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Demonstration of 10,000 Black students in Soweto, South Africa, on June 16. Police later opened fire,

killing two students on the spot, which touched off massive explosion of Black anger at racist regime.

## **Black Uprisings Shake South Africa**

## Washington's Stake in Apartheid

By Ernest Harsch

South Africa has been rocked by the most massive Black uprising in the country's history. In defiance of police bullets, clubs, and tear gas, tens of thousands of Black students and workers filled the streets of Soweto and other Black townships to express their hatred of the white minority regime's racist apartheid system.

The militancy displayed by the protesters reflects the determination of the African masses to free their continent of the last strongholds of white colonial rule. Together with the deepening ferment in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the Black upsurge in South Africa is an important sign of the rising national and class struggle throughout southern Africa.

The Vorster regime's response to the just demands of the Black population—the wanton murder of well over 100 persons—has revealed to the world even more sharply than before the utterly barbaric and retrograde nature of South Africa's apartheid system.

At the same time that Vorster's police were gunning down Black protesters, Secretary of State Kissinger declared that he would go ahead with his scheduled meeting with the hated racist. Slated to be held in West Germany on June 23 and 24, the talks are the first such high-level meetings between Washington and Pretoria since 1945.

Although confronted with deep unrest at home, Vorster also viewed the meeting as vital and refused to cancel or postpone it. Speaking at the airport in Johannesburg June 19 on his way to the talks, Vorster declared that the meeting with Kissinger was "a very important one in which I hope to be able to put South Africa's case at the highest level."

Vorster added that the talks reflected Washington's recognition of the role the South African regime "plays and can play in southern Africa." The same point had already been made in Washington two weeks earlier. On June 4, a high State Department official said that the reason Kissinger wanted to meet Vorster was because Pretoria played an "essential" role in southern Africa.

For American imperialism, the white supremacist regime plays an "essential" role for a number of reasons. South Africa controls the vital sea route around the Cape of Good Hope, past which much of the world's trade is shipped. It has some of

the largest naval bases bordering on the Indian Ocean. There are large deposits of diamonds, gold, and other valuable minerals in South Africa that Washington considers strategically important to Western imperialism.

About 360 American companies have nearly \$1.5 billion invested in South African mines and industries. Since the wages of Black workers in South Africa are kept at extremely low levels by the apartheid laws, the American investments yield profits at among the highest rates in the world.

Perhaps the most important consideration for Washington is Pretoria's role as a bastion of imperialist rule on the African continent. Itself an imperialist power, the South African regime has the economic and military strength to advance its own interests and those of its Western allies well beyond its borders. In addition to serving as a staging area for imperialist economic penetration of other African countries, the colonial-settler state is a powerful bulwark against the African revolution.

Despite Washington's occasional criticisms of the apartheid system, it has, in fact, done much to strengthen Pretoria's military might. As part of Washington's 1970 "tilt" toward more open collaboration with the white minority regimes of southern Africa, it has sold to Pretoria millions of dollars worth of "dual purpose" equipment that can be used for military objectives.

Included in the \$272.8 million worth of American aircraft sold to South Africa between 1967 and 1972 were Bell helicopters capable of being used in police and military operations and twin-engined Lear jets that can be outfitted for reconnaissance and certain combat missions. Also included were C-141 Starlifter and Hercules C-130 transport planes suitable for the ferrying of troops.

The new American policy toward Zimbabwe and Namibia announced by Kissinger during his recent tour of several Black African countries is just another aspect of Washington's overall strategy in Africa.

Washington has also sought to prop up those Black neocolonial regimes, as in Zaïre and Kenya, that are allied with Washington and favor a "dialogue" with

Pretoria. It was announced June 16 that the U.S. government has agreed to sell twelve F-5 jet fighters, worth more than \$70 million, to Kenya. The White House has also indicated that it will ask Congress for an increase in military aid to the Mobutu regime in Zaïre.

At a June 17 news conference in Washington, Kissinger made it clear that he expected Vorster to cooperate with Washington's strategy by pressuring the Rhodesian regime into a compromise with the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders and by moving toward ending direct South African rule over Namibia, in favor of more indirect, neocolonial forms. He said that at the meeting with Vorster "the question I want to explore is whether South Africa is prepared to separate its own future from Rhodesia and Namibia."

If it does, Kissinger said, then that would strengthen Pretoria's claim that it is "an African country." During his tour of Africa, Kissinger sounded the same theme, stating that white South Africans "are not colonialists; historically, they are an African people."

If such a view gained acceptance by the Black regimes, it would make it politically much easier for Washington to openly maintain its ties with Pretoria and even to increase its aid to the racist regime.

At the news conference, Kissinger also spelled out another goal of Washington's South African policy. He said that if Pretoria modified its ties to Zimbabwe and Namibia, "its evolution can proceed in a longer period of time and by different methods." That is, abolition of the racist system would be postponed to the Greek calends.

To deflect criticisms of Washington's backing to Pretoria, Kissinger and other government officials have been forced to issue periodic denunciations of apartheid. But these denunciations are purely for show. Washington has no intention of seeing the apartheid system abolished.

Unlike other countries in Africa, where the imperialist powers were able to maintain their economic and political domination after shifting to indirect forms of rule, a neocolonial "solution" in South Africa would be virtually impossible. South African capitalism rests on the foundation of apartheid exploitation. The positions of the South African and Western imperialists are so closely intertwined in the country that the downfall of white political power would likely prove fatal to continued imperialist economic control.

The Black proletariat in South Africa—now numbering more than six million workers—is a powerful force that could lead the national liberation struggle toward the overthrow of capitalism along with the apartheid system.

Pretoria and its allies thus have no alternative strategy of protecting their economic interests within South Africa other than through racial domination and

brute force. Washington's policy is basically aimed at buying time for Pretoria.

Some circles within the American ruling class, however, are already showing skepticism about whether this policy will work. The editors of the *New York Times*, one of the most influential bourgeois newspapers in the United States, said June 18, "The open question, as racial tensions erupt into violence, is whether or not this country's diplomatic interest has been expressed too late to be felt where it could count."

Two days later, they expressed even greater alarm: "All rational discussion of southern Africa's future must begin with an understanding that the present disturbances are not merely an isolated tragic episode but the advance warning of a gathering storm that could wreak havoc far beyond the African continent."

The editors of the *Times* are essentially correct. It may, in fact, be "too late" for Washington's policy to have much effect in retarding the Black liberation struggle in South Africa.

The sudden and spontaneous uprising in the Black townships gave only a glimpse of the explosive social tensions that have been building up in the country for centuries. And it is just a prelude to the powerful struggles that are yet to be waged by South Africa's Black masses. Those future struggles will have a profound impact on the course of the African—and world—revolutions. □

## Ford's Threat Against Lebanon

After massing a naval task force off the coast of Lebanon with enough firepower to flatten Beirut, the Ford administration ordered the evacuation of 263 persons from that war-torn city. In contrast to the massive concentration of military force assembled offshore, the operation was carried out with one lone landing craft, and with the cooperation of Palestinian and Lebanese Muslim forces.

Since none of those involved in the fighting in Lebanon had threatened to interfere with the evacuation of foreign citizens in the first place, only one conclusion is possible. The display of American military might was intended as a threat—one that had nothing to do with the evacuation of endangered civilians.

The desire of the Ford administration to put imperialist troops into Lebanon was clearly indicated in May, when it solicited the offer of French "peace-keeping" troops during President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's visit to the United States. This latest threat indicates once again the importance of the demand that the U.S. imperialists keep their hands off Lebanon. □

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Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Editorial Staff: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, David Frankel, Ernest Harsch, Judy White.

Business Manager: Pat Galligan.

Copy Editor: Mary Roche.

Technical Staff: Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, James M. Morgan, Bill Razukas, Will Reissner, Earl Williams.

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# Black Uprisings Shake South Africa

By Tony Thomas

Starting on June 16, South Africa has been shaken by uprisings in the Black urban townships surrounding Johannesburg.

The racist apartheid regime met the uprisings with a massive, murderous show of force. The government stopped giving figures on casualties after it admitted that 100 had been killed and more than 1,000 injured. However, *New York Times* correspondent John F. Burns reported that eyewitness accounts of the South African crackdown placed the toll "substantially higher" than the official figures.

The protests started in Soweto (an acronym for the South Western Townships), a Black city of more than one million. Outside of the Bantustans (reservations for Blacks), all Blacks, with the exception of some domestic servants, must live in such Black townships, since they are prohibited from "white" cities like Johannesburg.

While South Africa's ruling racists claim Soweto and the other townships circling Johannesburg are showcases of how good things are for Black South Africans, even U.S. Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development H.R. Crawford called them "modified concentration camps."

Only a small percentage of the homes there have running water, fewer have electricity or bathrooms. Whole families are forced to live in unbearably crowded conditions. Thousands of workers live in barracks, since they are allowed to bring their families and lease homes only after many years of "reliable" service in South African industry.

The explosion of protest in Soweto was ignited by government attempts to impose the Afrikaans language in the schools. As Winnie Mandela, wife of imprisoned African nationalist leader Nelson Mandela, pointed out: "The language issue is merely the spark that lit the resentment that is building up among Black people. Every car that looked like a white man's car was burned. That was nothing to do with Afrikaans."

### Peaceful March

The protests began on the morning of June 16 when more than 10,000 Black students and youth from Soweto demonstrated in support of a student strike in one school district protesting the language policy. The march converged on Phefeni junior high school, the center of the strike.

The march was peaceful. Banners were

carried that read "Down With Afrikaans," "We Are Not Boers," and "Viva Azania [an African name for South Africa]." The marchers sang the Black anthem, "Nkosi Sikeleli Afrika" (God Bless Africa).

Nicholas Ashford in the June 17 *London Times* paraphrased a report by Sophie Tema, an eyewitness who is a writer for the *World of Johannesburg*, a Black-oriented newspaper:

She said a crowd of several thousand students had gathered in front of Phefeni school when about 10 police vehicles containing about 30 policemen, mainly blacks, arrived. A section of the crowd then began taunting the police and waving placards at them. A white policeman replied by hurling what appeared to be a teargas shell.

Miss Tema said the crowd immediately became angry and began throwing stones and any other objects they could find. At no stage, she said, did the police warn the students to disperse. She then saw a white policeman pull out his revolver, point it and fire. Other policemen then began firing.

Two young students (one about seven years old) fell dead. The demonstrators continued to throw rocks and other objects at the cops. They began to march through the city fighting with cops and attacking government buildings and other symbols of the racist regime.

Exactly what went on in Soweto and other Black townships for the next few days is not clear, since the South African police immediately sealed the area off, preventing the press from getting direct reports. The regime then issued its own highly tendentious reports, blaming the rebellion variously and contradictorily on "agitators" or drunken thugs with no political motivation.

What is clear is that the masses of Africans in Soweto and nearby Black townships exploded in reaction to the killings, the language policy, and other aspects of the oppression they face.

A dispatch in the June 18 *New York Times* reported that "youths armed with shovels, pickaxes, iron bars, knives and sticks" were in control of the streets of Soweto. Schools, government offices, stores, and other symbols of authority, racism, and exploitation were attacked and burned, in a manner reminiscent of the ghetto rebellions in the United States in the 1960s.

Ashford, writing in the June 18 *London Times*, said:

... the police remained the main target of the rioters' anger. In a scene reminiscent of the

Hungarian uprising, stone-throwing youths attacked a convoy of police armoured personnel vehicles. They were driven off only after the police had opened fire. Orlando police station, at the centre of the riot area, was under a virtual state of siege, with crowds of children jeering and stoning police vehicles.

Describing the scene on June 17, Ashford wrote:

For the second day running clouds of dark smoke hung over the township as rioters set fire to government offices, schools, clinics, shops and vehicles. Army helicopters continued to drop tear gas cannisters to disperse crowds as more than 1,000 policemen, both black and white, armed with automatic rifles and machine-guns, tried to quell the looting and violence.

By the third day of the revolt, it had spread to Alexandra, Vosloorus, Natal-spruit, Katlehong, Tokosa, Daveyton, Tembisa, Kagiso, and other Black townships surrounding Johannesburg.

At the University of Zululand at Empangeni in Natal Province, Black students burned the main administration building. At the University of the North, at Turfloop, near Pietersburg, 125 miles from the Rhodesian border, students were injured when the police attacked 2,000 students who were holding a prayer meeting for the victims killed by the South African police.

The *New York Daily News* reported June 20 that Black students near Durban in Natal Province attempted to protest at the administration building, and march on Durban's city center, but were stopped by the police.

The upsurge also spread to Johannesburg, where most of the townships' people work. The *Financial Times* of London reported that on June 17:

Thousands of black workers stayed away from work to-day whether in sympathy or out of fear of reprisals is not clear—and others went home early. Many companies around Johannesburg were making emergency production plans in case violence did not stop and workers went on strike.

While the government rushed police, "antiterrorist" units, and helicopters into the Black townships, there were reports of whites lining up at gun shops.

Other whites, however, took actions in support of the Black rebellion.

### Cops Attack White Students

In a June 16 dispatch in the *Washington Post*, Robin Wright reported that Soweto's Blacks had already won support from students at Johannesburg's Witwaters-



rand University. Placard-carrying students marched down a main avenue of the city with slogans such as "Pigs kill again" and "We are standing by you, Soweto."

The next day, 200 white students from the same university marched through the city's streets protesting police violence against Blacks.

The students carried coffins made of cardboard and signs saying, "Black education kills," and "Your kids are next."

White and Black bystanders joined the march as it moved toward Johannesburg's downtown area, swelling it to 1,000. With the marchers shouting, "Power to Soweto!" and raising their fists in the Black power salute, the demonstration was attacked by 150 club-swinging cops and groups of white thugs.

On June 18, white students in Johannesburg and Cape Town attempted to hold demonstrations but were prevented by a government ban on public gatherings.

In a June 19 dispatch, Burns reported that Vorster's riot squads had "apparently succeeded today in bringing calm to 11 black townships around Johannesburg" after what he described as "the toughest police action of the three days' rioting."

How calm the situation is remains to be seen, since the South African regime has claimed that the rebellions were "over" every day since they started.

At the same time, M.C. Botha, South Africa's minister of Bantu (i.e., African) Administration and Development, met with what were termed "responsible" leaders of Soweto's Blacks.

After the meeting Botha announced there would be no changes in the language policy until after school vacations, if at all. Another meeting was scheduled for June 25.

Even these Black "leaders" had demanded an end to the Afrikaans language policy, withdrawal of riot police from the township, and establishment of a multiracial commission of inquiry.

#### Language Question

The issue that triggered the student actions in Soweto was the policy of the South African government to impose Afrikaans on Black schools.

Afrikaans is a Dutch-based language spoken by the majority of South African whites. Afrikaner culture is very closely identified with the ruling Nationalist party and its policy of apartheid.

Most Black South African students receive instruction in English or in African languages. They generally prefer English because of hostility to the Afrikaners. English also gives them access to culture, political ideas, and information from the world outside of South Africa.

Two years ago, the South African government ruled that Black education in the urban townships would have to be conducted half in English and half in

Afrikaans. In contrast, white students are able to choose between instruction in either language, although they must take Afrikaans or English as an additional language.

The apartheid regime's policy has been



VORSTER

to keep the educational level of Blacks minimal. Blacks must pay school fees, while white education is free. The regime spends \$700 per pupil each year on white children, while \$41 is spent per Black pupil. Most Black schoolchildren in Soweto, center of the unrest, are forced to drop out by the sixth grade.

The government tried to concretize its language policy by ordering that social studies and mathematics be taught in Afrikaans.

Stewart Dalby reported in the June 18 *Financial Times*: "Blacks themselves say social science was picked because it is a subject most easily susceptible to propaganda. Mathematics was chosen because it is extremely difficult to learn in a foreign language, and this would retard the progress of Africans, they say."

The policy was so hated that all but one of the subdivisions of Soweto's school system were forced to wangle exemptions from the policy. When a white school inspector in this one district implemented the program in mid-May, a student strike in six junior high schools broke out, involving thousands of youth.

Even though several thousand students were on strike, on June 12 the government

rejected requests from the administration of four of the schools to allow instruction in English only.

#### 'Power'

But the African youth in the townships raising the Black power salute and shouting, "Amandhla!" (Power), and their supporters in Johannesburg shouting, "Power to Soweto" were talking about more than overturning the language policy.

They were talking about taking power out of the hands of the white-settler minority of 4.1 million and putting it in the hands of the more than 20 million Blacks in South Africa.

The prospects for these African workers being able to realize their goal are much better today than in 1960, when scores of Africans were shot down in the Sharpeville massacre with which the current upsurge is often compared.

Since that time the size and power of the Black proletariat in South Africa have rapidly expanded. Today there are more than six million African workers in South Africa. The growing industrialization of South Africa has increased the number of Black workers, and the shortage of labor has forced the capitalists to hire more of them in skilled and essential positions in the South African economy.

Huge working-class populations have been brought together in Soweto and other cities. Like the urbanization of Afro-Americans, the development of these townships has heightened the spirit of confidence, militancy, and nationalism among South Africa's Black masses.

Since the early 1970s this Black working class has been using its newfound power in a series of strikes, demonstrations, and other actions in defiance of the racist regime. While Pretoria has taken repressive measures, it has been limited by its need for these workers who play more and more of a role in its economy.

Since the setback for South African imperialism in Angola, and the decline in the prospects of the Rhodesian white colonial-settler regime, the South African masses have sensed that they are in a stronger position to fight for liberation in their own country.

It is confidence in this new power and militancy that the Soweto upsurge most clearly expresses.

Already the Johannesburg *Star* has talked of a "witch-hunt" to follow the upsurge.

An international campaign of solidarity with the South African masses is needed to help prevent the racist regime from cutting down the militant leadership of the new stage of South African struggle. This is a particularly urgent task in countries like the United States, Britain, and France, which are closely linked to the apartheid regime. □

## Syrian Forces in Lebanon Threaten New Offensive

By David Frankel

Thrown back with unexpected losses after their first attempt to take over Lebanon's major cities, the Syrian invaders appear to be regrouping for another attack.

"More Syrian regular army reinforcements have moved into Lebanon in the last two days," *Washington Post* correspondent Douglas Watson reported in a June 13 dispatch from Beirut. A Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) official estimated the number of Syrian regulars in Lebanon "as at least 15,000 and probably closer to 25,000."

An article in the June 16 *Washington Post* said that "Syria was apparently moving new tanks and field guns into the mountains" east of Beirut. "There are so many tanks it looks like a parking lot," one reporter said.

While bringing up reinforcements and attempting to secure supply and communication lines in the mountainous terrain between Syria and the Lebanese coast, the Syrian military has blockaded the Mediterranean cities held by Lebanese Muslim and Palestinian forces. Joe Alex Morris, Jr. reported in the June 16 *Los Angeles Times*:

Diplomatic sources in Beirut said Syrian tanks in the hills overlooking the port of Sidon [Saida], 25 miles south of the capital, were shelling ships approaching the port, preventing the arrival of supplies for leftist forces there. Similar blockades were reported at the ports of Tyre, 26 miles south of Sidon, and Tripoli, 60 miles north of Beirut.

Beirut itself has also been blockaded by the Syrian invaders, and some reports have indicated that the Syrian navy is participating in the siege. In addition, Syrian forces have continued their bombardment of Palestinian refugee camps.

"Thousands of new refugees are fleeing from the Sabra area of Beirut and from the refugee camps of Chatila and Bourj Barajneh," Morris reported in the June 14 *Los Angeles Times*. More Syrian shelling of the refugee camps was reported in a June 19 Associated Press dispatch from Beirut.

For the soldiers of the Syrian army, the situation in Lebanon must be an uncomfortable one. They have been told for years that their purpose is to recover occupied Arab territory and to defend the rights of the Palestinian people. Now they find themselves fighting the Palestinians while the Israeli regime applauds.

Low morale among the Syrian troops

was probably a factor in the failure of the initial Syrian drive against Beirut, Tripoli, and Saida—Lebanon's three largest cities. Also, the resistance of the Palestinian fighters and the Muslim militia was apparently stronger than the Syrian command anticipated. Reports from Tripoli said that Syrian forces were driven out of the city "after fierce street fighting."

"Palestinian guerrilla groups are continuing to occupy all empty apartments in leftist-controlled western Beirut expecting to use them as fire bases in the eventuality that Syrian troops ever do enter the capital," William Blakemore reported in a dispatch from Beirut in the June 14 *Christian Science Monitor*.

The stiff resistance put up by the Palestinians is hardly surprising. They are threatened with being massacred. The outcome of the battle in Lebanon may also determine whether the PLO will survive as an independent political force.

PLO leaders have appealed to various Arab governments for support, but little help can be expected from that quarter. In fact, on June 15 an anonymous "senior Syrian government official" stressed that the Assad regime was eager for the deployment of the proposed joint Arab force in Lebanon.

"We Syrians ask Arab governments not to hesitate," the official said, while making clear that Syrian forces would remain in Lebanon until a "functioning constitutional government" is set up there.

