

The Fall of Chiang Ch'ing



CHIANG CH'ING: Accused of "plotting coup."

Mao's Successors

Launch Purge

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Thai Junta Steps Up Witch-hunt

Who Killed Orlando Letelier?

Resolución de la Minoría sobre Angola

Death and Detention in South Africa

By Ernest Harsch

The apartheid regime has claimed yet another victim.

South African officials announced October 14 that a twenty-two-year-old student, Jacob Mashabane, had "hanged" himself a few days earlier in the Johannesburg Fort jail. Mashabane was from the Black city of Soweto, which has been the center of the massive Black mobilizations against the white minority regime.

Mashabane became the twenty-sixth political prisoner known to have died in jail since 1963, when Pretoria began applying its special detention laws on a broad scale. At least three are known to have died in detention so far since the massive wave of arrests of Black activists began in June.

All of the deaths have been attributed by prison authorities to suicides, accidents, or natural causes. But given the widespread use of torture in South African jails, it is likely that they were the victims of Vorster's "interrogators." Some of the alleged suicides were found, upon medical examination, to have been severely beaten just before their deaths.

There is a real danger that there will be other "suicides" and "accidents" in the coming weeks and months. More than 300 Black leaders have been detained so far under the country's security laws and thousands more have been arrested for their participation in the demonstrations and strikes. The witch-hunt against opponents of apartheid is continuing.

On October 8, two of South Africa's best-known Black actors were arrested in the

Transkei, an African reserve or Bantustan, which is scheduled to become "independent" on October 26. In the eyes of Pretoria and its handpicked African administration in the Transkei, the chief crime of Winston Ntshona and John Kani was to criticize the phony "independence" scheme.

Ntshona and Kani had shared a Tony award for best actor in 1975 for their New York performances in *Sizwe Banzi Is Dead* and *The Island*. *Sizwe Banzi Is Dead*, a play about the hated pass laws of South Africa, had been banned by the white authorities in Port Elizabeth a month earlier. It played to packed houses for two nights in Umtata, the capital of the Transkei, before moving to Butterworth,

Who Killed Orlando Letelier?

By Judy White

The most notorious international murder gang of them all is lending a hand in the "investigation" of the September 21 assassination of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean ambassador to the United States.

Central Intelligence Agency chief George Bush met with top U.S. Justice Department officials October 4 to offer the CIA's "aid" in apprehending those responsible for placing the fatal bomb in Letelier's car.

The first thing the CIA did was to give the Pinochet junta a clean bill of health. Intelligence officials reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the CIA have "virtually ruled out" agents of the Chilean military as murder suspects, since the killing "could not have served the junta's purposes."

This despite the fact that among Letelier's friends and associates, the suspect most frequently mentioned is the Chilean secret police, the DINA.

Reza Baraheni, the exiled Iranian poet who has himself been threatened with death at the hands of the shah's secret police, the SAVAK, pointed to the parallel between the two cases. Speaking at a memorial meeting for Letelier September 30 in Princeton, New Jersey, he said:

"The SAVAK was created after the coup [in Iran] in 1953. DINA was created by the CIA after the coup in Chile in 1973. DINA is a duplicate of the SAVAK and the latter police organization has twenty years of murder—even mass murder—behind it."

To divert attention from the DINA and by the same token from themselves, the

where the two actors were detained under Proclamation 400, which allows for indefinite detention without trial.

According to Transkei Minister of Justice George Matanzima, Ntshona and Kani had given "vulgar, abusive and highly inflammatory" performances. "I abhor any play that has the effect of inflaming feelings of one race against another," the aspiring theater critic explained. Ntshona and Kani had characterized the Transkei as a dumping ground for urban Blacks and predicted unrest after the territory's "independence."

Nor are South African sports figures immune from repression. When eight white rugby players decided to implement the recently announced "integrated" sports policy, the regime threatened them with prosecution. The eight players had defied the Group Areas Act by entering Veeplas, a Black township near Port Elizabeth, without permission and joining two Black teams. This act of defiance against the apartheid regime won the approval of the 10,000 Black spectators, who carried the players off the field on their shoulders. □

CIA and FBI have pointed the finger in a number of other directions.

For example, they assert that they are investigating left-wing Chilean organizations, on the grounds that the assassination may have been an attempt to disrupt the Ford administration's warm relations with the junta. They do not attempt to explain how such a theory would take account of the fact that Letelier, a member of the Chilean Socialist party, was one of the most vocal critics of the Chilean dictatorship.

For those who refuse to accept such a transparent cover-up, the CIA and FBI point to another "promising lead"—the "Coordinación de las Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas" (Coordinating Committee of Revolutionary Organizations). This hitherto unknown formation is described as a "recently formed umbrella group" of Cuban exile organizations in the United States.

Also "under scrutiny," they claim, is Patria y Libertad, a Chilean fascist organization.

However, the CIA's zeal for investigating these two organizations is somewhat suspect. It is a matter of public knowledge that the CIA sponsored, trained, and financed the Cuban counterrevolutionary movement, and helped bankroll Patria y Libertad.

Even the most cursory investigation of these ultraright outfits would immediately point right back to the CIA—where responsibility for the murder of Orlando Letelier ultimately belongs. □

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Castro: Crash of Cuban Plane Was a CIA Job

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro announced October 15 that he would cancel the 1973 antihijacking agreement between Havana and Washington. Castro's move came after seventy-three persons died in the crash of a Cuban plane off Barbados October 6 as a result of an explosion on board the airplane.

Counterrevolutionary terrorists claimed responsibility for the blast, and several individuals, including Cuban counterrevolutionary exile leader Orlando Bosch, were arrested by Venezuelan and Trinidadian authorities following the crash. Bosch recently fled from the United States to Venezuela after being released on parole. He had been serving a sentence for anti-Castro terrorist activities, including bombings.

But Castro charged that the Central Intelligence Agency, which has a long history of aiding and arming counterrevolutionary exile groups, was directly involved in the explosion. He listed eight other terrorist acts carried out against Cuban targets since April, saying they were launched because the Ford administration was "resentful of Cuba's contribution to the defeat suffered by imperialists and racists" in Angola.

According to the antihijacking agreement, both Havana and Washington pledged to levy "severe punishment" on persons who form expeditions to carry out violent acts against the other country. This amounted to a Washington undertaking to prevent terrorist activities by Cuban exiles based on American soil.

Not only did the Ford administration fail to live up to the agreement, but the CIA may also have been planning another attempt on the Cuban premier's life. Castro reported that the CIA had asked one of its spies in Cuba, who was really a double agent, to find out his itinerary for a planned trip to Angola.

