



Peruvian Regime Deports Hugo Blanco to Sweden

HUGO BLANCO. Peasant leader in La Convención, Peru, in December 1975.

Israeli Terrorism in Uganda
South Africa Forced to Make Language Concession
Bitter Strike Confronts Bolivian Dictatorship
Mexican Workers Debate Independent Political Action
Carvalho Steals the Show From Portuguese CP
Angola—Behind the MPLA's 'Socialist' Mask

Documents

French Trotskyists Debate Portuguese Elections
Current Crisis of Chinese Bureaucracy

Israeli Terrorism in Uganda

By David Frankel

Thirty-one persons were killed July 4 when Israeli commandos raided Uganda's Entebbe Airport, where a planeload of hostages was being held by a group of pro-Palestinian hijackers. The Israeli regime claimed that its "rescue operation" was designed to save lives, but this is a lie on the face of it.

If the lives of the hostages were really Tel Aviv's main concern, it could have negotiated their release without any bloodshed by simply arranging the release of several dozen Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli, Swiss, French, West German, and Kenyan prisons. There can be little doubt that the governments concerned would have cooperated if pressured by the Israeli regime.

But Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin had other plans from the very beginning. "The Israel Defense Forces and the intelligence community lost not a single hour required for thinking, planning and preparation," he told the Israeli parliament following the raid.

In the same speech, Rabin characterized the raid as "Israel's contribution to the worldwide battle against terrorism." Rabin, of course, was not talking about the massive terrorism inflicted by governments—whether that of his American supporters in Vietnam, of Pinochet in Chile, or of his own regime, which is responsible for driving a whole people out of its homeland.

No, Rabin's "battle against terrorism" has nothing to do with fighting the real terrorists. But equally important, *its real target is not individual terrorism either.* Although it was a futile act of individual terrorism that played into the hands of the Zionists, enabling Rabin to mount his attack, the real target was the struggle of the Arab and African masses against imperialist domination.

As far as Rabin is concerned, the Palestinians become "terrorists" as soon as they challenge the policies of the Israeli state. When Palestinians living under Israeli rule stand up and demand their rights, it is standard procedure for the Israeli regime to frame them up on charges of being terrorists.

Similarly, the apartheid regime in South Africa labels the freedom fighters in Namibia and in its own cities as terrorists. One of its main pieces of repressive legislation is the "Terrorism Act." In Rhodesia as well, the Africans struggling

for majority rule are denounced as terrorists.

The imperialist press the world over sang hosannas to the Israeli raid—the reaction was almost instinctive. The *New York Times* applauded "the courageously conceived and brilliantly executed" operation in a July 6 editorial titled, "A Legend Is Born."

One British daily, *The Sun*, recalled the days of empire in a July 5 opinion column hailing the raid as "a bold, brilliant stroke. . . a daring action worthy of Britain in the 19th century. . ."

The rhetoric in the *Financial Times* was not as flashy, but it was more specific. The London daily said July 5: "Militarily, the rescue is a reminder that intervention by force of arms can work at a time when it had become fashionable to think that force is counterproductive."

The implications were discussed in greater detail in a July 6 dispatch from Addis Ababa by *Washington Post* correspondent David B. Ottaway. He noted:

The Israeli raid on Uganda's Entebbe Airport highlights once again the extreme vulnerability of African nations to outside interference of all kinds. . . .

In terms of self-defense African states seem just about as helpless today as they were 12 years ago when American planes and Belgian paratroopers were used to rescue the white hostages of leftist Congolese rebels holding out in Stanleyville. . . .

This lesson seems particularly relevant in East Africa, where conflicts between neighboring states are nearing explosion all the way from Sudan in the north to Mozambique in the far south.

Another aspect of the Israeli raid was pointed out by *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Francis Ofner. "It cannot have escaped the notice of the Libyan rulers," Ofner said in a July 6 article, "that this [Entebbe] operation places their own country well within easy reach of the Israeli armed forces."

Thus, the complaint of the Somali ambassador to Uganda that "this is the first time the big powers have come to invade an independent [African] country" reflected an understandable uneasiness.

The imperialists have attempted to brush aside the protests against the violation of Uganda's sovereignty. A typical argument was given by the editors of the *New York Times*, who said July 5, "Against the predictable—and hypocritical—cries of 'violation of international

law,' the Israelis have every justification to take any step within their power to neutralize the criminal behavior of hijackers. . . ."

And did the Israelis also "have every justification" in gunning down twenty Ugandan soldiers who had nothing to do with the hijacking? "Most of the hostages had no complaints about the attitude of the Ugandan soldiers," the *Washington Post* reported July 5.

The Israeli regime accused the Ugandan troops of guarding the hostages, but this was refuted July 5 by the pilot of the hijacked plane. "The watch over us was exclusively secured by the hijackers," he said. "Ugandan soldiers were never substituted for the hijackers."

By ordering the murder of those Ugandan soldiers, Rabin was simply giving a demonstration of the type of relations that he would like to see between the imperialist powers and the colonial and semicolonial countries that suffer under their exploitation.

Not only was the Israeli raid a blow in favor of imperialist domination of the world, it was also racist to the core. This was reflected in the total lack of concern for the dead Ugandans, as if they were just so much human garbage. It was also reflected in the propaganda campaign designed to win acceptance for the raid by whipping up sentiment against the regime of Ugandan President Idi Amin Dada.

Amin is a capitalist dictator. American imperialism arms and finances rulers similar to him in every corner of the world, from "Baby Doc" Duvalier in Haiti to the shah of Iran. What is really involved in the campaign against Amin is an affirmation of the right of the imperialist powers to have the final say in the internal affairs of Uganda—and ultimately, of every semicolonial country.

In his column in the July 7 *New York Times*, C.L. Sulzberger took up this question under the cover of how to battle terrorism. After looking at the Israeli success at Entebbe, he said:

One is forced to consider the wisdom of national governments preparing some kind of small, effective, mobile force to be used in counterterrorist moves as the Israelis used special troops to eliminate Arab terrorist blackmail from Uganda. . . .

France maintains such a force, rarely advertised, called the "Force d'Intervention." . . .

The idea is that if something considered harmful to French national interests is touched off by terrorists in Francophone Africa, the force intervenes. It has done so already, without much fuss.

Should the United States or other countries create a select, disciplined antiterrorist unit capable of dealing with political blackmail?

While the Israeli raid is being used in an attempt to legitimize the idea of imperialist military intervention around the world, it is also becoming a vehicle for renewed propaganda in behalf of the death penalty.

A July 6 Associated Press dispatch from Jerusalem reported, "Israeli cabinet officers were reported considering the death penalty for those convicted of terrorism so they would not serve as bait for ransom demands."

On this question as well, the Israeli colonial-settler state is marching in step with the most reactionary and oppressive forces in the world. It was not for nothing that U.S. President Ford sent a July 4 letter to Rabin expressing his "great satisfaction" at the Entebbe attack. □

Death Penalty: Legalized Murder

The U.S. Supreme Court acted to uphold the death penalty July 2, just in time for the American bicentennial celebration. The decision was a blow to the American working people, and especially to the most exploited and oppressed.

"The victims of this barbaric decision will be found disproportionately among Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans," Peter Camejo and Willie Mae Reid, the Socialist Workers party candidates for president and vice-president, pointed out in a July 7 statement.

There are more than 600 prisoners on death row in the United States—56 percent of them nonwhite. Blacks are nearly five times more likely than whites to be condemned, in proportion to their percentage in the population.

In their statement, Camejo and Reid said:

This is what the Democrats and Republicans have to offer the American people. They preach "law and order" while their secret police agencies carry out assassinations and their war machine commits mass murders.

The Supreme Court says the death penalty is necessary for "retribution." This "eye-for-an-eye" concept of justice is totally reactionary. It is lynch-mob justice.

Where is the "retribution" for the thousands of murdered Vietnamese, the Chileans, and the Attica prisoners?

The biggest criminals of all—the Henry Kissingers and Nelson Rockefellers—go scot-free.

There are two standards of justice in this country: one for the rich and one for the poor.

The real purpose of the death penalty, Camejo and Reid said, is to serve "as a weapon to terrorize and intimidate the people of this country. . . . It is one more warning to those who would fight for their rights and against their oppression."

"What is needed now," the socialist candidates conclude, "is a massive outcry by the American people against the death penalty. . . ."

"We must join forces to stay the hands of the executioners." □

In This Issue

Closing News Date: July 12, 1976

PERU	1092	Hugo Blanco Deported to Sweden —by Judy White
SOUTH AFRICA	1093	Pretoria Forced to Make Language Concession —by Ernest Harsch
SOVIET UNION	1094	Bukovsky Wages Hunger Strike in Prison
SPAIN	1094	CP Chief Seeks 'More Rational' Strategy
BOLIVIA	1095	Bitter Strike Confronts Banzer Dictatorship
ANGOLA	1096	Behind the MPLA's 'Socialist' Mask —by Ernest Harsch
MEXICO	1098	Workers Debate Independent Political Action
ARGENTINA	1101	French Jurists Denounce Junta
PORTUGAL	1102	Carvalho Steals the Show From CP —by Harry Farrar
EGYPT	1104	'Trotskyists' Released From Sadat's Jails
NEWS ANALYSIS	1090	Israeli Terrorism in Uganda —by David Frankel
	1091	Death Penalty: Legalized Murder
AROUND THE WORLD	1110	
SELECTIONS		
FROM THE LEFT	1108	
BOOKS	1106	When Women Speak Out—reviewed by Rebecca Finch
	1107	A Strategy to Fight Racist and Fascist Attacks —reviewed by Fred Feldman
CAPITALISM		
FOULS THINGS UP	1105	
DOCUMENTS	1100	The Current Crisis of the Chinese Bureaucracy
	1111	French Trotskyists Debate Strategy in Portuguese Elections
	1114	GAS Position on Portuguese Elections
	1114	Former Political Prisoners Appeal for Dzhemilev
FROM OUR READERS	1120	
DRAWINGS	1092	Hugo Blanco; 1094, Vladimir Bukovsky; 1103, General Ramalho Eanes—by Copain
EN ESPAÑOL:		
PORTUGAL	1115	Izquierda Cayó en la Trampa de Carvalho —por Gerry Foley
BOLIVIA	1118	Bolivia Bajo Estado de 'Excepción' —por Judy White
UNION SOVIETICA	1119	Victoria Parcial Sobre la Represión del Kremlin—por Marilyn Vogt

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Hugo Blanco Deported to Sweden

By Judy White

Hugo Blanco, well-known Peruvian revolutionist and leader of a mass peasant movement in the department of Cuzco in the 1960s, was deported to Sweden July 10. Blanco had been arrested July 3 by the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP), a political unit of the national police. At 1:30 a.m. the PIP picked him up at his brother's home in Cuzco, where he had been visiting for more than a week.

Two days later Blanco was flown to the headquarters of Seguridad del Estado (State Security) in Lima. For most of the time prior to his deportation, he was held incommunicado. No charges were placed against him.

Blanco's arrest was part of a roundup of at least 300 students, workers, and what the Morales Bermúdez regime called "criminals." The roundup took place in the two days following the junta's July 1 declaration of a state of emergency throughout Peru.

The official excuse for the state of emergency declaration suspending all civil rights was that there were "certain political groups who are trying to foment disruptions of public order." The "disruptions" the regime was referring to were mass demonstrations in Lima and major provincial cities in protest of the draconian austerity measures the government announced June 30. (See *Intercontinental Press*, July 12, p. 1074.)

The July 3 issue of the Paris daily *Le Monde* reported that the protests began at dawn on July 1 in the slums surrounding the Peruvian capital. The 1.5 million inhabitants of these slums took to the streets calling for an end to military rule and a rise in wages. They were met by armed police and tanks. Police fired on the protesters to disperse them, killing one person.

Meanwhile, inmates of one of Peru's jails joined the protest. Their revolt was crushed swiftly, leaving four prisoners dead and thirty-one wounded.

A further step to clamp down on the mass movement was taken by the Morales Bermúdez regime on July 3. The twelve major daily and weekly news publications in the country were banned on the pretext they were trying to divide the armed forces.

Deportation of political opponents is a favorite tactic of the Peruvian junta. On June 16 the junta announced that it was expelling Ricardo Díaz Chávez from the country. Díaz Chávez is a well-known labor lawyer who had recently been



HUGO BLANCO

released from prison as the result of international protest. The junta claimed it was deporting him for his role in a strike of workers at Manufacturas Nylon S.A. outside of Lima. The attorney and his family were put on a plane for Madrid.

Hugo Blanco had also been the object of this procedure in the past. In September 1971, only a few months following his release after serving seven years for his role in the peasant movement, he was picked up by the Peruvian police, held incommunicado twenty-four hours, and driven to the airport where he was put on a plane bound for Panama. From there he was flown to Mexico, where he was held by the authorities until international protest won him freedom and a temporary permit to remain in that country.

This was the start of more than four years Blanco was forced to spend in exile, driven from one country to another until he was finally granted permission to return to his native land in late 1975. Now he has again been forced into the difficult existence of exile.

Although Blanco was not directly involved in the protests against Morales Bermúdez's austerity program, he has been speaking and writing on the key tasks facing the Peruvian working class in the struggle to take control of their own

lives. He has authored a series of articles in the Peruvian Trotskyist newspaper *Palabra Socialista*, which he edits.

In the April 6 issue of the paper, he said:

In 1973 the Chilean working class was on the verge of taking power. However, instead of the working class doing this, Pinochet did. Why? Because the leadership of the workers led them to trust in forces other than themselves. But this was not the first time such a thing happened to the proletariat.

In 1965 something similar happened in Indonesia.

In 1952 the Bolivian working class destroyed the bourgeois army in the course of a few days. But it did not have confidence in its own ability to rule and turned power over to Paz Estenssoro. Now, as we know, there is a gorilla dictatorship in Bolivia.

In 1955 the Argentine working class was smashed because it trusted Perón instead of trusting itself.

In the 1930s the Spanish workers supported a bourgeois government instead of having confidence in themselves. That is why Franco came to power.

Blanco explained that Peruvian workers need a political party to give them the necessary confidence in themselves, a confidence that would arise from studying the struggles of the workers in Peru and throughout the world.

Starting with a handful of members, Blanco said, such a party can ultimately lead the workers to power, as the Bolshevik party did in Russia. Basing itself on the lessons of past struggles, it can apply them to the current fights taking place. By carrying out a consistently revolutionary policy, the handful of members will demonstrate the need to build the party so that its teachings can reach broader masses of the oppressed.

Blanco went on to examine the shortcuts attempted by other groups on the left and ended with an appeal to the Peruvian working class to join the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party), the Peruvian section of the Fourth International, to fight for the socialist transformation of the country. "In Peru today this is of prime importance since there are currents who try to lead the workers to trust the junta or some other sector of the bourgeoisie."

More than anything it is Blanco's uncompromising opposition to the policies of the so-called "revolutionary" junta that drove the Morales Bermúdez regime to deport him. It hopes that by putting thousands of miles between this revolutionary leader and the Peruvian masses it can put a brake on the mass protest. □

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Pretoria Forced to Make Language Concession

By Ernest Harsch

On July 6, less than three weeks after the massive Black uprisings that shook South Africa, the racist white minority regime was forced to concede to the demands of Black students, parents, and teachers that the compulsory use of Afrikaans as a language of instruction in Black schools be ended. Such a concession by Pretoria is unprecedented in South Africa's recent history.

The attempt by the Vorster regime to impose Afrikaans on Black students in the Johannesburg area had triggered a series of student boycotts and protests in May and June in Soweto, a city of more than one million Blacks. To Blacks in South Africa, Afrikaans represents the language of the oppressor. It is used by the Boers among the white population and is the language of the police, the courts, and the government.

On June 16, about 10,000 Black high-school students staged a protest in Soweto against the regulation. The students were viciously attacked by the police, who fired directly into the crowd. The murders of the students enraged the entire Black population, leading to the spontaneous uprisings in Soweto and many other Black townships in the Johannesburg and Pretoria areas.

According to Michiel C. Botha, the minister of Bantu administration and development and Bantu education, the principals of Black schools can now choose to teach in either of the two official languages, English or Afrikaans, after the fourth grade. (African students are taught in their native African languages during the first four grades.)

Although the concession is a major one from the point of view of the intransigent white supremacist regime, it will do little to satisfy the basic grievances of Black students or of the Black population as a whole.

Winnie Mandela, the wife of imprisoned African nationalist leader Nelson Mandela, pointed out, "As long as there is Bantu education there will be unrest. Small concessions are not a solution." ("Bantu education" is the regime's segregated and inferior educational program for Blacks.)

The Afrikaans language issue was only the spark that set off the uprisings. The thousands of Blacks who poured into the streets vented their fury against all symbols of white authority and expressed their hatred of the entire apartheid system.

In fact, the racist regime's concession—however minor it may be in the context of

its overall apartheid policy—could encourage Blacks to press other, more fundamental demands.

The July 7 *Washington Post* quoted a white South African journalist as saying, "For two years they [the students] got no place with quiet protests. But five days of demonstrations finally drew sufficient attention to the issue and got some action. Unless the government moves quickly on other flashpoints, it'll happen again."

The American imperialists, who back the apartheid regime, have also expressed a fear that Blacks will be emboldened by the concession. An editorial in the July 8 *New York Times* commented:

The concession is too late because it comes after the black majority had resorted to violence, which, as Mr. Vorster's concession now proves, can result in some gains. If Mr. Vorster and his colleagues had deliberately set their minds to radicalizing their country's black population and convincing its elite leadership elements that active, violent resistance is better than appeals to reason and humanity, they could hardly have done a more effective job of education.

Since the apartheid system has been maintained primarily through massive repression, the white rulers realize that any sign of weakness on their part could prove fatal. It was their determination to teach the Black population a "lesson" and to maintain an image of invincible white power that underlay the brutality with which the regime crushed the rebellions and launched the subsequent witch-hunt.

Although the official toll of Blacks killed during the suppression of the uprisings stands at 174, the actual figure may be much higher. According to a report by Denis Herbstein in the June 27 *London Sunday Times*, "Unofficially, it might be twice that number, to judge by doctors' reports."

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the head of the KwaZulu "homeland," was quoted in the June 26 weekly edition of the *Johannesburg Star* as saying, "Black leaders believed several hundred Blacks had been killed in the riots."

An official statement issued June 25 said that 1,298 persons were arrested during the uprisings. According to a July 1 dispatch from Johannesburg by *New York Times* correspondent John F. Burns, the arrests are continuing, reportedly under laws that permit indefinite detention without trial. South African newspapers have reported "large scale detentions."

Among those known to have been arrested are Victor Gallangi, a Black official of the Catholic Bishops Conference

of Southern Africa, and Thomas Manthatha, a leader of the Black People's Convention. The July 7 *Christian Science Monitor* reported that a former president of the all-Black South African Students Organisation has also been detained.

While Pretoria is hunting down Black activists, Washington has indicated that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will meet with Vorster a second time. Citing unnamed "sources" in Washington, Bernard Gwertzman reported in the July 4 *New York Times* that Kissinger and Vorster may meet again early next month, when Kissinger plans to visit Iran.

Like it did with the first meeting in West Germany on June 23 and 24, Pretoria will be able to utilize Kissinger's willingness to greet Vorster in public to show the Black masses that it has powerful allies.

The South African authorities undoubtedly intend to beat back the Black struggle as they did in the early 1960s after the Sharpeville massacre. At that time, Pretoria was able to stifle further mass protests by banning the organizations involved and arresting their leaders and members. The recent uprisings, however, were spontaneous and displayed a deep unrest among the Black population as a whole. The current repression may therefore be less effective.

If anything, the militancy among urban Blacks has grown even more since the rebellions. Willkie Kambule, the principal of the largest high school in Soweto, was quoted in the June 27 *London Sunday Times* as saying of his students, "If there is no change, these boys are capable of anything. Their mood is that we adults have betrayed them. They are willing to carry on the struggle to the bitter end."

This militancy has even forced Black officials working for the government to take a more critical public stance. After meeting with a group of white officials on July 6, T.J. Makhaya, the chairman of the Soweto Urban Bantu Council, flashed a Black power salute. According to a report by Burns in the July 7 *New York Times*, the delegation that accompanied Makhaya to the talks called for Black trade-union rights and an end to "influx control," which restricts the rights of Blacks to live and work in the "white" areas of South Africa. It also criticized the regime's policy of setting up Bantustans, or Black reservations.

A member of the Soweto council, Burns said, "acknowledged that it was no longer possible to take a moderate, conciliatory approach in view of popular feeling in Soweto, where militants representing organizations like the Black Parents' Association, a group formed during the rioting, had been around denouncing the councilmen as puppets and stooges."

Another indicator of this continued militancy was the July 3 funeral for Hector Peterson, a thirteen-year-old student who was the first person shot down by the

police on June 16. Since the authorities had refused permission for a mass funeral to be held, Peterson's burial became a symbolic commemoration for all those who died in the rebellions.

Although police riot squads were placed on alert just outside Soweto, and the Soweto officials had been told not to introduce political themes into their funer-

al speeches, the mood of the crowd was evident.

According to a July 3 dispatch by Burns, the several hundred mourners sang Black nationalist songs, such as "Nkosi Sikeleli Afrika" (God Bless Africa). There were shouts of "amandla" (power), Burns reported, "followed by the raising of a mass of clenched fists into the air." □

the "ice box" for fifteen days on bread and water. Then, after June 29, he was transferred for a six-month, strict regime term with "reduced" rations the first month.

