# AROUND THE WORLD



## South African Premier Visits Israel

Prime Minister John Vorster, chief of the apartheid regime in South Africa, arrived in Israel for a four-day visit April 8. "South Africa was one of the first states to recognize Israel when it was founded 28 years ago, and relations have remained friendly ever since," Thomas W. Lippman reported in the April 8 *Washington Post*.

Israel and South Africa recently elevated their diplomatic ties to full ambassadorial status. On an economic level, the two countries are major trading partners. Israel's major export is polished diamonds, which are imported in their rough form from South Africa.

An April 9 Reuters dispatch from Jerusalem said, "Officials declined to comment on reports from South Africa about a possible weapons deal, under which Israel would supply its Kfir jet fighter and other arms."

## Lisbon Seeks Foreign Investment

Lisbon published a new, liberal foreign investment code April 7.

Among its provisions are guarantees on the transfer abroad of dividends or profits, the reexportation of capital from the liquidation of investments, and "just" compensation for nationalization or expropriation.

## German Social Democrats Lose Votes

The Social Democratic party of West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has lost ground to the opposition Christian Democratic Union in ten of the eleven state elections held since the last national poll in 1972.

The latest defeat for Schmidt's party came in the southern state of Baden-Württemberg April 4. The Christian Democrats won 56.7 percent of the vote, a gain of 3.8 percentage points over their showing in the previous state election in 1972. The Social Democrats polled 33.3 percent of the vote, a drop of 4.4 percentage points.

Baden-Württemberg, a state with 9.2 million residents bordering Bavaria, has a heavy concentration of farmers and small businessmen. The Christian Democrats campaigned on the slogan of "Freedom or Socialism," while the Social Democrats countered with the assurance that "Up-swing is on the way."

The Baden-Württemberg vote was the last state contest before the national elections scheduled for October 3.

## Greek Cypriots Protest Renewal of U.S. Arms Shipments to Turkey

A crowd of young Greek Cypriots, estimated at 2,000 to 3,000, demonstrated at the U.S. embassy in Nicosia April 6 to protest proposed resumption of U.S. military aid to Turkey.

Carrying banners saying "Henry Kissinger murderer" and "American-Turkish agreement, gangster collusion," the demonstrators marched to the embassy. They were met with tear gas and baton charges by Cyprus police and the embassy's U.S. Marine guards.

About a dozen demonstrators had to be treated at a hospital, according to the police.

Washington has offered the Turkish government \$1 billion in military aid in exchange for permission to reopen twenty-six U.S. bases in Turkey, closed by the Turkish government in July 1975.

## Sihanouk Government Resigns

Cambodia's Royal Government of National Union resigned April 7, two days after its titular head, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, had taken the same action.

Resigning Prime Minister Penn Nouth announced that a new government would be named by the recently elected National Assembly.

Analysts cited in Western press reports interpreted the resignations as meaning that the Khmer Rouge now feels it has consolidated control over the country sufficiently to rule without the cover Sihanouk provided.

Also mentioned as a possible factor in Sihanouk's resignation was his close association with the late Chou En-lai, a current target of attack by the Maoist bureaucracy in Peking.

## New Thai Government May Ask Return of U.S. Intelligence Personnel

The new Thai government, elected April 4, has stated it will consider asking Washington to return some 4,000 military intelligence technicians to Thailand.

Prime Minister-elect Seni Pramoj said,

however, that he would not ask the United States to return combat forces to the country.

He said he wanted to avoid confrontations with neighboring powers and that his government would be "friendly with all the superpowers but stronger in dealing with Communists inside the country."

## Mexican Workers and Peasants Occupy 25,000 Acres of Farmland

In recent months, the Unión General de Obreros y Campesinos Mexicanos (UGOCM—General Union of Mexican Workers and Peasants) has led occupations of 25,000 acres of land in the states of Sinaloa and Sonora in northern Mexico.

The UGOCM has been acting on the basis of land laws of the 1917 revolution limiting individual farms to 250 acres. These laws have been systematically flouted. In the states of Sinaloa and Sonora, agribusiness controls 2.8 million acres—almost half of Mexico's total cultivated land.

Agricultural workers on a typical hacienda of the area earn US\$5.60 a day.

Land hunger in Mexico has risen because of unemployment, now almost 50 percent, and a rate of inflation running at 20 percent annually.

## Tin Maung Sentenced to Die in Burma

Student activist Tin Maung has been sentenced to death for treason, the Rangoon government announced. He was arrested March 22 on what authorities described as an "agitation mission" from the People's Patriotic party, a Thailand-based group critical of the Burmese government.

## Moscow Offers to Dump Carrillo in Return for Legalizing Spanish CP

In an attempt to gain legal status for the Spanish Communist party, Moscow has offered to remove Spanish Communist party General Secretary Santiago Carrillo and the party's president, Dolores Ibarruri.

The offer was passed along by unnamed Soviet officials to Spanish Interior Minister Manuel Fraga Iribarne, according to an April 7 Associated Press dispatch from Madrid.

The dispatch did not report reactions from Carrillo or Ibarruri on the matter.



# PROYECTOS DE RESOLUCION

## Tesis sobre Angola

[La siguiente resolución, presentada por la Tendencia de la Mayoría Internacional en la reunión de febrero del Comité Ejecutivo Internacional de la Cuarta Internacional, recibió la siguiente votación: 44 en favor, 17 en contra.

[La traducción fue tomada del número 46, 25 de marzo de 1976, de *Inprecor* en español. Hemos corregido ciertos errores obvios de esta traducción, cotejándola con el texto en inglés.]