On October 9, he said, CIA headquarters instructed the agent: "Please report as soon as possible any information dealing with Fidel's attendance at the ceremony of the first anniversary of the independence of Angola on Nov. 11. If affirmative, try to find out complete itinerary of Fidel's visits to other countries during the same trip."

Speaking before a mass memorial meeting for the air crash victims October 15, Castro asked a question to which everyone knew the answer: "Why does the CIA want the itinerary of the Cuban Premier?" □

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Editor: Joseph Hansen.

Contributing Editors: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, Ernest Mandel, George Novack.

Editorial Staff: Michael Baumann, Gerry Foley, David Frankel, Ernest Harsch, Judy White.

Business Manager: Pat Galligan.

Copy Editors: Jon Britton, Sally Rhett.

Technical Staff: Paul Deveze, Larry Ingram, James M. Morgan, Bill Razukas, Will Reissner, Earl Williams.

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The Fall of Chiang Ch'ing

By Les Evans

Less than a month after the death of Mao Tsetung, the regime he headed has been plunged into a crisis over his successor. The little-known Hua Kuo-feng has been catapulted to the chairmanship of the Chinese Communist party, and a sweeping purge has been unleashed against Mao's closest associates, including his widow, Chiang Ch'ing.

For a week, Peking was awash with rumors that four top-ranking members of the Politburo of the Chinese CP had been arrested at an October 7 meeting called to choose a new party chairman.

The leaders said to be jailed include Chiang Ch'ing, who directs state cultural policy; Wang Hung-wen, party vice-chairman, and, since the death of Chou En-lai in January, the CCP's second-ranking official; Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, vice-premier and chief army political commissar; and Yao Wen-yuan, believed to be director of the communications media. As many as fifty others are said to have been arrested, including the minister of culture and top Peking university administrators.

The regime has maintained a guarded silence on the purge, answering inquiries by Western diplomats and reporters with "no comment," even when asked to confirm or deny rumors that the four Politburo members have been shot. But on October 15, a wall poster campaign began in major cities denouncing the four by name and accusing them of plotting a "coup" against Hua Kuo-feng.

The wall posters are unrestrained even by the standards of a regime that has seen the deposition and disgrace of one after another of its top leaders for a decade. In the midst of official mourning for Mao, posters in Shanghai attacking his bereaved widow and her associates demanded: "Crush the heads of the four dogs" and "Crush and strangle the gang of four."

On October 15, according to a report from Peking in the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, "Thousands of Chinese citizens in the supposed radical bastion of Shanghai today celebrated the downfall of the widow of Mao Tse-tung and three other leading radicals by marching through the streets, plastering nearly every downtown building with wall posters and demonstrating in front of the municipal headquarters."

The following day, the anti-Chiang Ch'ing demonstrations continued on an even more massive scale. The October 17 *New York Times* reported:

"A crowd said to be in the hundreds of thousands carried effigies of Miss Chiang dangling from a hangman's noose and

banners demanding that she be 'knocked down.' The sources said the demonstration went on all day around the Shanghai party headquarters, with rallies in factories and neighborhood courtyards to explain the latest developments."

Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Wang Hung-wen, in addition to their national posts, are the heads of the Shanghai municipal government.

A word-of-mouth campaign directed against Chiang Ch'ing and the others now accuses them of trying to assassinate Hua Kuo-feng. This is an escalation of the first charges, put into circulation a week earlier, which said only that they had fabricated directives from Chairman Mao proposing Chiang Ch'ing's election as party chairman in opposition to Hua.

In typical Stalinist fashion, none of those under attack have been permitted to make a public statement in their own behalf, even though they outrank their accusers in the party hierarchy.

Hua Kuo-feng, who was elevated to the post of premier after the death of Chou En-lai in January, has taken over the posts vacated by Mao Tsetung. On October 12, Chinese officials confirmed reports that appeared in wall posters in Peking that Hua had been named chairman of the Chinese Communist party.

What has happened to Mao's widow and the other three of Mao's closest collaborators? What political differences are involved in the secret factional struggle in the party leadership?

That such questions remain unanswered starkly reveals the elitist and clique character of the Stalin-type leadership in Peking. Its monolithic structure, created to protect the ruling privileged bureaucracy from challenges by the working masses, does not permit open debate, either in its leading committees or the party ranks.

The capitalist press represents the struggle as a fight between the "moderates" (exemplified by the late Chou En-lai, Hua Kuo-feng, planning minister Li Hsien-nien, etc.) and the "radicals" led by Chiang Ch'ing. The "moderates" are said to be for special bureaucratic privilege, industrial modernization, "law and order," and détente with the West. The "radicals" are credited with defending "pure communism," egalitarian wage leveling, mass political participation, and revolutionary zeal.

That there are tactical policy differences among the clique formations in the high command is beyond dispute. Their substance has still to be disclosed. But the

schema of the bourgeois media has nothing to do with reality. The attributes of the "moderates" are compiled not from their own words or deeds but from the charges leveled by Mao against his purged opponents since the Cultural Revolution in the middle 1960s, from Liu Shao-ch'i to Teng Hsiao-ping. The description of the "radicals" is taken uncritically from the regime's effusive self-praise.

If the estimate of the capitalist press were correct, then Hua's victory would mark a decisive shift to the right.

The actual cleavages appear to take place along different lines. Mao in his last years dispensed with even the formality of working through the official channels of the party. Like Stalin, his personal word was law. Many of the central leaders were purged, and some, such as Lin Piao, killed.

Mao erected a buffer between himself and the remaining experienced administrators (with the exception of Chou En-lai). This took the form of what might be called a kitchen cabinet, composed of relatives, personal retainers, and young nonentities without any independent base in the party apparatus. This grouping was headed by his wife, Chiang Ch'ing, and originally included Ch'en Po-ta, his personal secretary (since purged), who was made head of the all-powerful Cultural Revolution Group in 1966. Its other members were Yao Wen-yuan, the Shanghai journalist reputed to be Mao's son-in-law; Wang Hung-wen, who was named by Mao to party third-in-command at the Tenth Congress in 1973; and Shanghai party leader Chang Ch'un-ch'iao.

None of these people had played any significant role in the party before 1966. Their rise was so precipitous that they were derisively referred to by their critics as "the helicopters." Far from being some special "radical" faction, they were the chosen representatives of Mao's line. They functioned as the most vigorous promoters of his coercive methods. As such they were not seriously challenged during the chairman's lifetime by other elements in the bureaucracy, who nonetheless chafed under their ruthlessness.

Moreover, as Mao's arbitrariness increased, like Stalin in his later years, his special emissaries became objects of popular hatred and a focus of discontent. At the massive spontaneous protest demonstration in Peking's Tien An Men Square last April 5, one of the slogans of the crowd of 100,000 was "Down with the Dowager Empress! Down with Indira Gandhi!" This was aimed directly at Chiang Ch'ing.