Now, twenty-two days after the end of the strict regime term, he has again been flung into the same starvation, again for six months.

On February 19, 1976, my son announced to a woman employee of the Medical Service of the MVD, Kalinchets, who visited him, his decision to declare a hunger strike as a sign of protest against the arbitrariness of the prison personnel. I understood from the words of this employee that Vladimir is continuing his hunger strike to this day—that is, for three months now—trying to win his demands.

He began this indefinite hunger strike an ill man, in a state of extreme exhaustion, and in the spring, when illnesses become more acute. (He suffers from a duodenal ulcer and from a liver ailment.) If my son has not died already, his days are certainly numbered.

His letters from prison have not been forwarded to me for seven months now, and for about a month my telegrams inquiring whether he is alive have not been answered. I intend to try to get an immediate meeting with my son.

At the same time, I have requested to Shchelokov of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and to N.V. Podgorny for the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that my son be released to me on parole or on bail so that he might serve the remainder of his term of imprisonment under house arrest. This will at least make it possible to save his life.

Vladimir's Mother

Nina Ivanovna Bukovskaya

Moscow

May 18-25, 1976

Dissident Reportedly in Danger of Dying

Bukovsky Wages Hunger Strike in Soviet Jail



VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY

administration toward my son Vladimir Bukovsky. A female employee of the Central Administration of the Medical Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of the USSR, L. Kalinchets, reported to me that my ailing son was placed in solitary confinement.

It was reported to me that he is being subjected to a new torture—starvation: to a six-month term under a strict starvation regime, with terribly "reduced" rations the first month.

Placing my son in solitary confinement is a new act of crude violence against him. In solitary confinement, it is possible to carry out any sort of arbitrary action against a person and no one finds out about it. And there is no one to give a piece of bread to a comrade dying of hunger or to call the doctor for him in case of extreme necessity.

In addition, this is the third time in a row Vladimir Bukovsky has been punished by starvation for refusing to perform compulsory labor and for his demand to have the status of a political prisoner.

In June of last year, he was thrown into

[Vladimir Bukovsky was sentenced to seven years imprisonment and five years internal exile in January 1972 because he made facts available to foreign psychiatrists on the Kremlin's abuse of psychiatric treatment to persecute political dissenters.

[While imprisoned, Bukovsky has taken part in numerous protests against the harsh conditions. In addition, he has refused to recant his views despite heavy pressure from the authorities to do so.

[Because of his stand, Bukovsky has been repeatedly subjected to barbarous treatment which has seriously undermined his health.

[The translation from the Russian of the following appeal from Bukovsky's mother was done by Kendall Greer.]

On May 17, 1976, I learned about the criminal activities of the Vladimir Prison

Spanish CP Chief for 'More Rational' Strategy

Santiago Carillo, the leader of the Spanish Communist party, thrilled procapitalist commentators when he disparagingly compared Communism to the irrational doctrine of primitive Christianity and the Russian revolution to "our Christmas" in a speech at the Berlin meeting of European CPs held at the end of June. As far as Carillo is concerned, there will be no more Christmases for the working class.

New York Times correspondent Flora Lewis gave Carillo a chance to explain his lowered expectations in greater detail in a July 2 interview. "Yes," Carillo said, "we had our pope, our Vatican, and we thought we were predestined to triumph. But as we mature and become less of a church, we must become more rational, closer to reality."

Lewis was impressed:

The way Mr. Carillo described them, the goals of the Spanish Communist party are reformist, not revolutionary, and they do not seem to go much beyond many reforms that the United States completed long ago without participation of any Communist party.

"You have a much more intelligent and modern bourgeoisie," he said. "The forces that can make these changes are already in place in the U.S., but in less rich and less developed countries, only progressives and the more modern parts of the bourgeoisie can do it."

Carillo's offer to help the backward and feeble-minded Spanish bourgeoisie to modernize their rule was accompanied by the insistence that "there is no basic difference" between his brand of "Communism" and the Social Democracy. As for the name of Communism, "Why should we renounce it and leave it to the extremists?"

Bitter Strike Confronts Banzer Dictatorship

LA PAZ—The assassination of exiled former Bolivian President Juan José Torres in Buenos Aires on June 3 has led to a confrontation between the right-wing military dictatorship of General Hugo Banzer and the key productive sector of the Bolivian economy—the tin miners. Banzer, who overthrew the left-leaning nationalist Torres on August 21, 1971, in a coup that Augusto Pinochet could have taken notes on, responded to the miners' strike with characteristic harshness. With the crises still going on after twenty days, three students and four miners are dead and the country is partly paralyzed by a general strike of miners and sympathy strikes in important sectors of urban industry and in the universities.

The Torres killing and the earlier assassination in Paris of Bolivian Ambassador Zenteno Anaya are generally viewed in La Paz as the work of Banzer and an indication of his deteriorating position. Both the right-wing Zenteno and Torres had a significant following among different sectors, and each posed a potential threat to Banzer at a time when the labor movement and the clandestine left were beginning to take the offensive.

Until recently Banzer has been a successful servant of imperialist interests in Bolivia. By maintaining a favorable climate for investment, and drastically lowering the real wage, his government has been able to attract growing foreign investment in agribusiness and mining. The "stability" that his government achieved through a murderous repressive apparatus and the outlawing of the unions has brought rewards in the form of huge loans from the U.S. government, the International Monetary Fund, and other lending institutions. In the five years that Banzer has been in power, Bolivia has increased its foreign debt from \$450 million to \$1.7 billion.

In order to understand the current miners' strike, a little must be said about the government's economic policies and the effect they have had on the small industrialized sector of the economy. In this poorest of South American countries only 9% of the work force is engaged in industrial production, 70% are peasants mostly living under subsistence conditions, and the government apparatus absorbs the other 20%. Of the potential work force, officially 14% are unemployed, and those underemployed (selling Chiclets on street corners, for example) probably number more than the unemployed. To finance the military, the bureaucracy, and the few government programs, the dictatorship has relied on the profits from the

nationalized sector of the mining industry. Total exports from mining account for close to 40% of foreign sales, primarily to the tin-poor United States. To keep profits up at a time when the world recession and U.S. control of the international tin market had pushed prices down almost to their production costs, Banzer has had to progressively decrease the real wage the miners get. This has been accomplished by wage freezes, devaluation of the currency, and inflation.

These policies have been disastrous for the miners. The average wage with bonuses is just about one dollar a day. This represents a 25% increase for the entire five-year period of the Banzer dictatorship. During this same time, price inflation of essential articles that miners consume has increased 350% according to officially recognized figures.

This advancing pauperization has meant additional hardships to the miners, who already suffer under some of the worst working conditions in the world. A miner who starts work at fifteen can expect a productive life of between fifteen and twenty-five years before being incapacitated by silicosis, the lung disease. As a result of the high acid content in the atmosphere of the mines, a miner at thirty has the physical appearance of someone of fifty.

The increasingly burdensome economic conditions under the Banzer dictatorship produced a highly volatile situation in the mining camps. At a national congress of miners in May, it was decided to prepare for a strike that would demand a large wage increase and, more importantly, a cost-of-living clause that would help to offset the effects of the relentless inflation.

As the preparations were being made, Torres was murdered and the Bolivian government refused to allow the repatriation of his remains. This caused indignation which immediately crystallized in a series of protest strikes in the mining camps and universities.

As the spontaneous strike movement spread, its character changed. The illegal Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (Trade Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia) and other mining unions began to broaden the strike by raising the demands of the union congress.

With this development Banzer was faced with the most serious crisis of his rule. Responding with maximum force he ordered the militarization of the mining camps, a national state of siege, curfew and travel restrictions, the closing of high schools and universities, and the occupation of the miners' radio stations. Within

the first few days 125 militants, union leaders, and students had been jailed; of these 25 were exiled to Chile.

The measures taken in the mining camps were more serious. These camps, set up on the company-town model, put their inhabitants completely at the mercy of the camp administration. Essential services, including food and water, are supplied by the company, and in a strike situation these are cut off.

This tactic has been used since the first day of the strike, in an attempt to starve the miners into submission. At Siglo XX and Catavi, two mines with a reputation of militancy, the local leadership refused to leave the mines, knowing that they would be arrested. In retaliation the army sealed the mine entrances and cut electrical power, trapping the miners. A communique from them read in part: "Remain firm and united around the directives of the unions and rank-and-file committees. Follow the instructions of the five unions on strike. Protect the pursued, and help the families of the prisoners. Fraternalize with the soldiers and young officers, explaining our cause."

Within the first couple of days the strike was complete in the nationalized mines and rapidly spread to the private sector.

From the government's point of view, the real danger is in the broad national support that the miners are receiving. First in Cochabamba, and later in La Paz, workers at the largest factories called sympathy strikes, and some of them raised their own demands for a wage increase. Seven of the nine national universities were completely shut down by students and professors after the government reopened them. Many clandestine peasant organizations issued statements of support and tried to deliver food to the miners. Religious organizations and one professional group called for a just response to the miners' demands. All of this is a clear indication that Banzer has practically no popular support.

As the strike continues Banzer's position is in doubt. He has taken a hard line on negotiations, saying that he is unwilling to discuss the miners' demands until the strike is over. With the situation now stalemated after nearly three weeks, he faces the danger of being replaced in a palace coup if he cannot break the strike or reach an agreement. A coup would allow the army to substitute a slightly more moderate figure who would be in a position to back down from Banzer's hard line and negotiate.

If Banzer does succeed in starving the miners into submission he will no doubt intensify the repression against them, factory workers, students, and the left in general in an attempt to disorganize the broad popular movement opposing his regime.

June 25, 1975

Behind the MPLA's 'Socialist' Mask

By Ernest Harsch

[First of two articles]

In countless communiqués, speeches, and radio broadcasts, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA—People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) has claimed that it intends to build a "socialist" society in Angola.

But the MPLA's "socialism" is limited to its rhetoric. Its actual policies tell a completely different story.

Since the end of the Angolan civil war in February, the MPLA regime has continued its efforts to control and demobilize the masses. In the Luanda area in particular, it has sought to contain and beat back any independent workers' struggles, arresting scores of labor and political activists.

At the same time, this "socialist" regime has obligingly invited imperialist interests to resume their exploitation of Angola's vast natural wealth. Two major oil and diamond companies have already accepted the MPLA's invitation, and other imperialist concerns are scrambling to grab a share for themselves.

From the actions it has taken to suppress any independent initiatives by the masses, it is clear that the MPLA fears any challenge to its course toward accommodation with imperialism and to its plans to construct a stable, neocolonial regime in Angola.

In order to contain this potential threat to its rule, the MPLA has adopted a two-sided policy. So far, its principal tactic has been to try to fetter the workers movement through trade-union and "people's power" bodies directly controlled by the MPLA, as well as exhorting the masses to "sacrifice for the revolution."

The other aspect of the MPLA's policy has been to wield its iron fist against those who remain unconvinced by its demagoguery or who attempt to organize any independent struggles.

'People's Power'

The massive labor upsurge that swept Angola following the April 1974 coup in Portugal had an important impact in loosening Lisbon's hold on the colony. For the first time, the Angolan workers had an opportunity to organize themselves on a broad scale. They formed trade unions, workers committees, neighborhood commissions, and "people's power" groups. Although they were established independently of the MPLA's control for the most part, these groups in the Luanda region generally looked to the MPLA for political leadership.

Rather than basing itself upon this labor upsurge to advance the struggle for real independence, the MPLA, like its nationalist rivals, saw the upsurge as a threat to its own narrow scramble for power.

After joining the coalition regime with the FNLA, UNITA,¹ and the Portuguese colonialists in January 1975, the MPLA issued appeals to the workers to halt their strikes, supported strike-breaking legislation, and in February even sent troops against striking dock workers in Lobito.²

For several months in early 1975, the MPLA capitalized on its support among the Mbundu population of the Luanda region to draw the workers and neighborhood bodies into its factional struggle against the FNLA and UNITA. By the end of July, however, the MPLA had managed to drive the FNLA and UNITA out of Luanda and no longer needed these groups as factional tools. It forcibly dissolved and disarmed some of them and transformed others into bureaucratically controlled organs for imposing MPLA policies on the masses. In September and October 1975, it began arresting a number of leaders of the workers committees and "people's power" groups who had not shown the proper degree of subservience to the MPLA leadership.

Thus, by late 1975, the various independent mass organizations had been politically decapitated. Originally established as part of the mass upsurge from below, they had been transformed into bureaucratic instruments encharged with carrying out MPLA directives from above.

This system of mass control was institutionalized on February 5 with the adoption of the People's Power Law, which provides for the election of "people's committees" on the neighborhood, village, commune, council and provincial levels. Only the neighborhood and village committees are to be elected directly, however. Each of the successively higher bodies are to be elected by the members of the subordinate committees within their jurisdictions.

Significantly, the law does not provide

1. Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (Angolan National Liberation Front), União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).

2. For a description of the antilabor actions of the MPLA and its partners in the coalition regime, see *Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War*, by Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976.

for any country-wide "people's committee," elected or otherwise.

To ensure that "undesirables" do not creep onto the electoral rolls, the MPLA tacked on a series of restrictions to the franchise. Denied the right to vote are sympathizers and former members of the FNLA and UNITA, as well as those who practice "racism," "tribalism," or "regionalism," that is, anyone who reflects the particular interests of the Ovimbundu, Bakongo, or other peoples of Angola. Also barred from voting are those deemed guilty of "economic sabotage" and "laziness," charges frequently hurled at labor activists and strikers.

Even with these restrictions, the MPLA still hesitated to hold the elections. They were originally scheduled for May 13, but were postponed because of a series of workers' struggles that broke out in early May.

Industrial workers in Luanda and other cities staged strikes and slowdowns to back their demands for wage increases and better working conditions. The strikes have continued for at least two months. According to the July 2 *Washington Post*, "the government ordered striking workers back to jobs at the sole coffee sack factory."

According to a May 9 *Prensa Latina* radio broadcast datelined Luanda, Interior Minister Nito Alves "said that at the time when production was paralyzed in the capital, the electoral vote would lose much of its real revolutionary significance."

President Agostinho Neto also took the strikes seriously. "There can be no solid or stable political power," he said, "while the factories and the countryside are not producing towards the consolidation of real economic independence."

According to a report by David B. Ottaway in the May 24 *Washington Post*, the MPLA was also concerned "because leftist opposition elements have been using the councils as a springboard to attack the new government." The elections were postponed, he said, because the MPLA leaders "suddenly realized they had not made adequate preparations to control the selection of candidates."

To screen out any dissidents, the MPLA decreed that all candidates for the neighborhood committees must be proposed by one of the MPLA-controlled labor, youth, or women's organizations.

The decision-making powers of these "people's power" bodies appear limited to the organization of such local tasks as

setting up market cooperatives in the shantytowns or carrying out educational activities. Their main function is to implement the policies of the MPLA leadership.

The various workers committees set up or taken over by the MPLA in the factories have a similar role. In a report in the February 28 issue of *Le Monde*, correspondent René Lefort quoted a manager of a coffee plantation as describing the workers committee there as "a simple consultative body." He added that "the powers of management are intact."

In the nationalized industries, the MPLA has set up management committees, some of whose members are elected by the workers in the factory and some of whom are appointed by the regime. As with the "people's power" groups, those members who are elected must be proposed by the local union.

The principal union federation in Angola is the União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola (UNTA—National Union of Angolan Workers), which is directly controlled by the MPLA. During the strike wave that began in May, UNTA General Secretary Aristides Van-Dunen visited the Textang factory to denounce the strikers. On May 13, an UNTA delegation in Cuanza Sul Province passed a resolution demanding that the regime suppress the strikes.

The UNTA has also played a major part in the MPLA's campaign to impose speed-up and longer working hours. Lefort reported that "according to the regional secretary of the union, the primary interest of the workers, in all cases, is to increase production."

Although the MPLA has tried to provide a pretense of democratic rule, the real power in Angola rests with the governing Revolutionary Council and with the MPLA's ten-member Political Bureau.

'Traitors' Beware

MPLA officials have tried to justify the arrests of political dissidents and independent labor leaders by branding them as "reactionaries," "ultraleftists," "traitors," "saboteurs," "racists," "divisionists," or "agents of imperialism."

The April 17 issue of *Diário de Luanda*, which is controlled by the MPLA, carried an article slandering Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, a leader of the former Revolta Activa³ who was imprisoned briefly by the MPLA. The article went so far as to label Andrade a "true partner of the Devil."

According to a pamphlet released by the CDALPA⁴ in Lisbon in March, many of those arrested by the MPLA were members

or leaders of various "people's power" groups, workers committees, neighborhood commissions, student organizations, or other local bodies in Luanda and Benguela. An arrested leader of the UNTA in Benguela was accused of trying to form "Marxist-Leninist study groups in the factories."

Some of the arrested dissidents were also members of clandestine leftist political groups, such as the Organização Comunista de Angola (OCA—Angola Communist Organization) and the Comités Amílcar Cabral (CAC—Amílcar Cabral Committees). Unlike the MPLA, some of the underground groups identify themselves with the Angolan working class and have called for the establishment of a workers and peasants government.

To further silence these leftwing forces, the MPLA banned the newspapers *Angola*, *Poder Popular*, and *4 de Fevereiro*. The former editor of *Angola*, Rui Ramos, has been arrested.

On April 28, the regime announced the establishment of a People's Revolutionary Tribunal, which is to try "crimes against the Angolan revolution." A law signed by Agostinho Neto May 3 specified that the court would also judge crimes against "the state and the MPLA." The verdicts of the court cannot be appealed.

The only major case the court has heard so far was that of the thirteen British and American mercenaries who had been captured in northern Angola in February. But judging from the MPLA's slander campaign against the imprisoned dissidents, it may also be preparing to bring them before the People's Revolutionary Tribunal, perhaps on charges of being "agents of imperialism" or "saboteurs."

In an April 9 declaration, Interior Minister Nito Alves threatened that some of the political prisoners may be executed. The dissidents could also be sent to the political "rehabilitation" camps the MPLA set up to supplement the old prison system inherited from the Portuguese.

Strengthening the Iron Fist

Since the end of the civil war, the MPLA has continued to expand its police and military forces.

By March, there were 45,000 troops in the MPLA army, the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA—People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola). In late February, a compulsory conscription law was adopted, stipulating that all Angolans between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five must serve two years in the armed forces.

"The draft will soak up the unemployed among Angola's six million and will be a convenient way to consolidate support for the regime," Caryle Murphy reported in the February 29 London *Sunday Times*. "Already the MPLA keeps close political control over its armed forces. Each army

unit, for example, has a 'comite dos combatentes' which links the soldiers politically to the movement."

The MPLA's political control over its own troops does not yet appear to be complete, however. In May, Defense Minister Iko Carreira complained that there was a "certain anarchist feeling" and a "tendency for absolute egalitarianism" in the armed forces. He said that the troops showed little respect for their commanders. According to the May 17 issue of the Lisbon daily *Jornal Novo*, Carreira said that the MPLA had been forced to recruit "lumpen" elements, which had led to a "lowering of the political level" within the military.

"It has already been confirmed by the Luanda authorities themselves that there are military units who are beyond the control of the General Command, acting on their own in an atmosphere of total indiscipline," the May 24 *Jornal Novo* reported. According to an MPLA commander, "infiltrators" within FAPLA have provoked unrest and incited the population in the Lubango region.

A plan for the reorganization of the armed forces was published in Luanda May 21. Distributed to the press by Commander Bakaloff, it called for the Central Committee of the MPLA to assume direct political control over the armed forces. Later the same day, President Neto canceled the report. He did not indicate any opposition to it, but said that it had been revealed "precipitately."

FAPLA's main task at the moment appears to be to maintain control of those areas of Angola formerly held by its rivals. Together with thousands of Cuban troops, it continues to carry out actions against guerrilla units of the UNITA, which still retains support among the Ovimbundu and other peoples of central and southern Angola.

In the Mbundu-populated region around Luanda, the MPLA's principal repressive forces are the police and the militia. According to Carreira, the purpose of the militia, the Organização de Defesa Popular (ODP—People's Defense Organization), is to "fight saboteurs, divisionist elements and all those people who try to alter the strategic tactical orientation of our movement." (Quoted in the *Daily News* of Tanzania, February 24, 1976.) In May, Carreira added that the ODP was also responsible for protecting workplaces.

Like the "people's committees," the ODP is organized on various levels, from the regional level downward. The two most important officials in the regional units are directly appointed by the FAPLA General Command. The regional ODP then appoints similar officials at the next lower level. This appointment process continues on down to the cell units, which are each composed of five persons. The cells are to be set up in factories, government agencies, offices, universities, farms,

3. Active Revolt, a dissident tendency within the MPLA, now dissolved.

4. Comité de Divulgação e Apoio à Luta do Povo Angolano (Information and Support Committee for the Struggle of the Angolan People).

and other places to ensure effective control over the entire population.

To supplement the ODP units in the factories, the MPLA has established Comissões de Vigilância (CV—Vigilance Committees) under the control of the UNTA. According to the CDALPA pamphlet, the CVs have the responsibility to “watch the workers, increase productivity, and prevent the distribution of revolutionary literature and pamphlets.”

The secret police body directly in charge of political repression is the Direcção de Informação e Segurança de Angola (DISA—Angola Directorate of Information and Security). Many of the dissidents now in prison were arrested by DISA agents.

