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NEWS ANALYSIS

Carter—A Redneck for President

By David Frankel

As was expected, James Earl ("Jimmy") Carter, Jr. won the Democratic party nomination for president of the United States July 14.

Carter, the self-proclaimed redneck who appealed to the supporters of archracist George Wallace in his 1970 campaign for governor of Georgia, and who signed the death penalty into law in that state in 1973, talked about the need for "love" and "compassion" in the government.

The millionaire peanut farmer with a toothy smile, who got rich by raking in government subsidies and through the superexploitation of Black laborers, tried to cast himself as a champion of the common people. In his acceptance speech he said:

Our party was built out of the sweatshops of the old Lower East Side, the dark mills of New Hampshire, the blazing hearths of Illinois, the coal mines of Pennsylvania, the hardscrabble farms of the southern coastal plains, and the unlimited frontiers of America.

Ours is the party that welcomed generations of immigrants—the Jews, the Irish, the Italians, the Poles, and all the others—enlisted them in its ranks, and fought the political battles that helped bring them into the American mainstream—and they have shaped the character of our party.

Carter did not have a word to say about the thousands of striking New York hospital workers—mostly Black and Puerto Rican—who demonstrated outside the Democratic party convention as it convened July 12. Talk about the dark mills and coal mines is OK for campaign rhetoric, but when a real strike breaks out, that's a different story.

As for immigrants—the Democratic party is ready to welcome those whose parents came fifty or seventy-five years ago. But Mexicans, Haitians, Dominicans, and others who try to get into the United States today are not considered immigrants by the Democratic party. They are considered "illegal aliens," and they are told to go back where they came from.

The fact is that as a man who aspires to lead the most powerful and ruthless

imperialist government in history, Carter could not be anything but a cynical liar without any conscience; it is part of the job.

Much has been made of the fact that Carter is a new face in national American politics. But not even the capitalist commentators most friendly to him have been able to make much of a pretense that his foreign policy will be any different than the one that Kissinger has been implementing for the last eight years.

The way columnist Tom Braden put it in the July 3 *Washington Post* was that "Carter thinks our present foreign policy is pretty good." Of course, Carter doesn't say that openly.

No candidate who represents the "outs" can afford to say that he fully agrees with the "ins," and so Carter has couched his foreign policy views in such a manner as to suggest that he will offer something new. The two new planks he offers are, first, cooperation between the United States, Japan and Western Europe; and, second, an end to secrecy in foreign policy.

Both points are more rhetoric than reality.

Robert Keatley reached the same conclusion in the July 13 *Wall Street Journal*. As Keatley saw it:

... the Carter framework seems fundamentally like that which it would replace, with only a few new angles here and an occasional buttress there. His aides admit there aren't many basic policy options available, and it's worth noting that Henry Kissinger said the other day that Jimmy Carter's foreign policy is one he would have little trouble living with.

Keatley was referring to Kissinger's July 10 statement, in which he said of Carter's foreign policy views that "the main outlines that I have found have been fairly consistent with the foreign policy we've put forward previously."

Nor do the imperialists worry when Carter accidentally expresses an independent thought. For example, in an interview published in the July 7 issue of the *New York Times*, Carter agreed that a "limited" nuclear showdown would likely escalate into an all-out conflict.

Columnist C.L. Sulzberger took up the question in the July 14 *New York Times*.

First, Sulzberger recalled how amenable to advice Ford has been on foreign policy issues. "Mr. Ford has been consistently sensible on Panama and has usefully followed Secretary Kissinger's advice on several other moot topics."

Turning to "nuclear matters," Sulzberg-

er pointed out that "if a President—as candidate Carter now does—excludes the possibility of limited nuclear war he also excludes the idea of flexible response, core of NATO's present planning. Then one rapidly ends up with the all-or-nothing game of chicken that dominated U.S. thinking in the 1950's."

However, Sulzberger saw nothing to get excited about. "Obviously this [game of chicken] is far from Mr. Carter's wish and there isn't much value in going deeper into the subject during the campaign because the election won't be won on that issue."

More to the point, Sulzberger noted, Carter will have his own Kissinger to tell him what to do. "... there are several qualified foreign affairs advisers around the expected Democratic nominee from whom he can choose an expert team, starting with State and Defense Secretaries and National Security Adviser."

By far the most accurate portrayal of what will really be involved in Carter's presidential election campaign was given by Albert R. Hunt in the July 14 *Wall Street Journal*. In its own house' organs, the American ruling class feels little need to hide its contempt for the working masses and its deep cynicism. Thus, Hunt explained:

Jimmy Carter, already charting his fall campaign, is planning a clever balancing act.

As in the primaries, he will run as an anti-Washington outsider, stressing the non-ideological themes of integrity, trust and love. But he will also try, through both policy pronouncements and media imagery, to look more like a President and less like a peanut farmer. . . .

"We don't want to lose our outsider image," concurs Gerald Rafshoon, Mr. Carter's advertising man. "We want to look presidential, but not too presidential."

Rafshoon added: "My biggest worry is tarnishing our underdog, antiestablishment image. . . . We're not going to abandon the equity we've built up in the working-man, average-guy appeal and integrity themes."

What about the racist mobs opposing school desegregation in Boston? What about the more than seven million workers the government admits are unemployed, and the millions more not counted in its statistics? What about the wholesale cuts in public services and layoffs of public employees in city after city?

"The Carterites hope to start soon, too, to project a candidate thinking long and seriously about the country and its problems," Hunt says. "Pronouncements on issues will be much more plentiful than before the nomination, although specific stands won't be. Says one Democrat close to the Carter camp: 'They now view issues and policies like taking medicine—a spoonful when needed.'"

This is the miserable huckster being put forward as America's shining hope by the ruling class. □

Summer Schedule

The last issue of *Intercontinental Press* before our summer break will be the issue dated August 9. We will resume our regular schedule with the issue dated August 30.

Ford's 'Show of Force'

—A Threat to Africa

The Pentagon wasted no time in following up the Israeli commando raid on Uganda's Entebbe Airport. On July 12, only eight days after the Israeli attack, the U.S. frigate *Beary* sailed into Kenya's port of Mombasa.

Although the Ford administration is taking advantage of the friction between the regimes in Kenya and Uganda, which was increased by the collaboration of Kenya's President Jomo Kenyatta with the Israeli raiders, the significance of this latest move goes far beyond the dispute between Kenyatta and Ugandan President Idi Amin Dada.

As was pointed out in this space last week, the real target of the Israeli raid in Entebbe was the anti-imperialist struggle in Africa and the Middle East as a whole. Ford and Kissinger are aiming at the same target.

It is necessary only to recall the response of the imperialist press to the Israeli commando operation to put Ford's latest move into context.

An editorial in the July 11 *Manchester Guardian Weekly* asked, if three Israeli planes could prove so successful, then "how safe is Lusaka or Dar [es Salaam] or Nairobi from a sudden technological strike? And what perceptions of, say, the Southern Africa crisis may be altered by such knowledge?"

While threatening to intervene against Amin in Uganda, Washington is attempting to establish Kenya as a long-term base for military intervention in Africa. "The U.S. military 'show of force' in the Indian Ocean . . . is viewed here by Pentagon and congressional sources as underscoring the rising U.S. role in east and southern Africa," Guy Halverson said in a dispatch from Washington in the July 15 *Christian Science Monitor*.

This "show of force," John W. Finney reported in the July 13 *New York Times*, included the landing of a plane in Mombasa from the newly opened U.S. naval base on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. Also, an American naval task force headed by the aircraft carrier *Ranger* entered the Indian Ocean July 11 "headed in the general direction of East Africa."

These maneuvers, which are aimed ultimately against the African masses as a whole, have been carried out under the hypocritical cover of a campaign against Amin's dictatorial rule. Revolutionists have no interest in taking sides in the dispute between Amin and Kenyatta, but they—along with all partisans of the African liberation struggle—have every reason to warn against the danger of American intervention and to oppose such intervention, whatever the pretext. □

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Syrian-Backed Rightists Make New Gains in Lebanon

By David Frankel

Right-wing Christian forces, in conjunction with their Syrian supporters, have dealt a series of setbacks to the Muslim-leftist-Palestinian coalition in Lebanon's fifteen-month-old civil war. *Washington Post* correspondent Joseph Fitchett indicated the situation in northern Lebanon in a July 7 dispatch from the village of Chekka. "Christian jeeps dragged the bodies of dead Palestinian guerrillas through jubilant Christian villages," he reported.

On July 12 rightist forces advanced to the outskirts of Tripoli, Lebanon's second-largest city. As the Christian rightists pushed on Tripoli from the south, Syrian forces were putting pressure on two Palestinian refugee camps north of the city. The Palestinians charged that Syrian artillery had caused heavy casualties in the camps of Nahar el-Barad and Baddawi.

Syrian artillery was also active in southern Lebanon, where it was used against the oil refinery and storage tanks in the port city of Saïda in an effort to cut off the supply of fuel to Muslim and Palestinian forces.

In eastern Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, Syrian army units occupied the city of Baalbek July 15 after two days of fighting. Baalbek, with a population of 110,000, was the only major town in the Bekaa Valley that was not already under Syrian control.

Meanwhile, in Beirut the rightist siege of the Palestinian refugee camp of Tel Zaatar entered its twenty-sixth day July 17 with the defenders still holding out. About 1,000 wounded persons were trapped there without medicine or running water according to Eva Stahl, a Swedish nurse inside the camp.

An unsigned dispatch in the July 16 *Washington Post* said that Stahl talked by radio with a Swedish reporter. She said that "there were between 30,000 and 35,000 persons still in the camp, most of them civilians. Other reports have placed the number still in the camp at no more than a few thousand."

Washington Post correspondent Douglas Watson reported from Tel Zaatar July 13:

A front-line visit here today found plenty of shooting and talk by rightist soldiers of using gas, poisons, and fire to kill Tal Zaatar's remaining defenders, who are cut off from resupply of water, food and ammunition.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad has preferred to let the Christian rightists take responsibility for the sharpest fighting, thus avoiding the charge that it is his forces that are threatening a massacre in



New York Times

Lebanon. But the reality is clear: without Assad, the rightists would never have been able to carry out their new offensive.

"The battle of Tell Zaatar points up the impact of the Syrian military intervention," Henry Tanner said in a July 9 dispatch from Beirut in the *New York Times*. Tanner continued:

Lebanese rightist forces launched their attack on the camp after Syrian troops broke the leftist-Palestinian siege of Zahle, the Christian city of 75,000 inhabitants in the Bekaa Valley.

The Christians of Zahle had been hostages protecting Tell Zaatar. The rightist forces did not dare attack the camp because they knew that the Palestinians and leftists would overrun Zahle in retaliation.

Rightist forces were vastly helped when Syrian troops coming from the Bekaa Valley north of Zahle moved against the rear of Palestinian-leftist forces in Zahle and attacked Palestinian-leftist forces that had threatened the Christian heartland from Ferraya, a ski resort high up on Mount Lebanon. The Palestinians could not face a two-front battle and dispersed, thus freeing rightist troops for the attack on Tell Zaatar.

In a letter to Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat that was made public July 8, Yassir Arafat, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), charged that Syrian armored units participated directly in the attack on Tel Zaatar. Although there has been no proof of this charge, a July 10 Associated Press dis-

patch from Beirut said, "Christians with new American rifles drove Soviet-made armored cars that had not previously been seen in Lebanon as they continued on the offensive in the north and in the capital."

It is highly unlikely that the rightist forces would be able to get Soviet-made armored cars from any source other than the Assad regime. Moreover, Tanner reported in a July 15 dispatch:

Christian right-wing leaders who returned from Damascus last night after several days of talks with President Assad were quoted by the rightist radio today as having said that they had received Syrian approval for a major offensive against Moslem and Palestinian areas in Beirut and the mountains east of the capital.

Further news reports have not featured any denials from Damascus.

The deteriorating situation of the Muslim-leftist-Palestinian coalition caused Arafat to issue an appeal to the Algerian, Libyan, and Egyptian regimes July 11. Arafat told Sadat that the leftist and Palestinian forces "are caught in the jaws of a nutcracker. There is deterioration and the situation is worse than you think." He warned that "urgent action . . . is needed to avoid a massacre."

Similar appeals were sent by Kamal Jumblatt, a leader of the leftist coalition, to the heads of state of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt.

Arafat and Jumblatt received their answer two days later with the end of a meeting of the Arab League devoted to the Lebanese crisis. As United Press International explained in a July 14 dispatch, the meeting ended "with adoption of eight resolutions generally interpreted as giving Syria the green light to continue its military intervention in Lebanon."

Tanner drew a similar conclusion. In a July 14 dispatch he said, "As most Lebanese observers see it, the majority of Arab governments made it plain in Cairo that they were not going to interfere actively with the Syrian role in Lebanon and had no objection to seeing the Syrians 'reining' in the Palestinians."

On the diplomatic level, Assad continues to maneuver in order to avoid as much of the onus as possible for the military reverses being suffered by the Palestinians and their allies. For example, his troops pulled back from Saïda July 14 after having destroyed the refinery there. This move was supposedly a gesture of good faith in order to ease the way for negotiations between Assad and Arafat.

However, Palestinian leaders have indi-

cated that they have little faith in such negotiations. Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Arafat's main aide, told Tanner in a July 16 interview:

The Syrians will not withdraw voluntarily [from their main positions in Lebanon]. . . .

Personally, I believe that the fall of President Assad's regime is a necessity. There will always be a struggle between him and us. Sometimes this struggle will be out in the open. Sometimes there will be political maneuvering. . . .

The Syrians came into Lebanon to strike at the Palestinian resistance, not at the Lebanese left. They came with the approval of the United States and Israel.

While Assad maneuvers to destroy the Palestinian movement in Lebanon, the Stalinist bureaucrats in Moscow have been playing a particularly treacherous role. As *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent

John K. Cooley explained in a July 15 dispatch from Beirut:

"The Soviets are trying hard to convince the Arab world that they will help the beleaguered Palestinians here against strong military pressure from Syria—but do not wish to endanger their strong position in Syria by actually doing so."

Thus, when Beirut radio said July 13 that the Soviet embassy had begun putting pressure on Assad to withdraw his forces from Lebanon, the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow refused to confirm the report. One Soviet citizen "with quasi-official status" in Beirut explained Moscow's view to Cooley by saying:

"The U.S.S.R. and Syria have too much interest in keeping up their good relationship to really jeopardize it now."

But the fact is that if Assad is successful

in gutting the Palestinian liberation movement in Lebanon, he will have done away with one of the most powerful forces standing in the way of his rapprochement with American imperialism. Not only is the policy being pursued by Moscow a betrayal of the Palestinian people, it also will open the door for further diplomatic defeats for the Kremlin in the Middle East.

Nor will the attempt to reach a Middle East settlement at the expense of the Palestinian people bring peace to the region. On the contrary, it will only embolden the Israeli regime to further acts of aggression while leaving the basic issues unsolved. As one PLO leader told *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent William Blakemore in a recent interview, "Do these regimes think three and a half million Palestinians are going to just go away?" □

Unionists, Publishers, Amnesty International Cable Peruvian Junta

International Protest Over Deportation of Hugo Blanco

By Judy White

The arrest and deportation of Peruvian revolutionist and peasant leader Hugo Blanco have sparked international protests.

Blanco was arrested in the city of Cuzco July 3, flown to Peruvian political-police headquarters in Lima, and deported to Sweden July 10, without ever having been informed why.

Leading trade unionists, civil libertarians, and political organizations in Montréal sent a telegram to Peruvian President Francisco Morales Bermúdez July 10 in which they condemned the arrest of Blanco and other political activists. Heading the list of signers was Michel Chartrand, president of the Conseil Central des Syndicats Nationaux de Montréal (Central Council of National Trade Unions of Montréal).

A similar protest was sent by 6,500 social service workers in California through the Human Rights Committee of Local 535 of the Service Employees International Union.

Earlier in the week messages had been sent by the New York and London offices of Amnesty International; Texas State Representative Ron Waters; the Association of American Publishers; Richard Fagen, president of the Latin American Studies Association—a professional organization of several thousand Latin Americanists in the United States; PEN, the international writers organization; and several academic figures, community leaders, and political organizations in cities throughout the United States.

The protest campaign has been spear-

headed by the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners (USLA), which has defended the Peruvian revolutionist since his 1966 frame-up trial for the work he did to organize a mass peasant movement in the Cuzco region of Peru.

"The July 10 deportation of Hugo Blanco was a completely arbitrary act by the Peruvian junta," said Mirta Vidal, a national coordinator of USLA. "He was not accused of any crime and is obviously being persecuted because of his political ideas. USLA has launched a campaign to expose this and other crimes of the Morales Bermúdez regime, and we will not end it until Blanco has been permitted to return to Peru, the other political prisoners have been released, and civil liberties have been restored."

USLA is asking that messages demanding Blanco's right to return to his homeland free of political harassment be sent to the Peruvian regime, with copies to the committee.¹

Behind the arbitrary deportation of Blanco lies the precarious position of the Peruvian government. There have been several indications of the shakiness of the regime in the days since it announced a drastic austerity program June 30.

The austerity decree set off a wave of mass explosions in Lima's slums July 1, to which the junta responded by declaring a nationwide state of emergency, making

mass arrests, and deporting Blanco.

On July 9 an attempted coup by troops at the Centro de Instrucción Militar (Military Instruction Center), led by Gen. Carlos Bobbio Centurión, was put down quickly and reportedly with no casualties. Centurión has been described as a right-wing critic of the junta who feels that the "revolutionary process" is destroying the unity of the armed forces.

One week later, four cabinet members—including Brig. Gen. Jorge Fernández Maldonado—were ousted. Fernández Maldonado is among the military men who have provided the populist, left cover for the junta. He was the one put forward by the junta to explain the necessity for the austerity measures.

"In his speech on the evening before the disturbances," reported the July 11 issue of the weekly English-language edition of *Granma*, "General Fernández Maldonado, prime minister and chief of the Army, said that the capitalist nature of the measures is due to the situation of dependence in which the country still finds itself. He ratified the decision to further the process of change in order to bring about the economic emancipation of Peru and attain full social justice."

When the prime minister's speech failed to convince the Peruvian masses to "ratify" the starvation measures, Fernández Maldonado was dispensed with, as so many of the regime's top figures have been in the last year and a half. (Even the initiator of Peru's "revolutionary process," Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado, was ousted

1. President Francisco Morales Bermúdez, Government House, Lima, Peru; USLA, 853 Broadway, Suite 414, New York, N.Y. 10003.

in a coup August 29, 1975.)

The start of this process goes back to 1974, according to Peruvian revolutionist Francisco Montes. In an article that appeared in the March 1975 issue of *Revista de América*,² he noted: "The sixth anniversary of the 'Peruvian Revolution' in 1974 marked the end of a period of relative bourgeois stability and the opening of a new period marked mainly by crisis."

Montes described the two ministerial crises of 1974 as "the initial superstructural manifestations" of an economic crisis.

In its early period in office, Montes pointed out, the "revolutionary" junta "gained a certain economic breathing spell" by carrying out certain reforms and nationalizations.

A number of measures—including state control over the fishing industry, some sectors of the mining industry, and the marketing of copper and other raw materials; agrarian reform and the subsidies given to industry—all helped the government to overcome the economic stagnation that marked the previous regimes. . . .

It implemented some measures aimed at reducing the imperialists' profits and displacing the oligarchic sectors so as to encourage the development of the incipient national bourgeoisie.

But this policy does not make it an anti-imperialist or revolutionary government. If the junta were to expropriate without compensation all the imperialist monopolies (Southern, Occidental Petroleum, and so forth), if it were to turn the factories over to the control of the workers and permit them to oversee the distribution and marketing of goods, if it were to turn the land over to the peasants without paying any compensation or imposing any control or "guidance"—then we would be able to say that Velasco heads an anti-imperialist and revolutionary government.

That is why the Peruvian economy was able to gain only a partial breathing spell, and was unable to shake off the structural crisis engulfing it.

The deep economic crisis has made it impossible for the capitalist regime to continue granting the substantial reforms it did in its early years in office, and, in fact, has forced it to try to cut back the standard of living of the Peruvian masses.

These cutbacks have been met with strikes by the organized sectors of the working class and by spontaneous explosions of rage among the oppressed masses. The regime has responded with stepped-up repression and with attempts to regain credibility by shifting figures in the junta.

But, as the economic crisis worsens, the attempts to maintain a "revolutionary" facade have become more and more ineffectual.

Among the few defenders of the "Peruvian revolution" remaining in the working-class movement are the pro-Moscow Stalinists.