The few representatives of other Arab regimes sent to Lebanon have already begun to help Assad. In his June 13 dispatch Watson reported that a "... PLO spokesman charged that the announcement yesterday by Libyan Premier Abdel Salam Jalloud of a cease-fire agreement was merely providing a 'cover' for the Syrian army to move against the Palestinian and leftist forces here."

On June 16, after meeting with the Arab League's secretary general, Mahmoud Riad, rightist leaders in Lebanon announced their support for a joint Arab force. "Lebanese fears arising from the [Arab] league resolutions have been allayed altogether," a statement by the rightists said.

The statement made clear that any pan-Arab force would operate within the context of the "Syrian initiative."

A new indication of the meaning of the "Syrian initiative" came June 19 when Syrian President Hafez al-Assad called for a conference of the different factions in

Lebanon to reach a settlement of the civil war there. The Palestinians are "not involved in the Lebanese problem and should therefore be excluded," he said.

Assad's cynical dismissal of the Palestinians should be viewed against the background of the events in Lebanon. Under the old Maronite-dominated regime, the Lebanese army and air force were used several times—particularly in 1969 and 1973—in unsuccessful attempts to wipe out the Palestinian guerrilla organizations and to impose strict controls on the 300,000 to 400,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon.

In fact, the current civil war was touched off in April 1975 by the machine-gunning by rightists of a bus returning from a Palestinian rally.

By attacking the Palestinians and offering his army as the guarantor of a dominant role for the rightists in the regime in Lebanon, Assad is clearly attempting to follow the lead of Egypt's President Anwar el-Sadat and establish closer relations with Washington.

"What the Syrians are doing here they are doing for their own reasons," one PLO official pointed out to reporters in Beirut June 13, "but they are doing it as part of an anti-Palestinian strategy approved of by the United States."

The editors of the *Washington Post* concluded June 15 that Assad's "determination to trim the Palestinians to size will have to be taken as serious evidence of his desire to move toward a general settlement with Israel."

As for the killing of Palestinians, the *Post* editors said:

There is no other way to disabuse the Palestinian mainstream of the dangerous dream that it can undo history and claim all of pre-1948 Palestine as its own.

... Lebanon could be the anvil on which are being hammered out Syria's commitment to a general settlement and the Palestinians' readiness to accept an historic compromise with Israel.

In the long run, the belief of the imperialists that it is possible to bomb and terrorize an entire people into renouncing "the dangerous dream" of returning to its homeland is an illusion. It is a program for endless war, not for a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

In the short run, if the attempt to put this policy into effect in Lebanon fails, it will endanger Assad's regime. On the surface, Assad's position appears impreg-



nable. His brother, Rifaat, commands special "defense units" numbering about 25,000. A bodyguard of 10,000 is run by Assad's nephew, Adnan. And Assad himself commands 10,000 paratroopers.

But the setback dealt the Syrian army in Lebanon earlier this month exposed the true weakness of Assad's regime. Assad's uneasiness was indicated June 14. *Washington Post* correspondent Jonathan C. Randall reported from Syria that day that "... Rifaat's forces and the air force staged joint maneuvers that sent jets flying low over Damascus."

Even if Assad is successful in a second attempt to occupy Lebanon's main cities, it will not be a simple task to reconstruct a stable regime in Lebanon without a massacre of the Palestinian and Muslim opposition. A ruler who is afraid of his own people as Assad is not in a strong position to carry out such an unpopular policy.

Moreover, the weakness shown by the Syrian forces in Lebanon must surely have whetted the appetite of the Israeli regime. Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak pointed out June 11, immediately after Assad's setback in Lebanon:

Assad's adventure has gone too far to be turned back. If he fails and is overthrown, Israel's watch-and-wait policy may also be overthrown, to be replaced by an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. Such intervention would certainly be accompanied by tongue-in-cheek protests that, if Syria could intervene in Lebanon without U.S. threats, so can Israel.

Down that road lies Middle Eastern war and a turn of the clock back to October, 1973, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union hovered on the brink of World War III.

The poor showing of Assad's forces in Lebanon was also noted by the U.S. State Department. The Ford administration used the assassination June 16 of the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, along with an embassy aide and a chauffeur, as an opportunity to pointedly remind all concerned that U.S. military intervention in Lebanon remains a possibility.

A squadron of ships including the helicopter carrier *Guadalcanal* and 1,800 marines was ordered into the waters near Lebanon once again. The giant aircraft carrier *America*, with fighter-bombers and other warplanes aboard, was also sent into the eastern Mediterranean. In addition, the Pentagon announced that three Air Force C-130 transports—which can be used to airlift troops—had been sent to a British base on Cyprus.

The excuse for all this military activity was the need to evacuate American citizens from Beirut. On June 20, a U.S. landing craft evacuated 263 persons from Beirut under the protection of Palestinian guerrillas and troops of the Lebanese Arab Army. However, Ford and Kissinger had made their point.

*New York Times* correspondent James

M. Markham said in a June 18 dispatch from Beirut that "among Lebanese and Palestinians the sudden departure of foreigners, urged in alarmist, stentorian terms over the Voice of America and the BBC, is widely read as [a] premonition of a showdown between the encroaching Syrian army and the Palestinian guerrillas."

Although Assad has certainly set the

## American Stalinists 'Explain' Assad's Invasion

Many people find it difficult to follow the ins and outs of the complex situation in Lebanon. The members of the American Communist party (CP), however, have special problems in this regard. How are they to explain the invasion of Lebanon by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad?

The Kremlin has friendly diplomatic relations with Assad. As a result, the Syrian regime is considered "progressive" in Stalinist circles. But Assad's invasion is reactionary on the face of it.

Assad is intervening against the Muslim population fighting for its basic democratic rights. At the same time, he is attempting to impose Syrian control over the Palestinian national liberation struggle. His forces have bombed and shelled Palestinian refugee camps, using the same terror tactics as Israel. They have tried to starve the population of Beirut into submission.

In the June 15 issue of the *Daily World*, the CP paper, Tom Foley tried to explain all this to his readers. According to Foley:

The key to understanding Syria's role in Lebanon seems to be the grave military threat posed to Syria itself by the continuation of the Lebanese crisis. . . .

The Bekaa Valley is a natural invasion corridor which would be used in any Israeli thrust northwards into Lebanon toward the Syrian border. The bulk of the Syrian forces inside Lebanon are concentrated here. The Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley are strong armored units and anti-aircraft artillery.

The nature of these Syrian forces in fact gives away their mission: the Palestinians and the Lebanese left have no tanks and warplanes. . . . But the Israelis do, and moreover, they have them in large numbers.

Thus, Foley pretends that Syrian forces have invaded Lebanon in order to fight Israel. The problem with this theory is that it is the Palestinians and the Muslim militia groups that the Syrian troops have been fighting, not Israel.

The Israeli regime has noticed this fact, even if Foley has not. It has served notice that it will go along with the Syrian presence in Lebanon as long as Assad's troops are killing Palestinians.

The Stalinists refuse to demand that Assad withdraw his invading army from Lebanon—that might alienate a "progressive" friend of the Kremlin. At the same

stage for such a showdown, it is possible that he will simply continue exerting a relatively low level of military pressure while attempting to force concessions on the Muslim-Palestinian-leftist coalition through negotiations. Both alternatives—a prolonged Syrian occupation of Lebanon, or an attempt to force through a quick decision—are fraught with danger. □

time, they attempt to pose as friends of the Palestinian people and supporters of their national liberation struggle.

In another article on Lebanon in the June 16 *Daily World*, Foley continues with the pretense that the Syrian invasion is aimed at Israel. The way Foley tells it, Syrian troops were "continuing yesterday to consolidate defensive positions in the Bekaa Valley and in southeast Lebanon." (Syrian armored forces had earlier overrun several Palestinian guerrilla bases in southeast Lebanon.)

While ignoring the attacks by Syrian jets and tanks against Palestinian liberation fighters, Foley waxes indignant about the American-made rifles used by rightist forces. He says:

The Falangists in the past week have steadily increased their attacks on the Lebanese/Palestinian left forces. The Falangists are at present using brand new U.S.-made M-16 automatic rifles. . . .

Guns from U.S. imperialist arsenals, sent to the Zionist military in Israel and now being used by Lebanese fascists in attacks against the Palestinians and Lebanese patriots—this is a concrete example of the real alignment of forces in Lebanon and the Middle East right now.

Foley might have added that another "concrete example of the real alignment of forces in Lebanon" is that the Phalangists would probably have been defeated already if it were not for Assad's intervention. He also could have noted that Assad's army was shooting at the same people the rightists were. But that type of talk would embarrass the Kremlin bureaucrats. And as far as Tom Foley is concerned, the Kremlin's diplomatic standing is a good deal more important than the interests of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. □

### CIA to Continue Use of Missionaries

The Central Intelligence Agency has agreed not to seek information from American missionaries stationed abroad, according to CIA Director George Bush. Bush added, however, that the CIA would continue to approach missionaries in the United States.



## Italian CP Pledges to Uphold NATO

In the final weeks leading up to the June 20-21 elections, Communist party leaders went all out to assure Italian and U.S. ruling circles that the last thing they want to do is weaken the bourgeois order.

In an interview in the June 15 *Corriere della Sera*, CP General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer stressed that it was really not important if the left won the elections. In fact, such predictions were practically provocative: "This is one of the arguments the Christian Democrats use to sow fear. . . . regardless of the vote for the CP, our perspective is for a government of the broadest possible democratic agreement."

Berlinguer even went so far as to say that NATO guaranteed the democratic freedoms of the Italian people:

... there is not the slightest possibility that our road to socialism could be obstructed or determined by the USSR. We might discuss whether the USSR wants to dominate its allies, but there is not the slightest action to indicate that it wants to go beyond the bounds set at Yalta.

The reporters asked Berlinguer if this meant that "the Atlantic pact can also serve as a shield for building socialism in liberty." The CP leader replied:

I do not want Italy to leave NATO for this reason "as well," and not only because our exit would upset the international balance. I feel more secure here, although here also there have been serious attempts to limit our independence.

CP coordinator of trade-union and economic policies Giorgio Napolitano indicated concretely what his party was willing to do to get the blessing of the local capitalists, as well as the guardians of the "shield for building socialism in liberty." His proposals were summarized in the June 21 issue of *Newsweek*:

They included increasing capital investment in both the public and private sectors of the economy and curtailing imports by cutting consumption of meat and petroleum.

Napolitano said soaring labor costs could be brought under control by restricting automatic cost-of-living increases. He renounced the use of price controls to curb inflation, but said the Communists could achieve "wage restraints . . . through cooperation with the trade unions."

The head of the CP's international department, Sergio Segre, explained his party's perspectives in a more rounded way in the July issue of *Foreign Affairs*, a journal close to the U.S. State Department. Segre no doubt knew that U.S. policy makers would want to know exactly where the CP thought it was going:

They [the CP] do not demand power for

themselves: what they propose, for today and for tomorrow, is a democratic leadership of society and the state by a coalition of democratic forces; but they are ready at any moment to respect the verdict of the electorate, just as they accepted the political change of course that led to the exclusion of the PCI and the Socialist Party from government in 1947.

To what ends? And in what international context? The ends are dictated by today's problems; namely, to put Italy back on its feet. The Communists are not urging the "historic compromise" with the intention of creating new imbalances and dislocations in Italian society.

Furthermore, Segre pledged that the CP was willing to do its bit to stabilize the capitalist system not just in Italy but in all Western Europe:

... given the danger, always present in integrated communities such as the European Community or in international alliances such as NATO, that a chronic crisis in one partner will be exported to the others, an Italy determined to solve her problems should actually be seen as a factor of stability, not of disruption. This would create the conditions for broader cooperation rather than for Italy's isolation.

Segre apparently also felt compelled to explain explicitly that the Italian CP's policy was not new but merely a continuation of the line it has followed since World War II:

In a certain sense, it [the "historic compromise"] represents the logical development, or better, an adaptation to present circumstances, of the political line followed by the PCI during the whole postwar period: a line calling for collaboration among all the popular forces. It is to this collaboration among political forces of differing ideological inspirations—in particular, Communists, Socialists and Catholics—that we owe, among other things, the breadth of the Resistance struggle in Italy against fascism and nazism, alongside the Allies. To it we also owe the Constitution of the Italian Republic, whose thirtieth anniversary Italy is celebrating at the same time as the bicentenary of American independence.

Since this article was aimed at those who are influential in determining American foreign policy, the main readership of *Foreign Affairs*, Segre could be frank:

Naturally, the Communists have also had to "think the unthinkable," to come to grips with their own history and rethink old convictions. One of the PCI's top leaders, Giorgio Napolitano, recently stated: "We are well aware of the fact that today we are asserting a conception of the relationship between democracy and socialism that cannot be identified with the one elaborated by Lenin."

As proof of the CP's devotion to "democracy," Segre offered a testimonial from Umberto Agnelli, vice-chairman of the

Fiat trust: ". . . the official statements of this Party, which says that it accepts the Western logic of the market economy and the pluralistic system, are known to all, and I personally, as an industrialist, have no reason to doubt them."

The program Segre outlined in his article was strictly right-wing Social Democratic. But he had the merit of making clear how these positions are completely in line with the basic policies set by the Kremlin. Berlinguer also in his interview in the June 15 *Corriere della Sera*—in almost the same breath as presenting the anti-Soviet NATO alliance as a guarantor of Italy's freedom—pointed out that keeping Italy in the Atlantic alliance corresponded to the deal Stalin made with U.S. imperialism thirty years ago.

Berlinguer's fear of a CP victory at the polls is shared by Moscow, correspondent David K. Shieler indicated in the June 20 *New York Times*: ". . . some Soviet officials wonder whether a good showing by the Communists in Italy might further strengthen conservative forces in the United States. One Russian asked an American last week: 'Would it be seen as another Angola?'"

The problem for CP leaders and capitalists alike is that the economic and social crisis in Italy cannot be solved by political deals.

Even Christian Democratic Minister of Industry Carlo Donat Cattin indicated, according to the June 16 *Corriere della Sera*, that there is no relief in sight for the economy. He pointed out that the current upturn in production will lead quickly to a new cycle of inflation in the fall because of rising prices of imported raw materials on which Italian industry depends. He said it would be extremely difficult for a government not including the CP to get the workers to accept the "inevitable" new sacrifices.

However, the workers expect something different from the CP than the capitalists do. They do not support this party as a "more responsible and efficient" team for running the capitalist system, and they expect to gain something if it is in the government. But the capitalists intend clearly to give the workers less and not more. □

### A Page From Pinochet's Book

The Indian delegation at the United Nations rejected as "groundless" a complaint by the International League for Human Rights charging the Gandhi regime with violating human rights, including the torture of political prisoners.

In an official statement issued to reporters June 7, the delegation said that charges about torture being used as official policy were the "height of absurdity."

It declined, however, to permit a UN investigation of the charges.

# Leonid Plyushch Issues Appeal for Moroz and Dzhemilev

[The following open letter, addressed to historians, is by Leonid Plyushch, the recently exiled Soviet dissident. We have taken the text from the May 26-June 2 issue of *Informations Ouvrières*, a Paris weekly that reflects the views of the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (Internationalist Communist Organization). The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

Two of your colleagues, the Ukrainian Valentyn Moroz and the Crimean Tatar Mustafa Dzhemilev, are today in a critical situation in the Soviet Union.

Valentyn Moroz, a talented poet and journalist, a perceptive analyst of Ukrainian history and culture, is one of the most active figures in the Ukrainian opposition movement. But his political activities have never gone beyond the framework of Soviet legality, as defined by the constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. He has only demanded that the Soviet government apply the constitution of the Soviet Union.

In August 1965, he was arrested and accused of distributing "anti-Soviet propaganda." In January 1966, he was sentenced to four years of forced labor. In 1970, he was sentenced to a new prison term of fourteen years for his writings denouncing the undemocratic character of the regime, the Russification of the Ukraine, and "Great Russian" chauvinism: *Report From the Beria Reserve, Amid the Snows, A Chronicle of Resistance, and Moses and Dathan*. His trial was held behind closed doors, and to protest this illegal practice Moroz and the witnesses refused to testify.

In 1971, he was imprisoned in the worst of the Soviet prisons, that at Vladimir, near Moscow. The conditions of his detention were particularly dreadful. He was imprisoned with common criminals and mental patients. In October 1972, he was seriously injured by other prisoners.

In July 1974, he began a hunger strike to demand that the regulations be followed, that is, that the conditions of his detention conform to the law. In November 1974, the authorities gave in and placed him alone in a cell as he demanded. I saw him after his first imprisonment; he was physically very weak. Today his life and sanity are gravely threatened.

Recently, we have learned that the Soviet authorities are spreading rumors about Moroz: that he has supposedly become very religious and has "discussions with God." Several days ago, a Reuters dispatch reported that Moroz had been sent to the Serbsky Institute to undergo psychiatric treatment.

This means one of two things: either he



London Times

MUSTAFA DZHEMILEV

is suffering mental problems after his hunger strike, or, in revenge, a sane man has been sent to undergo psychiatric treatment in order to break his will and spirit.

Personally, I lean toward the second possibility. As early as 1970, while lecturing to a group of teachers, an official in charge of ideology declared that Dzyuba, Chornovil, Grigorenko, Yakir, Sakharov, and Moroz were mentally ill.

In any case, Moroz must be taken out of the psychiatric prison. I appeal to you to form a commission of historians and psychiatrists to go to Serbsky Institute so as to verify Moroz's condition and demand that he be freed and permitted to go to the West for treatment.

Mustafa Dzhemilev was born in 1943 in the Crimea. In 1944, Stalin expelled and exiled all the Crimean Tatars to Central Asia. Having entered a university at the age of nineteen, he was expelled during his third year for his activity in support of the return of his people to the Crimea. In 1966, he was condemned to one and a half years in a prison camp. In 1970, he was the victim of a new three-year sentence on charges of "slandering the Soviet government and social system." In 1974, he received a sentence of a year and a half in a strict-regime camp.

Two days before his release, Dzhemilev was again accused of "defaming the Soviet regime," as a result of false evidence given by a fellow prisoner, Dvoryansky, whose

sentence was reduced in exchange for his collaboration. In April 1976, at the end of a show trial in Omsk, he was condemned to two and a half years in a "strict regime" camp. To sentence this innocent person after more than seven months of a hunger strike is equivalent to a death sentence.

In 1969, he became a member of the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human Rights in the USSR. He wrote, in samizdat, a *History of the Crimean Tatar People*. Unfortunately, that work never reached the public, since it was confiscated by the KGB.

We should all be aware of the working conditions of conscientious historians in the Soviet Union. Many records are hidden or destroyed. A historian can only write in accordance with the latest directives of the party. Until the war, the Ukrainian Cossack chief B. Khmelnytsky was held in scorn. Since then, he has been glorified.

All official history and historical literature in the USSR is anti-Semitic and anti-Tatar. To write the truth takes great courage. By doing so, Moroz and Dzhemilev have run the risk of losing their jobs and of being arrested and jailed in prisons and psychiatric hospitals.

I address myself to Soviet historians. Do they no longer have any conscience? Will they remain silent in face of what has happened to Moroz and Dzhemilev, in face of the humiliation of the peoples of the USSR?

I was myself unjustly sentenced and jailed in a psychiatric prison hospital. I won my freedom only after my colleagues, organized in a committee of mathematicians, carried out an intensive campaign.

I ask you to begin a campaign for the freedom of Moroz and Dzhemilev. I address myself to your consciences as free men. Unite your forces and knowledge to fight for the defense of human rights. It is your duty to enforce respect for the right to freedom of thought for everyone. Do not become accomplices through your silence!

## Turkish Regime Cracks Down on Suspected Guerrillas

Turkish troops attacked a group of alleged guerrillas in Gaziantep, in southeastern Turkey, with tanks, machine guns, and grenades June 9. Two of the "guerrillas" and a bystander, as well as two soldiers and a policeman, were killed in the clash. Three other persons were captured.

The regime also arrested twelve alleged members of the outlawed Turkish People's Liberation Army in police raids throughout the country.

The Turkish People's Liberation Army operates in eastern Turkey and has attempted to win the support of the Kurdish population in that region.



## Military Demagogues Dominate Portuguese Elections

By Gerry Foley

The campaign leading up to the June 27 Portuguese presidential elections is becoming something like the "last hurrah" of the MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement). The demagoguery of the "progressive military" still dominates political life. No major party or grouping has challenged it.

In fact, the subordination of the opportunist workers parties to the military demagogues is, if anything, more abject than ever. The same holds true for the radicalized petty-bourgeois groupings that claim to stand to the left of the Communist party, who are supporting the candidacy of former Gen. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

However, none of the candidates of the MFA or any of the parties supporting them directly or indirectly seem to be able to inspire any enthusiasm or trust in the masses. This is also true in the case of "General Otelo's" candidacy. Although he appears popular among the frustrated minority that supported the "MFA—People's Power" plan, he apparently has little appeal for the great majority of the Portuguese working people.