The record of the brief careers of the four purged leaders reveals nothing especially "radical" or egalitarian about them. Let us discuss them one at a time.

• *Chiang Ch'ing*. A former film actress, Chiang married Mao in 1937, but did not take an active public role in party affairs until 1964. In 1965 she was instrumental in dismissing almost all the leading actors, playwrights, and film directors on the Central Steering Committee for the film industry. In May 1967 she was appointed with Ch'en Po-ta to head the Cultural Revolution Group.

She played a central part in eliminating Mao's factional opponents from the party leadership. She was one of the main mouthpieces for the democratic-sounding rhetoric the regime used to bring the Red Guard youth into action against Liu Shao-ch'i.

Her most famous single act of the Cultural Revolution was her September 5, 1967, speech announcing Mao's directive to the army to fire on "mass organizations or individuals" that refused to obey military orders. This was a decisive turning point in the crushing of the Red Guard student and worker movement that had gone beyond the regime's directives, beginning to raise its own demands and even to question Mao's wisdom.

After this, Chiang was China's cultural commissar, setting national policy on films, theater, literature, music, and, to a lesser degree, education. Her authoritarian role can be compared to that of Stalin's henchman Zhdanov in the impoverishment of Soviet culture in the late 1940s.

In 1960, some 1,300 periodicals were published in China. This was cut to 648 at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and by 1973 was slashed to about 50. Book publishing was reduced to the works of Mao, technical manuals, party political tracts, and a few novels, mostly written by committees, on the "two-line struggle." The film industry practically ceased to exist, producing nothing for years but films of eight "model operas" personally rewritten by Chiang Ch'ing to make them more "political."

In education, the universities were closed for five years. They reopened in 1972, and today have less than half the enrollment of the pre-Cultural Revolution period. The length of study was cut from five years to three, and a third of that is spent studying the works of Chairman Mao. The students are handpicked by the party for their political loyalty.

• *Wang Hung-wen*. The youngest of the central party leaders (he is in his early forties), Wang typifies the qualities Mao's henchmen sought to cultivate in the Cultural Revolution. Until 1966, he was a member of the police force in a Shanghai cotton mill—this has led the Western press to refer to him as a "worker." He was appointed to trade-union leadership by the Maoist faction in Shanghai in October 1966. His principal distinction was his

ruthlessness in breaking strikes by rank-and-file workers demanding pay increases and shorter hours.

• *Chang Ch'un-ch'iao*. Like Wang, Chang was a Shanghai party leader lifted up by the Cultural Revolution. Outranking



HUA KUO-FENG: New CP chairman.

Wang at the time, he played a central role in the defeat of Liu Shao-ch'i's local supporters, and then in the armed crushing of the independent workers' movement that arose to the left of the Maoist faction. After the creation of the "Shanghai Commune" in January 1967, Chang was instrumental in dismantling this relatively democratic body. He invited army participation, which was used to scuttle the Commune.

• *Yao Wen-yuan*. Peking's press czar since the "Cultural Revolution," Yao first gained fame in Shanghai in 1965-66 as the most venomous journalistic mouthpiece for the Mao faction in its frame-up campaign against Liu Shao-ch'i as a "capitalist agent." For a decade, Yao's articles have been among the most ultra-Stalinist in their hostility to dissent of any kind and in promoting the cult of Mao's personality.

Ironically, it was just ten years ago that Yao himself launched the call to hunt down every critic of Mao's thought and "beat the wild dog to death" (October 31, 1966, Hsinhua dispatch). Today his adversary who has succeeded the Great Helmsman, Hua Kuo-feng, trained in the same school, calls on the party to "crush the heads of the four dogs."

On the question of egalitarianism, the four "radicals" are no more "left wing" than those who have ousted them, or those they themselves helped to discredit as "capitalist roaders." Until their purge, they continued to pocket salaries of some 450 yuan a month, ten times the pay of an

ordinary worker.

As for the "moderates," there are no publicly voiced disagreements by any known official of the Chinese regime with any of its policies. Hua seems to have succeeded in isolating the Chiang Ch'ing group not because of his different program, but because he has secured the backing of the most powerful and long entrenched government and army administrators. This at least is the implication of the demonstrative public appearances with Hua of chief economic planner Li Hsien-nien and the public pledge of support by Peking's military chief, Ch'en Hsi-lien.

Hua's own ascent is actually strikingly parallel to that of the "helicopters." He was virtually unknown to the majority of Chinese as late as this spring, when he was appointed premier. Five years ago he was an obscure provincial administrator in Hunan. The Chinese press has not revealed his age, his birthplace, or his previous record in the party.

Hua's rise in the party hierarchy came in 1971, when he was brought to Peking to help in the ouster of Lin Piao's followers in the party and army. On the basis of this experience he was elected to the Politburo in 1973 and made chief of the secret police in 1975.

It remains to be seen how soon or whether Hua and his backers will make any significant changes in the domestic or foreign policies they have inherited from Mao Tsetung. They no less than Chiang Ch'ing and Mao represent one of the wings of the conservative bureaucratic caste that has usurped political power from the Chinese working class. Within that framework, they are under growing pressure from a more and more critical population.

There are colossal contradictions in postrevolutionary China and urgent problems confronting this nation of 800 million people, in the modernization of agriculture, the building of industry, and the need for the development of workers democracy and genuine culture. It is unlikely that even after the dismissal of Mao's most intimate followers the Hua regime will acquire any great degree of stability.

In any event, the inner turmoil in the hierarchy is a sign of weakness. Its coming course will be closely watched by the masses as they take the measure of their new rulers and seek openings to act in their own right. □

Thai Residents in Japan Protest Military Coup

A group of sixty Thai nationals living in Japan issued a statement October 7 denouncing the "inhuman killing and maiming carried out by the army and rightist groups at Thammasat University," and demanding "the immediate release of the more than 3,000 people unconstitutionally arrested" at the university.

Assad Tightens Grip on Palestinian Strongholds

By David Frankel

"A climax may finally be approaching in the long civil war that has devastated Lebanon for so many months," the editors of the *New York Times* commented October 16. With customary hypocrisy, they professed the hope that Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's latest offensive "may at last be signalling the beginning of an end to the terrible suffering of the Lebanese people."

The response of the Arab regimes was equally hypocritical. A new cease-fire was proclaimed October 16 at the behest of the Saudi Arabian regime, and once again Arab heads of state trooped to a summit meeting on Lebanon.

