

By Joseph Hansen

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NEWS ANALYSIS

Tanaka—A Casualty of Japan's 'Watergate'

By Ernest Harsch

Former Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was arrested at his home on the morning of July 27 and hauled to a cell at Kosuge Prison in Tokyo. He was jailed on suspicion of violating the foreign exchange and currency laws for having accepted an estimated \$1.7 million in bribes from the American Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.

Tanaka is the highest Japanese government official to be arrested since 1948. His downfall testifies to the depth of the political crisis that has rocked Japan for six months as a result of the Lockheed scandal.

In February, Lockheed officials testified in Washington that they had paid out a total of \$12.6 million in bribes and "commissions" to Japanese business and political figures between 1958 and 1975 in order to consummate sales of Lockheed planes to Japanese airline companies and to the Japanese military.

These revelations sent shock waves throughout Japan. While government official after government official denied any knowledge or involvement in the affair, thousands of Japanese poured into the streets to demand a full investigation and the naming of the "gray officials" who took the payoffs. The trade unions played an important role in these protests, bringing out an estimated 3.5 million persons for the May Day demonstrations, which protested, among other things, the government's cover-up.

The regime of Prime Minister Takeo Miki—and its allies in Washington—have tried to keep the scandal under control. But the popular uproar over the affair eventually led to a series of arrests of figures who were already widely believed to be involved. Since Tanaka was prime minister from 1972 through 1974, when one of the Lockheed deals was concluded and another initiated, suspicion naturally fell on him as a leading participant.

Other arrested "big rats" included Yoshio Kodama, an ultrarightist mobster who helped bring at least three prime ministers to power; Hiro Hiyama, former chairman of Marubeni Corporation, Japan's third largest general trading com-

pany; and more than a dozen other business figures.

Besides Tanaka, a number of other central leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic party (LDP) are thought to be implicated, including LDP General Secretary Yasuhiro Nakasone. The LDP is the only significant bourgeois party in Japan, and the Lockheed crisis has become an important factor in undermining its credibility. Within weeks of the Lockheed revelations, public support for the LDP plummeted from 40 percent to 15 percent.

Although recent Japanese history is dotted with dozens of scandals, nearly all of them were successfully swept under the rug. But today there is a new element involved. In the wake of the Lockheed affair and the American Watergate scandal, which had a deep impact in Japan, the Japanese people have begun to see the necessity of piercing the veil of secrecy surrounding the operations of big business and the government. They are beginning to demand their "right to know."

The LDP government realizes the danger of this development to its continued rule. That is why it is doing everything it can to prevent a full disclosure of the government's involvement in the affair. Tanaka may have been chosen as a scapegoat to mollify this mass sentiment.

Shortly after Tanaka's arrest, Miki outlined his goals in a nationwide televised speech. "We must survive this trial," he said, "regenerate the Liberal Democratic Party and restore the people's confidence in the conservative party."

Australian Workers Set an Example

The first nationwide general strike in Australian history took place July 12. More than half of the entire Australian working class participated in the strike, called by the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) to protest the Liberal government's moves to dismantle Medibank—the national health-care plan established by the previous Labor government.

In an article in the July 15 issue of *Direct Action*, a revolutionary socialist weekly published in Sydney, Jim McLroy described the impact of the strike:

Around the country basic industry was brought to an almost total standstill. Transport, both in the public commuter sector and in the

The American imperialists share Miki's goals. At every step in the unfolding of the Lockheed scandal, Washington has tried to prevent or postpone the disclosure of additional details. The documents that it agreed to give to Japanese prosecutors were turned over on the condition that only the names of officials actually brought to trial could be made public.

Besides protecting its Japanese imperialist allies, the White House is intent on keeping the role of the American government in the scandal from coming to light.

A few weeks after the initial Lockheed revelations, American reporters disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency had had a "working relationship" with Kodama, Lockheed's chief influence peddler in Japan, since the late 1940s and that the CIA funded a number of Japanese ultrarightist groups as well as the LDP.

Revealing that some of the Lockheed bribes had been transmitted through a New York-based firm of international money dealers linked to the CIA, Tad Szulc commented in the April 10 issue of the *New Republic* that "Lockheed, who had been paying fees anyway to the Japanese to sell planes, would have been a perfect channel for the CIA to move funds secretly to people like Kodama." And through Kodama, it should be added, to officials like Tanaka.

For American imperialism, such secret dealings are the norm. Washington maintains similar relations with bourgeois regimes throughout the world, from the Christian Democratic government in Italy to the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee in South Korea. Secrecy and back-room maneuvering are essential aspects of capitalist functioning, both domestically and in the realm of foreign policy.

The increasing demands for the "right to know" by the Japanese and American people—as a result of the Lockheed, Watergate, CIA, and other revelations—thus strike at the very foundations of imperialism's methods of rule. □

industrial and commercial area, was almost nonexistent in most major cities. In the two biggest cities, Sydney and Melbourne, there was hardly a bus or truck on the roads. No trains ran anywhere in the country.

Warehouses were largely shut down, the waterfront was silent, and all scheduled flights from airports were cancelled.

Although the capitalist press attempted to minimize the impact and significance of the action, McLroy pointed out that "victory on the Medibank issue, especially if the Government can be forced to drop all plans to introduce a Medibank levy, will be a vital first step in the defence of living standards overall. It would open the way to a new confidence in the face of [Prime

Summer Schedule

This is the last issue of *Intercontinental Press* before our summer break. We will resume our regular schedule in two weeks with the issue dated August 30.

Minister Malcolm] Fraser's coming horror Budget and the Liberals' wage-cutting schemes."

ACTU President Bob Hawke, who called the strike action as a result of heavy pressure from the ranks of labor, has indicated his hope that the July 12 general strike will be the last such action. "But if Hawke and the ACTU leadership are really serious about saving Medibank from the Liberals' hatchet," McIlroy noted, "then the answer lies in immediately stepping up the campaign, not putting a stopper on it."

All over the world workers are facing attacks on their standard of living. The Australian working class has taken the first step toward the type of struggle needed to defend their basic interests. Their action can serve as a powerful example to others. □

The CIA in a Corner

George Bush, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), admitted in a sworn affidavit July 16 that the U.S. government's top spy agency has been carrying out illegal surveillance of members of the Socialist Workers party (SWP) outside the United States. Techniques used by the CIA include burglaries, wiretaps, and the use of hidden microphones.

When asked by reporters, a CIA official refused to say whether the agency still conducts burglaries against U.S. citizens overseas. However, the CIA is fighting a move to have Bush's testimony and the accompanying documents made public.

"It is apparent that disclosure of the documents would reveal CIA sources and methods," one U.S. attorney said. Would this be a problem if the "sources and methods" were no longer in use?

The information that has been pried out of the CIA so far has come to light as a result of the legal suit against government surveillance and harassment filed by the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance. The reluctance of the CIA to reveal the extent of its operations and details about them was indicated by the fact that Bush's affidavit was classified "top secret." The agency demanded that only the judge see the affidavit and the documents accompanying it.

However, the documents were so heavily censored that U.S. District Judge Thomas Griesa complained that he was unable to determine their significance. Meanwhile, the SWP is continuing to push for the release of all the documents on the CIA's criminal activities and assaults against democratic rights.

The CIA made headlines again when government sources leaked the news July 26 that lawyers for the Justice Department

Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

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Published in New York each Monday except last in December, first in January, and third and fourth weeks in August.

Intercontinental Press specializes in political analysis and interpretation of events of particular interest to the labor, socialist, colonial independence, Black, and women's liberation movements.

Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of Intercontinental Press. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material stands on the program of the Fourth International.

Closing News Date: August 2, 1976

Paris Office: Pierre Frank, 10 Impasse Guéméné, 75004, Paris, France.

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Subscription correspondence should be addressed to Intercontinental Press, P.O. Box 116, Village Station, New York, N.Y. 10014.

Please allow five weeks for change of address. Include your old address as well as your new address, and, if possible, an address label from a recent issue.

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were recommending against prosecution of CIA agents involved in an illegal mail opening program. In view of the developments around the SWP suit, which has also uncovered the illegal opening of mail directed against SWP members, the government leak was probably not coincidental.

Justice Department lawyers reasoned that since there was "evidence of Presidential knowledge" of the illegal CIA operation, "a continuum of Presidential authority" had rendered the mail openings legal.

Given the difficulties Nixon ran into with the argument that he could set himself above the law and justify illegal actions in the name of "national security," the editors of the *New York Times* felt

obliged to point out that "this notion [of the Justice Department] amounts to the assertion that Presidential knowledge of a crime is sufficient to revoke the operation of the law. . . ."

The American ruling class is caught in a contradiction between its need for secrecy concerning its use of international thuggery, and its need to rebuild the confidence of the American people in capitalist institutions. Up to now, the American imperialists have been unable to solve the crisis of confidence created by the Vietnam War and the Watergate revelations, and indications are that the SWP's suit will continue to unearth more information about the crimes of the U.S. government. □

Black Students Boycott South African Schools

Black high-school students in South Africa, whose protests ignited the massive Black rebellions in June, are continuing their active resistance to the white minority regime's racist rule. Despite the Vorster government's widespread arrests of young Black militants, the students have launched a boycott that has been particularly successful in Soweto, a Black city of more than one million persons near Johannesburg.

On July 26, the fourth day after the reopening of the schools, the 256 schools in Soweto were closed at midday because most of the 250,000 Black students in the city had stayed away. Although large police units were patrolling the area and additional forces were on alert, students also staged demonstrations at some of the schools.

Pretoria claimed that attendance in most other townships was normal, or close to it. But protests were nevertheless reported in at least nine Black townships in widely scattered areas. According to the Johannesburg *Star*, at least thirty schools were

hit by protests in a period of ten days.

These continuing actions are testimony to the growing militancy among young Blacks and to the depth of their hatred for the apartheid regime. International solidarity is needed to defend their struggles from Pretoria's attempts to crush them. □

Corrections

In the speech by Reza Baraheni ("Free Mustafa Dzhemilev and All Other Political Prisoners!") in the August 2 issue of *Intercontinental Press*, the line saying, "We speak two dialects of the same, archaic, Uralic language," should read, "We speak two dialects of the same Altaic-Uralic language. . . ."

Also, in the article by Marilyn Vogt ("New York Meeting Demands Release of Dzhemilev") in the July 12 *Intercontinental Press*, the name Mibeyyan Altan should have been spelled Mibeyyin Altan.

Healy Caught in the Logic of the Big Lie

By Joseph Hansen

The First Twenty-Six Articles

The April 19, 1975, issue of the *Workers Press*¹ carried the first of a series of seven articles signed by the "Political Committee of the Workers Revolutionary Party," the British sect headed by Gerry Healy.² The articles purported to deal with "Security and the Fourth International." I was singled out as the main target.

The series evidently did not satisfy the authors. The seven articles had proved to be duds. This ought to have been no surprise. Who is interested in the opinions of a nameless and faceless committee on such subjects as "Pabloism," Hansen's alleged "revisionism," the categorical imperative of constantly combing your own organization for agents provocateurs, and whether the brutal way in which Tim Wohlforth and Nancy Fields were treated proved Healy to be a Leninist rather than a candidate for psychiatric examination?

A second series, intended to be both quantitatively and qualitatively superior, began in the August 14, 1975, issue of *Workers Press*, ending in the September 9 issue. The series consisted this time of nothing less than nineteen articles bearing the impressive signature of the "International Committee of the Fourth International."³ Healy's American followers republished the nineteen articles as a booklet of 138 pages entitled *Security and the Fourth International—An Inquiry Into the Assassination of Leon Trotsky*.⁴

The central accusation leveled in the series, as formulated in the introduction to

the booklet, was as follows:

"The IC [International Committee] charges Joseph Hansen and the Socialist Workers Party to which he belongs, with criminal negligence in relation to the security implications of the death of Trotsky and the tasks of revolutionary security in relation to the defense of the Fourth International."

In an article "On Healy's 'Investigation'—What the Facts Show," published in the November 24, 1975, issue of *Intercontinental Press*, I answered the key allegations made in the two series of twenty-six articles.

For instance, the "International Committee" asserted in the September 9, 1975, issue of *Workers Press* that Max Shachtman had "raised questions about Sylvia Franklin before ex-Stalinist Louis Budenz made public her GPU role in Cannon's office. But although he pressed the leadership to conduct a security commission, his request was pushed aside. Cannon went on with a GPU bug on his phone and a Stalinist agent as his secretarial aide.

"Was this because Hansen was applying his anti-Trotskyist theory that it is better to have a spy in the organization than to take notice of 'personal suspicions'?"

I *proved* that this was a tissue of lies and slanderous insinuations. In the same issue of *Intercontinental Press* in which my reply appeared, I reprinted an article by James P. Cannon entitled "An Answer to Budenz's Latest Frame-up" that was first published in the August 28, 1950, issue of the *Militant*. In the article, Cannon reports on the inquiry conducted by the Control Commission of the Socialist Workers party in response to a "tip" received in 1947 "purportedly emanating in the first instance from circles close to the FBI."

Among other things, Cannon said:

"The investigation conducted by the Control Commission at that time established that the 'information' given to identify the accused comrade as to her biography, her previous occupation, and her personal life, was false. It was evident to us then that the accusation was based

either on mistaken identity, or was a deliberately planted story designed to create a spy-scare in the organization.

"The Control Commission rejected the accusation and exonerated the accused comrade, who had fully cooperated with the investigation, answered all questions put to her and supplied the Control Commission with all the data relating to her biography and previous occupations, which were subject to verification."

In the same article, Cannon pointed to one of the "established principles of the revolutionary workers' movement"; namely: "A 'spy scare' caused by planted 'disinformation' can do a hundred times more damage than any spies by undermining the confidence of comrades in each other and disrupting the comradely collaboration which is necessary for fruitful work."

Neither Healy, his Political Committee, nor his International Committee has answered this exposure of their lie about Cannon's "silence."

They have compensated for it by shouting all the louder about the "guilt" of Sylvia Caldwell (Franklin), as if what Cannon said about the perjurer Budenz meant nothing. Thus they reveal their hostility toward James P. Cannon, one of their principal targets, and their readiness to accept a slander that first emanated in the FBI and was later spread by Budenz, a former Stalinist who switched to the camp of the American political police.

Again in reply to the gross slander that I had a "familiar relationship" with "an FBI agent who was operating under diplomatic cover at the American Embassy,"⁵ I *proved* that if the charge were true, then it could be lodged with greater justice against Trotsky because of his association with the same official (Robert C. McGregor, an aide to the American consul in Mexico City). Thus the FBI smear, while ostensibly aimed at me, actually struck at Leon Trotsky.

On this, too, Healy and his committees have failed to answer up to now. Their need for more time is understandable. After all, they have had only since last November to think it over.

Three Cases Like the Hotel Bristol

I did more than show that their slanders necessarily involved slandering Trotsky. I *proved* that they had used frame-up

methods. I listed three cases that anyone interested in the truth can easily verify by checking the references:

1. *Workers Press* folded up, the last issue appearing February 14, 1976. It was replaced by a new publication, the *News Line*, the first issue of which was dated May 1, 1976.

2. In an advertisement for a rally in London, published in the first issue of the *News Line*, Michael Banda is listed as the "General Secretary" of the WRP. Healy is listed as only a member of the Central Committee. The meaning of the shift, however, remains obscure.

3. Whether the "International Committee of the Fourth International" and the "Political Committee of the Workers Revolutionary Party" actually consist of two different bodies is dubious. The "International Committee" may consist of only one person—possibly Cliff Slaughter. The writing style of the two committees is identical.

4. Available for \$2.25 from Labor Publications, Inc. 135 West 14 Street, 7th floor, New York, NY 10011.

1. A statement that appeared in the December 7, 1953, issue of *Labor Action*, the newspaper of Shachtman's Independent Socialist League, was doctored up to read: "When it comes to normal polemicizing against opponents there are all sorts of comrades who can undertake this task, but when Cannon wants to sharpen things up, with a real dirty below the belt job, all eyes on the committee turn automatically in the direction of Joe Hansen."

This item, an attempt at character assassination, was a rehash of words written by a bitter enemy of the Socialist Workers party twenty-three years ago. The rehash appeared for the first time in an article by "G. Healy National Secretary of the Socialist Labour League" in the September 10, 1966, issue of the *Newsletter*. Healy said the source of the quotation was "a member" of the "SWP leadership."

The venomous quotation, along with the lie about its source, was repeated in the April 25, 1975, issue of *Workers Press* in an article ironically entitled "Hansen's Campaign of Slander."

2. In the same 1966 article from which the above quotation and lie about its source were taken, Healy put words in Cannon's mouth that Cannon did not and could not have said:

"Eventually," said Cannon, "we cannot avoid discussion so your task Joe is to poison the political atmosphere inside the SWP against the SLL so that when we have to discuss our members will be dead against them."

"By implication he was saying: 'Never mind about principles and truth. We're pragmatists like President John F. Kennedy, so we do what is "best" to preserve ourselves now.'"

Whatever the final judgment of the literary critics may be concerning the merits of this piece of fiction, it does offer an illuminating insight into the mind of the author. Healy projects his own reasoning onto the devil he has created and accuses this fictional character, "Cannon," of doing what he himself did in poisoning the political atmosphere in the SLL against the SWP.

3. In the April 23, 1975, issue of the *Workers Press*, the Political Committee of the Workers Revolutionary party slandered Bala Tampoe as "associated with the Central Intelligence Agency."

To place me in association with Bala Tampoe, and thus—in accordance with witch-hunt logic—in association with the CIA, Healy's committee said that "Hansen wrote, 'Mr Robert McNamara, president of the World Bank, appeared to be very well briefed on the Ceylon situation.' He was indeed—by, among others, one Bala Tampoe, Hansen's man on the island."

I showed that the quotation about McNamara was taken from the February

14, 1972, issue of *Intercontinental Press*. I proved that I did not write it. The original source was the *Ceylon News*, and that paper ascribed it to a "senior western diplomat" in Colombo.

With the exposure of such frame-up practices, the entire structure of lies and slanders collapsed. For the question at once arose, Why did the authors of the twenty-six articles decide that they had to include outright fabrications? The answer was as obvious as the question: because they felt that their concoction was so implausible that it required falsified "proofs" like these to put it across.

They were correct in their calculation—provided they could get away with it. But they lost the gamble. And while they may have thought that it would not make much difference if a few bits like these were exposed as frauds, they failed to foresee what would happen to the credibility of

An Expert Opinion

While I was writing my reply, George Novack, then on a lecture tour that took him to the West Coast, wrote a short piece, stating his opinion of Healy's charges. This was published in the December 8, 1975, issue of *Intercontinental Press* under the title, "Healy's Frame-up Against Joseph Hansen."

"During my political career," Novack said, among other things, "I collaborated not only with Trotsky but with Joseph Hansen and Gerry Healy. I have been a close associate and literary partner of Hansen's since we jointly wrote the introduction to Trotsky's last work, *In Defense of Marxism*, in 1942. From 1951 to early 1953 I worked on a daily basis with Healy in England. I know both men well.

"From this personal experience and direct knowledge I believe I am as qualified as anyone living on either side of the Atlantic to judge the probity of both men and assay the charges Healy has leveled against his former associate. I may cite a further qualification. Since the Scottsboro case in 1931 I have been involved in defending civil liberties and labor's rights in a series of cases here and abroad too numerous to itemize. The best known are the Tom Mooney Case, the Moscow Trials, the Minneapolis Case, the Kutcher Case, and currently the SWP suit against the FBI, CIA, etc. As a result I have learned to smell the frame-up of a militant from miles away and have time and again organized movements to defend the victims on a national and international scale. As an expert on frame-ups of all kinds, I feel well equipped to render a verdict on this one. It stinks to the heavens.

"Apart from the total absence of a shred of evidence Healy can bring forth, to anyone who has known Hansen at the closest range for decades, it is a psychological impossibility that he could be an agent

their "evidence" and argumentation as a whole when it became known that they were using frame-up methods.

For a well-known example of the logic they overlooked, one can point to what happened to the concoctions in Stalin's frame-up trial of Zinoviev-Kamenev in Moscow in August 1936 when a few small details in the "evidence" were shown to be lies. Defendant Holtzman testified that he had met Leon Sedov in 1932 in the lobby of the Hotel Bristol in Copenhagen and had been taken by Sedov to see Trotsky, who gave him "terrorist" instructions.

It was proved that Sedov was not in Copenhagen at the time. It was further proved that the Hotel Bristol, along with its lobby, went out of business in 1917. Small details—but Stalin was never able to overcome the exposure of the fabrications included by the GPU in the script written for Holtzman.

of the Soviet secret police or the FBI. On the other hand, I know that Healy is quite capable of spreading false reports about his opponents for the sake of factional advantage, especially against those who tread upon his ego.

"In my judgment Healy is in this case a shameless liar, an unmitigated rascal, and a political hooligan. I state this, less to exculpate Hansen and Cannon, who do not need my defense, than to characterize Healy for what he has shown himself to be. In all my experience I have rarely seen so odious and flimsy a frame-up as this spicy dish he has concocted.

"His stupid calumnies against Hansen and Cannon are as detestable and unfounded as Stalin's accusations against Trotsky and Sedov in the Moscow Trials. Why does he refrain from including Dobbs and Novack, who were equally involved in and responsible for planning Trotsky's security—or are we being reserved for a second round?"

Novack's statement was a staggering blow to Healy's frame-up. In the world Trotskyist movement, no one has had as much experience as Novack in exposing frame-ups and defending victims of them. He was a key figure in the efforts that were finally successful in finding asylum for Trotsky in Mexico, and he played a central role in organizing the International Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, which was headed by John Dewey.

In the American radical movement as a whole, Novack is a well-known authority on civil liberties and defense of victims of the class struggle, whose advice and participation are sought in all kinds of cases in the struggle on this front.