Despite the fact that the main candidate for strongman, Gen. António Ramalho Eanes, is supported by all the major parties except the CP—which itself is actually giving him backhanded support—his campaign so far has fallen flat. For example, Christopher Reed wrote from Lisbon in the June 20 *Manchester Guardian Weekly*:

"Already there are small but disturbing signs that Eanes could just fail to get his majority. His first foray into the provinces brought him a crowd of 3,000. . . ."

In its June 2 issue, *Luta Proletária*, the weekly paper of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League, sympathizing group of the Fourth International), described the opening of the Socialist party's campaign for Eanes:

The SP held its first rally under the slogan "Eanes for the presidency, SP for the government." Apparently, the SP masses did not feel particularly attracted by this theme. The Campo Pequeno seemed almost deserted, especially if we consider, as was said many times during the meeting, that the SP is the main political force in the country and the main party of the Portuguese workers.

Since the SP won its mass following in part by resisting the attempt last summer of a wing of the MFA, backed by the CP, to strengthen its demagogic domination, it has been having increasing difficulty

getting its supporters to accept a military ruler who claims to stand above parties.

Another problem for the SP is that even the smoothest electoralist advisers apparently cannot get Eanes to improve his image very much. The photos of an icy martinet in full general's uniform, which set the tone of Eanes's campaign at the beginning, have been replaced lately with pictures of a smiling candidate in shirt-sleeves. But his cynicism is apparently irrepresible.

For example, when some right-wing journalists, in an interview published in the June 11 issue of *Jornal Novo*, asked Eanes why he issued a "leftist" electoral manifesto, he said:

"As is apparent, the manifesto contains general statements that can be interpreted in various ways. One is as you say [i.e., leftist]; I do not think such an interpretation is perceptive."

The masses who voted for the SP could only be repelled by such a figure, *Luta Proletária* explained:

Experience will show (as it has already begun to do) that the workers who voted for the SP voted against the economic and social results of November 25, for a government of workers parties without capitalists or generals, for socialism, and not for Eanes, who is already beginning to apply blackmail to shape the new government, threatening to torpedo the SP's plan.

Even reports in the U.S. capitalist press say that one of the most popular jokes in Portugal is that Eanes wears dark glasses to hide his monocle. The original monocle, General Spínola, proved ungrateful to the CP, which originally built him up as the "liberator of the nation." Perhaps the SP tops are already finding Eanes an unpleasantly pushy ally.

The MFA was able to take advantage of the confusion created by the attempted coup on November 25, which actually represented an attempt by the Gonçalves wing to recover its lost positions, to open an attack on the workers movement. Eanes commanded the operations that crushed the adventure.

In the wake of the putsch, the SP leaders claimed the experience showed that the masses had to rely on "constitutionalist" generals to defend their democratic freedoms. This argument apparently had some effect. Despite its support for the ensuing repression, the SP essentially held its vote in the April 25, 1976, elections losing proportionately less than the CP.

The small radicalized petty-bourgeois groupings most closely identified with putschism, the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left) and the Frente Socialista Popular (FSP—People's Socialist Front), suffered proportionately the heaviest losses. The União Democrática do Povo (UDP—People's Democratic Union), a Maoist group that tends to follow the general drift in the radicalized petty-bourgeois milieu, did gain. But it was the only one of these groups that dissociated itself from the putsch.

The fourth major group in this milieu, the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado (PRP—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat), a romantic ultraleftist group with a terrorist background, did not participate in the April elections "on principle." So, it is harder to say what impact November 25 had on its following. But every indication is that its influence went into decline.

These four groups, the dupes of November 25, have blocked behind the candidacy of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the representative par excellence of the wing of the MFA whose bluff was called on that day.

A public opinion poll cited by Reed shows 11% backing Carvalho, as against 33% for Eanes, 14% for Premier Pinheiro de Azevedo, and 3% for the CP's candidate, Octávio Pato. About 27% said they were undecided, and another 10% did not want to reveal their preference.

Such polls have proved inaccurate before. For example, they greatly underestimated the CP's support in the April campaign. However, in that case the polls may have indicated a wavering on the part of the working masses. Pollsters noted a last minute return to established loyalties.

The current poll may only indicate that the CP's following is wavering, and tending to be caught up by Carvalho's demagoguery. The combined estimate for Pato and "General Otelo" roughly equals the CP vote in April. These proportions tend to indicate that Carvalho's appeal is essentially to the section of the masses that has followed the CP. Such a tendency would be a serious danger, even if these voters returned finally to their traditional loyalty. This is a relatively small but important minority. It includes probably a majority of the militantly anticapitalist workers in the big industrial concentrations in the Lisbon region and in the areas of large-scale agriculture.

After the whole series of defeats suffered



by the CP, beginning with the fall of the Gonçalves regime and culminating in the post-November 25 crackdown, the workers in the CP-led industrial and building unions must feel frustration. They particularly have suffered from the social and economic consequences of November 25. It would not be surprising if "General Otelo" appealed to the illusions and frustrations of this misled section of the masses. He was the power behind the "People's Power" plan the CP identified with socialism. He is the symbol of the giddiest illusions that the MFA would bring socialism.

The CP was the main purveyor of these illusions, which the SP leaders also promoted. But it was the leaders of the radicalized petty-bourgeois groups whose heads were irreparably unscrewed by this populist demagoguery.

The CP has now been forced to run a formally independent campaign in order to preserve its working-class support, which it needs to continue negotiating with the MFA. But it finds itself threatened with disastrous losses by a demagogic pied piper it itself raised up.

And the groups behind this candidacy are the very ultraleft and centrist groups the CP used as cat's-paws in its "MFA-People's Power" campaign against the SP. These groups were drawn behind the CP and were never able to offer a programmatic alternative to it, being unable fundamentally to break with Stalinist conceptions. This is a supreme irony that the Stalinist leaders of the Portuguese CP seem unable to appreciate.

Now it is the CP's own following that is being endangered by this demagogue. Some SP workers repelled by their party's support for Eanes might be attracted to "General Otelo." But since for a long time he was identified with attempts to intimidate the SP rank and file, Carvalho's possibilities for influencing this sector are probably quite limited.

Even facing this threat, the CP seems unwilling to fight Carvalho. In a TV round table June 10, Pato explained that the CP was "not hostile to Otelo personally but to certain forces supporting him." This is the same position Pato has taken toward Eanes. After all, "Otelo" is a representative of the MFA too.

Actually, the support for Carvalho is contradictory. It apparently includes many of the most militantly anticapitalist workers and young radicals who are critical of aspects of the CP's reformism. Many of the best educated workers, in particular in the shipyards in Lisbon and Setúbal, have been influenced to a significant degree by the radicalized petty-bourgeois groups. These currents, although they seek to represent the workers, remain petty-bourgeois sociologically and politically because they are not fundamentally based on the working class or its organizations or on a program of advancing the class-consciousness of the workers and consist-

ently leading them to establish their own rule.

As a result, despite their criticism of the CP's reformism, they remain highly erratic and can even come into direct collision



OTELO DE CARVALHO

with the interests of the working class. This was what happened during the "MFA-People's Power" campaign. These groups have now come into even sharper conflict with the interests of the workers.

The political justification for this course is provided by the belief that "Otelo" supports "workers self-organization" and "workers control," and that the "dynamic" of these processes will automatically lead to workers power. Vague and depoliticalized conceptions of this type have long been used by centrist currents to offer a more left image than the traditional parties, while fuzzing over the fundamental difference between reform and revolution.

Conceptions such as "direct democracy" are part of the revolutionary program. But once detached from the full revolutionary program for raising the class consciousness of the workers and preparing them to take power, these themes can be used for counterrevolutionary purposes. Beginning with ultraleftist and even "sovietist" conceptions, the groups backing "Otelo" have taken a course that ends up with class collaborationism, as *Luta Proletária* explained in its June 2 issue:

The only possible kind of revolutionary campaign is one that supports a real solution for the problems of the working masses. Our answer is that we want the formation of an SP-CP government that will break with the pact and be responsible to the workers because this would be an enormous step forward in their struggle.

But the comrades of the MES, PRP, and UDP

limit themselves to denouncing the CP and SP. Once again, their sectarianism is the cloak for right-wing opportunism. Supporting the constitution, even voting for it, as the UDP did, maintaining criminal illusions about what political solutions are possible (Otelo says he would not have run if Costa Gomes had!), these organizations are uniting behind an illusory program. They say:

"We want Otelo as president to defend and develop the people's grass-roots organizations, Workers Commissions, Tenants Commissions, and Village Councils.

"We are fighting for a president who will not permit the professionalization of the armed forces, and will prevent the soldiers from ever turning their guns against the struggles of the working masses."

*Luta Proletária* pointed out how abstract this approach was, how romantic, and in the last analysis, how paternalistic: "Wouldn't it be better to link up with the fundamental experiences of the mass movement, support union democracy, a democratic congress of unions, the right to form soldiers committees?"

But "Otelo" doesn't do this. Instead he stresses how the people have "trusted" him "despite all my contradictions."

Carvalho uses all the most left-sounding phrases. But he is characteristically vague. The refrain goes like this: He can't say what he is going to do concretely because he is only a faithful servant of the masses and they must decide. He can't promise anything because obviously the masses are going to have to make sacrifices, but these sacrifices will have to be democratically accepted by them.

In its June 9 issue *Luta Proletária* issued a strong warning against the deceptiveness of Otelo's demagoguery:

Otelo is running in the elections as an army officer. He thinks he behaved correctly in the Jaime Neves case [a reactionary officer he saved from being thrown out by the rank-and-file soldiers]. Otelo refuses to attack the candidacy of "his comrade" Ramalho Eanes. He doesn't say anything about the pact, and like all the candidates he says that the armed forces should be at the service of the people. . . . Otelo like the others says he supports the nationalizations and workers control (including the Workers Commissions. . . .). What is the difference? That Otelo says the armed forces must not repress the workers. Does Ramalho Eanes say differently? No, the spokesmen of the MFA say they are going to protect the workers. . . .

In the time of the MFA of "Companheiro Vasco," the army, in trying to impose its control over the independent organs of the workers, took the first step toward destroying them. Eanes is trying to complete this today. Because these bodies can only be organs of workers power if they are completely independent, not from the workers parties (which Otelo does not consider useful), but from the bourgeois state and its army.

The LCI calls for a vote for Octávio Pato as the only candidate running who represents an organization in the workers movement. At the same time, it points out that he does not offer a program for working-class political independence. □

## **Brazilian Revolutionist Dies in Exile**

By Judy White

Brazilian revolutionist Maria Auxiliadora Barcellos Lara died in West Berlin June 1. Hounded by German authorities since she arrived in that country as a refugee in February 1974, she was finally driven to suicide.

Auxiliadora was born in Minas Gerais in 1945 and became active in the student movement while studying medicine. As a result she was arrested and tortured in 1969.

She was held until 1971, when—along with sixty-nine other political prisoners—she was freed and flown to Chile.

In Chile she completed her medical studies and practiced medicine until the September 1973 military coup again forced her into exile.

The following month I interviewed her in Mexico for a book of eyewitness accounts of the coup, *Chile's Days of Terror* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974). She described the xenophobia whipped up by the right wing in the weeks leading up to the coup:

Well, the pressure against foreigners in Chile was mounting daily. They even held demonstrations against us. Sometimes I'd be walking along and hysterical people would say to me, "Why don't you get out of Chile, guerrillas; we don't want you here, etc., etc." Just because we were speaking Portuguese. In other words, more and

### **Israel Establishes 'Department for Prevention of Emigration'**

Emigration from Israel is increasing. According to a report in the June 10 *Christian Science Monitor*, lines form outside the American consulate in Jerusalem every day as early as 5 a.m. A consulate official estimated that 15 to 20 percent of the Israelis who visit the United States as "tourists" do not return to Israel.

In 1975, the total number of emigrants from Israel was estimated at between 12,500 and 16,000. In addition, a growing number of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union no longer move to Israel. Israeli reporters in Vienna, a stopover point for Soviet Jewish emigrants, have reported that up to 60 percent now go to other countries.

The Israeli regime views this development with alarm. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin called the emigrants "dregs" and "deserters" in a recent speech. And in February the Jewish Agency, which is in charge of organizing Jewish immigration to Israel, set up a special "department for the prevention of emigration."

more people were feeling it (even tourists who were just visiting); everybody felt the change in atmosphere.

When the coup actually took place, she said, "every neighbor was either a potential ally or a potential enemy. We had neighbors who were in the state intelligence service. It was a very shaky situation."

In view of the danger, Auxiliadora and some friends took refuge in the Mexican embassy, where they were promised temporary residence in Mexico.

After several unsuccessful attempts to obtain asylum, she finally went to Ger-

many, where Amnesty International interceded on her behalf and requested asylum for her from the Bonn government.

Like many of the Brazilian refugees who had fled there from Chile, she was subjected to constant harassment by the authorities. During the world football championship in 1974, Auxiliadora was ordered to report to the local police headquarters three times a day or face expulsion from Germany.

In mid-1975 when her Chilean travel document expired, the Bonn government refused to issue a replacement, saying that she would automatically get a passport when and if she was granted asylum. This meant she was confined to West Berlin, where she was completing preparations to obtain a German medical degree.

The hardships of exile and constant insecurity took their toll on Auxiliadora, but she remained to the end committed to bringing about a revolutionary transformation of society. □

## **Puerto Rican Group Hit With Illegal Searches**

### **Socialists Protest Government Harassment**

Unauthorized searches of property and a campaign of slander have been unleashed against the Liga Internacionalista de los Trabajadores (LIT—Internationalist Workers League) in Puerto Rico.

The apartment and car of leading members of the LIT were searched. In one instance a so-called secret document was confiscated. The document was the report of two LIT members on a recent trip to the United States, where they attended a meeting of the Socialist Workers party.

Unidentified individuals have questioned persons who live near the headquarters of the LIT. These individuals accused the organization of peddling drugs and manufacturing explosives.

The LIT, a revolutionary organization that has expressed its solidarity with the Fourth International, denounced this campaign of harassment in an open letter dated June 14 to Puerto Rican Governor Rafael Hernández Colón.

Condemning the actions as a "violation of our most elementary rights," the LIT called on Hernández Colón to make the facts of the matter public. They explained that they were unable to make a formal complaint in the courts to the Civil Rights Commission "owing to the fact that the individuals did not identify themselves" and "to the natural intimidation felt by the witnesses to such acts."

They informed the governor that copies of the open letter were being distributed in the community where their headquarters is

located and sent to Puerto Rican Secretary of State Juan Albors, Police Superintendent Astol Calero, the press on the island and in the United States, and to other organizations.

In a cover letter, the LIT asked that these violations of the group's rights be publicized as widely as possible. "In doing so," the letter said, "you will help guarantee compliance with the rights accorded to all of us by the constitution of our island."

### **249,000 Prisoners in United States**

There are more men and women in state and federal prisons in the United States today than at any other time in the country's history, according to the April issue of *Corrections Magazine*.

As of January 1, there were 249,716 persons in prisons around the country, 10 percent more than last year. More than half the prisoners were under thirty years of age. The magazine said that growing prison populations could be expected "at least until 1985."

The increasing number of inmates has led to deteriorating conditions in the prisons. "In different states, prisoners have been forced to sleep on floors, in shower rooms and on ledges above toilets," the magazine said. "While overcrowding is not a new problem, some states report the current situation is worse than ever before."



### UNITA Retains Support in Southern Angola

By Ernest Harsch

More than four months after the MPLA<sup>1</sup> defeated its rivals in the Angolan civil war, it has been unable to bring the central and southern areas of the country under full control.

The Luanda regime faces continued guerrilla resistance by the UNITA<sup>2</sup> and has been unsuccessful in its attempts to win the support of the Ovimbundu and other peoples who inhabit the region. The MPLA's control still appears limited to the major cities and towns.

After MPLA and Cuban forces captured Huambo, Lobito, Lubango, Benguela, and other cities from the UNITA in early February, emergency "Directing Committees" were set up by the MPLA, and police and officials were flown in from Luanda to help administer the cities. According to a report from Huambo in the May 27 *Washington Post*, MPLA and Cuban troops form the backbone of the MPLA's power in that city.

The major obstacle to the MPLA's consolidation of its control in central and southern Angola has been the continued support, particularly among the 2.5 million Ovimbundu, for the UNITA. Before the UNITA retreated from the cities, it held rallies that reportedly drew crowds of more than 100,000 persons.

Luanda has tried to undercut this base of support. MPLA members who speak Umbundu and other local languages were appointed to the Directing Committees, and some former lower-echelon UNITA officials have been incorporated into the administrations. According to the April 9 Lisbon *Diário de Notícias*, the MPLA Executive Committee in Huambo Province has even tried to win over the Ovimbundu *soba*, the traditional tribal chiefs.

However, these efforts appear to have been only partially successful. The report in the May 27 *Washington Post* said that in Huambo the "general attitude among the Africans ranges from outright hostility to guarded acceptance."

*New York Times* correspondent Marvine Howe reported in a June 3 dispatch from Huambo that there are "rumors among the Angolan workers and the country people

who come here to market that . . . [UNITA leader Jonas] Savimbi will return soon." Howe also reported that some MPLA officials have admitted that the UNITA still commands wide support in the region.

One indication of the level of distrust of the MPLA by the population is the large number of Africans who are still hiding in the countryside. Before the UNITA retreated from Huambo, it was the second largest city in Angola. But thousands of Blacks fled the city just before the MPLA took it over. According to the *Washington Post* report, its population is now about 23,000, a third of its former size.

The Ovimbundu's fear of coming under Mbundu domination—a fear that was heightened by the months of bitter civil war—is an important factor in their hostility and distrust toward the MPLA. Although the MPLA claims that it is a pan-Angolan organization, its traditional base of support is among the Mbundu, who live in the Luanda-Malange region.

The fact that much of the MPLA's administration in the urban areas is run by *mestiços* (Angolans of mixed Portuguese and African lineage) may add to the Ovimbundu's fears of ethnic domination. When the Portuguese colonialists ruled Angola, they gave the *mestiços* certain privileges and positions that were denied to the rest of the Black population in an effort to sow ethnic dissension and weaken the national liberation struggle.

Attacks by UNITA guerrillas against the MPLA and Cuban forces have reportedly increased during the past few weeks. The Benguela railway, which passes through central Angola, was believed to have been blown up in a dozen places between Vouga, east of Huambo, and the Luau River on the border with Zaïre. There have also been reports of ambushes on the road between Huambo and Bié, as well as on the road to Luanda near Alto Hama, just north of Huambo.

According to unnamed sources cited in the June 3 issue of the Lisbon daily *Jornal Novo*, the MPLA has attacked UNITA bases near Cuemba, Cangumbe, Cangamba, Ninda, and Muié in the east and near Atome and Lussecó in central Angola. The sources also claimed that the UNITA had carried out a successful ambush against MPLA troops near Lucusse.

Fighting has taken place close to Huambo itself. "At night firing can be heard on the outskirts of the city. . .," Howe said. According to the May 27 *Washington Post*, "It is reported that National Union guerril-

las still slip in and out of Huambo's African suburbs at night without being betrayed."

Sources close to the MPLA military, Howe reported, said that the Luanda regime has sent 3,000 MPLA and Cuban reinforcements to the Huambo area. "All day today," Howe said, "Cuban soldiers could be seen loading armaments and trucks on railcars. Sources close to the Cubans said that about a battalion was ready to move in the next few hours eastward in the direction of Luso, where Angolan forces have already been dispatched."

Although the UNITA's strongest base is among the Ovimbundu in the central plateau region, many of the reported clashes in the east are in areas inhabited by the Chokwe, Luchazi, Luena, Mbunda, and other peoples from whom the UNITA has also received some support.

The MPLA's defense minister, Iko Carreira, declared in an interview in the May 9 Luanda daily *Jornal de Angola*, "Not much more is said about the war, but the truth is that the war continues. Our fighters are still dying in the struggle against the remnants of the puppet groups in Cabinda and in Bié. They are difficult areas that will require some time for us to be able to liquidate all the hotbeds of banditry."

Carreira and other government officials have charged that the guerrillas may have continued support from the regimes in Zaïre, Zambia, and South Africa, which backed the FNLA<sup>3</sup> and UNITA during the civil war.

The Zaïrean and Zambian regimes have formally recognized the MPLA's People's Republic of Angola, and Pretoria has reached an agreement with the MPLA on the construction of the Cunene dam project. But it is possible that they may still be providing aid to the UNITA as a way of applying political pressure on the MPLA. Washington, which funneled arms and money through neighboring countries to the MPLA's rivals during the civil war, may also have an interest in keeping the pot boiling.

In reply to the MPLA's charges, a UNITA spokesman said in Nairobi, Kenya June 11 that the UNITA forces were receiving no support from foreign powers.

At the same time that the UNITA has stepped up its guerrilla actions, it has kept open the door to a compromise with the MPLA. Savimbi was quoted in the April 15 *Jornal Novo* as saying, "We don't want to destroy the MPLA; we recognize their rights." According to the March 12 *Christian Science Monitor*, he said that he was still willing to work in a coalition with the MPLA. □

1. Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

2. União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

3. Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (Angolan National Liberation Front).