The Arab rulers share with the American imperialists the desire to eliminate the Palestinian national liberation struggle as an independent force in the Middle East. None of them want to take full responsibility for doing that, however, and none of them want it done in such a way that the shell of the Palestinian movement can be taken over by Assad for his own purposes. That is the reason behind the maneuvers of the Arab governments in relation to Lebanon.


As for Assad, he has staked everything on carrying off his Lebanese intervention successfully. Short of a negotiated surrender of the Palestinians, there is little doubt that he will renew his offensive.

The latest Syrian attack was made on two fronts, against the port of Saida in the south of Lebanon, and against the main leftist-Palestinian positions protecting Beirut.

The assault on Saida began October 12, when tanks and troops moved out of Jezzine, twenty miles to the east. By October 14 Syrians forces had taken the town of Abra, only four miles from Saida, and the following day they began shelling the port. (Saida is the port through which Palestinian and Lebanese leftist forces get most of their supplies.)

However, "the heroes of Golan," as Assad's propaganda calls the Syrian army, proved understandably reluctant to advance beyond Abra. "Roads into Sidon [Saida] have been heavily mined and barricaded by the city's defenders. Artillery pieces are mounted on office building roofs to fire on any attacking tanks coming through the streets, as they did in June when a Syrian attack was repelled," *Washington Post* correspondent Douglas Watson reported in an October 15 dispatch.

Lebanese leftists have also claimed that 1,200 Iraqi troops have reinforced the



New York Times

defenders at Saida. But even if this is true, Syrian commanders can simply dig in their troops outside the city and shell it, as they did after the failure of their June offensive. This would effectively prevent the use of the port.

A second front was opened by the Syrian army October 13, when its troops moved on the town of Bhamdoun, twelve miles east of Beirut. "The Syrians are hitting us with everything they have, heavy and medium artillery, tanks and . . . missiles," a Palestinian official told Watson.

"They use their rockets like we use our guns," a leftist defender told Associated Press correspondent Mohammed Salam after a day of fighting in the Bhamdoun area. "We fire 30 bullets and they fire 30 rockets."

Despite the superior firepower of the Syrian troops, they had to fight a bitter three-day battle to secure Bhamdoun. In the meantime, however, Syrian forces also opened up an assault on the town of Aley, a few miles closer to Beirut.

"According to a Damascus radio report yesterday," *New York Times* correspondent Henry Tanner said in an October 15 dispatch from Beirut, "about 4,000 Palestinians are massed in the area of Aleih, which is about 9 miles east of here. This is a large deployment in view of the fact that the town is exposed and conceded by Palestinian officials to be untenable in the long run."

The Muslim section of West Beirut is already hemmed in by right-wing Chris-

tian forces in the east, and by the Mediterranean Sea on the north and west. If Assad's forces were to take Aley and continue westward to the sea, the city would be completely encircled.

Christian rightists stepped up their attacks inside Beirut, and Tanner reported that people in the Muslim sector began to stock supplies in case of a siege.

In view of this military situation, it is no wonder that the *New York Times* editorial quoted above suggested that perhaps "the stage may be set for at least a temporary settlement in the near future."

Other commentators in the capitalist media openly expressed their satisfaction. The Syrian drive promises to "put a decisive curb on the military and political power of the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] in the Middle East," Joseph C. Harsch said in the October 15 *Christian Science Monitor*. The PLO "would no longer be able to block the road toward a negotiated Arab-Israeli settlement. That in turn would deprive Moscow of an environment congenial to its operations."

Is it true, though, that the defeat of the Palestinians in Lebanon will open the door to a negotiated settlement in the Middle East? Far from it. In fact, what is likely to emerge from such a defeat is a renewed danger of a general Middle East war.

The de facto alliance of Assad, the Maronite rightists in Lebanon, and the Israeli regime is based on their common enmity toward the Palestinian national liberation movement. But what will happen to this bloc if Assad finally breaks the Palestinian movement in Lebanon?

There is no reason to believe that the Maronite rightists would welcome Assad's tutelage once he renders their main enemy helpless. The Israelis, too, can be expected to demand that Assad's troops get out of Lebanon once they think the Maronites can handle the situation on their own.

The Syrian regime has consistently called for a settlement in Lebanon based on the 1969 Cairo accords, which gave the Palestinian guerrillas bases in southern Lebanon while limiting their armament in the refugee camps and their autonomy elsewhere in the country.

Implementation of the Cairo agreement was also one of the proposals made by Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat October 17 at the Riyadh meeting on Lebanon organized by the Saudi regime.

But the Cairo accords were agreed to only after the Lebanese regime found that it was too weak to crush the Palestinians. Events since then—including Assad's own intervention in Lebanon—have left the 1969 agreement a dead letter.

For example, the sections of southern Lebanon set aside for Palestinian guerrilla bases under the Cairo agreement are now firmly in the hands of right-wing militia groups working closely with the Israeli army. The Israeli regime has vowed never to let the guerrillas move back into the area.

Syrian Stalinists 'Analyze' Situation in Lebanon

From the beginning of the crisis in Lebanon, the Soviet regime has subordinated the needs of the Lebanese masses and the Palestinians to its diplomatic relations with Syria, and above all, to its desire for a Middle East deal with Washington. But perhaps the crassest expression of Stalinist opportunism was an article in the September 16 issue of *Nidal al-Sha'b* (People's Struggle), the newspaper of the Syrian Communist party.

According to this analysis, "reactionary intrigues" in Lebanon "are doomed since the ties between Syria, the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese national-patriotic forces are based on their natural alliance in the struggle

against the Israeli occupation and imperialism.

"This natural alliance serves the vital interests of Syria, the Palestinians and the Lebanese patriots.

"These forces will be able to overcome the existing differences in the immediate future and jointly will conduct large-scale activities to bring about a settlement in Lebanon."

No mention was made of the methods being used by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad "to overcome the existing differences," or of whether the Syrian Stalinists support Assad's invasion of Lebanon. Quotations from the article were printed without criticism in the September 18 issue of the American Stalinist newspaper, the *Daily World*.

In practice, it appears as if the Israelis intend to expel more than just guerrillas from the border region. On October 17, Christian rightists using Israeli armored cars and other weapons occupied the Muslim village of Hannine after shelling it during the night. "Hundreds of villagers were forced to flee, several were killed or wounded and several buildings destroyed, according to witnesses," Tanner reported in the October 18 *New York Times*.

Palestinian officials charged that Israeli tanks had participated in the attack, and Tanner noted that "many observers here find it easy to believe that the operation against Hannine was inspired and perhaps directed by the Israelis."