The July 8 issue of the Paris daily *Le*

Monde reported that the Peruvian Communist party justified the "sacrifices demanded from the masses" in the Morales Bermúdez austerity plan and, apparently

with reference to the mass protests, accused the right wing of taking advantage of the current situation to oppose the "revolutionary process." □

Walks Political Tightrope on Other Issues

OAU Summit Meeting Condemns Soweto Massacre

By Tony Hodges

PORT LOUIS, Mauritius—Article 3 of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) pledges "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent."

Such commitment is all the more necessary in the wake of the recent bloody police repression in Soweto and other South African cities in which at least 176 persons lost their lives.

But the recent summit conference here of the OAU—at which forty-seven of forty-eight formally independent African countries were represented—proved the organization's fear of extending all-out support to the deepening liberation struggle in southern Africa.

A series of resolutions were passed, including several denouncing South Africa. The Soweto massacres were condemned and June 16 was declared the "Day of the Soweto Massacres." The delegates denounced Pretoria's Bantustanisation policy and agreed to wage a concerted campaign against recognition of the "fraudulent pseudo-independence" of the Transkei, which Pretoria has set for October 23.

The summit came out against France's plans to sell South Africa nuclear reactors which, it is widely feared, could give a major boost to Pretoria's drive to manufacture nuclear weapons.

Member states of the OAU were "invited to reconsider" their participation in the Montréal Olympic Games if New Zealand, which maintains sporting ties with South Africa, is allowed to take part. And the delegates agreed to ask the Arab League to tighten its oil embargo against South Africa by forcing Shell, Texaco, and Gulf Oil to abide by it.

The Arab League was also asked to set up an aid fund to compensate Mozambique for the economic losses incurred when the Frelimo regime imposed sanctions against Rhodesia last March. Washington's veto of Angola's application for United Nations membership was condemned. And the summit went on record against France's continued occupation of the island of Mayotte and in defence of the territorial integrity of the Comoro Islands.

But what, one might ask, about the more than fifteen African countries, ranging

from Zaïre to the Ivory Coast, which continue to have commercial or other relations with South Africa in violation of OAU resolutions?

This issue prompted the Republic of Benin to present a pre-summit meeting of OAU foreign ministers with a resolution advocating disciplinary measures (including, perhaps, expulsion) against OAU member states which continue to flout the organisation's embargo against South Africa.

But by the end of the deliberations the Benin resolution had been dropped. The problem was submitted to the OAU Secretariat for further study. Likewise, on the related problem of OAU members continuing to allow landing rights to South African-bound aircraft, the delegates decided merely to convene a conference of experts to discuss the question.

Symbolic, perhaps, was the summit's decision to elect Mauritian Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam the new chairman of the OAU. Ramgoolam makes no secret of his plans to maintain Mauritius's close ties with Pretoria.

The island's trade with the white minority regime has grown rapidly in recent years. South Africa buys 70 percent of the island's tea crop and is the country's second most important source of imports.

South African investment is welcomed here (particularly in the hotel industry), South African Airways is allowed to run scheduled weekly flights to the island, and more than 10,000 South African tourists come here every year.

To avoid embarrassment during the summit, the Ramgoolam regime temporarily banned South Africans from the island and redirected South African tourists to the nearby French-ruled island of Réunion. This cosmetic policy was lifted the day the summit ended.

The intensification of the liberation struggle throughout southern Africa forced the neocolonial regimes at the OAU summit to pledge "maximum political, economic and military assistance to the liberation movements of South Africa to enable them to execute the armed struggle."

The delegates were careful to avoid discussion of the détente strategy pursued by the OAU over the previous eighteen

2. For a translation of the article, see *Intercontinental Press*, June 2, 1975, p. 734.

months. This policy had first become evident in December 1974 when the Zambian government of President Kenneth Kaunda forcibly "re-organised" the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi)—all of which were heavily dependent on their bases in Zambia—into the African National Council (ANC). The so-called Lusaka strategy hinged on forcing the Zimbabwean nationalists to sidetrack their struggle into negotiations with the Smith regime.

Coming in the aftermath of the April 1974 coup in Portugal (with independence for both Angola and Mozambique imminent), the Lusaka strategy won the approval of South African Prime Minister John Vorster. He badly wanted a settlement of the Zimbabwean crisis in order to re-stabilise southern Africa and thereby defend the interests of the imperialists and the white minority in South Africa itself.

The neocolonial states backed the Lusaka strategy because a sharp rise of the liberation struggle in southern Africa (eventually engulfing the industrial heartlands of South Africa) threatens to detonate big class battles in "independent" Africa too—in particular, at a time when these countries are wracked by the combined effects of the world recession and inflation.

The Lusaka strategy was codified by the OAU Liberation Committee in the "Dar es Salaam Declaration" of April 1975—which, in turn, was ratified by the twelfth OAU summit in Kampala the following July. This stated that "the OAU will support all efforts made by the Zimbabwe nationalists to win independence by peaceful means."

But the Smith regime's refusal, despite Vorster's bidding, to sign away even some of the Rhodesian settlers' privileges at the negotiating table led to the "strategy's" downfall. The bordering neocolonial regimes were left with little option but to authorise renewed guerrilla incursions against the settler regime, with the aim of putting pressure on Smith to return to the negotiating table.

While carrying out this delicate manoeuvre, the neocolonial regimes are seeking to ensure their tight control over the Zimbabwean nationalist movement and prevent its development in an independent direction. The OAU members have therefore made skillful use of the factional divisions within the Zimbabwean nationalist movement—between the "internal" wing of the ANC, led by Joshua Nkomo, and the "external" wing, led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole—to promote a so-called third force leadership under the strict control of the OAU Liberation Committee and the bordering states.

The neocolonial regimes have attempted to win acceptance for the "third force"

among Zimbabwean militants by demagogically accusing the old Zimbabwean misleaderships of responsibility for the rampant factionalism in the liberation movement (factionalism that has brought a wave of killings within the movement in the past two years).

The OAU members' aim to keep the Zimbabwean movement under tight rein was evident at the summit when the delegations voted unanimously to channel all funds for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle through the OAU Liberation Committee and the Mozambique government. All direct funding of the Zimbabwean movements has been ended, prompting vigorous complaints by both Muzorewa and Nkomo.

The OAU's manoeuvres amount to a direct interference in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. They will not assist the formation of a real united front against the Smith regime but threaten to intensify the factional warfare.

The mounting struggle for liberation in southern Africa was not the only test for the OAU at the Port Louis summit. The war in Western Sahara was another.

Last November, the outgoing colonial power, Spain, agreed to hand over Western Sahara to neighbouring Morocco and Mauritania. But the overwhelming majority of the Saharan population, according to a UN mission which visited the country the previous May, wanted independence and rejected Moroccan and Mauritanian annexation. Since November, the Saharan independence movement has waged guerrilla warfare against thousands of occupying Moroccan and Mauritanian troops, while a large part of the Saharan population has fled to refugee camps across the border in Algeria.

Last February, confronted by a Moroccan and Mauritanian threat to quit the OAU if recognition was given to Polisario, the OAU Council of Ministers failed to back the Saharans' struggle for national independence.

The summit also ducked the Saharan issue. Before the meeting, the OAU foreign ministers adopted a resolution submitted by Benin. The statement called for "unconditional support to the just struggle of the Saharan people for the recovery of its national rights" and demanded "the immediate withdrawal of all foreign occupation forces and the respect of the territorial integrity of the Western Sahara and the national sovereignty of the Saharan people."

When twenty-nine of the forty-eight delegations voted for the resolution, the Moroccan foreign minister announced that his delegation would boycott the summit. The Mauritanian president, Ould Daddah, remained in the sessions, but both governments warned that they would disaffiliate from the OAU if the summit ratified the resolution.

Diplomatic convenience won the day.

The Benin resolution was dropped and discussion of the Saharan war was postponed to a special OAU summit on the question. No date was set and many observers here question whether it will ever take place.

It is not surprising. Despite repeated rhetoric about "liberation," the OAU refrains equally from taking a stand on even the most scandalous domestic actions of its members. In fact, Article 3 of the OAU Charter pledges "non-interference in the internal affairs of states."

In consequence, such dictators as President Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea need fear little response from the OAU, although the underground opposition movement, the National Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy, claims that more than 90 top civil servants and political leaders have been executed on Nguema's orders.

The same goes for President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, where Amnesty International reports that more than 2,000 political prisoners are held in the notorious Dzaleka detention centre and other prisons. National liberation struggles like that of the Eritrean people against Ethiopian domination are also proscribed from receiving OAU support.

The OAU's endorsement of the suppression of the national rights of the Saharans, the Eritreans, and others reveals also the kind of "unity" to which the OAU aspires. It is not real pan-African unity, but the "unity" of blocs and deals between oppressive neocolonial regimes.

Pan-Africanist demagogy, of course, is the order of the day at an OAU summit. But the gulf between rhetoric and reality was highlighted by the succession of feuds that punctuated the proceedings. The Ugandan foreign minister, Lt. Col. Juma Oris, read a statement from General Amin on July 4 charging Kenya with complicity in the Israeli raid the previous night.

The Sudanese and Ethiopian delegations accused each other of harbouring annexationist designs over the French colony of Djibouti. And, on July 5, the summit's closing day, the Sudanese president, Gen. Gaafar el-Nimeiry, rushed here to accuse neighbouring Libya of responsibility for an abortive July 2 putsch in Khartoum.

Economic questions brought divisions too—for example, a strong conflict of interests between landlocked and coastal countries over rights to offshore minerals.

The small bourgeois elites in neocolonial Africa are unwilling to cede the sovereignty of their own artificial states to a "United States of Africa"—primarily because they rely directly on control of their own local state institutions to promote and defend their narrow class interests.

The task of unifying Africa falls to the workers and peasants, who, unlike the neocolonial regimes, have nothing to gain from the perpetuation of the artificial states inherited from the colonialists. □

India After One Year of Gandhi's Dictatorial Rule

By Pankaj Roy

NEW DELHI—June 26 marks the completion of one year of emergency rule by the Gandhi regime. The entire week is being officially celebrated as "emergency week." Special official dispatches hailing the gains of emergency rule have been published by all the newspapers.

For the bourgeoisie, the major achievement of the emergency was its success in bringing working-class struggles almost to a standstill. It effectively restrained legitimate trade-union activities such as bargaining, negotiations, and settlement of disputes through arbitration, not to mention picketing and strikes.

The overall situation during the past year of regimentation has been characterized by a comparative passivity and indifference on the part of the masses. Wherever strikes and struggles have taken place despite Gandhi's rigid rule, they were predominantly of a defensive economic character. They did not have the political thrust they had in 1973-74.

The bourgeoisie and its spokesmen are quite well aware of this gain. Raghunath Reddy, labor minister in the Gandhi regime, made this clear when he recently remarked with evident satisfaction that the climate of industrial relations has "changed beyond recognition."

There had been a steep fall in man-days lost in both public- and private-sector enterprises. Nineteen seventy-four marked the peak of industrial unrest, with a loss of 40.25 million man-days, nearly a 100 percent rise over 1973. In 1975 the figure dropped to 19.24 million man-days. Between July 1975 and January 1976, the loss of man-days was only 5.4 million. This compares with the loss of 18.1 million man-days during the seven-month period preceding the declaration of emergency.

The bourgeoisie has taken full advantage of this passivity and pressed further its economic offensive against the workers. A rigid wage freeze has been continued for one year, while the curb on dividend payments has been relaxed. Bonus payments to workers have been cut without evoking much organized resistance.

The lull in the class struggle has had the desired effect on raising production and increasing the profitability of investments. The steep rate of inflation was reduced, making it possible to keep demands for higher wages under firm control.

In addition the bourgeoisie has adopted a classical means of restraining demands for higher wages—artificially swelling the industrial reserve army of labor. This huge

army of unemployed hangs over the workers like the sword of Damocles. This serves as a weighty consideration preventing employed workers from agitating for their demands.

On March 19, Labor Minister Reddy informed the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament) that the total number of workers laid off since the promulgation of the emergency on June 26, 1975, was 479,000. This figure does not include some major states, such as Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Assam, and Haryana.

In view of the fact that layoffs are now often a prelude to the closure of an establishment and retrenchment, this figure for a period of only six months is certainly alarming.

The regime amended the Industrial Disputes Act March 5. The amended act provides that employers in factories, mines, and plantations employing 300 or more workmen have to obtain prior governmental approval before they lay off or retrench workers, or close down their establishments. They were also required to apply within fifteen days of March 20 for permission to continue any layoff, retrench workmen, or close down establishments where the periods of the notice of retrenchment or closure already set had not expired.

The labor minister said March 19 that no application seeking permission had been received so far from the central regions. He did not bother to try to reconcile this fact with his own figures, which showed that in the central regions as many as 111,670 workers were laid off between July and December 1975.

This shows that the laws that are supposed to ameliorate the situation of labor are not applied.

Sporadic workers' struggles do take place, and news about them can be gleaned from the otherwise heavily censored press. The situation in West Bengal seems to be illustrative. According to a survey by the State Labor Department—"Labor in West Bengal, 1975"—there was a rise in the number of strikes, lockouts, retrenchments, layoffs, and closures.

Speaking in the West Bengal Assembly, State Labor Minister Gopal Das Nag also admitted that the situation was far from normal. He said: "Dark clouds are hovering over the industrial scene and almost every day the labor department hears complaints from employers that because of lack of funds and orders they would be forced to shut down their units."

The jute industry is in severe crisis today, and the plight of jute workers has worsened. Their wages have been arbitrarily reduced, while their workload has been increased. They are forced to work on holidays without extra pay. Retrenchment of women workers goes apace. In contrast, the Gandhi regime has granted a series of concessions to the jute industrialists to enable them to continue to reap profits. It has consistently resisted demands for nationalization of the jute industry.

The survey pointed out that so far as West Bengal is concerned, 1975 saw a disturbing labor situation that did not improve even after the emergency. Closure of industrial units in jute, engineering, and small factories alone affected 11,194 persons in 1975, up from 6,820 the previous year. In the period between the promulgation of the emergency and the end of 1975, 4,128 workers were retrenched in all.

According to the survey, 60 strikes involving 31,997 workers occurred in West Bengal between June and December of last year, resulting in a loss of 240,159 man-days. There were 45 closures, 51 lockouts, and 392 cases of layoffs, affecting 144,243 workers during the second half of 1975.

It is obvious that whatever workers' struggles have taken place after the emergency was declared are defensive in character and have centered mainly around the questions of layoffs, retrenchment, and closures. They remain uncoordinated and have not made a dent on the overall situation of passivity.

The central trade unions have not been able to substantially raise the level of these struggles, nor to take up effectively the cause of the workers. For the most part they have succumbed to the rigors of the emergency. The trade-union bureaucracy and the reformist union leaders have docilely submitted to each attack on the workers' standard of living, as well as on their trade-union and democratic rights.

To preserve its bureaucratic privileges, the union bureaucracy has been compelled to give up its earlier policy of resorting to pressure tactics to secure certain concessions for the working class. It has completely surrendered itself before the bourgeois state.

The Gandhi regime is bent on harnessing the forces of the organized labor movement to implement the emergency measures and silencing all opposition in the trade unions. The regime deals with only those trade unions that have support-

ed the emergency. Even those federations like the AITUC (All-India Trade Union Congress), dominated by the pro-Moscow Communist party of India (CPI), are allowed to function only within carefully circumscribed limits.

The AITUC has perhaps gone the furthest in servile and abject adaptation to the current needs of the bourgeois state. This, of course, fits in well with the CPI's overall strategy of total support to the Gandhi regime. Even so, CPI Chairman S.A. Dange's reported remarks at a May Day meeting in Bombay are indeed revealing.

According to the account that appeared in the May 22 issue of the *Bombay Economic and Political Weekly*, the exclusion of GKU (Girni Kamgar Union—textile wing of AITUC) from the agreement on workers' participation in management figured very prominently in the speeches by union leaders.

Dange, however, is reported to have criticized all speakers who "complained so much" about the condition of the working class, the exclusion of the GKU, and so forth.

"It does not matter much that we do not get participation in the Bombay Mills," he said, "for are we not represented adequately at the top, in the national apex body?" He urged the workers to tighten their belts at this crucial juncture, and to stop complaining about such minor matters as wages. "Have not our conditions improved substantially over 25 years?" he asked. "It is a lie to say they have not."

Dange also stated that CPI/AITUC's support to the twenty-point program¹ was absolute, unconditional, and uncritical. He said: "It is the duty of workers to understand the historic significance of the 20-point programme and of the struggle against imperialism led by Indira Gandhi, the unique anti-imperialist ruler."

This helps illustrate the predicament of the organized trade-union movement in India. It has been politically expropriated by various bourgeois and reformist political parties. The Stalinist parties have failed to liberate the working class from the political spell of the bourgeoisie, owing to their political perspective of confining socialist revolution to an indefinite future stage.

They cannot be expected to do so, since their policies are based on a strategy of class collaboration. It is essential that the working class in India be decisively won away from the corrupting political influence of the bourgeoisie—whether exercised directly through the capitalist parties and through unions like the Indian National Trade Union Congress,² or indirectly

1. Gandhi demagogically announced a twenty-point economic program shortly after the declaration of the state of emergency in order to give her dictatorial coup a "progressive" cover.—IP



R. Cobb/Los Angeles Free Press

through working-class parties like the CPI.

There is an equal need for independent working-class politics in the unions. Even limited struggles require a correct and completely independent political perspective.

For example, the bonus cut provided a good opening for coordinating workers' grievances and organizing resistance. On a very limited scale, the Trotskyists of the Communist League of India were able to organize such resistance wherever it had pockets of influence in the working class, and they are currently carrying out similar work on the question of layoffs. The organized all-India trade unions could not exploit this opening because of their political perspective of subordination to the Gandhi regime.

Within this fundamental political axis of complete political independence of the working class, the basis can be laid for initially defensive struggles around such immediate economic demands as stopping layoffs and closures, repealing the bonus cut, and ensuring strict enforcement of

laws protecting past gains of the workers.

Initial efforts might simply be propagandistic in character; nevertheless they are bound to strike a sympathetic response in the workers, since they are, by all indications, very much concerned about the way the emergency has continued to operate against them.

Much will depend on the further evolution of the economic situation. The continued passivity of the masses depends on (1) fear of unemployment, (2) repression by the regime, and (3) momentary control over rampant inflation. We say *momentary* because the bourgeoisie's ability to control inflation is very much due to favorable natural factors, such as the timely onset of a good monsoon last year. Recently, the wholesale price index of several essential commodities has again shown a rise.

In any case, a further reduction in workers' living standards is a certainty. This is a basic fact of life that will help erode the continued passivity of the working class. A revolutionary-Marxist policy must be based on this premise, so as to build a proletarian defense against bourgeois attacks.

2. The INTUC is dominated by Gandhi's ruling Congress party.—IP

June 27, 1976

Pretoria Steps Up Arrests of Black Militants

By Ernest Harsch

Fearful of renewed uprisings by South Africa's Black majority, the white supremacist regime sent large contingents of police into the streets of Soweto and more than twenty other Black townships July 16. This show of force was staged exactly one month after the beginning of the massive Black rebellions that rocked the country in June.

Minister of Justice, Police, and Prisons James T. Kruger declared that the police units "will have instructions to protect law-abiding citizens and property at all costs and to do so with all means at their disposal. No disorder will be tolerated."

On July 15, he released a statement reimposing a ban on all political gatherings and invoking new arrest powers providing for indefinite detention without trial of anyone deemed a threat to "public order."

Kruger also declared that all Black schools in the Johannesburg and Pretoria areas would remain closed "until agitation dies down." They were originally shut down during the rebellions in June, but were scheduled to have reopened on July 20. It was student demonstrations against a government ruling imposing Afrikaans as a language of instruction in Black high schools in Soweto that ignited the uprisings.

The apartheid regime was forced to concede to the demands of Black students, teachers, and parents July 6, and agreed not to enforce the use of Afrikaans, which is seen by Blacks as the language of the oppressor. But this limited concession did not satisfy the Black students, who are opposed to the entire apartheid system.

According to a dispatch from Johannesburg by Robin Wright published in the July 16 *Washington Post*, "Several blacks have reported that many students will refuse to return to school and that African workers have been urged to strike to protest the mass arrests of students and adults during the rioting. . . .

"Yesterday a Soweto youth said an effort was being made to get students to boycott classes until all students arrested are released."

There were other signs of continued ferment among Blacks. At the all-Black University of Fort Hare, near King Williams Town, which has a student body of 1,700, students held a mass meeting July 17 to discuss the June rebellions. The students heard four hours of antigovernment speeches.

When the university authorities refused permission to hold a second mass meeting,

about 150 students staged a protest the next day. Police moved onto the campus in force, dispersing the students with tear gas. The university was then closed indefinitely. (The two other Black universities in South Africa, the University of the North at Turfloop and the University of Zululand at Empangeni, were shut down in June during the uprisings.)