Novack's considered statement on the Healyite concoction was thus certain to carry great weight in circles reaching far

5. See *Workers Press*, September 6, 1975, or *Security and the Fourth International*, pp. 93-95.

beyond the Trotskyist movement. Still worse from Healy's narrow factional viewpoint, knowledge of Novack's judgment could spread among the ranks of the WRP and the ranks of sister groups in other countries. The consequences could

include fresh questioning and even criticisms. These would have to be met with expulsions that might prove to be even more damaging than those that have affected the Healyite movement in the past couple of years.

Healy's Second Round

Several alternatives were open to Healy's two committees. They could have held a joint session—even if it meant simply counting the same persons twice—to discuss what to do now that the frame-up practices, for which they were responsible as leaders, had been exposed. If their main concern was the interests of the world Trotskyist movement, which they profess to uphold, here are some possible lines of action they could have considered:

1. They might investigate the ghost-writer, if one had been employed to put the material together in readable form, and try to ascertain what his or her anti-Trotskyist associations or connections might be. An honest public report of the findings could help redress the damage done by the falsifications.

2. In case members of the two top committees were the authors, these members might be investigated to determine who cooked up the fabrications and why. Again, an honest public report of the findings would open an honorable way out.

How Making Novack an 'Accomplice' Further Exposed the Frame-up

The first of a new series of seven articles by Healy's literary team, the "International Committee of the Fourth International," appeared in the January 5, 1976, issue of *Workers Press*.⁶ The members of the committee evidently wanted to demonstrate that they had spent the Christmas holidays in productive labor, for they dated the article "January 1, 1976." By way of season's greetings, they entitled the first of the new series "ACCOMPLICES OF THE GPU."

The title referred to a pair caught by the Healyite network of investigators:

"After painstaking research in Europe and America, the International Committee presents an irrefutable indictment of both men and calls for a public inquiry along

3. If all of the members of the two committees had participated in forging the material, at least a part of them—possibly a majority—might agree that a frightful mistake had been committed. A public self-criticism (with due space allotted for minority views on the question) would go far in making amends.

These alternatives were rejected, if they were ever considered. Healy and his lieutenants are not concerned about the interests of the world Trotskyist movement. Their own narrow interests, as they conceive them, come first. In place of seeking a way out that would have helped to rehabilitate the reputation of the WRP in left circles, they decided on a "second round"—as Novack had anticipated.

This course was the same in its logic as the one that engulfed Stalin when he tried to overcome the effect of the exposure of his frame-up in the first big Moscow trial by escalating the lies and staging more monstrous frame-ups.

the lines of the Dewey Commission of 1937 with a tribunal including worldwide representatives of the Trotskyist movement."

The two "accomplices of the GPU" were unveiled as "Joseph Hansen" and "George Novack."

The opening paragraph of the irrefutable indictment reads: "We accuse Joseph Hansen and leaders of the Socialist Workers Party (USA) of deliberately covering up GPU murder and penetration of the Trotskyist movement for the purposes of spying and disruption."

Thus, in the pattern followed by Stalin in the Moscow trials, Healy sought to cover up the exposure of his frame-up practices by doubling his previous lies and extending them to cover the entire leadership of the Socialist Workers party. The geometrical progression of the big lie was under way.

It is obvious why the frame-up artists decided to elevate George Novack to the position of "accomplice of the GPU." As an expert witness, he was guilty of publicly testifying that the facts showed Healy had concocted a frame-up against Hansen. In accordance with the technique of the big lie, the best way to dispose of that authoritative testimony was to

scream in all keys that Novack, too, was an "accomplice of the GPU."

Consequently from January 1, 1976, up to the present time, the Healyites have campaigned in their press, in leaflets, in posters, and in rallies that Novack—like Hansen—has served for "35 years" as an "accomplice of the GPU," his function being to remain "silent" about activities of the GPU in the Trotskyist movement and to block investigation of them.

With two exceptions, the Healyite sleuths cite no new "evidence." They simply add Novack's name to some of the items they had previously charged against me (allegedly preventing a "full-scale inquiry into the security at Coyoacan," defending Cannon's secretary Sylvia Caldwell against her slanderers, defending Trotsky's martyred guard Robert Sheldon Harte), all of which I answered in my article "On Healy's 'Investigation'—What the Facts Show."

The two new "crimes" chalked up against Novack were as follows:

1. In his statement condemning Healy's frame-up, Novack mentioned participating in work to save the lives of socialists in Western Europe from the Nazi butchers. The efforts were quite successful. Nonetheless, one of the refugees who received aid, Novack said, was a GPU agent, a fact the committee had no way of knowing at the time. The agent, Zborowski, was later exposed. He was deeply implicated in the assassination of Klement, Sedov, Trotsky, and perhaps others.

Pointing dramatically at Novack, Healy's committee screamed in chorus:

"We accuse George Novack and Mrs David Dallin (Lola Estrine) of admitting the GPU spy MARK ZBOROWSKI into the United States and re-integrating him into the top levels of the Fourth International although he was gravely suspect, and then suppressing this fact for 35 years."

Admitting Zborowski into the United States? Isn't that charge rather wild? Neither the State Department nor Immigration placed Novack in charge of admitting aliens to the United States. That can easily be proved.

As for "re-integrating" Zborowski "into the top levels of the Fourth International," that bit of garbage has been disposed of by Sam Gordon in his article "Healy's Smear Against Trotsky's Last Collaborators."⁷

2. Novack's second "crime" was discovered through "painstaking research." The committee went through the public statement made by Novack condemning Healy's frame-up. A promising paragraph was spotted. It was placed under a microscope and scrutinized in the most detailed way. The paragraph, consisting of only three sentences, was as follows:

"Healy likewise does not see that

6. An eighth article, "Open Letter to the SWP," was signed by Harold Robins, bringing the total to thirty-four in the three series. The Healyite press has published additional articles repeating the themes of the three series, plus a parallel series denouncing Alan Thornett of the Workers Socialist League in Britain as a "renegade," and still another series denouncing Tim Wohlforth and Nancy Fields in similar terms because they joined the Socialist Workers party in the United States.

7. See *Intercontinental Press*, May 24, 1976, p. 854.

Hansen and the others are only secondary figures in the drama. The principal actors were Trotsky and Sedov themselves who trusted Etienne and allowed Jacson entry into the household. *By aiming at the American Trotskyists Healy strikes at the victims themselves.*"

I added the emphasis to the last sentence because that is the sentence to be watched. Even as you watch, the sentence will suddenly vanish.

The meaning of the paragraph is clear enough: Healy accuses the secondary characters of being inexcusably lax in their security measures. But the main actors themselves trusted Zborowski and allowed Jacson entry into the household. Therefore, Novack contends, if Healy were consistent, he would have to say that Trotsky and Sedov were themselves inexcusably lax in their own security measures. By aiming at the secondary figures, Healy strikes at Trotsky and Sedov.

A bonanza for Healy! The meaning of Novack's paragraph can be converted into its opposite by the simple operation of slicing off the last sentence and amalgamating the remaining two sentences with a "theory" used by the GPU in 1940. The committee came up with the following "irrefutable indictment":

George Novack accuses Leon Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov of responsibility for their own deaths.

Novack writes: 'Healy likewise does not see that Hansen and the others are only secondary figures in the drama. *The principal actors were Trotsky and Sedov themselves who trusted Etienne (Zborowski) and allowed Jacson (Ramon Mercader) entry into the household.*' (Intercontinental Press', December 8, 1975.) [Emphasis added by Healy's committee.]

This is the most monstrous lie of all—a lie which Novack has taken directly from the GPU.

What miracles can be accomplished with a razor blade and Scotch tape! The paragraph from Novack's statement, its last sentence neatly amputated, is fitted into the "theory of self-assault" advanced by the Mexican Stalinists after the May 24, 1940, machine-gun assault on the Trotsky home in Coyoacán. The "self-assault" theme was a propagandistic ploy of the GPU. In the weeks before the police uncovered the identity of most of the assailants, who were headed by the painter David Alfaro Siqueiros, the Stalinist press in Mexico insinuated that Trotsky himself had staged the raid, machine-gunned his own bedroom, and whisked his guard Robert Sheldon Harte into hiding or out of the country.

When the body of Harte was discovered in a shallow, lime-filled grave, the Stalinists at once dropped the "self-assault" campaign. It remained to Healy to claim that Novack revived it thirty-five years later, taking it "directly from the GPU."

The Healyite team continues:

Trotsky defended himself indefatigably



LEON SEDOV

against this Stalinist lie which was fabricated by the GPU after the unsuccessful assassination attempt of May 24, 1940. The purpose of the GPU's 'theory of self-assault' was to cover the tracks of its agents.

'The GPU mobilised with great skill its agents in order to kill me. The attempt failed owing to an accident. The friends of the GPU are compromised. They are now compelled to do everything in their power in order to fix upon me the responsibility for the unsuccessful attempt of their chieftain. In accomplishing this they have not a wide choice of means. They are compelled to operate with the crudest of methods, and to guide themselves by Hitler's aphorism: the bigger the lie the more readily it will be believed.'

The words are those of Trotsky, written in 1940. But 35 years later, Novack revives the old GPU slander to shift attention away from its crimes. This makes Novack the co-conspirator of Hansen.

Novack can now truthfully say that he has seen everything. After devoting a lifetime to fighting frame-ups, he himself has become a victim of a frame-up, and one that is about as crude as they come.

Let us consider the Healyite script more closely. It goes as follows:

One year after Trotsky's death and four years after his achievement in organizing the Dewey Commission that found Trotsky and Sedov innocent of the charges leveled against them in the Moscow trials, George Novack went over to the side of Stalinism, and not only Stalinism but the GPU itself. Novack decided, according to the "irrefutable indictment," to devote himself to "deliberately covering up GPU murder" and other crimes of Stalin's political police.

Novack's first act in the new role cast for him by the Healyites was to "admit" GPU agent Zborowski into the United States. His second act was to "reintegrate" Zbo-

rowski into the "top levels of the Fourth International."

In the subsequent thirty-five years, Novack perfidiously defended GPU agents in the SWP whenever they were exposed. In addition he was always right there to block any investigation of these agents.

As his latest monstrous act, Novack revived the GPU lie that Trotsky—in a conspiracy with Robert Sheldon Harte—machine-gunned his own bedroom on May 24, 1940. This constitutes the final damning piece of evidence that "makes Novack the co-conspirator of Hansen." (The word "makes" was well chosen by the committee.)

Thus, to believe Healy's committee, Novack has led a double life since 1941, when he allegedly "admitted" Zborowski to the United States.

So far as Novack's public activities are concerned, he has spent full time—and a little extra—as a socialist editor, lecturer, and teacher, writing books, pamphlets, and innumerable articles in which not a single phrase can be found even remotely favoring Stalinism. In fact, in all his published works, Novack has assiduously defended, advocated, and sought in every way possible to advance Trotskyism, from the level of dialectical materialism right down to daily practice in the class struggle.

All this was a "masquerade," as the members of Healy's committee put it.⁸ "Fully conscious of the extremely grave charge we are presenting," they say, "painstaking research in Europe and America" has uncovered evidence proving that since 1941 Novack has actually alternated between being a good Dr. Jekyll and an evil Mr. Hyde. Whenever the moon is high and werewolves are on the prowl, Novack is to be found running with the hellish host, doing his bit as an "accomplice of the GPU."

What motivated Novack? Why did he strive secretly to tear down what he was publicly building up? Healy's committee says not a word about this crucial question. Here the Healyites fall below the level of the organizers of the Moscow trials, who understood that their victims had to have "reasons" for the criminal acts they were forced to confess to before being shot, such as wanting to be on the payroll of the Mikado or hoping for rewards from Hitler if they helped smash the planned economy and restore capitalism in the Soviet Union.

Was it Moscow gold that caused Novack to follow the path charted for him by Healy's committee? It is not visible in his standard of living or in the income tax forms he has filed.

If not Moscow gold, was it the Stalinist

8. "Both [Hansen and Novack] have conducted a 35-year masquerade as 'Trotskyists' living off the legend of their association with the exiled Trotsky in the 1930s until his assassination in Mexico on August 20, 1940." *Workers Press*, January 5, 1976.

politics of betrayal of the world revolution that won Novack over? Or the Stalinist theory of building socialism in one country? Did Novack succumb to the powerful personality of Stalin, say in a secret meeting in the lobby of the Hotel Bristol in Copenhagen?

No doubt we will receive answers to these questions in a "third round" soon to be prepared by the Healyite imitators of Stalin's methods.

Meanwhile, let us note what the inclusion of George Novack's name in the

Why Is Healy Silent About His Connections With Zborowski?

In a letter to me dated March 14, 1960, Healy revealed that he had met "Etienne" in the 1946 period.

"First of all," Healy wrote, "Etienne was in Europe after the war and attended the second congress. I personally met him on a number of occasions and in fact he stayed overnight at my place once. If Etienne was an agent of Stalin, then a whole number of things follow from this, the chief of which would be who replaced him in the ranks of the 4th International."

In another letter dated March 28, 1960, Healy added:

"The important story is that this Etienne arrived with a large sum of money in his possession in Paris. We were given to understand that the man had been all the time in a concentration camp or living in illegality and, in fact, when he was in Britain we bought him a pair of shoes because he said he hadn't had a decent pair since before the war. I give you this item in order to show the skilful type of agent which he was."

Let us note, first of all, that in 1946 Healy did not suspect that this "Etienne" was in reality a GPU agent. In 1960, however, Healy thought the "Etienne" he met was Zborowski. This leads to a puzzle. If Healy did not so much as suspect Zborowski in 1946, how can he assert that in 1941—five years earlier—that Zborowski was "gravely suspect"? Yet this is the basis on which Healy today condemns Novack!

According to Healy's "irrefutable indictment," Zborowski, despite being "gravely suspect" in 1941, was "admitted" by Novack into the United States and "reintegrated" by him into the top levels of the Fourth International. Healy's committee avers, consequently, that Novack led a double life for thirty-five years.

There are various possible solutions to the puzzle:

1. Healy's committee lied about Zborowski being "gravely suspect" in 1941. That would help explain why Healy did not suspect him in 1946.

But it would also prove that Healy's committee framed up Novack.

2. Healy's committee told the truth about Zborowski being "gravely suspect"

"second round" has done to the frame-up as a whole. The charges leveled by Healy's two committees against me and the rest of the leadership of the SWP are just as flimsy and just as self-contradictory as the charges leveled against Novack. In fact, they are the *same charges* in substance. Since the frame-up against Novack topples of its own weight, the frame-up of all the other intended victims goes down with it.

A house of cards falls, no matter how high it has been built, if only one card gives way.

in 1941. That would help in framing up Novack.

But it would also prove that Healy lied in 1960 when he said he did not suspect Zborowski in 1946. *Healy then becomes "gravely suspect."*

3. Another possibility is that Healy is mistaken as to the identity of the "Etienne" he met, invited home, and favored with a new pair of shoes. This would strengthen the testimony of Sam Gordon, who has stated that he never met Zborowski, but did know another "Etienne," who was not Zborowski and not a GPU agent.

But Healy claims Gordon is lying on this point. In the June 15, 1976, issue of the *News Line*, Healy's masked members of the "International Committee" say that Gordon's article is "clouded with evasions, double talk and downright lies." Among the "downright lies," they list Gordon's statement "that he had never met Zborowski (Etienne), the GPU mastermind behind the murder of Leon Sedov, Rudolf Klement, Erwin Wolf and Ignace Reiss."

These assertions, of course, do not affect the truthfulness of Sam Gordon's testimony. They only give greater weight to Healy's admission that the person *he* was dealing with was Zborowski. And Healy himself leaves us no choice but to accept the implications.

His letters of 1960 then *prove* that not only was he in close association with GPU agent Zborowski, he remained silent about

it all these years. He continued to maintain silence even while purporting to be engaged in "painstaking research" to uncover GPU agents and their accomplices in the Fourth International.

Healy acted precisely as if he were trying to cover up his relations with Zborowski.

If the members of Healy's two committees were consistent, they ought to give their chief an intensive grilling on his highly suspicious relationship with Zborowski. Here are some suggestions:

Where did Healy customarily meet with Zborowski? In Paris cafes? In London pubs? Who said what?

What information did Healy pass on to this GPU agent? How many Trotskyists lost their lives because of what he told this spy?

How long did Healy keep on seeing Zborowski? One year? Two years? Five years? When did he stop seeing him?

Healy admits he invited Zborowski to stay overnight. Did they sleep in the same bed? Or did one of them sleep on the floor? Which one?

Healy admits he bought Zborowski a pair of shoes. What kind of shoes? And only shoes? No lunch?

Why did Healy lead a double life for thirty years? What hold does Zborowski have on Healy?

Isn't it the moral duty of Healy's two committees to issue an "irrefutable indictment of Healy's guilt"? Isn't it imperative to brand Healy as one of Hansen's many "co-conspirators"?

Of course, Healy's top lieutenants will consider none of these embarrassing questions. They will issue an authoritative statement, bearing the customary rubber-stamp signature of the "International Committee." The statement will say that Healy's letters constitute one more damning proof that Hansen is an "accomplice of the GPU."

First, because Hansen maintained a deafening silence about the letters for sixteen years. Second, because Hansen had a mysterious hold on Healy, through which he contrived during the same sixteen years to prevent the author of the letters from making them public.

The Contribution of 'Captain' Harold Robins

One of the key contentions made by Healy's "International Committee" is that the security at Coyoacán was "criminally lax," that I was responsible for that laxness, and thus acted as an "accomplice of the GPU."

The main evidence offered by the committee is the word of Harold Robins whom they list as "captain of the guard at Trotsky's household-in-exile at Coyoacán in Mexico, in 1939-1940."

Robins does not appear to have bestowed the title of "captain" on himself, but he does say that he was the "last chief guard,

selected by Comrade Trotsky after the May 24, 1940, assassination attempt on his life had failed. . . ."

Why Robins says that he was "selected" by Trotsky, I do not know. The guards themselves elected one of their ranks to act as head guard, generally for periods of three months. Thus Robins's position as "chief guard" would have ended about the time Trotsky was murdered.

The post was equivalent to that of an organizer of a party cell or branch. It was seldom that anyone sought to be head guard, since it involved additional



Joseph Hansen

Inside the patio. Jake Cooper, one of Trotsky's guards, is talking with Milt Lesnik, *right*, a visitor. In the lean-to standing to the left, a

signal board connected to fine wires strung along the walls made it possible to immediately locate an attempted break-in.

drudgery and routine details such as keeping track of the expenses of the guard. Besides reminding guards of assignments democratically decided on at meetings, it also meant assuming full responsibility in relation to Trotsky for anything that occurred. For instance, if Trotsky saw a fault, he went to the head guard, and that head guard was held responsible. There was no passing the buck or making excuses, even though another guard might have been directly responsible for the error.

Such items, of course, are of no interest to Healy's committee. They are looking for mud. Thus in an interview published as "Part Five"⁹ in the series begun January 1, 1976, they report "Captain" Robins as saying:

"Now this may be that this so-called security set-up was a matter of perhaps congenital stupidity on the part of the comrade who set it up, and of the Political Committee who delegated it to Comrade Hansen; because he was their representative in charge of the guard, that this was all a case of stupidity and incompetence. In that case, a correction is in order.

"The other question that arises is: if one wants to see Comrade Trotsky protected, this is not the way to do it. *This is the way to get the guard knocked off and Comrade Trotsky murdered.* This is the appearance of the thing; the word but not the deed. This is, in other words, a set up: either through stupidity or through *planning.*" (Emphasis added.)

If "Captain" Robins actually said this, he was obviously faithfully following the logic of the big lie, but he was a jump ahead of Healy's committee. The charge

that I helped *plan* a "set up" to "get the guard knocked off and Comrade Trotsky murdered" fits into the coming "third round" of the frame-up, not the "second round."

To back his assertions, "Captain" Robins cites some details of his experience. Most of these are one-sided impressions, quite biased judgments, half-truths, and mistruths. Since they are typical of the material throughout the articles produced by Healy's two committees, it may be useful to take up at least the worst ones to show what a task it would be to answer all the allegations in the frame-up.

1. "Now let me talk about the security arrangements. And when I say *security*, let's put this in quotations. This was instituted by Hansen, and the comrades accepted it because he was the representative of the Political Committee."

Robins gives me too much credit. When I

9. *Workers Press*, January 9, 1976.

accepted the invitation to join the Trotsky household in 1937, I was not a member of the Political Committee. And I was not sent by the Political Committee to institute a security system, as he avers. I simply replaced Bernard Wolfe as a secretary to Trotsky. The head guard was Henry Stone, a capable comrade.

The security regulations were the same as those that had been followed in the household in Turkey, France, and Norway. Trotsky's secretary Jan Frankel introduced me to them and gave me some good advice on how to function most effectively in the household.

The danger that Trotsky might be assassinated by the GPU continued to rise. It was clear that among other measures, the guard in the household had to be strengthened. The Socialist Workers party responded to the need in its customary way. Despite its poverty, the SWP managed to get together enough funds to help improve the immediate situation. For instance, the SWP bought a new Dodge sedan for Trotsky, which I drove to Mexico.

The main contribution of the SWP was to make available an additional number of guards to stay in the household on a full-time basis. The strongest contingent came from the Twin Cities. They were experienced union battlers, capable drivers, and familiar with small arms, like most workers in that region at the time.

The guns carried by members of the guard were an odd assortment of makes and calibers brought from Europe. I recommended that they be replaced, and that we select a firearm not easily jammed, powerful enough to be deadly at short range, but not so powerful as to be difficult to handle; and that we settle on one caliber, enabling us to standardize on ammunition. This recommendation was accepted and we were able to buy enough .38 caliber Colt pistols to adequately arm the household.