\* \* \*

1. La formación de un Estado independiente en Angola es el resultado de una lucha política y militar llevada a cabo por múltiples fuerzas políticas y sociales. A pesar de la existencia de una tradición anticolonialista, y de la amplitud de las fuerzas movilizadas en la confrontación armada, la lucha se ha prolongado durante catorce años a causa de los siguientes factores específicos:

a. La necesidad que el imperialismo portugués tenía de controlar los considerables recursos del país, tanto más cuanto que, a causa de su debilidad económica y política, no podía plantearse seriamente la realización de una reconversión neocolonial;

b. La necesidad que el régimen fascista de Lisboa tenía de mantener su imperio colonial para no romper el desequilibrio socioeconómico en el que se apoyaba;

c. La presencia en Angola de un importante contingente de colonos blancos, empujados por sus intereses y por sus privilegios raciales a defender hasta el final las estructuras coloniales tradicionales;

d. El carácter de la estructura socioeconómica angoleña, que estaba más desarrollada que la de las otras colonias portuguesas, lo que abría más posibilidades a la entrada en una dinámica de revolución permanente;

e. La ausencia de una burguesía nacional con algún grado de solidez;

f. Las dificultades con que se encontraban los Estados Unidos para jugar la carta del neocolonialismo, a expensas de la vieja potencia colonial, y de contribuir a una reconversión, relativamente en frío, tanto a causa de los lazos político militares con el régimen de Lisboa en el marco del Pacto Atlántico (que implicaba una ayuda al ejército portugués) como por su voluntad de no poner en peligro el equilibrio de la Península Ibérica (los acontecimientos posteriores al 25 de abril han confirmado hasta qué punto estaba fundada esta

preocupación de los imperialistas, desde su punto de vista).

2. En el transcurso de la guerra se produjeron transformaciones que acrecentaron la importancia de alguno de los factores mencionados y, en último análisis, redujeron los márgenes de maniobra del imperialismo. Las estructuras tradicionales campesinas se han visto sacudidas violentamente, especialmente en algunas regiones, tanto por las operaciones militares como por las medidas de represión "preventivas" ("aldeas estratégicas") y las emigraciones masivas (especialmente hacia Zaire). Al mismo tiempo, se refuerza la agricultura capitalista que produce para el mercado mundial, en perjuicio de la de subsistencia. En lo que concierne a la economía industrial, se realizan importantes inversiones extranjeras en los sectores básicos (petróleo), en la pequeña y mediana industria de transformación y en las redes comerciales. Este proceso se ha visto incrementado a finales de los años sesenta y comienzos de los años setenta.

El resultado de este desarrollo combinado ha sido el acrecentamiento del peso relativo de las estructuras capitalistas, el aumento numérico de la clase obrera y de otras capas de asalariados, el refuerzo también de la pequeña burguesía urbana, y que, además, las burguesías de los países capitalistas, aparte de Portugal, se interesan cada vez más en el control de Angola (los Estados Unidos y las potencias de Europa Occidental, especialmente la Gran Bretaña). La guerra se prolonga también en la medida en que se halla dividido el movimiento anticolonialista y por el papel extremadamente ambiguo que juegan los países neocoloniales vecinos. Por una parte, estos países no pueden dejar de ayudar a los movimientos de liberación, pero por otra se esfuerzan por controlarlos y encajarlos en sus propios proyectos políticos, llegando hasta el punto de convertirse en vehículos de las presiones imperialistas (el gobierno congoleño ayudó al FNLA en detrimento del MPLA, favoreciendo las actitudes a la expectativa en el plano militar y equívocas en el plano político de la dirección de Holden Roberto; Zambia osciló en la elección de su aliado privilegiado).

3. El fracaso del imperialismo portugués no se sitúa solamente en el terreno militar. Este se debe, en realidad, a la imposibilidad del ejército colonial de aplastar la lucha armada del pueblo angoleño, a las derrotas militares sufridas por los imperialistas en Guinea Bissau y en Mozambique,

al peso cada vez más insoportable para el gobierno de Lisboa de los gastos de guerra y a las consecuencias políticas cada vez más graves que estaba produciendo en la metrópoli la larga duración del conflicto.

En el período inmediato al 25 de abril, el proyecto espinolista consistía en la aceptación de hecho de la victoria completa del PAIGC en Guinea Bissau, la resignación al control de Mozambique por el FRELIMO (aunque sin renunciar por ello a los chantajes, arreglos y manejos de última hora), y las maniobras en Angola, con el fin de mantener una influencia directa y un control más sustancial sobre ésta con relación a las otras colonias. Tal actitud tenía que ver con la importancia, tanto estratégica como económica, que Angola tenía para Portugal y para el imperialismo en general. Pero el elemento decisivo residía en la división existente en el movimiento nacional angoleño y la posibilidad de explotar ésta, tanto militar como políticamente. Debido a la crisis revolucionaria que se estaba desarrollando en la metrópoli y a la parálisis del ejército portugués, el gobierno no pudo llevar a buen término su operación y se vió obligado a retirarse del juego. No obstante, otras fuerzas imperialistas y neocolonialistas aprovecharon la brecha abierta (Estados Unidos, África del Sur, países de Europa capitalista, Zaire, Zambia, etc.) contribuyendo, más o menos directamente al estallido de la guerra civil.

## II

4. El movimiento nacionalista angoleño se remonta a los años veinte—e incluso a finales del siglo pasado ideológicamente—y tiene sus raíces en las luchas anticoloniales que se extienden a lo largo de cuatro siglos. Pero es sólo a partir de la mitad y los finales de los años cincuenta cuando comienza a adquirir una considerable influencia y a expresarse en formas organizadas. La lucha armada comienza como consecuencia del rechazo del régimen colonial a hacer cualquier tipo de concesión, y bajo la influencia de los acontecimientos en África en particular y de todo el mundo en general (formación de una serie de estados independientes en el continente, guerra de Argelia, victoria de la Revolución Cubana, etc.).