Tanner had earlier reported in an October 7 dispatch from the southern village of Rumaysh that "the Israelis are understood to be conducting night patrols regularly as far north as the Litani River, halfway between the border and the port of Saïda." The Israelis have long desired the Litani as a natural "security border" and as a source of water for irrigation.

Under the circumstances, it is clear that implementation of the Cairo accords could only be carried out at the risk of war with Israel. It is also clear that Assad, like King Hussein of Jordan before him, believes that if he neutralizes the Palestinians he will then be able to regain territory from the Israeli regime through negotiations.

In reality, if Assad does the work of the Israelis for them in Lebanon, the Zionist regime will have even less incentive for negotiating a settlement. In fact, the Israelis have yet to cede Hussein an inch of territory on the West Bank in spite of his massacre of the Palestinians in Jordan in 1970.

Whatever illusions Assad may hold, they are not reflected within the Israeli regime. Lieut. Gen. Mordechai Gur, the Israeli chief of staff, was quoted in an October 4 dispatch by *New York Times* correspondent William E. Farrell as saying:

"The quiet on Israel's northern borders with Syria and Lebanon has enabled us, the Israeli defense forces, to worry less about current security problems and concentrate more on preparing ourselves for total war. The Lebanese conflict has enabled us to concentrate more on central matters."

The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that the mobilized strength of the Israeli armed forces has increased from 300,000 at the time of the 1973 war to 400,000 today. The number of armored brigades—fifteen—has increased by five in the same period. The number of artillery brigades has been increased from three to nine. At the same time, enormous infusions of advanced American weaponry have enabled the Israelis to increase the firepower of each infantry brigade several times over and modernize its air force.

Israel has been granted an American aid package of about \$4.4 billion over the

twenty-seven months from July 1975 to October 1977, and it is asking for another \$2.3 billion in the year after that. The September 27 issue of the *Jerusalem Post* reported a radio speech by Gur in which he contended that Israel is now in a position to go to war without regard for the opinion of the American government. Such a war, he said, would be over quickly and "with a change in the geopolitical situation in Israel's favor."

Whether or not the Zionist regime decides to exercise this option, it is clear that the Syrian intervention in Lebanon has opened up the most favorable situation for Israel since the October 1973 Middle East war three years ago.

At the same time, within Lebanon itself there is a real danger of a massacre against the Palestinian population that would make the bloodbath that has taken place up until now pale by comparison.

What would happen, for instance, if the provisions in the Cairo accords that prohibit heavy arms in the Palestinian refugee camps were carried out? The refugee camps were originally fortified and armed to protect them from continuing terror raids—both from Israeli jets and rightist goons. One such attack—the machine-gunning of a busload of Palestinians returning from a political rally in April 1975—sparked the current civil war in the first place.

Nor has the attitude of the Maronite rightists mellowed in the eighteen months since then. For example, Tanner gave the following account in an October 4 dispatch:

Dr. [Hassan Sabry al-] Kholy, the Arab League mediator, reported that many civilians—men, women and children—were killed and houses dynamited by right-wing Christian militia forces that entered the predominantly Druse villages of Salima and Arsun in the mountains east of

Beirut in the wake of the Syrian army offensive last week.

The villages had been held by Moslem and Palestinian forces until then. "These were reprisal killings," Dr. Kholy said. "It is what usually happens. These people had not been fighting."

The Maronite establishment, with the encouragement of Israel, obviously intends to continue to carry out such massacres. It needs to terrorize the Muslim majority into accepting Maronite domination.

But the Palestinians can expect even worse treatment than the Lebanese Muslims. The Palestinians have proved to be the most combative sector of the masses in Lebanon as a result of their national oppression, and right-wing ideologues have made them into scapegoats for the crisis of Lebanon's archaic system of religious discrimination.

Assad himself would certainly prefer to avoid such a massacre. A bloodbath carried out by the Maronites would be a heavy blow to his stature in the Arab world and to his position at home. Assad has insisted all along that he is acting in the interests of the Palestinian cause. Thus, Damascus radio claimed October 12 that the leaders of the PLO were "deviationists" who had to be replaced "in the interests of the Palestinian people."

But Assad can hardly be relied upon to prevent a pogrom against the Palestinians. Even if he wanted to act, he would have to deal with the Israeli regime, which would welcome a massacre like the one carried out by King Hussein in September 1970.

Moreover, Assad himself has proved his willingness to bombard Palestinian refugee camps and to stand by as the Maronite rightists carried out the bloody siege of Tel Zaatar in July and August. He may yet use the same methods against Beirut if he cannot get his way through negotiations.

Warsaw Bureaucrats Carry Out Wave of Victimizations

[On June 25 the Polish working class responded to the announcement of steep increases in the price of food by carrying out strikes and demonstrations in cities across the country. The upsurge was so powerful that the Stalinist regime in Warsaw was forced to rapidly rescind the planned price increases (see *Intercontinental Press*, July 5, p. 1028, and July 12, p. 1066).

[However, in the months following that victory the regime has carried out a campaign of repression aimed at intimidating the workers and victimizing those most active in the June protest. The following compilation of eyewitness accounts describing the repressive measures carried out was smuggled out of Poland. The translation is by the Association of Polish Students in Britain.]

* * *

On June 25 almost the whole of the labour force of the Ursus motor factory was out on strike from morning. At first the workers waited on the shop floor for the management representatives to come and about 9 am made their own way out of the factory to the administrative block. The workers demanded that representatives of the principal authorities come immediately for consultations with the labour force of the factory. This demand was refused by the management and in view of this workers took up positions on nearby railway lines and stopped rail traffic on the Warsaw to Kutno and Warsaw to Skiernica lines. The purpose of this action was to inform as large a number of people as possible of the Ursus strike.

Protest action was throughout carried out in quite an orderly fashion. Police authorities did not intervene, but only mobilized large units of militia and made observation (including helicopter surveillance). Of the more important incidents mention should be made of the following: a female worker slapped the local Party First-Secretary and the Ursus Manager when during their address to the crowd they were critical of the strike; trains were stopped, including international connections, railway lines were dismantled and

Note: The above account contains names of only those who have so far been tried in cases reported by the press. Names of other persons mentioned are known to the authors of this account. The names are not disclosed here for fear of further reprisals that might be applied to the persons concerned.

an unsuccessful attempt was made at cutting rails with acetylene torches; a locomotive was rolled into the gap where the rails had been taken up; an egg delivery van was stopped and the eggs were distributed among the strikers and casual passers-by; a sugar delivery van was stopped and the sugar partly distributed.

About 8 pm the workers heard a television broadcast by the Premier revoking the price increases and after this announcement began to disperse. It was exactly then that detachments of the militia attacked the dispersing crowds with rockets and tear gas, hitting out with truncheons and kicking the fallen. During the police action a restaurant car burst into flames (probably hit by a rocket or other incendiary device). The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade but because of difficult operational circumstances (successive charges of police detachments) the restaurant car and part of the next carriage were destroyed.