2. "The guard would sit in a covered house which had no windows . . . and he'd sit there under a reading lamp and he'd read all night long. This was guard duty."

We did not have this problem during the first period when the Trotskys lived in Frida Kahlo's house on Avenida Londres. After the break with Diego Rivera (the husband of Frida Kahlo), a place was found on Avenida Viena.

In the new location a good deal of work had to be done such as heightening the walls and sealing off the windows that opened on the street.

Among the improvements sought by the guards was a lean-to that would give them a clear view of both sides of the patio, which they could step into during the rainy season. (The rain can be chilly at night in Mexico City.)

Jean van Heijenoort duplicated and improved an alarm system first used at the Avenida Londres address. If a break occurred in fine wires strung along the

walls, a red light would flash on in the lean-to, indicating the precise section affected. The system was ingenious, but it did not work well because of the number of false alarms caused by things that fly at night—large moths, beetles, and so on. A tendency developed to let it fall into disuse.

Worst of all, some of the guards—not all—began to read in the lean-to, presumably keeping an eye on the indicator board, but actually absorbed in a book or document. When I discovered this upon returning to Coyoacán after a stay in New York, I took up the question with the guards. A sharp dispute flared. One of the European comrades, who thought reading did not lessen his alertness or increase his vulnerability to being shot by a sniper, considered my intervention to be impermissible, a typical example of the brutality habitually displayed by Americans.

Robins is right in pointing to the danger of a guard reading while on duty. He lies in implying that I instituted this violation of security and did not oppose it.

3. On the question of the guards' skill in handling guns, "Captain" Robins is quoted as saying:

"That's what Hansen writes in his document and in the introduction to the autobiography of Trotsky. Of course, when he faced the fact that Robins had never fired a gun in his life when he went down there, well, 'Robins was a special kind of case'.¹⁰

"Now was he? Let me name some names. There were comrades from Czechoslovakia, from Germany, some of whom had fired guns, some of whom hadn't. We had Comrade Munis who was a member of the International, representing the Spanish section. When I asked him to take a practice test with a revolver at ten yards, he couldn't hit a target. Comrade John, a Czechoslovak comrade whose name isn't mentioned at all, never tried his gun out."

If there had been a rule that only experts in the use of arms would be accepted for Trotsky's guard, it is absolutely certain Robins would never have been selected. Yet, to hear him tell it, the choice was not bad at all—he turned out to be the only competent guard in the household. The truth is that Robins was chosen because we needed a *driver*, one with good enough reflexes to learn—without a serious accident—how to get an automobile down the Mexican roads of those days. It was expected that Robins would eventually

10. I did not say "Robins was a special kind of case." What I said was the following: "Marksmanship was not the sole criterion by which guards were selected. Expert drivers were just as badly needed. Robins had had experience as a New York taxi driver. Also Robins had proved his capacity as a union battler, even having served a term in prison for union activities." See my article "On Healy's 'Investigation'—What the Facts Show," *Intercontinental Press*, November 24, 1975, p. 1645.

prove capable of mastering the trick of holding a gun on target while squeezing the trigger. At close range, as in the patio, that would be sufficient.

Robins does not provide sufficient information for one to judge the marksmanship test to which he submitted Grandizo Munis. Was the target an American dime or an object the size of a GPU agent?

In any case, Munis was not a full-time member of the guard. Like the Mexican comrades, most of whom were excellent guards, he was among those who volunteered for occasional duty. Whatever "Captain" Robins's opinion was of these comrades, Trotsky was deeply appreciative of what they did to help defend him and Natalia Sedoff.

The Czechoslovak comrade mentioned by "Captain" Robins was added to the guard on the recommendation of Trotsky. He was a refugee from the Nazis, and Trotsky felt deep sympathy for him. I met him the first time upon returning from a stay in New York. It was clear to me that it would be a mistake to depend on him as an effective guard. I took up the problem with Trotsky. It was only with the greatest reluctance that Trotsky agreed to let him go—Trotsky understood the comrade and his demoralization as an exile. We managed to find a place for him to stay in Mexico City. He came out to Coyoacán rather regularly to talk with Trotsky and to borrow books from him, which he did not return promptly.

"Captain" Robins tries to score a point by saying that I did not mention this case. On the other hand, concentrating on his assignment of grinding an ax for Healy, Robins forgets Hank Schnautz, another comrade—really a sympathizer of the SWP—who came down to Mexico on his own in hope of seeing Trotsky. L.D. was attracted to this comrade, and asked me if it wouldn't be possible to include him in the guard. Unlike the other guards, Trotsky pointed out, Schnautz had a *farm* background. I recognized that Trotsky really wanted to get acquainted with a live American fresh off the farm.

Although a pacifist by conviction, Schnautz happened to be a gun enthusiast. He was a dead shot with a rifle, his preferred firearm. After some troubled thinking, he agreed that if we were attacked, he would not hold the lives of the assailants as something sacred. He would shoot to kill. So we included him among the full-time guards. Besides his handiness with guns, he was a hard worker, who knew a good deal about construction. Schnautz fitted into the household very well.

4. Healy's "International Committee" avers:

"There is still another facet of the events of the Siqueiros raid raised by Robins which calls for further investigation: the jamming of the guards' guns on the evening of May 24 during the raid. Robins

raised this occurrence when he described his reaction to the raid:

'Standing behind a eucalyptus tree that was three foot thick or two and a half foot thick, with a machine gun in his hand, was this guard (actually, a member of Siqueiros' raiding party in disguise). And he turns around and starts shooting at my door way. Naturally I had to go back in.

'I picked up a sub-machine gun which was in my room. It was a Thompson .45 calibre and we didn't know lead bullets would jam the gun. When we had fired the shells we refilled them with lead bullets and a powder charge. And Hansen knew it. And the others who all handled guns according to Hansen—who knew how to handle guns—didn't know you needed a steel-jacketed bullet in an automatic weapon.

'Otherwise, the lead on impact will flatten out and the gun will jam. So I had a machine-gun that didn't work. Charlie had a rifle, so again we had a gun handled by men who knew guns and who were used to handling them for a good part of their lives and who only required a small amount of practice—according to Hansen.

'But none of us knew enough about guns to know that you couldn't in an automatic weapon use lead-tipped bullets. Now there's a question of security here, isn't there?'

The question arises: When Robins saw the member of Siqueiros's raiding party behind the eucalyptus tree, why didn't he fire at him with his .38 caliber Colt pistol? The target was only a few yards away. It would have been hard to miss. The answer is that Robins thought the man belonged to the police detail. Robins called out, "Bob, Bob." The bogus policeman responded by firing at Robins.

Why didn't Robins then drop to the floor, take a dead rest, and put the gunman out of commission? Did he suddenly lose confidence in the one firearm he had learned to use? There's a clue for Healy's sleuths.

As for the "sub-machine gun" Robins reached for, I have already told how the question of standardizing our equipment had been decided several years earlier. The submachine gun had been fired successfully on outings, and it looked imposing.

After checking it out, my opinion was that it ought to be junked. The barrel was badly pitted. To try to replace it and perhaps secure a couple more would be a mistake in my opinion. Besides the prohibitive cost of practice ammunition, skill in the use of such equipment would tend to narrow down to a couple of persons. It was much easier, in the circumstances we faced, to widen familiarity with the use of guns if we settled on pistols. Besides which, it was easier to carry them.

A couple of the guards argued against junking any of the guns already accumulated. They were certain in particular that the submachine gun could be kept operating smoothly enough so that it would not jam. Moreover, occasionally displaying it would help keep up the image of the place as being well armed. A compromise was eventually reached. In return for relying on pistols, the guards interested in the



SIQUEIROS. Headed the May 24, 1940, assault on Trotsky's home.

submachine gun could keep it.

As it turned out, the compromise was a mistake. The dubious piece of equipment ended up in the hands of Robins, who decided, when the test came, to substitute it for the gun he had learned how to handle.

5. Healy's "International Committee" includes the following paragraph in the presentation of the interview with "Captain" Robins:

"Another guard was a comrade from

How Robins Met the Test

In judging how well Robins himself met the test of the May 24 assault, the details reported by Salazar¹¹ should be noted. Here is the section:

"I [Salazar] could wait no longer. I had Charles Cornell and Otto Schuessler arrested and brought to the *Pocito*. The former did no more than give a few precise details in his declaration. He was asleep when the attack took place. He was awakened by the noise of a machine-gun, and thought it was his comrades who were repelling an attack. At that moment he heard someone cry out in English:

"Don't move, and nothing will happen to you!"

"He looked for his revolver, but could not find it. He then remembered that he had lent it the previous night to Harold Robins: guns were often lent to one

11. General Sanchez Salazar, *Murder in Mexico* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1950), pp. 20-21.

Philadelphia who was known, according to Robins, for his lack of physical courage. Also, another aspect of his behaviour while in Mexico gave rise to the story among the guards, recalls Robins, that *'the day this comrade went back to the United States, they shut down the Quarta Mesine whorehouse district.'*

I do not know to what test Robins submitted the comrade from Philadelphia in order to ascertain his level of physical courage. Perhaps the comrade refused to step into the alley to settle a point of difference with Robins.

As for the sex life of the guards, this was their private concern. Even when the Mexican bourgeois press sought to step up circulation with headlines about Robert Sheldon Harte in this respect, Trotsky said nothing publicly. In a meeting with leading comrades from the Socialist Workers party, including James P. Cannon and Farrell Dobbs, who came to see him in June 1940, Trotsky indicated embarrassment over the scandal-mongering in the press, yet he made no big point of it. He began by saying: "I have never asked that the guards and secretaries live like monks—just the same. . . ."

That Healy's "International Committee" would ape the bourgeois press in searching for scurrilous material reveals more about the regime in the Workers Revolutionary party today than it does about security in Coyoacán thirty-six years ago.

The rule appears to be that in the interest of proper security, members of the WRP must keep the Political Committee duly informed on their sex lives and prove to the same authorities that their physical courage remains up to the level set by the leading plug-ugly.

another by the guards. He then went towards the door of his room. As soon as Harold saw him, he cried out:

"Put your head down, Charles! Don't let them see you!"

"In spite of this command, he looked in the direction of the guard post and saw three individuals, two dressed in dark suits and the other in a light one. He ran to look for his rifle, with the intention of going out into the courtyard. As he was wearing light-coloured pyjamas, he quickly donned a dark coat so as not to present too easy a target to the enemy. Just as he was going out, Harold cried out to him again:

"Don't show yourself, Charles! Keep your head down!"

"Without any doubt, this new order saved his life. Harold could see who was firing the machine-gun. He [Cornell] stayed at the door of the room, with his rifle ready to fire. He did not think that the attackers were in control of the whole house. At that moment he saw someone

whom he did not know running in the yard. He fired at him with his rifle, but missed him. He saw Otto going down from his own room to Trotsky's, and heard Harold cry out to him:

"Careful, Otto! You are in danger!"

"After the firing, they all joined Harold in one of the rooms used by the duty guards.

"Can I go and have a look at the old man's room?" he asked.

"Wait until we've put out the light," replied Harold.

"Having done so, they ran to the door leading into Trotsky's study. It was locked. He then went towards the yard. Neither before nor after the firing had he heard the sound of cars running. It was only afterwards that they noticed their disappearance, and also that of Sheldon."

Facts like these do not say much for Robins's capacities as a captain. His concern for his own safety and that of the other guards was high. But what about the safety of Trotsky and Sedoff? Why no counterattack? Why did Robins shout no instructions to the other guards until they showed up of their own volition at their doors? Why did his only instruction consist of passing on the order of the assailant, "Don't move, and nothing will happen to you!"

Why did Robins fail to see the three individuals that Cornell saw? How did it happen that Cornell was the first to fire, although he had to search for a rifle, his pistol having been "borrowed" by Robins, who forgot to use it?

After the firing by the assailants, why did Robins have the guards stop for a meeting in one of their rooms?

Why was it Cornell and not Robins who first pressed to see if the Trotskys had survived? Why did Robins refuse to move until the lights were turned off, giving the assailants still further cover?

Healy's experts in security matters have no difficulty in turning this sad exhibition into its opposite. In the April 19, 1975, issue of *Workers Press*, the Political Committee of the WRP states the following:

"[Hansen] was one of the guards in Trotsky's headquarters-in-exile in Coyoacan, Mexico, when the GPU agent Mercader struck his fatal blow with an ice pick. Hansen goes down in history, in the words of one of the guards, Harold Robins, as 'the man who couldn't find his gun,' although he had the reputation of being a 'crack shot.'"

I have heard this story about the guards before, but not in relation to me specifically, or in relation to the assassin Mercader (with whom I will deal further on). I heard it, in fact, shortly after the May 24 assault—it may have first appeared in a Stalinist-influenced journal.

Healy's committees know very well that *I was in New York—not Coyoacán—at the time of the May 24 assault.*

To shift the slander to August 20, the day Mercader drove his ax into Trotsky's brain, and to credit Harold Robins as its source is a new wrinkle. It shows the ingenuity of Healy's operators in working out the details of their frame-up.

In his "Open Letter to the SWP,"¹² Robins is more restrained. He makes several points of interest, two of which are worth noting:

1. He does not appear to agree that Healy has proved Robert Sheldon Harte to have been a traitor. He says on this:

The matter of loyalty of Comrade Sheldon Harte has been raised and discussed in this dispute. An inquiry may possibly bring about much greater clarity than exists now on this score. The various pieces of evidence indicate a serious conflict that is unavoidable in arriving at a decision.

Comrade Trotsky raised the matter of his surprising Sheldon Harte in Trotsky's bedroom—uninvited—and absolutely none of us ever would think of doing that. Nevertheless, although I may turn out to be wrong, I am of the opinion that it was Sheldon Harte who fired his revolver after he was captured—and this awakened me. My calls of 'Bob, Bob' brought about the situation where the bogus policeman standing by the big eucalyptus tree near the guards' rooms then turned back to face in my direction firing his sub-machine gun at my doorway and at me in it. This chatter of the sub-machine gun awakened Trotsky and Natalia, saving their lives during the May 24, 1940, assassination attempt. Accident often determines things.

2. Robins mentions that he disagreed quite strongly with Trotsky on a number of issues:

In the instance described above [Trotsky embracing Colonel Salazar, the chief of the

Plain Harold Robins Tells It Like It Was

Among our difficulties was Trotsky's dislike of having a guard present in his study when he talked with a visitor whom we had come to trust. Of course, in the case of reporters, tourists of various kinds, prominent persons from afar who wanted to talk with Trotsky as the basis for a possible article, Trotsky made sure to have a guard or secretary present. One reason for this was to have a witness to the conversation in case Trotsky was badly misquoted. But Trotsky balked at making this a rule applying to all who were invited into his study.

Trotsky also opposed searching everyone who came to visit him. To him, this was intolerable.

Moreover, Trotsky was insistent on our maintaining confidence in each other—of not engaging in spy-hunting, and above all of not permitting disinformation planted by the GPU or other police to sow suspicion and disruption among our own ranks. Trotsky followed this rule himself. For instance, in the absence of convincing

12. *Workers Press*, January 12, 1976.

Secret Police of Mexico, after he apologized for having arrested two of Trotsky's secretaries), it was precisely that objective view which distinguished the levels of operation of Comrade Trotsky from our subjective viewpoint of righteous indignation and reaction. Here I must say that despite numerous disputes on issues with Comrade Trotsky, I never, but never, found him difficult to work with. Some of those disputes resulted in sharp emotional reactions on either side or on both sides. They were always settled by one or another of us changing a point of view on an issue.

An account of the disputes that aroused sharp emotional reactions in either Trotsky or Robins or both ought to be of interest. Isn't it time to describe these charged exchanges? If they have already been written up, shouldn't they be published? Surely the Healyites, if no one else, would welcome the opportunity to publish Robins's account of his brushes with Trotsky in the field of ideas.

Taken altogether, what do the allegations, insinuations, and sensationalistic rumor-mongering of "Captain" Robins prove? Merely that the Trotsky household was not always smooth-running and that with our limited resources many difficulties confronted us in organizing even a small force of guards on an effective basis within the high walls of what Trotsky called a "prison." Not the least of the difficulties were personal weaknesses that showed up under the strain, including antagonisms that were hard to reduce. The role of Robins in helping to solve these problems, it must be said, was not exactly brilliant.

proof that "Etienne" (Zborowski) was guilty of disloyalty or of being an agent, Trotsky and Sedov maintained their confidence in him.¹³ Trotsky even invited

13. See Isaac Deutscher's discussion of this question in *The Prophet Outcast*, pp. 390-410. Deutscher, who had access to the closed section of Trotsky's archives at Harvard, shows that there was rising suspicion in 1937 that an agent provocateur was operating in Leon Sedov's circle. But just who? Suspicion fell on "Etienne" (p. 390), but also Victor Serge (p. 391), and even Sedov himself (p. 392). "Etienne" asked Trotsky what he should do about the suspicion of him voiced by Sneevliet and Serge. Trotsky advised him to ask for an investigation and a chance to clear his honor.

A letter was received by Trotsky from a GPU officer, who had defected and found refuge in the United States, warning Trotsky to beware of a dangerous stool pigeon in Paris. The letter described "Mark" so accurately that there could be no doubt that it was "Etienne." But the author hid his own identity and failed to respond to Trotsky's request to get in touch with his followers in New York.

"The apparent lack of response on the corres-

Jacson into his study alone although the agent's actions there caused Trotsky to think something was wrong about him.

When George Novack referred to these well-known facts, Healy's "International Committee"—as we have seen—charged Novack with reviving the GPU "theory of self-assault," which in their words meant accusing "Leon Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov of responsibility for their own deaths." Novack did nothing to the kind, as I proved earlier.

Yet it is a fact that it was on the basis of Trotsky's feelings in the matter that Harold Robins, the guard on duty the afternoon of August 20, 1940, did not search Jacson's raincoat upon receiving the assassin in the patio.

About twenty-six years ago, Robins—who was just plain Harold Robins then—put down some of his recollections as one of the guards in Coyoacán. Among other things, he said the following:

"Comrades often ask how did we permit Stalin's assassin entry into the house without search? Was the guard lax? Or of questionable loyalty?

"I can only answer that every living member of the 1940 guard was completely devoted to the 'Old Man' and proved it on every occasion. Trotsky refused to permit us to search everyone in spite of persistent urging on the part of the guard. He would not permit any of us to be present when he met with strangers unless he specifically invited us. He maintained this policy despite Natalia's and Hansen's opposition during a period of several years."¹⁴

According to the logic applied by Healy's committee to George Novack, doesn't this account by plain Harold Robins show that he was reviving the "most monstrous lie of all," a lie he had "taken directly from the GPU"?

Doesn't it prove that Robins was a "co-conspirator" of Hansen and therefore "an accomplice of the GPU" perhaps as long ago as 1940?

Why isn't his name included in the "indictment" worked up by Healy and his crew of frame-up artists "after painstaking research in Europe and America"?

Or is some unidentified person in the top circles of the WRP covering up for Robins? For what reasons?

pendent's part and the strange form of his warning made Trotsky doubt his trustworthiness. Nevertheless, a small commission was formed at Coyoacan to investigate the matter; but it found no substance in the charges against Étienne. Trotsky wondered whether the denunciation was not a G.P.U. hoax, designed to discredit the man who appeared to be the most efficient and devoted of his assistants, who spoke and wrote Russian, was thoroughly versed in Soviet affairs, and edited the *Bulletin*." (p. 409.)

14. Cited from a copy of the manuscript in the archives of the Socialist Workers party.



NATALIA SEDOFF

Natalia Sedoff's Testimony

To bolster their frame-up of Novack and me, the members of Healy's "International Committee" write as follows in the January 5, 1976, issue of *Workers Press*:

"Nor had Trotsky 'trusted' Jacson. Isaac Deutscher described Trotsky's reaction to Jacson on August 17, 1940, three days before the assassination:

"Reluctantly but dutifully, Trotsky invited 'Jacson' to come with him to the study. There they remained alone and discussed the article. After only ten minutes Trotsky came out disturbed and worried. His suspicion was suddenly

heightened; he told Natalya that he had no wish to see "Jacson" any more. . . He had the feeling that the man was an imposter. He remarked to Natalya that in his behaviour "Jacson" was quite unlike a Frenchman—yet he presented himself as a Belgian brought up in France. Who was he really? They should find this out. . . These questions must have been on Trotsky's mind, for two days later he repeated his observations to Hansen, as if to ascertain whether similar misgivings had occurred to anyone beside himself. . . it was on the day before the attempt on his life that

Trotsky confided his vague suspicions to Hansen.' (*The Prophet Outcast*, Oxford University Press, pp 498-499.)

"Despite the warnings, Jacson passed through the gates into the villa the next day. Hansen was the guard on duty."¹⁵

In the above quotation from Deutscher, it will be noticed that ellipses (. . .) occur in three places. The deleted sentences are not without interest. They show that Trotsky had noted something qualitatively different about Jacson, but that Trotsky did not draw the proper conclusions fast enough.

Here are the sentences that should be replaced where the first ellipses appears:

What upset him was not what the man had written—a few clumsy and muddled clichés—but his behaviour. While they were at the writing table and Trotsky was looking through the article, 'Jacson' seated himself on the table and there, placed above his host's head, he remained to the end of the interview! And all the time he had his hat on and clutched his coat to himself! Trotsky was not only irritated by the visitor's discourtesy; he sensed a fraud again.

The second set reads as follows:

Natalya was taken aback; it seemed to her that Trotsky 'had perceived something new about "Jacson", but had not yet reached, or rather was in no hurry, to reach, any conclusions'. Yet the implication of what he had said was alarming: if 'Jacson' was deceiving them about his nationality, why was he doing it? And was he not deceiving them about other things as well? About what?

The third one is a single sentence:

However, the assassin moved faster than the victim's intuition and instinct of self-preservation:

What are we to say about such dexterous handling of texts? It's at least up to the level of a cutting room in a Hollywood film factory, isn't it?