The Soviet and Cuban governments have played a crucial role in helping the MPLA strengthen its repressive forces.

Much of the heavy equipment being used by FAPLA was provided by Moscow during the civil war. Western sources have estimated the value of the Soviet arms at about \$300 million. During the visit of Angolan Prime Minister Lopo do Nasci-

mento to Moscow in late May, the Kremlin agreed to continue bolstering the Luanda regime by providing it with further military aid.

The importance the MPLA ascribes to Moscow's support was reflected in the composition of the delegation that accompanied Nascimento. It was the most important delegation the MPLA had sent abroad so far and included the defense minister, the deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, and the chief of intelligence and security.

According to a report in the April 29 *Jornal Novo*, the head of DISA, Commander N'Zage, has taken a course in “security” in the Soviet Union. This Soviet training was evident in the MPLA's witch-hunt against the left. The arrests of members of the CAC and “people's power” groups in Luanda in October 1975 were accompanied by a typical Stalinist slander campaign, which portrayed the dissidents as “partisans of Trotsky and Bakunin.”

The Cubans, however, have had the

most direct hand in training and advising the MPLA's police and military forces. They are helping the MPLA reorganize the former guerrilla units of FAPLA into a highly disciplined conventional army.

According to a dispatch from Luanda by David B. Ottaway in the May 26 *Washington Post*, “Domestically, the Cubans are presently helping the new Angolan government in many domains, from the training of a state security corps and a civilian militia to the reform of the country's prison system.” Ottaway reported that the Cuban security personnel were also instructing Angolan police in techniques of crowd control.

From the MPLA's point of view, the political support extended to it by Moscow and Havana is a central dimension of their aid. It helps to strengthen the MPLA's bogus claim that its policies are “socialist” and gives it a political cover for its witch-hunt against the Angolan left.

[Next: The New Danger of Imperialist Domination]

Opposition Groups Form United Action Front

Mexican Workers Debate Independent Political Action

[The following article appeared in the June 5 issue of *Clave*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Mexico City. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The First National Conference of the Worker, Peasant, and Poor People's Opposition took place in Mexico City May 14, 15, and 16. It was the most important political event in the country in many years because it succeeded in taking the first steps to form a political organization capable of drawing together and uniting an independent political movement.

For three days about 2,000 full and fraternal delegates representing 270 delegations debated the most important aspects of the course workers' and peasants' struggles should follow in our country. Although there were moments of sharp polemic, the conference took place in an atmosphere of unity and struggle. There was a lively chanting of slogans, and a panorama of raised fists dominated the hall over and over again.

The first day, the conference began at the Florida movie theater with the election of a presiding committee and reporting committees.

Héctor Barba of the Democratic Tendency of the Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana [SUTERM—United Electrical Workers

Union of the Mexican Republic] was elected chairman. In addition, vice chairmen and secretaries were elected for each sector that would have a session of the conference—trade unions, peasants, people in the field of education, and small landholders.

That afternoon, the delegates heard speeches from the leaders of the most important and representative mass organizations at the conference.

The second day deliberations resumed at Ciudad Universitaria [the campus of the National Autonomous University of Mexico], where assemblies met separately by sector, and meetings were held by the organization and program committees.

On the third day, a plenary session was held in an auditorium at the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, where reports from the committees and those approved in the sectoral assemblies were placed before the delegates for consideration.

There a proposal to form a Frente Nacional de Acción Popular [FNAP—National Front for Mass Action] was approved, along with a plan for mobilizations in June and July. The election of a Coordinating Committee to guide the work of the FNAP was postponed.

With regard to program—the knotty question of the conference—several positions were presented and will be discussed and voted on at a second national conference to be held later this year. Thus, only

the general lines of the program of the newly formed organization were approved.

The Political Independence of the Workers Movement

The most debated point at the conference was the question of program, particularly the issue of the new organization's independence from the government and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional [PRI—Institutional Revolutionary party].

We had already pointed out in the pages of *Clave** that discussion of this question was inevitable, since the ambiguous original draft of Programmatic Points did not include a clearly defined position on the political independence of the workers.

However, at a conference representing the most advanced elements of the mass movement in our country, it was impossible to ignore the central problem of the national political struggle. The bourgeois government and its party, the PRI, do not represent the interests of the exploited but are in fact the principal obstacles to their emancipation.

Consequently, one task of the conference was to call for a break from the control and domination the PRI exercises over the working masses of the country.

This was the axis of the discussion at

*See *Intercontinental Press*, June 21, 1976, p. 981.

the conference, and was the point that distinguished the different positions of the delegates. One entire group of delegations—possibly close to half, although not the most significant delegations—pointed to the need to break with the PRI. Those delegations also criticized class collaborationism and placing confidence in the government.

Although these proposals and criticisms were made from various points of view, they succeeded in creating a current of opinion within the conference favoring a break with the PRI.

This group of delegations scored significant gains in the conference discussions.

In the education sector—which included both teachers and students—they won a majority for an amendment naming the PRI government as responsible for the deficiencies in education in Mexico. It said that the bourgeois party and its government are the main obstacles to resolving the crisis in education and to advancing the student movement.

Amendments of the Program Committee

In the trade-union sector the debate was sharp. The union at the Instituto del Fondo Nacional para la Vivienda de los Trabajadores [Institute of the National Fund for Workers Housing] and the union at the Fondo de Cultura Económica [Fund for Economic Culture] presented a written report with sharp criticisms of so-called revolutionary nationalism. This report was loudly applauded, although it lacked concrete alternative proposals aside from a break with the PRI.

These two unions were the center of the group of delegations calling for political independence. Opposition to placing confidence in the government was expressed in a statement signed by several organizations, urging the organization arising from the conference to call publicly for a break with the PRI.

A clear attempt to offer concrete proposals to advance political independence from the government and the PRI was made by the workers in the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación [National Trade Union of Workers in Education] who belong to the *Boletín Magisterial*, and the Democratic Unity group in the Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas [Mexican Electrical Workers Union].

They pointed out that the only way to concretize the break with the PRI was for the conference to come out for the building of a workers party, which would guarantee the independent organization of the workers.

To organize such a party the compañeros proposed the formation of a committee charged with raising the idea among different unions and opposition groups.

The proposal also pointed out the need to call for the establishment of a workers and

farmers government, the only government that would consistently carry out the program of the workers' and peasants' opposition and liberate Mexico from imperialist domination.

It was particularly significant that the positions and proposals of these compañeros were codified in amendments presented to the plenary assembly as a minority proposal by the program committee.

The group of delegations who opposed having the conference clearly define its position against the PRI and the government is very important, since it represents such organizations as the Democratic Tendency of the SUTERM, the Sindicato de Trabajadores y Empleados de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México [Union of Workers and Employees at the National Autonomous University of Mexico], the Sindicato del Personal Académico de la UNAM [Union of Academic Personnel at the UNAM], and others.

Instead of openly opposing a break with the PRI, these delegations argued that the conference was scarcely beginning to develop a program, that it was a minimum program, and that you could not hope for it to contain everything you would like.

They said it was harmful to introduce "doctrinaire" discussions, which would destroy the unity of the forces gathered at the conference.

It is fitting to ask, however, if it is "doctrinaire" and "sectarian" to ask the workers to break with the party of the bourgeoisie and the union bureaucrats. Is the confrontation with the PRI and the apparatus it controls a question of "lifeless theory," or is it something faced daily in all struggles of the workers?

This should not require a lengthy discussion, and does not mean that a program includes *everything*. But it must contain the *basic point* that to advance the struggle for democracy, it is necessary to break with the bourgeoisie, its government, and its party.

During the debate, someone held up the newspaper announcing that the PRI would continue supporting the bureaucrat Salustio Salgado, in spite of his having been rejected by the telephone workers. Here the facts speak for themselves once again.

FNAP Must Follow the Path of Political Independence

The plan approved by the conference is fundamentally the motion of the Democratic Tendency of the SUTERM, along with the amendments proposed by the minority. Unquestionably, the electrical workers of the Democratic Tendency will continue being the fundamental builders of the FNAP.

We feel that these agreements represent a triumph for the conference and show that it is possible for the forces of the workers movement to discuss the most important political problems in an atmosphere of unity and democracy.

We should carry forward the agreements of this conference in the same spirit. The building of the FNAP has barely begun and it is the task of all of us, regardless of our differences. Thus, those of us at the conference who stated our position in breaking with the PRI and its government must be the most consistent builders of the FNAP so as to show in action that building a workers party is the only path that can lead the independent struggles of the workers of our country to victory. □

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The Current Crisis of the Chinese Bureaucracy

[The following unsigned article appeared in the April 15 issue of *October Review*, published in Hong Kong. The translation was done for *Intercontinental Press* by Jerry Chow. The article has been abridged by the translator.]

* * *

A new factional struggle in the Chinese Communist party (CCP) has broken out, called "the struggle to repulse the right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts." It is a continuation of the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao Tsetung a decade ago, and is another manifestation of the continual internal strife in the CCP during the past ten years.

The fact that the outbreak of the current struggle has resulted in a split in the CCP Political Bureau indicates not only its intensity but also the severity of the political crisis in China. It is an indirect reflection of the irreconcilable contradiction between the ruling bureaucracy and the people.

Since the downfall of Lin Piao in 1971, the Mao faction has waged a series of campaigns against other factions in the CCP. A number of signs indicated that Chou En-lai had been a target of some of these attacks. Chou's death has temporarily removed him as a major target of Maoist attack, but anti-Mao factions have lost a strong supporter and protector. In the eyes of supporters of the Mao faction, a strong opponent, who was difficult to defeat, has been removed. This has fundamentally changed the relationship of forces among the various factions of the CCP. One of the causes of the rapid escalation of the internal strife is the fight over the position vacated by the death of

Chou En-lai.

However, the central cause of the internal struggle is differences in policy between the Maoist and anti-Maoist factions. These differences have developed over many questions, such as economic development, education, and science and technology. Although the Maoist faction, which controls all publications, has never published any documents of the opposing factions, we can still gauge the differences from quotations cited in Maoist documents. In the following, we will express our views on some of the questions currently under discussion in China.

The Maoist faction denounced Teng Hsiao-ping as a capitalist roader. Teng's crime, according to the Maoists, was to have distorted Mao's instructions by describing all three of Mao's recent directives as "the key links for all work." The three directives were: 1) Push the national economy forward; 2) Promote stability and unity; and 3) Study the theory of the proletarian dictatorship. The Maoists advance the following hairsplitting argument: Mao thinks the study of the theory of the proletarian dictatorship should be the key link. Yet Teng says all three directives are equally important. Thus, Teng is "negat[ing] taking class struggle as the key link and tamper[ing] with the Party's basic line" (*Peking Review*, April 2, 1976, p. 7).

The Maoist argument is not very convincing. In a mechanical way, it counterposes ideological work to economic work, emphasizing the former and minimizing and even repudiating the latter. But the Maoists do not carry this out in practice. In a recent editorial in *People's Daily*, the Maoists emphasized the "principle of taking grain as the key link and ensuring an all-round development in arranging agricultural production as a whole."

Doesn't this run counter to the Maoist argument of "taking the study of the theory of the proletarian dictatorship as the key link"?

On the Problem of "Restricting Bourgeois Right"

The problem of restricting bourgeois right was first raised last year by Mao himself, who said that the present wage system, with its eight-grade wage scale, was not equal. The press then reported on a campaign to urge the workers to increase their hours of work and to intensify labor productivity, but not to demand higher wages. This shows what the Mao faction means by restricting "bourgeois right" by ideological work.

The Mao faction then accused the "capitalist roader" of not wanting to restrict bourgeois right. If what Teng opposed was this kind of restriction on "bourgeois right," Teng was definitely correct.

China today is still faced with scarcity and a low level of productivity. If the Mao faction prematurely restricts "bourgeois right" by cutting higher wage grades to the level of the lower grades, presses to increase labor productivity, and opposes any material incentives, all these policies not only will have an adverse effect on production, but will also sharpen social contradictions.

Why don't the leaders of the CCP themselves set an example in "restricting bourgeois right" by cutting their own astronomical salaries to the level of that of an ordinary laborer? Why don't they abolish their long-enjoyed privileges? Any such steps would be welcomed by the people of the entire nation. However, not only the "capitalist roaders" but the Maoists themselves still cling to their bourgeois life-style. How can the people tell the difference between them? What China needs now is not to restrict bourgeois right, but to abolish all economic and political privileges.

On "Educational Revolution"

One of the controversies that surfaced in the earlier stage of the current political struggle concerned educational policy. Mao wanted to conduct a revolution in education, and he might have been sincere in principle. But the Maoist bureaucracy went to the other extreme in attempting to correct past errors. They quoted Lenin correctly that "the school should be an instrument of the proletarian dictatorship." But they distorted Lenin's proposal that "the school be changed from a tool of bourgeois rule into an instrument of destroying this rule and completely eliminating class divisions." They did this by artificially creating class division, unnecessarily aggravating contradictions among people, and inciting one segment of the populace against another. Under the slogan "Down with bourgeois academic authority," they denied the importance of traditional teachers and textbooks. Instead they entrusted the running of the schools, the teaching, and the rewriting of textbooks to the Maoist faithful. Although they proposed the correct formula of combining classroom learning with experience in the process of production, they overzealously forced the school children to spend so much time in the fields that little

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time was left for classroom study.

Under the slogan "Education should serve the workers, peasants, and soldiers," they let those whose educational levels were equivalent to graduates of junior middle schools or even primary schools enter universities. They placed extreme emphasis on "redness" in politics, while ignoring "expertise" in professional knowledge.

After having carried out this kind of educational policy for several years, negative results appeared. As a result, criticism developed that "the educational level at the universities is even lower than that of middle schools," and "students are not learning culture at school," etc. To placate this criticism, the Teng faction proposed to "send good graduates of middle schools to universities," and to "let experts who are not party members run the institutions of higher education."

These reforms met strong opposition from the Mao faction. The reformers were accused of being "right deviationists attempting to reverse correct verdicts."

On the Problem of "Who Should Hold Leading Positions in Scientific and Technological Circles"

A closely related problem is who should hold leading posts in the scientific and technological fields. In principle, intellectuals should be integrated with the workers, peasants, and soldiers, and scientific and technological researchers should be linked with production. However, the dispute in recent years was not about this general principle, but the concrete problem of "leadership." Under the slogan of "exercising proletarian dictatorship on the scientific and technological front," pro-Mao workers and peasants have taken over the leading posts in the scientific and technological institutions since the start of the Cultural Revolution. This has generated a great deal of friction and conflict between the cadres holding leading posts and the professional scientists and technicians. Last year one often heard such comments as "Nonprofessionals should not lead professionals," and "First-rate authorities, publicly acknowledged in the scientific and technological communities, should hold the leading posts."

In our opinion, the leadership in scientific and technological fields, just as in any other, should be democratically elected by all those who work in the field. It should not be appointed from above. Nor should those "nonprofessionals" whose only expertise is reciting Maoist slogans be appointed to leading posts.

On the Problem of "Struggle Against the Bourgeoisie"

Mao Tsetung said recently: "You are making the socialist revolution, yet you do not know where the bourgeoisie is. It is right in the Communist party—those in power taking the capitalist road." Accord-

ing to Mao, the "capitalist roaders" have now become the "bourgeoisie." Yet no evidence has been presented in any document to show that the "capitalist roaders" in the CCP are indeed the "bourgeoisie."

In our opinion, none of the leaders and cadres of any of the factions of the CCP form a bourgeois class and privately own any means of production. They are a privileged bureaucratic caste, merely parasites on the workers state. Mao and his supporters have denounced Teng Hsiang-ping as the "arch unrepentant capitalist roader" and "a political representative of the bourgeoisie." But Teng is no more a bourgeois than Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao were.

However, this accusation does reflect two things. One, the bureaucracy of the workers states enjoy material privileges as do the bourgeoisie of the capitalist countries. Two, the methods of oppression of the laboring masses by the bureaucracy are similar to those used by the capitalist class. As the laboring masses have increasingly shown their impatience toward and intolerance of the present situation,

the Maoists attempt to shift the blame onto the "capitalist roaders" in order to protect the interests of the entire bureaucracy.

The Road Forward For the Workers and Peasants

The never-ending factional struggle inside the CCP has caused political crisis after crisis. It has seriously impaired not only the normal development of China's economic construction but also impeded raising the people's standard of living. When one group of the population was incited against another, a great deal of damage was done to the morale of the people.

It is time for the workers and peasants to step in and put a stop to the factional strife being waged inside the CCP. The masses should form their own organizations, raise their own demands, and intervene in the affairs of the nation. It is only through their own efforts that the bureaucracy can be overthrown and a democratic socialist society built. □

Deepening Repression Compared to Pinochet's Chile

French Jurists Denounce Argentine Junta

Respect for citizens' legal rights has "deteriorated much more rapidly in Argentina than in Chile after the military coup," two French jurists told a press conference in Paris June 30.

Louis Joinet, former president of the magistrates union, and Philippe Texier, an examining magistrate, conducted a one-week fact-finding tour in Argentina in late June, under the sponsorship of the International Federation of Human Rights and the International Movement of Catholic Jurists.

Although they were denied cooperation from military officials and were refused permission to visit political prisoners, they conducted numerous interviews with church officials, diplomatic representatives, and families of prisoners. Their findings were summarized in a report in the July 3 issue of *Le Monde*.

After the coup, they said, "all judges were dismissed, a step that the Chilean military did not dare to take." The supreme court was replaced with new judges "who swore an oath of loyalty to the new regime before assuming their posts."

War councils have been set up in various parts of the country, and hand down verdicts in great secrecy. All persons charged with "altering public order" are tried before these councils, as well as all students expelled from the University of

Buenos Aires. The accused are denied the right to a civilian lawyer.

It is often impossible to tell if a person has been arrested, because no list of the names of political prisoners are released. Prisoners' rights to visits from family members have been suspended indefinitely.

Arrest raids "are frequently carried out by men in plainclothes or by policemen who wear no insignia on their uniforms and produce no arrest warrant."

Very few arrests are carried out after what the authorities call "confrontations" in which suspects "resist arrest." According to the jurists, "The suspects in question are, more often than not, killed by the police."

The situation in the prisons is reported to be "very serious," with torture an "everyday occurrence." The jurists learned of the existence of "several torture centers," including one in which a prisoner was slowly sawed to death.

In the factories, the right to strike has been abolished, all wage negotiations have been suspended, and it is "forbidden to meddle in labor relations."

The similarities with Chile do not end there, the jurists reported. "As in Santiago in 1973, people are beginning to recognize among the bodies that float down the Río de la Plata in Buenos Aires some of those who had disappeared and about whom no information could be obtained." □

Carvalho Steals the Show From the Portuguese CP

By Harry Farrar

LISBON—With one-quarter of the electorate abstaining, General Ramalho Eanes, the Portuguese "law and order" candidate, won a sweeping victory in the June 27 presidential elections, obtaining 2,967,484 votes, or 61.5% of the total.

Maj. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, again a hero of the "far left," came in second with 793,392 votes, or 16.5% of the total, while Octávio Pato, the Communist party's candidate, got only 365,371 votes, or 7.6%—less than half the votes received by the CP in the April 25 parliamentary elections. This represented a heavy setback for the CP. A major portion of its base obviously voted for Carvalho.

Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, who suffered a serious heart attack just three days before the elections, came in third with 692,382 votes, or 14.4%.

The leaders of the Socialist party and the two bourgeois parties, the PPD and CDS, are congratulating themselves on Eanes's victory. The UDP, MES, PCP(ML), and PRP—the MES and PRP having been major elements of the FUR¹—are claiming Carvalho's big vote as a major defeat for the right wing and a victory for the working class. Meanwhile, the CP is busily licking its wounds.

The CP campaigned for "unity" on the left, with appeals to Socialist party workers to vote for Octávio Pato as a symbol of the need for a "left government" (any that would include the CP). It also called on the SP to accept unity and a CP-SP government based on the majority held by the reformist workers parties in the Assembly of the Republic. But the CP not only failed to win any new support, it barely managed to keep the vote of its hard-core supporters.

1. PPD—Partido Popular Democrático (Democratic People's Party, the liberal bourgeois party); CDS—Centro Democrático Social (Social Democratic Center, the right-wing bourgeois party); UDP—União Democrática do Povo (People's Democratic Union, a Maoist organization with a syndicalist line); MES—Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (Movement of the Socialist Left, a left centrist group with anarchist conceptions); PCP (ML)—Partido Comunista Português, Marxista-Leninista (Portuguese Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist, a right-centrist Maoist group); PRP—Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado (Revolutionary party of the Proletariat, a radical populist guerrilla group); FUR—Frente de Unidade Revolucionária (Front for Revolutionary Unity, a now defunct bloc that originated in a programmatic accord between a number of left groups including, initially, the Communist party).

The high rate of abstention indicates growing disappointment among the electorate. But with even as much as 25% not voting, it cannot be said that the workers abstained to a larger degree than any other social sector.

Millions still wanted to register their opinion against control by the generals and against capitalism. Eanes, who was backed by the Socialist party, was distasteful to many; the CP did not campaign vigorously against him, although it ran its own candidate, Pato.

So the protest vote went to the agile demagogue of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), Maj. Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

Still facing charges over his part in the ill-fated November 25, 1975, adventure involving the MFA's left wing, his candidacy was supported by a conglomeration of ex-FUR, centrist, and adventurist groups that survived the disaster and are now again beginning to grow for lack of any other alternative on the left that appears serious.