En el movimiento participan diversas fuerzas sociales y políticas: pequeña burguesía urbana, intelectualidad radicalizada, militantes y cuadros extraídos del proletariado y del campesinado, emigrantes del Congo, etc. Es casi simbólico que las iniciativas que señalan la apertura de

las hostilidades (en los meses de febrero y marzo de 1961) provengan de los dos componentes sociales y políticos activos de la época (núcleos procedentes de la pequeña burguesía y de las masas pobres de las ciudades, esencialmente bajo la influencia del MPLA, y núcleos procedentes del campesinado y de los emigrados del campo, bajo la influencia de la UPA, predecesora del FNLA). Desde el inicio mismo de la lucha se pone ya en evidencia la amplitud de las capas que se movilizan o que son susceptibles a ser movilizadas en la lucha antiimperialista y la dificultad de establecer un marco político y organizativo unitario.

5. En el período que va de 1961 a 1966 el FNLA, dirigido por Holden Roberto, consiguió establecer una correlación de fuerzas netamente a su favor.

El MPLA, cuya base inicial era esencialmente urbana, fue mucho más duramente golpeado por la represión desencadenada a partir de las acciones de 1961, y no consiguió desarrollar una base fuera del enclave de Cabinda. Atravesó una fase especialmente crítica entre 1961 y 1974, en la que, entre otras cosas, se dedicó a maniobrar con una serie de pequeños grupos de naturaleza dudosa, y se vio seriamente afectado por una crisis de dirección que incluso terminó con la escisión del grupo de Viriato da Cruz (que se reclamaba marxista y con concepciones maoístas). A causa de su orientación y de sus relaciones internacionales se encontró particularmente limitado por la intervención del gobierno del Congo, que sabotó sus actividades y se esforzó por hacerlo desaparecer de la escena.

El FNLA se hallaba en mejores condiciones para soportar la represión, gracias a su implantación campesina. Pudo pues aprovecharse de su presencia en las regiones fronterizas y de la base que le aseguraba la masa de emigrados. Disfrutó además de la ayuda o de la tolerancia de los gobiernos que se sucedieron en el Congo. Ante las negativas de los Estados Unidos a satisfacer las demandas de ayuda material, intentó explotar ventajosamente el conflicto chino-soviético, mediante una apertura hacia Pekín; consiguió obtener que la Organización para la Unidad Africana (OUA) reconociera el gobierno por él formado, el Gobierno Revolucionario de Angola en el Exilio (GRAE) e incluso su composición tribal (bakongo)—siempre más fuerte en el FNLA que en el MPLA—representó, en aquel momento, un elemento de gran importancia, entre otras razones porque le aseguraba las relaciones vitales con la emigración y con el Congo.

6. Esta situación no comenzó a cambiar hasta 1966. El MPLA retomó la iniciativa apoyándose en las fuerzas consolidadas en Cabinda y aprovechándose de la tolerancia, si no es que del apoyo activo, de Zambia, creó nuevas zonas de operaciones

(al Este, al Norte y más tarde al Nordeste). En 1968 declaró que ejercía control sobre una tercera parte del territorio. Su reforzamiento se vio ayudado por una concepción más flexible de la guerrilla y por sus esfuerzos por organizar las zonas liberadas, donde surgían organismos populares, bajo la forma de comités de aldea. Así consiguió ampliar su anterior radio de influencia y aparecer como fuerza operante a escala nacional.

En ese mismo período el FNLA adoptaba una actitud a la expectativa, apoyándose exclusivamente en sus bases del Norte y en sus "retaguardias" en el Congo. Las presiones de los gobiernos de Kinshasa contribuyeron a esa orientación. Por otro lado, en ese mismo período sufría una escisión, con la salida de Savimbi, que formó inmediatamente la UNITA. Esta, durante un largo período no tuvo mayor peso, pero su existencia, bajo la dirección de un hombre con fuertes relaciones tribales como Savimbi, representó en todo caso un obstáculo a la extensión nacional de la influencia del FNLA y, al mismo tiempo, un obstáculo para una extensión suplementaria de la zona controlada por el MPLA. Con el cambio de la correlación de fuerzas sobre el terreno, las repercusiones internacionales no se hicieron esperar: por un lado, el MPLA reforzó sus relaciones con los estados obreros y los gobiernos llamados "progresistas," mientras que el FNLA estableció relaciones con China; además, el MPLA consiguió una rectificación de la actitud de los estados de la OUA, al tiempo que algunos de éstos mantenían ya relaciones especiales con él y, de hecho, se aseguró un estatuto igual al del FNLA-GRAE.

7. En el momento del hundimiento del régimen fascista de Lisboa, el movimiento nacional angoleño continuaba dividido en tres tendencias principales. En varias ocasiones se habían realizado tentativas de unificación, bajo el impulso de algunos gobiernos africanos, especialmente en 1972, pero sin alcanzar resultado positivo alguno. El relanzamiento de tales intentos se efectuó en 1974, pero sólo a comienzos de 1975, con los acuerdos de Alvor, se consiguió la formación de un gobierno unitario, bajo los auspicios de la potencia colonial.

De hecho, era el MPLA quien más se arriesgaba a correr con la cuenta de la operación:

- Porque el FNLA y la UNITA hacían frente común, explotando factores tribales contra el MPLA.

- Porque éstos se veían favorecidos por su alianza con los gobiernos neocoloniales vecinos (con la única excepción del Congo Brazzaville, cuyo peso no era especialmente significativo).