Now we come to the reference to Hansen—"it was on the day before the attempt on his life that Trotsky confided his vague suspicions to Hansen"—which is what the indicters wanted to weave into their exhibits.

When Deutscher showed me the page proofs of the chapter on the Mexican period, "The 'Hell-black Night,'" in the final volume of his biography of Trotsky, I mentioned several facts that were new to him, and also pointed to a few errors. He made notations on these and was able to make some changes.

Among these points, I told Deutscher I could not recall Trotsky telling me he had developed suspicions about Jacson.¹⁶ In

15. "Hansen was the guard on duty." This is a good example of the calculation that goes into the lies presented in the "indictment." Robins was the guard on duty. I was on the roof working with Melquiades Benitez and Charlie Cornell on the alarm system.

16. See Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast*, pp. 498-99.

previous weeks Trotsky had been of the opinion that we should try to win over this "sympathizer," the husband of Sylvia Ageloff. As Deutscher points out, three days before the assassination, Trotsky was still only vaguely disturbed about Jacson. If Trotsky had told me, for instance, what had happened in that interview, I think the attitude of the entire guard would have changed at once. But Trotsky did not even tell us he had made an appointment to see Jacson on August 20.

Deutscher said he was sure that there was a documentary basis for this part of the chapter but that he would check.

Three sources are cited by Deutscher for the passage quoted above: Natalya Sedova in Victor Serge's *Vie et Mort de Trotsky*, p. 319; the *Biulleten Oppozitsii*, no. 85, 1941; and *Fourth International*, May 1941.

I will begin with the third reference, "How It Happened," written by Natalia Sedov Trotsky, which was published in the May 1941 issue of *Fourth International*.¹⁷ There is not a word in it about Trotsky having communicated suspicions to me about Jacson the day before the assassination. In other respects, the account confirms Deutscher's summary, and further shows with what deliberation Healy's committee distorted the facts and even suppressed crucial items.

Deutscher's second reference is to the *Biulleten Oppozitsii*, no. 85, 1941. But this is merely the Russian original of Natalia's article "How It Happened."

Deutscher's first reference is to Victor Serge's *Vie et Mort de Trotsky*.¹⁸ The passage is by Natalia Sedoff. Her recollections here are virtually the same as those in "How It Happened." However, it contains some additional details that help bring out aspects of the security problem that have been challenged by Healy. I am including more pages than Deutscher referred to:

On another occasion, he [Jacson-Mornard] took some of our American friends from Minneapolis on a drive to Toluca. On the way back, he pretended he was going to drive the car over a precipice. "Then it would all be over!" he said to our friend Anna Konikova, who attached no particular importance to his sudden fit of depression. His visit to the States had completely changed him—the somewhat vulgar *bon vivant*, who had been content to lead an easy and leisurely life, was suddenly in a terrible state of nerves. . . . He called on us seven or eight times

17. The article is included in the collection *Leon Trotsky: The Man and His Work*. It may be obtained from Pathfinder Press, 410 West Street, New York, New York 10014.

18. Victor Serge, *Vie et Mort de Trotsky* (Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1951), pp. 318-20. An English translation of the book was released in November 1975. See *The Life and Death of Leon Trotsky* by Victor Serge and Natalia Sedova Trotsky (New York: Basic Books, Inc.), pp. 264-66.

and we would speak to him for a few minutes in the garden and on two occasions in the house. "Sylvia's husband" seemed neither interested in politics nor particularly likeable as a person. Leon Davidovich would see him out of politeness during breaks from his work, while feeding the rabbits. . . . Mornard, who was extremely discreet about his business affairs, even with Sylvia, kept speaking to Leon Davidovich about his "boss", a "brilliant businessman" whose speculations had apparently earned him a fortune. Knowing of our financial difficulties, his employers had no doubt advised him to hint how useful he could be to us in that sphere. Leon Davidovich, who was utterly indifferent to all this talk, replied with vague remarks about commercial ability and similar things. These short conversations used to irritate me, and Leon Davidovich disliked them as well. "Who is this fabulously rich boss?" he asked me. "We should find out. After all, he might be some profiteer with Fascist tendencies and it might be best to stop seeing Sylvia's husband altogether. . . ." Mornard used to call on the most trifling pretexts; he would bring me a box of chocolates from Sylvia; he was leaving for New York and insisted on lending us his car; his boss was winding up some important business and he was going to leave Mexico with him. . . .

When he returned from the States in about the middle of August, he looked awful. His complexion had gone pale and grey. "Are you ill?" I asked him. "What is the matter with you?" He said that he had been ill in Monterrey. I mentioned a mountain walk I had taken with Leon Davidovich. I was struck by his sudden interest. How had we got there? Why had we not taken him up on his offer to drive us? . . . At the time, I failed to understand why he was so anxious to accompany Leon Davidovich to the mountains. . . .

During his breaks from work, Leon Davidovich avoided serious subjects—those who sought political discussions with him had to make a special appointment. Leon Davidovich would receive them in his study, listen attentively, his head slightly inclined, his hands often clasped on the table, while he carefully weighed his answers. . . . A week before the black day, Sylvia and her husband had tea with us for the first time; Sylvia passionately defended the minority standpoint in the [American Trotskyist] Party. Jacson Mornard said hardly anything; it appeared that the arguments ranged so widely as to exclude him altogether. But a few days later, he asked if he could show Leon Davidovich a draft of an article he had written.

Leon Davidovich saw him in his study for ten minutes. . . . He seemed worried after the interview. "He showed me a paper devoid of any interest. It's confused and full of banal phrases. He says he can produce some interesting French statistics." Leon Davidovich looked uneasy. "I don't like him. What sort of a fellow is he? We ought to make a few enquiries. . . ." Jacson Mornard, instead of taking a chair, had sat down on a corner of the large table, wearing a hat and carrying his raincoat over his arm. . . . It had obviously been a sort of rehearsal of his crime. We were so far from suspecting the man who, for two years, had been the companion of an unaffected and agreeable young comrade, that when one of our American friends suggested we search him, Leon Davidovich exclaimed, "Come, come! What are you thinking of?" But he did not want to see him again. Despite his long and unhappy experience of people, Leon Davidovich was not in the least suspicious. On the contrary, having spent the best part of his life among the revolutionary masses, he had great confidence,

both reasoned and emotional, in the average man in the street. There was so much ability, so much potential and idealism in a crowd at a meeting or in a small group of labourers. He had so often devoted long hours to discussions with American workers, or with Spanish refugees. . .

Note especially Natalia Sedoff's report of L.D.'s reaction to the suggestion from "one of our American friends" that Jacson ought to be searched when he was received at the entrance. "Come, come! What are you thinking of?"

According to Healy's logic, that attitude surely proves in retrospect that Trotsky was a "co-conspirator" with Hansen and therefore was an "accomplice of the GPU." Why isn't Trotsky's name included in the indictment?

In her account, "How It Happened," Natalia cries out against the length to which security measures were being taken. "After the failure suffered by our enemies in the May 24 attack, we were absolutely certain that Stalin would not halt, and we were making preparations. We also knew that a different form of attack would be used by the G.P.U. Nor did we exclude a blow on the part of a 'solitary individual' sent secretly and paid by the G.P.U. But neither the bullet-proof vest [a gift sent by Los Angeles well-wishers] nor a helmet could have served as safeguards. To apply these methods of defense from day to day was impossible. It was impossible to convert one's life solely into self-defense—for in that case life loses all its value." (Emphasis in original.)

In Healy's two committees does Natalia Sedoff pass "security" scrutiny? Or, in accordance with the logic followed by these inquisitors, is she to be branded as Hansen's "co-conspirator" and therefore an "accomplice of the GPU"?

What was the source of Deutscher's error? I do not know. Perhaps it was a mere slip of the pen. Nor do I know whether he intended to correct this error in a subsequent edition of the biography.

The Role of President Cárdenas

"The IC charges Joseph Hansen and the Socialist Workers Party to which he belongs, with criminal negligence in relation to the security implications of the death of Trotsky and the tasks of revolutionary security in relation to the defense of the Fourth International."¹⁹

If we leave aside the frame-up, of which this concoction is a central part, Healy's concept of the defense at Coyoacán does not correspond at all with the reality. As he (and others of the same cast of mind) conceive it, everything depended on the handful of guards that could be assembled;

In any case the error was minor and does not affect his delineation of how the assassin wormed his way into the confidence of the household and why Trotsky did not sense something "new" about



PRESIDENT CARDENAS

Jacson until just three days before the assassination (two days by Natalia's account), communicating his feelings to Natalia the following day in such a way as to indicate that he had not yet come to any definite conclusion.

Natalia's testimony in turn, both substantiates Deutscher's account while providing nothing to indicate that her words constituted the source of the detail about Trotsky's having communicated suspicion of Jacson to me on August 19.

and this in turn, according to his argumentation, was the responsibility of the Socialist Workers party. (At that time Healy, as an opponent of Trotsky and Cannon—but not as an "accomplice of the GPU," contributed nothing.)

Robins goes even further. To read his criticisms and reconstruction of events, the main thing was skill in handling a pistol or Thompson submachine gun, a skill that he found especially difficult to master. So that to choose as a guard someone like him, who had never stepped inside a shooting gallery, was to demonstrate "criminal negligence in relation to the security implications of the death of Trotsky."

However, the most essential element in

the defense was the interest displayed by President Cárdenas in providing protection for the hounded revolutionist to whom he had granted asylum.

Cárdenas provided a police detail at the entrance to Trotsky's home on a twenty-four-hour schedule. Besides this, the Mexican government kept up a certain watch. For example, in 1939, the Stalinists held a big rally in which Trotsky was made the main target. It appeared that the Mexican CP was trying to organize a raid by a crowd of ostensibly outraged, honest workers. Shortly after midnight, two busloads of police arrived to beef up the detail. V.T. O'Brien, then the head guard, remembers the incident well, as he met them at the door to find out what their mission was.

After the May 24 assault, the Mexican government tripled the size of the police detail to help guard Trotsky.

On excursions, or on trips for a few days of relaxation at Taxco or elsewhere, Jesús Rodríguez Casas, the head of the police detail, usually accompanied us. Often one or two more police in uniform went along as guards.

It is true that the government was permeated with members of the Communist party or fellow travelers, who sought to undermine the efforts of Cárdenas to protect Trotsky. Thus, according to Salazar, they succeeded in getting the original detail of thirty-three men cut to eight, a compromise finally being set at ten. (The ten were divided into two squads of five men, the squads alternating on duty every twenty-four hours.)²⁰

Some interesting theoretical questions arise concerning the relation of the defense of Trotsky and the Cárdenas government. On this not a word has been said by either the philosophical pundits or the frame-up artists of the WRP. (They may be the same individuals.) For instance, was it principled of Trotsky to:

1. Accept asylum from a bourgeois government?
2. Accept protection by the police of a bourgeois government?
3. Collaborate with the secret police of a bourgeois government against the secret police of a workers state?
4. Press the bourgeois secret police to stop being diverted by red herrings dragged across the trail by the secret police of a workers state?
5. Demonstratively embrace the head of the Secret Police of Mexico when he apologized for arresting Charlie Cornell and Otto Schuessler?

Two more related questions demand answers: If a line is to be drawn somewhere, just where should it be drawn? Precisely what is the basic principle that was observed by Trotsky in his actions?

While Healy's staff wrestles with the problem of whether to indict Trotsky as an

19. Introduction to *Security and the Fourth International*, p. vi.

20. *Murder in Mexico*, pp. 17-18.

"accomplice of the Secret Police of Mexico," let us return to the role of Cárdenas.

First of all, it is obvious that without the asylum granted by the Mexican government, the Norwegian government might well have turned Trotsky over to the Moscow executioners at the end of 1936 or early 1937.

Second, without the police protection provided by the Mexican government, Trotsky's personal guards could not have saved him very long from Stalin's murder machine, which had a powerful state apparatus and the resources of a number of Communist parties at its disposal. The attitude of Cárdenas, who was abiding by the principles of bourgeois democracy in this instance, placed serious obstacles in the way of the GPU.

To have gunmen, easily identifiable as agents of the Kremlin, kill Trotsky could prove costly to Stalin, since it would cast a glaring light on his arrogant violation of the sovereignty of Mexico. If one or two members of the Mexican police were killed in the process, the cost would be still higher.

The GPU's first efforts were therefore directed at making it appear that a sector of the populace was highly opposed to Trotsky's presence on Mexican soil and that their anger was rising. The objective was to stage a mass raid on the Trotsky household. The leaders of the Mexican CP and figures in the labor movement were assigned to whip up the public atmosphere required to put across the tactic.

This line of action failed because the virulent propaganda directed against Trotsky did not catch on, partly because of the efforts of Trotsky and his followers to expose the true reasons for the Stalinist campaign, partly because of the friendliness of the masses toward Trotsky, and most importantly because Cárdenas demonstrated his readiness to step up his government's defense of Trotsky's right to asylum.

The GPU therefore shifted to a different course. With the advent of World War II, Stalin plotted an attack that would depend on a few GPU agents at the head of a squad of especially selected members of the Mexican Communist party. The calculation was that the tragic onrushing international events would help turn public attention away from the crime of murdering the Soviet Union's most able defender.

One of the obstacles to carrying out this operation was the police detail at the entrance to Trotsky's home. Special planning went into overcoming this difficulty. Hence the elaborate measures of seducing some of the police to gain inside information on their routine, and of securing police uniforms as disguises for the assailants in the May 24 attack.

A close study of that attack shows that the main scheming went into overcoming the possible resistance of the police, who

were well armed and knew how to use their guns. Careful attention was also paid to the problem of breaching the armed defense inside the walls. If the assailants did not succeed in getting Harte to open the doors, they had other means of getting inside. They brought a scaling ladder, evidently intending to place it against the wall on the patio opposite Harte's station; that is, the wall running parallel to the Churubusco River, which had been recognized by the guards from the beginning as a weak spot in the layout of the place. The assailants also brought an electric saw and an iron bar, which Salazar describes as used by Mexican malefactors "to open doors or to stun their victims with."²¹

That L.D. and Natalia were not killed in this attack was accidental. Harte did die, executed by the GPU after being kidnapped.

The capture of most of the Communist party members who had participated in the attack was a setback for Stalin. He was left with the damaging political costs of the attempt without achieving the goal he sought. It was under the *direct orders of President Cárdenas himself* that the Secret Police of Mexico succeeded in arresting most of the participants in the crime, including David Alfaro Siqueiros, and in

locating the body of Robert Sheldon Harte. Cárdenas's action was decisive in solving the crime. Before he intervened—in response to an appeal from Trotsky—the Secret Police had been diverted by the Stalinists into adopting the "theory" that Trotsky and his guards had staged an assault on themselves.

Stalin was thus compelled to resort to the most hazardous and easily exposed means of murdering Trotsky; that is, a blow struck by a single individual—the one who had used Sylvia Ageloff to gain the confidence of the household. Even here, in case Jacson were killed in the attempt, the GPU planted false evidence making out that the assassin was a member of the Fourth International who had turned against Trotsky.

To leave out the role played by Cárdenas and the Mexican government in the defense of Trotsky—as Healy and sectarians like him do—totally distorts the reality. It, of course, helps Healy in constructing his frame-up, particularly in presenting any relations Trotsky's secretaries had with a bourgeois government or its police as a betrayal of revolutionary Marxism, even though such relations solely concerned upholding the bourgeois-democratic right of not being murdered.

The Assassin—the Main Exhibit

In proving Moscow's linkage to the assassination of Trotsky, the world Trotskyist movement as a whole sought to keep the spotlight on the killer.

"Jacson" thus lived for almost twenty years in a Mexican prison as a constant public reminder of Stalin's guilt in the murder of Trotsky. Writers far removed from the Trotskyist movement wrote articles about him and his Kremlin ties that received wide distribution. Interest in the details of the assassination of Trotsky kept up for two decades because of the possibility that this proven agent of the GPU might talk.

Immediately after Jacson's arrest, we established his identity as a GPU agent so thoroughly that the proof was accepted as irrefutable by all circles except those completely taken in by the propaganda of the GPU. This was done through analyzing the Moscow trials-style "confession" he had typed up and put in his pocket, and through exposing the contradictory nature of the statements he made to the police.

Albert Goldman, Trotsky's attorney before the Dewey Commission and one of the leaders of the Socialist Workers party, was permitted by Judge Raúl Carranca y Trujillo to cross-examine Jacson, which led to further confirmation of Jacson's identity as a GPU agent.

Through the American consulate, which I visited, material was obtained of decisive importance concerning Jacson's identity—he had used an altered passport that once belonged to a Canadian, Tony Babich. Babich enlisted in the International Brigade to fight against Franco in the civil war in Spain, where he died. His passport fell into the hands of the GPU, as did the passports of others who were in the Stalinist-controlled International Brigade.

Because Jacson applied to the American consulate June 12, 1940, for a transit visa to Canada (he went only to the United States), the American authorities were able to check out the false passport even though Jacson had burned it.

All this material was reported and analyzed by Goldman in a booklet dated October 11, 1940, *The Assassination of Leon Trotsky—the Proofs of Stalin's Guilt*, which was widely circulated by the Socialist Workers party at the time. It still remains a valuable source of material on the case.

During subsequent years, we noted such things as Jacson's reliance on Stalinist attorneys in his legal moves, the reports that he was well supplied with funds, and his shift to open support of the Stalinist line during the war.

Proof of Jacson's personal identity, however, remained at a standstill until Julian Gorkin, who collaborated with Salazar in writing *Murder in Mexico*, said in that book (which appeared in Mexico in

21. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

1948) that he had received convincing information from Catalonian refugees who once held responsible positions in the Catalan Stalinist organization that they knew both the assassin and his mother, Caridad Mercader.

When Salazar's book appeared, I took the position that Gorkin's evidence was inconclusive. It rested on the word of unidentified persons.

In 1959 Isaac Don Levine in his book *The Mind of an Assassin* proved beyond doubt who "Jacson" was. His fingerprints matched those of Jaime Ramón Mercader del Rio, taken when he was arrested in Barcelona on June 12, 1935, on the charge of secret membership in a Communist youth organization.²² From the family album in Barcelona, Levine was also able to get photographs of Mercader, his mother, sister, and two brothers.²³

Although it was superfluous, the final proof that the assassin was a GPU agent came when he was released from prison in 1960. The *Militant*, of which I was editor, published a full account in the May 16, 1960, issue under the headline, "Prague Accepts Trotsky's Killer—Natalia Trotsky Predicts His Reward Will Be Liquidation by Stalin's Heirs."

To illustrate the attitude of the *Militant* toward "Jacson," the prime exhibit among the GPU agents who have been exposed, here are some excerpts from the account:

On May 6 the Mexican authorities announced that they had released the assassin of Leon Trotsky from prison, some four months before completing his 20-year sentence, ordered him deported as an "undesirable alien," and had placed him on a plane bound for Havana where he would remain one week before departing for Prague, Czechoslovakia, his eventual destination. . . .


He was taken from the prison just before noon, driven in a prison van for about a mile and transferred to a government limousine. The automobile drove onto the ramp where the plane of Cubana's Flight 465 was warming its engines. There the prisoner was met by two Czechoslovak diplomats, Oldrich Novicky and Edward Foulches. They made the flight with him. . . .

The Czechoslovak government provided "Jacson" with a diplomatic passport for his exit from Mexico. Made out in the name of "Jacques Mornard Van Dendreschd," it did not list his place of birth or the names of his parents. But it was good for a transit visa through Cuba; and Mexican officials said that on his arrival in Prague he would assume Czechoslovak citizenship. They did not explain why the Czech government felt impelled to extend this honor to Trotsky's murderer. . . .

The ones who have most to gain from committing Mercader to the silence of the grave are Moscow's secret political police and those at the very top of the Soviet government who inspired Prague's department of foreign affairs to make Mercader a Czech citizen.

22. See *The Mind of an Assassin* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959), pp. 209-10.

23. See reproductions; *ibid.*, pp. 12-13.



Joseph Hansen

An outing in the mountains. Trotsky asked that a photograph be taken of him and two members of the police assigned by the Cárdenas government to help guard him.

Trotsky's widow, Natalia, now nearing 80, expressed this in a few vigorous words when she told the Mexican press May 7: "Mornard goes now to his reward of elimination. He was just an instrument. We knew that from the beginning. If he had not succeeded in his task, some other Kremlin hatchet man would have taken his place."

In two editorials (May 8 and May 9) the New York Times sought to utilize the murder of Trotsky by Stalin's secret police as an argument to defend American provocations against the Soviet Union. Trotsky, however, was too powerful a defender of the workers state which he helped create to be easily utilized in imperialist propaganda and it does not seem likely that this twist will be followed up.

A more objective attitude was taken by the St. Louis Post Dispatch which expressed regret at the pending disappearance of "Stalin's best-known triggerman." For "unless the man was an ignorant tool, blindly obedient to others, how much he could tell of what led to the end of Leon Trotsky!"

That is exactly why Stalin's heirs were so interested in getting Trotsky's assassin in their hands. They want to end once and for all the danger that this professional butcher might finally speak and reveal to the world their share of the guilt in one of the most unspeakable crimes in all history.

In Prague, the assassin vanished from public view. Rumors circulated that he had continued on to Moscow where he was given the medal said to have been awarded him by Stalin for his success in murdering Trotsky. Possibly the GPU gave him a sinecure. More likely he was punished for not having committed suicide in Trotsky's study and for having lent himself for

twenty years to the production of publicity highly embarrassing to Stalin and his heirs. Was his last walk along a corridor of the Lubyanka prison?

The revelation, fifteen years after Trotsky's death, of Zborowski's role in feeding information to the GPU was important. It added fresh evidence confirming the accuracy of the analysis made by Trotsky in 1938 showing the responsibility of the GPU in the deaths of Sedov and Klement and in plotting his own assassination.