The main difference between Carvalho's electoral platform and that of the other candidates was his insistence that the "people's power" formations—workers commissions, neighborhood commissions, etc. (nobody speaks any more of soldiers committees)—would be promoted, strengthened, and extended if he were elected.

This vague promise seemed to be enough for his leftist sponsors. He was for socialism, of course, but in due time, which would require at least four years of hard work and serious preparation. One may even assume that since the presidency runs for five years and the legislative assembly for four, he was planning to bring in socialism single-handedly during the last year of his term in office.

Carvalho's campaign was the liveliest of all because of the street theater aptitudes of his promoters. They organized a street demonstration in Lisbon of 1,500 persons on election eve. The chants were: "Eanes, fascist," "Eanes to Brazil now," and, most popular and vociferous of all, "Otelo, a friend in the presidency."

But "Otelo" himself tried his best to avoid polemicizing with the other candidates, though he made absurd and contradictory statements according to the demands of the moment. At one time, for example, he said he would name Mário Soares as prime minister if elected. At another, he said he would call on General

Vasco Gonçalves of Fifth Government fame.

Undoubtedly, one of Carvalho's reasons for running was to try to win some popular support against the charges still hanging over him for his November 25 escapade.

Carvalho's candidacy was viewed by the most radical sectors of the Portuguese working class as the only alternative to Eanes or Pinheiro de Azevedo. These sectors tended to discount the candidacy of Octávio Pato as not being seriously meant—it was a mere electoral maneuver designed to put the CP in better position for participation in the new government after the elections.

Carvalho got his highest vote in the radicalized areas considered CP strongholds, such as Setúbal, Beja, Evora, and Lisbon itself, where he got 31% against 53.5% for Eanes, and where Pato got only 10.3%.

It was in Beja, in the lower Alentejo, the area of large landholdings (many of which were taken over in the earlier stage of the upsurge) where the CP had the best standing among the agricultural proletariat, that Pato got his highest percentage—25.6%. But even here both Carvalho and Eanes outdistanced him with 32.8% and 34.6% respectively. In Beja, the bedraggled Azevedo, with 7%, made his worst showing.

In Setúbal, situated in the upper Alentejo, Carvalho came in first, the only district where he did so. He won 41.8% against 30% for Eanes, 18.7% for Pato, and 9.6% for Azevedo.

The UDP and other petty-bourgeois radical groups behind Carvalho were so overwhelmed by his victory in Setúbal that some talked of setting up a "Setúbal Commune." It was rumored in the press the day after the elections that these groups had run up the red flag in Setúbal and had decided to install Carvalho as leader of the new commune, proclaim him president of the nation, and secede if the rest of Portugal did not give in and accept him. The rumor was quickly put to rest, however.

Alvaro Cunhal, the head of the CP, trying to explain Pato's defeat to the press, gave an interview while on his way to the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties as the Portuguese representative. He said, "It must be noted that the sum total of the vote for Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and Octávio Pato is some hundreds of thousands greater than the total of the vote for the Communist party

and the several left groups in the elections for the Assembly of the Republic."

And, counting in the votes for Pinheiro de Azevedo, he said the "parties supporting the Eanes candidacy lost almost one million votes from their electorate." He admitted that the CP also lost some "hundreds of thousands" of votes from those who had voted for it in the April 25 elections and who almost certainly voted for Carvalho on June 27.

The Pato campaign, he said, had been very "complex" and had had to go against the tide, against deep-seated illusions, "alarmist illusions about the danger from the right as well as illusions in a possible victory by Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

"We can say that we partially won some of the political education goals that faced us, but there was, without doubt, a relative lack of success due to the fact that we were unable to dispel these illusions among the popular sectors that were and continue to be with our party."

Finally, he predicted that "something which appears as a lack of success will be politically recuperated, with interest."

Clearly, for the CP, the chickens were coming home to roost.

The CP's decision to run Pato made it possible for revolutionists to support his candidacy to indicate the need for working-class political independence from the ruling class and military, while attacking the program and policies of the CP, attempting to convince the advanced workers of the need for a consistent fight to break with these forces on the political arena. This was the position taken by the Trotskyist groups in Portugal that support the Fourth International, the PRT, LCI, and GAS.³

The UDP, which has some strength in the labor movement, used Carvalho's candidacy with some success to break away supporters of the CP. Workers commissions, unions, and other formations generally dominated by the CP sent messages to Octávio Pato suggesting that he pull out of the race in favor of Carvalho. Faced with this alarming development, the CP called a special Central Committee meeting to decide to hold fast with Pato. An editorial in the June 24 preelection issue of *Avante!*, the official CP organ said:

There will be a PCP candidate in Sunday's elections: Octávio Pato, Communist candidate for the presidency of the republic, will be on the ballot at the polling places according to the decision of the PCP Central Committee at its plenary session last Monday, called especially to consider this question.

In the recent period those who are interested in dividing the left have tried to carry out a

2. PRT—Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (Revolutionary Workers party); Liga Comunista Internacionalista (Internationalist Communist League); GAS—Grupos de Accção Socialista (Socialist Action Groups).

demobilizing action, proposing the withdrawal of Octávio Pato as a candidate. The PCP Central Committee now gives them a reasonable, conclusive, and the only justified reply—on to the ballot box.

At first the CP tried to find a way to support a member of the officer caste. It early centered attention on getting the president, General Costa Gomes, to run. Significantly, it was only Carvalho, not the CP, who even thought of mentioning the CP's former hero of the Fifth Govern-



EANES

ment, General Vasco Gonçalves. When they failed to get Costa Gomes to run, the CP decided to run a civilian so as not to introduce a "divisive" force into the armed forces' Revolutionary Council. *Avante!* was forthright on the question of unity in the armed forces:

The independent Communist candidacy will have a unifying effect within the Armed Forces themselves. When there are three military candidates, two of them members of the Revolutionary Council, divisionist factors among the military are introduced into the electoral battle for the presidency of the Republic.

Alvaro Cunhal very correctly stated in Setúbal that one of the main objectives of reaction, supported by the leftist groups, is to divide and provoke the definitive separation, cause a split and confrontation between the People and the Armed Forces. The reaction knows very well—Alvaro Cunhal emphasized!—that if such a confrontation and separation should take place it would signify the final defeat of the Portuguese Revolution.

The only candidate and political forces really attacked by the CP were Carvalho and the groups supporting him. They also

gave Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo a light slap on the wrist:

... the great mass political educational campaign of the Communist candidate will lay clear before the eyes of even the least informed people the openly divisionist character of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho's candidacy and the demagoguery and anti-Communism of the adventurist groups who run his campaign; and at the same time it will show the capitulation before imperialism of the propagandists for Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo's campaign.

Maintaining silence on the CP's own responsibility for spurring on Carvalho and the FUR "far left" in their campaign that culminated in the November 25 disaster—the CP editorial continued:

The danger of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho's campaign flows from the divisionist and disruptive character of the forces that support it. The groups that promote Otelo's candidacy suffered serious reverses in the last elections for the Assembly of the Republic. Without having understood the lessons from the past, they want to reconstitute the FUR under conditions that will inevitably bring those who participate in it to new defeats and new defections.

Their actions in the past, with Otelo, brought the Portuguese Revolution its most serious defeats. The main objective of those groups that support Otelo is to fight the PCP and divide the working masses. One of these forces, the UDP, took an unequivocal position against recognition of the Republic of Angola and called the regime led by the MPLA and Agostinho Neto fascist.

But the CP apologists were very gentle toward General Eanes. They tended rather to criticize the PPD and CDS for playing an opportunist game of supporting him and leading the people into confusion. And these Stalinist hacks prostrated themselves before the armed forces and the right-wing general:

The PPD and CDS's latching on to General Eanes's candidacy and to the SP, with the objective of climbing into the seats of power where they can deal a deathblow to Portuguese democracy, demands that this candidate and the SP itself draw a clear political line of demarcation. This demarcation is urgently needed. It is well known that the SP will pay very dearly for any delay in making this political demarcation.

One clear line of demarcation is indispensable: that is, on cooperation between the People and the Armed Forces, a cooperation that is often very complicated but that is absolutely necessary to continuation of the democratic process.

The only point made in this long editorial that could possibly be in the interests of the working class and the Portuguese revolution was so weakly put and so linked to cringing before the armed forces and the bourgeois regime that it did not stand out clearly. This was on the need for CP-SP unity:

Octávio Pato's campaign will contribute to broadening the political and social base of the unifying movement which will bring about the founding of a majority of the left and make possible the formation of a government of the left, of Socialists and Communists.

But the turn by the CP on this question was not very convincing, and the appeal to SP voters obviously fell mostly on ears deafened by the slander and physical attacks committed on them by the CP and the "far left," by CP arrogance and bureaucratic bullying at all levels in the past.

The SP's capitulation to the ruling class is clear to all with eyes to see, and many SP voters also undoubtedly added to Carvalho's vote as a means of protest against the criminal policy of Soares.

In the early stages, there had been differences in the SP leadership about supporting a military figure. Significant opposition to such a move was expressed. But a leadership meeting decided not to vote and to leave the decision to Soares, who then negotiated with Eanes and committed the SP to him.

SP and CP capitulation, and the diversion of the best working-class fighters into the blind alley of political support to the bourgeois military figure Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, have now made possible a further consolidation of the Portuguese armed forces and bourgeois regime.

Eanes will ask Soares to form a government. The Assembly of the Republic will have three chances, according to the constitution, to vote on governments presented by Soares and the Revolutionary Council—if it doesn't approve the first two. If the assembly rejects three governments in a row, the president can dissolve it and call elections for new peoples' representatives who will be more responsive. Such is the beauty of the new Portuguese constitution General Eanes and the armed forces will have to work with.

The as yet undefeated working class now faces a harder fight than before, but a fight in which there is still time for a revolutionary alternative and a new political class consciousness to be developed.

The ferment and upsurge across the border in Spain can help give the besieged Portuguese workers even more time.

The Trotskyist forces are the only hope for this historic task. They were the only ones to reject all military figures in the presidential elections and to clearly call for a government free of generals and composed of representatives of the workers parties. The Trotskyists were the only ones who did not support Portuguese chauvinism in the guise of "national independence" and who called for a fight against their own imperialist bourgeoisie as well as against all the others. And they were the only ones who refused to support the new constitution which effectively gives all political power to the armed forces.

The Trotskyist groups had planned to present their own candidate to make the political fight clearer. This was a move that could have led to encouraging successes. But in their enthusiasm and hurry to present a candidate with a militant

record in the underground struggle, they were led to accept as good coin a comrade's own romantically embellished stories of her "heroic" past. On the eve of closing the lists, the CP charged in a press conference that the claims of the Trotskyist candidate were fraudulent, as would soon be proved. Making their own check, the Trotskyists found misrepresentation in the record, and they decided they had no choice but to withdraw. But the damage had been done, and there was no time to present a more politically solid candidate. They then decided to give critical support to the CP candidate.

The new Trotskyist groups have faced

difficulties because of the small number of cadres they had to begin with and their lack of roots in the Portuguese class struggle. Despite heroic efforts, they have not yet been able to exert a big impact and they have suffered many internal divisions generated by the pressures of the petty-bourgeois radical groups and by international political pressures. But they continue to face up to the task and are on the way to creating a unified, strong, independent-minded Portuguese Trotskyist leadership rooted in the Portuguese mass movement.

June 30, 1976

Victory for International Defense Campaign

Five 'Trotskyists' Released From Prison in Egypt

Word has reached the United States that the five remaining "Trotskyists" held as political prisoners by the Sadat regime have been released. Further details, such as the state of their health after nearly a year of imprisonment under extremely harsh conditions, are not yet known, owing to the tight censorship in Egypt.

The release of the five is a victory for the international campaign waged in their behalf.

In the United States, Arab-American attorney Abdeen Jabara, who specializes in defending the civil rights of Arab nationals, sent a telegram of protest to President Sadat. *Action*, a New York weekly edited by Dr. M.T. Mehdi of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations, printed an appeal on behalf of the prisoners.

In addition, many prominent civil-liberties activists signed a petition urging freedom for the detainees. These included Reza Baraheni, a poet and former political prisoner in Iran; Ralph Schoenman, who helped organize the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal; and Martin Sostre, a former American political prisoner.

Also, Dr. Theodore Stathis, chairman of the United Hellenic Front; Noam Chomsky of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Eqbal Ahmad of the Institute for Policy Studies; the Arab poet and activist Adonis; the Palestinian artist Kamal Boulatta; and the noted Turkish novelist Yashar Kemal.

In Sri Lanka, activists in the defense effort circulated petitions and organized a campaign that resulted in hundreds of letters of protest being sent to President Sadat and the Egyptian embassy. In Belgium, a solidarity committee helped raise funds to aid the families of the prisoners, several of whom were deprived of any income by the arrests.

The five prisoners who were released are Abdel Kazim Shahit Mahmoud and Muza-

him Muhi el-Takriti, both of whom are Iraqi teachers; Reda Ibrahim Farag, a student; Mahmoud el-Sayid Muhammed el-Sayid, a worker; and Rashad Mansour Mustafa el-Bedawi, also a worker.

They were part of a group of sixteen alleged "Trotskyists" arrested July 3, 1975, on witch-hunt charges of having "established relations with foreign communist organizations," specifically the Fourth International and the Revolutionary Communist Group of Lebanon.

As reported in the Egyptian press, the charges against them included:

1. Intending to "overthrow the country's political and economic system so as to impose a 'Trotskyist' extremist-communist regime."
2. Possession of a typewriter, allegedly purchased with the financial assistance of Lebanese Trotskyists.
3. Use of the typewriter in the production of pamphlets and leaflets.
4. Possession of the Lebanese Trotskyist publication *Al-Mounadel*.

One of the detainees was placed under house arrest and ten were subsequently released on bail. The remaining five were eventually transferred to an ordinary prison, where they were kept with common prisoners under extraordinarily harsh conditions.

The fact that the sixteen were arrested not for any criminal act but on purely political grounds is an ominous development, the petition circulated in the United States pointed out. "It is a dangerous violation of the democratic rights of all Egyptians, particularly the right to free association and to the free exchange of ideas."

The defense effort will continue until all charges are dropped against the sixteen former prisoners. Protests may be sent to President Anwar el-Sadat, National Assembly, Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt. □

Capitalism Fouls Things Up



Alaska Pipeline Price Rises Again

The estimated cost of the 800-mile Alaskan oil pipeline has been raised again, this time to \$7.7 billion.

When the pipeline was first proposed in 1969, the cost was estimated at \$900 million. A year ago the price was estimated at \$6.4 billion. This had risen to \$7 billion by January. Since completion of the project is planned for mid-1977, further price rises can be expected.

The price for constructing the pipeline estimated by the Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., a consortium of eight oil companies, does not include the cost of cleaning up the Alaskan environment once the pipeline is in operation.

Computer Solves Pollution 'Mystery'

The "mysterious incursion" that recently coated seventy miles of New York beaches with sewage and other filth has turned out not to be so mysterious after all.

Using a computer model of the area that included the actual weather conditions for the first three weeks of June, scientists at the Brookhaven National Laboratories found that *anything floating* in an area of about 4,500 square miles south of New York Harbor washed up on the beaches within a maximum of ten days.

It is worth noting that among other noxious items, hundreds of millions of gallons of raw sewage are dumped into

this area every day, converting it into what one local official termed "a giant toilet bowl."

"Normally, nearly all the debris is carried out to sea by the prevailing current," the *New York Times* reported June 27. But an "unusual wind condition, which Brookhaven scientists said had begun on the afternoon of June 7, reversed the usual pattern. . . .

"The scientists agreed that there was probably enough debris at all times in the area immediately south of New York Harbor and Long Island for pollution of the beaches to recur regularly. Only the rarity of the persistent southwesterly winds keeps the beaches clean most of the time, they said."

An initial examination of weather charts "indicated that such persistent southwesterly winds did not recur more than once every four years."

Perhaps to avoid unwelcome speculation, it was not reported whether anyone had checked the charts on the probability of a tidal wave.

Drinking Water: Britain's Newest Luxury Item

British health officials are examining whether it is necessary for the government to provide bottled water, according to a report in the July 7 *London Times*.

Although the current drought has drastically lowered the flow of rivers providing municipal water supplies, there has been no decrease in the amount of contaminants entering the streams. The resulting higher than normal concentration of pollutants—particularly nitrates draining off fertilized farm land—has made the drinking water hazardous in many parts of the country.

Babies under six months of age are particularly susceptible to cyanosis, a disease caused by an excess of nitrates. Adults subjected to prolonged intake of the contaminated water will experience symptoms that "include breathlessness, headaches, and fatigue," the *Times* reported.

Nitrate levels in the drinking water in some districts are currently as high as 22.6 parts per million—double the amount regarded as safe by the World Health Organization.

In Case of Nuclear Disaster

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has estimated that the release of large amounts of radioactive material as a result of a nuclear reactor accident would probably result in 66,000 to 330,000 delayed cancer deaths over the twenty to thirty years following the accident. The EPA estimate is two to ten times higher than the previous estimate of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

However, the U.S. government is in the process of drafting a plan on how to cope with such a disaster. The plan will prescribe the precise responsibilities of thirty-two government agencies in the event of a nuclear accident.

For example, the EPA is charged with developing "guidelines for the disposal of the dead, removal of solid wastes, animal carcasses and other debris, whether radioactive or nonradioactive, that might contaminate the environment."

French Unionists, Environmentalists, Protest 'Super-Phénix' Reactor


In an appeal published in the July 3 *Le Monde*, a group of environmental activists, unionists, and representatives of political groups urged a public campaign against the scheduled construction of the "Super-Phénix" nuclear breeder reactor. The proposed site for the reactor is Creys-Malville, some twenty-five miles outside Lyon.

Breeder reactors, which produce more radioactive material than they consume, present even greater dangers than the reactors currently in use, the appeal points out. Among the hazards are the following.

Breeder reactors use great quantities of plutonium, "one of the most deadly substances known." The inhalation of less than a milligram can cause lung cancer.

"Unlike 'conventional' reactors, a breeder reactor can, in an accident, become the site of an atomic explosion of the sort euphemistically labeled a 'nuclear excursion.' The workings of breeder reactors, and hence the probability of such accidents, is very poorly understood."

Signers of the appeal included Friends of the Earth, national officials of the CFDT trade-union federation, and officials of the Socialist party, the Left Radical party, and the United Socialist party.



Al Kaufman/*New York Times*

When Women Speak Out

Reviewed by Rebecca Finch



A good number of books by American feminists or about them have recently appeared in France. Previously the feminist publishing house, Editions des Femmes, was nearly alone in publishing the works of feminists from other countries. But in recent months, some big publishers have started bringing out translations of the works of many American feminist authors, such as Kate Millet and Ti-Grace Atkinson, or they are publishing books written about the movement in the United States.

One of these books, *Quand les Femmes se Disent (When Women Speak Out)*, was published late in 1975 by Editions du Seuil. It has received wide attention in France, and is of particular interest to American socialists because the book contains interviews with two leaders of the Socialist Workers party, Linda Jenness and Evelyn Reed.

The book is a collection of a dozen interviews with American feminists done by two French women, Malka Weksler and Evelyne Guedj. In addition to the interviews—actually these transcripts from tape recordings and notes could better be described as informal conversations—the book contains an account of how the project developed. Thus, Weksler and Guedj tell their own story of struggling to overcome the barriers facing women when they seek to do more with their lives than what is normally permitted or expected of them. This account is a moving one that every feminist in the world would understand.

The two women met one another on a plane in the summer of 1973 on their way to the United States, and found that they shared a common interest in the history, life, and struggles of Native Americans. On their return to France, they decided to work together on a project that would serve as the basis for their master's degrees in American civilization at the University of Paris. Since they were becoming interested in feminist ideas just at that time, and since they were interested in revolutionary Marxism as well, the subject chosen was a study of "an American revolutionary party and the question of women, the Socialist Workers Party."

In the weeks of preparation, the two women read and reread literature published by the SWP, talked about their

project to other French feminists and their teachers, and visited the offices of the then-banned ex-Ligue Communiste, predecessor of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), French section of the Fourth International. They interviewed Alain Krivine, one of the LCR's leaders, about the organization's views on the emerging feminist movement, and Catherine Verla, one of the women responsible for the organization's activity in the women's liberation movement.

At this point Weksler and Guedj decided to change the nature of their project somewhat. Instead of spending time only with SWP members, they would also interview other feminists, such as members of the New York Radical Feminists,

Quand les Femmes se Disent (When Women Speak Out), by Malka Weksler and Evelyne Guedj. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975. 374 pp.

Black women activists, etc. Eventually they decided to publish the interviews as such, adding a few brief commentaries by Guedj telling of their own work on the project.

The book is revealing about trends in American feminism, and for that reason alone it is unfortunate it is not available in English. Many of the women interviewed were first active in the feminist groups that grew out of the student movement, or the New Left groups of the late sixties, such as Students for a Democratic Society, the Black Panther party, or *Newsreel*, a New Left film group.