The militia detachments then organized a man-hunt that was accompanied by brutal beating of people in the streets, mainly of youths. Both uniformed and plain-clothes detachments rounded up people, often passers-by, in the area round the factory, in the town's main streets and in the outskirts of Ursus. Those stopped were beaten with truncheons, spanners, belt buckles and were kicked often to unconsciousness. This operation lasted until morning.

Here are some examples illustrative of the methods used by the police authorities:

- A worker on his way for the third shift was arrested and brutally beaten.

- A worker returning from the second shift was arrested and beaten and further abused in a police car.

- A worker gone to fetch his wife, on foot, from Wlochy (from the second shift) was arrested and beaten up in his wife's presence; he was dragged by the feet to a police car.

- A worker returning home with a wife in late pregnancy was forcibly pushed into a police car, the wife being brushed aside.

- A worker returning in the evening to the workers' hostel was stopped near the hostel by some men in civilian clothes driving a private car (commandeered for the operation) and beaten in the car until bleeding.

- Some young people walking along the Street of the Heroes of Warsaw near a police station were attacked by militia and beaten; one of them lost consciousness, whereupon he was abused as he lay

unconscious; he was later collected by an ambulance.

- A young worker was hit so hard with a truncheon during the police intervention, that he sustained fractures of the jaw in two places.

On arrival at the Ursus police station the arrested had to walk down between a double line of truncheon thrashing militia men. Some were forced through the double line twice. Once inside the building they were thrown in, one by one, into a special room where a number of militia would beat them and kick them and if some fell they would be kicked on the ground. Cases are known where ribs were broken. In the back yard of the station a "health-trot" was organized round which the arrested were ordered to run under a hail of truncheons.

It seems that all the arrested were beaten—not one exception to this rule is known. That night a sum total of 200 to 300 people were arrested.

The arrested were next transported to the Mostowski Palace—those who had collapsed during the beating were dragged by their feet and bodily thrown into police cars. In the Mostowski Palace they were photographed and had their finger-prints taken. Then they were examined under ultra violet lamps to see if they had been marked with special dust dispersed by cartridges fired during earlier action by the militia for identification purposes. Here too enquiries were held for the first time. Then they were transported to the HQ in Rakowiecka Street. Before being taken to the Mostowski Palace some passed through a middle stage at the Walicow police station, where they were also beaten.

On Sunday 27 June courts of summary jurisdiction were called and these sat late into the night. Those arrested were charged with attacking the militia, ignoring orders to disperse, demolishing shops, railway carriages etc. The majority of the accusations were false. Militia men were called as witnesses—generally these were not the same people as had arrested the accused—and the cases were heard on written evidence from absent witnesses for the prosecution.

Almost all the accused were sentenced. Fines and penalties of between 1500 and 5000 zlotys were meted out, or some dozen hours of unpaid "social" work, or suspended imprisonment. After 48 hours most of the accused were sent home.

On Monday 28 June workers who had been set free resumed work, though some had to stay at home suffering from shock

from the beatings. After a few days the motor works terminated without notice contracts of employment of all those workers who had been arrested, citing as legal grounds Article 52 para 1 of the Penal Code. Those of them who had accommodation at the workers' hostel were ejected from their lodgings the following day.

It was primarily those who had been arrested that were dismissed from work. Nevertheless a much wider group was subject to dismissal. Dismissals were handed out on the basis of photographs taken by the militia and on the basis of statements made by some of the managers and by informers. In the course of this workers' rights were blatantly violated. Here are some examples:

- A worker who had been off sick for a long period and had a medical certificate of exemption from work, had his contract of employment terminated without notice; on June 25 this worker had not even been at work on account of illness.

- Another worker's contract was similarly terminated though he was on holiday at the time and had not even been at work on that day.

Since on June 25 almost everyone at Ursus had been on strike, the management could dismiss anyone they themselves or the supervisory staff did not like. The total number of dismissed at the Ursus plant is not known. Various figures are quoted. One quite frequent estimate puts the figure at 250 and another at about 1500. This divergence has hitherto not been clarified—one should expect confirmation of the second rather than the first estimate.

Between July 4 and 6 those of the workers who had been sentenced to fines were served summonses to the Ursus police station. They presented themselves thinking that only formalities of some sort were required. However, they were arrested and taken to Warsaw to the police HQ on Rakowiecka Street (this included persons who had paid their fines). It turned out that the militia's Warsaw Command had ordered a revision of the earlier sentences which it considered too lenient. The courts of summary jurisdiction were directed to re-hear all cases and return sentences of absolute imprisonment. That was indeed the way that matters went and now almost all sentences came to three months' imprisonment. Some of the cases were tried with complete disregard for the principles laid down by the Code of Penal Proceedings. Thus for example, statements by an absent witness (Witness Dynda) were cited at the trial which alleged that the accused had attacked militia men. The court gave no credence to denials by the accused and based their verdict just on the written evidence of the prosecution witness who was not present at the trial. Often use was made of an indirect witness for the prosecution (Witness Dabek) who had

merely put on record at the police station personal details of those arrested and cause of arrest as stated by the militia escort. Since Witness Dabek had not recorded personal details of the militia escort, there was no way of checking the credibility of the information. It happened too that witnesses confused various of the accused and did not know at all well where they had made their arrest.

After hearing their sentences workers were transferred to the Bialoleka Prison. Many of them submitted appeals, unsuccessfully as a rule, because the second hearings had confirmed the earlier verdicts. The court also made no reaction to statements by workers that they had been beaten by the militia.

When the first month was up some of those sentenced (about 40 in number) were offered suspension of the remaining two months of imprisonment for a period of six months. Thus about 40 people were released from prison at the beginning of August. It is worth noting that those who had earlier paid up their fines and had then been sentenced again (to three months' imprisonment) have still not received their money back. They were thus punished twice for the same actions.

All those workers who faced reprisals (this applies both to those who had only been dismissed from work as well as those who had been tried) can find no employment anywhere. State employers, co-operatives and even private employers have been banned from accepting them into employment (private employers were threatened with suspension of their licences). The Warsaw Employment Bureau does not even agree to interview workers dismissed from work after the events of June 25. In some cases workers who had been accepted (despite the ban) were dismissed from their jobs. The Area Review Committee in Pruszkow as of now still takes a negative view of applications for a review of dismissal decisions. Workers are convinced that they will be re-employed after a break of three months, for then they will have lost continuity of employment and related rights.