A book assembling this evidence with what was already established in relation to Mercader could prove useful as a condensed account of the way Stalin mobilized the forces at his disposal to kill Trotsky.

A survey of that kind ought to include a résumé of the Moscow trials, the work of the Dewey Commission, a summary of the pressures Stalin exerted to deny asylum to Trotsky anywhere on the planet, and an account of the blows struck by the fascists against Trotsky and his followers.

However, Healy's committees are not at all interested in an objective work of that kind. For reasons I will take up further on, their sudden preoccupation with this material is based on the possibility of turning it to account in framing up the leaders of the SWP. Consequently the selection fitted together by Healy's lieutenants is shot through with inaccuracies, untruths, half-truths, distortions, omissions, poisonous interjections—whatever might help advance the main lie. Healy has gone out of his way, it seems, to prove

once again that the end determines the means.

For this reason the series remains silent about the role played by the SWP in exposing "Jacson" so thoroughly that during his entire term in prison he could not escape functioning as a public reminder of Stalin's guilt in the assassination of

Healy's Singular Confidence in Thomas L. Black

The testimony of Thomas L. Black is without doubt the most damaging piece of evidence dug up by Healy's sleuths in their "painstaking research in Europe and America." Upon studying Black's revelations, Healy—despite his well-known reluctance to speak evil of the SWP—obviously felt convinced that he had no choice but to issue an "irrefutable indictment" naming George Novack and me as "accomplices of the GPU."

Black is cited in the *Workers Press* of January 5, 1976, as having testified "before the United States Senate judiciary committee on May 17, 1956," that he was told by a Soviet espionage agent to proceed to Coyoacán where "there would be other Soviet agents in Trotsky's household." Black's mission would be to work out the details of assassinating Trotsky.

According to Healy's committee, Hansen and Novack "have completely betrayed [these] responsibilities [of maintaining security and safeguarding Trotsky] by suppressing vital evidence of Stalinist GPU penetration of Trotsky's household itself" as revealed in Black's "sworn testimony."

The quotations in the *Workers Press* are not the same as the official Senate transcript. They have been touched up (presumably to make them more readable), and five lines have been dropped without this being indicated in any way. Black's "vital evidence," it is true, is reported as he gave it; the small alterations, however, serve to remind one of the notorious unreliability of the Healyite press. For the sake of accuracy, I will quote the passage as it appeared in the record, including the bit about the spelling of Coyoacán, which Healy left out.

Mr. Morris. Did he give you an assignment?

Mr. Black. Yes, sir; when I was released from the hospital. He told me that he wanted me to quit my job and make arrangements to go to Coyoacan.

Mr. Morris. Would you spell that for us, please?

Mr. Black. I am sorry. I can't spell it.

Mr. Mandel. That is C-o-y-o-a-c-a-n.

Mr. Morris. He wanted you to go down there?

Mr. Black. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Did he state for what purpose?

Mr. Black. Not specifically. He said that he wanted me to go down and join Trotsky's household.

Mr. Morris. In other words, he wanted you to join the household itself?

Mr. Black. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. And keep contact with him.

Trotsky.

Healy's silence is understandable, if hardly commendable. To acknowledge the role of the SWP in exposing "Jacson" would be difficult—if not impossible—to fit into his frame-up of Hansen, Novack, Gordon, Cannon, and others still to be named in his big lie.

Mr. Black. That is right.

Mr. Morris. Did you learn what Rabinowitz's plan was at that particular time?

Mr. Black. No; not at that time. I asked some questions, and he told me that the questions the nature of which I was asking did not need to concern me then. I would get instructions later.

First I was to go to Coyoacan, and there would be other Soviet agents in Trotsky's household, and I asked him who they would be.

He said I would find out that when the time came.

I asked him what I was supposed to do, and he said I would be told when the time came. He refused to answer any questions about what the nature of the work was.

Mr. Morris. Did you subsequently find out what the nature of that assignment was?

Mr. Black. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. What was the nature of that assignment?

Mr. Black. To arrange for the assassination of Trotsky.

This is the end of the quotation in *Workers Press*. It is taken from pages 1119-20 of the U.S. government publication *Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States*. Having quoted this much, we might as well add a few more lines—those immediately following the place where Healy's trimmers cut off the interrogation:

Mr. Morris. Did you take that assignment?

Mr. Black. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. Why did you not take that assignment?

Mr. Black. Because, as I stated previously, in 1936 I had lost complete sympathy with the Communist movement, and the Soviet Union, and I was trying to break away from these Soviet agents. Incorrectly, but I was still trying to make a break.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us why it is that you appear here today and tell us that you were disassociated ideologically with the Communists, and yet you kept accepting these assignments?

Mr. Black. I did it because of fear.

A few lines further down on page 1120, the interrogation continues as follows:

Mr. Morris. Now, what reason did you give Rabinowitz for not going to Coyoacan?

Mr. Black. I told him that it would look very suspicious if I were to suddenly leave the country without appearing before the workmen's compensation court which was to settle my accident case. He accepted that.

When did Rabinowitz make his proposals to Black? Elsewhere in his testimony, Black said that his previous contact, "Paul Peterson," broke off "probably the latter

part of 1937, or the early part of 1938." Peterson was followed by "Semon Semonov" for "a very short period" and then "Gregor Rabinowitz." The date of the latter shift is not specified.

We now come to an astonishing revelation in the very next lines of Black's testimony:

Mr. Morris. I see. Now, what was your next assignment after that?

Mr. Black. After that, after the assassination of Trotsky, I didn't see any more of Rabinowitz. But I was contacted by another agent, the one I believed I knew as Jack.

Note that parenthetical clarification: *after the assassination of Trotsky*. That occurred in August 1940. So, to believe Black, in 1937 or possibly 1938 Rabinowitz breezed into the hospital where Black was laid up from an industrial accident and introduced himself. When Black was released from the hospital, Rabinowitz proposed that Black quit his job, go to join Trotsky's household in Coyoacán, and meet other Soviet agents there. Subsequently Rabinowitz told him his job would be to arrange for the assassination of Trotsky.

Black couldn't leave right then—it would look suspicious if he failed to appear at a hearing for workmen's compensation for injuries suffered in the accident. Rabinowitz accepted that, and left the scene as vaporously as he had appeared.

Black was not contacted by any more GPU agents until after August 1940; that is, perhaps three years later, when "Jack Katz" gave him a buzz on the phone.

A few lines further on we come to a revelation that seems to belong to science fiction—the timing of the assignment given Black by "Jack Katz"

Mr. Morris. What assignment did he give you?

Mr. Black. Well, a period of some months had elapsed. Then he finally contacted me by a method which had been prearranged by other agents.

We seem to have suddenly slipped back to 1937 or so—a *period of some months had elapsed*. But, no, as many as three years have slipped by, not just "some months":

Mr. Morris. What year is this?

Mr. Black. I believe that this must have been about 1940. The reason I believe that, is that, in checking some dates this morning with Mr. Mandel, he pointed out that Trotsky had been assassinated in 1940. This was after the assassination of Trotsky, I am almost certain.

In coaching Black, Mr. Mandel may have done his best to stress the difference between 1937-38 and 1940 and how overlooking this could prove fatal to the internal consistency of the story he was about to tell under oath. No doubt Black did his best with a tough assignment.

There are other curious items in Black's testimony that Healy's committee, for

reasons best known to themselves, chose not to report. For example, at one point Black's relations with "Paul Peterson" became strained:

Mr. Morris. Through what period did you work with Peterson?

Mr. Black. Until about 1938—1937 or 1938.

Mr. Morris. From 1934 to 1938.²⁴ During that period, the time was consumed principally in training you for espionage work?

Mr. Black. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. No specific assignments were given to you at that time, were they?

Mr. Black. Yes; but they were not in connection with espionage.

Mr. Morris. I see. What was the nature of those assignments?

Mr. Black. In 1936, at the time of the first Moscow trials, I lost sympathy with the Communist movement, and I told Peterson that if this terror was going to continue in Moscow, I would become a Trotskyite.

Mr. Morris. How did he react to that disclosure by you?

Mr. Black. He became violently angry, and we parted on very bad terms.

Black's revulsion over the first Moscow frame-up trial in 1936 was deep enough to lead him to tell "Paul Peterson" that he was considering joining the Trotskyists. Nevertheless, to believe Black, within a year or so, Rabinowitz, who took over from "Paul Peterson" and "Semon Semenov," thought highly enough of Black to assume that he would jump at the proposal to rush down to Coyoacán, join Trotsky's household, and arrange for the assassination of Trotsky.

What led Rabinowitz to be so sure of Black's responsiveness to the bid? The way he responded at his next meeting with "Paul Peterson"? Let us read on:

Mr. Morris. Now, did he ever drop you as a contact?

Mr. Black. No, sir.

Mr. Morris. What happened?

Mr. Black. A period of time elapsed—I don't recall just how long. Possibly a few months. Then I got a phone call from him, and in the telephone conversation he seemed rather friendly. He asked me to meet him. I kept that appointment.

Mr. Morris. Did you meet him in New York?

Mr. Black. Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris. Did he give you another assignment?

Mr. Black. Yes; he did. He told me that he had been thinking over what I had told him about becoming a Trotskyite, and he thought that was a very good idea. So he instructed me to join the Socialist Party, the Trotskyist faction.

In carrying out this assignment, did

Black become so thoroughly indoctrinated in favor of Stalin that his GPU superiors came to the conclusion that he—more than any other agent in the world—would leap at the chance to sink an ax in Trotsky's brain? If so, Black does not report it. On the contrary, he says that he was trying to break from the clutches of his contacts.

Moreover, the duties assigned him under the command of "Paul Peterson" do not seem to have run along the line of intensive indoctrination and preparation for the job of hatchet man. "I was instructed to be a good party member and to ingratiate myself with the leadership of the party," Black says.

Thus we come to another revelation that ought to cause even Healy's eyebrows to lift:

Mr. Morris. Now, will you tell us the nature of your assignment with the Trotskyist party?

Mr. Black. The only definite assignment I had was to become friendly with the leading Trotskyists.

Mr. Morris. And to report back to Peterson?

Mr. Black. Just to keep contact with him. Not to report anything specific to him. As a matter of fact, he was not interested in what was going on in the Trotskyist movement.

Of course, it is possible that Black lied about this. Perhaps "Paul Peterson" actually hounded him for information about what the Newark Trotskyists were doing. In that case, however, none of Black's testimony can be accepted as truthful.

As a matter of fact, it can be established that Black did not speak as he was required to under oath. He told Mr. Morris: "Carlo Tresca was an anti-Communist radical who had been active for a great many years. I don't know what his political philosophy was. I believe he was an anarchist, but I am not sure."

George Breitman, a leading Trotskyist in Newark at the time, recalls that Black "told us, as he did not tell the committee, that he was an anarchist at heart, with a lowercase *a*, and that he hoped the Soviet Union, regenerated, would lead to an anarchist-type society. When he told the committee that he thought Carlo Tresca was an anarchist, but he was 'not sure,' pp. 1121-22, he was lying; he knew very well what Tresca was."

Carlo Tresca, a renowned figure, was gunned down on a New York sidewalk on January 11, 1943. He had participated for almost forty years in labor struggles and in defense of victims of the class struggle. He battled Italian fascism from the beginning, condemned Stalinism, and among other things, was a member of the Dewey Commission. The motives for assassinating him were generally assumed to be political.

The murder was never solved. While the GPU was under suspicion, it seemed more likely that Mussolini had ordered his death. As the case developed, the leads pointed to local Italian fascists in New York. The New York police exhibited

exceptional reluctance to follow up these clues.

Black, however, had something to say about the case—this was probably why it came up in his testimony. His GPU contact at the time, "Jack Katz," had decided to reveal to him in a "conversation" who it was that killed Tresca:

Mr. Morris. What did Katz say about Carlo Tresca?

Mr. Black. Carlo Tresca was murdered in New York as he was leaving an office building.

Mr. Morris. Was that in January 1943?

Mr. Black. I think so. The Trotskyists accused the Communists of the murder. In the press, of course. So I asked Katz what the story was there. I told him that it was my opinion that that sort of thing gave communism a very bad name, and I didn't approve of it.

Mr. Morris. What did he tell you about Tresca?

Mr. Black. He told me that Tresca was an enemy of the working class, and that as such he had received a fair trial in Moscow.

Mr. Morris. He had been tried in Moscow?

Mr. Black. He had been tried in Moscow in absentia, and this was not a murder; it was an execution.

Mr. Morris. He said that he had been tried and found to be an enemy of the working class; is that it?

Mr. Black. That is correct.

Sensational as the revelation appears to be, it is so vague as to prove nothing. Its vagueness, in fact, is on a par with the unlikelihood that Black's GPU overseer would ever pass that kind of information on to an agent as insignificant and uncertain in loyalty as Black.

Black's assertion that a Soviet spy had admitted that the job was done by gunmen of the GPU was well calculated to help the New York police, who were under fire from civil libertarians and the left for their resistance to following up the known leads pointing to local ultrarightists as the killers of Carlo Tresca.

The gaps, sensationalistic inclusions, and contradictions that jut out in Black's testimony may become less of a mystery if we take a closer look at the committee before which he testified.

According to Healy's research experts, it was the "United States Senate judiciary committee." At best this is a half-truth. The testimony was taken by a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. The name of that body, as shown on the title page of the document cited by the Healyites, was "Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws." This infamous crew of witch-hunters was headed by Senator William E. Jenner, a Republican of Indiana and one of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's closest and most vicious collaborators.

The Committee still exists. It is now headed by Senator James Eastland, a Democrat of Mississippi. Recently it published a 472-page report entitled "Trotsky-

25. See "SWP answers 'terrorist' smear," *Militant*, March 12, 1976, p. 5.

24. Like Black, Mr. Morris has difficulty keeping his dates straight. "Paul Peterson" was in charge of Black "from 1934 to 1938." But Mr. Morris also specifies that Semenov replaced Peterson in 1937. Rabinowitz took over at an unspecified date. He was followed by "Jack Katz" in 1940. Why is it so difficult to fix the date Rabinowitz took over command of Black and the length of time he stayed before taking the tubes back to New York?

ite Terrorist International.”²⁵

In 1956, Jenner held a powerful position among the McCarthyites after McCarthy himself had suffered a setback—a censure by the Senate on December 2, 1954.

Jenner's main purpose in interrogating Black was to gain headlines on Soviet espionage in the United States through a confession by Black that Moscow spies had tried to get him to deliver industrial secrets (his deliveries did not satisfy his Soviet contacts). The bit about Tresca being secretly sentenced in Moscow, and the sentence being carried out by Soviet executioners, appears to have been inserted to help gain publicity (and help the New York police). The same bid for headlines appears to apply to the story about Black being commandeered to proceed to Coyoacán and arrange for the assassination of Trotsky.

To fill out the picture, one more piece of information is required—Black's attitude toward Jenner's notorious body of witch-hunters. Here it is on page 1124 of the transcript:

Mr. Morris. How long have you been cooperating with the FBI?

Mr. Black. Since 1950.

Mr. Morris. You have made, to the best of your knowledge, full disclosure to them?

Mr. Black. That is correct.

Mr. Morris. In view of the witness' very responsive attitude to the questions that have been asked him, and because of his voluntarily testifying about other things he was not asked about, I would like the record to show that the committee should commend him for his testimony before the committee.

Senator Jenner. The committee does commend you, Mr. Black, and furthermore, let me state that it is unusual for this committee to get a man who has had past affiliations with the Communist Party such as you have had to come out openly and help this committee in their effort to stop this Communist conspiracy.

This particular phase of our study is to look into Communist tactics, how they operate in our country. We know they are operating today. We know the method of operation continues to change.

It is our duty as a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, a Subcommittee on Internal Security, to try to keep abreast of their machinations.

I want to commend you, and I want to thank you for your cooperation here, and I do believe that the fact that you have come forward will give you more protection from the fears you have expressed in the past. Furthermore, you may encourage others to do the same.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Black. Thank you.

Let us summarize the facts. Thomas L. Black, who had been working as a stool pigeon for the FBI for six years, appeared before the witch-hunting committee headed by McCarthy's good right arm, William E. Jenner. The senator, after listening to the FBI agent's well-prompted recital of his lines, issued an official commendation for services rendered. Jenner's praise was equivalent to a pat on the back from McCarthy himself.

Bearing this situation in mind, we should now be able to judge the credibility of Black's claim that one of his Soviet espionage contacts was Rabinowitz and that, among other sensational items, this Soviet spy said “there would be other Soviet agents in Trotsky's household.”

What conclusion should we draw? One thing can be said for sure. Stalin must not have had much confidence in the competence or intelligence of the “other Soviet agents in Trotsky's household” if he thought they could not “arrange for the assassination of Trotsky” on their own without Black's expertise and personal participation. But why did Stalin have such high confidence in Black? Why did Stalin consider Black so important that he decided to send “Rabinowitz” as an emissary to enlist his aid?

The conclusion that best fits the facts is that Black's testimony regarding a mission to Coyoacán was intended by Jenner and J. Edgar Hoover to create a furor among the Trotskyists. Perhaps it would sow enough distrust to embroil them in a disruptive “investigation” as to the identity of these “other Soviet agents in Trotsky's household.” It is *disinformation* of the kind regularly produced and disseminated by the FBI in the Cointelpro (Counterintelligence Program) set up by J.

Edgar Hoover.²⁶

The gullible Healy has the utmost confidence in the credibility of the testimony FBI agent Black gave before the witch-hunting Jenner committee. “We say, every single member of Trotsky's household who is still alive should be investigated to clear the stains of suspicion in the Senate record and to unmask the GPU agents Rabinowitz referred to.”²⁷

Had we reacted that way to the disruptive ploys of the McCarthyites and the FBI, the SWP would have ceased to exist long ago.

If an investigation is called for “to clear the stains of suspicion,” it should be centered on those who decided to dig through the refuse of the Jenner committee. They obviously knew what they were doing. The lying testimony of an *avowed* agent of the GPU and of the FBI, they decided, could be used to perfection to “prove” that Hansen and Novack were “accomplices of the GPU”—the fraudulent Black thus being pressed into Healy's service to smear Hansen and Novack as frauds.

What Healy's garbage collectors failed to see was that exposure of the “proof” would by itself blow their frame-up sky-high. Healy now stands so discredited by his use of the lies of an FBI stool pigeon that he will never be able to live it down.

Not Retreating, Just Twisting

If he did not have such an overpowering urge to do in the SWP, Healy might prove capable of taking a more critical attitude toward testimony offered by agents of the FBI. It was simply owing to his factional obsessions that he combed through the “findings” of the Jenner committee.

Healy's readiness to turn to the FBI in search of material with which to smear the SWP was shown in the article “The Role of Joseph Hansen and Pabloite Revisionism” published in the September 6, 1975, issue of *Workers Press*.

My attempt to secure information on the identity of “Jacson” from the American consulate was given the most invidious interpretation. Healy's “International Committee” flatly asserted that Robert G. McGregor, the aide to the American consul whom I saw, was “an FBI agent who was operating under diplomatic cover at the American Embassy in Mexico City.”

The insinuation was pursued: “Until the International Committee discovered the existence of a statement he gave to the FBI agent at the US Embassy in Mexico on August 31, the movement knew nothing of it. Why?”

To make their associating me with the FBI still more plausible, Healy's committee pictured me as almost an intimate of the alleged FBI agent:

“The tone of the opening sentence of the US Consul McGregor's report hints at a familiar relationship with Hansen. Perhaps this is why they made a Saturday morning rendezvous. It raises the question whether Hansen had met McGregor before. How many times? What had they discussed?”

To this and similar slanders by Healy's committee, I pointed out in the November 24, 1975, issue of *Intercontinental Press* that their real target was Trotsky inasmuch as Trotsky himself had initiated relations with the American consulate, had invited the supposed FBI agent to visit him, and had been “most polite,” according to McGregor.

In a scathing analysis of Healy's frame-up, Betty Hamilton and Pierre Lambert began their article with the following sentence: “We have read the indescribable

26. For an extensive and accurate account of the FBI's program of disruption, plus photographs of a number of poison-pen letters and other incriminating documents written by the FBI, see *COINTELPRO—The FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom*. Distributed by Pathfinder Press, New York. A Monad Press Book. Second, expanded edition, 190 pp., cloth \$9.00; Vintage paper edition \$2.95.

27. *Workers Press*, January 5, 1976.

articles written at the orders of G. Healy attempting to prove that Joseph Hansen and George Novack are agents of the CIA and the NKVD."²⁸

This was the only point on which Healy's committee felt capable of offering a concrete rebuttal. In the June 15, 1976, issue of the *News Line*, they responded:

"No such charge was ever made. The International Committee's indictment charged them with being accomplices of the GPU."

Does this mean that Healy has begun to

Should I Have Gone to the French Consulate Instead?

Healy's "International Committee" has presented as its chief finding against me a report sent by McGregor to the State Department on my visit to the American consulate in Mexico City shortly after the assassination of Trotsky. McGregor's report clearly shows that my purpose in seeing him was to seek information concerning the identity of "Mornard" which the consulate, through its resources, might be able to supply. I also inquired about the possibility of visas for Natalia Sedoff and Trotsky's grandson to enter the United States. McGregor did not mention this, at least in any material I have seen.

Naturally I sought to stress the American base used by the GPU in organizing the assassination. In the September 6, 1975, issue of *Workers Press*, Healy's committee jeered at this:

Hansen makes another puzzling statement to the man from the embassy. He says that he believed that the Stalinist murder plot originated in the United States. But all the evidence demonstrates that the center was in Paris. This was easily deductible by even the most amateur observer. It is surprising that it wasn't deduced by Hansen, who was the head of security in Mexico.