Not all the women interviewed were sympathetic to the views of the SWP—far from it. Some of them expressed their hostility to Marxist organizations of both men and women, others to the idea that a socialist revolution would be necessary for the achievement of women's liberation. Some were openly hostile to mass action campaigns like the one for the right to abortion conducted by the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONA-AC), which the SWP helped to build in the early seventies. But the interviews are also a rich source of information about the astoundingly rapid and deep development

of the women's movement in the U.S., and the many different ways in which individual women reached feminist consciousness. It is in this sense that the book has real value for the women's movement in France, for many French women are trying to grapple with problems similar to those faced by feminists in the U.S.

One of these problems is combating the age-old myth of women's biological inferiority. Weksler and Guedj were interested in learning more about the work done on this question by Marxist anthropologist and SWP member Evelyn Reed. They were acquainted with two of Reed's pamphlets, *Is Biology Woman's Destiny?* and *Problems of Women's Liberation*,* and their interview with her touched on these questions. At one point, Evelyn Reed attacks the male-biased views of French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, who believes that women have always been dominated by men. Guedj replies, "He's my boss." She is employed by him on the staff of the French anthropological magazine *L'Homme (Man)*.

Then the conversation moves on to other subjects, like the development of the first consciousness-raising groups, and the founding convention of the Coalition of Labor Union Women. In the short commentary preceding the interview, Guedj writes, "When we left her house, we were enthusiastic. To meet a woman of another generation and to have a common ground with her, a common language, was strengthening and encouraging. We both felt this very vividly."

It is likely this interview will generate interest in Reed's most recent book, *Woman's Evolution*. Her American publisher, Pathfinder Press, is presently negotiating with the feminist publishing house Editions des Femmes for a French edition.

The conversation with Linda Jenness, the SWP's presidential candidate in 1972, was unfortunately reproduced only from notes. It focuses on the history, depth, and strength of the developing feminist movement, its powerful impact on campus, Black and Chicano, and working women, the SWP's mass action perspective in the

* These are available from Pathfinder Press, Inc., 410 West Street, New York, New York 10014.

women's liberation movement, and the party's general participation in American politics.

Commenting on their conversation with Jenness, Guedj writes, "Linda is passionate, likable and enthusiastic. That does a lot for us. At the end of the interview, Linda proposes that we make a visit to the SWP building, the offices, those of the newspaper the *Militant*, the printing shop, and the machine room. She is proud of the

headquarters, explaining to us how the members have entirely reconstructed this dilapidated old building." Guedj notes that "everywhere there are women, including one (the only one in the U.S.A.) who operates the big web press."

One discordant note in the book is the conversation held with LCR leader Catherine Verla. The two authors gained an unfavorable impression of the SWP from this conversation, which was, however,

dispelled when they actually met the SWP leaders. Verla later wrote that she hadn't expected her remarks to be published, and that they did not represent the position of the LCR.

Malka Weksler and Evelyne Guedj have put together a source book rich in information about the American women's movement that will go a long way in stimulating discussion and solidarity among French and American feminists. □

A Strategy to Fight Racist and Fascist Attacks

Reviewed by Fred Feldman

From Boston, Massachusetts, to Pasadena, California, attacks on the rights of Blacks and other oppressed minorities are on the rise in the United States. Encouraged by the government and politicians of both capitalist parties, this offensive has found expression in the rise of violent racist groups like ROAR (Restore Our Alienated Rights), the organization centered in Boston leading the drive against school integration).

The racist offensive is a breeding ground for even more virulent right-wing formations. Fascist groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the National Socialist White Peoples party, while small and without mass influence, and not the likely form American fascism will take, have begun to grow and to incite terrorist attacks on Blacks in Chicago and other cities.

In combating the racist offensive, American revolutionary socialists have had to rethink and discuss many problems of strategy and tactics. An important product of this process is *Counter-mobilization: A Strategy to Fight Racist and Fascist Attacks*.

This pamphlet consists of the transcript of a May 6, 1975, discussion between leaders of the Young Socialist Alliance and the Socialist Workers party. Led off by Farrell Dobbs, for many years a central leader of the party, the discussion takes up the tactical problems raised by the racist offensive in a broad strategic context.

The discussion occurred in the wake of a demonstration organized by several ultra-left groups against an American Nazi speaker at San Francisco State University. Using confrontationist tactics and directing their propaganda against "free speech for fascists," the ultralefts so alienated the campus community that the administration felt able to launch an effort to expell them.

Dobbs' presentation is premised on the decisive importance of the mobilization of the working class in beating back fascist attacks. While fascism does not represent a major threat now, he points out, the ruling class is certain to rely more heavily on fascist groups as the class struggle heats up. ". . . we have to see the next period as

a period of mobilization of fascist forces and countermobilization of working-class forces. . . .

"Tactically, your actions must be calculated to aid the mobilization of the workers and their allies and obstruct the mobilization of the fascists. The fascists are trying to do the same thing. They are trying to develop a system of tactics that will facilitate the mobilization of fascist forces and block the mobilization of our forces."

Dobbs discussed the danger involved in efforts to "smash" the fascists now with

Counter-mobilization: A Strategy to Fight Racist and Fascist Attacks, by Farrell Dobbs. New York: National Education Department, Socialist Workers party, 1976. 23pp (8½" x 11"). \$.75.

limited forces: "If you start by attempting to hastily gather together a vanguard force and crush fascism in the egg, you are playing into the hands of the fascists. You are losing ground in the mobilization of the real class that can do away with fascism, and the fascists are gaining ground as a result. Now that's the problem the ultralefts fell into in San Francisco."

Dobbs discusses the approach taken by the Trotskyists in 1938 in mobilizing the labor movement in Minneapolis against a threat by the fascist Silver Shirts to attack the headquarters of the Minneapolis Teamsters. They built a union-wide defense guard which organized a counterdemonstration that put a quick end to the fascist organizing drive in Minneapolis.

Dobbs stresses the importance of avoiding slogans and tactics that create the false impression that revolutionary socialists seek to suppress free speech, rather than to put a stop to fascist attacks on labor and the oppressed minorities.

"We didn't say a word about anybody depriving the fascists of their right of free speech. We didn't say a word to the state or federal authorities about doing anything to prevent the fascists from speaking.

"Our remarks were concentrated on

explaining to the workers why they couldn't rely on any arm of the state apparatus to protect them against the fascists and why they should rely only on themselves to do so. . . .

"I have suggested that, instead of raising an attack on the formal democratic right of the fascists to speak and peddle their program and recruit goons, we counterpose the democratic right to counterdemonstrate. According to the tempo and development of the situation, we infuse into it the concept of the democratic right of self-defense."

Dobbs explains the importance of presenting the issue defensively in mobilizing the workers against fascist and racist attacks. "Don't forget Lenin and Trotsky made a revolution under defensive slogans. If you are obliged to clobber some fascist in order to protect your rights, it's always good if this is done in the name of defending yourself. It helps you to involve more allies."

In his comments, SWP National Secretary Jack Barnes said it was necessary to place "the whole question of fascism into proper proportion. The main approach to fighting these people today is as *racists*, not as fascists. Fascism is not an imminent threat in the United States, but the mobilization of racist forces is.

"The racist offensive is not only an imminent threat but a gigantic campaign that has been organized and mobilized for over a decade by the ruling class. Showdowns with real social forces are taking place over education, jobs, housing, from Milwaukee to Boston to Los Angeles to Chicago to Houston to Baltimore.

"I would think that the axis for the mobilization of broad forces—not just a few ultralefts—would be to concentrate on the racist aspect. Racist mobilizations, racist theories, racist opinions, and racist agitators are part of this attempt to build up a racist offensive. They show the need for a counteroffensive."

The contributions contained in this rich discussion make *Counter-mobilization* must reading for all who are concerned about organizing an effective working-class response to racist and fascist drives.

Selections From the Left



"Socialist Gazette," newspaper of the Internationalist Marxist Group, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Colombia. Published in Bogotá.

The June issue features an analysis of the López regime's offensive against democratic rights. The paper points out that behind López's proposal to convene a national constituent assembly is a plan to "reform" the constitution by strengthening its repressive aspects.

López prefers to do this through a specially set up "constituent assembly" because dissident currents in the House and Senate are considered vulnerable to popular pressure and would likely demand a lengthy debate.

Part of the offensive is an effort to elevate the repressive decrees authorizing state-of-seige powers to the level of constitutional law, thereby giving the hated measures a greater appearance of legitimacy. The second prong is an attack on the powers of the Departmental Assemblies [provincial consultative bodies] and City Councils, which in the present context of rising class struggles are considered dangerous potential forums for currents in the workers movement.

"The opposition López and his associates have expressed recently to the Departmental Assemblies and City Councils is aimed at freeing the executive branch of these obstacles. Traditionally, they have been centers for pork-barrel politics among representatives of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. But they have also inevitably been centers of political debate in which representatives of the workers parties, such as the CP and the [Maoist] Independent Revolutionary Workers Movement, have been able to put forward their views. Consequently, it could not be excluded that representatives of other radical currents in the workers movement might eventually gain access to such forums for the purposes of revolutionary propaganda. . . ."

López has publicly suggested that the provincial administrations become more "technical" and stop being "so political." The aim is to eliminate these elected bodies "precisely at a time when the problems of the provinces and the cities, above all those regarding services that are supposed to be provided by the state, are becoming worse and are turning into an increasingly serious source of social conflict. The *paros cívicos* [mass demonstrations by entire

communities to protest cuts in social services] have shown the magnitude of the problems affecting the provinces, issues that are scornfully dismissed by some as 'municipalist protests' or 'regionalist aspirations.' In fact, however, they are an expression of the profound mass discontent that has been building for decades, and that could be turned to account for the revolutionary proletarian struggle by an intelligent and audacious revolutionary leadership. The bourgeoisie has good reason to be so concerned with doing away with these bodies," which could be utilized to provide guidance and direction to the struggles of the masses.

Socialists must oppose any attempt by the capitalist regime to dissolve these bodies, which, "however degenerated," represent the "gains of previous revolutions." In face of this offensive by López, the correct path for revolutionists is to call for a genuine constituent assembly, freely elected and holding full powers, to open the way toward a government that represents the interests of the vast majority of Colombians—a workers and peasants government.



"Truth," published six times a year in Rio Pedras, Puerto Rico. Presents the views of the Internationalist Workers League.

The Trotskyists of the Internationalist Workers League (LIT) are urging a vote for the Puerto Rican Socialist party in the November elections, Antonio Merle reports in the May-June issue. The PSP, which has never before run candidates, is fielding a large slate headed by its general secretary, Juan Mari Brás.

Merle points out that the LIT is a new, small organization that does not have the resources to obtain ballot status and conduct a campaign. Consequently, working people will have four choices in November.

The two largest parties, the New Progressives and the Popular Democrats, are both capitalist parties that "represent the interests of the rich, of the corporations."

The Puerto Rican Independence party, which won 5 percent of the vote in 1972, "represents the interests of the petty bourgeoisie," Merle writes, and does not offer an alternative because of its "program of class collaboration."

The PSP, in Merle's view, "represents the only independent class alternative" for working people in the election.

Merle says the LIT is urging a vote for

the PSP slate despite shortcomings in the PSP program. "We are in agreement in large part with many of the points in the program of the PSP, but we believe this is an *incomplete program*."

Instead of presenting broad social measures working people should struggle for, Merle says, the PSP takes up many of these measures as part of a description of what Puerto Rico would be like after winning independence and establishing a workers government.

Making its own proposal for a "worker-socialist program," the LIT puts forward twelve main points, including the following: independence; the right to a job, a decent wage, and decent housing; equal rights for women; and freedom for the five Puerto Rican Nationalists who have been imprisoned in the United States since the early 1950s.



Newspaper of the American Communist party.

In the July 3 issue Conrad Komorowski comments on the strikes and demonstrations that took place in Poland June 25 to protest increases in the price of food. He complains that the press gave too much attention "to actions of a very small number of disgruntled persons."

According to Komorowski, "the overwhelming masses of people reacted in anger against the disgruntled few," and "the Polish people are taking the price increases on meat, sugar, and a limited number of commodities in their stride."

As Komorowski explains it, Poland is one big happy family, and any disagreements are "all in the family." Economic planning in Poland "is somewhat like a family budget."

The children may complain, but papa knows best—or, as Komorowski says: "Whatever price increases there may be are necessary. As a matter of fact, the public in general knew that some price increases would come because the economic facts of life had been explained to them."

"The economic facts of life," as set forth by Komorowski, are that Poland "buys meat and other foods abroad, and pays inflated capitalist prices. The difference between the inflated capitalist price and the low, stable, controlled socialist price has been made up by governmental subsidies, but these have proved too expensive."

In case anyone gets the impression that this means the cost of living will rise in

Poland if the government raises food prices, Komorowski says that the price hikes will be accompanied by a plan "ensuring full compensation for the higher cost of living." (Emphasis in original.)

He does not explain what the point of raising prices is, if that is the case.

Finally, Komorowski stresses that "the protests did not frighten the Polish Government into retreat." He makes clear that the price increases will be carried out, but they have been postponed so that the people can "advance their proposals on how the necessary adjustments and economies can be made to spark Poland's great progress." (Emphasis in original.)

He concludes: "The democratic procedure has been noteworthy."

PEKING REVIEW

Weekly magazine published in Peking.

An item in the July 2 issue takes the opportunity offered by the workers' upsurge in Poland to score a few points against the "new tsars," the rival Stalinist regime in Moscow.

Pointing to a factor hitherto unnoticed by most commentators, the report explains the particular explosiveness of the situation as stemming from the workers' belated recognition that capitalism has been restored in Poland.

"This latest strike was the inevitable outcome of the sharpening contradictions between the Polish people and the ruling clique. In the past 20 years or more, the Polish ruling clique, tailing closely behind the Soviet revisionist clique, has restored capitalism in the country, thus making a mess of agricultural production. . . .

"The new tsars' intensified plunder, exploitation and control of Poland in recent years was another cause of the strike. The Soviet Union, whose output of agricultural products has dropped in the last few years, has failed to provide Poland with the amount of grain as was agreed on. . . . Moreover, the Soviet Union has made Poland supply it with large quantities of meat and meat products, thus adding still greater difficulties to Poland's own acute shortage in meat supply."

rouge

"Red." Revolutionary Communist daily, published in Paris.

The July 1 issue reports on the reaction of Stalinist bureaucracies in other East European workers states to the workers' upsurge in Poland.

The East European regimes have tried to use massive importation of Western technology as a "universal panacea for all the problems of their so-called socialist economies," Sacha Blumkine writes.

"However, the exchange structure,

which favors the Western countries, as well as the effects of the capitalist crisis on prices, made worse by the increase in the price of goods from the Soviet Union, has created a serious balance-of-payments deficit in these countries. To counter this, the solution most obvious to the bureaucracies was to cut social spending, reduce imports of consumer goods, raise the price of daily necessities, and hold back wage increases—in short, to attack the standard of living of the masses.

"Consequently, the bureaucrats have every reason to be worried about the response of the Polish working class. The Hungarians, who were scheduled to raise consumer prices July 1 . . . tried to justify the position taken by their Polish colleagues: 'The price increases are a consequence of objective facts and not a question of intention—it is a matter of economic reality. . . . we hope that the Polish government finds an appropriate solution' (Radio Budapest). It is not known at present whether the scheduled increase will be put into effect.

"The Czechoslovak press, for its part, has not used the term 'strike' in commenting on the Polish events, but speaks of 'antisocial phenomena provoked in certain places by irresponsible elements.' One can understand the concern of the leaders of this 'normalized' country, who had scheduled a general increase in wholesale prices, to take effect in January 1977 after being postponed for a year."

An Phoblacht

"The Republic," weekly newspaper reflecting the views of the Provisional republican movement. Published in Dublin.

The editorial in the July 2 issue denounces the death sentence handed down June 9 in Dublin to Noel Murray and Marie Murray, two anarchists convicted of killing a policeman in the course of a bank robbery.

"In the Irish actuality," the editors state, "the death penalty has been abolished in most cases but has been reserved for special cases [i.e., the killing of a policeman], thus suggesting that some lives are more valuable than others. . . .

"This is abhorrent to public morality but it militates also against logic. All have an equal right to life, if we agree even with the decadent, so-called morality of the bourgeois state which pretends equality but which, in fact, protects one class and its interests against all others and their interests. . . .

"In the past, Republicans, perhaps more than any other section of the community, have been the victims of the revenge motive behind the death penalty in the Twenty-Six Counties. . . .

"Sanity, if nothing else, demands that killings should be kept to an absolute

minimum. The Republican Movement condemns any state which, for any reason, carries out the death penalty, even when those convicted have had the benefit of just laws, of a fair trial by jury and of unbiassed judges obviously independent of the political status-quo. The sentenced couple, we believe, have had few, if any, of these safeguards."

The editors point out that although the Murrays had no connection with the republican movement, it would be a grave error for the movement to remain silent on the case, "for we are concerned with Irish freedom; with a new Irish state, freed from alien interference. . . ."

DIRECT ACTION

Socialist weekly published in Sydney, Australia. Presents the views of the Socialist Workers party.

The July 1 issue reports protests in Australia following the bloody suppression of Black demonstrations by the Vorster regime in South Africa.

The Australian Council of Trade Unions has imposed a one-month boycott on all South African goods, ships, and airline services, Deb Shnook reports. "The executive said it will ask the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to back a worldwide boycott of South African goods and services."

In Sydney, Tony Mclenaghan reports, more than 200 persons demonstrated outside the South African Airways office June 25. "Following the rally a march proceeded to the American consulate to condemn the reaffirmation of American support for the racist regime signified by the recent talks between South African Prime Minister Vorster and US Secretary of State Kissinger in West Germany." The march then moved on to two Woolworth stores, which sell large quantities of fish imported from South Africa.


In Canberra, John Coleman reports, picket lines were held outside the South African embassy June 18 and June 25.

The June 24 issue reports earlier protest actions, including a demonstration of 100 persons June 19 in Sydney outside the South African Airways office and a rally of about 600 persons in Melbourne June 21. The Melbourne demonstration was joined by a group of workers who had marched from the docks.

The editors expressed their full support for the demonstrations in South Africa: "In Australia, we must show our solidarity with the courageous fight of Black South Africans in every way we can. Waterside workers in Victoria have shown the way by banning all shipping to and from South Africa, and as we go to press, those in Sydney and Newcastle have followed suit.

"We must demand that the Fraser Government immediately break all trade and diplomatic ties with the racist regime in Pretoria."

AROUND THE WORLD



Micronesians Demand Independence

Representatives of separatist groups in the Marshall and Palau Islands have demanded at the United Nations that their islands be granted independence. They are now ruled by Washington as part of the UN Trust Territory of the Pacific, commonly called Micronesia.

Anton deBrum, a spokesman of the Marshallese, told the UN Trusteeship Council that the United States should not play the role of "colonizer" at a time when it was celebrating the end of its own colonial rule by Britain. He said that Washington was maneuvering to maintain a "colonial stranglehold" over the Marshall Islands to perpetuate its control of the Kwajalein Atoll, where it has a missile tracking station.

Chief Ibedul of Palau Island protested a multi-billion dollar American project to turn that island into a large port for the transshipment, processing and storage of oil.

George Allen, an American lawyer living in the Marshalls, charged that American authorities practiced segregation against Marshallese in the Kwajalein Atoll. He said that it constituted "racial discrimination comparable only to apartheid in South Africa." He also said that earlier this year an epidemic of spinal meningitis took twelve lives and left two children with brain damage because the policy of segregated facilities prevented American doctors from aiding the sole Marshallese health officer.

Cement Scandal in Nigeria

The cement scandal that preceded the downfall of Nigeria's head of state Gen. Yakuba Gowon last July is far from over.

"In two or three years, we may be seeing buildings collapsing all over Nigeria," an official told reporters. He made the comment following the collapse on June 19 of a dormitory building nearing completion at the University of Ife. One worker was killed in the collapse and eighteen were injured.

The building fell after students in the engineering department warned that inferior cement was being used in the construction. The substandard cement came from ships that have been backed up in Nigeria's ports for as long as eight months to a year. Because of moisture in the hulls, the cement the ships were carrying lost its binding quality after six months and

became worthless for construction.

It is believed, however, that millions of tons of the defective cement have been purchased by small contractors. "Estimates say that as much as half the cement went bad," the official said. "Nobody knows where it went. It certainly wasn't thrown out. It's being mixed in with good cement to stretch it out."

Under Gowon, Nigerian officials ordered twenty million tons of cement, to be delivered within twelve months. At a rate of 1.6 million tons a month, the shipments were more than twice the unloading capacity of all of Nigeria's ports combined.

Gandhi Vows Continuation of Dictatorial Rule

In an interview with the national news agency Samachar, to mark the anniversary of the June 26, 1975, coup, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said she had no plans to hold elections, restore press freedom and civil rights, or release the tens of thousands of political prisoners.

"Dangers before the country have not diminished," she claimed. "They are as real today as they were a year ago."

Although Gandhi has tried to terrorize all political opposition into silence, about 100 persons staged a silent protest march in New Delhi. Police reportedly broke up the demonstration. According to an opposition member of parliament, about 400 persons were arrested in the old part of the city.

Nearly 100 persons demonstrated outside the Indian consulate in New York City June 26 to protest the state of emergency. The protest was called by the Ad Hoc Committee for Human Rights in India, Indians for Democracy, and the Indian People's Association of North America.

Seychelles Gain Independence

The Seychelles Islands became a formally independent republic on June 29. After 166 years, the 58,000 inhabitants of the ninety-two islands in the Indian Ocean broke their direct colonial ties with Great Britain. But the regime of James Mancham has indicated that the islands will still be closely linked to the imperialist powers.