- Porque estos dos disfrutaban del apoyo prioritario de las potencias imperialistas.

El MPLA esperaba explotar en su favor la simpatía de una ala del MFA—lo que le llevó a sembrar ilusiones sobre éste y sobre el Gobierno de Vasco Gonçalves—, pero en la práctica no consiguió más que ventajas efímeras y muy limitadas durante la administración de Rosa Coutinho. En ese mismo período sufrió además una profunda crisis interna que lo dividió en tres tendencias y lo expuso peligrosamente, durante todo un tiempo, a la influencia de los gobiernos neocoloniales.

En este contexto, los acuerdos de Alvor, que serían posteriormente confirmados en Nakuru, no eran más que el fundamento de una basta operación neocolonial, al menos potencialmente. Pero el estallido de la guerra civil cuestionó inmediatamente todo.

### III

8. La concreción del proyecto de Alvor implicaba la realización y el mantenimiento de delicados equilibrios entre las numerosas fuerzas interesadas, tanto angoleñas como extranjeras (compromisos entre las diferentes capas sociales, entre los diferentes grupos étnicos y formaciones regionales, entre los diferentes aparatos políticos y militares, entre los contradictorios intereses de los diferentes estados neocoloniales y las potencias imperialistas). La situación portuguesa, directa o indirectamente, introducía a varios niveles otros elementos de desequilibrio y otras contradicciones. Pero en último término, fue la dinámica del movimiento de masas en las ciudades, y especialmente en Luanda, la que jugó el papel clave en el estallido de la crisis.

Los cambios socioeconómicos que la guerra colonial había producido, reforzaron el peso específico de las capas urbanas. Con la caída del régimen de Caetano se descomposieron todos los equilibrios anteriores. Las capas pequeñoburguesas ocuparon, o esperaron ocupar, las plazas abandonadas por los colonos en fuga. La intelectualidad se dispuso a aprovechar la posibilidad de jugar un papel importante en la administración y en la gestión del país en general. La clase obrera, que había visto reforzado considerablemente el número de sus efectivos a raíz de la relativa industrialización, se organizó y se movilizó para imponer sus derechos y arrancar condiciones de vida menos miserables. Las masas proletarias y populares de los suburbios se organizaron y se movilaron a su vez, con el fin de autodefenderse frente a las desesperadas acciones de los ultras del colonialismo y del racismo.

Las huelgas y las movilizaciones se sucedieron, hasta llegar a la gran manifestación que reunió en Luanda a decenas de millares de personas y a la realización de la asamblea nacional de los comités de base (por otra parte, había tenido lugar en Luanda, en septiembre de 1973, una huelga general).

La dinamización de estas capas urba-



nas, que no podían ser integradas en un marco neocolonial, fue precisamente lo que hizo saltar los acuerdos de Alvor.

9. La movilización de las masas de Luanda no fue el resultado de una iniciativa política deliberada del MPLA. En realidad, y en una gran medida, se desarrolló en gran parte al margen de su marco organizativo (de hecho su aparato aún no estaba puesto en pie en el momento en que estalló el movimiento de masas). Pero por su tradición, por su anterior enraizamiento, por la naturaleza de una buena parte de sus cuadros, por su carácter nacional, y no regional o tribal, el MPLA era quien estaba en mejores condiciones para beneficiarse de tal movimiento y acrecentar enormemente de este modo su audiencia. Por otro lado, el MPLA se hallaba enfrentado a dos opciones concretas: o bien seguir hasta el final las orientaciones de Alvor, luchando por una aplicación estricta de los acuerdos, lo que implicaba, entre otras cosas, el desarme de los "civiles" y la entrada en conflicto con su propia base, o bien integrarse en el movimiento y tomar su dirección, tratando al mismo tiempo de canalizarlo. Considerando todos los elementos que actuaban en su contra, y ante la carencia de una implantación campesina lo suficientemente fuerte, no tuvo otra salida que optar por la segunda.

El FNLA, que no contaba con una base real en las ciudades, que además esperaba ser, si no inmediatamente, al menos a corto plazo, el principal beneficiario de los acuerdos de Alvor, se lanzó, por el contrario, a una ofensiva contra el movimiento de masas a través de una sangrienta represión. Su objetivo era lograr el control de la capital, acabando con la base de apoyo de la organización rival.

La UNITA, por su parte, llegaba a la última etapa del giro que le había hecho ir abandonando su demagogia socialista, renunciando a todo neutralismo y presentándose a los portugueses como el socio más dispuesto a colaborar en la reconversión neocolonial y a colaborar con el FNLA. Su naturaleza regional, que le había permitido ganar una base importante, le empujó también a tomar posición contra el movimiento urbano de Luanda y a comprometerse contra la organización que gozaba del apoyo de las masas.

#### IV

10. La génesis concreta de la guerra civil, las delimitaciones de los movimientos nativos y los alineamientos internacionales ponen en evidencia, sin lugar a ningún tipo de ambigüedades, la naturaleza fundamental del conflicto angoleño. Por un lado se alinean fundamentalmente las fuerzas sociales que, objetivamente, están interesadas en luchar consecuentemente por la independencia nacional y por rechazar las soluciones de compromiso

neocoloniales, lo que las introduce potencialmente en una dinámica de revolución permanente, del crecimiento de la revolución nacional en revolución socialista. Estas fuerzas son: las capas decisivas de la clase obrera urbana—tanto de la industria como de los servicios—, las capas de los asalariados agrícolas, las masas populares marginadas de la estructura económica y social por el colonialismo, y amplios sectores del campesinado pobre que han participado, directa o indirectamente, en la lucha armada y que han hecho sus primeras experiencias de movilización y de organización política, entrando en conflicto con los marcos de la sociedad rural tradicional.