## Witch-hunt Law Under Fire in Germany

In its June 5 issue, the London *Economist* adopted an unusual tone of commiseration with West German ruling circles. Snide jibes at the indecently successful capitalists in "Middle Europe" are more in the character of this cynically chauvinist organ of British big business. The *Economist* said:

They're after the Germans again; or so many Germans think. The leader of the French Socialist party, Mr François Mitterrand, has set up a committee "to protect civic and professional rights" in West Germany. A Belgian television programme has decided that West Germany's approach to civil liberties has something in common with, guess where, Spain, Chile and Argentina. . . .

One thing all these people have in common is their criticism of West Germany's attempt to keep political extremists out of the public service. *Berufsverbot* (banned from doing a job) is in danger of becoming an international-German word, like kindergarten and gemütlichkeit.

Mitterrand's action is interpreted by the *Economist* as a riposte to West German Social Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who opposes alliances between Socialist and Communist parties, such as the French Union of the Left. The writer did gently chide the West German government for being indiscreet about its victimizations of leftists. Such things, he indicated, are done with greater finesse in France, and no doubt in Britain above all.

As the front line of the cold war, West Germany has always had witch-hunt legislation on the books. The constitution itself bans advocating "class war." However, the conditions for anti-Communist repression were already weakening at the time the new witch-hunt began in 1971. The bourgeois party that had presided over the cold-war years, the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union, had lost its strong majority position.

By this time, the West German bourgeoisie was obliged to let the Social Democrats run their government for them. The SP tops and union bureaucrats were anxious to be accepted by the capitalists as reliable guardians of order. They were willing to take the lead in the crusade against "dangerous radicals."

However, in following this policy the Social Democrats ran into problems in their own ranks, and with the SPs in other European countries that were subject to more pressure from below. In fact, their course represented a break with the tradition of the German workers movement, historically the main force supporting democratic rights.

In the 1970s, the German SP turned against its own history. It took the

responsibility for introducing the "Anti-Socialist law" of the twentieth century, the equivalent of the repressive law Bismarck applied against the SP in the 1880s.

This course began in November 1971, when the SP-controlled Hamburg city senate voted to exclude "elements hostile to the constitution" from public employment, "especially in the educational field." This was aimed in particular at preventing radical students from going into teaching.

On January 28, 1972, the premiers of the German federal states adopted a position barring from all public employment anyone who "cannot be counted upon at all times to defend the liberal democratic order." At the same time, SP Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt issued a joint statement with the state government heads to the same effect.

Application of this policy was complicated by the German federal system. The worst witch-hunting was in Berlin and Baden-Württemberg. Persons denied jobs by bigoted state administrations could often find employment in other states, especially in Hesse. As a result, victimizations became harder to defend from a judicial standpoint.

The Genscher Bill, passed in March 1974, was designed to streamline and sugarcoat the job ban. According to this law, persons had to be judged individually and only on the basis of evidence verifiable in the courts.

The constitutionality of the job ban was upheld on July 25, 1975, by the reactionary German Supreme Court. A teacher, Anne Lehnhart, appealed against the regulation on the grounds that it robbed her of her freedom of conscience and the right to belong to the party of her choice. The court ruled that the loyalty oath required of state functionaries took precedence over these rights.

Despite their efforts in behalf of "order," the SP tops got little gratitude from the Christian Democrats. In May 1975, the SP press service complained: "Ever more shamelessly the Christian Social Union Bavarian state government is misusing the so-called radicals decree as a club against Social Democrats applying for state jobs." On November 27, 1975, the SP organ *Vorwärts* said: "The boomerang that the SP has helped to carve will hit our own comrades with its conservative backlash."

At the same time, right-wing SP state governments used the decree against left-wing members of their own party.

Almost from the beginning, the job ban generated dissension and political differ-

entiation within the SP. In its June 3 issue, the West German Trotskyist weekly *Was Tun* summarized this process:

"Immediately after the introduction of the job ban, it became clear that the positions of the party leadership and the parliamentary fraction had only limited support in the SP. The Young Socialists took a stand against it, and since then they have protested against it every year at their national conference. Hesse State Premier Oswald opposed it for some time and various party members spoke against it." For example, the Schleswig-Holstein parliamentary fraction of the SP issued a statement in July 1972 opposing the regulation.

The left wing won a local victory in the Hannover state SP convention in April 1973. Over the objections of the party leadership, a resolution was adopted opposing loyalty oaths for public employees.

On June 11, 1975, the SP national leadership issued an order calling on members not to participate in agitation against the job ban. Shortly before this, it had expelled an SP member of the Schleswig-Holstein state parliament for participating in a anti-job-ban committee.

Although there was less opposition at the trade-union level, a number of local unions and conferences of trade-union youth and women spoke out against the witch-hunt.

Pressure from Social Democratic parties in other countries grew. On February 24, 1976, the newspaper of the Swedish union movement said:

"The German Social Democracy shares responsibility for this antidemocratic development."

The Dutch SP leaders denounced the ban as reminiscent of Nazi repression, and protests against it came from unions in Finland, Italy, France, and Belgium.

The pressures against the ban inside and outside of West Germany tended to combine in the case of Silvia Gingold, a young teacher in the state of Hesse. She was a member of a Jewish Communist party family that was forced to emigrate to France after the Nazis came to power. Her father held a high decoration from the French government for his work in the resistance to the Nazi occupation. She was known as an outstanding teacher.

On May 28, the Administrative Court of Kassel overturned the decision of the Hesse minister of education that barred Silvia Gingold from employment, ruling that mere membership in a legal party, even if it was considered "anticonstitution-

al," was not sufficient grounds for denying civil-service jobs.

This decision was the first clear victory for the opponents of the job ban.

On June 5 and 6, an antirepression congress met in Karlsruhe, the seat of the Supreme Court. It drew 20,000 participants, including delegations from the left wings of a number of European SPs. Besides the delegation from the German Young Socialists, there was a group from a tendency in the Austrian SP, led by the son of the premier. Groups further to the left, such as the German Trotskyists, were also represented.

In the June 8 issue of the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge*, a correspondent in Frankfurt commented that the Karlsruhe congress was "probably the largest gathering of the SP left and far left in Germany since the end of the 1960s."

In its June 3 issue, *Was Tun* called for building a broad movement against the job ban:

Everyone who is prepared to fight against the job ban, even if this is only in specific cases, must be won for common work, regardless of whether they are ready to fight against state repression as a whole.

For this reason, we have to fight the job ban through organizations formed specifically for this work and not in the framework of general antirepression activity.

*Was Tun* opposed the CP's line of excluding groups that would not accept the constitution as a whole because of the provision banning calls for "class warfare."\* It said:

Our dividing line must be between the liquidators of democratic rights and the defenders of those rights.

If this fight is going to be waged successfully, then it is essential to help overcome the split in the movement. Along with all forces that refuse to apply another antiradicals decree inside the movement, we must put pressure on the CP to abandon its sectarian posture. Then we can move on to overcome the dispersion and localism of the resistance movement.

Then, we can make a qualitative step forward to building a permanent, national coordination of all actions, initiatives, and committees, and all political currents ready to join in a common front. Only with unity can we exploit the enemy's obvious weaknesses and get the radicals' decree withdrawn. □

\* The CP changed its name from the *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* to the *Deutsche Kommunistische Partei* and accepted the constitution as a whole in order to gain legality. Many groups that claim to be further to the left refuse to accept the constitution.

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## Juan Carlos's 'New Spain'

### Continued Torture of Political Prisoners

"There is no obstacle that can prevent our community from pushing ahead, working toward the creation of a society that grows in prosperity, justice, and authentic liberty," Spanish King Juan Carlos told the U.S. Congress June 2.

In view of the widely publicized recent reports of torture and mistreatment of political prisoners throughout Spain and especially in the Basque Country, the king's demagoguery about "justice and authentic liberty" becomes quickly unmasked.

Miguel Castells, a lawyer in the Basque city of San Sebastián, told a *London Times* correspondent, "In the Basque provinces at this moment massive round-ups of political suspects and the use of torture are as prevalent as in the worst times under the Franco regime."

Among the many accounts of torture of political prisoners in Spain are the following:

• María Amparo Arangoa Satrustegui, a twenty-three-year-old leader of the Falangist *Unión de Trabajadores y Técnicos* (UTT—Workers and Technicians Union) in Navarra, is hospitalized in Pamplona with extensive and deep bruising on the front and back of the thighs and on the buttocks. She is also suffering renal and intestinal blockage.

This condition was brought about by torture following her arrest April 21 at the Sarrió Paper Factory where she works.

The Civil Guard accused her of being a member of the illegal *Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores* (Revolutionary Workers Organization). When she denied it, the torture began.

In a court proceeding April 26 in Pamplona, Arangoa described what happened:

At about 4:15 they began to interrogate me and I was injured by being shaken violently and hit repeatedly in the face. Later I was obliged to change my clothing. They put me into a bath of dirty water into which I was violently submerged and kept my head under water until I lost consciousness.

Later I was undressed and they put me back into my clothes, continuing to beat me on the soles of my feet, my thighs, and buttocks with a cord and a wet towel. They also tugged violently at my hair.

• Javier Aranceta, a Basque accused of membership in *Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna* (ETA—Basque Nation and Freedom), was arrested April 6 and held incommunicado for ten days. His family and attorney reported that he was beaten (one eardrum was shattered, the other severely infected), hung by his arms for three days with his toes barely touching the floor, and repea-

tedly submerged in a bathtub filled with human excrement and vomit until he nearly drowned.

• José Alfredo Erlanz, the manager of a nightclub in Rentería, Guipúzcoa, was arrested March 23. He was beaten for five hours with metal bars and clubs. Because of the severity of his injuries he had to be hospitalized for more than a month. The medical report stated he had suffered lesions on the testicles and soles of the feet, and respiratory difficulties that required treatment by an artificial respirator. Erlanz is being held on charges of illegal association and propaganda.

The May 1 issue of *Combate*, the newspaper of the *Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna-VI* (Revolutionary Communist League/ETA-VI, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International), printed excerpts of a letter from the thirty political prisoners in Jaén about their situation:

In recent months we have watched them snatching away almost all the gains we won after many struggles. But our situation became extreme immediately after the escape from Segovia jail.\* The government has imposed an obligatory norm for all jails, which—at least at Jaén—is being put into effect. It calls for closing the courtyards, reducing the time and number of days for visits, a police crackdown on both letters and newspapers (extending to clipping out items even from the press of the Falangist Movement), locking us in our cells earlier, and restrictive measures affecting matters ranging from hygiene to food. □

\*On April 5 twenty-nine prisoners, most of them Basque nationalists serving long terms, escaped from the Segovia prison through the city's sewer system.

### 'All-Time Record' Fish Story

KWANGCHOW, May 4, 1976 (Hsinhua)—Fishermen operating around Kwangtung Province's Hsisha, Nansha and Chungsha islands on the South China Sea report big catches in the first quarter of this year. The quarterly state purchase plan for fish and other marine products, including lobsters, sea cucumbers and turtles, were overfulfilled by 88 percent for an all-time record.

This achievement is an outcome of the fishermen's socialist enthusiasm which was spurred by the current struggle against the right deviationist wind to reverse the correct verdicts of the Cultural Revolution.



## New Lease on Life for British Imperialism?

By Alan Jones

LONDON—Amidst the type of fanfare generally reserved only for royal births, deaths, and marriages, Britain has exported its first ever shipment of oil. It was admittedly not very impressive by Saudi Arabian or Kuwaiti standards—one 50,000-ton tanker to West Germany from the North Sea oil fields—but to judge by the press and government reaction you would have thought Britain had regained its place as the mightiest economic power on earth.

Industry Minister Benn declared that this was the culminating point of an "outstandingly successful year for exploration with 24 new discoveries—nearly as many as in the previous five years of exploration" and that proven reserves had increased by over 27 percent from 1,060 to 1,350 million tonnes. (*The Times*, April 30, 1976.)

By now, however, the population of Britain should be getting used to these "outstandingly successful years." When in November 1975 the first North Sea oil came ashore in Britain, Queen Elizabeth, in a speech carefully prepared for her by the government, announced that this was an event of "outstanding significance in the history of the United Kingdom." To celebrate, it was felt necessary to spend \$1 million for a gigantic reception, with most of the royal family, virtually the entire Cabinet, and 1,000 notables in attendance.

Despite the celebrations, however, there is no doubt that cynicism about such "triumphs" is growing. After all, living standards for the working class have fallen 6 percent in as many months. Furthermore, despite all the cheering, things don't seem to be proceeding on quite such a wondrous level as everyone had been led to believe.

Despite Benn's "outstandingly successful year," the government had to admit that projected production figures by 1980, when production should be reaching full scope, have been reduced from 100-130 million tonnes a year to 95-115 million tonnes; that of the twenty-four discoveries last year only one—that of the Statford field, which is in any case shared with Norway—was commercially exploitable; and that present oil production, from the Argyll and Forties fields, is, at 1.1 million tonnes, at the absolute bottom end of even the most pessimistic government projections. (*The Times*, April 10, 1976.)

Furthermore, despite the bluffing and boasting on Britain's supposed colossal

new economic power, the government was put very smartly in its place last autumn when the European Economic Community, under the prodding of West German Chancellor Schmidt, rejected British demands for a separate seat at the international energy conference. This last rebuff



Red Weekly

QUEEN ELIZABETH

was so sharp in fact that the left social democrats of the *Tribune* group who, as good reformists, are prepared to grasp at any straw and had therefore been lauding North Sea oil to the skies, felt it necessary to run a black-bordered box on the front page of their newspaper December 5 deploring this "betrayal of British interests."

In the light of the fanfare in Britain and the apparent indifference "overseas," it is perhaps worth taking the occasion of Britain's entry onto the scene as an "oil-exporting nation" to see whether British capitalism has at long last found a way out of its difficulties, whether other imperialist powers should now be quaking in their boots before the onslaught of a new British colossus, and what, if anything, the British working class stands to gain from the "outstanding achievement."

### A Miserable Fraud

The reality of the situation is that North Sea oil is one of the worst, but most expensive, con tricks in the world—and one bought at the cost of deprivation through artificially inflated oil prices for both the British working class and hundreds of millions of people in the colonial world.

The actual oil reserves of the North Sea are pitiful. Taken as a whole, they account for only 2% of the world oil reserves—with the British sector accounting for a mere 1.25%. This is lower than Venezuela (2.7%) or Nigeria (3.8%), let alone Saudi Arabia (25.2%), Kuwait (12.2%), Iran (11.4%), etc. ("Make or Break?" supplement to *The Economist*, July 1975.) Furthermore, by the time it comes fully into operation in 1980, the North Sea will be facing competition not merely from the Arab East but from new sources such as the 2.5 million barrels a day forecast from the North Slope Alaskan fields. ("Oil, the Gulf and the West," supplement to *The Economist*, May 1975.)

A further crucial factor for North Sea oil, and the manoeuvres of the British government, is that oil extraction from the North Sea fields is quite extraordinarily expensive—the capital cost per barrel-a-day capacity is £2,500 [£1=US\$1.77] compared to £100 in the Arab Gulf and £900 in the Gulf of Mexico. ("Make or Break?" op. cit.) This is despite the fact that the methods by which the oil companies obtained the North Sea sites must be one of the most extraordinary rip-offs of all times—some of the lots went for a mere £2,000 compared to £39 million for twenty-four square miles in Alaska. (*The Oil Fix*, Counter Information Services, London, 1974.)

### The Cost and the Return

The result is that the cost of production in even the most economic fields of the North Sea is \$2 to \$3 a barrel, compared to \$1.20 to \$1.50 in the Arab Gulf. For most of the North Sea the extraction cost is \$4 to \$6 a barrel. ("Make or Break?" op. cit.) The result of this situation is that of the probable 20-25 billion barrels of reserves, only 6-8 billion is commercially recoverable at current prices. The capital cost of starting serious production by 1980 is likely to be \$16-20 billion. (*The Financial Times*, April 27, 1976.)

It is only the desperate economic needs of the British ruling class, and the desire of the oil giants to find alternative sources of supply to the Arab East, that leads to such investments in otherwise economically irrational projects. (For the oil companies' motivations, see "The Arab Oil Boycott: A Conspiracy With the Trusts?" *Intercontinental Press*, January 28, 1974, p. 75.)



With such small recoverable reserves, and such a high cost of production, the contribution of North Sea oil at the present price to the British economy can only be pitiful—after payment of debts on the \$16-20 billion necessary to reach the projected target of 3 million barrels a day, the benefit to the economy is probably only 0.8% of Gross Domestic Product a year for 6-7 years. (*The Financial Times*, November 4, 1975.)

Any fall in the price of oil would of course drastically reduce even this effect—particularly when the whole operation makes any sense at all only if oil can be exported, since only 35% of Britain's oil consumption is in the light crude grade that comes from the North Sea fields and the other 65% heavy crude will have to continue to be imported anyway.

The operative word, however, is that these figures refer to the *present* price. If prices can be increased significantly, then the whole project takes on a very different aspect.

As a result, the British government, despite its public attacks on "exorbitant" oil prices, is one of the chief campaigners on an international scale for an increase in the price of oil. This was indeed the issue on which it clashed with Schmidt and why it wanted a separate seat at the international energy conference in the first place.

Furthermore, while the British government is easily put in its place by the West Germans, it possesses a very powerful lever in its half stake in the British Petroleum Company (BP)—one of the "Seven Sisters" of the oil giants and the fourth largest non-American corporation in the world. This already provides useful services to the British government, such as dealing with "politically sensitive" issues like aiding South Africa to withstand any threat of boycotts or sanctions.

For example, in March 1974 Sir Eric Drake, the company's chairman, visited Johannesburg, where "he had held discussions with Mr Vorster, the South African Prime Minister, and officials about the ways in which BP could make a contribution to the local coal utilisation situation 'or in any other way that is useful to South Africa and BP.'" (*The Financial Times*, March 4, 1974.)

Other interesting aspects of this company's activities have also come out with recent revelations concerning its methods of political payment in Italy. The real dimensions of this have almost certainly not yet even been partially exposed.

BP itself admits to payments of £800,000 to parties in the coalition government. However, its statement carefully referred to these payments as those which "are the subject of investigation," and nobody believes that this is anything but the tip of the iceberg. Further, BP's official auditor, Whinney Murray, admitted delicately that "audit tests by their very nature would not

necessarily uncover 'illegal payments.' Indeed they are not necessarily designed to do so." (*The Financial Times*, April 14, 1976.)

The British government, which as a mere half owner of the company would naturally have no way of knowing what was going on, has of course said how surprised and shocked it is—although of course as "business expenses" such payments are probably even tax deductible.

Apart from their general operations and links with the oil cartel, those firms which operate in the North Sea have their own more direct methods of squeezing out extra pennies. While the real increase in the price of oil which is needed to make the North Sea profitable involves an agreement with OPEC, and it is this which the British government directly and indirectly is putting its attention to, the British consumer can also be squeezed for a bit of ready cash for the companies.

In the last six months or so, the chief oil companies have therefore been putting a great deal of their attention to forcing out of the market various "rogue" importers who were undercutting the outrageously inflated prices of BP, Shell, Esso, etc. This was done by artificially dumping oil on the market to undercut the competitors while simultaneously cutting off the sources of surplus oil which the "rogues" had been purchasing.

To achieve this, Shell-BP-Esso cut their petrol (gasoline) prices to 71.5p a gallon (about \$1.40). By the end of April 1976, they had succeeded in cutting off the rogues' source of supply and underpricing them so effectively that they finished them off as competitors.

On May 1, the major companies immediately raised their prices to 79p a gallon (\$1.55). The government, which is suppo-

sedly on a "price restraint" policy, made no official comment, but through unofficial sources "let it be known" that an important consideration in its policies was "the protection of the small garage owner" who was supposedly injured in "price wars." The protection of garage owners who are not so little obviously wouldn't have figured as a calculation!

The reality of what is taking place in the North Sea is quite clear. British imperialism has found common interest with the oil giants, who for political reasons, and questions of leverage, like to have certain alternative sources of supply to the Arab East. The costs of these developments, however, are vast and someone is going to have to foot the bill in the greatly increased oil prices necessary to make them economical.

That "someone" is naturally *not* going to be Esso, BP, British imperialism, or any such worthy. The cost will be borne by the British working class in inflated prices and the countries of the "third world" such as India, Zambia, and others that are bearing the full brunt of the oil price increases. Meanwhile, the statements by Her Majesty, the press fanfares, the continuous "outstanding achievements," serve only to conceal the real "astounding achievements" of a company like BP, aided and abetted by the Labour government, seriously attempting to present as a great victory for the "British people" the fact that it has exported 50,000 tons of oil, for which it receives the profit, in the same week as it puts up petrol prices by 10%—for which the working class foots the bill.