Mancham has said that the Seychelles will join the British Commonwealth. And although he maintains that the new

republic will have a "neutral" foreign policy, he has expressed his approval for an American naval buildup in the Indian Ocean, supposedly to offset Soviet naval activities. Washington, moreover, maintains a satellite tracking station on Mahé Island, the largest of the Seychelles.

'Breaking Point' Near in New York Prisons

New York City's overcrowded jails are reaching the "breaking point," according to a report by Correction Commissioner Benjamin J. Malcolm at the end of June.

In the week ending June 24, 175 more persons were jailed than were released, bringing the total in the city's nine jails to 7,547. The Bronx House of Detention, to take one example, is 96 percent full.

A further sharp increase in the prison population is expected in August, owing to trial delays caused by judges' vacations.

International Protests Condemn Torture and Arrests in Argentina

Prominent political figures in Europe and the United States have protested the political repression in Argentina.

Danish Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen, Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, French Socialist party leader François Mitterrand, and Portuguese Socialist party leader Mário Soares were among the signers of an appeal in the June 20-21 issue of *Le Monde*.

The statement called for an end to torture, the release of all political prisoners, and the restoration of civil and political rights. "We consider," the signers said, "that the measures adopted to date by the military junta that governs Argentina put new obstacles in the way of a peaceful and democratic solution to Argentina's problems."

In a May 28 press release U.S. Senator James Abourezk and Congressman Donald Fraser joined United Auto Workers President Leonard Woodcock in condemning "the unprecedented increase of violence and repression occurring in Argentina."

"The reports from Argentina present an appalling picture of police raids, detention of trade unionists, torture and political assassinations," they said.

French Trotskyists Debate Strategy in Portuguese Elections

[In its June 30 issue, *Rouge*, the Paris daily that reflects the views of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR—Revolutionary Communist League), opened a public debate on the Portuguese presidential elections. It published three articles signed by leaders of the LCR presenting three different positions on this question.

[The editorial board noted that a debate had been taking place on the Portuguese election in the ranks of the LCR "which interests the entire far left and which we

have delayed too long in making public." It was announced that the next plenum of the Central Committee of the LCR would adopt a resolution on this question, and that the leaderships of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International and the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI—Internationalist Communist League, Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International) would also discuss it and come to a decision.

[The translation of the following articles is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

The Only Possible Working-Class Vote

By Gérard Filoche

The June 27 presidential election was a trap for the Portuguese working class. The two main parties that the workers gave an absolute majority in the April 25 legislative elections were able to divide and disorient the working class. The plebiscitary 61.5% vote for Eanes represents a grave defeat for the vast mass movement that swept Portugal to the brink of revolution. The SP leadership's betrayal pushed hundreds of thousands of workers and poor peasants to cast their ballots for a reactionary candidate. And most of the rest of the workers' vote was divided between the other two military candidates, while the only civilian candidate belonging to the workers movement came in last.

These are the consequences of a revolution betrayed. The responsibility falls on the SP and CP leaderships, which followed a criminal policy of holding back the workers' struggles for the sake of an alliance with the military and with the bourgeois parties.

Heeding the warnings from American imperialism about the need for keeping the CPs out of European governments, the SP, the main workers party, rushed to endorse a military officer, even though last year it tried to give the impression that it was demanding that the military withdraw from power.

Isolated by this concerted maneuver of the SP, the PPD [Partido Popular Democrático—Democratic People's party] and the CDS [Centro Democrático Social—Social Democratic Center], the Communist party was forced by pressure from its ranks to run its own candidate. It could have counted on holding its own and even capturing part of the SP electoral follow-

ing, if it had not had to pay the price of its long opportunist policy toward the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement] and thus toward the three military officers running. Rather than run a campaign, the CP tried to make guarantees to Eanes and negotiate a withdrawal from the race on honorable terms. The CP policy of "campaigning in retreat" increased the confusion in this election and undermined the enthusiasm that could have been aroused by the only working-class candidate.

The workers who in their great majority had understood the need to cast a class vote in the legislative elections, found it hard to make such a clear choice in the June 27 election. As a result, many of them turned toward the candidate of illusion, Otelo de Carvalho.

The fact that because of a lack of perspectives a large number of workers were dazzled and deceived by his campaign does not give Carvalho's campaign a working-class character. (This is not the first time in history that, betrayed and mocked, the workers have turned toward a leader who served as a surrogate for what they wanted.) The real problem is that extraordinary energies were tapped by the Carvalho campaign. In many cases, it was the most combative and radical sectors that constituted his electoral following. The result is all the more tragic because of this. This movement showed both the combativity and political confusion of all these sectors. The Portuguese centrists have incurred a grave responsibility by diverting all these energies toward a charismatic substitute for accomplishing the necessary and indispensable task of building a revolutionary workers party.

Otelo's success was possible only because of opportunist and ultraleftist policies in the past, sectarian impatience, and the absence of a revolutionary strategy capable of winning the masses away from the influence of the reformist leaderships and the military.

This former general, this former member of a ruling triumvirate, this man who freed Jaime Neves,¹ this man who endorsed the November 25 state of siege, managed to work effectively into his campaign those themes that have most disoriented the working class and its vanguard: "people-MFA alliance," "unity and discipline of the armed forces," "respect for the constitution," "mass political education by the army," "people's power," and so on. The most pernicious of such themes are "non-partyism" and "people-MFA" supra-class unity, because these go directly against independent organization and political expression by the working class. Carvalho even called on the centrist groups supporting him to subordinate themselves to the GDUP [Grupos de Dinamização da Unidade Popular—Groups to Promote People's Unity] so that he could maneuver more freely over the heads of the parties and in fact against them.

Throughout his campaign, Carvalho stood for a policy of class collaboration that, although different in form, was comparable to those followed by the SP and the CP. It was the same reactionary policy that has kept the workers from drawing the lessons of two years of revolution and which is blocking any clarification.

This is why the thing to do was not to "go through the experience" with the militant and radical workers who were being led astray by their illusions and errors, on the pretext that by so doing we could gain a hearing or link up with some kind of "dynamic" or "potentiality" for "regroupment of the vanguard" (is this supposed to take place on a nonparty or multiclass basis?). In this election, which was rigged against the workers, the revolutionary Marxists could only struggle against the stream, dig their heels in, and struggle to keep the most militant workers

1. The commander of the Amadora Commandos. A soldiers committee attempted to purge him as a rightist at the start of August. He was rescued by Carvalho. As a result, he was able to crush the soldiers movement in this regiment and make it into the main striking force for the government. This unit played the leading role in crushing the November 25 attempted coup.—IP

from being drawn into the wake of a petty-bourgeois candidate pretending to be radical.

This, moreover, was what was signified by the LCI's correct decision to run a Trotskyist candidate. Such a campaign would have been the best forum for opposing the various military candidates, as well as the CP candidate.

Because our attempt to run our own candidate failed, were we put in a position where the only choice was abstention? This is the only serious question.

However, such a position looks at all the candidates as "Tweedledum and Tweedledee." While the program of all the candidates, after two years of revolution, represented a reactionary policy, they nonetheless did not all have the same class position. One of them, Octávio Pato, was organically linked to one of the main workers parties. What was needed was to throw up a roadblock against Eanes. What was needed, in one way or another, was to register a class vote against the common candidate of the CDS, PPD, and SP and against Otelo's supraclass "nonpartyism." This is the only real argument for voting for Pato.

Such a position by no means represents endorsing Pato's program or his campaign. Pato was also for unity of the army, for "people-MFA" unity. His policy was to

subordinate working-class independence to the MFA, and he was able to accomplish this only because the workers saw him as the spokesman of a workers party. The assessment of Pato cannot be separated from the class nature of his party. It was in spite of his policy and his noncampaign that 7% of the workers cast their ballots for the only candidate from the workers movement.

We have to seize on everything that can advance the perspective of working-class independence from the bourgeois parties, ministers, and military. To "skirt" this question on the grounds that Carvalho "got more votes" is opportunistic and right wing. Precisely because we do not underestimate the sectors taken in by Carvalho, we should fight all the harder for working-class unity and independence. And this requires fighting for an SP-CP government without bourgeois ministers and without military officers. It is utopian to think that this fight can be bypassed by following the star of the "leader," Carvalho.

The Portuguese revolution marked a "return" to the "classical schema" of workers revolution. The strength of the working class and its traditional organizations makes it foolish to gamble on Carvalho playing a charismatic and substitutionist role. □

Is this sufficient to define where he stands in class terms and keep him from joining the camp of the workers?

The criterion for solving this question has to be sought elsewhere, in the *political significance* of the fight whose standard-bearer he has become. Supported by the organizations of the far left alone, he has sought the votes of the workers and of them only. What backing has he gotten from any organized bourgeois or petty-bourgeois current, any sector of the state apparatus, of the military hierarchy, or even of the defunct MFA? None.

On the basis of his support, to see in the Otelo phenomenon a new version of Peronism or Nasserism is inadmissible. That Otelo might tomorrow in fact play the role of a left bonaparte is, of course, not excluded, but this is not predestined. And if this happened, the responsibility would have to be placed on the errors and betrayals of the working-class leaderships.

Was the thing to do, then, to call for a vote for Otelo? Unquestionably, by voting for him many workers registered their defiance. They took a stand to the left of the CP and identified, over and above some dangerous ambiguities, with the defense of the organs of people's power and the revolutionary gains whose standard-bearer Otelo became (his final speech in Lisbon is clear testimony to this, see *Rouge*, June 29).

However, if we want to define the policy put forward by Otelo in terms of the currents in the workers movement, we should talk about left reformism and not centrism. Paradoxically, the breadth of his vote indicates what distinguishes his electoral support from that of the Proletarian Democracy slate in Italy, or even the traditional PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié—United Socialist party] vote in France. Otelo's candidacy cannot therefore be equated with a united far-left candidacy, no matter how much unity and militancy coalesced around it.

Moreover, as a providential tribune comfortably positioned above the parties, Otelo could only be the momentary spokesman of a refusal and a hope. His success largely reflected the bankruptcy of the reformist workers parties. But it does not offer a start to overcoming this bankruptcy.

Otelo's success only better highlights the power that could have been brought to bear by the candidacy of a workers leader who came out clearly for an anticapitalist program of action and had the united backing of the far left, the workers commissions, and representative trade-union structures.

Kalidas Barreto, a workers leader and a member of the left-wing of the SP, could have been such a candidate. (See the interview with him in *Rouge*, May 8. [A translation of the interview was published in *Intercontinental Press*, May 31, p. 895.]

In the absence of this sort of candidacy, the only thing that this election could

Pato-Otelo, Two Working-Class Candidates

By A. Artous, D. Bensaid, F. Lourson, A. Robs, and Y. Salesses

The ballot choice and more broadly the decision about what kind of political fight revolutionists should wage in the Portuguese elections depended on an analysis of the objective significance of the electoral confrontations and thus on a clear characterization of the candidacies of Pato and Otelo.

In choosing to vote for Pato, our comrades of the Liga Comunista Internacionalista said that his was "the only possible class vote," because Pato was the only candidate "organically linked to the workers movement." (*Rouge*, June 9.) Otelo's candidacy was thus indirectly characterized as one outside the workers movement, without its class content being clearly defined (was it bourgeois or petty bourgeois?). This analysis led logically to a prediction that the workers, and especially those who up till then had placed their confidence in the SP and would refuse to go along with its support for Eanes, would express their rejection of bourgeois candidates by throwing their vote behind the "only working-class candidate," Pato. In order to maintain this analysis, it is necessary to interpret the results of the election as a political defeat, a spectacular drop in the level of consciousness of the workers in a mere two months' time, when no confrontation has occurred to change

the relationship of forces between the classes since the April elections.

However, the election results have confirmed what a correct characterization of Otelo's candidacy would have enabled us to foresee. The CP candidate was incapable of becoming the rallying point for such elementary class consciousness. In fact, the CP even saw a large part of its party's own electoral base turn away from it and vote for Otelo. In voting against the bourgeois candidates, the workers issued a warning to the bourgeoisie and to the reformist leaderships of the CP and the SP: They are determined to defend their revolutionary gains and not to give up an inch of ground without a struggle. They are determined to put up a stubborn fight against the process of normalization that is under way and against the threatening advances of the democratic counterrevolution that is being directed by Soares with the willing complicity of Alvaro Cunhal.

It was wrong to see a class difference between Pato and Otelo.

Both candidacies are bourgeois in the program they put forward, and, regardless of Otelo's references to "people's power," both remain in the framework of respect for *bourgeois democracy and its institutions*. By his origins and his place in society, Otelo is certainly petty bourgeois.

clearly register was a class-against-class vote. This in fact was what was expressed by the support the workers gave Pato and Otelo.

The only thing left, then, for revolutionists to do was to put forward their own

program, while strongly criticizing the programs of Pato and Otelo and calling on the workers to vote for them rather than the bourgeois candidates. And at the same time, revolutionists should have called on the workers to continue their struggle. □

itself on the fact that Otelo is not a member of a workers party and does not seek to build a revolutionary party, places him in the camp of the bourgeoisie. From this standpoint, the shift of votes from the CP to Otelo is analyzed as a political regression, or even a reactionary vote. This position seems to me to be extremely dangerous inasmuch as it keeps us from understanding anything about the form the radicalization of the working class has taken in the Portuguese context.

On what bases was Otelo able to win in the strongholds of the CP?

Fundamentally, Otelo was able to do this by putting forward correct anticapitalist themes representing a position to the left of the CP—defense of the nationalizations, of the agrarian reform, of the workers committees. The personal prestige of the former Copcon [military security forces] chief and the artisan of April 25 certainly helped to bolster his popular support.

However, this prestige was effective only because Otelo identified himself with the themes we mentioned. The betrayal of the reformist parties and the impotence of the workers commissions explain, while of course they do not justify, the veritable cult around this personality. These parties have lost credibility to the benefit of the section of the working class that has taken refuge behind this personality. And, to be sure, it is in this problem of the personality cult that all the dangers lie. Otelo himself is responsible to no one, and may go off in any direction. Even if he is still under the pressure of the concerns of those who voted for him, this is an unorganized following in danger of being cruelly disillusioned tomorrow. The “nonparty” demagoguery is dangerous. The CP and SP still have a broad following in the working class. With its tradition and its apparatus, the CP will be able to win back a part of those who voted for Otelo. To think that it is possible to advance to socialism while neglecting these two parties means starting down the same road of errors as before.

This said, in such an election, you cannot sit in your ivory tower and score points in the name of program. The candidacies of Otelo and Pato both created illusions but not the same ones. It was important that a massive vote appeared to the left of the CP for a candidate, what is more, who had no support from any bourgeois formation. Despite the confusion, Otelo's success will restore the confidence of a broad section of the working class and prepare them for future struggles. Those who voted for Otelo certainly represent the most radicalized wing of the workers movement (see, for example, results in Setúbal and Beja). By giving critical support to Otelo, the Portuguese revolutionary Marxists could have gained opportunities to more effectively expose the limitations and illusions of his campaign. □

Take Advantage of a Working-Class Vote to the Left of the Communist Party

By Alain Krivine

The debate that has opened up in the LCR and throughout the revolutionary far left on what electoral policy should have been followed in Portugal takes on a great interest once the question is not limited to merely calling for a vote for one candidate or another, which is a tactical problem, but rather when we try to understand the differences in the analysis of the Portuguese revolution and the currents that run through it.

From this broader standpoint, we think there are only secondary differences between those of us who felt that the thing to do was to call for a vote for Pato and Otelo, and those, including myself, who believed that the right thing to do was to vote for Otelo alone. On the other hand, our differences with those comrades who maintain that Pato represented the only possible class vote are of a different order. This latter position arises from a failure to understand the phenomena of radicalization that developed prior to the November 25 coup.

Correctly, at that time in the columns of *Rouge*, we pointed up the various exemplary actions carried out by the workers in the united fighting organizations that they built, that is, the workers commissions, neighborhood commissions, and soldiers committees. Tens of thousands of workers began to take their struggle into their own hands and carry out experiments in workers control. This wave of self-organization was not free from confusion and political weakness, since it developed in the country at a time when all the big national workers organizations, the CP, the SP, and Intersindical, were practicing a class-collaborationist policy, with one foot in the committees and the other in the bourgeois state apparatus. This contradiction led the revolutionary organizations to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis, turning more toward one pole or the other. The FUR² at first was completely opportunist toward the CP; it may even have been attracted by the demagoguery of the CP's left speeches. And then it fell into an

ultrasectarian policy toward the big reformist parties, explaining that only the committees could carry the revolution to victory over the bodies of the CP and SP. This “nonparty” sentiment found a considerable echo in a section of the working class disgusted by these parties' policy of betrayal and division. However, the sectarianism of the far left helped to isolate the vanguard from the great mass of the workers. It prevented these committees from developing a united national structure and from developing a centralized leadership so that they could become a mass structure representing the working class and a possible alternative power to the bourgeois state.

The logical culmination of this course was November 25, that is, a rightist provocation designed to liquidate the process of self-organization, and which was facilitated by a desperate adventure by certain far-left groups and a section of the army.

The vanguard workers suffered a defeat on November 25. But they were not crushed; the bulk of them were not involved in the coup and did not fight.

It was inconceivable that two years of politicalization and revolutionary mobilization could be forgotten and wiped out overnight. It is this movement that we find today following Otelo, with the same hopes and the same confusion as before November 25. Two attitudes may be taken toward it.

One position, the dogmatic one, basing

CP left the front after about two days. The CP's front organization for its petty-bourgeois periphery, the Portuguese Democratic Movement, however, remained in until after November 25. The bloc included all of the ultraleft and centrist organizations of any size, except the eclectic Maoist União Democrática do Povo (People's Democratic Union), which was in orbit around it. It was dominated by two formations. One was the Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado (Revolutionary party of the Proletariat), a group with an urban guerrilla history and anarchist political conceptions. The other was the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (Movement of the Socialist Left), a centrist group with theories of rank-and-file organizing and combining parliamentarism and building “counterpower.” Both adopted a position in favor of an immediate insurrection in the period before November 25, and thus played into the hands of the rightists.—
IP

2. Frente de Unidade Revolucionária, Front for Revolutionary Unity. This bloc originated in the August 25 demonstration in Lisbon in support of the Fifth Provisional Government of Vasco Gonçalves. It was originally called the August 25 Bloc and the Frente Unitária Popular (People's United Front). The name was changed when the

GAS Position on Portuguese Presidential Race

[The following is the text of a leaflet issued by the Grupos de Acção Socialista (GAS—Socialist Action Groups) in Portugal. The GAS was formed by former members of the Partido Revolucionário dos Trabalhadores (PRT—Revolutionary Workers party) who had been expelled from the PRT on February 1. The leaflet, dated June 23, has been translated by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The crisis of bourgeois rule continues two years after April 25, 1974. This was confirmed in the victory of the working masses who gave an unequivocal majority to the workers parties in the elections for the Assembly of the Republic, reasserting the desire they expressed in the Constituent Assembly elections. It is confirmed in the instability of the provisional governments and the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement]. Having lost their credibility with the workers movement, they have been forced to focus their attacks on the masses in the big conciliatorist workers parties—the SP and the CP.

In this framework the elections for president of the Republic are going to take place. In opposition to the plans of the bourgeoisie to present Eanes as the single candidate “representative of all the Portuguese people,” the candidacy of Octávio Pato, a Communist party activist representing a sector of the working class, leaves open possibilities of struggle for the independence of the working class. This candidacy represents the resistance of activists and sympathizers of the CP and SP and the class as a whole to the agreements and bureaucratic maneuvers of the leaderships of their organizations with the bourgeoisie and the MFA. This resistance is forcing the CP leadership to put up its own candidate. The leadership of the PCP has not wished to place its candidate in a situation in which he could become an alternative for the masses of people and especially to the vast number who support the Socialist party against Eanes. This would only be possible if he defended a concrete program to unify the masses outside the framework of collaboration with the bourgeois parties and the MFA. Because we identify with the aspirations of the workers and youth to obtain a government of their own organizations without representatives of the bourgeoisie, the Grupos de Acção Socialista call for a vote for Octávio Pato.

We do this despite the intentions of the Stalinist leadership of the CP, who seek to prevent the process of development of class independence, and who now promise allegiance to Eanes if he should get elected. We pick up on the desires of the

workers and youth and hold the only candidate of the workers movement responsible for carrying out on the level of electoral struggle the aspirations of the working masses—for a united workers and farmers government of the CP and SP.

Only such a government will be able to satisfy the legitimate demands of the masses of workers and people. Its program will be able to protect the extension of democratic rights and the creation of conditions for the struggle of the workers against the institutions of the bourgeois state and for socialism.

With respect to Otelo's candidacy, which unfortunately is gaining support from sectors of the mass movement as the result of the petty-bourgeois perspectives of the organizations that encourage them, the Grupos de Acção Socialista do not consider it a workers candidacy. Sympathy for Otelo and the basic positions he defends—

Former Political Prisoners Appeal for Dzhemilev

[The following appeal was published in the July 15 issue of the *New York Review of Books*.]

* * *

Is it a crime to speak out against national oppression and genocide? Mustafa Dzhemilev, a Soviet dissident, was recently sentenced to two-and-one-half years imprisonment for just such activities in defense of his people, the Crimean Tatars, a Moslem, Turkic people in the USSR.