But I did not say that the murder plot "originated" in the United States. McGregor does not attribute that word to me; he attributes to me the assertion that the plot was "engineered" from the United States. I, of course, take no responsibility whatsoever for McGregor's report or its formulations. If the "origin" of the murder plot had come up I would probably have said "Moscow," not Paris or New York.

As for the fact that a base of GPU operations did exist in the United States, I called attention, among other things, to "Mornard's" trip to the United States after May 24.

What point is Healy trying to make? Is he implying that I went to the American

retreat? That he has given up his attempt to frame me up with the lie that as a secretary to Leon Trotsky I had a "familiar relationship" with an FBI agent in Mexico City?

Not at all. Healy is simply twisting. While trying to save the frame-up by adding fresh lies, such as labeling Novack an "accomplice of the GPU," he is also trying to cover up some of the earlier fabrications, which as he now may be able to see only served to immediately expose what he was up to.

consulate to divert McGregor from instituting inquiries in Paris? Is he implying that the GPU did not operate out of New York? Since he is hardly an "amateur observer," just whom is Healy trying to cover up?

One of the striking contradictions in the frame-up perpetrated by Healy's "International Committee" is that one of their main charges is based on the lying testimony of Thomas L. Black, a resident of Newark, New Jersey, and not of Paris, France. And Black's tale about being told to go to Coyoacán, where "there would be other Soviet agents in Trotsky's household," involved Rabinowitz of the GPU base in New York, not Paris.

By their emphasis on the importance of Black's "sworn testimony," Healy's committee acknowledges the importance of the GPU's base of operations in the United States. In contradiction to this they say that it was "easily deductible by even the most amateur observer" that the "center was in Paris."

Clearly one of the advantages of a frame-up is that you can keep your cake while you eat it. Or sit in a Paris cafe while you walk the streets of Newark. Observe this remarkable feature of frame-ups as Healy's committee continues:

The American Stalinists played a role, but it was secondary to that of the Paris GPU network. . . .

Everyone [that included me—J.H.] at Coyoacán knew that Miss Ageloff met Mercader, alias Jacques Mornard, in Paris and it was to Paris that most of them naturally turned their attention. But not Hansen. The chief of Trotsky's security told McGregor that the operation was conducted from the United States.

If Hansen's wrong advice was followed, it must have please Zborowski and every GPU agent. Because in a year's time Zborowski was to travel to New York to resume his counter-revolutionary activities in the Fourth International and the Socialist Workers Party.

1. According to Healy, then, I should have gone to the French consulate, not the American.

2. What leads Healy to think that the puppet government of Marshal Pétain, which was set up to meet the conditions laid down by the Nazi conquerors of France, would cooperate in uncovering the



Workers Press

HEALY: Caught in logic of big lie.

identity of the assassin of Trotsky? Or is Healy, after all, only an "amateur observer" who has forgotten that Trotsky was assassinated during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact when the Gestapo and its counterpart in the French government were collaborating with the GPU?

3. How does Healy account for our success—despite our "wrong advice"—in establishing that Mornard had used a false passport originally belonging to a participant in the Spanish Civil War?

4. How does Healy explain that the false passport was traced through the American—not the French—consulate? Who does he think supplied the necessary clues? (We knew the exact date "Jacson" went to the United States and the name he used.)

5. Why would Zborowski, or any other GPU agent, be "pleased," as Healy's mind readers put it, because of the exposure of the nature of "Jacson's" passport?

Was "Jacson" pleased? Did he think that I was acting as an "accomplice of the GPU" in going to the American consulate in search of substantive evidence as to his real identity?

The fact is I was working in a close team with Albert Goldman, Evelyn Reed, and others, to expose the assassin and his master in the Kremlin—not to cover up his identity as Healy insinuates. That is the truth. The only one this does not "please" is Healy. Whose interests is he serving with his frame-up?

6. What did my going to the American consulate in Mexico have to do with Zborowski's coming to New York a year later? Did it not have even less connection than Healy's gift to him of a pair of weatherproof British shoes?

In all this, Healy's target again is really Trotsky. On September 14, 1938, Diego Rivera, acting on behalf of Trotsky, issued a statement to the press that began as follows:²⁹

28. See "A Statement on Healy's Frame-up of Hansen and Novack" by Betty Hamilton and Pierre Lambert, *Intercontinental Press*, March 15, 1976, p. 397.

On September 8, the well-known Chicago attorney, Albert Goldman, informed the press of a GPU plot in connection with the congresses in Mexico. The heart of the plot, according to Goldman, was New York, where the leader of the Mexican Stalinist party, Hernan Laborde, was summoned under greatest secrecy. In order better to hide his participation in the plot against Trotsky and his friends, Hernan Laborde spread the rumor that he was leaving for several months in the USSR.

In reality, however, he remained during this entire time in New York in close contact with the most important representatives of the GPU in the United States. Under their direction Laborde worked out a campaign of persecution and slander against Trotsky and his friends. The practical aim of this campaign was either to achieve the expulsion of Trotsky from Mexico—that is, his actual delivrance into the hands of the hangmen of the GPU—or the creation of a favorable atmosphere for doing away with him in Mexico itself. This was Moscow's order.

As a curiosity that may be of interest to students of blind spots, in the very quotation used by Healy to beat the drums about the idiocy of going to the American instead of the French consulate, McGregor writes the following:³⁰

Hansen declared that he shared the opinion expressed to me personally by the late Mr. Trotsky that Mr. Harry Bloch, an American citizen residing in the Federal District, is the direct agent here for Mr. Oumansky, Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Oumansky, Hansen said, is a police officer whom Trotsky knew personally when in authority in Russia and that Trotsky always felt apprehensive of Oumansky's presence in Washington.

In an earlier article,³¹ Healy's "International Committee" quoted from the report made by McGregor on his June 25, 1940, conversation with Leon Trotsky:

In a strictly confidential and private manner Mr. Trotsky told me that he suspected the orders for this attempt on his life came through the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Oumanski, who according to Trotsky is a GPU agent. Trotsky stated that lacking a diplomatic legation in Mexico the Soviet officials in Washington maintain an agent here, who is none other than American citizen Harry Bloch.

This would show that up to the end, Trotsky kept in mind the GPU base of operations in the United States. Moreover, he expressed his awareness of the danger from that source to the very same American consular official whom I went to see on the same subject.

In claiming that I gave the "wrong advice" to McGregor about the GPU base in the United States, why doesn't Healy put Trotsky on the spit? Doesn't Trotsky's "wrong advice" to McGregor show that he

was a "co-conspirator" with Hansen and therefore "an accomplice of the GPU"? Why does Healy insist on maintaining a "deafening silence" about Trotsky's con-

clusions in this matter? Is he afraid of being exposed as an imposter in claiming to uphold Trotsky's positions in the struggle against the GPU?

'If Hansen Had Told Trotsky . . .'

The following passage in McGregor's report to the State Department, as cited in the September 6, 1975, issue of *Workers Press*, appears to the Healyites to be at least one item in their frame-up that is truly irrefutable:

Hansen stated that when in New York in 1938 he was himself approached by an agent of the GPU and asked to desert the Fourth International and join the Third. He referred the matter to Trotsky who asked him to go as far with the matter as possible. For three months Hansen had relations with a man who merely identified himself as "John," and did not otherwise reveal his real identity.

On the basis of this passage (for which I once again disclaim any responsibility), the unidentified members of Healy's "International Committee" make a series of assertions in which lack of proof is counterbalanced by a brazenness reminiscent of Vyshinsky, the prosecutor in the Moscow Frame-up Trials. They have repeated the litany several times; the version in the January 5, 1976, *Workers Press* is typical:

We state categorically that Hansen is lying when he says that Trotsky told him to consort with the GPU agent 'John' Rabinowitz. It is inconceivable that the Bolshevik leader would instruct the head of his security arrangements at Coyoacan to meet a GPU agent over a period of three months.

If Trotsky knew that Hansen had been approached by 'John', he would have exposed it at once. He would have unmasked the GPU's attempt to suborn one of his secretaries as a warning to the New York organization as well as the Trotskyist movement elsewhere.

Trotsky's custom and practice would have led him to take a statement from Hansen about the GPU encounter and publish it along the lines of '*Stalin Seeks My Death*'.

As Trotsky wrote on November 2, 1937:

'We must tirelessly gather printed material, documents, *testimonials of witnesses* (our emphasis) concerning the criminal work of the agents of the GPU-Comintern. We must periodically publish in the Press rigorously substantiated conclusions drawn from these materials.' ('It is High Time to Launch a World Offensive against Stalinism—An Open Letter to all Workers' Organizations', *Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1937-1938*, Pathfinder Press.)

A Hitherto Unpublished Letter by Trotsky

McGregor's report to the State Department on my visit to the American consulate includes among other discrepancies the statement that in 1938 I met an agent of the GPU in New York. But I was in Coyoacán throughout 1938.³² Upon leaving there, I went to New York, arriving

about the first of February 1939. The date is of importance, since it shows the

32. *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1937-38)*, p. 33.

33. I arrived in Coyoacán September 28, 1937, and met L.D. and Natalia the following day.

29. For the full text, see *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1937-38)*, 2nd ed. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976), pp. 449-50.

30. *Workers Press*, September 6, 1975.

31. *Workers Press*, August 21, 1975.

relevance of the following letter to me from Trotsky, which is dated March 8, 1939; that is, a little more than a month after I reached New York.

* * *

March 8, 1939

Dear Joe:

I see again from your letter, as from my discussion with two women comrades who came here from New York, that there exists a very poor state of affairs as regards the work of our party inside the Communist Party. There are no connections at all and there is a certain fatalism in this respect. "We are too weak. We do not have enough man-power to begin a systematic action. Etc."

I find it absolutely false, dangerous, almost to say, criminal. It is my opinion that we must register all the comrades who came from the Communist Party within the last two or three years, those who have personal connections with the Stalinists, and so on. Organize small discussions with them, not of a general, but of a practical, even an individual character. Elaborate some very concrete plans and re-discuss the matter after a week or so. On the basis of such a preparatory work a commission can be crystallized for this purpose.

The end of the Spanish tragedy, the truth about the activities of the Stalinists in Spain and such articles as the excellent correspondence from Terence Phelan in Paris, will inevitably create some disintegration in the Stalinist ranks. We must be present to observe these processes and to utilize the opportunities presented. It is the most important party task of this period.

As you can imagine, it is with the greatest impatience that I await your ultimate information about the manuscript. Your procedure is not clear to me, but I am inclined to suppose that it is good. We will see the results.

We are glad to hear that your and Reba's personal situation is more or less OK and that you have the full possibility of devoting yourself entirely to the Socialist Appeal.

We learn from the Socialist Appeal that our friend Andrews has been arrested. We saw the photos in which he was participating in the "bull fight," not of the Mexican, but of the Yankee "breed." We should be very glad to have some personal lines from Chris himself.

Friendliest greetings from Natalia and myself to you both.

Comradely,
L.T.

Coyoacan, D.F.

LT:L

1-17

PS: I see no reason for writing to Malamuth. He happened to be a poor translator. I did everything in my power to smooth the matter over and not to offend

him. He sent me a very appreciative letter. Then, against all my warnings, he permitted himself a condemnable indiscretion with my manuscript. I protested. His elementary duty should have been to apologize for his mistake and everything would have been in order again. I also find that Comrades Burnham and Shachtman committed an error in entering into a discussion with him about the quality of the manuscript without asking him whether or not he had my authorization to give them the manuscript. The best thing would be for Comrades Burnham and Shachtman, on their own initiative, to explain that they, together with Malamuth, committed something of an indiscretion and that it was best to recognize it as such and let it go at that.

Malamuth seems to have at least three qualities: he does not know Russian; he does not know English; and he is tremendously pretentious. I doubt that he is the best of translators. . .

L.T.

* * *

For the sake of completeness, I have included the entire letter. A few points require clarification:

1. Photographs of the Yankee-type "bull fight." On February 20, 1939, the fascist movement, which was rapidly expanding at the time, staged a meeting in New York at Madison Square Garden. It was attended by about 18,000 people.

In response to a call by the Socialist

The Dynamic Policy Advocated by Trotsky

Trotsky's views on how best to combat the Stalinist machine are well worth studying for what they reveal about his politics in general. The caricature of Trotsky offered by the leaders of the Workers Revolutionary party bears no resemblance to the founder of the Red Army and his incessant probing for openings by which the initiative might be seized.

Just as Trotsky made a fundamental distinction between the conquests of the October revolution and Stalin's totalitarian regime, so he distinguished between the ranks of the Communist parties and their bureaucratic leaders. He considered it imperative to reach the ranks—a task calling for actions far more vigorous than simply distributing leaflets at their meetings.

Accordingly, he proposed some practical moves, one of which was to establish pro-Trotskyist groupings inside the Communist party. The first task of such groupings, he held, was to obtain information. To penetrate the wall of prejudice erected by the CP leadership required accurate knowledge of what was happening among the ranks, the impact of events among

Workers party for a counterdemonstration, about 50,000 people assembled in the adjoining streets. In addition, there were about 50,000 "spectators," according to the police estimate. The police sought to cordon off and split up the demonstrators. However, as the fascists left the rally, fighting broke out at various points. Chris Andrews, who had served as one of the guards at Coyoacán, was among those who appeared in press photographs of the scuffling. A week later he was arrested for something entirely different—passing out leaflets at a Stalinist meeting.

2. In the fourth paragraph, Trotsky says he awaits "with the greatest impatience . . . your ultimate information about the manuscript." This is the way we had agreed to write about my contact with a GPU agent in New York. That Trotsky approved the way I was following through is indicated by the words, "Your procedure is not clear to me, but I am inclined to suppose that it is good. We will see the results."

3. The postscript deals with the manuscript of Trotsky's biography of Stalin. Malamuth had showed parts of his translation to others. Carelessness of this kind could lead to its falling into the hands of the GPU, which would interfere with my assignment.

4. The parts dealing with the "work of our party inside the Communist Party" relate in particular to Trotsky's views on the "best methods of parrying and resisting the Moscow gangsters."

them, possible lines of differentiation, critical moods that were certain to appear from time to time among the leaders, and so on.

Such work would not only coincide with "parrying and resisting" the GPU; it would facilitate it. Consequently, Trotsky pressed for action along this line. Tactical maneuvers to advance the process interested him to a high degree. If steps had already been taken, he sought for more. This was quite characteristic of him.

In the discussion held in Coyoacán June 12-15, 1940,³⁴ Trotsky's approach emerges quite clearly. The combination of his train of reasoning, as stated in his arguments, and his proposed line of action is all the more interesting in that the central subject was what attitude to adopt toward the American Communist party, a much smaller formation than the Communist parties in Western Europe and one renowned for its belly-crawling performan-

34. *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1939-40)*, 2nd ed. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973), pp. 251-89.



Trotsky standing at the side of a campfire on a slope of Ixtacihuatl.

Joseph Hansen

ces in following the twists and turns of the Kremlin.

James P. Cannon posed the problem. The American CP, as its part in supporting the Stalin-Hitler pact, had adopted an antiwar stance that placed it objectively in political opposition to the Roosevelt administration. For the SWP, this created a difficulty. In opposing Roosevelt's preparations to plunge the United States into the Second World War, the SWP had to clearly differentiate itself from the Stalinists. Just how to do this most effectively still remained to be worked out.

"We need a more effective counterattack against the Stalinists," Cannon said. (p. 260.)

Trotsky rapidly went through the possibilities. Did the SWP have its own presidential candidate? No. The smallness of the party and the antidemocratic provisions of the electoral laws made it very difficult to get on the ballot. Was there a labor candidate to whom the SWP could

offer critical support? No. The labor bureaucracy as a whole was supporting Roosevelt.

No alternative was left then, Trotsky reasoned, but to offer critical support to Earl Browder, the antiwar candidate of the Communist party running against Roosevelt. That is, there was no other alternative if the SWP were to follow a dynamic policy and not simply abstain in the presidential elections.

In the ensuing discussion, the American delegation and Trotsky disagreed on the advisability of the tactic.

Cannon based his position on the general orientation followed by the American Trotskyists since 1933; that is, toward the militant layers in the trade unions. He saw few cadres left in the American CP who could be won to Trotskyism. Moreover, an electoral maneuver such as Trotsky proposed could create unnecessary obstacles in winning anti-Stalinist militants, among whom the SWP had been success-

fully recruiting in the years of the big strike waves and the rise of the CIO.

Cannon's opinion was weighty. As one of the founding members, he knew the American Communist party in and out. After founding the Trotskyist movement in the United States in 1928, he had adhered rigorously for five years to a policy of concentrating on trying to win cadres from the CP. In addition, Cannon knew the American labor movement probably better than any other Trotskyist—and there were others who knew it very well.

Trotsky had no disagreement with the general proletarian orientation of the SWP—quite the contrary. Nonetheless, he pressed his point, utilizing *political* arguments that the American delegation pondered and found difficult to answer.

These arguments centered on the political gains that could accrue from the tactic of offering critical support to Browder even if the tactic were but of short duration. Greater receptivity could be expected

among the ranks of the CP to Trotskyist ideas. The possible costs among anti-Stalinist workers would in all likelihood not be high, particularly if they were against Roosevelt and his war preparations.

Besides arguing for this "daring" tactic, Trotsky also pressed his view on the broader problem of engaging the Stalinist foe at closer range. Thus he brought up some points that deserve separate consideration even though they are meshed with his arguments in favor of a dynamic approach to Browder's candidacy:

* * *

"The Stalinists are clearly the most important for us." (p. 261.)

* * *

"Imagine the CP without holding a specific hatred toward it. Could we enter it as we did the SP? I see no reason why not—theoretically. Physically it would be impossible but not in principle. After entrance into the SP there is nothing that would prevent our entrance into the CP. But that is excluded. We can't enter. They won't let us."³⁵

* * *

"Trotsky: . . . Do we have a nucleus among them?"

"Cannon: We have a small nucleus in New York and in one or two other places.

"Trotsky: Sent in?"

"Dobbs: No. They came to us and we advised them to stay and work within.

"Cannon: We got some with our campaign against the fascists." (p. 262.)

* * *

"If the results of our conversation were nothing more than more precise investigation in relation to the Stalinists it would be very fruitful." (p. 266.)

* * *

"It [critical support of Browder] is a short maneuver, not hinging on the main question of the war. But it is necessary to know incomparably better the Stalinists and their place in the trade unions, their reaction to our party." (p. 266.)

* * *

"But we must have contact and information. I don't insist on this plan, under-

35. The American Trotskyists entered as a group into the Socialist party in 1936. The entry was carried out openly, and in fact upon invitation of the Socialist party leadership who were under pressure from a growing left wing. For details see *The History of American Trotskyism* by James P. Cannon, 2nd edition. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), pp. 216-56.

stand, but we must have a plan. What plan do you propose?" (p. 267.)

* * *

"It is a very daring undertaking. But the cohesion of our party is such that we could succeed. But if we reject this plan, then we must find another policy. I repeat then we must find another policy. What is it?" (p. 267.)

* * *

"Shall we follow negative or dynamic politics? I must say that during the conversation I have become still more convinced that we must follow the dynamic course." (p. 269.)

* * *

"Our aim is to oppose the Stalinist worker to the machine. How accomplish this? By leaving them alone? We will never do it. By postponing? That is not a policy." (p. 274.)

Trotsky, Cannon, Shachtman Fully Informed

Trotsky, of course, had been thinking along these lines before Browder found himself temporarily in opposition to Roosevelt and his onrushing preparations for war.

For instance, in a discussion held in Coyoacán March 20, 1939, Trotsky outlined even more specifically his views on this question. "By and by," he said, "an organization can be established, which must do work of two kinds: one, very delicate and illegal work which must be organized only from the top, locally and nationally, working closely with the rank and file; and another, a general penetration in the Stalinist ranks."

The March 20 discussion is of additional interest in that Trotsky quotes from his letter of March 8 to me and also from a letter I wrote him on the same topic.³⁶ The letter from me also proves that I discussed the question of fraction work in the CP with the top leaders of the SWP. "I proposed work on a national scale be instituted of an organizational nature, and one of the higher comrades wondered how I would like to do that kind of work." I displayed interest, I can add, and was awarded the assignment.

As can be surmised, it was rather natural for me to accept an assignment in this field. It was part of the struggle to defend Trotsky against Stalin's decision to kill him. Moreover, it was not just a

36. See "Our Work in the Communist Party," *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1938-39)*, 2nd ed. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974), pp. 237-46.

* * *

"Of course we consider the terror of the GPU control differently; we fight with all means, even bourgeois police." (p. 282.)

* * *

"It is not just to write a manifesto, but to turn our political face to the Stalinist workers. What is bad about that? We begin an action against the Stalinists; what is wrong with that?" (p. 275.)

To summarize: Trotsky proposed a small, short, political maneuver of a daring type—to support Browder as a presidential candidate, but very critically, insisting that he stick to his antiwar position while predicting that he would surely betray.

In the course of the discussion, Trotsky indicated his preoccupation over setting up nuclei in the Communist party to gain information and so on. Even an entry into the CP would be permissible if it could actually be carried out—but, of course, the Stalinists would never acquiesce.

passive defense but part of an effort—however limited—to mount a counteroffensive.

I felt no special aptitude for the task. Nonetheless, under Trotsky's direct influence and the encouragement of Cannon and Shachtman, I was willing at that age to tackle anything that would help advance the Fourth International and speed the victory of socialism. To take on a GPU agent from whom something might be milked would no doubt seem to some to be an unusual and even a "daring undertaking." In Trotsky's battle against Stalinism, it was only a very small maneuver.

I kept Trotsky informed of what I was doing in the assignment, having arranged this with V.T. O'Brien, an American secretary-guard, before leaving Coyoacán. For security reasons, we followed the rule of keeping the number of persons involved to a minimum. For instance, in communicating to O'Brien on this topic, I was to use invisible ink, writing between double-spaced typewritten lines of letters on other subjects.