On July 16 and 17, the County Court in Warsaw tried seven workers accused of derailing a locomotive. Five of them worked at the Ursus motor factory, one at the nearby Pruszkow machine tool factory and one was a truck driver and managed a newspaper kiosk for 'Ruch.' None of them had any previous convictions. The youngest was not quite 21, the eldest was 42 years old. They were officially assigned legal counsel. The only evidence available were photographs. Sentences were handed out of 5 years', 4½ years', 4 years', and 3 years' imprisonment. The highest sentence was given to the youngest of the accused. Most of the families of these accused are in dire financial straits:

- Grzegorz Zielonka (aged 42) left a wife with two adopted children aged 7 and 8; the wife has to look after a sick and

disabled mother, so she cannot take up employment; the family thus has no means of support.

- Czeslaw Milczarek (aged 27) left a wife and two children (1 and 3 years old); the wife looks after a mother who suffers from severe asthma; nevertheless she has decided not to stop working.

- Wojciech Czarniecki left a mother who recently underwent a partial gastrectomy; the mother receives a pension of 900 zlotys.

In August two trials were held at the Pruszkow Court of persons accused of distributing eggs and sugar from the smashed delivery vans. Altogether 12 people were sentenced to jail for from a 1 year suspended sentence to between 3 and 5 years' imprisonment. The families of those convicted are also suffering severe material hardship.

The number of workers still detained remains unknown. It is thought the number reaches 50. Some of these (10 persons) are the subject of an investigation regarding derailment of a locomotive. Some of their families experience severe material difficulty:

- A family with a large number of children (aged between 4 and 15); the wife cannot seek employment for health reasons; they do not have any means of living and receive some, though inadequate, help from relatives.

- Aged parents, both gravely ill (mother blind and suffering from severe diabetes, father with bilateral hernia); their elder son came out of prison after 6 weeks of arrest and still faces proceedings; he is severely ill: distorted spine, diabetes and this year suffered three heart attacks (in May, June and also early July during beatings at the police station in Ursus); the younger son was sanctioned by the Public Prosecutor to October 1 and is in Mokotow Prison; as a result of beatings by the militia he sustained fractures of the jaw in two places.

- To this moment a young boy who is mentally retarded and has been receiving medical attention since infancy, is being held in detention (since the beginning of July) pending investigation.

Help from places of work and local Social Security offices is feeble. Allowances which a place of employment is legally bound to pay and which were approved at the lower administrative level (sectional) were rejected by an over-riding authority (managerial). Also, local social workers refuse help when approached. Since for the most part families were in the keep of the present victims of the reprisals, they are now themselves deprived of medical care.

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Arnosht Kolman's Open Letter to Leonid Brezhnev

[Arnosht Kolman, a noted Marxist philosopher who joined the Bolshevik party in 1918, made public October 6 his letter of resignation from the Soviet Communist party. The following is the text of the letter, slightly abridged by the editors of the London *Times*, who printed it in their October 6 issue.]

* * *

L.I. Brezhnev,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party,
Kremlin, Moscow.

I wish to inform you that I am leaving the Soviet Communist Party. I am 84 and have been a party member for 58 years. I joined its ranks in order to fight for social justice, for a happy future for mankind. Now, after long and painful reflection, I have come to this difficult decision.

I was born in Prague and came to Russia as a prisoner of war during the First World War. During Kerensky's rule I was held in solitary confinement for six months for anti-war propaganda, and I was freed by the October Revolution. As a Red Army soldier, I fought on four fronts for the establishment of Soviet power.

In the 1920s I worked illegally in Germany, was a member of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party. I was sentenced to five years' hard labour, but after half a year's solitary I was freed in an exchange [with the Soviet Union].

Afterwards I held responsible ideological posts in the Comintern, in the Central Committee, in the Moscow party committee and in the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

I was also elected member of the Moscow party control commission and the Moscow party district commission. I knew Lenin personally, worked with Krupskaya [Lenin's wife], Khrushchev and many others.

During the Second World War I worked in the Political Command of the Soviet Army in charge of units fomenting disaffection in the ranks of enemy troops. It was at this very time that my sister was burnt in a gas oven in one of Hitler's concentration camps, while my brother, one of the founders of the Czechoslovak Communist Youth League, was murdered by Stalin. In 1945, I was appointed head of the Czechoslovak Party's propaganda department in Prague, but after three years I was arrested and shipped back to Moscow, where I spent three and a half years without trial—three of them in solitary confinement—in the Lubianka jail.

During this stretch, my wife and small

daughter were exiled to Ulyanovsk, where they lived in appalling conditions. After my rehabilitation, I was appointed director of the Institute of Philosophy in Prague. Since my retirement in 1963, I have been living in Moscow as a pensioner.

After Khrushchev's revelations about the bloody crimes of Stalin, euphemistically described as "the personality cult," I began to understand how deeply distorted the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet power had become, and that I, as a party member, must bear my share of responsibility for this.

However, 1968 was the real turning point for me, when I had occasion to observe the "Prague Spring" and see with my own eyes with what enthusiasm the united people of Czechoslovakia backed the strivings of the party to rekindle the socialist ideals and the fight for socialism with a human face.

When your tanks and armies occupied Czechoslovakia subjecting it to your political *Diktat* and merciless economic exploitation—in short turning it into your colony—I lost any illusions I may have had about the nature of your regime.

I understood that the Soviet Communist Party had long since ceased to be a political party, that it had been transformed into a mutual society for the early fulfilment of the Five Year Plan.

Its members, the congresses, even the Central Committee, have virtually no influence over the shaping of the party's policies, which are determined by you personally from your high ruling perch.

And in any case, about what sort of socialism can one talk in the Soviet Union, when the place of the former capitalist and landowner exploiting classes has been taken by the privileged castes of the party and state bureaucracies? They are drowning in wealth, live isolated from the people, above them, and contemptuous of ordinary folk, not wishing to and incapable of understanding their needs and sufferings.

Of what sort of socialism can one talk when you are continuing Stalin's totalitarian dictatorship within the country and a great power policy abroad?

The Soviet Union lacks the most elementary democratic rights: instead of free elections there is voting for candidates imposed from above; there is no public political life; strikes are forbidden and the trade unions are subservient to state interests; political discussions are forbidden and everything is covered by universal censorship; information is subject to the interests of lying propaganda.

Basic human rights are crudely trampled on in the Soviet Union: dissi-

dents are harshly persecuted, tens of thousands of them are languishing in jails, concentration camps and psychiatric jail hospitals, many being punished for their religious beliefs only. In the sixtieth year of Soviet power there are no elementary intellectual freedoms and there is no freedom for the creative artists. . . .