British imperialism in its death agony appears to be attempting to follow the maxim of the Roman emperors that if you can't give the people bread then perhaps a circus will keep them happy. □

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## My Philosophical Itinerary

By George Novack

[First of two parts]

[The following is an autobiographical foreword\* to a collection of essays written between 1960 and 1976 by George Novack, to be published next year by Pathfinder Press under the tentative title *Polemics in Marxist Philosophy*.]

\* \* \*

The essays in this book were produced over a sixteen-year period from 1960 to 1976. They differ from the usual run of philosophical writings in the United States in two salient respects. They have been written by a convinced dialectical materialist. And they were prompted, not by topics discussed in professional philosophical journals and conferences, but by theoretical and methodological questions that have aroused controversy within and around the international socialist movement over the past two decades.

The diffusion of Marxist ideas has varied greatly from one country and continent to another since their emergence in the mid-nineteenth century. The United States was the second country in the world after Germany to constitute a national party based on the principles elucidated by Marx and Engels: the Workingmen's Party of 1876, later known as the Socialist Labor Party. Yet a century later their ideas have exercised only a marginal influence on America's intellectual and political life. For weighty historical reasons, the United States has up to now been the most resistant among the major countries to the consideration and acceptance of scientific socialism.

Thanks to the War of Independence, the United States acquired the most advanced political regime in the world for that time. When the bicentennial anniversary came around, it had the most highly developed industry. And yet it was the most retarded in matters of social theory.

Marxist philosophers have accordingly been a rare breed in this country whose political and ideological level is far lower than its capacity to build computers, jet planes, and nuclear missiles. Whereas in postwar France political commitment has consorted with philosophical conviction, these areas are kept widely apart on this side of the Atlantic.

The separation of theorizing from practical affairs is carried to an extreme in the philosophical departments of the universities, where, as a rule, the specialists of various persuasions pursue their vocation in complacent detachment from social and political problems. They tend to disparage Marxism because, among other reasons, its ideas are inseparable from the stakes in the class struggle; they usually refuse to accord dialectical materialism the same full citizenship rights in the domain of contemporary thought as the varieties of positivism or existentialism.

Most faculties have not allowed the doctrines of Marxism to be presented by qualified adherents. Under such circumstances a revolutionary socialist thinker who was also a political activist would have been wise to emulate the unorthodox Spinoza, who, to maintain his independence, chose to grind lenses for a living rather than take a chair at Heidelberg.

Mindful of these realities, although I have been preoccupied with philosophical questions for half a century, I have not dropped anchor in any university harbor. The choppy waters of radical politics have been the milieu of my activities. For more

than forty years I have dedicated my energies to promoting the cause of socialism as a member of the Socialist Workers Party and taken a leading part in its work as a journalist and editor, a campaigner for civil liberties and labor rights, and a shaper of its policies on national and international issues. This has necessitated applying the Marxist method to the urgent problems of the class struggle in which competing theories are put to the test by their consequences in practical operation.

Not until the ferment among the youth opened up American campuses to socialist views in the late 1960s was I asked to speak at numerous colleges around the country. Professor Walter Kaufmann of Princeton testifies to the explosion of interest in Marx at that time. "When Jacques Maritain joined the department of philosophy at Princeton University in 1948, one professor was apprehensive that the great neo-Thomist might try to convert his students to Roman Catholicism, and he considered it reassuring that Maritain would not teach undergraduates. Yet the only suggestion Maritain ever made about the undergraduate curriculum was that Marx should be taught, as he was in Paris. In the late 1960s students almost everywhere wanted to have courses on Marx; and many were persuaded by Marx's early writings or by Engels or some passages in Lenin, or by Kojève or Lukács, that one cannot fully understand Marx without knowing something about Hegel." (*London Times Literary Supplement*, January 2, 1976.)

Although the "dangerous thoughts" of Marxism were barred from entering by the front door, they came in through windows opened up by the students. I was sometimes asked before and after my talks: Where do you teach? as though it was unthinkable for anyone to philosophize without Ph.D. credentials and some sort of academic affiliations. Here is an extended version of my answer to such queries about my background and qualifications.

\* \* \*

As the only son of immigrant Jews from Eastern Europe, I escaped the lot of a rabbinical student thanks to the voyages of my father and mother to the New World late in the nineteenth century. This fortuitous circumstance has buttressed my belief in the determinative effect of their social situation on people's destinies. Growing up in the suburbs of Boston, I was directed at high school toward Harvard, where an older cousin living in the same house had enrolled before me. To my family this upward step in the educational ladder was to provide a passport to success and wealth in one of the professions or as a business executive. Alas for the dreams of parents for their children! My university training was to be put to quite different uses.

I was an omnivorous reader of anything in print, from recipes on cereal boxes and adventure stories to novels and poetry; the free public library did almost as much to educate me as the schoolrooms. I had a passion for creative literature, but that yielded to other interests at Harvard, where I shifted my field of concentration from the English department to philosophy. Just as certain youths with a scientific bent aspire to learn radio technology or the properties of the chemical elements, I wanted to know where the ideas in people's minds came from and how they developed.

This concern with the nature of ideas was a strong incentive for studying philosophy and later becoming a Marxist. The adversaries of Marxism often allege that we Marxists are interested only in the pursuit of power, not in ideas. The productions of its leading exponents is the best refutation of this libel. Ideas have their own

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power and the way to power is guided by ideas. But they are products and parts of the total process of social development. Dialectical materialists consider them to be conceptual reflections—and projections—of the conditions of the natural and social environment in which people act. The proponents of Marxism could hardly underplay the creative role of ideas when their own system has been the most far-reaching and fruitful ideology ever let loose on this planet.

Another deepgoing motive for my embrace of philosophy came from a yearning to find out "the secret of life." What, I wondered from adolescence on, gave meaning to the endeavors of human beings and how could I, as an individual in my own time and place, relate to this scheme of things and contribute to its realization? This spiritual, intellectual, and scientific problem, which has sustained the fictions and fantasies of religion, is in some form posed to every thinking person.

The conclusions of science had rendered belief in divine ghosts a ridiculous anachronism. I shed faith in god and immortality early and easily despite the perfunctory ceremonials of a fast-fading Judaism in my home and sought enlightenment from some secular source. After discarding the virtues of philanthropic good works as a satisfactory replacement, I was momentarily excited by the excessive individualism and poetic exaltation of Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra* and captivated by Havelock Ellis's unrestrictive attitude toward sex and his prescription for making an art out of the good life.

This self-centered estheticism was one ingredient of a restless and diffuse discontent with the prevailing conditions of American life as well as with the kind of teaching I encountered at Harvard, where I spent five years but quit three times, without getting a degree. My quest for a philosophy of life was from the first coupled with a critical attitude toward the domination of the dollar. This was honed by Upton Sinclair's exposures of the grip of big business upon the educational system and press in *The Goslings*, in *The Goose-Step*, and in *The Brass Check*.

My fervor for social justice and cultural renovation boiled over when I read *The Golden Day*, Lewis Mumford's criticism of the commercialism and shortcomings of nineteenth century American culture. At the end of the book Mumford invoked Walt Whitman's invitation to remold America along plebeian-democratic lines: "Allons! The road is before us." As naively idealistic youth will do, I took this injunction more literally than the author intended and wanted to send him word that I was all set to join the glorious crusade "to conceive a new world" he projected. When I became acquainted with Mumford after I migrated to New York, I soon saw the unrealism of his utopian plans for remaking "this country into a complete and harmonious society" without a political confrontation with the power of the ruling plutocracy.

I participated in the Third World Congress of Philosophy held at Harvard in the summer of 1926 in a most humble role. At the request of my tutor, Raphael Demos, I took care of the laundry of visiting celebrities. In addition to this glimpse of the underside of the philosophic community, I listened to, among other contributions, the talk given by John Dewey on "Philosophy and Civilization," later published in the collection of his articles under that title.

My main occupation that summer was racing through the shelves of the philosophical section in the stacks at Widener Library, indiscriminately gobbling up the proceedings of the Aristotelian Society along with other philosophical writings and ransacking their pages for light on the riddle of existence. According to these British scholars, the answers seemed to be located in problems arising from the theory of knowledge rather than the nature of reality.

My development thereafter followed a standard pattern for Marxists—from youthful idealism through pragmatism to a matured materialism. When I was inducted into philosophy at Harvard in the mid-1920s, its faculty offered a bewildering bill of fare for the neophyte to digest. They expounded religious idealism (Hocking), pragmatic realism (Perry), Thomism (deWulf), and differing approaches to logic (Sheffer, Eaton, C.S. Lewis).



JOHN DEWEY

Echoes from the halcyon days of James, Royce, Peirce, and Santayana still reverberated through Emerson Hall, the seat of the philosophical department, and the last survivor of that galaxy, the venerable George Herbert Palmer, could be seen pattering through Harvard Yard. The disconnected writings of C.S. Peirce were then being collected and edited by one of my teachers, Charles Hartshorne.

However, the attention of the more serious students was drawn toward Bertrand Russell's collaborator, A.N. Whitehead, the erudite modernizer of Platonism with scientific-mathematical trimmings. He read several chapters of his major treatise *Process and Reality* to our class. Obscure and enigmatic as much of its metaphysics was, it appealed to my need for a comprehensive rational interpretation of the universe. For a while I became an entranced disciple of Whitehead, although as an atheist I was disconcerted to hear that my guru occasionally sermonized at King's Chapel in Boston. This immersion in Whitehead's system with its fusion of scientific, mathematical, and philosophical concepts immensely widened my intellectual horizon. I also learned from his *Science in the Modern World* that the clash of doctrines speeds progress.

At the foremost institution of higher learning in the United States, I was taught nothing about Marxism or socialism in the midst of that conservatized decade which was promised endless prosperity. I learned about Plato's Theory of Forms, Aristotle's doctrine of the Golden Mean, Hume's skepticism, and the wager on god's existence laid down by William James. But not a whisper about modern materialism in my philosophy or history courses.

After leaving the academic cocoon of Harvard for New York, where I had to work for a living in the publishing business, I passed over for a time to pragmatism. Dewey's instrumentalism was not only popular among friends who had studied under him at Columbia but suited my political and social orientation. This was of the *Nation-New Republic* type, spiced with a dash of Menckonian cynicism and elitism about the crass bourgeoisie and

its dupes among the "booboisie." As a left liberal, I voted for Al Smith in the 1928 presidential election, the first and last time I supported a capitalist candidate. Most probably, if I had not gone to Manhattan and become integrated into its literary milieu, my career would have been very different. The transit was indeed fortunate for me, even though I did not foresee its consequences.

The social catastrophe and economic paralysis that climaxed the decade late in 1929 upset my whole outlook and permanently estranged me from loyalty to capitalism or hopes for its reformation. Along with a legion of leftward-moving intellectuals, I became persuaded of the necessity for socialism and undertook sustained study of the theoretical bases of Marxism in philosophy, sociology, history, and economics.

I had the greatest difficulty in overcoming resistance to accepting the labor theory of value in the political economy elaborated by Marx and Engels and to the dialectical logic that guided their investigations. Notions of this kind were foreign to my previous training. I could not wholeheartedly embrace Marxism until the correctness of these key ideas became clear to me.

Under the impact of the Great Depression, it proved easier for most new-hatched radicals to switch political positions from liberalism to socialism than to change the philosophical foundations underneath the two outlooks. That required a thorough transmutation in one's habits of thinking; the novel ideas had to be absorbed into the very marrow of one's being. Thus the process of learning the dialectical materialist method effected as much of a revolution in my mode of thought as in my politics.

There is a world of difference between teaching philosophy for a living, which can be done without the force of personal conviction, and adopting a satisfactory philosophy to live by. The two need have no affinity. That was not the case with me. I earnestly sought a set of beliefs that could provide a compass to steer by in daily affairs as well as in scientific matters. Marxist philosophy alone filled these requirements.

On the way to Marxism I paused to consider other options. During the summer of 1931 I assiduously annotated the just published *Reason and Nature*, the major work of Morris Cohen. The professor at the College of the City of New York was admired by such acquaintances as his former pupil Sidney Hook for his wit, learning, and logical acumen. His method of logical rationalism was regarded as the most eligible alternative to Dewey's instrumentalism.

Cohen's approach to reality and thought was predicated on his "principle of polarity," which stated that opposites involved each other and therefore both sides had to be carefully weighed in all situations and all problems. This prudential maxim was a devitalized version of the unity of opposites at the core of Hegel's dialectics; it cut out the impetus of conflict that eventually resulted in resolving real contradictions. The process of negation as the motive force of progressive development was missing from his scheme of things.

Cohen's primary principle, with its arguments for rational order in all realms, was out of kilter with the turmoil of the times. It was a formula for the liberal consensus—there were always two sides to every question and both had to be mutually accommodated in the end. This doctrine that a balance had to be struck between opposing demands was the very essence of the liberal reformism I was rejecting. From different premises Cohen's rationalism arrived at the same conclusion as Dewey's instrumentalism that conflicting claims and interests in morals, politics, and sociology had to be adjudicated and opposing tendencies reconciled rather than thought through and fought out until the right point prevailed or progressive force was vindicated.

Through the 1930s most radicals followed the Communist Party. My path diverged from theirs. I was part of the first group of left intellectuals in New York, where national trends in politics were set, who became disillusioned with both Stalinism and Social Democratic reformism because, as experience demonstrated, their policies could not effectively combat fascism and lead the working class to power. Late in 1933, following the shock of Hitler's victory

in Germany, I joined the American Trotskyist movement. Through sharp confrontations with larger rivals, its members were constantly embroiled in ideological controversy, and as a writer for its publications, I had to improve my grasp of socialist theory in a hurry.

It may be of interest to note the impediments we novices had to overcome to break loose from prevailing currents of thought and assimilate the teachings of Marxism. The main block on the road was the deep-rooted and pervasive empiricism that has saturated American life and thought for so many generations and affected the socialist movement as well.

Earlier American socialists took little interest in dialectical materialism and made no significant efforts to disseminate its method of thought. We had no such reliable and talented teachers as the Russian Marxists had in Plekhanov, the Germans in Franz Mehring, and the Italians in Antonio Labriola. Lacking either native traditions or homegrown literature, we had to rely upon imports from abroad, as our prerevolutionary colonial predecessors did.

Even so, the available writings on the subject had big gaps. There was no complete edition of Marx and Engels in English. The main items in the inventory at hand were such classics as *Anti-Dühring*, *Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, and part of *The German Ideology*. These were flanked by some of Plekhanov's essays and Labriola's excellent *Socialism and Philosophy*. Neither Marx's early writings such as the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* or Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* were yet accessible in English. To be sure, we had Marx's *Capital* as the consummate example of his dialectical and historical method to learn from, though its fourth part, *Theories of Surplus Value*, had still to be translated. The very existence of the *Grundrisse* was unsuspected. Not until 1940 did we have access to Engels's *Dialectics of Nature*, which enabled us to see how the dialectical approach could be applied to the theoretical problems posed by the developments of natural science.

In view of the prominence this theme has since acquired, it is surprising in retrospect that Marxists then paid hardly any attention to the concept of alienation. I cannot recall a single discussion of the topic during the 1930s, although Sidney Hook's *From Hegel to Marx* had some references to it. It came forward only after the Second World War.

It took almost fifteen years for the regeneration of dialectical materialism by the leaders of the Russian revolution to reach American shores. A translation of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* appeared in 1926 but his important *Philosophical Notebooks* were unknown. Bukharin was represented by his somewhat mechanical treatise on *Historical Materialism* and by his articles in the compilations *Science at the Crossroads* (1931) and *Marxism and Modern Thought* (1935). Trotsky's views on philosophy were only slightly known through his *Literature and Revolution*.

Somewhat later in the decade several popularizations of uneven merit appeared, such as Thalheimer's *Introduction to Dialectical Materialism*, T.H. Jackson's *Dialectics*, and Conze's misleading and superficial *An Introduction to Dialectical Materialism*. I mention these to indicate the kind of handbooks students like myself might turn to for guidance.

Since the Social Democrats were largely indifferent to theory in general, and Marxist philosophy in particular, we were dependent upon whatever Moscow saw fit to issue in English. Apart from the boon of the classics, its apparatus, bound by the edicts of the cultural commissars and Stalin's canonical scripture on *Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, offered debased and dogmatic versions of philosophy that in some respects diverged as widely from the teachings of Marx and Engels as from their policies.

The liveliest discussions on philosophic questions took place outside the precincts policed by the official Communist ideologues. These revolved around the debates conducted through the decade between Sidney Hook and Max Eastman. As an avowed adversary, Eastman waged an untiring battle against dialectical



materialism in a series of books and articles in left periodicals. At the end of the decade, disheartened by the crimes of Stalinism, he abjured socialism altogether.

Hook defended Marxism against Eastman's arguments in a special manner by adapting his theory of knowledge to Dewey's instrumentalism and borrowing deviant ideas from the works of Lukács and of Karl Korsch, whose lectures he had attended. I had personal relations with both men, and Hook had played a part in winning me to Marxism, but I did not share either one's positions. I thoroughly disagreed with Eastman's hostility to the philosophic foundations of scientific socialism, while I was disquieted by Hook's abandonment of the dialectics of nature and the labor theory of value, two cornerstones of Marxist theory.

When Hook published *Toward the Understanding of Karl Marx* in 1933, I could see the discrepancies between his interpretations on a number of questions and the positions actually held by Marx, Lenin, and Luxemburg. I drafted an open letter addressed to Hook, which, however, remained unfinished and unsent, calling attention to these differences and asking him to comment on them.

Around that time, from his exile in Prinkipo, Leon Trotsky wrote a letter to the *Nation* taking Hook to task for casting doubt on the scientific character of the Marxist method. So did other writers in the *New Internationalist*, the theoretical monthly of revolutionary Marxism, to which Hook and I contributed. However, until 1939-40 most of us in the American Trotskyist movement who were concerned with matters of theory did not fully appreciate the importance of a correct philosophical method or the grave consequences implicit in departures from its principles in respect to political policy.

This relationship was made crystal clear when a tense struggle erupted within the Socialist Workers Party following the Soviet-Nazi pact and the onset of the Second World War. At issue was the nature of the Soviet Union and the necessity for its defense against imperialist attack without any concessions to its Stalinist misleadership. James Burnham and Max Shachtman headed the minority that sought to change the traditional Trotskyist position on these questions; Leon Trotsky and James P. Cannon led the majority.

At the outset of the conflict I was somewhat disoriented and uncertain about which side had the correct political line until, as the debate expanded, the underlying philosophical issues in dispute with Burnham, the ideological inspirer of the opposition, were brought to the fore by Trotsky's initiative. Once the issues were posed on that theoretical level, I could see that Burnham was upholding non-Marxist views in both his politics and philosophy.

My comprehension was facilitated by the fact that I had previously had disagreements with Burnham, who was a professor of philosophy at New York University, a colleague of Hook's, and the coauthor with Philip Wheelwright of a textbook on logic based on positivist rather than materialist premises. In October 1936 Burnham, Shachtman, and I had gone to Philadelphia where the National Committee of the Socialist Party was meeting, in order to solicit support for the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky of which I was national secretary. Its purposes were to obtain asylum for the exile interned in Norway and to promote the formation of a Commission of Inquiry into the monstrous charges against him in the Moscow trials. This was later headed by John Dewey.

While waiting hours in an anteroom for a hearing, the three of us discussed some matters pertaining to philosophy and logic. Burnham opposed the historical necessity of socialism on the general ground that no categorical determinism existed either in nature or society; any and every proposition about reality was no more than probable. In arguing against this positivist probabilism, I asked: "Don't you think you will die some day, as all other human beings have done up to now, and isn't this an absolutely necessary statement—or do you believe you might be immortal?" With logical consistency, Burnham replied: "My death is not absolutely necessary and certain; it is only extremely probable."

This rejection of materialist determinism and lawfulness convinced me that we stood far apart on fundamental questions of

science and logic. So I was already forewarned that, despite our then political agreement, Burnham held non-Marxist and anti-materialist views in philosophy. At Trotsky's suggestion I took up the cudgels in defense of dialectical materialism against Burnham's offensive, and in the party discussion in New York City that wound up the furious faction fight, I debated him on the philosophical issues involved.

My first work on Marxist philosophy, *An Introduction to the Logic of Marxism*, came out of this experience. It was based on talks originally given to SWP members in 1942 as part of a program under the tutelage of the learned John G. Wright to enhance their understanding of the essentials of the Marxist mode of thought.

This exposition of the elements of dialectical logic, which has since gone through six printings and proved popular in its Spanish translation, contravened an almost unanimous campaign against the philosophic basis of Marxism. Three books published in 1940-41 repudiated the dialectic on various grounds as a worthless hangover from Hegelian idealism in the Marxist outlook. These were *Marxism: is it Science?* by Max Eastman, *Reason, Social Myth and Democracy* by Sidney Hook, and *To the Finland Station* by the literary critic Edmund Wilson, who was indoctrinated on this point by them.

The trio's negative verdict settled the matter for most American intellectuals. The materialist dialectic was virtually banished from the scene for the next three decades. It found few defenders outside the Trotskyist ranks. From then on I held an isolated outpost on the philosophical front.