The response to my first communication was the March 8, 1939, letter from Trotsky. However, because of an error that O'Brien "still finds embarrassing,"³⁷ the response was unusually delayed.

"A couple of weeks after your departure," O'Brien continues, "I received a long letter from you, full of news from New York and of our friends there and around

37. The quotations are from a letter by O'Brien to me dated June 8, 1976.

the country. I read it gratefully but never thought to give it the heat test. I don't remember whether you finally flashed a signal to me or L.D., but I very well recall bringing in the letter with the real message showing plainly. L.D., this man with whom I had a most warm and friendly relationship, said quite seriously and without anger, "Thomas, in time of war you would be shot."

Trotsky and O'Brien then read the letter together, as they did with most letters from the United States, O'Brien recalls, "with my 'translation' of difficult or idiomatic phrases. After apologies for the unconscionable delay, I relayed L.D.'s advice to continue the contact."

Trotsky advised me to ask the comrades in the SWP under whom I had been working in this field to be sure to draw up a memorandum for future reference.

Max Shachtman drew up the memorandum in the form of a report to the Political Committee. (It was actually made known to only some of the members at the time, those with an incorrigible inclination to gossip about matters taken up in the Political Committee being bypassed.) Cannon went over the draft, making a few changes. They thought I ought to sign it, too, although I was not a member of the National Committee, still less the Political Committee, at the time. Here is the text:

* * *

April 7, 1939

To the Political Committee
of the Socialist Workers Party

Comrades:

Upon his return to the United States from Mexico, Comrade Joe Hansen chanced to meet an agent of the G.P.U. This agent introduced Hansen to a superior in the G.P.U., a man apparently the head or one of the heads of the American division of the G.P.U. This man whose real name Hansen does not know but who may be called "Y" sounded out the possibilities of converting Hansen into an agent of the G.P.U. Hansen immediately informed Comrades Trotsky, Cannon, and Shachtman. Under their direction and with their full approval he conducted for purposes of reconnaissance in the American G.P.U. organization a series of conversations with "Y" upon the Stalin book which Comrade Trotsky is now writing, the internal status of the S.W.P., and the internal conditions at Mexico, in all cases giving equivocal, mis-leading answers to "Y's" questions or telling him things that are semi-public knowledge, reporting in detail after each meeting to Comrades Trotsky, Cannon, and Shachtman. Through these conversations valuable information has been gained for the Fourth International. Hansen is disinclined—for fear that the

story might leak out and because the reconnaissance is not yet completed—that the entire P.C. should be made aware of this affair at present without full guarantees that his personal safety and the further political gains which might accrue be safe-guarded by complete silence on the part of P.C. members with their friends, political associates, and correspondents regarding this affair. Even the most guarded allusions or hints might cause the

Healy's Fakery in Calling for a 'Commission of Inquiry'

In the June 12, 1976, issue of the *News Line*, Healy's shadowy "International Committee" repeats the litany of their January 1 declaration:

JOSEPH Hansen and George Novack of the Socialist Workers Party (USA) have kept a five-month silence since the International Committee of the Fourth International indicted them as accomplices of the GPU.

They cannot reply to our indictment. Only one conclusion can be drawn from this silence. *Until they answer before an international commission of inquiry, our charges are proved and they are guilty as charged.* [Emphasis added.]

The International Committee of the Fourth International has called upon them to submit to an international commission of inquiry along the lines of the Dewey Commission which Trotsky set up to repudiate the frame-up charges of the Moscow Trials.

The International Committee is prepared to appear before such a body and present its evidence. But Hansen and Novack are not. They have shown that they have not the slightest intention of accounting for the 30 years they have masqueraded as 'Trotskyists'.

"Until they answer before an international commission of inquiry, our charges are proved and they are guilty as charged." Why did Healy feel compelled to take such an antidemocratic position? Must we conclude that it is part of his reformism? That he wants to reform the British juridical system so that it comes closer to the system followed by Stalin and Vyshinsky? The answer is probably, no. Healy took this position because he does not have a particle of evidence, and thus he feels the difficulty of making his charges stick. His proclamation of "guilty until proved innocent" is a way of solving the problem.

How convenient for Healy—he merely spits epithets, and unless his targets answer in the way he prescribes, his epithets are proved. Thus if his victims choose to ignore his slanders, as is their right, they automatically become "guilty as charged."

Let us turn to his proposed "international commission of inquiry."

Concretely, what would be the composition of the commission? For chairman, does Healy have in mind a pragmatist as eminent as John Dewey was in the field of philosophy? Would this person of international stature as a liberal and a civil

failure of further work in this respect.

J.P. Cannon
Max Shachtman
Joe Hansen

* * *

I returned to Coyoacán the first part of October 1939. When Trotsky reviewed the small maneuver with me, he thought it best not to publicize it. But he did say, "I think you may not have heard the last of it."

libertarian accept the ground rule laid down by Healy's nameless and faceless committee that Hansen and Novack are guilty of all charges cooked up by Healy until they prove their innocence?

Just who would organize and finance the commission and its hearings? George Novack with his experience in that side of setting up the Dewey Commission is an indicated candidate; but then Healy charges him with being an "accomplice of the GPU"—guilty beyond a peradventure of a doubt until he proves his innocence to Healy's satisfaction.

Everything has been turned into its opposite in Healy's fake call. It was Stalin in the Moscow Frame-up Trials—not John Dewey—who followed the principle, which Healy has now made his own: *Until they prove their innocence, they are guilty as charged.*

In the hearings before the Dewey Commission, Trotsky set out to prove his innocence, although this was not required under the rules followed by the commission.³⁸ He set out to do still more—to prove that Stalin was guilty of perpetrating a monstrous frame-up, not only against him and his son Leon Sedov, but against all the defendants in the Moscow trials.

Healy calls for an "international commission of inquiry" as if he were the victim of the frame-up and not its perpetrator. Meanwhile, under the auspices of his "Political Committee of the Workers Revolutionary Party" and his "International Committee of the Fourth International"—both of which he keeps shrouded—he publicizes his lies and defamations in his press in the style of Vyshinsky.

Trotsky, as the major target in those trials, called for an international commission of inquiry because of reasons of much greater import than Stalin's foul slanders. Moreover, his first move was not for a commission of inquiry but a demand that the Soviet government apply for his extradition, which would have thrown the case into the courts where he could appeal to bourgeois justice. The commission of

38. On the reasons for Trotsky's decision, see *The Case of Leon Trotsky* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1968), pp. 6-8; 445-46; 464-67.

inquiry was a substitute for the stronger and more dynamic procedure.

Let me repeat—it was not merely the slanders directed against him personally that led Trotsky to call Stalin to account, whether in the bourgeois courts or in a commission of inquiry. Stalin held state power, which he had usurped. The lives of an entire generation of revolutionists, including Lenin's top staff of Bolsheviks, were at stake. The Dewey Commission offered Trotsky a platform, even if a limited one, to appeal to world public opinion against Stalin's purges and his international network of killers.

Even more important, the Dewey Commission made it possible for Trotsky to amplify his voice in explaining what had happened in the first workers state; and how best to combat the Stalinist degeneration, defend the remaining conquests of the October revolution, and advance the struggle for a socialist world.

In the case of George Novack and me, the situation is quite different. We are faced with nothing but the miserable slanders of the head of a tiny, ossified sect, a tin-pot despot who cannot extend his purges beyond his own ranks. No lives are at stake.

While our reputation is involved, we feel this requires but little defense. An issue of more general concern is Healy's use of frame-up methods. On that, a quarantine notice should serve for the time being as sufficient prophylaxis.

If it were necessary, we would, or course, call for an investigation of Healy's frame-up; and we would make some specific proposals. The exposure of the frame-up, however, has already been completed.

Healy's International Committee states that it is "prepared to appear" before an international commission of inquiry "and present its evidence." This, obviously, is the "evidence" already published and circulated wherever a hypnotized Healyite is able to function. If Healy has more of such "evidence," let him publish it.

And if the International Committee is prepared to appear before an international commission, let this mysterious body begin by publishing the names of its members. Let them come out of the woodwork and into the light. What is the reason for such strenuous efforts to maintain the anonymity of these addicts of the poison pen, who are doing their utmost to destroy the reputations of cadres that have been in the forefront of the struggle for Trotskyism for four decades and more?

Had Healy actually run across evidence strong enough to arouse suspicions of us, his proper procedure would have been to place his findings before the Political Committee of the SWP for its consideration. Instead, he opened a lurid, internationally orchestrated publicity campaign, thereby betraying that his motives were purely factional.

We answered him publicly. Thus the evidence and the arguments of both sides were placed before a broad audience that in this case served as a competent "commission." The decision has been coming in

from many countries. The verdict is virtually unanimous—condemnation of Healy for perpetrating a frame-up and denunciation of the use of such methods in the labor movement.

The Politics of Desperation

In conclusion, a few words should be said about Healy's political motives. For the past couple of years, his grouping has been in a state of crisis. Several substantial splits have occurred, and his press continually features denunciations of "renegades"; that is, cadres who have reached the conclusion that something is decidedly wrong with Healy's leadership. As a result, these cadres are reading material that was previously verboten. Some have opened lines of communication with the Socialist Workers party and with sections of the Fourth International adhering to the United Secretariat.

Healy's number one problem is to stop the disintegration of his forces and to seal them off from the influence of those who became critical of his politics. He is particularly concerned about the attraction of the SWP.

Novack was selected as a target because of his appeal on the philosophical level as a defender, advocate, and user of dialectical materialism; and because Novack spoke out against the frame-up directed against me.

I was selected as a kind of chief target because of criticisms I have made of Healy's politics and practices and because of my editorship of *Intercontinental Press*, a weekly voice of international Trotskyism that gets around in Britain, as it does in various countries where members of Healy's grouping are to be found.

Other SWP leaders, including James P. Cannon and now Jack Barnes, have been singled out for attention because of the influence of the SWP as a whole and

because of the contrast it offers to Healy's sectarianism and stifling regime.

Healy was once a promising Trotskyist leader who received strong backing from the SWP in the arduous task of building a mass revolutionary-socialist party in Britain. The opportunities to advance this work in the late 1950s and early 1960s were truly brilliant. However, precisely when the political and organizational problems were becoming acute, going beyond Healy's limited experience, he veered sharply toward sectarianism and the blind alley of ultraleftism. Instead of continuing to collaborate politically with James P. Cannon and other leaders of the SWP for whom the new set of problems was not so new, Healy terminated this fruitful relation, averring that the SWP was capitulating to "Pabloism." Healy's turn cut off the possibility of swift advances in Britain and doomed him to isolation.

Healy is still trying to justify his course, mainly by heaping opprobrium on his former friends and comrades. This way of seeking justification for a tragic departure from Trotskyism accounts on the political level for Healy finding himself compelled finally to resort to the use of frame-up methods.

At this point we hardly need to analyze the bizarreness of his assumption that he could get away indefinitely with such methods if he just used them more and more forcefully. These malicious methods are as self-defeating as were Stalin's deadly frame-ups.

July 10, 1976

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FBI Tops Exposed in New Burglary of Socialists

By Larry Seigle

NEW YORK—Another political bombshell exploded in the FBI's face last week. An FBI informer in the Young Socialist Alliance chapter in Denver, Colorado, was revealed to be the burglar who broke into the Socialist Workers party headquarters in Denver on July 7 and hauled off four cartons of party files.

What's worse—for the government—is that the FBI's files on the informer and on the burglary implicate FBI officials all the way up to FBI boss Clarence Kelley in the cover-up of the Denver break-in.

The informer file, the first ever to be made public, also provides a devastating portrait of the FBI informer as a person with ultraright views, a history of psychiatric problems, and a bad habit of committing burglaries—political and otherwise. Nonetheless, he was rated an "excellent" informer by his FBI superiors.

The ramifications of the Denver disclosures are far-reaching. Investigators from the Justice Department in Washington are in Denver, gathering evidence as part of the department's ongoing probe into FBI break-ins.

Evidence is being compiled against some thirty FBI agents and officials for their involvement in burglaries in recent years, including "dozens" against the SWP, according to the *New York Times*. The FBI men are said to be scrambling to rat on their fellows in return for lenient treatment from the prosecutors.

The most important consequences of the Denver revelations, however, will be their impact on the massive lawsuit being prosecuted by the SWP and the YSA against the White House, the FBI, the CIA, and other government spy agencies. This unprecedented suit, which is the subject of increasingly prominent national news coverage, is widely credited as responsible for some of the most significant revelations about FBI crimes, and for forcing the government to undertake its current investigation, which could send FBI agents and informers to jail.

The suit has already forced the FBI to admit that the SWP was the target of at least ninety-four burglaries between 1960 and 1966. Information on more recent burglaries has been obtained by the SWP as a result of court orders.

The suit has also forced the CIA to admit that it carries out break-ins and electronic surveillance against Americans abroad. (See News Analysis.)

The Denver burglary took place before dawn on July 7. At a news conference later

that day to protest the break-in and to rally support for the demand that the cops apprehend those responsible, the Denver SWP charged that the theft had all the earmarks of an FBI operation.

However, an FBI official told reporters that the bureau had "absolutely no knowledge of the break-in."

Then, on July 24, a Denver newspaper reported that Denver Police Chief Arthur Dill had said that the FBI had told cops where the stolen files could be found. Several days later, newspapers reported that the suspect in the case was Timothy Redfearn, a paid informer for the FBI in the Young Socialist Alliance.

Lawyers for the SWP and YSA moved quickly. At a July 28 emergency hearing in federal court in New York City, where the lawsuit is being heard, the socialists insisted that the FBI be ordered to turn over the complete file on Redfearn and on the break-in.

In an unprecedented move, the federal judge in charge of the case directed the FBI to make the material available, *uncensored*, no later than noon on July 30. All other material turned over by the FBI has been heavily expurgated to conceal the most damaging information.

The files contain irrefutable proof that FBI higher-ups conspired to cover up the Denver break-in and to withhold information.

The files contain a teletyped message, transmitted in code from the Denver office to Director Clarence Kelley in Washington, dated July 8, *the day after the burglary*.

This message states in part: "At approximately 2:30 p.m., July 7, 1976, DN 481-S [Redfearn's code number; "DN" means Denver, "S" stands for security matter, and "481" is Redfearn's assigned number] telephonically contacted agent that he had something of great interest to the bureau. Contacting agent met DN 481-S and found that he had some files pertaining to SWP/YSA matters in the trunk of his car which he felt that the office might wish to reproduce. When asked how he obtained this matter, DN 481-S replied, 'You don't want to know.' . . . This information was immediately furnished to FBIHQ [in Washington] who in turn instructed Denver to advise the informant to return the files and that he should not furnish this office with any documents. These instructions were relayed to the informant who expressed disappointment. . . . He

then left with the files intact in the trunk of his automobile."

In other words, FBI headquarters knew that the informer had stolen documents, but failed to instruct the Denver FBI to notify the police. They also failed to make this information available to the judge in the SWP case, or to the Justice Department investigators who at that very time were investigating illegal FBI burglaries.

Moreover, although this report asserts that the files were left "intact," another document in the files contradicts this. A form identified as a "Cover Sheet for Informant Report or Material" records that FBI Special Agent John Almon, Redfearn's controlling agent, received "A list of subscribers to 'The Militant,' the socialist news weekly published by the SWP." This list was obtained from "DN 481-S" on July 7. The list was delivered "in person."

A second sheet, received from the same source on the same date, describes an "original mailing list of Concerned Citizens for Equal Education," a Denver group fighting for bilingual education and school desegregation.

The moment the burglary became known to the FBI, the machinery for the cover-up was set into motion. The July 8 teletype from the Denver FBI to Kelley states, "Newspaper inquiries will receive reply that this office knows nothing of the burglary at SWP headquarters."

A second memo, dated July 16, reports that James Ingram, FBI deputy assistant director for the Intelligence Division in Washington, told the Denver office by phone that Kelley had given instructions to be personally notified about any "press release" to be issued in the case.

According to this memo, "INGRAM advised that it was the recommendation [of FBI headquarters] that if press inquiries were received by the Denver Office the Denver Office would respond as follows: FBI has not taken any documents, nor has it instructed anyone to do so—that any comments would be inappropriate as the FBI is engaged in litigation with the SWP."

The cover-up machinery was operating according to plan until July 14. On that day Redfearn was arrested at the Denver airport by local cops on a charge of stealing furniture from the house of a neighbor.

The following day, July 15, the Denver FBI office told the cops for the first time

that Redfearn was an informer for the FBI and that the stolen files were in his possession. Whether Redfearn began to bargain with the cops by disclosing his role as an FBI informer, or the FBI merely feared that he might do so, is unclear. Whatever the reason, the FBI was convinced it had to wash its hands of Redfearn.

In an "urgent" message to the Denver office FBI Chief Kelley said, "After carefully reviewing the facts available concerning circumstances surrounding the obtaining of SWP/YSA files by DN 481-S, it is the determination of headquarters that source's identity and the fact of his possession of these files should be made known to the Denver Police Department."

However, the cover-up didn't end when Redfearn was fingered by his former employers. The FBI, following detailed instructions from Kelley's office in Washington, has merely tightened its perimeter of defense, hoping to protect FBI agents and officials who are into this conspiracy up to their ears.

On July 21, Special Agent John Almon was advised of his rights by the Denver district attorney's office, and questioned at length.

The Denver office of the FBI dispatched a memo to Kelley recommending that, "In view of nature of questioning of SA [Special Agent] John V. Almon by DDAO [Denver District Attorney's Office] on July 21, 1976, indication appears strong that DDAO is looking toward grand jury presentation of possible conspiracy charges against SA Almon based on statements made by Redfearn concerning materials taken by him from Denver SWP office."

The Denver office reported that Almon would decline to submit to a lie detector and had not kept an appointment with Denver cops for fingerprinting. The DA wants to check Almon's fingerprints against those on the SWP's files to see if he had handled them.

The Denver FBI also told Kelley, "In the event the DA again requests the file maintained by this office on Redfearn it is recommended that they be advised that this file cannot be released without the approval of the U.S. Attorney General."

The message added that two Denver FBI officials would refuse to answer questions from the district attorney.

The FBI had no choice but to concede the Redfearn burglary. However, the documents in the secret file show that the FBI is desperately trying to seal off the investigation before it uncovers other illegal acts carried out by Denver FBI agents and informers.

In an astonishingly frank memo—obviously never designed to be made public under any circumstances—Kelley cabled his Denver office, "In order to be apprised of any problems which might arise from a later grand jury subpoena, the [Justice] Department has requested that

the Denver office gather data and be prepared to advise, on short notice, as to whether such testimony could possibly lead into areas concerning *other break-ins by this former informant, other informants of the Denver office or agent personnel of the Denver office directed against the Denver branches of the SWP/YSA.*" (Emphasis added.)

On July 19, Redfearn telephoned Almon and frantically asked "that the FBI provide him with new identification and relocate him in another city," according to a memo from Almon. Almon apparently let him know that things had gone too far for that.

The nearly 2,000 pages from Redfearn's file turned over under court order offer an unprecedented look into the subterranean world of FBI spies. The picture that emerges is one of a highly unstable personality with a long record of criminal activity sanctioned and protected by his FBI superiors.

When Redfearn was first tagged in newspaper reports as the suspect in the burglary, YSA members visited his apartment and found it decorated with Nazi emblems and paraphernalia. Whether Redfearn is linked in some way to a Nazi group is unknown. However, on July 26, the day Redfearn's identity was exposed, a photograph of a Nazi poster was found pinned to the door of the YSA office at Metropolitan State College in Denver.

In 1973, Redfearn had turned over the fruits of at least two of his burglaries to the FBI. In the files is a report, dated December 30, 1973, from Redfearn accompanying "several items" that "were removed from the MILITANT bookstore at 1203 California St. Denver last night."

According to the report, signed by his code name "Lennon," 350 pages were copied and then returned to the headquarters.

Around the same time, Redfearn broke into the home of several members of the

YSA who were out of town attending the YSA convention. He took not only personal and political papers, including bank statements, but also helped himself to a stereo and some jewelry that was in the apartment.

Throughout his career, he received high marks from the FBI for his resourcefulness. An evaluation of Redfearn, dated January 10, 1974, noted approvingly that, "Very recently, he made available for Xeroxing, YSA records relating to finances, membership, executive committee meetings, national meetings, resignations, transfers and graduations to SWP."

This form indicates that Redfearn was "considered stable and reliable" and that he was authorized to receive up to \$300 a month "for services rendered on a c.o.d. [collect on delivery] basis," and up to \$50 a month for "expenses actually incurred."

A report from an FBI inspection team, which visited the Denver office on a routine tour to make sure that bureau regulations and rules were being obeyed, judged Redfearn as "excellent," the highest rating. The report was dated January 22, 1974. The inspector, obviously, had access to the reports indicating Redfearn's break-ins. Under "remarks" appears the following notation: "Well handled informant. File is administratively sound."

However, in early 1975, Redfearn was arrested by Denver cops for stealing some \$20,000 worth of guns and electronic equipment from a home. Redfearn pleaded with his FBI cohorts to intercede with the prosecutor on his behalf, but the FBI decided not to disclose Redfearn's FBI links even to the local cops.

According to the file, Redfearn told his control agent that "during most of March, 1975, he was in St. Joseph's Hospital receiving treatment for depressed condition occasioned by his arrest on burglary charge . . ." and by what Redfearn said were threats on his life.

In light of this information, added to the fact that "since his arrest in Feb, 1975, source has made no significant efforts to

Appeal for International Support for SWP Suit

The suit launched by the Socialist Workers party against the major agencies of the U.S. government has already exposed secret-police activities of a wide scope against the socialist, labor, Black, Chicano, women's, and antiwar movements.