On July 13, several hundred Indian* youths staged a demonstration in Johannesburg to protest the eviction of Indian shopkeepers from Pageview, an Indian area in downtown Johannesburg. Although Indians have traded there for eighty years, the apartheid regime declared it a "white group area" last year. About fifty police with riot clubs and dogs attacked the protesters and broke up the demonstration.

On July 15, two Blacks reportedly shot and killed two white officials in Krugersdorp, about twenty miles from Johannesburg. The officials were with the Bantu Administration and Development (BAD) department, which is in charge of carrying out Pretoria's apartheid policies.

Wright reported that there was also an unconfirmed report that a vehicle from the BAD office in Soweto had been stoned and an official injured.

The continued unrest in the Black townships highlights the racist regime's inability to keep the Black masses under complete control, despite its use of murderous force to crush the uprisings. If anything, the militancy among Blacks has deepened even further since the rebellions.

This new militancy among Black youths became evident in the early 1970s with the rise of what is known as the Black Consciousness movement and with the formation of such all-Black groups as the South African Students Organisation (SASO) and the Black People's Convention (BPC). Young Blacks in Soweto and other townships now often greet each other with clenched-fist salutes and shouts of "amandla" (power).

In a report in the June 27 *Chicago Tribune*, correspondents James Yuenger and Clarence Page quoted a Black student in Soweto as saying, "The Black Power movement in the United States had a great impact on us here. The white man doesn't like to see us giving Black Power high signs. That's why we do it."

*South Africa's Black population is composed of 17.8 million Africans, 2.3 million Coloureds, and 710,000 Indians.

The rise in the class and national liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia over the past two years has also been an inspiration to the Black struggle in South Africa. Moreover, the failure of Pretoria's military intervention in the Angolan civil war shattered the myth of white invincibility, further emboldening South Africa's Blacks.

In an attempt to silence these young militants, the white minority regime has stepped up the wave of arrests that began during the uprisings. The last official announcement on the arrests stated June 25 that 1,298 persons had been detained by that time, but according to local newspapers the arrests are continuing on a large scale.

New York Times correspondent John F. Burns reported in a July 16 dispatch from Johannesburg that at least nine Blacks were arrested on that day alone. One of them was Jairus Kgokong, a well-known leader of the SASO. Others were members of the BPC and the South African Students Movement (SASM), a high-school student group that works closely with the SASO and BPC. Members of the SASM reportedly played an important role in the June 16 demonstration by 10,000 Black students that led to the uprisings.

Many leaders of the SASO, BPC, SASM, and other Black groups were arrested or banned even before the witch-hunt that followed the rebellions. Some of them are currently facing trial on charges under the Terrorism Act.

According to an Associated Press dispatch from Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal Province, the trial of ten Blacks began there on July 12. The ten are alleged to be members of the outlawed African National Congress and are facing charges under the Terrorism and Suppression of Communism Acts.

An international campaign is urgently needed to defend the South African political prisoners and to prevent the racist regime from jailing even more Black militants. □

U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Israel

For the third time this year, the Ford administration has vetoed a resolution on Israel in the UN Security Council. The latest veto came June 29, when the U.S. delegate acted to kill a resolution demanding Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories by June 1, 1977. The governments of Britain, France, Italy, and Sweden abstained on the vote, repeating the American complaint that the resolution lacked "balance."

Israeli officials said the resolution, which called for evacuated territories to be handed over to the Palestine Liberation Organization, was a "calculated formula for the destruction of Israel."

The New Danger of Imperialist Domination

By Ernest Harsch

[Second of two articles]

Angola was the "crown jewel" of Portugal's colonial empire. It has important deposits of oil, iron, manganese, phosphates, and other minerals. Before the outbreak of civil war in 1975, it produced 8 percent of the world's diamonds and was the world's third largest exporter of robusta coffee. It is estimated that, with the exception of South Africa, Angola has the greatest economic potential of any African country south of the Sahara.

The desire of the major imperialist powers to maintain and expand their exploitation of this vast natural wealth was the main threat to Angola's independence following the collapse of Portuguese colonialism and was an important factor fueling the factional warfare between the three Angolan nationalist groups.

Since it won the civil war in February, the MPLA regime has invited foreign companies to invest in Angola. Although the MPLA relies heavily on anti-imperialist demagoguery in its public pronouncements, its invitations to imperialist investors have been a standard feature of its economic program since early 1975.

During the civil war, however, many foreign concerns, particularly those owned by the Portuguese imperialists or colonial settlers, either abandoned their interests in Angola or temporarily withdrew their personnel. The uncertain economic prospects of a country wracked by civil war and labor unrest was the primary reason for this. Some of the foreign firms may also have been concerned that the MPLA's pledge to build "socialism" in Angola was a serious one or that it might not be successful in reining in the labor movement.

The MPLA's actions during the past few months have helped to dispel their concerns. Its efforts to stabilize its neocolonial regime by arresting leftist dissidents and labor activists and by tightening its control over the masses already appear to have convinced some of the imperialists that their investments will be relatively safe in Angola.

"Representatives of many western companies have paid visits to Luanda for discussions with the MPLA government about reviving the economy," the May 31 issue of the London weekly *West Africa* reported.

The American Gulf Oil Corporation is by far the most important foreign concern to have resumed its operations in Angola so far.

By the end of May, the production from its 125 wells off the coast of the Cabinda enclave had climbed back up to 100,000 barrels a day, about two-thirds of its normal production level. Before resuming its operations, Gulf paid the MPLA regime \$102 million in back taxes and royalties that had been held in escrow since December.⁵ Based on the present royalty agreement, payments by Gulf to the MPLA government will average about \$500 million a year when production gets back to its former level.

The Cabinda oil wells are an important part of Gulf's overseas operations. According to a Gulf spokesman, production from the Cabinda wells normally contributes about 10 percent of the parent company's earnings from foreign oil operations, or about \$20 million a year.

The Cabindan oil is still being exploited on the basis of Gulf's oil agreement with the Portuguese colonialists. But the Luanda regime has declared its intention of acquiring state control over most essential industries, including oil. In line with this policy, Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento announced May 13 that negotiations with Gulf would begin for a new contract "under new conditions."

According to the March 6 London *Economist*, Gulf officials are not opposed to ceding a 55 percent share of their Angolan subsidiary to the MPLA regime. In fact, before Angola gained its independence, Gulf had already negotiated a contract with the Portuguese authorities that gave Luanda a half share in Gulf's operations. But that agreement was never put into practice.

The income from Gulf's operations is vital to the MPLA's economic plans. With the decline in other industries as a result of the civil war, oil now provides about 80 percent of Angola's foreign exchange. Previously, it accounted for only 40 percent.

In order to protect this source of income, the Luanda regime has stationed thousands of Cuban and MPLA forces in Cabinda to suppress the Cabindan separatists. "There are still 3,000 to 4,000 Cuban troops fighting in Cabinda," Ottaway reported in the May 26 *Washington Post*, "where the [Cabindan] front has increased

its activities in the past two months, especially against the Cubans. Soviet-provided Mig jets are being used to bomb hideouts deep in the forests where Cuban soldiers are hesitant to go. . . ."

The old Cabindan separatist group, the Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC—Cabinda Liberation Front) was dissolved in March. But a new group was quickly formed, called the Movimento de Libertação de Cabinda (Molica—Cabinda Liberation Movement). In an April 22 communiqué, Molica protested against the agreement between Gulf and the MPLA to resume the exploitation of Cabinda's oil.

It is quite possible that the increase in Molica's activities is the result of efforts by French concerns to grab part of Angola's oil wealth. The old separatist group, FLEC, had links with French intelligence and oil interests. And many of the forces in FLEC are now part of Molica, including João da Costa, the leader of both groups.

Washington Turns the Screws

In December 1975, while Washington was funneling arms and money to the FNLA and UNITA, it pressured Gulf into withdrawing from Angola and halting its payments to the MPLA (by that time Gulf had already paid the MPLA \$116 million in 1975). As a result of the failure of the American intervention in Angola and the defeat of the FNLA and UNITA by the MPLA, Washington has made a tactical shift and is now seeking an accommodation with Luanda.

The State Department's decision in February to allow Gulf to resume its operations marked the first significant overture by Washington to the MPLA regime.

Despite this tactical shift, its overall aims remain the same. American imperialism's basic strategy toward Angola—and to the rest of independent Black-ruled Africa as well—is to ensure that it remains part of the capitalist world and that American companies have as great an access to its natural resources as possible. The outcome of the civil war has simply forced Washington to try to implement its neocolonialist strategy in Angola through the present regime.

The large royalty and tax payments by Gulf to the MPLA give U.S. imperialism a strong lever in its dealings with Luanda. The White House is undoubtedly hoping to use this lever to wrangle further conces-

5. Texaco, which has a 25 percent share in another Angolan oil operation that was shut down in January, has also resumed its royalty and tax payments, giving the MPLA nearly \$1 million.

sions from the MPLA.

The MPLA, for its part, has made it clear that its diplomatic doors to Washington remain open. On May 25, it returned the official residence of the former U.S. consulate in Luanda, complete with an apology for the temporary takeover of the building by Cuban and Angolan troops.

At the same time, the White House has continued its pressure on the MPLA to have the Cuban troops withdrawn. On June 23, the U.S. representative to the United Nations vetoed Luanda's bid for membership in the world body. "The continuing presence and apparent influence of Cuban troops, massive in number in the Angola context, is the basis of our view," U.S. delegate Albert W. Sherer, Jr. explained.

Washington may also be seeking to pressure the MPLA from another direction. During the civil war it funneled money and arms to the FNLA and UNITA through such neighboring regimes as those in Zaïre, Zambia, and South Africa. It is possible that American money and supplies are continuing to find their way to the UNITA guerrillas, who have stepped up their activities in the past two months.

As part of its efforts to shore up the Black neocolonial regimes allied with Washington, the White House has requested approval from Congress of a \$27.5 million economic aid package to the regime of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia. It has also indicated that it will ask for an increase in U.S. military aid to the Zaïrean regime of Mobutu Sese Seko. During the civil war, some of its funds to the FNLA and UNITA were hidden in similar aid packages, particularly to the Mobutu regime.

Since it is a standard practice of the American imperialists to keep as many options as possible, Washington may at the same time be keeping its eye open for figures within the MPLA who are even more favorable to the West than the present leadership.

A Race for Profits

In the imperialist scramble to plunder Angola's valuable mineral resources, the American oil interests are at the head of the pack. But other imperialist firms are not far behind.

In 1972, Angola produced more than 2 million carats of diamonds, valued at about \$110 million. The company that exploits the diamond fields in northeastern Angola is the Companhia de Diamantes de Angola (Diamang), which is controlled by Portuguese, South African, American, British, and Belgian capital.

Since the April 1974 coup in Lisbon, production in the Diamang concession has dropped drastically to about 15 percent of its former level. This was caused by the departure of more than two-thirds of the



Manchester Guardian

company's 20,000 Black workers and by a sharp rise in smuggling.

Diamang has begun negotiations with the MPLA regime with the aim of turning over its concession rights. The company may be hoping that the MPLA will take on the responsibility of halting the smuggling and of getting productivity back up to "normal" levels. (MPLA troops have already taken on the task of policing the area after the dissolution of Diamang's private security force of 500 troops.)

Diamang still plans to remain in Angola as the principal exploiter of the diamonds, however. The MPLA regime, which now owns an 11.6 percent share of Diamang, appears to agree on this. According to the March 5 issue of the French *Marchés Tropicaux*, "The negotiations with the Angolan government began in Luanda at the end of January. The MPLA seems extremely interested in avoiding the impression that it seeks to nationalize the company, according to the president of Diamang."

The Angolan diamonds, moreover, are still being marketed through the Central Selling Organisation of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd., which is controlled by the South African conglomerate, the Anglo American Corporation.

The major South African interest in Angola is the giant hydroelectric project on the Cunene River in southern Angola, in which Pretoria has more than \$200 million invested. According to South African Minister for Economic Affairs J.C. Heunis, work on the Cunene dam resumed in early April after the MPLA had guaranteed to protect the workers and equipment.

The Cunene project, which is near the Namibian border, is scheduled to provide water for Ovamboland in northern Namib-

ia and most of the power for the South African, American, and British-owned mines in the territory. The project is the cornerstone of Pretoria's scheme to increase its economic exploitation of Namibia, which it rules as a direct colony.

The South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), which is fighting for Namibia's independence, had previously declared that the Cunene project would be a target of its guerrillas. But it remains to be seen if it will carry out any actions against the dam given the reported MPLA "guarantee."

Writing in the June issue of the British monthly *African Development*, correspondent Roger Murray commented, "The MPLA has agreed to provide SWAPO with material assistance and the use of training camp facilities in southern Angola, and in return for this, SWAPO may be prepared to hold-off attacks on Kunene itself."

The MPLA, however, has claimed that it has made no deals with Pretoria concerning the dam project.

Among the other business interests eager to get on board is Grängestade National Mining, a Swedish company. According to a report by Bernard D. Nossiter in the June 3 *Washington Post*, the Swedish businessmen were invited by the MPLA to study reopening the Cassinga iron mines, which were closed when their former owner went bankrupt.

Nossiter reported, "The invitation to these businessmen, the sources here [Stockholm] contend, reflects a deliberate policy by [President] Neto to encourage links with the West."

Modifying the Rules

Like many similar nationalist regimes, the MPLA's capitulation to the imperialist powers is not totally abject. Nor is its anti-imperialist stance purely for show. Within the framework of neocolonial subordination, the new rulers of Angola are interested in strengthening their bargaining position with the imperialists as much as possible.

In order to gain a certain amount of control over the imperialist holdings in Angola and to compel the foreign companies to agree to more favorable economic deals, the Luanda regime passed a law on February 28 regulating the terms of state intervention in the economy.

It empowers the Revolutionary Council to nationalize any foreign or Angolan business, either partially or fully. Under the terms of the law, the regime indicated its intention of acquiring control over "strategic" industries. It can also confiscate businesses and property that have been abandoned by their owners.

In early May, the MPLA regime began nationalizing a number of Portuguese-owned industries and plantations that had been abandoned, including the Champalimand steel works, a cement factory, textile

and sugar companies, and twelve agricultural complexes. The fact that all of the nationalized firms had been abandoned by their owners revealed "the cautious approach of the MPLA government to the nationalisation scheme," a correspondent commented in the May 17 *West Africa*.

The nationalizations of the Portuguese enterprises came during a diplomatic rift between Lisbon and Luanda. The Luanda regime ordered Lisbon May 18 to withdraw all its diplomatic representatives from Angola. The MPLA charged Lisbon with being a "center of reactionary forces" because the Portuguese press publicized a tour by an FNLA representative and because Portuguese refugees from Angola had bombed an MPLA office in Lisbon.

Added factors in the rift were Lisbon's reluctance to release Angolan bank deposits held in Portugal or to back the Angolan escudo. Some of the present leaders of the ruling military junta in Lisbon have also expressed public hostility to the MPLA in recent months.

As part of its land-reform program, the MPLA nationalized a number of plantations, again mostly Portuguese-owned. Those that had been abandoned were confiscated outright. According to an April 29 radio broadcast by the Yugoslav news agency, Tanjug, "The handful of private plantation owners who did not flee the country when Angola was liberated will [be] indemnified for their property and allowed to remain and work on plantations as experts."

So far, the MPLA has been careful not to touch any non-Portuguese interests.⁶ London *Financial Times* correspondent Jane Bergerol reported in a May 6 dispatch from Luanda that in the recent nationalizations, "Shares owned by foreign non-Portuguese private interests are exempt from State control or confiscation, as exemplified in the case of one of the textile companies confiscated whose Dutch shareholders are specifically stated to be outside the scope of the Government's action."

While the MPLA regime has reserved for itself a role in Angola's economy, it has also made it clear that there will be ample room for private investments, both domestic and foreign. In fact, the same law that gave the regime the power to nationalize enterprises also stipulated that the private sector "must be encouraged and supported by the State as long as it respects the general economic and labour policies defined by MPLA."

According to the July-August issue of the New York bimonthly *Africa Report*, "Angolan officials acknowledge that great sums of financial aid and investment are

6. The one exception is Tanganyika Concessions, an American and British firm that owns the Benguela Railway. It is scheduled to be nationalized after it pays off its \$40 million debt. In the meantime, the Luanda regime is reportedly subsidizing the salaries of the railway employees at more than \$1 million a month.

needed to continue developing major foreign exchange earners—oil, coffee, and diamonds."

A 'Model Socialist State'?

In his closing speech at the Luanda International Trade Fair in May, Prime Minister Nascimento said that the Luanda regime would launch a three-year development plan next year, to be followed by a five-year plan in 1980. He claimed that the MPLA was totally committed to "socialism" and aimed to build "a model socialist state on the African continent."

In light of the MPLA's actual policies, particularly during the past several months, the "socialism" espoused by officials like Nascimento is nothing more than a demagogic dressing for the Luanda regime's efforts to construct a formally independent Angola that will continue to be based on capitalist property relations and subordination to world imperialism.

In this respect, the MPLA's neocolonial regime displays features similar to those of other "African socialist" states, as in Tanzania, the Congo Republic, and Guinea, where the labor movements are also directly tied to the state and the masses are controlled through bureaucratic "people's" bodies of one variety or another. Each of these three "socialist" countries has been free of direct colonial rule for fifteen years or longer, yet is today still subject to imperialist economic domination.

Although there is now no Angolan bourgeoisie to speak of, there are petty-bourgeois layers who are scrambling to take over the positions previously occupied by the Portuguese and who aspire to transform themselves over time into fledgling capitalists. A similar process has already taken place in many other African countries, where feeble national bourgeoisies were able to arise in the sectors of the neocolonial economy not directly controlled by imperialism.

There are already some signs that this process is beginning in Angola. In a report in the February 28 *Le Monde*, correspondent René Lefort summarized a description by an MPLA commander of the formation of "a new group of merchants, transporters, and functionaries who have always thought that their MPLA membership cards gave them the right to take the places left vacant by the departing Portuguese."

In the March 12 issue, Lefort noted that "the birth of a caste of *nouveaux riches* is quite evident. . . .

"Within several months, tens of thousands of Angolans who were clerks or minor officials have become merchants with houses of their own or heads of departments."

As part of the MPLA's general "socialist" rhetoric, it has proclaimed that it is opposed to "the transformation of the Angolan colonial petty-bourgeoisie into a

national bourgeoisie." But at the same time, the MPLA leadership has kept its arms open to the "patriotic bourgeoisie," which it warmly proclaims as "part of our Angolan nation."

The overriding danger to the Angolan masses, however, continues to come from the imperialist powers. Under the Portuguese empire, Angola was subjected to direct colonial rule; during the civil war, its freedom was threatened by the military intervention by Pretoria, Washington, and the other imperialist powers. But today, the danger of imperialist domination takes on a new, more indirect, form.

In a country as wealthy as Angola, the capitalists of the United States, Europe, and South Africa will use every available opening to continue and expand their plundering of its wealth. As long as capitalism survives in Angola, the political and economic strength of the foreign investors and the crippling pressures of the world capitalist market will ensure that the country remains underdeveloped or develops only in those sectors that serve the needs of imperialism.

No matter how many three- or five-year plans the MPLA institutes, it will not be able to appreciably ease the poverty of the Angolan masses under such conditions. Moreover, the danger also exists that the large foothold the imperialists now have will later give them an opportunity to roll back even those partial economic measures taken against them by the Luanda regime.

Only the mobilization of the masses of Angolan workers and peasants under a revolutionary-socialist leadership can overthrow capitalism, attain real national independence, and begin the construction of a socialist future. The MPLA stands in full opposition to such a course. □

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The Development of the Civil War

[The following interview with a leader of the Revolutionary Communist Group, the Lebanese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, was obtained in Europe in June by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

Would you describe the reasons for the recent Syrian intervention in Lebanon and the background to it?

I would like first to briefly describe the nature of this intervention because its novelty has been greatly exaggerated by the news media. The Syrian intervention in Lebanon is not recent. Syrian troops have been in Lebanon for at least six months. They have been there camouflaged as Saiqa¹ forces, or they have been there as regular Syrian forces, mostly stationed in the Bekaa valley.

The recent development has been the fact that they have sent in tanks in large numbers and, most importantly, the fact that they have advertised their advance into Lebanon. This leads us to ask what the motives of the Syrians are in doing this.

A prevalent attitude in Beirut at the time of the Syrian advance—and this was true in usually very well-informed sources in Fateh²—was that the Syrians were coming for the big kill. They were coming to take over Beirut and Saida, the main strongholds of the left and the Palestinians, and actually crush the resistance in the same way it was crushed in Jordan by Hussein in 1970 and 1971.