Por el otro lado, se encuentran los que se aferran a los privilegios, incluso irrisorios, del pasado; los que tienen interés en la estructuración de una sociedad neocolonial, los que no quieren cortar definitivamente el cordón umbilical que les une al imperialismo, los que quieren defender lo que subsiste de la sociedad tradicional. Estos son: los colonos supervivientes, las capas pequeñoburguesas acomodadas, los núcleos embrionarios de la burguesía nacional, los jefes tradicionales y sus acólitos. El estallido de la guerra civil a partir de los movimientos de masas urbanos refleja, de forma condensada—y simplificada—el contenido sociopolítico de la confrontación militar.

El hecho de que tanto el FNLA como la UNITA se hayan visto apoyados por el imperialismo norteamericano, por las principales potencias imperialistas europeas, por los racistas de África del Sur y el bloque de los estados neocoloniales más conservadores e incluso reaccionarios, mientras que el MPLA goza del apoyo de los estados obreros, con la innoble excepción de China, y en primer lugar, de la Unión Soviética y de Cuba, y de los gobiernos neocoloniales que no pueden aún permitirse hacer abstracción de la tradición de lucha de sus movimientos naciona-

les y de los sentimientos de las masas, o de los que quieren embellecer su blasón "progresista," confirma y refuerza el análisis de la dinámica de las fuerzas nativas. Además, está suficientemente claro que en el caso de una eventual victoria del bloque FNLA-UNITA significaría no solamente un éxito de la contrarrevolución en Angola, con las secuelas trágicas de la represión sangrienta que esto supondría, sino que además reforzaría las posiciones del imperialismo en una región de gran importancia estratégica y daría un nuevo empuje a los racistas sudafricanos al tiempo que acarrearía la formación de regímenes más reaccionarios en una serie de países sudafricanos.

11. La intervención de los imperialistas en la guerra civil angoleña estuvo inspirada por la necesidad de defender sus intereses económicos, políticos y estratégicos, especialmente importantes en la misma Angola y, sobre todo, en esta región de África.

El gobierno norteamericano se ha visto sometido a presiones contradictorias: por una parte, la de las tendencias partidarias de la intervención directa, bien en función de la defensa de intereses económicos concretos, bien a partir de consideraciones de tipo político; y, por otra, la de los grupos que se oponían a este tipo de solución, en función de sus intereses en una serie de países africanos, el alineamiento estrecho con el bloque FNLA-UNITA y con el régimen de Pretoria; más aún, algunos políticos se inclinaban más a jugar la carta de la integración del MPLA en un proyecto neocolonial.

Pero la posición política y estratégica global de Washington no le dejaba otra salida que el apoyo al FNLA-UNITA. Si hasta este momento éste no se ha traducido en una intervención militar directa es debido a la situación creada por la derrota de Vietnam y por el miedo a provocar el resurgimiento de un movimiento antigue-

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rra, especialmente por la minoría negra. El régimen sudafricano, por su parte, se ha visto forzado a intervenir tanto para defender sus viejos intereses económicos como por su preocupación de mantener en su alrededor un *glacis* estratégico y político, pero especialmente por la crisis interna en que actualmente se halla metido, ya que una victoria de las fuerzas antiimperialistas en Angola, y eventualmente en otros países de la región, podría ser un estímulo para la lucha del proletariado más importante de toda África y poner en cuestión la existencia misma del régimen.

La actuación de la burocracia soviética queda explicada por su voluntad de desempeñar un importante papel en el juego político del continente africano en general y por el deseo de no renunciar, en el momento decisivo, a las ventajas que puede obtener de su apoyo al MPLA durante un largo período. Al mismo tiempo, la burocracia soviética está motivada por la necesidad de ganarle terreno a China en el movimiento comunista y obrero internacional y entre las masas de los países coloniales y semicoloniales. Tampoco se pueden excluir los efectos de los juegos internos en vísperas de su nuevo congreso. La intervención cubana, aún reflejando el acuerdo político de base entre La Habana y Moscú, posee una particular importancia por el hecho de su carácter directo y masivo y representa un auténtico desafío al imperialismo norteamericano, remontándose a las mejores tradiciones del internacionalismo revolucionario.

12. La definición de la naturaleza de la guerra civil y la comprensión de las potencialidades de una dinámica de revolución permanente, se basa en el análisis de las fuerzas sociales y no en el de las organizaciones políticas, y por lo tanto, no está en contradicción con una caracterización del MPLA como movimiento con dirección pequeñoburguesa, tanto a causa de su composición social como de sus concepciones y orientación política. A partir del momento en que adquiere una influencia de masas se convierte en una parte importante del movimiento antiimperialista, comprometiéndose en una lucha armada prolongada contra el colonialismo portugués, y expresando más bien una corriente pequeñoburguesa nacionalista y revolucionaria. La influencia ideológica y política que ejercían desde el principio elementos de formación estalinista o kruscheviana no entraba en contradicción con el conjunto de su ideología. Y esto no se debía solamente al hecho de que los revolucionarios pequeñoburgueses pueden apoyarse perfectamente en el marxismo, y máxime cuando se trata de un marxismo deformado como un ingrediente más de sus concepciones, sino, más en concreto, porque las tesis estalinistas sobre la revolución por etapas y las concepciones burocráticas de las relaciones con las masas tienden a coincidir con la línea de colabo-

ración con la burguesía nacional, con las concepciones del Estado y del partido y con los criterios organizativos burocráticos que han caracterizado y caracterizan al MPLA. El hecho de que el MPLA haya organizado después del 25 de abril de 1974 comités en las regiones liberadas, y haya llamado a la creación de comités en las ciudades, no puede hacernos olvidar que estos comités son concebidos con criterios paternalistas y autoritarios, que el mismo funcionamiento interno del MPLA ha sufrido siempre de deformaciones burocráticas muy serias y que incluso en los últimos meses, después de tomar la dirección del movimiento de masas en Luanda, ha sometido a los comités a una estructuración desde arriba, eliminando a los cuadros y a los militantes acusados de izquierdistas o anarquistas, y ha realizado severas medidas de depuración.