Recently, the SWP compelled the CIA to admit that it carried out burglaries, wiretaps, and other illegal activities against SWP members living abroad. These could only have been carried out with the complicity of the governments involved.

As the SWP suit progresses, it will further expose Washington's undemo-

cratic practices and the complicity of other governments.

Socialists and all those who believe in democracy around the world should add their support to the thousands of Americans of many different political viewpoints who have endorsed the SWP suit. This effort is being coordinated by the Political Rights Defense Fund.

To add your name as an endorser of the SWP suit, or for more information, write:

Political Rights Defense Fund
Box 649, Cooper Station
New York, N.Y. 10003
United States

provide coverage re Denver chapter YSA," Redfearn's services were terminated. Redfearn has reportedly been under psychiatric care for "intermittent depression" for several years.

However, in December of 1975, FBI headquarters in Washington answered an inquiry from Denver by stating it had "no objection to reactivation" of Redfearn. It further authorized payments of up to \$400 a month. The FBI noted that terms of his parole barred him from associating with criminal types. But, the bureau pointedly observed, this did not include members of the YSA and SWP.

In April, 1976, an FBI inspector rated Redfearn's performance as "very good," and added that "in short time source has been reopened he has provided very good info."

As late as June, 1976, an "Extremist or Security Informant Progress/Justification Letter" noted once again that Redfearn was viewed as "stable and reliable."

"Source attends and furnishes information on all regularly scheduled meetings of the YSA," the letter noted, "as well as all special meetings and demonstrations arranged by the SWP and YSA in the Denver area. At the present time source is reporting on 29 members of the Denver Branch of the YSA and 23 members of the Denver Branch of the SWP."

Redfearn freely used epithets like "nigger" and "queer" in his reports, confident that the words wouldn't offend any of those who would read them.

There is no reason to doubt that Redfearn is typical of the rats the FBI employs. The FBI testified before the Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities that it employs more than 1,500 "domestic intelligence informers." The annual budget for their activities is \$7,400,000—more than twice what is spent on criminal informers.

Yet it was only a combination of an accidental arrest and quick action by the SWP that has brought Redfearn's file to light. Other files, undoubtedly documenting literally tens of thousands of illegal thefts and break-ins, remain locked in the FBI vaults.

Among them are undoubtedly further details on FBI harassment against the Denver socialists. The July 7 burglary was only the latest in a series of attacks against the SWP and the YSA.

According to the PRDF's Stapleton, attorneys for the SWP will be taking steps in court to compel the FBI to turn over all files on FBI informers used against the socialists. "We will also show," Stapleton added, "that the FBI has failed to respond to the judge's orders that they turn over files that would document illegal activities by the FBI. None of Redfearn's files, which prove at least two previous burglaries against the YSA, were supplied prior to this latest order." □

Aumenta la Escalada Represiva

Cómo me Deportaron del Perú

Por Hugo Blanco

Yo había viajado al Cuzco el 21 de junio. Yo vivía en Lima y había viajado al Cuzco con el objeto de participar en la concentración pública de mi federación, que es la federación provincial de campesinos de La Convención y Lares.

Esta federación agrupa alrededor de 100 sindicatos de campesinos en la zona de La Convención y Lares en el departamento del Cuzco. Entre estos sindicatos está el mío, que es el sindicato de Chaupimayo. También soy miembro del Comité Ejecutivo nacional de la Confederación Campesina del Perú (CCP).

Había llegado al Cuzco el 21, y el 24 fui a la manifestación pública. No era la única manifestación ese día, porque el 24 de junio es el día del Campesinado y hay manifestaciones en varias partes.

La manifestación a la que fui se llevaba a cabo con el debido permiso de las autoridades de la provincia, o sea que no tenía absolutamente nada de ilegal. Se había pedido permiso por escrito, y había sido otorgado.

Inclusive la policía sabía que yo iba al Cuzco a hablar en la manifestación en Quillabamba.

Posteriormente fui a la asamblea de la federación el día sábado 26 de junio. Es la asamblea regular de la federación cada sábado. Uno de los sindicatos me pidió que fuera a la renovación de cargos que iba a haber en ese sindicato para el día siguiente, de modo que asistí a esa asamblea. También era una asamblea absolutamente legal.

Posteriormente, el 30 de junio asistí a una asamblea de mi sindicato en Chaupimayo para tratar de los problemas de la cooperativa. Es una cooperativa de comercialización de productos, una de las que hay en el valle de La Convención. Estuve, pues, en la asamblea de esa cooperativa, que fue también, por supuesto, una asamblea completamente legal.

Quiero hacer notar que durante todo el tiempo que estuve en el campo no sabía nada de lo que estaba sucediendo en las ciudades. Al llegar al Cuzco el día 1 de julio me enteré de que tenía que tomar un taxi para ir a mi casa porque había paro de los microbuses, o sea, paro del transporte colectivo por un alza que había habido de los precios de la gasolina.

Al llegar a mi casa leí los periódicos y me enteré del alza; era un alza del 117% en el precio de la gasolina y juntamente con eso una devaluación de la moneda del 30%. También hubo simultáneamente un alza de los transportes en el 30% y otras

medidas económicas, incluyendo un aumento de salarios solamente del 10 al 15%, pero los salarios quedaban congelados por 12 meses.

Estas eran, pues, unas medidas económicas que afectaban fuertemente al pueblo peruano, especialmente a los sectores más pobres. Estos pasos están enmarcados dentro de las medidas que se están aplicando desde hace algún tiempo en el Perú para tratar de salvar al capitalismo peruano de la crisis. El ministro de Economía, Luis Barúa Castañeda está aplicando una serie de medidas recomendadas por el Fondo Monetario Internacional. No es, pues, la primera vez que aplican medidas de este tipo, pero nunca lo han hecho en forma tan fuerte y tan concentrada como esta.

Esto, indudablemente, trae más hambre en el pueblo, hay más desocupación y causa un descontento popular creciente.

Debido a estas medidas hubo la huelga de los transportes colectivos. Los microbuses decretaron paro general a escala nacional.

Después me enteré de más detalles de esto, ya cuando estuve prisionero en Lima. El gobierno decía que los microbuseros querían el aumento de los pasajes, pero los microbuseros con los cuales yo estuve preso me aclararon que eso era completamente falso, que lo que ellos pedían era que la gasolina bajase al precio antiguo, y también que los pasajes bajasen al precio antiguo. Aun con esto, ellos se estaban sacrificando, porque el alza del dólar y el alza de muchas mercancías de todas maneras les iba a perjudicar a ellos también, pero a pesar de eso no pedían ni un centavo de alza.

El gobierno peruano ha tratado de hacer un paralelo entre las huelgas producidas en el Perú con las que se produjeron en Chile contra el gobierno de Allende.

Como todos sabemos, en Chile había huelgas de los dueños de los transportes contra el gobierno de Allende. Estas eran huelgas derechistas junto con toda la patronal para bajar al gobierno de la Unidad Popular y para aplastar a la clase trabajadora.

El gobierno nunca habla claramente contra Chile, no solamente no habla contra Pinochet ni contra el régimen militar en Chile sino que mantiene muy buenas relaciones con este gobierno y no permite que en el Perú se haga una campaña contra la dictadura de Chile.

Las organizaciones fabricadas por el gobierno, las llamadas organizaciones

laborales—como el Frente de Defensa de la Revolución Peruana—no hacen ninguna movilización contra la dictadura chilena.

El gobierno pudo calumniar fácilmente a los microbuseros en paro porque todos los diarios de circulación nacional están en sus manos. El gobierno dice que están socializados y en manos de organizaciones populares, pero eso es absolutamente falso. De acuerdo a los virajes que tiene el gobierno y de acuerdo al sector que está más fuerte en el gobierno es que se cambian los periodistas que más gustan a un sector o a otro del gobierno, los directores de los diarios, etc. Y la única prensa independiente que hay en el Perú—además de algunos periódicos locales que tienen que actuar con mucha cautela y tienen poca circulación—a escala nacional, son las revistas semanales, quincenales o mensuales.

El gobierno decomisó las principales de estas revistas independientes, de tal modo que cualquier cosa que hubieran querido sacar los microbuseros, cualquier aclaración, no podían hacerlo porque estas revistas estaban decomisadas.

Quiero hacer notar acá que esto va limitando cada vez más la libertad de prensa, fundamentalmente contra la izquierda, puesto que aunque también han sido decomisadas las revistas de derecha, para la derecha no hay problema, porque tienen el suficiente dinero como para volver a sacar la revista. En cambio, la revista *Marka*, por ejemplo, que es una revista de izquierda, va a tener muchas dificultades económicas si es que continúa saliendo, y tal vez deje de salir por razones económicas, porque ya es la tercera vez que se decomisa *Marka*, y estas revistas de izquierda viven sólo de sus ventas; el decomiso de toda la edición es, por supuesto, un golpe muy serio contra ellas.

Debido a la huelga de los microbuseros hubo en Lima concentraciones de gente, especialmente de obreros y estudiantes, los obreros que querían ir a su trabajo y los estudiantes que querían ir a sus colegios. Todos estaban indignados por las alzas de precios.

Se agolpaban en los paraderos esperando alguna forma de movilizarse, y estas concentraciones fueron el origen de manifestaciones espontáneas que surgieron en varias partes de Lima, especialmente en las barriadas, es decir, las poblaciones marginales.

Las manifestaciones tomaron la forma de movilizaciones contra el gobierno y contra el capitalismo. Fue asaltado por lo menos un local de una oficina gubernamental en una barriada, y también fueron apedreadas algunas empresas, por ejemplo, Motor Perú, que fabrica carros.

También fueron bloqueados puentes y otras vías de comunicación tanto en el norte como en el sur de Lima. Se hablaba de que había habido asaltos a casas comerciales y quema de algunos microbuses que estaban circulando durante la

huelga, o sea que la gente apoyaba a los microbuseros que estaban en huelga a pesar de que era poca la gente que sabía las verdaderas razones de esta huelga.

El gobierno decretó la suspensión de garantías durante treinta días y también el toque de queda a partir de las 10 de la noche hasta las 5 de la mañana. Dicen que por las calles de Lima circularon tanques, carros blindados y también la caballería. Se produjeron muchos arrestos esos días aprovechando la suspensión de garantías.

Una de las disposiciones de la suspensión de garantías es que no se podía entrar ni salir de Lima sin permiso. La zona de Lima y alrededores fue declarada en estado de emergencia.

Yo estaba en el Cuzco y no sabía ninguno de los datos exactos de estos sucesos, solamente lo que salía en el periódico y una que otra noticia que escuché de radios extranjeras.

Tenía que viajar a Lima el sábado 3 de julio, pero la noche anterior vino la policía de investigaciones a la casa de mi hermano, que era donde yo estaba alojado. Fui despertado por mi cuñada, que me dijo, "La policía te busca." De modo que me levanté, me vestí y me llevaron detenido. Esto era alrededor de medianoche. Me llevaron a la estación de policía donde estuve incomunicado más de veinticuatro horas. El domingo, más o menos a las 11 de la mañana fui llevado a Lima en avión. No me dijeron por qué estaba arrestado y en ningún momento me acusaron de nada.

En Lima estuve también en el cuartel de la policía de investigaciones. Allí me hicieron tres interrogatorios en tres días diferentes.

El primer interrogatorio fue acerca de lo que yo había hecho en Lima durante los nueve meses de mi estadía en el Perú. Yo dije todo lo que había hecho porque era completamente público.

Me preguntaron con insistencia cuántas veces había ido a la redacción de la revista *Marka*, para qué había ido y qué había hecho allí. Les dije que algunas veces había ido para pedir algún número atrasado, y las últimas veces me hicieron un reportaje sobre el movimiento campesino en el cual yo había participado desde 1958 hasta 1963.

Además me interrogaron qué vinculación tenía yo con Francisco Montes, que es director de *Palabra Socialista* y miembro del Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, el partido trotskista en el Perú. Yo contesté que Francisco Montes es director de *Palabra Socialista* y que yo escribía para ese periódico algunos artículos. Cuando me preguntaron por mis relaciones con el PST contesté que no militaba en ese partido puesto que era imposible la militancia, ya que era seguido permanentemente por la policía; aunque indudablemente yo compartía los puntos de vista políticos del PST.

Desde el momento en que llegué al Perú, hace nueve meses, había frente a mi casa

por lo menos un carro, a veces dos y a veces tres de la policía; a veces también había motocicletas equipadas con radio. Adonde yo fuera, la policía me seguía. Varias veces, si no siempre, tomaban fotos de la gente que venía a visitarme.

Cuando iba al Cuzco, me vigilaban hasta que me subía al avión y cuando llegaba al Cuzco, inmediatamente que bajaba del avión la policía me tomaba fotografías y también me seguía.

En la casa de mi hermano en Cuzco, que era donde me alojaba, hay teléfono, y permanentemente llamaban preguntando si estaba ahí, qué hacía yo, dónde había salido, dónde iba a salir, si iba a viajar a alguna parte, etc. Era una vigilancia al milímetro. Cuando iba a algún pueblo, a veces a pie, mandaban después gente que me siguiera a pie a ese pueblo, y si iba en carro, lo mismo.

Por lo tanto, de todas estas actividades más, mejores datos tenía la policía que yo. Ellos, por supuesto, lo tenían todo por escrito, y en cambio yo no memorizaba todo lo que había hecho día tras día.

Quiero recalcar que durante los nueve meses que yo he estado en el Perú no he hecho absolutamente nada ilegal. He dado mis puntos de vista sobre el gobierno, sobre las medidas del gobierno, etc., que según lo que dice el gobierno peruano es legal. Está permitido que uno pueda ejercer el derecho de crítica inclusive cuando se denuncian las deportaciones. Yo no he hecho más que ejercer este derecho.

El segundo interrogatorio fue acerca de USLA (United States Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners—Comité de los Estados Unidos para la Justicia con los Presos Políticos Latinoamericanos). Por este interrogatorio me di cuenta de que la policía leía toda mi correspondencia.

El tercer interrogatorio fue acerca de muchas personas de la política peruana y

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cuál era mi relación con ellas. A este interrogatorio me negué a contestar. Les dije que no iba a contestar esas preguntas porque yo sabía que cualquier persona que tuviera alguna relación conmigo—incluso simplemente un amigo o un miembro de mi familia—quedaba en peligro de ser víctima de la represión. Esto les había sucedido a varios parientes míos por el solo hecho de ser mis parientes.

Les cité el caso de mi madre.

Cuando mi madre estaba agonizando y yo estaba deportado en Chile, pedí a las autoridades peruanas que me permitieran ir al Perú. Para lo único que sirvió mi solicitud fue para que la policía fuera donde mi madre estaba agonizando y se complaciera en ver su agonía.

Después de este interrogatorio hablé con uno de los jefes de la policía y le dije que ya me habían preguntado todo lo que yo podía decir y que si seguían llevándome a interrogatorios yo lo iba a interpretar como una forma de tortura.

Varias veces en mis anteriores detenciones me tuvieron sentado durante cuatro, cinco, diez horas a veces, interrogándome. Claro que no me interrogaban todo el rato. Comenzaban a interrogarme un poco, y después se iban a hacer cualquier otra cosa, dejándome sentado frente a la máquina de escribir. Volvían después de dos o tres horas y me hacían una o dos preguntas más, y nuevamente se iban y volvían a las dos o tres horas. Es una modalidad que tienen para romper los nervios de las personas, supongo.

Durante la estadía en la detención en Lima, al principio no estuve en un calabozo, sino en alguna de las oficinas de la policía política.

Después de los interrogatorios pedí que me pasaran a un calabozo para estar más tranquilo, y estuve solo en un calabozo. Había más o menos tres calabozos al lado, y había más o menos treinta personas. La comida, por supuesto, era muy mala, como es en todas las prisiones peruanas.

De estos treinta prisioneros había algunos que habían estado caminando después del toque de queda, choferes de microbuses, algunos de ellos dirigentes. También había algunos extranjeros, argentinos y chilenos que habían pedido asilo político en el Perú. También había dirigentes de un sindicato de supermercados en Monterrey.

Este sindicato estuvo en huelga hace algunos meses pidiendo cumplimiento de pactos y aumentos de salarios, etc., pero no logró triunfar.

Después de esto la patronal pidió juicio contra los dirigentes diciendo que por culpa de ellos se habían podrido los alimentos y muchas otras cosas. Posteriormente murió la secretaria general del sindicato en forma muy misteriosa.

Voy a leer algunos párrafos de un comunicado de prensa que emitieron:

“A la clase obrera, al pueblo peruano:

“Los trabajadores del Sindicato Unico de las Tiendas de Monterrey, SA, nos dirigimos

a la opinión pública para hacer llegar el conocimiento de la muerte de nuestra secretaria general, compañera Aurora Vivar Vázquez, muerte por demás sospechosa que a la fecha no ha sido esclarecida. Justamente cuando nuestra combativa dirigente acababa de rendir su instrucción en el insólito juicio criminal que la patronal sigue a los trabajadores de nuestro sindicato por supuesto delito de daños y usurpación, como una abierta represalia por haber defendido hidalgamente nuestros elementales derechos en la huelga general indefinida de que el pueblo peruano tiene perfecto conocimiento así como de que nuestra compañera Aurora dejó muy claro ejemplo de honestidad y valentía en defensa de nuestra clase explotada.

“Su muerte se ubica en una situación de agresión directa y sistemática por parte de la multimillonaria Monterrey SA, traducida en violaciones de pactos, costumbres y leyes laborales en contra de los trabajadores de nuestro sindicato. Su muerte también se ubica en hechos sospechosos tales como los ocurridos el día 15 del presente en horas de la noche, cuando fue destrozada la tienda Monterrey ubicada en la urbanización Santa Catalina, según versiones, producida por los efectos de una bomba incendiaria.

“Y vaya coincidencia, al día siguiente, miércoles 16 en horas de la mañana encontramos en la puerta de nuestro local sindical botellas de cerveza que después de las investigaciones se comprobó que también eran bombas incendiarias.

“Asimismo encontramos una buena cantidad de volantes que llevaban el nombre de nuestra organización, en los que se empujaba a los trabajadores de nuestro sindicato a acciones descabelladas. De estos hechos tiene conocimiento el prefecto de Lima.

“Sin embargo, quedan preguntas que flotan en el ambiente. ¿Será el caso que se pensaba imputar el incendio ocurrido en la tienda de la urbanización Santa Catalina a nuestro sindicato? ¿O acaso querían hacer volar a los dirigentes?

“La respuesta es obvia. Hay unos extraños y reaccionarios que vienen operando con el objeto de crear un clima capaz de conducir a una represión abierta en contra de los trabajadores. Este acto de terrorismo es una alerta para que todas las organizaciones laborales estemos en constante y permanente celo en resguardo de nuestros intereses.”

Después de esto, los compañeros invitan al pueblo a acompañarles en el velatorio y el entierro de la compañera secretaria general. Precisamente durante el entierro hubo otros actos de provocación. Un fotógrafo estaba sacando vistas de los dirigentes y de la gente que había ido al funeral. Todo esto es peligroso porque se sabe que la policía lo usa después para los interrogatorios a la gente que ha estado en situaciones como esta.

Tuvo que intervenir la asesor jurídico de este sindicato, la doctora Laura Caller, que también es miembro de Amnistía Internacional, para que no golpearan al fotógrafo, ya que las masas estaban totalmente irritadas por la función policial que este estaba cumpliendo.

Después hubo acusaciones contra la abogada, diciendo que había querido incitar a las masas y no sé qué otras acusaciones más; de modo que este problema es largo.

Ultimamente, aprovechando la suspensión de garantías, la patronal y las autoridades han acusado a los compañeros de la dirección del sindicato de estar implicados en la muerte de la compañera Aurora Vivar. De modo que en realidad, los que parecen haberla matado son los que están acusando ahora a los compañeros de la muerte de ser los criminales; a causa de esto estuvieron presos los compañeros en el cuartel de la policía.

Cuando me despedí de ellos les prometí que a cualquier país que fuera, iba a hacer esfuerzos para que se hiciera una campaña internacional en favor de ellos, porque es un caso demasiado escandaloso. Pido, pues, solidaridad con estos dirigentes del sindicato de Monterrey.

Había otras personas presas: dos personas que habían sido arrestadas durante una asamblea de campesinos que se realizaba cerca de Lima, y además dirigentes estudiantiles. Y, por último, un habitante de una barriada que estaba comiendo una naranja, y como se cortó en el dedo tiró la cáscara al suelo. En ese momento pasaba una tanqueta, y le dijeron que estaba saboteando a las fuerzas armadas; por eso le tenían detenido.

El 10 de julio me llevaron al aeropuerto y fui embarcado en un avión con rumbo a Suecia. Ni esta vez ni la vez anterior el régimen me hizo optar entre prisión y deportación, sino que simplemente fueron y como si fuera un objeto, una carga cualquiera, me depositaron en el avión, sin que yo supiera siquiera para dónde iba.

Ya al pie del avión se acercó el embajador de Suecia y pidió que se le mostrara el billete. Por supuesto, yo no tenía ni el billete ni el pasaporte, eso lo tenía el piloto, a quien se lo había entregado la policía.

La policía había pedido mi pasaporte a la gente de mi casa, y ellos tuvieron que dárselo porque había suspensión de garantías. En vista de esto decidieron dárselo, antes de que ellos asaltaran la casa.

El avión iba hasta Amsterdam, y allí también estuve detenido en el aeropuerto hasta que salí en el otro avión con rumbo a Escandinavia. Y ya en Dinamarca se me entregó mi pasaje y mi pasaporte.

Todo indica que en el Perú van a seguir tomando medidas contra el pueblo peruano y es probable que el régimen lleve a cabo una represión cada vez mayor contra el pueblo. Por eso es necesario que la opinión internacional esté alerta ante la escalada represiva que se lleva a cabo en el Perú. □