We believe that their immediate goals were much more limited than this. We think they meant simply to increase the pressure on the left and the Palestinians in Lebanon, to force some concessions from them, and possibly reach a favorable agreement between the leftists and the right wing, especially the Kataeb [Phalangist] forces and the newly elected president, Elias Sarkis. Such an agreement would weaken the positions of the left and the resistance, and pave the way for a more complete repression later on.

1. Saiqa is a Palestinian guerrilla group that was formed on the basis of support to the Syrian wing of the Baath party.

2. Fateh is the largest Palestinian guerrilla organization. Fateh leader Yassir Arafat also heads the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

What do you think the longer range objective of the Syrian government is?

The Syrian government is not acting alone, so it is necessary to describe the long-term objectives of imperialism and the Arab bourgeoisie.

There is a dual problem in Lebanon, and the two aspects are closely related. The main problem in Lebanon, before the civil war broke out—the main problem for the bourgeoisie, that is—was that state authority was beginning to wither away as the result of the existence of a sort of dual power resulting from the presence of the Palestinian bases.

Ever since the formation of the Palestinian resistance groups, there have been attempts to liquidate them in Lebanon. The most important attempt took place in 1969, and it ended up with a victory of the Palestinians and the signing of the Cairo agreement which legitimized their presence in Lebanon. They had power in the camps, they had the right to have their own army, they had the right to use Lebanon as a base against Israel.

Another attempt to liquidate the Palestinian groups took place in 1973. The Melkart agreement was reached. It basically confirmed the clauses contained in the Cairo agreement, with a few changes that were in fact never implemented.

Now, the presence of the Palestinians served as a tremendous catalyst to the masses in Lebanon. There was a tremendous mobilization that resulted from it—you had a mushrooming of leftist organizations, a mushrooming of groups fighting for the rights of the oppressed.

The example of the resistance, which had organized itself from the beginning independently of the bourgeois state, was taken by a number of other organizations. The result was a great gain for the left in elections, tremendous mass mobilizations, and a daily challenge to the authority of the state.

The bourgeoisie tried to intervene in a number of ways. They tried to have reformists enter the government in the hope that they would be better able to contain the masses in this way. This turned out to be a failure. They tried repression. That again didn't work; it resulted in greater radicalization and mobilization of the masses. Just before the civil war, the tactic used by the government was to try to clamp down on the masses in localized areas.

This strategy met with some success at the American University of Beirut, where after a very long strike the Lebanese army entered and took complete control of the

campus. Since then the campus has been extremely tame.

The tactic was tried also in an indirect fashion in the city of Tripoli, but there it wasn't given a political character. There was an intervention by the army, but it was in fact to take control of part of the city which was in the hands of bandits, really, gangsters. There too that policy met with some success, but it did not have such a political character.

The final attempt to use this tactic took place in Saida, and here it completely backfired. They strongly repressed a demonstration of fishermen, workers, and peasants, killing one of the community leaders there. The result was a tremendous mobilization in Saida, a real insurrection. The army had to leave the city; the city was under the control of the armed masses. That took place in March 1975.

In the meantime—for several years, that is—the rightists had realized that the Lebanese army was too weak to be used as an instrument to repress the left and the Palestinians. The army was too weak both numerically and in its equipment, and it contained a majority of Muslim soldiers while the officer corps was mostly Christian. So the right wing had been building their own militias for the last three years. They said they had something like fourteen military camps, and they had demonstrations in the streets wearing paramilitary uniforms and giving support to the army.

By April they felt they were ready for battle. The international situation was also propitious. Kissinger had succeeded in convincing the Egyptians to sign a separate agreement with Israel. He was preparing to settle the Arab-Israel conflict in a more general way. The major obstacle to this was the Palestinian question.

So these were the two basic goals. The settlement of the whole Palestinian question, and an attempt to regain the authority of the bourgeois state in Lebanon.

On April 13, 1975, a bus containing about thirty Palestinians returning from a meeting held under the auspices of the "Rejection Front"³ was passing the Christian area of Ain al-Rummaneh. It was stopped by members of the Phalangists and other right-wing Christian groups, and the passengers were cold-bloodedly murdered—about twenty-seven of them were killed.

This is how the civil war began. There was a reaction from the left and the Palestinian resistance groups, which

3. The Rejection Front includes those forces in the Palestinian movement that are opposed to negotiating with Israel for the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. It includes the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Arab Liberation Front, which supports the Iraqi wing of the Baath party, and smaller groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command).

singled out economic targets owned by Phalangists and other well-known Christian rightists and attacked them.

How has the civil war developed, and what has its effect been on the masses as a whole?

Lebanon is based on a political system that is quite unique—that is, a division of parliamentary seats and political power among various sects. The Christian minority has traditionally looked to the West for support, while the Muslim majority has traditionally looked to the Arab world and identified itself with Arab nationalist aspirations.

The presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon created a division more or less along these lines. When the right wing decided to mobilize against the Palestinians and the left, their forces came mostly from Christian parties—the Phalangist party, the Liberal National party of [former] President Chamoun, the private army of the tribal leader Franjeh, who is the actual president of Lebanon.

The right-wing forces, in order to mobilize and get solidly behind them the majority of Christian opinion, decided deliberately—and I emphasize that it was deliberate—to give a sectarian character to the fighting. In the early months of the civil war they used to stop people, and on the basis of their religious affiliation, as indicated in their ID, they would murder them if they belonged to a Muslim sect or if they were Palestinians.

At the same time, they were hoping for a reaction from the other side. Sometimes there was a reaction, even though I must say that the Muslims in this respect were much more politically conscious than the Christians. There were many more sectarian killings on the side of the right-wing Christians than on the side of the Muslims.

But there were a few sectarian killings of Christians by Muslims—by uncontrolled elements on the Muslim side—and the right wing used that to create a religious hysteria on the Christian side. They managed as a result of this, and as a result of military retaliation by the left and the Muslims, to turn the Christian areas into areas which were under their complete control.

The [Christian] masses really were behind the rightists because they were afraid of the Muslims. They were certainly not justified in being afraid, but the propaganda of the right wing was very successful in this respect.

On the side of the Muslims, for a long while you did not have any mobilization. There were provocations by the right wing again and again, massive killings of Muslims, but the mobilization took quite a bit of time. I think this was because of the maneuvers of the reformist leaders, who consistently tried to contain the mass

movement, and because of the role that Syria and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), which at that time was under effective Syrian control, played.

To give an example, typically what would happen would be that the right wing



SARKIS

would attack, or they would kidnap a large number of Muslims and kill them. There would be a strong reaction in the Muslim neighborhoods—they would want to be defended, they would want to finish once and for all with the right-wing militias.

The PLA would intervene in the fighting on the side of the left and the Palestinians, would put its weight in the battle for a day, or at most two days, and then would force a cease-fire. They would sort of ride the wave to be able to stop it. So the mobilization of the masses on the Muslim side during the first few months of the civil war was never really allowed to continue unchecked, while on the other hand the right wing was mobilizing, creating an area that was under its complete control.

All the Muslims in the area controlled by the right wing have either been kicked out or killed. All the [Christian] leftists have been singled out individually and been kicked out of their houses. The rightists have really created their own state. They have a police force, they have taxes, when people leave the port of Junieh they actually give them a visa and check their passports. They have created a state—a strong state, a fascist state.

On the Muslim-leftist-[Palestinian] resistance side, there was to begin with a much greater decentralization. You have a very large number of organizations and very little coordination between them. And then there was the role played by Syria.

What time period is covered in what you have described so far?

This takes us to November-December 1975. In December 1975, for the first time, Syria's role became clear.

A new round of fighting had started. It was caused by the discovery of four Christian bodies by the right-wing militias. In retaliation they kidnapped about 500 Muslims, people who had no relation whatsoever with the fighting. About 200 of them were killed.

There was a very strong reaction on the side of the Muslims and on the side of the left. The left, in retaliation, attacked the military positions of the fascists in the [Beirut] big hotel area. That was the beginning of the famous big hotel battle.

For the first time the Syrians, through the PLA forces, rather than using their usual tactic of putting their weight in the battle in order to later stop the battle, decided to oppose the mobilization. That is, they first withdrew their forces from the battle, and second they started condemning politically the leftist attack on the right-wing strongholds. They denounced it as being motivated by a desire to steal and rob.

The leftists were, however, quite victorious, managing to take a large part of the commercial district, which was a mixed district religiously with both Muslims and Christians. Eventually, they agreed to a cease-fire.

During this period as well, the Fateh forces withdrew from the fighting and stopped giving ammunition to the left and other armed groups on the side of the nationalist forces. The reason given by people very close to Arafat was that at the time, talks were being held between the PLO and American representatives on the question of the West Bank.

Arafat felt [according to these people close to him] "that the question of the Palestinian entity was a few yards away, and he did not want to compromise the chances of success on this." Eventually the talks broke down and Fateh was again involved in the fighting.

So up until then you did not really have a very important mobilization of the masses in the Muslim-held areas. Later, Syria's role became more clear—that is, Syria's long-term intentions were in fact to either completely bring the Palestinian resistance under its control or liquidate it. As Fateh became more clear about its enemy's motives, its policies stopped fluctuating so much. This firmer policy allowed a much greater mobilization on the left.

After the beginning of the famous big hotel war, the Christian right-wing side attempted to complete the conquest of the Christian territory. There were still Muslim and Palestinian enclaves in the Christian areas.

This took place with the overrunning of

a small Palestinian refugee camp—a Christian Palestinian camp, in fact—Dbaye, and the overrunning of the Quarantina area, a slum area mostly inhabited by Muslims and Kurds. Quarantina was overrun by the Phalangist forces and there was a massacre which was reported by the Western press. Scenes of undecipherable horror took place there.

There was a tremendous mobilization on the Muslim-leftist side because of this, and the Syrians, who had just tried openly opposing the military offensive in the hotel area, again decided to revert to their previous tactic. A large number of PLA troops—and some reporters say also Syrian regulars—entered Lebanon and put their weight in the battle on the side of the Muslim leftists. After a couple of days of battle, they forced a cease-fire.

Before the cease-fire came into effect the Muslim-leftist-resistance forces overran a Christian city in the south—the city of Damour—and had unfortunately been involved in the same sort of sectarian killing of innocents as the fascists had done in the Quarantina area.

But Syria's intervention was becoming clearer and clearer to the left and the Palestinian resistance forces. Although in appearance the Syrian forces strengthened the left and the resistance militarily, in fact they prevented an even greater mobilization. Later on when they withdrew from the fighting it became clear that even without the Syrian and PLA forces on their side the left and the Palestinian resistance were strong enough to deal with the fascist threat.

We haven't talked yet about the role of the army in all this. From the beginning there were attempts to involve the army in restoring order in Lebanon. One of the leitmotifs of the fascist propaganda, even in the few months preceding the beginning of the civil war, was to try to rebuild the prestige of the army. The army had never fought against Israeli invaders. The army had never tried to prevent Israeli commandos from entering Beirut and killing Palestinian leaders, as happened in 1973. The army did nothing to stop the daily Israeli bombardment of the civilian population in the south. But the army did not hesitate to shoot at unarmed civilian demonstrations.

The prestige of the army was in great need of being restored, and one of the main thrusts of fascist propaganda in the first few months was precisely to rebuild this prestige. It is obvious that in the first months of the civil war the strategy [of the rightists] was to form a military government. They were either hoping for a military coup or for the formation of a military government.

In fact in the second month of the civil war, President Franjeh named a military man prime minister, and the cabinet he formed was a military cabinet. But there was such a tremendous, massive opposi-

tion to this that the cabinet was forced to resign after three days.

There were attempts to involve the army in the fighting directly. Of course all along the army, which is literally under Christian command because the commander in chief and the majority of the high-ranking officers are Christian, was supplying the right wing with ammunition, was training the right wing, and was even involved in directing the fighting.

But there was still the danger of the army being used in a more direct fashion against the left. Eventually, when the Syrians took a clear position against the left, and the left and the resistance felt threatened, they triggered a split in the Lebanese army. One faction joined the nationalist ranks in March under the name of the Lebanese Arab Army.

Fighting erupted again, and this time the left and the Palestinians did not hesitate. They took energetic military action, and it became obvious that the fascists could not cope with the advance of the left and the resistance. They were retreating on all fronts, in the mountains as well as in Beirut. They lost their strongholds in the big hotel area in Beirut, and in the mountains Palestinian and leftist troops advanced deep into the heart of Kesrouan, the Christian area.

So there was a very clear possibility of military victory by the left. Syria, which already had quite a few troops in Lebanon under the guise of PLA forces and inside the resistance in the Saiqa organization, and which had army regulars in the Bekaa valley, started increasing much more rapidly the number of troops it had inside Lebanon and started opposing the Lebanese leftists and the resistance on the military level.

They insisted on keeping the president of the republic, Franjeh, and then when it became clear that he wasn't popular at all, even among the Christians, they decided on elections to be held and they imposed their own candidate, Elias Sarkis. This was in April.

Since then the Syrians have increased their presence in Lebanon. They have gained control of a large part of the Muslim-held area. They have reached the outskirts of Saida and the outskirts of Beirut. In the mountains they have been stopped on the Damascus road in the city of Bhamdoun, and they have begun a blockade of Beirut and Saida to try to increase the pressure on the Palestinians and the leftists.

This was accompanied by a very intense bombardment of Beirut. Unfortunately for the Syrians, the result was the same as the response in Hanoi to the bombing by U.S. planes. There was a tremendous mobilization against the Syrians.

Even though the people of Beirut have been cut off from electricity, water, telephone communication, bread, and ammu-

munition, and have been under very heavy bombardment, there has not been demoralization. Almost everyone has become involved in preparing for the defense of the city.

In Saida women and children were reported to be massively involved in building barricades at the entrances of the city. In Beirut, the same thing. Sandbags were being thrown all over the place, and there was no sign at all of weakening of the will of the masses to resist the Syrian threat.

Possibly as a result of discontent inside Syria, the Syrians recently decided to pull back their forces and end their bombardment of Beirut. This, however, does not mean they are retreating. There have been reports that they are increasing their forces, not decreasing them. But they are taking less exposed positions.

The reaction of the pro-Syrian and Syrian forces inside Lebanon to the reversal of Syria's position, which for the first time is in very violent conflict with the Palestinian resistance and the nationalist forces in Lebanon, has been very uneven. Among the pro-Syrian Palestinian forces, there have been massive desertions, and these forces have joined with Fateh or the PLO.

I do not know of any massive desertions, or even small numbers of desertions, in the Syrian army. Of course, the step would be a much more serious one for a Syrian soldier to take than for a member of the PLA or Saiqa. The Palestinians can leave and take refuge in their own neighborhoods, with their families.

But what is very clear is that the Syrian soldiers do not want to fight. Their opposition to the policy of the government reveals itself in lack of motivation in battle, in readiness to retreat, rather than in the much more serious step of desertion.

Inside Syria itself there have been reports of quite a number of demonstrations, some of them taking place at funerals for officers killed in Lebanon. There have also been reports of dissension inside the Baath party—not only in the left wing, the Salah Jadid group, many of whose supporters have been jailed, but even among the Baath moderates. They have been extremely uncomfortable about the recent developments in Lebanon.

It is obvious that Syria cannot continue on the present policy of openly confronting the Palestinian resistance and nationalist forces in Lebanon without the regime itself being threatened.

What are the announced political objectives of the left, and what are the main components of the leadership of the left in Lebanon?

The resistance has always claimed that it does not want to intervene in the internal affairs of Lebanon, so it doesn't even try to offer a perspective in Lebanon.

All it claims is that it wants to survive in Lebanon. They say that's all they want; just to have the right to be here. They say they are ready to accept many conditions, among them the pledge not to take any actions against Israel from Lebanon—they've said that on numerous occasions. But they do not offer any political perspective.

Which group leads the Palestinian resistance?

I'm talking here about the Fateh group, which is the most important component of the PLO.

It still retains the basic dominance within the resistance forces?

Very clearly so. I think the fighting has clarified this very well.

And the component of the Lebanese army that came over to the left forces. . . .

This was triggered by Fateh, in fact. El-Khatib, who is the leader of the Lebanese Arab Army, is a Fateh man.

The left in Lebanon, the reformist left—that is, the CP, the Organization of Communist Action, and the Jumblatt political party, all under the leadership of Jumblatt, have fluctuated so much during the last few months that they have not come up with one policy that they did not contradict with a completely opposite policy a few months later.

At first they tried to mobilize around democratic issues, like giving equal representation to the Muslims. Even their first formulations were much more radical than that. They were talking in terms of a constituent assembly with direct power from the base. Of course they made more and more concessions. Finally, they accepted reforms which gave 50 percent of the seats to the Muslims, 50 percent to the Christians, with the president of the republic remaining Christian. This while the Muslim population represents 60 percent of the total.

Recently they have abandoned even these demands. You don't hear about this anymore.

Their policy at first was to try to isolate the Phalangists, whom they considered to be the main enemy. They have always thought in terms of "the principal enemy"—the rest are lesser evils. They have always tried to join forces with anyone against this "principal enemy."

So at first the principal enemy was the Phalangists. Jumblatt participated in a government with Chamoun, serving under Franjeh. Later it became clear that Chamoun and Franjeh also were the "principal enemy." So the policy was then to try and get rid of Franjeh—the president. When Sarkis was elected president it

was obvious it wasn't going to make any big difference.

At first the resistance and the left were against the intervention of any Arab troops. When Syria became the major



ASSAD

threat, they asked for the intervention of Arab troops. A month ago when there was a threat of intervention by the French army, Jumblatt and the resistance opposed it. When Syria again became the "principal threat," Jumblatt asked for the intervention of the French.

They have no political perspective.

Recently an interview with a leader of the Communist party described that party's program. What they say is that they don't want to abolish capitalism, they just want liberal capitalism. And they are even less ambitious than their Italian or French comrades. They said that they did not want to participate in the government. They said all they want is to be allowed to remain in the legal opposition.

Now that's a very modest demand for a party which, with Fateh, is now really controlling two-thirds of the country.

The Communist party is in this left bloc? It is opposing the Syrian intervention?

Yes.

That's interesting, because the Communist parties outside are tending to support. . . .

Well, the Syrian Communist party, for

instance, is still in a national front with the Syrian Baath, and they have not publicly criticized the Syrian government's policy. They have not withdrawn from the front.

When Kosygin came to Syria [June 1-4] he did not openly criticize Syrian intervention. This has led to serious questioning among CP members in Lebanon, and many of them are now disenchanted with the CP policies outside of Lebanon. Though they still see links between themselves and Moscow, they are in great difficulties in explaining why the other CPs do not support them.

What are the demands being raised by the revolutionary Marxists in Lebanon?

There are a number of questions facing us in Lebanon. One of them is the question of political power, distribution of power. The demand raised by the Revolutionary Communist Group in Lebanon is for a constituent assembly.

At the level of intervention by the Syrians and at the level of the fascist threat, we consider that one should resist this threat by all means and that one should not agree to any deals or concessions with members of the bourgeoisie that are going to weaken our position in the immediate future. Deals with the bourgeoisie can be broken easily, and if you make concessions that matter you will just be paving the way—as in Jordan—for a complete liquidation of your forces later on.

What is the position of the Rejection Front?

With respect to the Palestinian question, it opposes setting up a Palestinian state on the West Bank. That is the basis of the alliance.

In the events in Lebanon, again they do not have a clear political perspective. Militarily, they tend to keep fighting one day more than the Fateh people, or than the reformist left, once a cease-fire is obtained to prove that they are more radical.

But they really do not have an independent military power of their own. Once Fateh and the reformist left in Lebanon decide to stop fighting, the Rejection Front cannot continue on its own.

Many of them call themselves leftists, but I do not know any one of them coming up with a program of specific demands, of clear demands like the constituent assembly, or a workers government, or anything like this. They don't have a program of action.

How has all this affected the life of the working class and of the urban and rural poor in Lebanon?

Well, the conditions now are dreadful. There is no work, so there is no income.

Fortunately, one does not have to pay rent or electricity or telephone bills, and I don't think many people are bothering to buy the new fashions in clothes, or anything but what is immediately needed—food, and maybe drugs from the pharmacy. That is about it, so people are managing to survive.

There has been a very large exodus from Lebanon. The poor people go to neighboring Syria to look for work there, or to Jordan. And in almost every Lebanese family there are at least one or two people outside who are working and sending money in. I think that this is what is allowing the survival of the people who are still in Lebanon now.

So the workers are without work. The highly political elements among them have joined one of the militia groups—either the CP, or a resistance group, or one of the very large number of other organizations that exist.

In the rural areas, things have been much easier. Because the rural areas, especially in the south, have not been the scene of such fierce and continuous fighting as in the cities. So they are still growing crops and selling them in Beirut and other Lebanese cities.