When Mustafa was just one year old, in 1944, the entire population of Crimean Tatars were forcibly deported to Central Asia where they have been held ever since. Almost half of the population died during the deportation and the first years of exile. Although the charges against them were formally dropped in 1967, the Tatars have not been allowed to return to the Crimea. Petitions demanding the right to return to their homeland have been signed by over a hundred thousand Tatars and brought to Moscow by elected representatives from each village.

Mustafa has participated in this non-violent struggle since childhood. He was expelled from college for speaking and writing about the history of the Crimean Tatars. He was first arrested in 1966 on the false charge of draft evasion and served one and a half years in a labor camp. In Moscow as an elected representative of the Tatars, he joined with other dissidents to form the Initiative Group for Defense of Human Rights in the USSR and de-

“unity of the armed forces,” a “patriotic government headed by Vasco Goncalves,” “the elimination of parties”—objectively represents a disastrous retreat by those sectors, which have come to trust a bourgeois military figure who does everything he can to disorient and divide the workers movement in the name of his imaginary “rank-and-file socialism.”

The class dividing line that distinguishes Octávio Pato, an activist in the CP, from the military hierarchy of the bourgeois state allows us without any doubt whatsoever to say that he is the only one deserving the workers' votes. Such votes are a mandate for him to struggle against Eanes, the MFA, and the capitalist parties:

*Break the pact with the MFA!
Dissolve the Council of the Revolution!
Organize a CP-SP government without
bourgeois representatives!* □

nounced the occupation of Czechoslovakia. He was arrested for “slandering the Soviet state” and spent three years in a strict regime camp. In 1974, he was rearrested for draft evasion and sentenced to another year in a strict regime camp. When this sentence was about to end, he was again charged with “slandering the Soviet state.” He began a hunger strike to protest against this treatment, but in April 1976 he was sentenced to two-and-one-half years imprisonment. His health is very poor due to the harsh prison conditions and his prolonged hunger strike.

We must condemn this unjust verdict and demand that the Soviet authorities release Mustafa Dzhemilev immediately. Free speech and support for the right of oppressed nationalities are not crimes. They should not be punishable in the Soviet Union, in the United States, or anywhere else. We are soliciting support for Dzhemilev among those who defend the rights of prisoners of conscience, democratic rights, and the rights of oppressed nationalities in the West as well as in the East—aiming to organize the kind of mass protest which the Soviet government cannot ignore.

Reza Baraheni, former Iranian political prisoner; *Pavel Litvinov*, former Soviet dissident; *Martin Sostre*, former American political prisoner.

Those interested should contact: The Mustafa Dzhemilev Defense Committee, Room 414, 853 Broadway, New York, New York 10003.

Izquierda Cayó en la Trampa de Carvalho

Por Gerry Foley

[El siguiente artículo apareció en nuestro número del 12 de julio con el título "Portuguese Left Caught in Trap Set by Carvalho." La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Hace solamente dos meses, en las elecciones legislativas del 25 de abril, los partidos obreros portugueses ganaron una victoria que afectó seriamente los planes de la burguesía para liquidar el ascenso revolucionario. Esta votación mostró que a pesar de dos años de experiencias desmoralizantes y de la profunda división en el seno de la clase obrera, la gran mayoría de las masas seguían queriendo un gobierno de los partidos que pensaban les representaban y realizarían sus aspiraciones por el socialismo.

Sin embargo, en las elecciones presidenciales del 27 de junio, no hubo ninguna alternativa clara o creíble de la clase obrera. Los partidos obreros de masas, así como la mayoría de los partidos que se reclaman a su izquierda, capitularon a uno u otro de los tres candidatos militares. Confusos y divididos, los trabajadores sufrieron la derrota política más grave desde el comienzo de la crisis revolucionaria en Portugal hace dos años.

El candidato número uno de la burguesía, como hombre fuerte militar, el general Ramalho Eanes, ganó el 61.54% de la votación. El general triunfante anunció inmediatamente una ofensiva contra las conquistas de los trabajadores. En su primera conferencia de prensa dijo que su elección señalaba el principio de la era de la "legitimidad democrática." Más adelante, dijo, "las leyes ya nunca volverán a ser letra muerta y se aplicarán plenamente en todo el territorio nacional."

Una de las leyes que el gobierno ha fracasado en hacer cumplir hasta ahora es la ley anti-huelga del gobierno de Gonçalves apoyado por el Partido Comunista. El Consejo de la Revolución, cuerpo dirigente del MFA (Movimento das Forças Armadas), comenzó a amenazar con reforzar esta ley como un medio de intimidación contra una ola de huelgas que comenzó a desarrollarse en el período anterior a las elecciones de abril.

En los decretos emitidos el 1 de julio, el gobierno provisional anunció una serie de medidas de austeridad, incluyendo un aumento de los precios de la gasolina y el petróleo, que son ya los más altos de Europa. Esto arrastra inevitablemente un

alza general de precios en los artículos de primera necesidad.

A la vez, el gobierno se movía hacia una represión escalonada. El gabinete amenazó con la deportación de los extranjeros que participasen en actividades políticas. El ministro de Justicia decretó que cualquiera que "calumniase" a un cargo civil o militar sería castigado con un año de prisión. "Calumnias" contra miembros del gabinete, del Consejo de la Revolución o de la Asamblea de la República serían castigadas con un período de prisión entre dos y ocho años.

La derrota de los trabajadores en las elecciones del 27 de junio fue tanto más trágica cuanto que fue claramente el resultado de las traiciones de los reformistas. Los trabajadores mostraron de todas las formas posibles que querían votar por una alternativa obrera, y tanto el Partido Comunista como el Socialista tuvieron grandes pérdidas debido a su subordinación a los generales.

La tasa de abstención subió aproximadamente hasta el 25%, tres veces mayor que la de las primeras elecciones libres del 1975 y considerablemente más alta que la de las elecciones legislativas de este mismo año. El Partido Comunista, que intentó apoyar a Eanes de forma disimulada, a la vez que presentaba su propio candidato, perdió casi la mitad de los votos que había conseguido anteriormente, a favor del demagogo militar Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. Los dirigentes del PS se las arreglaron para darle a Eanes solamente alrededor de la mitad de su votación.

Incluso con el apoyo de los partidos burgueses y del PS, Eanes no pudo arrastrar al distrito de Setubal, donde se da la mayor concentración de obreros industriales de todo el país. Consiguió menos de la tercera parte de los votos, frente a alrededor del 42% para Carvalho, 18% para el candidato del PC—Octavio Pato—y alrededor del 10% para el primer ministro Pinheiro de Azevedo, que consiguió un poco más del 14% a nivel nacional.

Aparentemente, no más de la mitad de los votos del PS fueron para Eanes, alrededor de un tercio para el primer ministro, y el resto—una proporción menor, pero considerable—fue al demagogo de "izquierda." El grueso del voto a Carvalho provenía claramente de aquellos que anteriormente habían votado por el PC.

Una distribución de los votos similar a

la de Setubal se produjo en los dos distritos de Alentejo, donde están las mayores concentraciones de obreros agrícolas. Sin embargo, aquí el PC se quedó con porcentajes algo más altos de su voto, y un porcentaje algo mayor de votantes del PS siguieron las directivas de su partido. Esto hizo posible que Eanes consiguiera una leve superioridad sobre Carvalho.

En la misma Lisboa, Eanes solamente consiguió alrededor del 53% de la votación. Ganó claramente en el conservador norte del país y en las islas. Es claro que su mandato no le vino de la clase obrera, y que los obreros más militantes eran hostiles a su candidatura.

La campaña de Carvalho tuvo exactamente el mismo efecto que temía el PC. Afectó profundamente a la base de apoyo del PC, que quedó reducida a menos del 8% desde el 14.5% que consiguió este partido en las elecciones legislativas de abril. A nivel de todo el país, Carvalho consiguió el 16.52%, del cual más de una tercera parte debía haber venido del PC. El resto debe haber llegado desde el PS y los partidos centristas de izquierda (estos últimos consiguieron alrededor del 3% en las elecciones de abril).

Las Esperanzas del PC

El PC intentó utilizar a Carvalho y a sus esquemas demagógicos durante los pasados primavera y verano para contrapesar a los socialdemócratas, que, utilizando su victoria en las elecciones a la Asamblea Constituyente, intentaban presionar al MFA para conseguir más posiciones en el aparato del Estado, los sindicatos y los medios de comunicación a expensas de los estalinistas. Esta maniobra hizo necesario sembrar ilusiones entre los mismos militantes del PC sobre el esquema del "Poder Popular" y los demagogos de izquierda del MFA. Finalmente, esto ha tenido el resultado de que el supuesto "ingenuo, pero puro soldado," Carvalho, le ganó al PC la mitad de las fichas.

Incluso después de este duro despertar, el partido estalinista no ha aprendido la lección. En su primera conferencia de prensa después de su derrota, Pato atribuyó el número de votos de Carvalho a "la convicción de los votantes de que el presidente debería ser un militar." De hecho, el PC presentó su propio candidato para evitar ofender a cualquiera de los militares, explicaba el corresponsal G.

Ratiani en el número de *Pravda* del 25 de junio:

"Era imposible para el PC escoger uno de los candidatos militares contra el otro. Ambos eran miembros del Consejo de la Revolución [esto se refiere claramente a Pinheiro y Eanes; el PC no consideraba que Carvalho fuese un candidato militar de buena fe.] Los comunistas siempre han apoyado la unidad en las fuerzas armadas y la unidad nacional."

Ahora, como resultado de su capitulación frente a los militares, el peso electoral del PC ha quedado virtualmente reducido al de un partido menor. Eanes tiene muchas menos razones para hacer cualquier concesión al PC. Es seguro que les va a forzar a hacer capitulaciones todavía más humillantes y costosas.

Pato intentó consolarse con el fracaso de los dirigentes del PS en transmitir la votación de su partido a Eanes: "Se dice que hubo cambios en el apoyo electoral al PC. Pero si miramos la cuestión más de cerca, el gran cambio se produjo en el comportamiento de los seguidores del PS, que mostraron su rechazo de la derecha."

Hay una cierta verdad en la declaración de Pato, pero este la distorsiona sectariamente. A los dirigentes del PS no les fue mejor que al PC, pero difícilmente lo hubieran podido hacer peor.

Las elecciones mostraron que los dirigentes del PS, que apoyaban a Eanes para conseguir que este apoyase un gobierno socialista basado en el 35% de la votación en abril, sólo pudieron conseguir el 17% o el 18% de su electorado para apoyar su política de realizar una alianza de facto con la derecha para excluir al PC del gobierno. Probablemente le dieron menos votos a Eanes que el PPD [Partido Popular Democrático, el partido burgués liberal] y no muchos más que el CDS [Centro Democrático Social, el partido burgués de derecha]. Ya que fueron los partidos burgueses los que le dieron a Eanes el grueso de sus votos, hay muy poca presión sobre él para hacer cualquier concesión a las necesidades de los dirigentes del PS, de cara a evitar que pierdan su apoyo obrero.

La posición política de la dirección del PS es ahora mucho más débil, como resultado del apoyo a Eanes, de lo que era antes. Es el prisionero de "su general." De hecho, el peso político de los dos partidos obreros reformistas se ha reducido mucho, en ventaja de los bonapartes burgueses.

Durante la campaña, los dirigentes del PS se enfrentaron con la rebelión abierta de parte de muchas de las organizaciones locales del partido. "El secretario general Mario Soares es fulminante contra los abandonos por parte de la base," Charles Michaloux escribía desde Portugal en el número del 24 de junio del diario trotskista de París *Rouge*: "En Aveiro, Viana do Castelo y Guimarães, para citar algunos ejemplos, se están negando a participar en los comités de apoyo al 'candidato de Portugal,' que están dirigidos por los jefes

locales del PPD y del CDS. El PS ha tenido que renunciar en la práctica a organizar sus propias acciones a favor de Eanes, después del fracaso de los primeros intentos en Oporto y Lisboa."

Ya que por lo menos la mitad y quizás una mayoría de los votantes del PS rechazaron las líneas de su dirección, parece inevitable algún tipo de crisis dentro del partido.

Carvalho—Demagogo de Izquierda

El perenne demagogo de "izquierda" del MFA, ex general Carvalho, ganó su mayor victoria política hasta ahora. Sin duda, su votación provino fundamentalmente de los sectores más radicalizados de los obreros industriales y agrícolas, que le identificaron con las ilusiones dominantes en las primeras etapas del régimen del MFA de que el socialismo estaba a la vista. Estas masas tomaron en serio la retórica "socialista" de los gobiernos de Gonçalves y se niegan a renunciar a las aspiraciones hacia las cuales los demagogos del MFA habían hecho concesiones verbales.

Ciertamente, los votos por Carvalho reflejaban un rechazo de los planes de "estabilización" de la burguesía. Eanes en particular contribuyó a presentar a su compañero oficial más demagogo como símbolo de los "inestables" tiempos anteriores. Aún más, Carvalho fue detenido como consecuencia del fracasado intento de golpe ultraizquierdista del 25 de noviembre, cuya represión abrió un período de ataques a la clase obrera y al PC.

La dirección del PC construyó el ambiente para la aventura del 25 de noviembre con una furiosa campaña de demagogia con apariencia izquierdista, en particular tras la caída de Gonçalves. Inició una ola de acciones militantes para intentar hacer una exhibición de sus fuerzas. Cuando vio la inutilidad de ello, inició una rápida retirada. Esta actuación sólo se pudo ver como cobarde por parte de la mayoría de los luchadores que apoyaban al PC.

El hecho de que "Otelos" también se desmarcase de la aventura del 25 de noviembre en el último momento, ha sido oscurecido por la forma en que la prensa burguesa y Eanes le describen como un peligro "revolucionario." Así, parece que el "general del pueblo" se volvió un héroe romántico para muchos de los seguidores del PC.

A pesar de las creencias subjetivas de los trabajadores que apoyaron a Carvalho, y a pesar de la palabrería de izquierda que este usó para atraerlos, el voto por este demagogo debilitó políticamente a la clase obrera. No representaba un rechazo de la tutela del MFA, sino que dirigía a las masas más hostiles a Eanes de nuevo al MFA por un camino diferente. Una vez más, le dio a Carvalho la oportunidad de desviar a importantes sectores de la clase obrera de plantear y luchar por sus propias demandas políticas.

El demagogo de "izquierda" utilizará la oferta al MFA del apoyo que ha conseguido para fortalecer su posición entre los diversos candidatos para bonaparte, exactamente igual que hizo en agosto pasado cuando intentó que sus seguidores centristas y ultraizquierdistas se unieran a un bloque común con el contrarrevolucionario Grupo de los Nueve, dirigido por Melo Antunes.

Fundamentalmente, Carvalho aún representa una opción gubernamental posible para la burguesía, si esta fracasa en el próximo período en conseguir que la mayoría de las masas acepten su dominación en una base abiertamente capitalista. Es decir, defiende un régimen demagógico de izquierda que gobierne por medio de decretos en beneficio de la burguesía.

Por ejemplo, en una entrevista en la edición del 9 de junio del diario de Lisboa *A Capital*, Carvalho dijo: "Los chinos han podido trabajar setenta horas semanales. No sé si yo pediré la misma cosa. Esto depende de las condiciones que experimentemos. No sé si cuarenta horas serán suficientes, o si podemos pedir setenta o más. Durante el proceso revolucionario, yo trabajé hasta noventa horas a la semana."

Estas no son simples palabras. En la primavera de 1975, las fuerzas de seguridad militar de Carvalho intervinieron en una reunión de los trabajadores del metal en Lisboa para reprimir a los que apoyaban la reivindicación de las cuarenta horas semanales de trabajo.

Una Cosa 'Insípida'

En lo que respecta a los medios de propaganda electoral de "Otelos," Charles Michaloux escribió en *Rouge* del 24 de junio: "Es insípido. Con el fondo de los colores nacionales, hay fotos de Otelos en uniforme de general. Los slogans son los siguientes: 'Otelos, un amigo de presidente,' o '25 de abril 1974 para presidente.'"

El diario de Lisboa, *Jornal Novo*, informaba que en Alentejo los admiradores del ex general pintaban en las paredes, "Vota Otelos, vota MFA."

En el número del 22 de junio del *Financial Times* de Londres, una de las publicaciones más autorizadas de las grandes empresas inglesas, el corresponsal Paul Ellman describía el programa de Carvalho de la siguiente forma:

"El único candidato presidencial que se ha aproximado a describir lo duro que va a ser el tiempo que nos espera ha sido Otelos Saraiva de Carvalho. Pero él confía en una especie de economía de excepción para resolver el problema. . . ."

Según la campaña se acercaba a su fin, Carvalho aumentaba el tono de su retórica. Alcanzó su forma máxima en la concentración de cierre de la campaña en la mayor plaza de Lisboa, la Praça do Comercio.

Como en los días de la "izquierda" del MFA, Carvalho utilizó consignas aparentemente revolucionarias, como la de unidad obrera, para fortalecer su propia

imagen "bonapartista revolucionaria." Convirtió estas consignas en relumbrantes generalidades, quitándoles todo contenido concreto. Ya que las corrientes centristas y ultraizquierdistas que le apoyan están acostumbradas a pensar en términos de categorías como la "dinámica revolucionaria de la autoorganización," etc. no es probable que se dieran cuenta de las maniobras de Otelo. La concreción no es su punto fuerte.

Posiblemente, Carvalho también estaba inspirado por la gran multitud. En *Rouge* del 28 de junio, Charles Michaloux y Michel Rovère estimaron la asistencia como casi tres veces mayor que la de 15,000 que consiguió Octavio Pato en su concentración final:

"La Praça do Comercio se llenó cuando la gigantesca manifestación del 16 de noviembre pasado. El viernes [25 de junio] una apretada multitud ocupaba dos tercios del espacio, y los andamios de alrededor de los grandes edificios públicos estaban llenos de gente hasta la altura del tercer piso. ¿Cuántos habría? Es difícil de calcular. Desde luego, no menos de 40,000 personas."

El demagogo estaba muy a tono con su audiencia: "Otelo habló durante algún tiempo sobre las ilusiones que existían de que todos los oficiales que tomaron parte en el 25 de abril podrían seguir juntos hacia la instauración del socialismo. En un estilo muy fidelista, Otelo se incluyó entre los que estaban decepcionados o dudaban."

El MFA es la primera dirección demagógica en Portugal que ha hecho un buen estudio de las sensibilidades de las corrientes centristas y ultraizquierdistas de la juventud y que ha aprendido cómo manejarlas. Carvalho se mostró especialmente habilidoso, incorporando estas corrientes que existían entre los soldados jóvenes de su comando de seguridad militar, y utilizándolas como medios de negociación con las masas. Sabía que estas corrientes, nacidas de una forma romántica del estalinismo, de los conjuros de la Revolución Cultural china, quedarían deslumbradas por la "autocrítica." Para ellos, la confesión se ha convertido en un talismán que puede conjurar toda la historia de un demagogo, y silenciar toda idea crítica sobre las motivaciones de un confusionista.

Carvalho también sabía que sería muy popular invocar la "unidad obrera." Sin embargo, las propuestas que hizo para unir a los obreros fueron precisamente las que hasta ahora les han dividido con mayor eficacia—una nueva versión del esquema de "poder popular."

"El pueblo trabajador no sólo ha mostrado una vez más su capacidad de lucha, su imaginación creativa, y su voluntad de vencer, también ha mostrado que es capaz de encontrar el camino que nos conducirá a la victoria—el camino de la unidad obrera, el camino de la unidad construida



CARVALHO

sin manipulaciones en los arraigados organismos populares y otras organizaciones de los trabajadores, el camino de la unidad construida en la lucha y en el marco de la democracia obrera."

¿Qué nuevo izquierdista romántico podría resistir todas estas invocaciones de los caprichos favoritos de las nuevas corrientes centristas de izquierda? Lo que tienen en común todas estas tendencias es un intento anarquista de evitar los problemas políticos, confiando en la "dinámica de la autoorganización obrera" para resolver los problemas políticos a que se enfrenta la clase obrera en su camino hacia el poder.

Debido a su debilidad política, los centristas de izquierda portugueses fueron presa fácil para los demagogos del MFA que apoyaban el esquema de "poder popular" en un intento de extender su influencia de forma directa en las fábricas y vecindades. Este intento del ala "izquierdista" del MFA fracasó el verano pasado, en el sentido en que no fue capaz de construir una correa de transmisión orgánica para el MFA. Tuvo éxito en la medida en que detuvo el avance político de los trabajadores hacia una determinación de arrancar el gobierno de manos de los generales. Dividió a los trabajadores y mantuvo la influencia política del MFA sobre ellos en diversas formas.

Es poco probable que la repetición del esquema de "poder popular" por "Otelo" pueda tener un efecto mayor del que tuvo la primera vez que se llevó a cabo esta maniobra. La amplitud potencial de esta operación se ha estrechado, por lo menos hasta ahora. Sin embargo, si se produce una reacción masiva entre los trabajadores contra los "estabilizadores," esta carta confusionista puede llegar a tener mayor importancia en el juego de la burguesía.

Por el momento, el principal peligro que representa el esquema de "poder popular" de Carvalho es que va a desviar a los trabajadores más combativos de la tarea de organizar una resistencia efectiva al

programa de austeridad de Eanes, y de la ruptura política con el MFA.