13. Los rápidos e importantes éxitos conseguidos por el ejército de la República Popular de Angola no son únicamente el resultado de su superioridad militar, sino que, sobre todo, se explican en el plano político. Mientras que tanto el FNLA como la UNITA mostraron ser incapaces de movilizar a las masas en sus respectivas zonas de influencia, de dar moral a sus tropas, el MPLA ha podido contar con una sólida base de apoyo urbana. Hasta el momento las masas campesinas no han jugado un papel activo. Pero en cualquier caso, la movilización de éstas es un aspecto clave, no solamente para el logro de una victoria definitiva en la guerra civil sino, en un plano más general, para el futuro de la revolución angoleña.

La cuestión decisiva sigue siendo la conquista de las amplias masas campesinas. Cualquier eventual subestimación de este problema traería consigo graves consecuencias, no solamente para el desarrollo del actual conflicto militar sino, en general, para el porvenir de la revolución angoleña. Por todo ello, es absolutamente prioritario desde el punto de vista político, emprender la lucha por una reforma agraria que destruya el poder de los grandes propietarios y de los granjeros capitalistas, que afronte el mísero estado de la agricultura de subsistencia y las estructuras tribales que aún se conservan, que garantice precios remuneradores para los pequeños y medios campesinos, que les permitan escapar de las garras de los intermediarios y que ayude a las poblaciones del campo a resolver los problemas elementales creados por la guerra colonial y la guerra civil.

A la vez, las medidas de expropiación de las propiedades imperialistas—legítima respuesta, en todo caso, a los ataques militares combinados contra la RPA—permitirán fundir más las filas de las fuerzas antiimperialistas por la concreta demostración a las masas de que son llamadas a la lucha por la defensa de sus propios intereses elementales.

Pero la lucha por los objetivos antiimperialistas debe ir acompañada de la organización democrática y revolucionaria de las masas en la base. Las experiencias extraídas en el curso de los dos últimos años, especialmente en el momento culminante de las movilizaciones urbanas, deben ser asimiladas al máximo por medio de volver a lanzar organismos democráticos y revolucionarios, cuyos dirigentes sean elegidos por las masas, pudiendo ser revocados en todo momento si no cumplen con sus obligaciones, y que no gocen de privilegio material alguno. El respeto más estricto de los derechos democráticos es, después de siglos de colonización y de largos años de cruel represión imperialista, una necesidad particularmente sentida, incluido el derecho de expresión de las diferentes corrientes y organismos políticos. Otro instrumento de singular importancia para la lucha contra las estructuras reaccionarias y contra los vestigios tribales es la organización democrática y revolucionaria de las masas, que se oponga a todo intento burocrático y autoritario. En esta batalla pueden y deben jugar un papel importante los militantes que hayan hecho las experiencias de lucha, especialmente en los dos o tres últimos años, y que hayan asimilado las lecciones de las luchas antiimperialistas de otros países, comprendida la Europa Occidental. Finalmente, en la medida en que se establezcan relaciones estrechas con los movimientos revolucionarios de África Austral, que con sus luchas debilitan a los regímenes reaccionistas de Salisburgo y Pretoria, murallas del imperialismo en esa parte del continente, en esa misma medida se verá reforzada la lucha antiimperialista de las masas angoleñas.

14. Las fuerzas imperialistas se han visto obligadas a revisar su política como consecuencia de los catastróficos fracasos militares del FNLA y de la UNITA. Algunos gobiernos neocoloniales ya han operado un giro reconociendo a la RPA y buscando un compromiso con el MPLA. Los imperialistas de los Estados Unidos y de Europa podrían seguir por el mismo camino iniciando una operación de envergadura con el objeto de integrar a la RPA, en un plazo más o menos largo, en un proyecto neocolonial relativamente "progresista." La base material de tal operación la constituyen las capas pequeñoburguesas acomodadas, los núcleos embrionarios de la burguesía "nacional," y toda una pléyade de aprovechados y de arribistas. Las tendencias derechistas del MPLA, inclinadas ya anteriormente a adoptar soluciones de compromiso con la UNITA, podrían presionar a fin de llevar a cabo tal opción. El proyecto de la dirección del MPLA—tal como se desprende de la RPA—no se haya en absoluto en contradicción con tal operación neocolonial, como lo confirman, entre otras cosas, las recientes aperturas en dirección al Zaire o a Zambia.



Frente al desarrollo de esta posibilidad y, en todo caso, para evitar que la derrota rápida del enemigo tenga, paradójicamente, consecuencias negativas para la lucha revolucionaria, es más necesaria que nunca la movilización y la organización de las masas en organismos democráticos que garanticen su autonomía con respecto a toda clase explotadora y a todo aparato burocrático. Esta tarea, que no va a ser realizada por la dirección pequeñoburguesa del MPLA, debe ser emprendida por los revolucionarios ligados al movimiento de masas.