In Beirut itself, there is such a state of insecurity, of continuous hazards, of continuous discomfort, that there is a general feeling of people not being able to take it anymore. They are fed up with the situation, they want it to change.

But at the same time, a large number of them have some political understanding of what's going on. That is, they understand that there was a fascist aggression against them and they are willing to resist it. They have violently opposed the Syrian intervention, not only because of its political aims, but also because it was clear that it was the Syrian blockade which was not permitting gasoline and bread and food to come into their areas.

It is difficult to gauge the real political feelings because of the very special conditions that exist. A demonstration in Beirut would be an extremely risky thing because you're under daily bombardment from either the Syrians or the Christian right wing. If you look at the growth of organizations as a measure of sympathy that the masses have for their positions, the leftist organizations have swelled considerably.

The CP has won members or sympathizers active in its ranks on the order of thousands, making it by far the largest Communist party in the Arab world.

Has there been any indication of the reaction of Communist parties in other Arab countries besides Syria?

Well, they don't have a legal existence elsewhere, except perhaps in Iraq, and there I am sure they have criticized the Syrian intervention because it is the Iraqi

government's policy to oppose the Syrian intervention—to oppose Syria, anyway.

But apart from the CP in the West Bank, which has taken a position in support of the PLO against Syria, there hasn't been an independent voice of the CP in the Arab world taking a position clearly on the side of the Lebanese leftists and the resistance against the Syrian intervention.

Is there any sign of a break from the right wing in the Christian camp?

There is a movement of opposition among the Christians against the right wing, but I would not characterize it as being a rank-and-file movement. The opposition among the Christians takes the form of Christians in left-wing organizations.

Most left-wing organizations have been founded by Christians or at least have a high proportion of Christians. This is true of the CP; this is true of the Organization for Communist Action in Lebanon; this is true of the Trotskyist group; this is true of the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], which is led by George Habash, a Christian; this is true of the DPFLP [Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], which is led by Nayef Hawatmeh, who is as well a Christian.

There is also the Syrian Popular party, which is a Christian-based party, and which was in fact created in opposition to

the Phalangist party in the 1930s. It has a base in the Christian area of Koura.

In addition to these forces which have been consistently on the side of the left and the resistance, there is now also the opposition led by Raymond Eddé, the unsuccessful candidate in the last presidential election who was supported by the reformist left and the resistance.

He is a bourgeois liberal candidate, whose supporters participated in the first months of the civil war on the side of the Christian right wing. Later, his supporters withdrew from the battle, and have recently taken a very Lebanese nationalist position against Syria. They worked with the resistance against Syria. This led to clashes between the supporters of Eddé and the Phalangists and other right wing groups in the mountains. About thirty people were killed in Eddé's stronghold in Jbeil, so Eddé's supporters can now be considered a movement against the right-wing Christian leadership.

Another movement which has been recently formed, which is led by Samir Franjeh, the nephew of the president of the republic, is based in the north in Franjeh's village of Zghorta. It is called the Zghorta Nationalist Movement, and it supports the resistance and opposes the right wing.

But these two movements are in very serious difficulties, because they are caught in the middle of the Christian area.

From the Argentine Underground

Halt the Secret Executions of Political Prisoners!

[The following appeal was sent from Buenos Aires July 6.]

* * *

We are sending you an urgent message of distress for help in stopping a murderous operation the military dictatorship is preparing to carry out.

As you know, in Córdoba where the most right-wing, reactionary sector of the military apparatus is located, for some months the military has been killing imprisoned revolutionists with impunity—not to speak of the kidnappings, torture, and murderous raids of the parapolice gangs. They make no attempt to hide the savage character of their method. Prisoners confined in the Córdoba penitentiary are taken to the courts as part of the trial procedure. But en route they are shot to death in the prison vans. The following day the newspapers print a communiqué from the Third Army Corps explaining that "in a confrontation provoked by extremists who tried to free the prisoners being transported, the following persons were killed." The list of

compañeros who have died in this way is too long for us to reproduce. Moreover, what concerns us now is something even more serious.

Through a clandestine source—there is no contact of any sort with the political prisoners—we have learned that in the common prisoners section at the Córdoba penitentiary the police themselves are building a tunnel. At the same time, they have spread the rumor that in the coming days about one hundred of the imprisoned compañeros will be freed. The plan is obvious—behind a smoke screen of an "escape attempt" they intend to carry out an "exemplary" massacre.

An immediate and forceful protest can stop this savage act by the reactionaries.

We have exposed this plan to all the big Argentine dailies—without any hope that it will be published—and to the most important dailies and magazines around the world. But, naturally, we count on only the solidarity of our Trotskyist comrades in all countries and on the forces that they can place in motion. □

Capitalism Fouls Things Up



Spain's 'Costa de la Mierda'

Just how polluted are the golden beaches of Spain's Costa Blanca and Costa del Sol? Spanish consumer magazine *Ciudadano* analyzed samples of the sand from twelve beaches. The results are reported in the April 29 issue of *New Scientist*, under the headline "Costa de la Mierda."

Sand samples taken in November 1975, a time of the year when pollution is at its winter low, showed that nine of the twelve beaches had bacterial counts higher than 100,000 colonies per gram of sand, suggesting a "health hazard."

"At the height of the tourist season in July and August, when hotels are full and the sewers overloaded, conditions must be very much worse," the *New Scientist* report comments.

Among the illnesses beach-goers should be on the lookout for are enteritis and colitis, which show up as stomach pains and diarrhea; typhoid; athlete's foot; ringworm; and tetanus.

The following are some of *Ciudadano's* findings for specific beaches:

Benidorm. "Effluent [sewage] runs in open across beach."



Herblock

Garrucha. "Highly infected."

Motril. "Effluent runs over beach and along shore; grossly polluted bacterially."

Torremolinos. "Very dirty beach . . . gives high bacterial count."

Fuengirola. "Polluted. High fungal count: risk of wound infection."

Turning the Oceans Into Cesspools

"An occasional washup of filth onto the beaches may put ocean dumping into terms that the public can understand, but it is clear that the dumping of wastes is slowly threatening to turn the ocean into a cesspool. In April, the Senate Commerce Committee reported that America's wastes were being put to sea in the mid-1960s at the rate of 7.4 million tons a year, a 335 per cent increase since the early 1950s. By 1973 . . . the figure soared to 12 million tons. . . ."

"In New York, sludge barges shuttle daily between mainland sites and a nine square mile ocean area a few miles out near the continental shelf known as The Bight. The barges unload 150 million cubic feet of sewage a year. The deep-sinking into this dead sea has been going on for 50 years. . . ."

"What New York doesn't take out to sea in barges is discharged by outfall pipes. New York City, according to *Newsday*, has 30 pipes that disgorge 400 million gallons of sewage daily into the Hudson River, about 15 per cent of it untreated. On the West Coast, it is much the same. California outfall pipes deposit sewage at the rate of one billion gallons daily."—Columnist Colman McCarthy, in the July 7 *Washington Post*.

'The Seine Never Looked So Bad'

The once-scenic Seine is now little more than an open sewer, carrying the sewage of 15 million persons and the waste from one-third of French industry. In normal times this is bad enough. Under the current conditions of drought, which have greatly reduced the flow of water without decreasing the discharge of pollutants, the concentration of contaminants is several times worse.

"The Seine has never looked so bad," *Le Monde* reported July 6. "Three and a half meters below the surface its waters

are about 29 degrees Centigrade [about 84 degrees Fahrenheit], whereas in a normal year they do not go above 23 degrees Centigrade [about 73 degrees Fahrenheit]. It contains about two and a half times more ammonia than usual, four times more nitrate, and 50 percent more chlorine. On the other hand, its oxygen content is two times less than normal."

Gas Masks Recommended

"At Grosblierstroff (Moselle), the hot water discharged by the power station for the Lorraine coal basin has raised the temperature of the [drought-stricken] Sarre River to 40 degrees Centigrade [104 degrees Fahrenheit]. Two and a half tons of dead fish floating on the river gave off a pestilential stench, and had to be removed by firemen wearing gas masks."—*Le Monde*, July 6.

Another 'Mystery'

Forty-nine of the 250 wild horses that roam the army's Dugway Proving Ground in Utah have inexplicably dropped dead, and more than a dozen more are sick, officials reported in early July.

Although the proving ground is the army's test station for chemical warfare, Dugway commander Col. James Templeton, Jr. denied that nerve gas or biological warfare experiments had caused the horses' deaths.

His statement was greeted with understandable skepticism. "Despite the military's denial that it is responsible," the *Washington Post* reported July 10, "the horse deaths have raised unsettling reminders of a similar animal kill in 1968. In that incident 6,300 sheep grazing about nine miles from the site of the current horse deaths were killed by an agent which was later shown in laboratory tests to be nerve gas."

New Ruin in the Making

Large cracks have appeared in the great dome of the Florence Cathedral, Reuters reported July 13. Vibrations from heavy automobile traffic in the northern Italian city have been blamed for the damage to the dome, which is regarded as one of the masterpieces of Renaissance architecture.

Selections From the Left

DIRECT ACTION

Socialist weekly published in Sydney, Australia. Presents the views of the Socialist Workers party.

On July 12 some two million Australians joined in the first twenty-four hour national strike in the country's history, protesting Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser's plan to destroy the national medical care plan that currently pays 85 percent of doctor and hospital bills. Under Fraser's proposed budget, workers are to be taxed an additional 2.5 percent for medical care.

An editorial in the July 8 issue hails the decision by the Australian Council of Trade Unions to call the strike as a "victory for working people and a strong blow against the reactionary Fraser Government and its plans to dismantle Medibank. . . .

"At the same time," the editors point out, "July 12 must be seen not as the end but as the beginning of a campaign. The Government is obviously testing the unions at this stage. Much more will be needed if we are to win our demand of retaining Medibank in its present form.

"Let July 12 be the start of a growing movement, building itself by further strikes and other industrial and political action and seeking the support of groups outside but sympathetic to the unions, until Medibank is saved and we can go on to defeat the Government on its Budget and all its other economic plans."

INFORMATIONS OUVRIERES 753

TRIBUNE LÉPÉE DE LA LUTTE DES CLASSES

"Workers News," Open Forum for the Class Struggle. Published weekly in Paris.

Featured in the July 7-July 15 issue is a worker's account of the massive protests that forced the Polish government to rescind scheduled price increases. He describes what happened in Radom June 25, when a delegation elected by the striking workers was unable to meet with local CP officials to discuss the price increases.

"It was very hot. Factory workers, particularly those from the big shoe factory, gradually began to join their delegates in front of the party headquarters. After about an hour they realized that the party leaders had left the building by automobile. There was no one left inside but lower-ranking employees. It was only then that angry workers set fire to the party offices and also to the luxurious connecting apartments. They threw furniture, rugs, and personal belongings out the

windows, and then burned them. 'Look how they live!' they shouted. On several occasions the crowd headed toward the armory. . . .

"At the Ursus tractor factory, the workers went to see the factory directors and asked them, 'Are you with us or against us?' The directors replied Saturday morning [June 26] by arresting more than 100 workers. The others then went back on strike, and the arrested workers were immediately released. . . .

"In Katowice, the workers went to the PKOs ('special' stores), where luxury goods can be purchased only with dollars. At the stores they compelled the clerks to sell them food items—such as ham, which was unavailable in the local stores—and accept zlotys in payment."

מצפן מרקסיסטי

בנין סניף תל אביב 1970

"Matzpen Marxist" (Marxist Compass), organ of the Revolutionary Communist League. Published in Tel Aviv, Israel.

The Syrian intervention in Lebanon is denounced in the June issue. A front-page editorial says: "Eric Rouleau, the well-known political commentator who has just returned from the U.S., speaks of a general agreement between that country and the Syrian regime. The essence of the agreement is the following:

- Syria will undertake to restore order in Lebanon—this at the expense of the progressive camp, and in particular at the expense of the Palestinian resistance movement.

- Syria will not prevent the extension of the UN mandate in the Golan Heights for an additional six months.

- The U.S. will prevent Israeli intervention against Syrian domination of Lebanon.

- As soon as the presidential elections are over, the U.S. will undertake to pressure Israel for a provisional settlement in the Golan Heights (this would include and Israeli withdrawal).

- The U.S. will work toward reconvening the Geneva Conference. The Palestinians will be represented in a joint delegation with the Syrians, and under control of the latter."

According to *Matzpen*, "Syria is thus clearly marching in the footsteps of the Sadat regime. It is openly preparing itself for a break with the Soviet Union, and, like Sadat, it will be working toward setting up close relations with American imperialism."

The Palestine Liberation Organization, the editorial points out, has sought assist-

ance from sections of the Arab bourgeoisie opposed to Sadat, but "since these regimes are all part of the imperialist setup in the region, an intervention of this nature will be of no service to the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese left. . . .

"This is the price the PLO is now paying for its reliance on the apparently 'progressive' regimes in the region and for its refusal to intervene in the internal affairs of those countries."



The paper of the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International.

In the "Portugal Forum" section of the July 1 issue, Ric Sissons explains why he believes the Portuguese Trotskyists of the Internationalist Communist League made a "tactical error" in calling for a vote for CP candidate Octávio Pato in the presidential elections. The "correct course," Sissons writes, "would have been a critical vote for Otelo" Saraiva de Carvalho.

"Clearly Otelo is not standing on a revolutionary programme [Carvalho's program is printed elsewhere in this issue], but he is marked off from Pato in that he calls for the nationalisation of all sectors of industry, the maintenance of the agrarian reform, and the defence of working class organisations, especially the workers commissions.

"Of course, the programme also defends the constitution, giving the president powers of veto, even though Otelo says he wants it put at the service of the people! He calls for national independence, rather than a socialist Iberia. The section on the armed forces does not mention soldiers commissions, and in press statements he has called for unity and discipline in the armed forces—again at the service of the people and not to repress the workers. Otelo also fails to call for a CP-SP government.

"However Otelo's programme, which can be defined as centrist, is still preferable to the class collaboration of Pato, whose programme is three key aspects: the AFM [Armed Forces Movement]-people alliance; the defence and application of the constitution; and the formation of a left government, that is of the SP-CP and individuals of the AFM.

"Secondly, does Otelo spread illusions in the military? Yes, in the sense that he represents the errors made in the period of March to November last year with the failure of the working class to develop its own self-defence.

"However, those illusions stem from the progressive role that sections of the army—e.g. the Military Police and the Lisbon Light Artillery (RALIS)—played in defending the radio stations, in refusing to break up workers demonstrations such as that of the building workers, and in giving arms to the workers. In that respect, while Otelo's support is based on both the strengths and weaknesses of that period, it represents above all the combativity of the workers and soldiers. It seems to me that it is the Pato campaign that spreads the most dangerous military illusions—that is, total subordination of the working class to the officers of the AFM. . . .

"Thirdly, in comparison to the poor showing of the CP (only 5,000 turned up to hear Pato in Setubal, where the party won 45 per cent of the vote in the assembly elections), Otelo's campaign has met with a massive response. For example, in Oporto 70,000 people turned out—the biggest demonstration since April 1974. More importantly, Otelo has won widespread support from workers commissions throughout the country, and at the Lisnave shipyard, one of the most important centres of working class militancy, a mass meeting voted to back Otelo.

"This, it seems to me, is the crucial point," Sissons concludes. "Accepting as our starting point the need through the campaign to prepare the working class for the autumn offensive of the ruling class, then the forces capable of giving such a lead are to be found behind Otelo. It seems to me that the workers vanguard are supporting the Otelo campaign. It is these workers, the most advanced section of the class, who must be prepared and clarified, and it is there that revolutionary Marxists should intervene."

libération

A socialist monthly published in Montréal. Presents the views of the Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière/League for Socialist Action.

Under the headline "What Price the 'Olympic Dream'?" Michel Rose comments in the July issue on the way Montréal Mayor Jean Drapeau and the Canadian government have seized on the Olympics as a pretext for crushing democratic rights and filling the coffers of the big corporations.

The new, hastily planted flowers and trees "can scarcely conceal the fact that Montréal is an armed camp," Rose writes.

"More than 16,000 soldiers, invested since June 10 with the same powers as the police, have invaded the city of Montréal. This is in addition to the forces added previously to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Québec security bureau, and the Montréal police.

"On June 9, Québec Solicitor General Fernand Lalonde admitted that the police had already carried out seventy-five



Liberation

"I'm training him for the Drapeau Olympics."

searches without warrants, and the number may reach 200. Among those who have been harassed are trade-union militants, citizens committees, and above all immigrants and homosexuals.

"A new federal law gives the minister of immigration the power to refuse entry to Canada to any person he considers 'dangerous.'

"The police have made sweeps of the gay bars and of the headquarters of left groups. The May 11 issue of *La Presse* disclosed a campaign by the Montréal police to imprison vagabonds and tramps during the games. . . .

"In face of this situation, the League for the Rights of Man established June 8, with the support of the union federations, a 'vigilance committee for democratic rights and freedoms.' The League fears that the Olympic games may become a pretext for another October 1970, when the government abolished all democratic rights and arrested hundreds of innocent persons.

"Just as in 1970, the government is using hysteria about 'terrorism' to justify these attacks against unionists, socialists, homosexuals, and immigrants—in short, anyone looked on with disfavor by the government. And, just as in 1970, the population is rather skeptical about searches for terrorists among tramps, and for terrorist plots in union headquarters and gay sauna baths."

This cynicism has been heightened by the amount of money spent on the games, Rose writes. "The government has already spent \$1.8 billion on construction for the Olympics, not to mention the millions spent on 'security,' advertising, and so forth. But at the same time it did not hesitate to impose wage controls, cut the health and education budgets, and reject public employees' demands for a pay increase."

THE MILITANT

A socialist weekly published in the interests of the working people. Printed in New York City, New York.

In the July 23 issue, Dick Roberts comments on the Democratic party convention that nominated Jimmy Carter for president.

"On the first day of the Democratic convention," Roberts reports, "a Democratic party propaganda film declared: 'Too many promises have been broken. What we have to do is make fewer promises. . . .'

The racist peanut dealer from Georgia appears admirably suited to conduct such a campaign.

"While struggles raged in Boston for the right of Black children to decent schooling, Carter refused to support Blacks who were targets of racist lynch mobs," Roberts writes.

"While the guns of the racist apartheid regime in South Africa mowed down rebelling Black youths, Carter said not one word about Washington's pro-South African policies.

"When the Supreme Court decided in favor of capital punishment, which will inflict the greatest penalties on Black people, Carter again said not one word. Carter signed into law the Georgia death penalty approved by the Supreme Court. There are currently twenty-nine people on death row in Georgia; eleven white and eighteen Black, including one Black woman."

However, Roberts points out, the importance of Carter's positions "does not really lie in what he specifically promises or does not promise to do. As a capitalist politician Carter can be counted on to respect none of the pledges he makes to voters."

Solzhenitsyn's Lenin: A Reactionary Caricature

Reviewed By David Frankel



As a Marxist thinker, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) wrote extensively on economics, philosophy, and political theory. As a political strategist and leader, he was instrumental in the victory of the socialist revolution in Russia and the establishment of the Soviet Union.

This last accomplishment is a crime that can never be forgiven in the eyes of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn's latest book, *Lenin in Zurich*, is his attempt to settle accounts with the man he holds responsible for the totalitarian regime in the USSR today.

In form, *Lenin in Zurich* is a selection of chapters from Solzhenitsyn's uncompleted trilogy on World War I and the collapse of the Romanov dynasty in Russia. The only thing linking these chapters is that they all deal with Lenin's wartime exile in Switzerland.

In a favorable article on *Lenin in Zurich* in the April 25 *New York Times Book Review*, Simon Karlinsky points out that "the only conceivable motive for publishing these disjointed chapters in this form is political."

Karlinsky solidarizes with the political view expressed by Solzhenitsyn, arguing that the tsarist regime was in the process of gradually liberalizing itself and that the Russian Revolution was the work of a man whose "abiding concern" was "gaining unlimited personal power."

Karlinsky's review, taken by itself, is an unridicled attack on Lenin, but the author assures his readers that Solzhenitsyn's work "is neither a caricature nor a political broadside."

Even warmer approval is given by Michael Scammell in the April 23 *Times Literary Supplement*, published in London. Although he stops short of endorsing the regime of Nicholas II, Scammell says that *Lenin in Zurich* "succeeds brilliantly."

Scammell especially applauds the fact that "... Solzhenitsyn depicts his subject almost exclusively in terms of Lenin the plotter, Lenin the schemer, Lenin the tactician. . . . The goal is always the same: not equality, not brotherhood, not justice—but power. And not power for social democrats, for socialists or even communists, but for that narrow, fanatical faction that calls itself Bolshevik."

This is good stuff, Scammell says—"one

of the finest things that Solzhenitsyn has ever done."