Junto con su retórica "revolucionaria" Carvalho ha insistido continuamente en que considera a Eanes como un "camarada" y que solamente se ha opuesto a él porque este estaba siendo utilizado por fuerzas derechistas. Como máximo, ha expresado "desilusión" respecto a Eanes. De hecho, los ataques más fuertes a Eanes vinieron de Pinheiro, quizás debido a resentimientos personales. Sin embargo, "Otelo," que fue autorizado por el ejército para presentarse como candidato, cree firmemente en la "disciplina" y la cohesión de la casta militar.

La más importante tarea inmediata que se les plantea a los trabajadores es desarrollar una organización sindical efectiva. Después de más de un año de retórica embriagadora sobre el "poder obrero en las fábricas," la clase obrera todavía carece de un instrumento elemental de defensa económica a nivel nacional. Lo que existía de un aparato sindical nacional fue minado por el sectarismo estalinista y por la intervención del MFA. La dirección estalinista de la Intersindical, que fue confirmada en esta posición por la ley de "unidad sindical" del MFA, está desacreditada, y todo esto ha retrasado gravemente la formación de un movimiento sindical unitario de masas.

Carvalho y sus seguidores ultraizquierdistas y centristas proponen transformar los comités de su campaña, los Grupos Dinamizadores da Unidade Popular (GDUP) en un sistema de "poder popular" que surja desde la "base." Actualmente este esquema está completamente desconectado de cualquier organización unitaria de los trabajadores. Significa introducir en las fábricas una forma sectaria de organización, no solamente divisionista, sino atada al carro de un demagogo militar representante de la burguesía que no tiene nada que darles a los obreros. De hecho, la crisis económica y el agotamiento de sus reservas significa que la burguesía tiene que obligar lo más rápido posible a los trabajadores a que acepten un programa de austeridad y un drástico aumento del desempleo.

En el *Rouge* del 26 de junio, Michel Rovère prevenía a los centristas y ultraizquierdistas que pensaban que los éxitos electorales de su "general rojo" significaban que podrían barrer a los cuadros de los partidos reformistas de las fábricas:

"Incluso a nivel electoral, las filas del PC—por lo menos sus miembros y simpatizantes organizados—se mantienen relativamente firmes. . . .

"Aún más, habría que señalar que un triunfo electoral está muy lejos de querer decir que se ha ganado la dirección de la clase obrera y el campesinado pobre. Aún a riesgo de desilusionar a algunos, tengo que decir que en los astilleros de Lisnave y Setnave y en la fábrica de acero Siderurgia

Nacional, el PC no está desapareciendo. Son los activistas de los dos principales partidos reformistas [es decir, el PC y el PS] los que están dirigiendo las luchas sociales que se han continuado desarrollando durante esta campaña electoral. . . .

"Habría que señalar también que el 'apartidismo' promovido durante esta campaña, que para el MES [Movimento de Esquerda Socialista] y la UDP [União Democrática do Povo, un grupo maoísta ecléctico con algunas nociones anarquistas como "autoorganización obrera"], es sólo la otra cara de la moneda de su análisis de la socialdemocracia y el 'revisiónismo,' es un obstáculo fundamental para que estos grupos puedan sacar ventajas de la crisis producida en el PS y el PC por las capitulaciones de las direcciones. Si Otelo . . . hubiera dicho que iba a llamar a Mário Soares para formar el futuro gobierno y que la votación de los obreros el 25 de abril hacía urgente la formación de un gobierno PC-PS, uno de los principales argumentos del PC durante la campaña habría quedado desmantelado."

Desde luego, Carvalho no tiene la menor intención de llamar a un gobierno PC-PS; toda su historia muestra que esto es lo último que quiere. Intentó llamar a votar en blanco en las elecciones de abril de 1975 para evitarlo, y cuando el voto en blanco no se materializó, se volvió hacia la "democracia directa" como una forma de eliminar la demanda de un gobierno responsable ante los obreros a través de los partidos que estos apoyan. Utilizará el apoyo que ha ganado como una ficha a su favor en los regateos dentro del MFA, exactamente como intentó hacer en agosto.

En agosto, los seguidores centristas y ultraizquierdistas de Carvalho se negaron a participar en esta maniobra. ¿Se negarán de nuevo si les ofrece un lugar en un régimen del MFA, como en efecto hizo el verano pasado? Desde entonces, los seguidores de Carvalho han avanzado un paso más en su completa subordinación a este.

El proceso revolucionario portugués ha sido la primera prueba decisiva para las corrientes ultraizquierdistas y centristas que dicen representar una alternativa revolucionaria a los traidores socialdemócratas y estalinistas. Hasta ahora, han fracasado en ofrecer tal alternativa, y de hecho tienen una gran parte de la responsabilidad por serias derrotas que ha sufrido la clase obrera. ¿Continuarán más lejos por este camino? Este es el interrogante que plantea el apoyo electoral que consiguió ganar Carvalho. □

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Militares no Pueden Romper Huelga Minera

Bolivia bajo Estado de 'Excepción'

Por Judy White

[El siguiente artículo apareció en nuestro número del 5 de julio, bajo el título "Bolivia Placed Under State of 'Exception'". La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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El presidente boliviano Hugo Banzer Suárez sometió aproximadamente a la tercera parte de la población del país a la ocupación militar el 15 de junio. Instituyó leyes de "excepción" en los departamentos de Oruro y Potosí, suspendiendo todos los derechos individuales y dejando el poder de decisión de todos los aspectos de la vida diaria en manos del ejército.

Pocos días antes había ordenado la ocupación militar de las minas por primera vez desde que subió al poder en 1971.

Banzer hizo esta acción en respuesta a la creciente movilización de los mineros y estudiantes que había llegado a ser una huelga general el 14 de junio. Se informó que habían sido afectados por la huelga hasta 70,000 obreros en las minas estatales y 20,000 estudiantes en todas las universidades de Bolivia menos dos. La producción de estaño en las minas, que constituye alrededor de 75% de la producción nacional, se paralizó por completo.

El dictador ya había intentado dar una serie de pasos antes de imponer las leyes de excepción para acallar el auge de las luchas obreras que ha estado experimentando Bolivia desde principios de este año.

En enero, se declaró ilegal una huelga de obreros de Manaco, la mayor fábrica de zapatos del país. Cuando los obreros se negaron a volver al trabajo mientras se mantuviera la "reforma" de aumento de ritmos de trabajo de Manaco, la empresa expulsó a 820 trabajadores. A su vez, esta acción desencadenó huelgas de solidaridad entre los miembros de la Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB), otros sectores de la clase obrera, y estudiantes.

El 29 de enero, los trabajadores de Manaco trabajaban de nuevo con una victoria de su lado.

Aún más, Banzer se vio forzado a conceder las demandas planteadas por el sector estudiantil de la movilización—liberación de los dirigentes estudiantiles detenidos y más control sobre la vida universitaria.

La FSTMB, que ha estado históricamente en la vanguardia de la lucha de clases en Bolivia, estuvo recuperando su fuerza durante el año pasado. A pesar del hecho de que toda actividad sindical ha sido

ilegal desde noviembre de 1974, pudo realizar un congreso con 400 delegados los días del 1 al 4 de mayo de este año en Corocoro.

La información sobre este congreso es fragmentaria, pero indica que las tendencias políticas dentro del movimiento obrero funcionan libremente entre los más de 30,000 miembros de la federación.

El congreso criticó fuertemente al gobierno de Banzer y se comprometió a trabajar por la reconstrucción de la Central Obrera Boliviana, fuera de la ley.

El número del 2 al 10 de junio del periódico francés *Informations Ouvrières*, que refleja los puntos de vista de la Organisation Communiste Internationaliste (OCI), informaba de cuestiones importantes que se plantearon en el congreso. Una de ellas era la orientación política que seguiría la organización:

La batalla sobre el documento programático se desarrolló en primer lugar en la comisión política saliente que estaba a cargo de la preparación del documento para el congreso. En el interior de la comisión política se dio una confrontación entre dos tendencias que incluso amenazó con hacer explotar la comisión. Por un lado, una minoría inspirada por los maoístas y los representantes del partido stalinista boliviano, el PCB. Por otro, la tendencia unitaria, inspirada por la fracción del POR.*

Los stalinistas de ambos tipos propusieron "actualizar" el programa de la FSTMB con la teoría de una revolución en dos etapas para el país. Mantienen que Bolivia es un estado feudal, y llaman al apoyo a un gobierno burgués como un paso progresivo.

El POR (Lora) llevó una lucha victoriosa por reafirmar las Tesis de Pulacayo, un documento programático de la federación minera y la COB que llama al establecimiento de un gobierno obrero y campesino en Bolivia.

El segundo punto central para presentar al congreso minero era la elección de una nueva dirección para el sindicato:

La renovación de la comisión ejecutiva de la FSTMB ha estado marcada por otra victoria de la fracción del POR. En la preparación del congreso, el POR había planteado la necesidad de barrer a la vieja burocracia y de proceder a la elección de nuevos dirigentes. En el mismo

*Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Lora), seguidores de Guillermo Lora. También se le conoce por POR (Masas) a causa del nombre del periódico del partido, *Masas*.

congreso, la antigua dirección fue acusada de traición y de complicidad con el gobierno de Banzer por una mayoría de los delegados.

Informations Ouvrières informaba que después de la discusión, los peores burócratas salieron de la comisión ejecutiva y varios activistas del POR (Lora) ganaron puestos en la nueva.

El congreso también se pronunció a favor de salarios para los desempleados, la jornada de seis horas, el control obrero, la ocupación inmediata de las minas en caso de quiebra, y la escala móvil de salarios.

El 24 de mayo, otro sector de la clase obrera ganó una victoria sobre el régimen. Después de una huelga general de veinticuatro horas de los periodistas del país, Banzer prometió el "respeto indefectible del gobierno hacia la libertad de prensa."

La huelga se produjo a continuación del asesinato del general Joaquín Zenteno Anaya en París. Zenteno era considerado como uno de los principales rivales políticos de Banzer. Aunque se informó ampliamente que su muerte fue debida a la acción de la "Brigada Internacional Che Guevara," un oscuro grupo francés supuestamente terrorista, diversos órganos de información bolivianos culparon de la acción al gobierno de Banzer y al alto mando militar. La huelga comenzó cuando los militares tomaron represalias, dando una golpiza a un periodista, y amenazando con deportar a varios otros.

La última ola de acciones masivas comenzó el tres de junio, a partir de la publicación del asesinato del anterior presidente boliviano Juan José Torres. Torres, que vivía exilado en Argentina, fue secuestrado el 1 de junio, y después fue muerto por un grupo terrorista de derecha.

La FSTMB realizó una huelga general de veinticuatro horas, a la que se unieron otros sectores de la clase obrera y del estudiantado.

Cuando, tres días más tarde, el gobierno de Banzer anunció que no permitiría que los restos de Torres fueran enterrados en Bolivia, las protestas aumentaron.

Banzer respondió declarando el estado de sitio el 9 de junio. Su secretario de prensa explicó el paso como una forma de "disolver una atmósfera de subversión predominante en el país."

El ejército fue enviado a los principales centros mineros para ocupar las emisoras de radio utilizadas por los mineros y las minas. Dirigentes de los trabajadores mineros fueron arrestados y encarcelados.

El Ministerio de Educación anunció que cambiaba las vacaciones escolares, de forma que empezaban ese mismo día.

La huelga general que comenzó el 14 de junio estaba centrada en la petición de la retirada de las tropas de las minas, la liberación de los dirigentes de los trabajadores mineros y la reapertura de las negociaciones salariales.

Cuando las protestas continuaron y

crecieron, el gobierno hizo uso de la violencia para tratar de detenerlas. El 16 de junio, por lo menos tres personas habían muerto, dos de ellas estudiantes de Oruro.

La huelga continúa a pesar de la declaración de estado de "excepción" en Oruro y Potosí por parte de Banzer. De

El Caso de Valentín Moroz

Victoria Parcial Sobre la Represión del Kremlin

Por Marilyn Vogt

[El siguiente artículo apareció en nuestro número del 5 de julio con el título "Partial Victory for Valentyn Moroz." La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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La campaña internacional por la liberación del historiador ucraniano disidente Valentín Moroz, ha ganado una victoria parcial. De una forma casi sin precedentes, los "doctores" del Instituto Serbsky de Moscú han "encontrado" que Moroz está mentalmente sano, según *Svoboda*, un diario en lengua ucraniana que se publica en los Estados Unidos.

Valentín Moroz fue sentenciado en noviembre de 1970 a una condena de catorce años (seis años de cárcel, tres años de trabajos forzados, cinco años de exilio interno) a causa de sus escritos en defensa de los derechos democráticos en la Unión Soviética y de los derechos nacionales del pueblo ucraniano. La condena de seis años de cárcel debía haber terminado el 1 de junio. Pero en vez de transferir a Moroz desde la prisión de Vladimir a un campo de concentración, como previsto en la sentencia, el 10 de mayo fue transferido al Instituto Serbsky de Psiquiatría Forense.

El Instituto Serbsky es conocido a causa de que los agentes de la policía secreta, disfrazados de expertos psiquiatras, ayudan a los burócratas soviéticos a suprimir a los disidentes políticos declarándolos enfermos mentales e internándolos en hospitales psiquiátricos-cárceles por tiempo indeterminado.

Raissa Moroz, la esposa de Valentín, se enteró a través del mismo de que se le transfirió al Instituto Serbsky porque los burócratas del Kremlin opinaban que necesitaba un examen psiquiátrico como consecuencia de su "religiosidad excelsiva" y sus "intentos de mutilarse a sí mismo."

Raissa se enteró de esto durante una visita que se le permitió hacerle a Moroz el 19 de mayo en el instituto, según un informe del *Toronto Star* del 22 de mayo sobre una entrevista que este periódico sostuvo con ella por teléfono.

Ella dijo que un doctor del instituto le dijo que Moroz tenía que sufrir un examen

hecho, el 18 de junio se había extendido a las minas privadas. Aunque el dictador acompañó este anuncio con una oferta de un alza salarial del 30 por ciento, los mineros insistieron en la retirada de las tropas de las minas como condición de su vuelta al trabajo. Además, el alza salarial que ellos piden es del 130 por ciento. □

porque últimamente "se había vuelto taciturno."

"Que le cambien a un campo de concentración. El trabajo es duro, pero por lo menos allí estaría entre amigos," dijo Raissa al *Toronto Star*. "Que le manden a un campo. Eso no me preocupa. Pero él es una persona sana y tiene que salir del Serbsky."

Leonid Pliutch, un marxista ucraniano que pasó dos años y medio en el hospital psiquiátrico Dnepropetrovsk debido a sus actividades en defensa de los derechos democráticos, hasta que fue liberado por un esfuerzo internacional de defensa, dijo, según *Le Monde* del 27 de mayo:

Es inhumano y absurdo censurar a una persona por sus creencias religiosas y ver en ellas una prueba de desequilibrio mental. Y lo que es todavía peor son las alegaciones de supuestos intentos de suicidio. Uno de los compañeros de prisión de Moroz informó no hace mucho que éste le había pedido que informase al mundo de que se le obligaba a compartir una celda con personas desequilibradas en un intento de romper su resistencia mental. Los locos pierden a veces el control, y el "intento de suicidio" puede muy bien haber sido un intento de ataque físico [contra él]

Según el *Toronto Globe and Mail* del 24 de mayo, Tatiana Zhitnikova, que fue una figura instrumental para asegurar la liberación de su marido, Leonid Pliutch, dirigió una carta abierta a organizaciones de mujeres de todo el mundo, llamándoles a pedir la liberación de Moroz.

En respuesta a los esfuerzos de los burócratas del Kremlin de declarar a Moroz enfermo mental, Zhitnikova dijo que Moroz revelaba "el dolor y los sufrimientos del pueblo ucraniano. Esta es la verdadera razón de su 'locura.'"

Sin embargo, los burócratas se han visto forzados a retroceder bajo la presión del creciente trabajo internacional de defensa a favor de Moroz. Según *Svoboda*, Raissa Moroz anunció el 21 de junio que fue informada de la decisión del Serbsky por cargos oficiales, que también le comunicaron que Moroz había sido transferido a la cárcel Butyrka de Moscú, desde donde sería transferido a un campo de trabajos forzados. □

FROM OUR READERS

A reader in Montréal, Canada, sent us a clipping and a suggestion:

"While the eyes of the world are focused on Montréal for the XXI Olympiad, a less well publicized aspect of the Olympic Games has recently come to public attention.

"Enclosed you will find a clipping from the June 30 *La Presse*. Published in Montréal, it describes itself as 'le plus grand quotidien Français d'Amerique.' The article describes just one of the many discriminatory firings on the basis of political affiliation and sexual orientation that have occurred in the past month, during this pre-Olympic 'clean-up' campaign of 'undesirables'.

"I hope that through the reports in *Labor Challenge*, *Libération*, in addition to the enclosed press release, that you will be able to publicize these undemocratic measures taken by the Comité organisateur des Jeux Olympiques (COJO).

"May I also take this opportunity to express a few comments about *Intercontinental Press*. I find that the inclusion of 'Selections From the Left' is an extremely important addition. The same goes for 'From Our Readers'.

"However, I would greatly appreciate it if you could run more material on the gay liberation movement around the world—like for example, the June 19 demonstration in Montréal against police repression in the gay community that is part of a 'clean-up' campaign in preparation for the Games. This was an internationally significant action.

"Coverage of this nature would I'm sure greatly interest the gay liberation activists, like myself, who regularly read *IP*."

"I just read the article about Berufsverbot ['Witch-hunt Law Under Fire in Germany,' June 28 issue] in *IP* No. 25," writes S.K. of Frankfurt. "The facts reported are generally correct, but I would like to point to three small inaccuracies:

"1. The constitution itself does not ban advocating 'class war'. There is a provision that parties can be banned if their aims are contrary to the so-called 'free and democratic basic order'. Most further restrictions came in 1956 by the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court outlining the reasons for banning the KPD.

"2. The congress against repression which drew over 20,000 on June 5 and 6 was not in Karlsruhe, but in Frankfurt. There was another congress in Karlsruhe before this one, which drew several thousand participants, organized mainly by DKP-influenced forces with international participation.

"3. It is said that victims of the Berufs-

verbot in some states of the Federal Republic can find jobs in the state of Hesse. This was true in a couple of cases. But in order to avoid a false picture it has to be said that some of the most outrageous cases of Berufsverbot actually occurred in Hesse."

R.H. of St. Catharines, Canada, included some comments with his subscription:

"I have read *Intercontinental Press* off and on over a number of years and now plan to become a regular reader. It is the strongest publication I've read on analysis of world events and stands for a program which can change all our lives for the better.

"P.S. Please note the unusual way the name of my city is spelt. It is St. Catharines with two 'a's.' Getting it right would be a first for any of the people who mail things to me here."

We hope we got in there with "a first."

Another subscriber in Canada, B.P.J. of Nanose Bay, British Columbia, notes that "The Postal Rates are being raised, both sides of the line. I reckon that the annual Postage on my *Intercontinental Press* is above \$11.00. I enclose a \$5.00 money order to help defray Postal cost for my annual sub.

"Our local papers have suggested that our New Democratic Party will face convention pressure to commence a Provincial Weekly Paper in B.C. The N.D.P. defeat in last December's election was due to the lies and distortions of the news media. We need a press of our own, explaining the class struggle. Teachers, nurses and government employees, miners, mill workers, industrial workers, railway workers are determined to fight any drop in their living standards. The One Big Union of the early 20's lives and grows."

"I hate to have to do this once again," writes T.B. of Houston, Texas. "But I need to order a bunch of back issues of *Intercontinental Press* for the second time this year. There are lots of complicated reasons for this."

T.B. explains that although the Houston branch of the SWP intended to order a weekly bundle, "drunken drivers have slowed both of us down. First, I got hit by one while on my way home from work one night, resulting in a broken leg; then, believe it or not, our bookstore got run into by one just two weeks later!"

G.P., a New Orleans subscriber, says that "The *IP* has really been doing a fantastic job of saving me from that informational wasteland, commonly called the New Orleans *Times-Picayune*. Keep up



Stayskal/Chicago Tribune

the improved reporting on Africa, more on Latin America please."

From Minneapolis, Minnesota, S.L.K. sent the following letter:

"I am a subscriber of your magazine. Unfortunately I have been very unlucky in receiving the *Intercontinental Press*. I have been receiving on and off without reason. For three months my subscription even stopped and I never knew why. I regularly pay the fee for the subscription and when I moved I immediately sent you a notice. . . .

"I do not know what to do any more. I sent you a letter already which evidently was not received or not read. I have been a reader of your magazine since 3 years and a half and this is the first time that such a thing happens."

Clearly the Postal Service is serving Minneapolis with its customary dispatch—and not only Minneapolis. We continue to get requests from our readers urging us to do something.

A reader in Bayonne, New Jersey, tells us that a recent issue was delivered ahead of an older one. "Also," he adds, "I consistently receive my *IP* several weeks behind schedule. Is there any way to send them more on time?"

A subscriber in Toronto, Canada, writing us about a bundle mailed to him, expressed joy at its arrival. "This was a red-letter day. . . . About two months to the day after they were mailed—maybe we should hire one of those racetrack ponies."

For all our subscribers who don't get their issues in good time, we have reproduced Stayskal's cartoon above. Makes a good pinup for contemplation when the mailman passes you by. □