The eclipse of Marxism's fundamental philosophical tenets was one aspect of the stampede from anticapitalist attitudes that set in during 1939 and culminated in the conformism and anticommunism of the postwar period. Though the opponents of dialectics balked at recognizing the objective reality of contradiction, they themselves passed through a highly contradictory course of development after 1929. They forsook reformism for socialism and the program of revolution, and then, as they slid back, reverted to a toothless liberalism or served as armor-bearers in the camp of imperialist reaction.

I observed the gyrations of this mercurial layer of intellectuals at firsthand; many of my former associates were prominently involved in them. If preceding events had not already impressed this phenomenon on my mind, the sharp swings in their standpoints proved to me how, under the impact of changing circumstances, groupings and individuals can turn into their opposites.

Georg Lukács observed in *The Young Hegel*: "The political and social fate of Germany led him to place the phenomenon of contradictoriness in the forefront of his thought; we see how he comes to *experience* contradiction as the foundation and the driving force of life." (p. 97.)

The young people of my generation first experienced the full force of the contradictions inherent in capitalism after the crash of 1929. Then the presence of poverty and misery amidst plenty and the spectacle of millions of unemployed beside the most productive apparatus in the world made contradiction a visible reality.

I could also see how my own political evolution from a liberal do-gooder to a revolutionary socialist, and the changes in my systematic thought from an idealism that was partially negated by pragmatism and then fully transcended by dialectical materialism, exemplified the pattern of a dialectical development.

The radicalization and deradicalization of this segment of my contemporaries were not to be explained on ideological grounds alone. These turnabouts were at bottom provoked by the vicissitudes in the stability of U.S. capitalism and were connected with the oscillations from right to left and back again in the alignments of class forces on a national and world scale. This correlation between changing views and material circumstances bore witness to the operation of that historical determinism which was so abhorrent to the liberal mentality.

[To be continued]

# Selections From the Left

## klassen kampf

"Class Struggle," fortnightly central organ of the Revolutionary Communist League, Luxembourg section of the Fourth International.

The June issue carries a statement by the Political Bureau on developments in the Socialist party youth organization:

"In their May 22 congress, the Young Socialists accepted a document by a two-thirds vote that, on the basis of an analysis of the crisis of capitalism and the antilabor balance sheet of the coalition government between the SP and the Democratic party, calls on their parent organization to go into opposition. The Young Socialists also called for nationalizing the Arbed trust, abolishing the political spying agency, and defending the right of abortion. They said they were ready to follow a policy of alliances with anticapitalist forces.

"Although the Revolutionary Communist League, Luxembourg section of the Fourth International, cannot agree with many statements in the Young Socialist document, nonetheless this declaration takes up real problems and offers a start toward more concrete perspectives and actions."

The Revolutionary Communist League leadership agreed in particular with the Young Socialists' call on the SP to break from the class-collaborationist coalition. It explained how it viewed this question:

"It is not sufficient by any means to look for other governmental partners or for more left-wing reformist models. The workers parties stand on the side of the wage-earning masses. Their role must be to defend the workers' interests intransigently, to support their material demands and class unity and the political independence of the workers movement from all entanglement with the institutions or structures of the bourgeois state. In this sense, the orthodox socialist movement has always stressed that it is essential that the workers parties and organizations not become the administrators of capitalist state institutions and bourgeois mechanisms for co-opting the workers into the system. When they become the manager of these state institutions and thus of exploitative capitalist relations, the only result can be to divert the working class from its advance toward a classless society and to sow dangerous illusions that in the worst cases can lead to bloody impasses (e.g., Chile).

"Revolutionary Marxists think that

what is necessary is to call on all honest fighters for socialism to join together in an *anticapitalist united front*."

The Luxembourg Trotskyists call for united action and discussion around the following program:

"a. Consistent support for the working class and the workers movement against the attacks of the bosses and the state. SP out of the government!

"b. Nationalization of the steel industry and energy sector under workers control.

"c. Active support of the women's movement with the following slogans: free round-the-clock child-care centers; free abortion, including for minors.

"d. Abolition of the political spying agency.

"e. Uncompromising struggle against the plan for building an atomic plant in Remerschen.

"f. Support for the rising struggles of the European workers (Spain, Portugal, Italy, France)."

## INFORMATIONS OUVRIERES 753

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"Workers News," Open Forum for the Class Struggle. Published weekly in Paris.

The May 26-June 2 issue comments on the Portuguese presidential elections scheduled for the end of June:

"It is quite clearly its refusal to bow to the will of the masses, expressed again on April 25, 1976, that is, to form an SP-CP government based on the majority in the legislature, that motivated the SP leaders' decision to support Eanes. . . . This alliance between the SP and the representative of the Armed Forces Movement is the only way an all-SP government is possible. To block an SP-CP government, the SP leadership wants to call on its members and backers—who last July were the first to shout, 'The people are no longer with the MFA'—to vote for the spokesman of what remains of the Armed Forces Movement. The SP leadership's aim (see Soares's interview in *Der Spiegel*) is to prevent a split in the party.

"For the same reasons (to prevent a sharp internal crisis), the CP leadership had to make up its mind to run a working-class candidate, Octávio Pato, its No. 2 man and undoubtedly its most popular leader. Long favorable to a military candidacy and in particular to Eanes, the CP leaders could not—without running grave risks—call for supporting the candidate of the CDS and PPD [the bourgeois parties]. Alvaro Cunhal noted, however,

that the CP leaders do not conceal their intention of calling for a vote for Eanes if there is a second round.

"Nonetheless, Pato's candidacy is a working-class candidacy that must be supported, just as the workers in France for example support SP and CP candidates, although they have declared for the Union of the Left, a popular front for class collaboration.

"In voting for Pato, the masses will not be voting only against the military candidates. They will be voting SP-CP, they will be voting for an SP-CP government without representatives of the bourgeoisie and military officers.

"So, without illusions, the toiling masses, the workers, and the members of the workers parties will vote against the generals of the right and of the 'left,' for the workers candidate put up by the CP. Mário Soares, who claims that 90 percent of the members and backers of the SP do not want an SP-CP government, could be in for some surprises."

*Informations Ouvrières* reflects the views of the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI—Internationalist Communist Organization). Its Portuguese cointerthinkers are calling for a vote for Pato.

## klasse- kampen

"Class Struggle," published monthly by the Revolutionary Socialist League, Danish section of the Fourth International, in Copenhagen.

In the June issue, Jesper Nielsen gives a balance sheet of the struggle to defend the RUC, an experimental university that permits students to enter and to continue their work without traditional examinations.

"The RUC's existence is now assured. Two hundred second-year students have been reinstated after having been expelled. In negotiations with the university authorities, the students have been assured that they will have to take examinations only for the work they actually did, that is, on their projects. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education has promised that none of the students who participated in actions in solidarity with the second-year students can be subjected to reprisals.

"These are the results of the biggest student mobilization Denmark has seen since 1968."

The struggle was touched off by the government demand that second-year students take traditional examinations in some subjects.



Protests developed at many universities and won some trade-union support.

"The decisive factor in this broad solidarity movement was that the RUC students came out and informed the other campuses about the attacks. Similar educational work was done in the factories and unions. What was decisive in getting support from workers was the concrete collaboration between RUC students and some factory locals and unions in doing studies of working conditions."

The struggle culminated in mass demonstrations May 4 in Copenhagen and Aarhus, which drew 20,000 and 7,000 participants.

**rood**  
weekblad van de revolutionaire arbeiders liga  
Belgische afdeling van de vierde internationale

"Red," Flemish weekly paper of the Revolutionary Workers League, Belgian section of the Fourth International.

The June 10 issue comments on the formation of the Proletarian Democracy state in Italy, a bloc of parties and groups that claim to stand to the left of the Communist party:

"This unity was not structured very democratically. Thus, Lotta Continua got only 15 percent of the candidates on the slate, far less than corresponds to its organizational strength. Proletarian Democracy is only a common slate without a programmatic accord and without a common program.

"Nonetheless, this extremely limited unity can serve to build a strong anticapitalist current at the grass roots. People are talking about a million votes to the left of the CP.

"Such a dynamic in united committees at the grass-roots level can be of inestimable value when the CP tries to hold back the struggles after the elections."

**rouge**

"Red," Revolutionary Communist daily, published in Paris.

In the June 10 issue, F.T. reports on a meeting held the previous day in Paris in support of the Proletarian Democracy slate in Italy, a bloc of parties and groups that claim to stand to the left of the Communist party.

"This meeting pointed up the importance of the unity agreement reached by the forces of the Italian far left, an agreement that is also relevant to the debates being carried on in France.

"After the speeches by representatives of the OC-GOP, the LCR [Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire—Revolutionary Communist League, French section of the Fourth International], and OC-Révolution, Massimo Gorla, speaking for Avanguardia

Operaia, and Luigi Bobbio, for Lotta Continua, explained the scope of this accord. 'It is not a heterogeneous amalgam but a decision taking root in the mass movement.' It is an accord that frightens the reformists, who fear the impact of such a political advance. These two speakers also stressed the programmatic bases that underlie the governmental formula and pointed to the importance of the tasks that will face the Italian revolutionists in the wake of the elections."

F.T. deplored the absence of the United Socialist party, the largest centrist group in France. This formation has a special relationship with the Italian PdUP (Partito d'Unità Proletaria—Party of Proletarian Unity), which failed to send a representative. F.T. pointed out:

"The experience of the Italian comrades is directly relevant for French revolutionists. In the meeting, the debate on this was opened by proposals from the LCR that raised the 'possibility of running common slates in coming legislative elections' and from Révolution for 'movement slates.' The idea was also raised of an international conference in the fall to coordinate struggles against the multinational corporations.

"Whatever experience is accumulated in one country should become the common experience of all."

**NEISTI**

"Spark," published monthly by the Revolutionary Communist League in Reykjavik, Iceland.

According to a new bill introduced into the national legislature, the Althing, strikes can be called only after a majority of all members on the union rolls—not just in a general assembly—vote in favor and then only after a "cooling-off" period. The editorial in the June 1 issue comments:

"The powers of the arbitrators are greatly increased, since they can delay strikes if they see fit.

"Thus, it is clear that if this series of measures is adopted, it will greatly reduce the ability of the workers to use the strike weapon effectively. For example, it will be unlawful to call a strike on short notice. The arbitrators can use their power to make the timing of strikes most favorable to the capitalists."

The editorial called on the union leaders to oppose the bill actively. "The national union leadership has not made clear how it intends to organize the struggle against these measures and to what extent it opposes them. What is the meaning of the statement by Björn Jónsson that he is favorable to increasing the powers of the arbitrators? What has the leadership explained to the union members about the nature of these measures? Apparently nothing.

"A grave danger stands at the door. The leadership is going to have to make its position clear. It is going to have to organize the struggle against these changes in the labor laws.

"We will take advantage of the preparations for the national union congress scheduled for next fall to raise this question. In the course of these preparations, we will demand a harder line against the new measures and try to get unity on this point at the congress. We will demand that the national leadership show the same energy and readiness to call mass actions on this question as it did in backing the extension of our territorial waters."

Neisti called for a struggle to "defend democratic rights," which include the right to strike. It called for a fight against all attempts by the capitalist state to limit the rights of labor.

**世界革命**

"Sekai Kakumei" (World Revolution), weekly central organ of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International.

An editorial in the June 3 issue comments on the treacherous role of the SP, CP, and trade-union bureaucracy in the governmental crisis set off by the Lockheed scandal.

"For the LDP [the main bourgeois party] and the government, the state of affairs now developing is a very paradoxical one." On the one hand, the governmental crisis "has been smothered by the SP-CP 'normalization' policy in the Diet [parliament] and by the Mindo [Social Democratic labor] bureaucracy's betrayal of the general strike, the showdown battle of the 1976 Spring Labor Offensive." On the other hand, "there is a governmental crisis situation in which strategic divisions, and undercurrents within the LDP aiming for a 'strong government,' continue to exist."

The SP has limited itself to "raising the call for [Prime Minister] Miki to step down (not for bringing down the LDP government), for early dissolution of the Diet, and for general elections."

"What's even worse is the Communist party. In regard to the rift within the LDP, the CP is in a position—at least objectively—of defending Miki as the 'lesser evil.'"

To counter these class-collaborationist schemes, the editorial states, "We must expose all the parliamentary deals of the opposition parties that are trying to utilize the internal rift in the LDP. We must condemn the betrayals based on the self-serving strategies of the SP and CP of trying just to gain a few more seats in the general elections. We must make it clear that it is precisely a full-fledged, militant, massive struggle that will resolve the situation."

### Shah Seeks to Glorify Ancient Kings

By Javad Sadeeg

The new year in Iran is celebrated on March 21, the first day of spring—a carryover from the ancient Persian rites of spring. The calendar dates from Hejira, the emigration of prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Medina, which is considered to be the beginning of the Muslim era. According to this calendar, March 21, 1976, is the first day of the year 1355.

However, less than one week before the new year was to start, a joint session of the shah's handpicked House of Representatives and Senate decided to change the base year of the calendar from the Islamic Hejira to the year of the coronation of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Persian monarchy. Accordingly, the government backdated the calendar, proclaiming this to be the year 2535. The hastiness of the decision was underscored by the fact that hundreds of thousands of calendars already printed had to be discarded.

The general reaction to the shah's latest stunt was not favorable. The majority of the people in Iran consider themselves Muslims, have common historical ties with the Arab peoples, and identify more with the prophet Mohammad than with the ancient kings of Persia, or for that matter with the shah himself. He is considered an anti-Islamic and antinational element who has been imposed upon Iran by the imperialist powers.

On March 24 Azizollah Rahimi, a retired army colonel, brought charges against the government for violating the Iranian constitution by debasing the calendar. In an open letter to the attorney general, circulated in Iran, Rahimi argued that the government of Prime Minister Abbas Hoveida had insulted the religious sentiments of the Muslim population and violated the Iranian constitution.

Rahimi wrote that the action of the government had caused "strong agitation and anger" in the Muslim population of the country, and added, "... at present the Iranian people are viewing these atrocities with apathy, but this apathy certainly is not long-lasting and the Iranian Muslims cannot tolerate disrespectfulness to the Islamic prophet." In the letter he appealed to the shah to dismiss the government and dissolve the two houses of parliament. Rahimi's letter was published in *Payame Mujahed*, a monthly opposition paper abroad.

Azizollah Rahimi became known in the early 1960s as a defense attorney for the leaders of the Freedom Movement of Iran, a religiously oriented nationalist grouping,



SHAH

who were being tried in a military court for political opposition to the shah's regime. Along with three other retired army officers, he made a courageous defense effort that gained the respect of the opposition and the wrath of the dictatorship.

After the conviction of the Freedom Movement of Iran leaders, the four defense attorneys were also brought before a military tribunal and received prison sentences. Rahimi served two years in prison.

At the time, the opposition press published a memo by SAVAK (the secret police) entitled, "The Past Record of Colonel Rahimi." The SAVAK document said: "He had refused to wear used American uniforms [which the Americans had provided for the Iranian army as part of their Military Assistance Program]. Furthermore, he had encouraged the other officers to refuse the donated used American uniforms."

In February Rahimi wrote an open letter to Queen Farah in which he called for amnesty for all political prisoners and political exiles. Earlier he had written to Prime Minister Hoveida protesting the creation of a one-party system in the country. The public political protest by Rahimi is the first of its kind in Iran in many years.

The calendar issue has been tied to the death of a prominent Muslim mullah (clergyman). Ayatollah Shamsabadi was kidnapped near his home in the city of Isfahan on April 7. He was found strangled the next day in a nearby village.

The *New York Times* published a report May 12 by Eric Pace indicating that some well-placed Iranian and European sources believed that the mullah was killed by SAVAK because he publicly criticized the shah for debasing the Iranian calendar. "Such direct opposition to a pet project of the Shah was found intolerable by a provincial security official, who ordered the Mullah's death, according to one widely whispered account. It is even said by some that the Shah was informed after the killing and was furious at the high-handedness."

One week after this *New York Times* article was published the Iranian government announced that it had arrested four persons and that they had all confessed to the killing of the mullah. But this did not eliminate the speculation.

The monarchization of the calendar coincided with a decision to mark this year for the glorification of the fiftieth anniversary of the Pahlavi dynasty, which was founded by the present shah's father through a British-engineered coup. The shah is planning to splurge millions of dollars in the coming celebrations of the dynasty as he did in the infamous celebration of the two thousand five hundredth anniversary of the Persian monarchy in 1971.

Eric Pace cabled from Tehran March 2 that "in this capital there are those who argue privately that underscoring past achievements serves to blunt pressures for new ones; that whipping up enthusiasm for Riza Shah and his family, now known as the Pahlavi dynasty, strengthens the present Shah's political hand.

"Some Iranians and some foreigners also argue that spotlighting Iran's culture and history is part of an inward-turning that has become evident now that the material fruits of the country's oil boom have proven in some ways disappointing."

"Spotlighting Iran's culture and history" actually turns out to be the arrogant and dictatorial moves by the shah, viewed as insults to the religious and national feelings of the people. Instead of strengthening the shah's political hand, these actions are futhering his isolation, and have the potential of backfiring in a massive way. □

#### No Smoking While Swimming

"The Tlalneplanta River, near Mexico City, is so heavily polluted that it can burst into flame at any time, reveals biochemical engineer Miguel Romero. Reacting to Romero's charges, the Mexican government has announced that it will post 'no-smoking' signs at the river banks."—*Moneysworth*, June 21.



# Capitalism Fouls Things Up

## The Alaska 'Swiss Cheese' Pipeline



The Alaskan oil pipeline is a multibillion dollar giveaway to American oil companies, authorized in November 1973 prior to the final disgrace of the Nixon administration. Taking advantage of the artificially engineered oil shortage, Nixon and Agnew publicized the pipeline project as the answer to America's need for "energy independence."

Among the pipeline's more recent supporters is Gerald Ford, who hailed the project as "an outstanding example of how our ecology can be preserved while energy needs are met."

It should therefore come as no surprise that the \$7 billion, 800-mile pipeline, which will bisect Alaska from north to south, is an environmental disaster. When completed in mid-1977 it threatens to spill tens of thousands of barrels of oil over an Arctic tundra so fragile that a single footprint or tire track remains visible for years.

The mere scope of the project indicates the potential for disaster. The pipeline is designed to transport 600,000 barrels of oil daily from the 9.6 billion barrel reserve discovered off the coast of northern Alaska. It is the first hot-oil (145 degrees Fahrenheit) line to operate north of the Arctic Circle and to be buried under or elevated over hundreds of miles of permafrost.

It is also the first pipeline to cross three mountain ranges, numerous rivers and streams, five earthquake zones, and pass near four huge glaciers that have shown

an ability to move considerably in the recent geological past.

The government's own environmental-impact statement said it was almost certain that at least one large-magnitude earthquake would strike the zone crossed by the pipeline during its lifetime.

A report in the May 22 *New York Times* cited other dangers: "A spill could cause thawing, heaving and subsidence of the Arctic tundra. A break at a river crossing . . . could send crude oil flowing downstream, disturbing fish and wildlife for scores of miles."

Although it might conceivably be possible to construct a pipeline and a safety system to counter each of these obstacles, it is obvious that such a system would be so expensive as to rule out profitable development of the Prudhoe oil field. It is also obvious that this is not the sort of pipeline that is being built by the consortium of eight American corporations at work on the project.

In fact, a report by Richard D. James in the June 11 *Wall Street Journal* suggests that when the pipeline actually opens, it may have more holes than a piece of Swiss cheese.

The pipeline consists of forty-foot and sixty-foot sections, each of which is four feet in diameter. Since proper welding is critical to the safety of the pipeline, each joint where two sections are welded together is supposed to be X-rayed to guard against defective work. Theoretically, costly and time-consuming repairs are then carried out.

Alyeska, the consortium building the pipeline, has used a simpler procedure. X-rays of defective joints have been "lost," "stolen," or just plain falsified. An expert hired to investigate X-ray procedures unfortunately died of cyanide poisoning before he could complete his work.

Following a lawsuit by a former employee who testified that he had been ordered to overlook falsifications, Alyeska now admits not only that X-rays were doctored but also that thousands of welds made last year contained defects not permitted by state and federal construction codes.

"Alyeska says that falsified X-rays only involve the half of the pipeline laid south of the Yukon River," James reported. "But a former supervisor for one of the firms

that X-rayed the pipeline welds says he knows of 50 deliberate falsifications of X-rays taken north of the Yukon.

"Some X-rays—358 of them—have disappeared, taken in the burglary of an Alyeska office last September. . . . An Oklahoma troubleshooter hired to investigate X-ray irregularities was found dead of cyanide poisoning in his Fairbanks hotel room last December, apparently a suicide."

Interviews with pipeline employees and supervisors turned up countless other instances of shoddy construction work and cover-ups carried out to cut costs and increase profits. Among them are the following:

- Although Alyeska said it was unaware of any defects in the longitudinal, or lengthwise, seams in the pipes, a radiographer on the project reported that he discovered defects in the long seams of twenty to twenty-five pieces of pipe in one section alone. The stress on these seams is one and a half times greater than that on welds joining separate pieces of pipe.