## V

15. A propósito de Angola, la resolución sobre Africa del Octavo Congreso de la Cuarta Internacional (1965), manifestaba: "Es evidente que no existe aún una verdadera dirección revolucionaria angoleña y que los conflictos y las luchas internas del movimiento nacional continuarán durante un largo período. Para los marxistas revolucionarios el criterio fundamental que determina los campos de acción a los que dará preferencia es saber quién ejerce, en un momento determinado, una influencia de masas real y quién lleva efectivamente los combates, porque es ahí donde la lógica de la lucha revolucionaria permitirá más fácilmente que se forme una vanguardia revolucionaria. No se pueden tomar como criterios decisivos las orientaciones de una dirección o de algunos dirigentes y con menos razón, las insinuaciones o suposiciones de tal o cual personaje. . . Sin disimular sus críticas y desplegando sus propias concepciones sobre la naturaleza de la revolución angoleña, la Cuarta Internacional continúa asegurando su solidaridad con las fuerzas que combaten efectivamente y que son, sobre todo, fuerzas campesinas, organizadas en la etapa actual en el FNLA. Al mismo tiempo considera que la unificación del FNLA con las otras fuerzas existentes que éste afirma desear, podría ser en principio benéfica, a condición, naturalmente, de que sea realizada en la lucha, sobre la base de un programa antiimperialista y anticolonial claro y sin que pueda perjudicar a la necesaria unidad en la lucha armada."

Incluso, a pesar de que los criterios que se aplicaban eran correctos, al igual que el análisis de la correlación de fuerzas sobre el terreno, se impone en todo caso una autocritica que se puede sintetizar en los términos siguientes:

a. Tanto la resolución del SU [Secretariado Unificado de la Cuarta Internacional] de febrero de 1964, así como la resolución del Octavo Congreso Mundial sobrestimaban las posibilidades que había en que el FNLA superara sus orígenes tribales y las consecuencias del condicionamiento regional, y por tanto, de que pudiera escapar a la influencia ejercida por los gobiernos neocoloniales congoleños, vehículo de la presión imperialista.

b. Las mismas resoluciones no tenían en cuenta las posibilidades y la capacidad del MPLA para volver a lanzar sus acciones en otras regiones del país, y subestimaban también el papel que su ideología, más progresista que la del FNLA, podría jugar en la eventualidad de que se diera tal recuperación.

c. La Cuarta Internacional se ha retrasado considerablemente en la verificación analítica de la situación en Angola y, en consecuencia, a ajustar la política y la táctica necesarias. Incluso, la resolución del Décimo Congreso Mundial (febrero de 1974) se limitaba a afirmar, de forma muy general, que "el desarrollo del proceso de revolución permanente . . . no podrá hacerse más que a partir fundamentalmente de una clarificación dentro del MPLA y del FRELIMO" y a señalar la "tarea de construcción y formación de cuadros marxistas revolucionarios."

16. En la guerra civil que estalló en vísperas de la proclamación de la independencia, la Cuarta Internacional escogió el campo de la RPA fundada por el MPLA, contra la santa alianza de los imperialistas, de los racistas y de los reaccionarios locales. Se colocó de parte de las masas movilizadas en defensa de la independencia arrancada mediante una tenaz lucha armada, en defensa de sus intereses fundamentales contra todas las clases y capas explotadoras, extranjeras y "nacionales," por la expropiación de los capitalistas y de los propietarios terratenientes y por la formación de un gobierno obrero y campesino basado en los comités democráticos revolucionarios, como expresión directa de las masas.

Tal actitud no implica de ningún modo que la Cuarta Internacional renuncie a sus críticas a la dirección del MPLA, a la que caracteriza como nacionalista pequeñoburguesa, y no como proletaria y comunista, y que no podrá llevar a cabo las tareas para la construcción de un estado obrero. La militancia en el mismo campo y la solidaridad en la lucha común no están en contradicción con la necesaria batalla por la autonomía política de la clase obrera y de los revolucionarios, y por la construcción de una dirección proletaria revolucionaria y de una organización marxista revolucionaria.

Los marxistas revolucionarios angoleños se comprometen sin reservas en la lucha militar contra la santa alianza reaccionaria hasta la victoria final, por la defensa de la RPA y por la independencia completa de Angola. En su campaña política insisten especialmente en la necesidad de la movilización activa y consciente de las masas, de su organización en comités democráticos y revolucionarios, elegidos y revocables en todo momento, así como en la defensa de los derechos democráticos para todos los que combaten en el campo antiimperialista. Asumen la tarea indispensable de la clarificación teórica y

política sobre la naturaleza de la estrategia de la revolución en Angola, esforzándose por reagrupar, en primer lugar, a los cuadros y militantes que han hecho experiencias en la lucha y en las movilizaciones de las masas, y que han reflexionado de manera crítica sobre sus experiencias.

17. La Cuarta Internacional debe tomar parte activa en una campaña de solidaridad con la RPA, organizada a escala mundial. Esta campaña deberá exigir la retirada inmediata de todas las fuerzas imperialistas y neocolonialistas, la ayuda política y material de los estados obreros y del movimiento obrero internacional, la suspensión de todo envío de armas y de material al bloque FNLA-UNITA, y el reconocimiento de la RPA.

La Cuarta Internacional denuncia la actitud de la dirección burocrática china que, después de haber ayudado al FNLA, adopta ahora una hipócrita actitud neutral, demostrando así, en la práctica, el carácter nefasto de sus concepciones y análisis que basan su política en la denuncia de la URSS como el enemigo principal, pretendiendo de hecho un compromiso con el imperialismo norteamericano, europeo y japonés.