Is it really? Only somebody blinded by hatred could think so. From a purely psychological and literary point of view the portrait is totally unbelievable. We

Lenin in Zurich, By Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976. 309 pp. \$8.95.

have the testimony of many of his contemporaries that Lenin was a man who was capable of inspiring devotion. That is not what emerges from Solzhenitsyn's pen, to say the least.

Solzhenitsyn's Lenin is cold, self-centered, obsessed with power for the sake of power, a man who is always ready to betray friends or to take advantage of strangers. The portrait that emerges is so unrelieved by any admirable human qualities—particularly by the sense of humor for which the real Lenin was known—that it becomes nightmarish.

Lenin is portrayed as rejoicing in the slaughter of World War I, viewing the Russian casualty figures "with surprise and satisfaction. The bigger the figures, the happier they made him. . . ." (p. 101).

At one point, Lenin and other exiled revolutionists are shown as ghouls celebrating the murder of workers killed by the tsarist regime at the beginning of the 1905 revolution:

Walking along the street one January evening, he and Nadya had met the Lunacharskys, radiantly happy. "Yesterday, the ninth of January, troops fired on the crowd in Petersburg! Many people were killed!!!" How could he forget that evening of triumphant celebration among the Russian émigrés! They had darted into a Russian restaurant, where the whole colony was assembled and sat talking excitedly, singing songs . . . Everyone was suddenly young, vigorous, alive again . . . Trotsky, his outstretched arms making him look longer than ever, busily proposed toasts, congratulated everybody, kept saying that he was going home at once. [P. 203.]

Above all, Solzhenitsyn's Lenin is petty. He has no sense of history, no commitment or interest in great ideas. Total identification with the cause of the working class and all the oppressed permeates the real Lenin's writings. But the literary work of a

lifetime—more than forty volumes—is dismissed by Solzhenitsyn as merely a prolonged exercise in deception, meant to put the best face on sordid aims.

Thus, Solzhenitsyn's fake Lenin thinks, "... the outbreak of war was such a marvelous thing! He was overjoyed by it! *Back there*, all those liquidators would be suppressed immediately, the importance of legal activity would sink sharply, whereas the importance of the emigration, and its strength, would increase!" (pp. 21-22, emphasis in original).

Or again: "It might seem that the proletarian front had been weakened by the mass betrayal of socialists: not so—it was *good* that they had betrayed! It would now be so much easier to insist on his own distinct line" (p. 25, emphasis in original).

There are several instances where Solzhenitsyn's spleen against Lenin takes such exaggerated form that the result is ludicrous. Thus, Lenin supposedly thinks: "Split, split, and split again! Split at all stages of the movement! Go on splitting until you find yourselves a tiny clique—but nonetheless the Central Committee. Those left in it may be the most mediocre, the most insignificant people, but if they are united in a common obedience you can achieve anything!" (p. 55).

Although *Lenin in Zurich* is a work of fiction, Solzhenitsyn insists on its historical accuracy. He even includes a list of Lenin's writings and of several historical studies which he contends prove the truthfulness of his portrayal.

In fact, the book is a fabrication and a dreary smear-job from beginning to end. Solzhenitsyn's lack of sympathy for Lenin is exceeded only by his ignorance of what Lenin stood for.

Perhaps the most outstanding of all the absurdities attributed to Lenin is the long argument where Lenin tries to prove to a group of revolutionists that "SWITZERLAND IS THE CENTER OF WORLD REVOLUTION TODAY!!!" (p. 61, emphasis in original).

Apparently Solzhenitsyn believes that falsifications of this type will convince his readers that Lenin was a fool as well as a maniac.

Aside from idiocies such as the argument on Switzerland, Solzhenitsyn's main charge against Lenin is one that was used as a slander against the Bolsheviks in

1917. Since the German authorities allowed Lenin to travel across German-held territory in order to get to Russia after the overthrow of the tsar, Lenin was accused of being an agent of the German general staff.

The German regime, of course, acted for its own reasons. It knew of Lenin's stand against the imperialist war, and it hoped to see mass pressure force Russian withdrawal from the war. But the Bolsheviks opposed *all* the imperialist governments carrying out the bloodbath in Europe. When the German workers rose up against the kaiser at the end of 1918, the Bolsheviks applauded and supported their action.

The charge that Lenin was a German agent was used as a weapon against the Bolsheviks during the period of reaction in July and August 1917. Lenin's enemies in the former tsarist intelligence apparatus and in the capitalist provisional government were unable to come up with a shred of evidence proving this accusation, which was in contradiction to everything Lenin believed and stood for.

Neither the questionable origin of the charges nor the lack of proof bothers Solzhenitsyn. He maintains that the Bolshevik revolution was a German plot, carried out by German agents with German money. Parvus, a socialist who became a German patriot, is the man who Solzhenitsyn describes as the go-between for Lenin and the German general staff.

In developing the truly idiotic idea that the German monarchy backed the socialist revolution in Russia, and in fact calculated on this event as part of its wartime strategy, Solzhenitsyn says:

The first to come and consult Parvus . . . was the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine . . . then the Armenian and Georgian nationalists. His door in Constantinople was open to all engaged in fighting Russia

. . . from this explosive combination of socialist and nationalist experience the Plan was born. . . .

Just as engineers prefer triangular supports because of their resistance to deformation, so Parvus found that the nationalist and socialist components lacked a third partner—the German government. The aims of all three very closely coincided! . . .

The Plan was to concentrate all their potential, all their forces, all their resources under a single command, to control from a single headquarters the activities of the Central Powers, the Russian revolutionaries, and the border peoples. [Pp. 136-137.]

To Solzhenitsyn, a Russian chauvinist, the national liberation struggle of the peoples oppressed by the Great Russian Empire—"the border peoples"—and the refusal of revolutionary socialists to support the "patriotic" slaughter are betrayals. Although he doesn't call him the "Little Father," Solzhenitsyn can barely contain his sympathy for the tsar as he describes "the Plan" in greater detail:

Shaken by destructive propaganda within, Russia must also be besieged by a hostile world

press. An anti-Tsarist campaign will be mounted by socialist newspapers in various countries, and the excitement of Tsar baiting will spread to their neighbors on the right, the liberals—that is to say, to the dominant section of the press throughout the world. A newspaper crusade against the Tsar! In this connection it is particularly important to win public opinion in the United States. And by exposing Tsarism we will simultaneously unmask and undermine the whole Entente! [P. 140.]

This passage reflects Solzhenitsyn's view on present-day politics. In a March 21 television address in Spain, for example, Solzhenitsyn warned "utopian Spanish progressives" against the dangers of opposing the Francoist regime too strongly. "Tomorrow you will have democracy," he said. "But the day after tomorrow—do you know it won't fall into totalitarianism?"

His reactionary politics have blinded Solzhenitsyn to the simple fact that revolutions are made by huge masses of people who are driven into action by intolerable social and economic problems. In his eyes, history is made by tiny groups of conspirators, and the masses are just sheep with no will of their own. He says:

To start a strike, or a riot, to bring the people out in the streets, you do not need the unanimous consent of the majority, or even one in four—indeed, it is wasted effort to try and prepare even a tenth of them for action. A single shrill cry from the thick of the crowd, a single orator at the factory gates, two or three toughs brandishing fists or sticks are often enough to keep a whole shift from their benches or bring them out into the streets. Then there are neighborly conversations condemning the government, the transmission of alarming rumors . . . for each and any of these preliminary blows you need no more than five men to a factory, and if you cannot find five who will do it out of conviction, you can buy help in the nearest tavern—what tavern scrounger refuses money? [Pp. 174-175.]

Lenin's supposed "betrayal" is not difficult for Solzhenitsyn to explain—it comes from Lenin's non-Russian nature.

Solzhenitsyn has Lenin think in one passage:

How could you knead sad Russian dough into any sort of shape! Why was he born in that uncouth country? Just because a quarter of his blood was Russian, fate had hitched him to the ramshackle Russian rattletrap. A quarter of his blood, but nothing in his character, his will, his inclinations made him kin to that slovenly, slapdash, eternally drunken country. [P. 103.]

Lenin, whose features testified to his partly Mongolian ancestry, is seen as a fitting ally for those oppressed nations contemptuously dismissed by Solzhenitsyn as "the border peoples." Solzhenitsyn's Great Russian chauvinism, his contempt for the masses, and his hatred of Lenin and the socialist ideas he stood for, leads him into outright racism.

Lenin is referred to as "that Asiatic with his wild ideas" (p. 48). He speaks "with a caustic flash of his Mongol eyes, in a voice without depth or resonance, but with the cutting edge of a Kalmuck saber" (p. 58).

In another passage, "Lenin wagged his finger in the little space left between their heads, and smiled like a Kalmuck extolling a melon in an Astrakhan bazaar" (p. 153). On the following page, Solzhenitsyn refers to Lenin's "slyly good-natured Asiatic grin."

It is sad to see a great writer degenerate into a reactionary crackpot. In Solzhenitsyn's case, the ultimate responsibility lies with the Stalinist bureaucracy. Its suppression of democratic rights in the Soviet Union is what has led Solzhenitsyn to glorify the "good old days" of the tsar.

Ironically, it is the Stalinist bureaucracy that will benefit most from Solzhenitsyn's *Lenin in Zurich*. The Kremlin will use this miserable collection of lies to bolster its false argument that those who fight for democratic rights against the bureaucratic tyranny represent imperialism, and not the interests of the masses of Soviet workers and peasants. □

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
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AROUND THE WORLD



Mass Demonstrations in Spain Force Concessions from Regime

Following protests numbering as many as 200,000 persons, the Spanish government has announced reforms in its penal code and a decision to grant amnesty to several hundred political prisoners.

A July 14 vote in the Cortes, the Phalangist parliament, lifted penalties on the activities of political parties that do not engage in violent subversion or seek "the destruction of the juridical, political, social and economic system."

The new penal code also does away with penalties for meetings of more than twenty persons, street demonstrations, distribution of political propaganda, and forming political parties.

The promise of amnesty for political prisoners was qualified to include only those not accused of committing acts of political violence.

The concessions were announced following a week of massive demonstrations throughout Spain, centering on demands for amnesty and political liberties. The demonstrations, which had been called by the opposition formation Coordinación Democrática, were the biggest in the country since the Spanish Civil War. In Bilbao and Asturias, where the demonstrations were authorized by the government, 200,000 and 100,000 persons marched, respectively.

Thousands also demonstrated in cities

where no authorization was given. They were attacked by police, leaving one person dead in Santurce and several injured in Madrid, Barcelona, and Pamplona. In Madrid, close to 100 persons were reported arrested.

The July 9 killing of Begona Menchaca in Santurce by police was protested in a funeral cortege of 40,000 persons for the forty-six-year-old mother of three children. Amnesty demonstrators in Pamplona wore black arm bands in mourning for the victim.

Oiling the Wheels of Commerce

An Occidental Petroleum Corporation shareholder filed a lawsuit July 1 asking for restitution from Occidental officers for money spent on illegal bribes both inside and outside the United States, and for all losses resulting from such bribes.

The suit charged that the company made \$3 million in illegal payments "to Venezuelan officials for the purposes of securing favorable business concessions," and an additional \$175,000 "in payments to other foreign government officials in apparent violation of the laws" of those governments. Two Occidental officers have already been convicted of making an illegal \$54,000 contribution to Richard Nixon's 1972 presidential campaign.

In June, a Venezuelan congressional commission recommended that the Venezuelan government not compensate Occidental for its nationalized holding because of the corporation's "irregular activities." The proposed compensation had been estimated at \$25 million.

Death Penalty Abolished in Canada

The Canadian government formally abolished capital punishment for all non-military crimes July 16. The new law, which passed its crucial test in the House of Commons July 14 by a vote of 130-124, saved the lives of eleven persons on death row.

A previous law had retained the death penalty for killers of policemen and prison guards on duty.

Seven Protesters on Trial in Poland

Most food prices in Poland will remain frozen this year instead of rising sharply as was originally planned, the regime of Communist party boss Edward Gierek announced July 13. The original announcement of price increases that averaged 69 percent for meat products, 100

percent for sugar, and 30 to 60 percent for many other foods, provoked massive protests in Polish factories June 25.

The regime's new plan limits increases in food prices this year to meat and poultry, which will go up 35 percent. However, while making concessions in the economic sphere, the Gierek regime made clear that those who protest its decrees do so at their own risk.

On July 16 seven workers from the Ursus tractor factory outside of Warsaw went on trial for their part in the June 25 protests. Western reporters were excluded from the trials and were not allowed to copy the names of the men and the charges against them. Families of the defendants said that some were charged with sabotage, which provides for a minimum five-year prison term, and which can bring the death penalty.

Mideast Arms Race Heats Up

The Middle East is now the "most militarized region on the globe," the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute reported June 17. The institute's seventh annual yearbook on world armaments said arms expenditures in the Middle East are now running at 16 percent of the area's combined gross national product.

Total military spending in 1975 was \$280 billion. NATO and the Warsaw Pact accounted for 78 percent of this total, but the Middle East accounted for more than half of all new arms purchases.

In regard to the spread of nuclear weapons, the institute estimated that by 1980 there would be enough plutonium in the world for 10,000 bombs, and that up to thirty countries would be able to make nuclear weapons within the next four years.

Amalrik, Soviet Dissident, Exiled

Andrei Amalrik, the dissident Soviet writer, went into exile in Europe July 15 as a result of a campaign of harassment and pressure from the Soviet authorities. Amalrik had been kept under surveillance and was repeatedly arrested and threatened since his return from exile in Siberia in 1975.

He was barred from living in Moscow, and police officials hinted that if he did not agree to leave the country he would be sentenced to a third term of imprisonment. Amalrik reported that he was pressured to go to Israel, but he refused.



Herblock/New York Post

Election Program of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho

[The following is the program put forward by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho in the Portuguese presidential elections. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

As candidate for president of the republic by popular demand, I promise the Portuguese workers and people, in the event that I am elected, to guarantee conditions enabling the united and organized people to advance toward solving their problems on the road to a new society—a socialist society—where the democratic exercise of power by the working class will be possible.

Thus, I pledge:

1. To assure the defense of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, a conquest of the people that should be placed at the service of the salaried workers of the countryside and the city, of the workers in industry and the small and middle-size tenant farmers, of the technicians and poor and well-off merchants, of office workers and bank workers, of insurance workers, and sales clerks.

To prevent the privileged classes—who continue to hold power—from overturning the progressive elements of our fundamental body of law.

I pledge:

2. To steadfastly assure the defense and the deepening of the fundamental gains won by the Portuguese people since April 25. These include:

- Agrarian reform, which should be carried out, consolidated, and developed through the decisive participation of the workers so as to benefit the small and middle-size farmers and tenant farmers.

- Workers control by all laborers, which should be encouraged, developed, and extended throughout the country.

- Nationalization of the basic sectors of the economy, which cannot be allowed again to serve groups of capitalists and which should be developed to serve the people and the independence of the nation.

- The right to strike, a sacrosanct right of the workers that cannot be subject to regulations that attack and destroy it.

- Freedom of expression, assembly, and association, as long as they do not involve promoting fascist or fascist-like ideas and practices.

I pledge:

3. To defend, strengthen, and develop all forms of workers organization, especially the rank-and-file people's organizations—the Workers Commissions, Tenants Commissions, and Town Councils.



CARVALHO

These organizations are a fundamental and truly democratic creation of the working masses. They assure their real unity and are an indispensable condition for resistance or for advance of the people's movement.

I pledge:

4. To guarantee the autonomous organization of the workers in trade unions independent of the state and the political parties, by helping to create the conditions that will make it possible for them to be united and democratic.

I pledge:

5. To respect the desires of the workers and the people as expressed in the election results, by naming the prime minister as the Constitution indicates, by guaranteeing—in the framework of the Constitution—that the government carries out a policy that defends the interests of the workers and the people, and by rejecting governmental conduct that opens the way for the violation of constitutional principles or that creates conditions for a return to fascism.

6. To not permit any attempts whatsoever to make the working classes pay for the capitalist economic crisis. The crisis will have to be combated through a policy that assures an increase in the production of essential goods, lower prices for the consumer, a struggle against unemployment through an increase in the number of

jobs, and freedom from dependence on the imperialist powers.

As the first, extremely important step to put into practice an economic policy of this sort, businesses and nationalized sectors must be placed under the control of the workers and at their service so as to make possible the reorganization and planning of the economy.

The economic crisis can only be resolved in a socialist society, through economic planning based on national independence, the mobilization of the workers, and the creative action of their struggle.

I pledge:

7. To bring April 25 to the small and middle-size farmers and tenant farmers throughout the country—the great forgotten element who have the right to the product of their labor and to a real improvement in their standard of living—construction of roads, hospitals, schools, electricity, water, and sewer systems. Therefore, they cannot go on subject to the control of the big middlemen. They must be assured access to the fruits of their labor at the just price guaranteed before the campaign, loans on favorable terms, and low prices for fertilizer, supplies, seeds, machinery, and cattle.

The law governing land tenure in the countryside must be rigorously enforced.

I pledge:

8. To guarantee that the agrarian reform will be carried all the way through for the rural workers in the areas of large landholdings and, in the other areas, for the small and middle-size farmers and tenant farmers.

The rights of the small and middle-sized farmers and tenant farmers will always be scrupulously respected.

The agrarian reform must contribute to achieving the independence of the country in the food sector, in conjunction with a progressive policy on the fishing industry.

I pledge:

9. To fight the reactionary attempts to open a breach between the small and middle-size farmers of the North and the agricultural workers of the South, by uniting them in the same struggle to improve the living conditions of the Portuguese people.

Rejection of the bugbear of political, religious, and economic differences, will make it possible to overcome the divisions between the countryside and the city, the North and the South, the continent and the islands, that the reactionary forces manage to exacerbate.

I pledge:

10. To support a housing and health policy that will serve the most needy classes and not, as has been the case up to now, a policy that protects privileged minorities.

To support a policy that concerns itself with the retired and the elderly, that protects children, and that frees women

from the situation of double exploitation as workers inside and outside the home.

To back a policy in support of the emigrants and their families, deepening the ties that unite them to Portugal, staunchly defending their living conditions and right to work, and fighting so that in the future the Portuguese will not need to emigrate.

I pledge:

11. To promote a truly democratic policy in the fields of education, teaching, and communications, defending the forms of the nation's culture against foreign domination in these fields.

To struggle for the elimination of illiteracy and for the cultural liberation of the people by encouraging displays of popular culture and supporting the associations and organizations that develop them.

To contribute in this way to the Portuguese people's access to the cultural heritage of all of humanity.

I pledge:

12. To fight for a policy of national independence that defends the interests of the Portuguese people against the pressures and domination of the big foreign powers and their partisan interests, by struggling especially for economic, political, and military emancipation from the imperialist powers that most directly affect us.

To support a foreign policy of nonalignment in relation to the politico-military blocs and to promote development of relations with the nonaligned countries, especially the Third World countries.

I pledge:

13. To establish special relations with the new Portuguese-speaking African nations, deepening the basis of anti-imperialist solidarity and of the process of decolonization.

Decolonization—the coming together of the antifascist fight of the Portuguese people and the MFA [Movimento das Forças Armadas—Armed Forces Movement] and the fight of the national liberation movements—brings an end to an unjust colonial war that cost our people and the peoples of the colonies many thousands of dead and wounded and tens of millions of escudos.

To fight to resolve the serious problems affecting the Portuguese who have returned from Africa, who are also victims of a colonial situation imposed by the fascist regime that was overthrown April 25. To do so by recognizing that the solution of such problems lies in the framework of fraternal relations with the new African countries and can only be achieved by instituting an economic policy that serves the working classes to which the overwhelming majority of these Portuguese belong.

I pledge:

14. To place the Armed Forces at the service of the people and the national interests, never allowing repression to fall

upon the workers.

The Armed Forces will fight against counterrevolution and terrorism. They will not permit the fascist forces—which are still not totally defeated—to take advantage of the freedom won April 25 to destroy that freedom itself.

The Armed Forces must guarantee

active support to the solution of the most urgent problems of the Portuguese people.

The Armed Forces—the people in uniform, never professional mercenaries—must be the protectors of the Constitution, making possible the truly democratic exercise of power by the workers and the people. □

Iranian Dictatorship Spills More Blood

Shah's Press Hails Slaying of Ten Oppositionists

By Majid Namvar

Banner headlines in the front pages of the government-controlled press in Iran announced July 1 the deaths of Hamid Ashraf and nine other "terrorists."

The killings were said to have occurred June 29 in a predawn police raid on an apartment house near Tehran's Mehrabad airport.

Less than a week before, police had killed five youths in three separate gun battles on the streets of Tehran. Five women were said to be among the latest victims of the shah's police.