- Of the total of 3,955 "problem welds" admitted to by Alyeska (these were discovered by X-raying 1.5 inches of the ends of each pipe section, the sole X-ray test), 1,105 are described as "critical." This means they are buried beneath river crossings or frozen solidly into the permafrost. Repairing such welds would be "costly and difficult, if not impossible," James reported.

- Of thirty-two welds chosen at random along the length of the pipeline last year, twenty-one failed an examination known as the "bend test," a procedure simulating earthquake conditions in which a weld is bent by mechanical force.

- Sections of the pipeline were at times deliberately buried before they could be X-rayed.

The likelihood of Alyeska's rectifying these defects and others yet to be disclosed can be gauged from the experience of Peter Kelley, the former pipeline employee whose lawsuit initially exposed the X-ray falsifications.

Kelley, who worked for one of the companies doing the X-rays, said that after questioning the welds he was told to "think from the neck down"—and then fired. □



New York Times

Alyeska is now the only Arctic pipeline under construction; four more are proposed.

## The Imperialist Plundering of Namibia

Reviewed by Ernest Harsch



Namibia is one of the most mineral-rich countries on the African continent. It is the world's second largest producer of gem diamonds and has important deposits of zinc, lead, copper, uranium, cadmium, lithium, and vanadium. Yet the more than one million Blacks in Namibia are forced to live at near-starvation levels.

Namibia has been administered as a de facto colony of the racist South African regime since the end of World War I. Throughout that period Pretoria and its allies in Britain, the United States, and West Germany have filled their coffers at the expense of the Namibian peoples.

*The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia* is a detailed and comprehensive study of the imperialist plundering of the country's vast wealth. It is one of a series of studies published under the auspices of the Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia (South-West Africa).<sup>1</sup> The two major essays in the book are "The Namibian Economy: An Analysis of the Role of Foreign Investment and the Policies of the South African Administration" by Roger Murray, and "The Black Workers in Namibia" by Jo Morris.

The Study Project's policy is to limit itself to a factual examination of the subject. None of the contributions in the book take an explicit political stance on the Namibian struggle for independence. But the wealth of assembled facts nevertheless makes it a powerful exposé of the crippling effects of imperialist rule on the Namibians.

Virtually the entire commercial economy of Namibia is confined to the southern part of the country, known as the Police Zone. "Within this are," Murray writes, "making up two-thirds of the country (and containing most of the known mineral reserves, land suitable for animal husbandry, ports and railways), control of the economic resources, and ownership of the

land, is in the hands of the White community of Namibia."

Since 1969, Namibia's economy and administration have been formally integrated with that of South Africa. More than half of Namibia's exports go to South Africa, including its entire diamond production, the bulk of its cattle exports, and a significant part of its fish catch and zinc production. The uranium production from the giant Rössing mine, when it is completed, will be a cornerstone of Pretoria's nuclear energy program.

In addition to plundering Namibia's wealth for its own profit, Pretoria has also encouraged its American and European allies to invest in the country, offering

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### *The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia.*

Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia (South-West Africa). London: Africa Publications Trust, 1974. 220 pp., paperback. The book can be obtained in the United States by sending \$3.00 to the African-American Institute, Publications Department, 833 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017.

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them attractive incentives. Of the total capital investment of about 92.5 million rand,<sup>2</sup> more than half was from non-South African sources. As of 1971, U.S. companies had \$45 million invested in Namibia (see box).

Pretoria saw the growth of American and European investments in Namibia as a form of insurance for its continued rule over the colony, since it gave its imperialist allies a stake in maintaining the status quo. The revenues from the non-South African mining companies also helped finance Pretoria's own economic and administrative projects in Namibia.

The absolute domination by imperialism of the economy is reflected in its nearly total orientation toward exports. According to official sources cited by Murray, the value of Namibia's exports in 1965 was

equivalent to 91 percent of its Gross Domestic Product.

In 1972, the three largest mining companies—Consolidated Diamond Mines, South West Africa Company, and Tsumeb Corporation—raked off \$91 million in profits. Tsumeb, which is controlled by American and British capital, averages between \$15 million and \$26 million in profits a year. The Anglo American Corporation, the giant South African conglomerate that controls Namibia's diamond production, takes in a yearly profit of about \$64 million from its subsidiary Consolidated Diamond Mines.

Such high profit rates are a product of the superexploitation of the Namibian workers, whose wages are even lower than those of Black workers in South Africa itself.

Although Pretoria has begun to talk of granting "self-determination" to Namibia at some unspecified future date, it is in fact preparing for an even greater plundering of the country's resources, particularly its uranium. Its allies in London, Washington, and Bonn, who also pay lip service to Namibian "self-determination," are deeply involved in Pretoria's "development" plans.

The main focus of the expansion schemes is the Rössing uranium mine near Swakopmund, which when completed will be the largest open-cast mine in southern Africa. Murray estimates that by mid-1976, a total of £150 million (US\$355 million), mostly in British and South African capital, will be invested in the mine.

Brushing aside United Nations resolutions barring any dealings with the South African authorities in Namibia, successive British governments, both Labour and Conservative, have allowed their Atomic Energy Authority to contract for the purchase of Rössing uranium.

Closely connected to the planned increase in foreign mining operations in Namibia is the Cunene hydroelectric dam project in southern Angola, which is scheduled to supply nearly all of the power for the Namibian mines. One of the reasons for Pretoria's intervention in the Angolan civil war was to "protect" its \$200 million investment in the Cunene project.

A major obstacle to Pretoria's plans to step up the exploitation of Namibia was

1. The Study Project was established under the joint sponsorship of the Africa Publications Trust; the Institute for the Study of International Organisation at the University of Sussex; the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver; the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies at the University of Uppsala; and the African Research Unit at the Free University of Berlin.

2. Study Project used exchange rate of R1=US\$1.28.



the Black population that still lived in the Police Zone, where most of the valuable mineral deposits are to be found. The South African solution to this problem was to forcibly expel the Namibians from the "white" region. A section of Murray's essay examines this resettlement scheme, which is similar to Pretoria's Bantustan policy within South Africa itself.

The program, launched by Pretoria in 1964, called for the displacement of 150,000 persons and for the establishment of ten "homelands" for the main African ethnic groups. The vast majority of the inhabitants of the country are thus deprived of all but about 39 percent of the total land area. The land in the "homelands," moreover, is the poorest in the entire country, much of it without enough water to support agriculture or stock raising.

Murray notes that according to 1970 census figures white settlers who were dependent on farming had on the average sixty-five times more useful land per person than Blacks did.


In addition, the overcrowding and poverty in the "homelands," particularly in Ovamboland, forces Blacks to migrate under contract to the white-owned areas in search of work. This ensures a steady supply of cheap labor for the mines.

Pretoria has sought to disguise the real motives behind its "homeland" policy by claiming that the Black areas would eventually be granted "self-determination." In mid-1973, Ovamboland and Kavangoland were granted "self-government" under legislative assemblies dominated by the tribal chiefs. But this was no more than a facade. The South Africans retained control of such key areas as defense, the manufacture of arms, foreign affairs, the admission of "aliens," and currency and customs matters.

The legal aspects of foreign investment in Namibia are examined in a short essay by John Dugard. He notes that under the provisions of a 1970 United Nations resolution, member states are obliged to "discourage" their companies from investing in Namibia. None have actually done so, however. And although Washington supposedly supports the UN resolution on Namibia, it has consistently blocked the implementation of enforcement actions, such as economic sanctions, against South Africa itself.

A commentary on Dugard's study by Neville Rubin cites an example of the British Labour government's violation of the UN prohibition against any dealings with Pretoria that recognize South African control of Namibia. In 1967, Rubin reveals, London reached a double-taxation agreement with Pretoria that explicitly extends the definition of South Africa to include "the territory of South West Africa." The British chancellor of the Exchequer at the time was James Callaghan, the present prime minister.

Jo Morris's essay, "The Black Workers



Namibia News

Black workers at Katutura compound begin general strike on December 13, 1971.

in Namibia," is perhaps the most important in the book. It details the conditions of the Black working class and its growing resistance to South African domination.

The development of mining, manufacturing, and ranching, as well as the forced resettlement of tens of thousands of Blacks, has proletarianized much of the Namibian population. Morris estimates the total employed Black work force at nearly 87,000 (at any given time, there are many thousands more in the "homelands" seeking jobs). These Black workers are concentrated in the most strategic sectors of the economy.

The South African authorities are well aware of the potential threat this Black working class poses to Pretoria's continued control over the colony. They have taken a series of precautions to keep the workers as unorganized, insecure, and dispersed as possible.

The Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance of 1952 is the basic law governing labor relations. Patterned after a similar law in South Africa, it restricts the wages of Blacks and bars them from certain jobs. Although the ordinance contains no overt racial clauses, it stipulates that the term "employee" may not apply to a "native." Black workers are thus subject to the older and more repress-

ive "native administration" laws.

"As in the Republic," Morris writes, "African trade unions are not recognised and attempts to join unions are ruthlessly suppressed. Africans, therefore, are not entitled to strike even in the few circumstances in which a strike by other employees is permitted."

The cornerstone of the apartheid labor policy in Namibia is the migratory labor system, which undercuts working-class stability and gives the authorities a large degree of control over the movement and employment of Black workers.

Under the migratory system, Blacks from the "homelands" are allowed to live in the Police Zone only temporarily and while they have a contract to work there. They must carry identification passes at all times when they are in the "white" areas to prove that they have permission to be there. Of the total Black work force, 43,000, or about half, are contract workers from northern Namibia and southern Angola (the Ovambos, who make up more than 40 percent of the Namibian population, also live in southern Angola).

To ensure that the white-controlled economy always has a ready supply of cheap labor, the "homelands" are kept in utter poverty. In Ovamboland, the largest and most densely populated, the unem-

ployment rate is a staggering 70 percent. Since agricultural production is very low because of the meager rainfall and the poor quality of the land, all Blacks are at least partially dependent on a cash income to buy their basic necessities. Only a tiny proportion can find jobs with the tribal administrations in the "homelands"; the rest must periodically migrate to the Police Zone to earn enough to barely survive.

The conditions of Blacks in the urban areas are nearly as wretched. More than 11,000 Black workers are forced to live in an all-Black ghetto just outside Windhoek called Katutura, which in Herero means "we have no permanent resting place." Even within Katutura, the Black workers have to live in compounds segregated by ethnic origin.

Morris quotes a description of the Ovambo compound by Adam Raphael, a correspondent for the London *Guardian*:

5,000 Ovambos are being housed in circumstances that would disgrace a nineteenth century prison. . . . A visitor can only be appalled by the compound's unrelieved bleakness; the barbed wire fences; the concrete bunks in dark overcrowded rooms in which up to 20 men sleep; the food being prepared with spades and pitchforks; above all, the overwhelming stench of urine which hangs over the compound.

Because of the apartheid labor conditions, the banning of strikes, and the nonrecognition of Black trade unions, the low wages of Black workers in Namibia have remained virtually stationary while the cost of living rises about 12 percent a year. Food prices increase about 17 percent a year. Many large foreign companies in Namibia pay their Black workers just over half of what they pay Black workers in South Africa.

In both South Africa and Namibia, the bare subsistence level for a family of five is measured by the Poverty Datum Line (PDL). In Namibia, the PDL is very conservatively drawn at R81.25 a month. It is slightly lower than the PDL level in South Africa and does not take into consideration the higher cost of food in Namibia. Morris estimates that the majority of the Black population earns less than half of the PDL subsistence figure.

These conditions have naturally bred a deep and widespread discontent among the Namibian masses, which erupted on a mass scale in the general strike of December 1971 to January 1972.

The strike was initiated by a group of students who had been expelled from school for political activities. Some of them later found jobs in Walvis Bay, where they came into contact with the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), the main Namibian nationalist group. In November 1971 they issued a call for a general strike to protest the migratory labor system.

The strike began in the Katutura compound on December 13, 1971, and spread rapidly. Within a few weeks, about 20,000

## Wall Street's Stake

Most of the \$45 million invested in Namibia by American companies is in the mining sector. More than half of the giant Tsumeb Corporation is owned by two U.S. firms, American Metal Climax (AMAX) and Newmont Mining Corporation. Both companies also own more than 75% of the O'okiep Copper Corporation.

Among the other U.S. companies involved in mineral mining or prospecting are the following:

- Nord Resources Corporation owns 100% of a tin and wolfram mine at Krantzberg and prospects for tin, wolfram, silver, and tungsten in the Omaruru area.

- Zapata Norrness Inc., which owns 100% of the Navarro Exploration Corporation, operates the Onganja copper concentrate mine at Seeis and prospects for silver, zinc, lead, and molybdenum near Windhoek.

- Bethlehem Steel carries out joint prospecting with Tsumeb for fluor spar at Grootfontein.

- Phelps Dodge prospects for copper, silver, and zinc at Outjo and in the northeast.

Until 1974, five American oil companies were prospecting for oil off Namibia's coast. Under pressure from church groups and anti-apartheid organizations, however, Texaco, Continental, Getty, and Phillips withdrew from Namibia. Standard Oil still operates there.

Arthur G. McKee and Interspace are involved in the construction of the Rössing uranium mine. Several other firms have offices in Namibia, including Burroughs Machines, Canada Dry, Firestone, General Tire and Rubber, National Cash Register, Royal Crown Cola, and Singer.

Chase Manhattan Bank and Citibank (formerly First National City Bank) are part of a consortium financing the Rössing project. They also provide loans to the South African government.

Black workers had walked off their jobs, crippling many of the major mines and industries and disrupting virtually the entire economy. Strikers held mass meetings to discuss their demands. The principal demand was the abolition of the South-West African Native Labour Association (SWANLA), the agency responsible for recruiting migrant workers.

The strikers also addressed themselves to the lack of democratic rights. At a mass meeting in Ovamboland on January 10, the strikers declared, "Our objective is for human rights to work in peace and order like other people, all over the world."

The authorities declared a state of

emergency in Ovamboland (most of the strikers were Ovambos), banning virtually all political activity. Although an official inquiry later claimed that only eight Blacks were killed, it is believed that several dozen were gunned down by the police.

Hundreds of men and women were rounded up and jailed in crowded steel cages in Ondangua and Oshikati. Some were tortured during interrogation. The tribal authorities assisted the white administration by instituting a reign of terror in the "homelands," breaking up meetings, beating prisoners, and shooting workers.

In his pamphlet *The Namibians of South West Africa*,<sup>3</sup> Peter Fraenkel noted that the South Africans also tried to break the strike by deporting nearly all striking migrant workers to Ovamboland and attempting to recruit new workers elsewhere. But despite the high unemployment rate, they were unsuccessful in finding enough Blacks willing to scab and were thus forced to renegotiate for the return of the Ovambo workers.

Although the strikers eventually won their demand for the abolition of SWANLA, the agency was replaced by individual recruiting bodies controlled by the tribal authorities in the different "homelands." The basic features of the migratory labor system remain unchanged. The general strike did, however, transform the political atmosphere in Namibia. Morris notes:

. . . the strike brought about a new solidarity among Black workers and the realization that Blacks had it in them to cripple the economy of the territory. . . . There has been a notable increase of political activity since early 1972: there have been regular mass meetings; women are politically active for the first time; in Ovamboland over 100 men and women have been flogged for their opposition to the Bantustan system. In August 1973, elections in Ovambo were almost totally boycotted and the *Windhoek Advertiser* reported that over 2,000 pupils stayed away from schools in Ovamboland during the election period as a mark of protest.

Johannes Nangutuuala, the leader of the Strikers Committee in Ovamboland, formed a new party shortly after the strike, the Democratic Development Co-Operative party (DEMCOP), which was composed predominantly of workers. DEMCOP has collaborated closely with SWAPO. Since the general strike, SWAPO has also stepped up its activities and broadened its influence among Namibians. SWAPO guerrillas based in southern Angola and in Zambia have carried out periodic operations from across the border.

The setback of the South African intervention in the Angolan civil war, which proved to the Black masses that Pretoria is not invincible, will be an additional inspiration to the Namibians in their own struggle against South African domination. □

3. London: Minority Rights Group, 1974.



# AROUND THE WORLD



## How Indian Authorities Meet Sterilization Quotas

Municipal authorities in the Indian town of Barsi, Maharashtra, met their targeted amount of sterilizations for the week of January 27 to February 3. As part of Indira Gandhi's population-control strategy, this town of 60,000 inhabitants sterilized 1,000 persons that week.

How did they do it?

The police dragged several hundred men off the streets and drove them in two garbage trucks to a local family-planning clinic. They were physically held down and forced to undergo vasectomies.

Shahu Laxman Ghalake, a peasant from Kavhe, was one of the victims. He filed a complaint against the municipal authorities in which he reported being surrounded on the street by about ten persons. He was thrown into a truck. When he asked where he was being taken, he was beaten. At the hospital he tried to explain that he had already been sterilized. To no avail. He was held down and sterilized once again.

## \$6 Trillion for Merchants of Death

Worldwide expenditures on arms in 1975 soared to \$280 billion at current prices, according to a report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute cited in the June 18 *Christian Science Monitor*.

Since World War II, the total spent on weapons has surpassed \$6 trillion, an

amount roughly equal to this year's gross national product for the entire world, and more than five times the GNP of all colonial and semicolonial countries combined.

As an example of the enormous squandering of resources involved, the institute pointed out that development costs for a single warplane—the U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter—totaled more than eight times the \$83 million spent by the World Health Organization to eradicate smallpox.

## Campaign Launched to Defend Dominican Longshore Union

A campaign in defense of the rights of Dominican longshoremen was announced in New York June 8. The groups launching the effort are the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA) and the Comité pro Defensa del Sindicato Portuario de Arrimo (POASI—Longshoremen's Union of [the town of] Arrimo).

USLA representative Claudio Tavárez explained that POASI headquarters has been under Dominican police control since 1973. The union has a handpicked leadership "installed by the government of President Joaquín Balaguer," he said, "which does not allow the holding of free elections by POASI workers."

Moreover, Tavárez reported that the police have been using POASI headquarters as their barracks since they occupied it.

The USLA spokesman referred to the committee's victorious campaign to free imprisoned leaders of the Central General de Trabajadores (CGT—General Workers Federation) Julio de Peña Valdez, Francisco Antonio Santos, and Eugenio Pérez Cepeda: "If we had success in organizing a campaign to free the leaders of the CGT, we think we can mount a campaign to pressure the Dominican government to cease occupying POASI and permit that union to hold free elections."

## Congressman Has Second Thoughts on \$125 Million Loan to Chile

Henry Reuss, chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee, has expressed doubts about a \$125 million loan extended to the Pinochet government in January.

The loan—negotiated by sixteen major New York, California, and Canadian banks—was supposed to be contingent on

Chile's obtaining a standby loan from the International Monetary Fund. The IMF loan would have meant that agency was supervising Chile's economic policies. However, under international pressure the IMF refused to advance Pinochet the credit.

Reuss pointed out in a letter released June 13 that Chile's monthly inflation rate has almost doubled since last November, and that payments and service on the more than \$4 billion Chilean foreign debt will exhaust 38% of Chile's export earnings in 1976.

He also noted that unemployment in Chile is above 16% and the gross national product declined more than 12% in 1975.

## Left-Wing Priests and Nuns Support Workers in Colombia

Two hundred priests and nuns issued a public attack June 2 on Anibal Cardinal Muñoz Duque, calling him "an accomplice of the system of injustice." The cardinal had earlier suspended some of the priests and prohibited them from celebrating mass after they held outdoor masses in support of striking bank workers.

Workers in the state-owned banks have been on strike for three months against the regime of President Alfonso López Michelsen, who is opposing the demands of the workers in the name of his "anti-inflation" policy. The priests and nuns condemned López Michelsen for maintaining a "cruel situation of hunger and of repression of the just claims of the people," and attacked the cardinal for conferring a religious medal on the president.

## Argentine Police Accused in Deaths of Former Uruguayan Legislators

Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, the conservative Blanco party candidate for president of Uruguay in 1971, has accused the Argentine police of "acting on orders issued by the Uruguayan Government" in the recent murders of two former Uruguayan legislators—Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz.

He pointed out June 2 that although the Argentine government claims it is concerned about the Buenos Aires kidnapping and killing of the men, it has not interviewed a single witness nor looked for fingerprints. This is despite the fact that witnesses reported the kidnappers spent a long time searching the apartments where the victims resided.



'TIGHTEN YOUR BELT'

Pierotti/New York Post

## Nicaragua—Presión Creciente desde Abajo

Por Cecilia López

Mientras, en la mayor parte de América Latina todo el movimiento de estrategia política guerrillera se encuentra en franca retirada, en Nicaragua, donde nunca antes se había logrado consolidar un movimiento guerrillero sólido, aparece, desde finales del 74, una lucha guerrillera que, esta vez, no ha logrado todavía ser sofocada por el régimen dictatorial y represivo de Somoza.