Los marxistas revolucionarios africanos, conscientes de que la derrota de los imperialistas y de los neocolonialistas en la guerra civil angoleña tendrá enormes repercusiones en el continente, creando las condiciones favorables para derribar a los regímenes racistas de Africa del Sur, de Namibia y de Zimbabwe y erosionando las bases de los regímenes neocoloniales reaccionarios, realizarán la campaña por el apoyo militante a la RPA y a los combatientes angoleños, en los medios de la vanguardia política africana en las organizaciones de masas, en los sindicatos y en las organizaciones de los trabajadores y estudiantes en el extranjero.

14 de febrero de 1976

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# FROM OUR READERS

A reader in Paris sent us the following comment on David Frankel's article "Israeli Nuclear Arsenal—Time Bomb in Mideast," which appeared in the March 29 issue of *Intercontinental Press*:

"There is one additional point—an important one, I think—that should be added about the danger stemming from the Israeli possession of nuclear weapons. If they should ever develop a long-range delivery system—and this may well be feasible—there is the danger that they would threaten to use them against Soviet cities in the event that they felt desperate enough. The implications of this are obvious.

"The Pershing missiles that they may obtain have a range of 450 miles. Consider the fact that several key Soviet cities lie within a mere 1,000 miles from Tel Aviv. Or even consider the one-way range of the Phantom jets they already have."

George Novack's article "In Defense of Engels," which appeared in the February 23 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, provided a wide-ranging answer to the current detractors of the cofounder of scientific socialism. Among the responses from our readers, Thomas Boushier of Houston, Texas, called attention to another problem. Here are some extracts from his letter:

"If it's true, as George Novack says in his article . . . that there was a forty-year break in the continuity of assimilating Marxist theory, ranging from the 1930s to the 1970s, then the important task may lie not so much in making comrades aware of the curves and nuances of thought represented by quasi-bourgeois philosophers such as Lukacs, Marcuse, and so forth (as Novack seems to indicate) but rather in simply encouraging them to read the works of Marx and Engels for themselves. . . .

"At this period of time, it seems best to me to make the challenge to grasp Marx and Engels out of the context, and as a further extension, of the way people first came to tolerate, then accept, and later identify with our concept of the events that took place from 1917 (the time of the Russian revolution) to the 1930s. For, after all, that was the time when what was done by those who were assumed to be masters of Marxist theory—Stalin, Bukharin, Kamenev, and others—was done and 'practiced' in a way that only later showed that they had hardly read or understood Marx and Engels at all."

We agree that the necessity of studying the works of Marx and Engels cannot be stressed too much. One of the problems, however, is that many potential students of these works are turned off by the detractors, who make Engels their special

target. Thus to arouse interest in the writings of Engels, it is imperative to answer his detractors.

In passing, it must be observed that in the days before he usurped power in the Soviet Union, Stalin was never recognized as a master of Marxist theory. As for others, such as Bukharin, a comparison of their writings before and after the opening of the Stalinist period shows that they *degenerated* as Marxists. The view that they never understood Marxism in the first place leaves out the personal side and the effect of changing social forces on individuals.

Concerning the same article, D.C. of Ithaca, New York, put this note on his order for back issues of IP: "Novack's article on Engels was fantastic."

Readers of *Intercontinental Press* will recall that some time ago S.F., "a former supporter of the Opposition in the Soviet Union," who now lives in Tel Aviv, wrote us asking that the four-volume *Bulletin of the Opposition*, which he had seen by chance, be sent to him at "a low price or . . . as a gift . . . because of the material conditions" under which he lives.

The four volumes were sent as a gift and along with it a small sum of money donated by readers of *Intercontinental Press*.

After a delay, for which we give full credit to the Postal Service, delivery was made, and S.F. sent us a letter of appreciation:

"The other day, happily, I received these books for which I owe heartfelt gratitude to all those concerned individuals. As regards the monetary assistance, I flatly refuse to accept it, but I will accept the books of L.D. Trotsky: *History of the Russian Revolution* and *Revolution Betrayed*."

These two books are now under way, and we hope S.F. enjoys them as much as the *Bulletin of the Opposition*.

The latter book, by the way, is a Monad Press publication, distributed by Pathfinder Press, 410 West Street, New York, New York 10014. The four volumes, cloth-bound, cost \$160.

A prisoner in Ohio asks:

"Can you help me obtain correspondence with someone. . . ?"

"I have been locked up for some time, and have not communicated with people beyond this prison for many years. Do not reject me because of presumed group membership or because of derogatory stigma attached to prisoners. I am not a hard-to-get-along-with type of person, and would like to meet and communicate with



Conrad/Los Angeles Times

anyone who's interested."

If you are interested, please write us for the prisoner's name and address.

We do our level best to follow readers of *Intercontinental Press* when they move, but sometimes it's quite difficult. For instance, we welcomed K.D.'s note from Los Angeles, sent in spite of his being upset when he didn't get his copy of IP after he had moved. "My sub to I.P. hasn't come to my new address yet, which made me mad until I thought that maybe I haven't told you what the address is yet."

If you don't get each copy of *Intercontinental Press* when you think you should, it would be a good idea to drop us a note. We will take it from there.

T.K. of Colorado Springs, Colorado, notified us that he hadn't received any copies of IP from April to August 1975—not "a single issue. Why? I sent the proper forwarding addresses and have checked the post office repeatedly. I would deeply welcome an explanation. . . ."

We would, too. Unfortunately the Postal Service has discontinued offering rational explanations for such things.

Matters are bound to get worse, as can be seen from Conrad's cartoon above. Our tip is to renew your subscription now before the next round of increases in postage. □

## Death and Taxes

Under the heading of "Emergency Relocation Planning and Operations," the *Internal Revenue Service Handbook* advises: "During state of national emergency resulting from enemy attack, the essential functions of the Service will be as follows: (1) assessing, collecting, and recording taxes. . . ."—Quoted in the May issue of the *Progressive*.