These clashes raised to well over sixty the number of opponents of the Iranian dictatorship who have been reported killed or executed this year. "The actual death count," Eric Pace reported in the June 30 *New York Times*, "is rumored to be substantially higher, and an undisclosed number of policemen have been killed by terrorists."

Hamid Ashraf, whom the government claimed was one of the most wanted "terrorist leaders," was the last surviving member of what was once known as "the 'Siahkal group,' named after a village in the northern province of Gilan.

The Siahkal rural police outpost was reportedly attacked in February 1971 by an armed leftist group following the detention of one of their members. The rescue attempt, which resulted in the death of six policemen, was widely publicized by the opposition and was viewed by the radicalizing youth as the beginning of a new offensive against the monarchy.

Shortly afterward, however, it was brought to a tragic end with the capture and execution of thirteen alleged participants. Nine others associated with the event have been killed in various clashes with the police during the past five years.

Police accounts printed in the shah's press played up the significance of the Mehrabad raid. Photos of Ashraf were published, along with those of seized weapons of numerous calibers and stacks of U.S. dollar bills. The police also repeat-

ed their previous charges that documents found at the apartment proved the "link" between the Libyan regime and those killed in the raid. The alleged documents have yet to be published, however.

The weekly air edition of *Kayhan* reported in its July 7 issue: "With the extermination of this terrorist group which was led by Hamid Ashraf, a member of the Siahkal gang, the central staff of Iranian communist terrorists has been totally smashed."

This is not the first time the government has claimed itself victorious in "uprooting" the opposition. In the past, such claims have generally been followed by more widespread opposition and more police violence.

One indication of the regime's increased feeling of insecurity was shown by the fact that on July 5 the parliament hurriedly passed a law requiring all landlords to report to the police the identities of their tenants. Failing to do so would be punishable by a minimum sentence of three months' imprisonment.

The following day, the government announced in a vaguely worded communiqué an "amnesty" plan for those members and supporters of guerrilla organizations "who have not been involved in any bloodshed."

"By surrendering to the officials and providing them with information, such people can be sure of legal protection and complete amnesty," the communiqué said.

Such empty promises by a regime that holds and tortures tens of thousands of political prisoners is, to say the least, rather dubious. □

Documents discussed at 1974 Tenth World Congress of Fourth International. 128 pages, 8½ x 11. \$2.50

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Trotskistas Franceses Discuten Elecciones Portuguesas

[En su número del 30 de junio, *Rouge*, el diario de París que refleja los puntos de vista de la Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR), abría un debate público sobre las elecciones presidenciales portuguesas. Publicaba tres artículos firmados por dirigentes de la LCR, en que se presentaban tres posiciones diferentes sobre este problema.

[La redacción señalaba que se había estado realizando un debate sobre las elecciones portuguesas en las filas de la LCR "que interesa a toda la extrema

izquierda y que nos hemos retrasado demasiado en hacer público." Se anunciaba que el siguiente pleno del Comité Central de la LCR adoptaría una resolución sobre este punto, y que las direcciones del Secretariado Unificado de la Cuarta Internacional y de la Liga Comunista Internacionalista (LCI, organización portuguesa simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional) también lo discutirían y llegarían a una decisión.

[La traducción de los siguientes artículos es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

El Único Voto de Clase Posible

Por Gérard Filoche

Las elecciones presidenciales del 27 de junio fueron una trampa para la clase obrera portuguesa. Los dos principales partidos a los que los obreros habían dado la mayoría absoluta en las elecciones legislativas del 25 de abril pasado, han tenido la fuerza necesaria para dividir y desorientar a la clase obrera. El plebiscito de Eanes, con 61.5% de los votos, confirma un grave golpe para el amplio movimiento de masas que ha conducido a Portugal al borde de la revolución. La traición de la dirección del PS ha empujado a centenas y centenas de millares de trabajadores y campesinos pobres a dar su voto a un candidato reaccionario. Y aún son otros dos militares quienes se han repartido el resto de los votos de los trabajadores, mientras que el único candidato civil perteneciente al movimiento obrero quedó en última posición.

Estos son los resultados de una revolución traicionada. La responsabilidad recae en las políticas criminales de las direcciones del PCP y del PSP que han frenado el avance de las luchas obreras en beneficio de la alianza con los militares y los partidos burgueses.

El PSP, el principal partido obrero, respondiendo a las intimaciones del imperialismo americano sobre la necesidad de separar a los PC de los gobiernos europeos, se ha preocupado de dar su apoyo a un militar, de los cuales fingió exigir el año pasado que abandonasen el poder.

El PCP, aislado por esta maniobra conjunta del PS, el PPD y el CDS, ha tenido que presentar un candidato propio bajo la presión de su base. Hubiera podido salvar su propia apuesta, e incluso captar una parte del electorado del PSP, si no hubiera tenido que pagar la cuenta de su

larga política oportunista respecto del MFA y por lo tanto de los tres candidatos militares. En lugar de hacer campaña, el PC ha intentado dar garantías a Eanes, y negociar una retirada honorable. Esta campaña "a empujones" ha aumentado la confusión de estas elecciones y ha frenado la movilización que podía impulsar, aun a pesar de ella misma, la única candidatura obrera.

Los trabajadores, que en su gran mayoría habían realizado un voto de clase en las elecciones legislativas, han encontrado grandes obstáculos para reeditarlos con toda claridad. Gran parte de ellos han retrocedido a causa de esto, hacia el candidato de las ilusiones, Otelo de Carvalho.

No es el hecho de que un gran número de trabajadores haya sido engañado y mistificado—a falta de otras perspectivas—por su campaña, el que puede dar a la candidatura de Carvalho una naturaleza obrera (no es la primera vez en la historia que los trabajadores traicionados y engañados se vuelven hacia un líder que les sirve de sustituto). El verdadero problema es que son extraordinarias energías, los sectores a menudo más combativos y radicales los que han constituido el electorado de Carvalho. Esto es aún más dramático. Esto indica a la vez la combatividad y la confusión política de todos estos sectores. Los centristas portugueses han contraído una grave responsabilidad, desviando todas estas energías de las tareas necesarias e irremplazables de la construcción de un partido obrero revolucionario hacia un sustituto carismático. El éxito de Otelo no se explica más que por el oportunismo y el izquierdismo pasados, por las impacencias sectarias,

por la ausencia de una estrategia revolucionaria capaz de arrancar a las masas de la influencia de las direcciones reformistas y de los militares.

El ex general, el ex miembro del triunvirato, el hombre que liberó a Jaime Neves, el hombre que aprobó el estado de sitio del 25 de noviembre, ha ensartado de nuevo con éxito las consignas más perniciosas que han desorientado a la clase obrera y a su vanguardia: "Pueblo-MFA," "Unidad y disciplina de las Fuerzas Armadas," "Respeto a la Constitución," "Dinamización cultural" y "Poder popular," etc. Las más temibles de las consignas en cuestión son la del "apartidismo" y la de la unidad por encima de las clases "Pueblo-MFA," ya que atacan directamente la autoorganización y la expresión autónoma de la clase obrera. Carvalho ha llegado a pedir a los grupos centristas que le apoyan que se disuelvan en el GDUP (Grupos de Dinamização da Unidade Popular), para aparecer más libre en sus movimientos por encima de los partidos, y, de hecho, contra ellos.

Carvalho simbolizaba, a través de su candidatura, una política de colaboración de clases, diferente en cuanto a la forma, pero comparable a las puestas en práctica por el PSP y el PCP. Es la misma política reaccionaria que oculta a los trabajadores las lecciones de dos años de revolución, que impide toda clarificación.

Esta es la razón de por qué no había que "acompañar" a los trabajadores combativos y radicales en sus ilusiones ni en el terreno de sus errores bajo el pretexto de hacerse comprender por ellos o de unirse a no se sabe qué "dinámica" o "potencialidad" de reagrupamiento de la "vanguardia" (¿apartidaria e interclasista?). Con ocasión de estas elecciones trucadas y desfavorables a los trabajadores, los marxistas revolucionarios no podían hacer otra cosa que luchar contra la corriente y, punto por punto, actuar para impedir que los obreros más combativos se pusieran a remolque de una candidatura pequeñoburguesa, falsamente radical.

Fue precisamente ese el significado de la justa opción de la LCI por presentar una candidata trotskista. Esta hubiera sido la mejor tribuna para oponerse a los diferentes candidatos militares y al del PCP.

En base al fracaso de este proyecto, ¿nos quedamos reducidos a la abstención? Este es el único problema serio.

Pero esta posición rechaza a todos los candidatos, los juzga en términos de "tanto da uno como otro." Si el programa de todos los candidatos representa después de dos años de revolución una política

reaccionaria, no tienen sin embargo la misma posición de clase. Uno de ellos, Pato, estaba orgánicamente unido a uno de los principales partidos obreros. Era necesario poner una barrera ante Eanes: era necesario, de una forma o de otra, un voto de clase contra el candidato común del PPD, CDS y PS y contra el apartidismo por encima de las clases de Otelo. Este es el único argumento real para votar por Pato.

No es en absoluto un apoyo a su programa ni a su campaña. Ya que Pato también está por la unidad del ejército, por la unidad "Pueblo-MFA." Es su política la que ha subordinado la autonomía obrera al MFA y solamente ha podido hacerlo porque los trabajadores reconocen en él un portavoz de un partido obrero. El juicio sobre Pato no es discociable del juicio sobre la naturaleza de clase de su partido. Fue a pesar de su política y de su falta de campaña que el 7% de los votos de los trabajadores han recaído sobre el único

candidato del movimiento obrero.

Debemos apoderarnos de todo lo que pueda desarrollar la perspectiva de la independencia de la clase obrera respecto a los partidos, a los ministros burgueses, a los militares. "Girar" sobre esta cuestión bajo el pretexto de que Carvalho "gana más votos" es oportunista y derechista. Precisamente porque no subestimamos a los sectores confundidos por Carvalho, debemos combatir con tanto más vigor por la unidad y la independencia de clase, lo que pasa principalmente por una batalla por el frente único de sus organizaciones, por un gobierno PCP-PSP sin ministros burgueses ni militares, y no por la "superación" utópica de los combates bajo la égida del "líder" Carvalho.

La revolución portuguesa ha señalado la "vuelta" al "esquema clásico": la fuerza de la clase obrera y de sus organizaciones tradicionales impide especular sobre el papel carismático y sustituido del jefe del COPCON. □

Pato-Otelo: Dos Votos Obreros

Ror A. Artous, D. Bensaid, F. Lourson, A. Robs e Y. Salesse

La elección de la consigna de voto, y más ampliamente, de la batalla política que debían llevar los revolucionarios en las elecciones portuguesas, estaba condicionada por un análisis del significado objetivo de los enfrentamientos electorales, y por tanto, por una clara caracterización de las candidaturas de Pato y Otelo.

Al escoger votar por Pato, nuestros camaradas de la Liga Comunista Internacionalista afirmaban que se trataba del "único voto de clase posible," porque Pato era el único candidato "unido orgánicamente al movimiento obrero" (*Rouge* del 9 de junio de 1976). La candidatura de Otelo se caracterizaba así por defecto como exterior al movimiento obrero, sin que su contenido de clase se definiese claramente (burgués, pequeñoburgués). Este análisis llevaba a un pronóstico lógico: los obreros, y en primer lugar los que hasta ahora le habían dado su confianza al PS y se negarían a seguirle en su apoyo a Eanes, manifestarían su rechazo a votar por los candidatos burgueses agrupando sus votos sobre el "único candidato obrero," Pato. De mantener este análisis, no se podrían comprender los resultados más que como una derrota política, como un retroceso espectacular del nivel de conciencia de los trabajadores en el espacio de dos meses, en tanto que ningún enfrentamiento ha venido a modificar las relaciones de fuerzas entre las clases desde las elecciones del pasado mes de abril.

Entonces, los resultados electorales han confirmado lo que una caracterización correcta de la candidatura de Otelo permitía prever: el candidato del PC ha sido incapaz de aglutinar esta conciencia de

clase elemental. Incluso ha visto cómo una parte importante de su electorado se alejaba de él y votaba a Otelo. Votando contra los candidatos burgueses, los trabajadores lanzan un aviso a la burguesía y a las direcciones reformistas del PC y del PS: están decididos a defender palmo a palmo sus conquistas revolucionarias y a oponerse firmemente al proceso de normalización en curso, a los progresos amenazadores de la contrarrevolución democrática bajo el pastoreo activo de Mário Soares y con la complicidad benevolente de Alvaro Cunha.

Era falso ver una diferencia de clase entre las candidaturas de Pato y Otelo.

Burguesas, lo son las dos, por el *programa* que defienden, y cualesquiera que sean las referencias de Otelo al "poder popular," se inscriben en el respeto de la *democracia burguesa y de sus instituciones*. Pequeñoburgués, desde luego que Otelo lo es por su origen y por su situación social. ¿Es esto suficiente para caracterizar sus posiciones de clase, y le impide unirse al campo de los trabajadores?

Lo que permite zanjar la cuestión está en otra parte, en el *significado político* de la batalla de la que ha sido portavoz: apoyado únicamente por las organizaciones de extrema izquierda, ha arrastrado los votos de los obreros y solamente de ellos. ¿Qué corrientes burguesas o pequeñoburguesas organizadas, qué sectores del aparato del Estado, de la jerarquía militar, o incluso del difunto MFA le han apoyado? Ninguno.

Ver en el fenómeno Otelo una reedición del peronismo o del nasserismo, desde este punto de vista es inadmisibile. Que Otelo

pueda jugar el día de mañana un papel efectivo de bonaparte de izquierda desde luego que no está excluido, pero tampoco es inevitable. Y en ese caso, habría que ponerlo a la cuenta de los errores y las traiciones de las direcciones obreras.

Por lo tanto, ¿había que llamar al voto por Otelo? Indiscutiblemente, muchos trabajadores han señalado con este voto su desconfianza, a la izquierda del PC, y se han reconocido, por encima de peligrosas ambigüedades, en la defensa de los órganos de poder popular y de las conquistas revolucionarias de que Otelo se ha hecho portavoz (su último discurso en Lisboa es un claro testimonio).

Pero si se debe relacionar la política defendida por Otelo con una corriente del movimiento obrero, es necesario hablar de reformismo de izquierda y no de centrismo. Paradójicamente, la amplitud de su electorado muestra lo que le separa del electorado de Democrazia Proletaria en Italia, o incluso del electorado tradicional del PSU [Parti Socialiste Unifié] en Francia. Por lo tanto, la candidatura de Otelo no puede asimilarse con una candidatura unitaria de extrema izquierda, cualquiera que sea la combatividad unitaria que arrastre.

Además, Otelo, tribuno providencial instalado complacientemente por encima de los partidos, sólo podía ser el portavoz momentáneo de un rechazo y de una esperanza y su éxito sanciona ampliamente el fracaso de los partidos reformistas. Pero no aporta ningún principio de solución.

Esto solamente subraya la fuerza que habría tenido la candidatura de un dirigente obrero, que se pronunciase claramente por un programa de acción anticapitalista y apoyado unitariamente por la extrema izquierda, las comisiones de trabajadores y las estructuras sindicales representativas.

Kalidas Barreto, dirigente obrero, miembro de la izquierda del PS, habría podido ser ese candidato.

A falta de una candidatura así, lo único que las elecciones podían expresar claramente era un voto de clase contra clase, que se ha expresado en el voto obrero por Pato y Otelo.

Así, no les quedaba a los revolucionarios más que defender su programa, criticando sin compasión tanto el de Pato como el de Otelo, y llamar a los trabajadores a votar por ellos, negándoles sus votos a los candidatos burgueses. Y a continuar su combate. □

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Aprovechar los Resultados de un Voto de Clase a la Izquierda del Partido Comunista

Por Alain Krivine

El debate que se ha abierto en la LCR [Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, sección francesa de la IV Internacional], como por otra parte en toda la extrema izquierda revolucionaria, sobre cómo habría sido necesario votar en Portugal, es de gran interés, desde el momento en que no se limita a la simple consigna de voto, que es un problema táctico, sino que por el contrario se esfuerza en comprender las divergencias en cuanto al análisis de la revolución portuguesa y de las corrientes que la recorren.

En este sentido, creemos que no hay más que divergencias secundarias entre aquellos de nosotros que piensan que era necesario votar por Otelo y por Pato, y aquellos que, como nosotros, pensaban llamar a votar solamente por Otelo. En cambio, las divergencias son de un orden diferente con los camaradas que mantienen que solamente el voto de Pato es un voto de clase. Ahí se trata de una incompreensión de los fenómenos de radicalización que se han desarrollado hasta el golpe del 25 de noviembre.

Como el asunto merecía en su momento, hemos mostrado en las columnas de *Rouge* las diferentes experiencias ejemplares realizadas por los trabajadores en las estructuras unitarias de combate que se habían dado; a saber, las comisiones de trabajadores, de moradores, los comités de pueblo, los comités de soldados. Decenas de millares de trabajadores comenzaban a tomar su combate en las propias manos y a realizar experiencias de control obrero. Esta ola de autoorganización no ha carecido de confusión y debilidad política, ya que se ha desarrollado en un país en el mismo momento en que todas las grandes organizaciones obreras nacionales, PC, PS e Intersindical, practicaban una política de colaboración de clase con un pie en los comités y el otro en el aparato de Estado burgués. Esta contradicción ha llevado a las organizaciones revolucionarias a navegar entre dos escollos, y a dar preferencia alternativamente a uno u otro de estos polos. El FUR [Frente de Unidade Revolucionaria] estuvo en un principio completamente oportunista respecto del PC, quizás incluso atraído por la demagogia de su giro de izquierda, para después caer en una política sectaria hacia los grandes partidos reformistas, explicando que sólo los comités eran capaces de hacer triunfar la revolución pasando sobre los cuerpos del PC y del PS. Este sentimiento "apartidista" pudo encontrar amplio eco en la fracción del movimiento obrero desmoralizada por la política de traición y de división de estos partidos. Pero el sectarismo

de la extrema izquierda ha contribuido a aislar a la vanguardia de la gran masa de los trabajadores y ha impedido que los comités se estructuren nacionalmente en la unidad, que se centralicen para transformarse en la estructura de masas representativa de la clase obrera, y una posible alternativa al poder burgués.

El final lógico de esta trayectoria fue el 25 de noviembre, es decir, una provocación de la derecha destinada a liquidar el proceso de autoorganización, facilitada por la precipitación de ciertos grupos de extrema izquierda y de una fracción del ejército.

Los trabajadores de vanguardia han sufrido una derrota el 25 de noviembre. Pero no un aplastamiento, ya que la mayoría de ellos se encontraban fuera del golpe y no han sido derrotados.

Era impensable que dos años de politización y de movilización revolucionaria de los trabajadores pudieran ser olvidados y borrados de un día para otro. Y es esto lo que encontramos hoy en día detrás de Otelo con las mismas esperanzas y las mismas confusiones que antes del 25 de noviembre. Desde entonces, son posibles dos actitudes:

Una, dogmática, que partiendo del hecho de que Otelo no es miembro de ningún partido obrero y no pretende construir un partido revolucionario, le coloca en el campo de la burguesía. La transferencia de los votos del PC a Otelo se analiza entonces como una regresión política, léase un voto reaccionario. Esta posición me parece extremadamente peligrosa en la medida en que no permite en absoluto comprender la forma de radicalización de la clase obrera en el cuadro portugués.

¿Sobre qué bases ha sido capaz Otelo de imponerse en los bastiones del PC?

Fundamentalmente por avanzar reivindicaciones anticapitalistas correctas, representando una posición de izquierda con respecto al PC: defensa de las nacionalizaciones, de la reforma agraria, de los comités de trabajadores. El prestigio personal del antiguo jefe del COPCON [Comando Operacional do Continente] y artífice del 25 de abril ciertamente ha contribuido a reforzar la adhesión popular.

Pero el prestigio realmente sólo ha servido porque se identificaba a las consignas que hemos mencionado. La traición de los partidos reformistas, la impotencia de las comisiones obreras explican sin justificarlo el verdadero culto alrededor del personal. Estos partidos han perdido su crédito en provecho de la fracción de la clase obrera que se retuerce detrás del personaje. Y desde luego que es allí donde se encuentran todos los peligros. Otelo solo

no tiene que rendir cuentas a nadie y eventualmente quién sabe a dónde puede ir, incluso si aún está bajo la presión de las preocupaciones de su electorado, pero que es un electorado inorganizado y que se arriesga a ser terriblemente decepcionado el día de mañana. La demagogia "apartidista" es peligrosa. El PC y el PS continúan teniendo una amplia audiencia en la clase obrera. El PC con sus tradiciones y su aparato será capaz de recuperar una parte del electorado de Otelo. Creer que se puede ir al socialismo sin tener en cuenta a estos dos partidos es comenzar de nuevo con errores pasados.