En sus anteriores intentos guerrilleros, como por ejemplo en Bocay en 1963, en Pancasán en 1967, en Yaosca en 1969, etc., el Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional no había logrado sostenerse en las montañas combatiendo más que algunos meses. En la actualidad lleva un año y medio de combates esporádicos y el solo hecho de permanecer todavía en las montañas, es todo un record.

En efecto, la ferocidad del régimen de Somoza ha obligado a la mayor parte del campesinado a huir de las zonas de combate, abandonando sus tierras y sus cosechas. Los guerrilleros se repliegan hacia zonas cada vez menos pobladas en las que existen escasez de caminos de penetración. Los Estados Unidos, mientras tanto, financian el Instituto de Bienestar Campesino, que fomenta cooperativas en la zona y abre rutas de penetración.

En Nicaragua la lucha guerrillera no es algo nuevo. Ya en 1928-1932 el General Augusto C. Sandino había dirigido con éxito una campaña guerrillera contra la intervención de los Estados Unidos. En aquella época la gesta heroica de Sandino, en su lucha contra el imperialismo norteamericano, suscitó un amplio movimiento dentro de los Estados Unidos contra la guerra de intervención y una enorme simpatía y apoyo a la lucha sandinista de parte de diversos sectores progresistas de toda América.

El mismo régimen de Somoza tiene su origen histórico en la lucha de Sandino contra la intervención imperialista norteamericana. En efecto, cuando la presión interna contra la intervención y las derrotas militares sufridas obligan al gobierno norteamericano a retirarse de Nicaragua en 1933, dejan en lugar de los "Marines" un ejército local, la Guardia Nacional, entrenada y equipada por ellos, y colocan a la cabeza de este ejército un general fantoche, fiel servidor de los intereses imperialistas. Este general era Anastasio Somoza, el cual en 1934 asesinó a Sandino y desató un pogrom contra los campesinos de la zona Norte, centro de operaciones de Sandino.

Cuando en 1956 fue asesinado por Rigoberto López Pérez, Somoza ya no era solamente el fantoche nacional representante de los intereses norteamericanos. Durante el período anterior, y basándose, claro está, en su dominio del ejército, se había enriquecido personalmente convirtiéndose en el sector más fuerte y dinámico de las clases dominantes nacionales, había concertado alianzas económicas diversas con prácticamente todos los sectores dominantes dentro de la economía nacional. En resumen, el poder político que ejercía de una forma dictatorial, lo había utilizado para integrarse plenamente a las clases dominantes y convertirse en uno de sus sectores más fuertes. Esto creó una situación contradictoria. Por una parte, el ejercicio del poder político en su beneficio económico particular afecta otros sectores de las clases dominantes que preferirían las leyes ordinarias de la competencia capitalista, creando enormes tensiones y oposición en los sectores afectados. Por otra parte, esta misma situación de uso en beneficio económico propio del monopolio del poder político provoca una fuerte tendencia a asociarse económicamente con Somoza para beneficiarse de una forma colectiva de los privilegios que brinda el uso arbitrario del poder del Estado.

Las clases dominantes se han visto, pues, históricamente sometidas a ambas tendencias; en ocasiones la dominante ha sido la de rechazo del régimen que les afecta económicamente, en otras circunstancias ha sido dominante la tendencia a congraciarse y asociarse con él. La mayor parte de las veces ambas tendencias han coexistido en sectores económicos diversos, de forma que las diferentes coaliciones de oposición al régimen somocista han sido débiles y vacilantes. Somoza ha podido fácilmente dividirlos, aliarse con unos sectores contra otros, etc. Por otra parte, Somoza creó una burocracia militar cuya principal fuente de ingresos se encontraba ligada a actividades al margen de la ley. La lumpen-oficialidad garantiza la parte más importante de sus ingresos a través de cuotas a la prostitución, monopolio de los juegos de azar, extorsiones a la ciudadanía, etc. Esto creó una capa social bastante amplia y económicamente interesada en el mantenimiento del aparato del gobierno somocista.

En diferentes ocasiones, oficiales descontentos y de cierta honestidad urdieron complots dentro del ejército contra Somoza. Pero la estructura social de la Guardia

Nacional les impidió encontrar en ella una suficiente base social como para presentar una alternativa seria.

Por todas esas razones, cuando Somoza es asesinado en 1956, sus hijos pudieron, sin grandes dificultades, controlar el poder del Estado. No era simplemente que controlaran al ejército, sino que el ejército veía en ellos la garantía de continuidad de su modo de vida, y la oposición burguesa en su conjunto no veía al régimen como su enemigo.

El producto de esta situación es la enorme estabilidad de que ha gozado el régimen somocista a pesar del enorme descontento popular que le rodea. Esta estabilidad lo ha hecho la punta de lanza del imperialismo americano en la zona centro-americana. Fue en Nicaragua, por ejemplo, donde se entrenaron los mercenarios contratados por la CIA para derrocar al gobierno de Arbenz en Guatemala en 1954 y de donde salieron igualmente los aviones que bombardearon Guatemala. Las tropas nicaragüenses intervinieron también en Costa Rica en 1948 y en los 50.

La dictadura somocista aparece a los ojos de cualquier ciudadano nicaragüense como la expresión más dolorosa de la ausencia completa de libertades democráticas, como el imperio de la arbitrariedad y el abuso, como la tortura y el asesinato continuados descarada e impunemente durante más de 49 años. La dictadura somocista es casi unánimemente odiada y repudiada por los más amplios sectores de la población. Sin embargo, la verdadera oposición a Somoza no se encuentra entre las clases dominantes o las vacilantes y enclenques clases medias, sino entre los sectores más explotados y oprimidos del país: el campesinado y el proletariado urbano.

Durante décadas el campesinado ha sido víctima de todo tipo de abusos, de expulsiones de sus tierras, de asesinatos, de persecuciones y multas, de vigilancia policial despiadada. Se puede decir que en el campo nicaragüense el emitir una opinión política puede costar la vida. Esta situación ha favorecido una despiadada sobreexplotación del campesinado que ha beneficiado al conjunto de las clases dominantes y ha sumido a la población campesina en una espantosa miseria.

En Nicaragua, la acumulación y concentración interna de capitales se ha producido en los últimos y decisivos 40 años, dentro del contexto político de la dependencia imperialista y de la dictadura somocista.



ta. Pero, junto con esta acumulación y concentración de capitales y junto con las inversiones extranjeras, ha nacido y crecido lentamente el proletariado urbano, alcanzando en sus luchas formas de organización de clase.

El proletariado nicaragüense tuvo la desgracia de caer desde sus inicios bajo la influencia ideológica traidora del estalinismo. El Partido Socialista Nicaragüense (el PC criollo), es fundado en la época de los Frentes Populares y nace como aliado de Somoza contra el fascismo! Somoza les facilita el Gimnasio Nacional para su Congreso de Fundación, consigue el apoyo del PS en la campaña electoral y después de ella, encarcela a todos los dirigentes y les deporta a una isla en el litoral atlántico.

Jamás desde la fundación del claudicante y traidor PSN, le ha sido de ninguna forma disputada, por ninguna organización de izquierda, la hegemonía que el PSN tiene en las organizaciones de clase del proletariado nicaragüense. A pesar de ello, este proletariado joven ha dado muestras repetidas veces de su vigor, de su combatividad, de su solidaridad de clase y de su antisomocismo. En varias ocasiones sus luchas han arriesgado desencadenar huelgas generales locales y hasta movimientos en escala nacional. Ahí ha estado presente el PSN para detener las luchas, para negociar rápidamente y desmovilizar las masas, etc. Pero es evidente también que en esas ocasiones el conjunto de la burguesía ha sentido alivio en saber que el ejército corrompido y el sátrapa despiadado se encontraban a su lado contra los trabajadores en huelga.

En esto se encuentra la clave social de comprensión de las vacilaciones de la oposición burguesa al régimen somocista. El régimen corrompido de Somoza es al mismo tiempo el garante y el ejecutor de determinadas formas de propiedad en el campo. Es él quien garantiza y ejecuta la expropiación de tierras al campesinado, y quien defiende la nueva propiedad nacida del crimen de familias enteras campesinas, sobre todo en la zona Norte del país.

Por esa razón, la dinámica misma de la oposición al régimen somocista es completamente diferente entre las clases dominantes y entre el campesinado y proletariado urbano. Para el campesinado y el proletariado, la oposición al régimen somocista es la forma concreta que reviste su oposición a las formas de propiedad existentes. En las clases explotadas se encuentra de una forma combinada e indisoluble la lucha contra la dictadura y la lucha por su emancipación social.

Es por esto que la oposición burguesa jamás ha cometido el error de "movilizar a las masas" contra el régimen somocista. He ahí la profunda debilidad de toda oposición que renuncia de antemano a la movilización de las masas. La razón es sencilla: las masas no tomarían ningún tiempo en descubrir que el burgués o

## Algunas Estadísticas de Nicaragua

**Area:** 57, 143 mi<sup>2</sup>.

**Población:** 2.5 millones de habitantes.

**Tasa de crecimiento de la población:** 3% al año.

**Relación entre la población urbana y rural:** 49% de la población es urbana (el 20% corresponde a Managua) y el 51% es rural.

**Exportaciones:** 70-80% procedente de la agricultura (algodón, café, carne, azúcar).

**Desempleo:** 40%. 60% de subempleo en la agricultura.

**Distribución de ingresos:** El 50% inferior de la población tiene un ingreso medio de \$90 al año (15% del Ingreso Nacional Bruto). El 5% superior tiene una renta media de \$18.000 al año (40% del Ingreso Nacional Bruto).

**Propiedad de la tierra:** 43.2% de las propiedades (menores de 7 hectáreas) ocupan el 2.2% de la superficie cultivada. El 1.9% de las propiedades (mayores de 350 hectáreas) ocupan el 47.6% de la tierra cultivada.

**Analfabetismo:** 80% en el campo, 60% en la ciudad.

**Salud:** 6.8 doctores y 14.2 camas de hospital por cada 10,000 habitantes (antes del terremoto). Tasa de mortalidad infantil: 20%. El 60% de las muertes, de niños menores de 14 años.

terrateniente más opositor de Somoza es, en el fondo, el cómplice de Somoza que se beneficia de las formas de propiedad agraria, producto directo de la bota militar somocista, y de las relaciones obrero-patronales impuestas por la Guardia Nacional.

Desde comienzos de los 50 entró en la escena política nacional un nuevo sector: el estudiantado. De un inicio puramente anti somocista, el movimiento estudiantil se vio rápidamente radicalizado en la persona de sus más honestos e inteligentes dirigentes por la participación en él de estudiantes con origen de clase oprimida. Esta radicalización se movió en el sentido de un doble rechazo. Rechazaban al mismo tiempo a los partidos burgueses tradicionales y al claudicante PSN, pero se veían atraídos por la Revolución Rusa y el socialismo en general, sin encontrar una forma específica de conciliar su rechazo inconsciente del estalinismo con su atractivo por el socialismo, sus aspiraciones revolucionarias, con la política conciliadora de clase del PSN.

Para toda esta generación de líderes estudiantiles, enormemente radicalizada y perseguida, con sus principales dirigentes en el exilio o en la cárcel y que contaba ya con la experiencia de enormes movilizaciones y masacres estudiantiles, el triunfo de la Revolución Cubana fue toda una inspiración. Lógicamente, se dirigieron a Cuba y encontraron en ésta el más completo y decidido apoyo.

Sin embargo, todo el entusiasmo y la honestidad de estos jóvenes no fue suficiente como para dotarles de la principal arma de lucha: una comprensión revolucionaria y científica de la lucha de clases, una estrategia política central: la construcción del partido revolucionario. En realidad, los dirigentes cubanos les podían ayudar muy poco en este aspecto pues ellos mismos no habían asimilado de una forma precisa la dinámica de las fuerzas motrices de su mismo proceso.

En estas condiciones, los líderes radicalizados nicaragüenses asimilaron de la

Revolución Cubana sus aspectos meramente técnico-militares y la juventud en el país recibió de Cuba un soplo de energía y entusiasmo. El triunfo de la Revolución Cubana significó el inicio de un enorme flujo de luchas estudiantiles contra el régimen y el punto de partida de una serie ininterrumpida de expediciones militares contra el régimen somocista. Durante todo este proceso fueron perdiendo la vida en aventuras militares, lo mejor de esa generación.

Sería falso pensar que el movimiento guerrillero en Nicaragua surgió sólo a partir del triunfo de la Revolución Cubana. En realidad, decenas de intentos guerrilleros anteriores al triunfo de la Revolución Cubana vieron la luz y fracasaron. Lo peculiar de los movimientos guerrilleros en Nicaragua, después del 59, es que presentaban para sus protagonistas una clara perspectiva de Revolución Socialista, pero sus métodos de trabajo político siguieron ligados a un esquema técnico-militar, abandonando de una forma casi total la organización y movilización de las masas.

El Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), fundado en 1962, fue la organización que centralizó, desde esa época hasta ahora, toda la "lucha armada" contra el régimen de Somoza. La base social de esta organización fue desde sus inicios estudiantil, en la ciudad, y pequeños propietarios agrícolas, en el campo. Después de varios fracasos, en 1964 durante un período breve surgió el proyecto de construir un partido legal de masas, pero este proyecto fue rápidamente abandonado. A pesar de combatir verbalmente al PSN, el FSLN jamás intentó seriamente ser una alternativa en la práctica de la lucha de clases frente al estalinismo. De esa forma, a pesar de la inmensa simpatía nacional gozada por el Frente Sandinista en todos los sectores oprimidos de la población, no ha tenido la estructura organizativa social que le permita dirigir de una forma cualquiera el movimiento de masa. Así, mientras el FSLN predicaba el

abstencionismo electoral, la oposición burguesa, apoyada por el PSN, logró reunir 80,000 personas el 22 de enero de 1967 en una manifestación electorera que fue violentamente reprimida y en la que murieron centenares de personas bajo las balas de la Guardia Nacional.

La historia política reciente del país puede resumirse en la sucesión familiar del poder del Estado, en las coaliciones con Somoza realizadas por la oposición burguesa, en la política colaboracionista del estalinismo y en las acciones aventureras, aisladas de las masas y llenas de fracasos, del FSLN.

Así, en 1957 es elegido Presidente Luis Somoza, hijo de Anastasio; en 1963, un fantoche ocupa el puesto mientras el poder efectivo sigue estando en manos de Anastasio Somoza hijo, jefe del ejército, quien se hace elegir en 1967. En 1970 hace un gobierno de coalición con la oposición burguesa, a la que aparta en 1972, para elegirse de nuevo en 1974.

Sin embargo, a partir de 1973 el proletariado urbano comienza claramente a tomar auge, una huelga sucede a otra hasta que, a comienzos de 1974, se produce un movimiento enorme, tomas de iglesias, huelga hospitalaria, movilización en barrios pobres, huelga de choferes, huelga de empleados de la construcción, etc. La mayor parte de los observadores políticos convienen en admitir que fue sólo la intervención del PSN, realizando una rápida negociación del 10% de aumento salarial y procediendo acto seguido a desmovilizar por todos los medios los sindicatos que controlaba, lo único que impidió la expansión explosiva del movimiento. A tal punto fue seria la movilización que la Guardia Nacional, que no vacilaba en reprimir por la menor razón, se encontró prácticamente paralizada e impotente.

La victoria más notoria de este período fue una amplia libertad de prensa de facto y una enorme facilidad de movimientos para las clases trabajadoras.

Mientras tanto, al calor de los acontecimientos se había formado la Unión Democrática de Liberación (UDEL), una agrupación electorera frentepopulista en la cual algunos partidos de oposición burguesa ponen el programa político de gobierno y el PSN pone las masas. UDEL se presenta como una alternativa colaboracionista de clase frente al régimen somocista, y la falta de una alternativa marxista revolucionaria coloca a las masas en una situación de confusión ideológica y de dependencia política frente a la burguesía.

El Frente Sandinista, mientras tanto, vive al margen de la vida política real. Nada es más clarificante de esta situación que los sucesos de diciembre de 1974. Durante todo el transcurso del año 74 el movimiento de masas se fue acentuando,

nuevos sindicatos aparecieron, las huelgas se sucedían sin que el régimen pudiera hacer nada para remediarlo. Algunos sectores laborales hablaban de la preparación de huelgas generalizadas y el régimen somocista vacilaba en imponer el estado de sitio, no fuera a precipitar el movimiento que se avecinaba. En esas condiciones aparece el Frente Sandinista dando un golpe espectacular. Durante una fiesta en honor del embajador norteamericano se cuestra una cantidad de diplomáticos y miembros prominentes del régimen somocista y exige la libertad de los presos políticos sandinistas y un millón de dólares, así como aumentos salariales a la Guardia Nacional. Somoza se ve obligado a ceder. Pero al mismo tiempo el golpe es tan fuerte que paraliza al movimiento obrero por temor a las represalias. Somoza aprovecha para decretar estado de sitio, poner la más estricta censura de prensa que el país haya conocido, y para desatar una sistemática represión en los sindicatos. Durante meses no hubo golpe alguno serio contra el FSLN y todo el peso del régimen cayó sobre la clase obrera. A pesar de ello se produjeron algunas huelgas pero tan aisladas y en condiciones tan difíciles que para la dirigencia del PSN no le fue difícil desmovilizarlas, sembrando el pánico y la confusión.

El FSLN no ha aprendido políticamente mucho en sus catorce años de existencia. Mientras tanto, se ha visto sometido a todas las tendencias y contradicciones de los medios en los que se ha movido. Su estrecha vinculación política con la dirección de la Revolución Cubana, por ejemplo, no podía dejar de afectarle cuando ésta fué moviéndose desde 1968 hacia una política exterior oportunista de apoyo a regímenes "nacionalistas" tipo Perú o Panamá. Esa evolución marcó fuertemente al FSLN reforzando en él las posiciones más de derecha, de modo que en la actualidad aboga por una revolución por etapas y sitúa su objetivo inmediato como de lucha contra el régimen somocista e instauración de una democracia burguesa nacionalista. Ellos lo resumen en la conocida fórmula estaliniana de lucha antimperialista.

Pero la misma vida interna de la organización se ha visto afectada por una política que no tiene en absoluto en cuenta la educación política seria de sus militantes, su vinculación con la lucha real de clases, etc. Las tendencias militarizantes han dominado plenamente la organización, adoptando cada vez más métodos expeditivos de solucionar problemas internos. Algunos casos, hechos públicos, de sus métodos, le ha acarreado bastante desprestigio. En diciembre de 1974, por ejemplo, algunos prisioneros políticos sandinistas ante una Corte Marcial erigida por Somoza hicieron declaraciones públicas según las cuales se habían producido toda una serie de asesinatos internos sin juicio alguno, motivados por rivalidades

políticas o por celos pasionales. Así, Narciso Cepeda, heroico combatiente campesino desde 1961, de gran dedicación a la lucha y gran honestidad, apareció asesinado y sus ejecutores relataron fríamente cómo lo habían "ajusticiado" por "diferencias" con la dirección y ayudaron a desenterrar el cadáver que apareció fotografiado en los principales diarios del país.

Sin embargo, a pesar de sus fracasos, de su desvinculación con la lucha de clases, del carácter militar y no político revolucionario de su organización y de su centralismo y verticalismo organizativo, el FSLN sigue apareciendo ante todo el país como el único sector realmente opuesto al régimen somocista. Por esta razón, la radicalización que sufre el país y la creciente decepción que provoca el estalinismo, no encuentran otra forma de expresarse más que a través de simpatía hacia el FSLN o el Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (FER), su organización estudiantil. En ninguna otra situación la ausencia de una organización marxista revolucionaria es más trágica.

Después de 40 años de dictadura, las demandas democráticas sólo interesan realmente a las clases explotadas y son susceptibles de movilizar a los más amplios sectores de la población, pero la creciente radicalización no coloca todavía al régimen en una situación sin salida porque la juventud radicalizada no tiene el contexto organizativo revolucionario que le permita comprender que es en la lucha de clases, en todas sus manifestaciones, que se educan las masas a la revolución y no en una "lucha armada" aislada y minoritaria.

Las demandas democráticas aparecen cada vez más llenas de un contenido de lucha social. La vinculación de las demandas democráticas en Nicaragua con la revolución socialista se encuentra basada en que las únicas clases sociales interesadas y capaces de conquistar la democracia son precisamente las clases sociales para las que democracia significa al mismo tiempo superación de sus problemas socio-económicos.

Incapaz de enfrentarse a la ardua tarea de construir un partido revolucionario que movilice y dirija a las masas en base a consignas centradas en la vida misma de las masas y en sus necesidades más inmediatas, la guerrilla se debate en las montañas en un combate secreto para las masas.

A pesar de la resistencia enorme de los sandinistas, la historia no se está escribiendo en las montañas ocultas de la Segovia o de la costa atlántica nicaragüense. La historia decisiva de Nicaragua se escribe en el campo y en las ciudades en las luchas de las masas, y el problema fundamental de su desarrollo sigue siendo la crisis existente de dirección revolucionaria. □