Una vez dicho esto, en este tipo de elecciones, no se puede uno quedar en su torre de marfil y contar los puntos en nombre del programa. Las candidaturas de Otelo y de Pato, las dos crean ilusiones, pero no las mismas. Actualmente era importante que se dibujase un voto masivo a la izquierda del PC sobre un candidato que, además, no tenía ningún apoyo de formación burguesa. Este éxito de Otelo devolvería la confianza, a pesar de la confusión, a una amplia fracción de la clase obrera para los combates futuros. El electorado de Otelo ciertamente representa el ala más radicalizada del movimiento obrero (véanse los resultados de Setubal y de Beja). Con un apoyo crítico a Otelo, los marxistas revolucionarios portugueses se habrían dado los medios de denunciar con más crédito los límites y las ilusiones de la campaña. □

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Nueva Muestra de la Crisis del Estalinismo

[El siguiente artículo se basa en dos artículos de David Frankel, que aparecieron en números anteriores de *Intercontinental Press*: "The Whole of Poland Is on Strike Today," publicado en el número del 5 de julio, y "Polish Upsurge Highlights Crisis of Stalinism," publicado en nuestro número del 12 de julio.]

* * *

La clase obrera polaca no tiene posibilidad de decir nada respecto a las decisiones económicas básicas que le afectan. Este simple hecho fue ilustrado gráficamente por las furiosas protestas que sacudieron a Polonia el 25 de junio por los aumentos en los precios de los alimentos.

Incluso los incansables defensores del "socialismo" estalinista del Partido Comunista norteamericano quedaron reducidos al silencio.

Los aumentos de precios decretados por el régimen incluían aumentos del 100% para el azúcar, 69% para la carne, 30% para la mantequilla y el queso, y entre el 30 y el 60% para el pescado y el arroz.

A principios de 1965, los marxistas polacos Jacek Kuron y Karol Modzelewski señalaron que según las mismas estadísticas de la burocracia, el 42% de las familias de la clase obrera en Polonia se veían obligadas a subsistir con una alimentación que estaba por debajo de lo suficiente, y la alimentación del 23% de ellas era absolutamente insuficiente. El régimen no previó ningún aumento de los salarios reales en el plan quinquenal de 1965-70, y aunque hace cinco años que los precios de los alimentos están congelados, los trabajadores polacos tienen todavía el nivel de vida más bajo de toda Europa Oriental.

"Silencio total" fue como un corresponsal describió la forma en que se trataron las huelgas y manifestaciones en los medios de comunicación de Europa Oriental.

Los sucesos fueron los siguientes: Alrededor de 5,000 obreros indignados en la fábrica de tractores Ursus, fuera de Varsovia, recibieron la noticia de los aumentos levantando las vías de los trenes que iban a la ciudad, deteniendo el tráfico. Uno de los trabajadores contestó a la pregunta de un periodista de la agencia Reuter, acerca de si estaba "dispuesto a discutir la situación con las autoridades": "No necesitamos discutir. Volviremos al trabajo cuando bajen los precios."

En Radom, sesenta millas al sur de Varsovia, los obreros en las fábricas de cuero y fertilizantes de la ciudad dejaron el trabajo para manifestarse en contra de las alzas de precios. Según los informes de la

prensa desde Varsovia, comercios de comida y licores fueron saqueados y los locales de tres pisos del Partido Comunista, quemados.

También se realizaron huelgas en Olsztyn, en la fábrica de carros Zeran en Varsovia, y en la fábrica de grúas Warynski. Los obreros en los astilleros de los puertos bálticos de Gdansk y Szczecin comenzaron a hacer ocupaciones. "Toda Polonia está hoy en huelga," dijo un obrero de la Ursus.

En la misma Polonia, donde el régimen no se podía permitir el lujo del silencio, el alcalde de Radom manifestó que "gamberrros borrachos y mujeres histéricas habían sido los más activos" en las protestas. No explicó por qué el gobierno había retrocedido si realmente ese era el caso.

Sin mencionar las protestas de los trabajadores el primer ministro Jaroszewicz anunció por televisión el 25 de junio la anulación de los aumentos. Declarando que "había muchas propuestas" por parte de los trabajadores "que merecen un análisis cuidadoso," Jaroszewicz dijo que "ahora llevaría varios meses hasta que el asunto se examinase de nuevo, y se elaborase una solución adecuada."

Pero ni el silencio ni la calumnia pueden ocultar el hecho de que el levantamiento en Polonia es un reflejo de la crisis general a que se enfrentan los regímenes estalinistas en Europa Oriental y en la URSS. Visto desde este ángulo más amplio, es particularmente significativo que la explosión del 25 de junio tuviera lugar en Polonia.

Si el descontento de la población está tan cerca de la superficie en Polonia, que tiene uno de los regímenes más liberales de Europa Oriental, ¿cuál será la situación en países como Checoslovaquia y Alemania Oriental? El hecho de que las tropas soviéticas continúen ocupando estos países es una indicación sobre la opinión del Kremlin.

Desde el levantamiento masivo de 1970, que terminó con la carrera de Wladislaw Gomulka como jefe del Partido Comunista Polaco—y amenazó con ir todavía más lejos—el régimen polaco ha seguido una política de aplacar a los obreros. Edward Gierek, el sucesor de Gomulka, instituyó un sistema de "consulta" con representantes de los trabajadores, y cultivó una apariencia de ser una persona abierta a las sugerencias desde abajo.

¿Un Fallo de Comunicación?

"Para algunos analistas aquí," decía el corresponsal del *New York Times* Raymond H. Anderson en un comunicado del 11 de junio de 1973 desde Varsovia, "el

aspecto más prometedor de las reformas de Gierek es la apertura de canales de queja, que permiten correcciones antes de que los resentimientos alcancen un punto explosivo."

Un planteamiento de optimismo similar lo presentó el periodista Henry Kamm al *Times*. En un comunicado del 8 de diciembre de 1973, Kamm informaba que "un miembro influyente del Comité Central del Partido Comunista [polaco]" le dijo que "Gierek ha establecido un compañerismo entre el partido y el pueblo. El pueblo ya no dice 'nosotros' para ellos mismos y 'ellos' cuando se refieren al Partido, como en el pasado."

Aparentemente, a las personas que quemaron los locales del Partido Comunista en Radom, no les había llegado la noticia.

El intento de Gierek de hacer una pequeña cirugía estética al régimen nunca afectó los privilegios burocráticos y esto fue lo que dio a las protestas de los obreros su carácter explosivo. El resentimiento generado por la decisión de aumentar los precios de los alimentos se puede comprender fácilmente. Los trabajadores saben que los cargos del partido y los gerentes de empresas compran comidas de importación, vino y licores en tiendas especiales de las que la gente normal está excluida. Ven cómo los burócratas viven en casas de recreo lujosas y manejan carros nuevos. Y entonces se les dice que tienen que sacrificarse, que las necesidades de la economía requieren mayores precios en los alimentos—una medida que afecta con la mayor fuerza a los trabajadores peor pagados.

El movimiento disidente en la Unión Soviética en general ha lanzado la reivindicación de los derechos democráticos en términos de libertad artística e intelectual. El levantamiento de Polonia la plantea en términos de la abolición de los privilegios especiales de la burocracia.

La reivindicación de los derechos democráticos se les plantea de forma objetiva a las masas en todos los estados obreros estalinizados porque el régimen político de dominación burocrática está en contradicción con las necesidades de la planificación científica.

En tanto que se niegue a los trabajadores su derecho a determinar la política económica por medio de sus propios representantes electos, no hay ninguna forma de ganar su cooperación para llevar adelante la política que se ha decidido. La alienación de los trabajadores en la Unión Soviética y en Europa Oriental se refleja en la baja productividad, las altas tasas de absentismo y el sabotaje industrial.

La respuesta de los burócratas se señalaba en un comunicado de la agencia Reuter desde Varsovia el 18 de noviembre de 1975, que decía: "En su guerra contra el absentismo y el cambio de trabajos, Polonia ha introducido nuevas sanciones para los

trabajadores del Estado que falten a su trabajo por enfermedad injustificada o dejen el trabajo."

Así, los burócratas se enfrentan a una situación en que no pueden gobernar el país sin democracia, y en que no pueden permanecer en el poder con ella. Este dilema explica la tendencia de los regímenes estalinistas a oscilar entre políticas de represión y de reformas limitadas.

Debido a la contradicción entre el papel parasitario de la burocracia y las necesidades de la economía planificada, la dominación burocrática es por sí misma inestable. Un levantamiento masivo amenaza con derribarla en cuestión de días. Sólo los tanques soviéticos salvaron los regímenes estalinistas de Alemania Oriental en 1953, de Hungría en 1956, y de Checoslovaquia en 1968.

Bajo el capitalismo, la organización de la producción está en manos de capitalistas y corporaciones individuales. Esta es una función esencial en el capitalismo, pero no hay ninguna necesidad económica de una burocracia incontrolada en una economía planificada. Las decisiones que actualmente toma la burocracia se podrían tomar mucho mejor en consejos obreros, la forma proletaria de democracia, y ser realizadas por técnicos pagados por el Estado.

La Crisis Mundial Golpea a los Estados Obreros

En términos económicos, la única función de la burocracia es actuar como un freno en el desarrollo económico y en el progreso en general. Este papel negativo se ha vuelto especialmente gravoso debido a la crisis económica mundial.

Más de la mitad del comercio polaco se realiza con naciones capitalistas. La inflación ha elevado la deuda polaca por importaciones a 1,400 millones de dólares durante los últimos dos años, mientras que la depresión de 1974-75 produjo una pérdida de alrededor de mil millones de dólares en las exportaciones de Polonia al mercado capitalista.

Todos los estados obreros se enfrentan a problemas similares. La Unión Soviética ha importado enormes cantidades de grano a precios inflacionarios, y los regímenes de la URSS y Europa Oriental son también grandes importadores de maquinaria y otros productos de tecnología compleja de los países imperialistas.

Como resultado, Polonia no es el único estado obrero donde se les dice a los trabajadores que se aprieten el cinturón. Clyde H. Farnsworth informaba en el *New York Times* del 29 de junio:

En Checoslovaquia, lo que se llama una "reestructuración" de los precios de venta había de realizarse el pasado 1 de enero, y ahora se espera que se aplique al comienzo de 1977.

En Hungría, el gobierno ha decidido "en principio" un aumento del 35% en el precio de la

carne, que será efectivo el domingo.

La semana pasada, los periódicos de Viena contenían informaciones sobre racionamiento de comida en la Unión Soviética.

Las dificultades económicas a que se enfrentan los regímenes estalinistas mues-



GIEREK

tran que la democracia interna es más imperativa que nunca. Aún más, la imposibilidad de "construir el socialismo en un sólo país" ha recibido una nueva confirmación.

Stalin lanzó por primera vez esta teoría de construir el socialismo en un sólo país en diciembre de 1924. Esta perspectiva de desarrollo económico nacional y aislado corresponde a las necesidades económicas de la casta privilegiada representada políticamente por Stalin que estaba cristalizando. Los burócratas no querían más sustos ni molestias, no más conflictos con el imperialismo; querían solamente gozar de los frutos de sus nuevos puestos.

Como predijo Trotsky, la prosecución del "socialismo en un sólo país" llevó a la burocracia estalinista a una política exterior conscientemente contrarrevolucionaria. Ya que los burócratas se preocupaban solamente de salvaguardar su propia trinchera nacional, intentaban alejar la intervención imperialista demostrando que se podía confiar en ellos como aliados del capitalismo. Los estalinistas se opusieron activamente a la extensión de la revolución socialista, bajo consignas como la "seguridad colectiva," "coexistencia pacífica" y "détente."

Otro punto de la crítica de Trotsky al "socialismo en un sólo país" era el hecho de que es una perspectiva utópica y reaccionaria. Incluso si los burócratas pudieran evadir la amenaza de la invasión imperialista—amenaza que se realizó durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial—una sociedad socialista sólo se puede construir sobre una base internacional.

Una de las contradicciones básicas que Marx señaló en el capitalismo es la restricción de las fuerzas productivas que constituyen las fronteras nacionales, cuando aquellas tienen que expandirse debido al empuje imperioso para conseguir plusvalía. La contradicción se resuelve introduciendo la planificación socialista a escala internacional, y las fronteras nacionales dan paso a una sociedad cooperativa de amplitud mundial.

Pero los burócratas estalinistas están tan atados a estrechos intereses nacionales que son incapaces de organizar un plan económico unificado incluso entre países colindantes de Europa Oriental y la URSS.

Cada estado obrero tiene su propio sistema monetario, su propio monopolio del comercio exterior, su propio programa de desarrollo. No hay ningún intento serio por establecer una división internacional del trabajo que supere la que aún practica el capitalismo a escala mundial, o de comenzar el proceso de superación de las irrationalidades impuestas por las fronteras nacionales. Las relaciones económicas entre los estados obreros, siguiendo la ley del más fuerte, se pueden resumir en el aumento del precio del petróleo para sus "compañeros" europeos orientales que los burócratas soviéticos efectuaron para mantener la paz con los precios del mercado mundial.

Aún más, los estados obreros deformados continúan siendo dependientes de la economía mundial capitalista. Así, el estalinismo se ha mostrado incapaz de realizar las mayores tareas económicas a que se enfrentan las sociedades postcapitalistas.

Los regímenes estalinistas reclaman que representan el socialismo, cuando la gran masa de la población tiene que vivir mal pagada, con restricciones de alojamiento, racionamiento de comida, censura, vigilancia de la policía secreta y opresión nacional.

Sin embargo, la resistencia de los trabajadores polacos muestra que se pueden realizar conquistas si las masas se movilizan para luchar por sus derechos. El ejemplo que han dado los trabajadores polacos el 25 de junio será seguido por la clase obrera del resto de Europa Oriental, así como de la Unión Soviética. □

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Respuesta al Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño

Por Pablo Soto

[El siguiente artículo apareció en la edición correspondiente a mayo-junio de *La Verdad*, órgano de la Liga Internacionalista de los Trabajadores de Puerto Rico, con el título "En Defensa de los Derechos Democráticos en el Movimiento Obrero."]

* * *

En el Comentario Político del 6 de mayo de 1976, aparecido en *Claridad*, el compañero Ramón Arbona lanza una serie de críticas a todas las organizaciones pequeñas de izquierda. Estas críticas tienen como marco la polémica sobre la táctica de participación electoral.

Comienza Arbona, en su artículo, hablando sobre organizaciones pequeñas que distribuyen boletines en los actos del primero de mayo, según él, al margen de la celebración oficial. Alega que estas organizaciones lanzaron una serie de ataques al P.S.P. [Partido Socialista Puertorriqueño].

Estas organizaciones de izquierda, los famosos "grupúsculos," son todas, según Arbona, ultraizquierdistas, maoístas o trotskistas, o alguna supuesta desviación con tangencia en algunas de estas dos líneas. Pasando de la geometría a la jardinería, a tales organizaciones el compañero Arbona les llama rabanitos, presentándolas como tontos útiles del imperialismo por el hecho de no formar parte del PSP. A consecuencia, Arbona alega la necesidad de aislar a estas organizaciones pequeñas, mientras el PSP hace trabajo de concientización con las masas.

Vamos a los hechos. ¿Cuál es el supuesto ataque que lanza la Liga Internacionalista de los Trabajadores (LIT) al PSP sobre la participación electoral? Nuestro alegado ataque consiste en el dar apoyo crítico al PSP en las elecciones. Nos brindamos para esto porque ese partido es la única alternativa electoral, ya que tiene una línea independiente para la clase obrera, ante los partidos patronales y ante el partido claramente identificado con la pequeña burguesía, el PIP [Partido Independentista Puertorriqueño]. Al PSP no le damos un apoyo incondicional pues su programa es incompleto y deformado, lo cual explicaremos en otros artículos.

En cuanto al primero de mayo, ocurre que la celebración oficial ya estaba planificada y organizada por los sindicatos participantes y por el PSP. El PIP fue invitado, pero actuando sectariamente no asistió. En la organización previa a la actividad participó el MSP (Movimiento Socialista Popular). Esta organización planteó el uso de consignas políticas en el

acto, contrario a la mayoría de las organizaciones quienes favorecían el usar consignas exclusivamente sindicales. En base a esta diferencia y a otras más, el MSP se retiró del comité organizador.

El derecho como agrupación política obrera a ser organizador de la actividad, el derecho a contribuir activamente en la elaboración de consignas, el derecho a participar en la tarima no estaba reservado en el pasado primero de mayo a los partidos grandes: el PIP y el PSP.

Ocurrieron en el primero de mayo los siguientes incidentes:

1) Una compañera de la LIT estaba repartiendo un boletín obrero, donde se presentaba nuestro programa electoral resumido de apoyo crítico al PSP. Miembros del Comité de Disciplina intentaron verbalmente hacer que ella dejara de repartir el boletín. Alegaron que al hacer esto (en palabras usadas por el compañero Arbona) ella estaba "al margen de la celebración oficial."

2) Militantes del PSR (Partido Socialista Revolucionario) y el MSP que estaban lanzando sus propias consignas, fueron rodeados por miembros del Comité de Disciplina, estos últimos entonaron consignas oficiales para impedir que se oyeran las consignas del MSP y del PSR. La actitud del Comité de Disciplina creó fricciones, las que por momentos amenazaron en convertirse en confrontaciones violentas entre compañeros.

Concluimos que en la práctica, el Comité de Disciplina se convirtió en un comité de censura. Este intento de monopolizar el uso de consignas y de monopolizar o impedir el debate ideológico a través de boletines es impropio para un organismo obrero. Como miembro organizador de la actividad, el PSP debe repudiar estos actos. Pero el artículo del compañero Ramón Arbona lo que hace es incitar a que se incremente esa conducta y esas actitudes sectarias. Esto parte del juicio incorrecto que hace Arbona de los que estamos fuera del PSP. Según Arbona, los que estamos en organizaciones pequeñas, necesariamente tenemos que estar equivocados en nuestras apreciaciones críticas a la lucha de los obreros. Aún más, aunque no nos considera forzosamente como agentes concientes del imperialismo, Arbona asegura que somos tontos útiles, meros rabanitos. Por ello el compañero Arbona incita al sectarismo hacia los grupos pequeños. Para ello, además de la usual acusación de agente, consciente o inconsciente, tantas veces repetida contra cualquier disidente del PSP, ahora Arbona

recurre a la jardinería. Siguiendo el propio diccionario del compañero Arbona, él podría ser considerado un tomate, esto es, rojo por dentro y por fuera. Pero nosotros creemos que esa es una forma muy floja de discutir.

Si seguimos el análisis del compañero Arbona se podría decir que el MPI [Movimiento Pro Independencia] era un grupúsculo, es decir, el primer "rabanito." Fue en la lucha de clases diaria—en la acción y en la crítica política—que se forjó el PSP-MPI, al margen del partido grande, el PIP. Pero suponemos que el compañero Arbona piensa que el MPI, como organización pequeña o grupúsculo, ya era el germen de la "verdad," ahora encarnada en el PSP, el cual no cometía errores políticos. Por tanto, tampoco le servía de tonto útil a la colonia, como alegaba el PIP en aquellos días.

El compañero Arbona olvida que el desarrollo de las organizaciones obreras se forja en el debate político continuo. Para esto es imprescindible la democracia en el seno del movimiento obrero. Esto incluye libertad de organización, libertad de crítica, de propaganda ya sea por medio de boletines o consignas y otras libertades que hacen fructífero el debate político.

Nosotros, la LIT defendemos y defendemos incondicionalmente el derecho de cualquier tendencia (grande o pequeña) en el movimiento obrero a contribuir mediante sus acciones y propaganda política al proceso de superación revolucionaria de los trabajadores. Ante cualquier intento sectario de censura por parte de organizaciones mayores o pequeñas denunciaremos esta acción ante los trabajadores, los cuales creen en la defensa de sus derechos democráticos.

Así sucedió el primero de mayo. Cuando el Comité de Disciplina intentó impedir que nuestra compañera repartiera boletines, ella acudió a los trabajadores presentes. Frente al repudio de los obreros, el Comité tuvo que desistir de su actitud sectaria.

Entendemos que para el mayor desarrollo de la crítica marxista-leninista y para la conducta responsable entre compañeros es necesario que el compañero Arbona rectifique su posición. □

Argentina 'Desnacionaliza' los Bancos

Chase Manhattan, Citibank y Morgan Guaranty son algunos de los bancos que se beneficiarán de la búsqueda de 1,200 millones de dólares en préstamos por parte de la junta militar argentina.

El ministro argentino de Finanzas, José Martínez de Hoz anunció que los bancos serían "desnacionalizados," cosa que se espera facilite el que la junta consiga los préstamos que necesita para enfrentarse a su deuda exterior de diez mil millones de dólares.