As far as the nationalities policy is concerned, the history of the Soviet Union is nothing but an uninterrupted chain of territorial annexations, forced "unification" of foreign lands, subjection of and discrimination against many nationalities in the country, among them the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, Jews, the Baltic nations, the people of the Caucasus and Central Asia, etc. This makes the Soviet Union no less "a prison of the nations" than Tsarist Russia was.

While preaching about "international détente" and "peaceful coexistence," the Soviet Union is, in fact, amassing at an increasingly fast rate nuclear weapons and rockets, is preparing new generations of mass destruction weapons and is preparing for aggressive wars.

It keeps vast armies outside its frontiers, builds more and more military bases in Europe, Asia and Africa, and is preparing for the occupation of Romania and Yugoslavia. Under the guise of "selfless aid" to the national liberation movements and developing countries, the Soviet Union is carrying out ceaseless attempts to infiltrate their ranks and to establish its military and political overlordship in various corners of the earth; it is also supplying arms and providing military support for most reactionary regimes and international terrorists.

The political and social structures of the country are in a state of acute stagnation. The Soviet Union has one of the most conservative regimes in the world, with an aging leadership. . . .

It is perfectly logical that under such circumstances and as a result of the colossal expenditure on arms, the sustenance of the vast KGB network and of the party and state apparatus, the country's economic situation grows worse and worse. Inflation and rising prices, officially denied, are accelerating.

Productivity in industry is extremely low, industrial production is of poor quality and, judged by its technical parameters, it falls way behind similar production in the West. And is it not a tragedy that 60 years after the Revolution the agriculture of Europe's former granary is unable to produce enough bread, meat, fish and even potatoes to satisfy the needs of its own population? . . . Can one simply

ignore all these facts without drawing conclusions from them?

I am not going to deny the successes achieved by the Soviet Union in ending illiteracy, in the fields of education, science, technology and in securing a better living standard for a considerable section of the population. But man does not live by bread alone.

A human being must be able to say aloud what he thinks, write down what he thinks, read what takes his fancy, choose his place of abode freely and go wherever he wants to go. But we are once again afraid, just as under Stalin, we hide our manuscripts, stop trusting one another, write meaningless letters for fear of the censors, and sever links with friends . . .

Isn't it inhuman to take away children from parents, block the reunion of families, deny exit visas to visit relations abroad and to deny the families of political

prisoners the right to see their loved ones for years and even to write to each other? Can one live amid such conditions? And how long can one live like this? I can no longer go on living like this.

My decision to leave the Communist Party does in no way mean that I will be abandoning the ideals of socialism, with which I became acquainted in 1910 and which have since constituted the main substance of my long life.

On the contrary. I have come to the firm conclusion that my staying in the ranks of the Soviet Communist Party would amount to a betrayal of the ideals of social justice, humanism and the building of a new and more human society, for the attainment of which I have strived, despite my mistakes and the errors of my ways, and shall go on striving to the end of my days.

Academician Arnosht (Ernest) Kolman

National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), which has organized many of the student protests over the past three years. All the arrested students are to stand trial before military tribunals, without the aid of lawyers. Some of them have already been brought to trial. Under a twenty-four-year-old anti-Communist law that was reimposed shortly after the coup, the students face possible death sentences.

The junta has begun preparing for a frame-up of the students. Police have claimed that they have uncovered evidence of a "communist plot" to seize control of the country. Although reporters have confirmed that the Thammasat students had few weapons during the police siege, troops searching the university have periodically announced the "discovery" of arms and of "communist literature."

Since seizing power, the junta has banned all political parties and student political groups. All strikes have been outlawed under the martial law regulations. Universities, as well as primary and secondary schools, have been closed. More than one million "subversive" books have been seized throughout the country. After ransacking the NSCT headquarters in Bangkok, police burned piles of books and documents.

A new student organization called the October Sixth Front has released a statement denouncing the American domination of the country. "The United States," it said, "is now desperately trying to tighten its vicious grip on the freedom-loving people of Thailand. This so-called National Administrative Reform Council backed by the United States must be overthrown by any means necessary."

The Soviet, Laotian, and Vietnamese regimes have also scored Washington's links with the new military rulers.

The new regime in Bangkok has made no secret of its support to the American imperialists. Two days after the coup, Thanat Khoman, a former foreign minister and now a civilian adviser to the junta, declared that "Thailand still offers some advantages to the United States. For example, temporary use of our air bases."

Washington bears direct responsibility for the bloodshed at Thammasat University and the subsequent repression. Many of the officers who staged the coup were American-trained. Moreover, since the October 1973 student and worker upsurge that overthrew the old military dictatorship, Washington has supplied more than \$150 million in military aid to the Thai generals.

During a protest in front of the United Nations shortly after the coup, a leaflet distributed by Clergy and Laity Concerned condemned the American aid to the Thai military and stated that "it is essential that all concerned Americans act now to protect the lives of those thousands of innocent Thai citizens who have been, and are still being arrested and tortured by the junta." □

Washington Offered 'Temporary Use' of Bases

Thai Junta Steps Up Witch-hunt of Opponents

By Ernest Harsch

After arresting more than 3,000 students in Bangkok, the rightist military junta that seized power in Thailand October 6 has intensified its witch-hunt against "troublemakers."

Gen. Serm Na Nakhorn, the commander in chief of the army, announced October 15 that arrests were being carried out throughout the country under "order number 22," which allows for detention of suspected "Communists" for up to thirty days without bail or charges. Those subject to arrest under this decree include persons who promote strikes, "stir up trouble," or "urge the people to support any regime other than democratic rule with His Majesty the King as head of state."

One day before the decree was enacted, the ruling National Administrative Reform Council ordered the establishment of special centers for "re-education and vocational training of individuals considered to be potential dangers to society." The preventive detention decree provided that any prisoner who had "shown no signs of repentance" at the end of the thirty-day period would be sent to these prison camps.

Supplied with lists of names, intelligence police and special branch detectives have begun breaking into homes and searching for those deemed threats by the junta. By October 16, at least 200 persons had been seized. Among the first victims of this intensified crack-down were several promi-

nent intellectuals, including Pansak Vin-yaratn, the publisher of the Bangkok weekly *Chaturat*.

Armed police in Korat raided the home of Khamsing Srinawak, a widely read author and member of the Central Committee of the Socialist party of Thailand, but he is believed to have evaded arrest. Several student leaders and teachers from the same area were detained.

This new wave of arrests began a little more than a week after the bloody massacre of students at Thammasat University. According to the regime, thirty-nine students were killed when heavily-armed police units attacked the university. But according to a student who was present during the four-hour siege, nearly 100 students were gunned down. *Washington Post* reporter Lewis M. Simons said in an October 13 dispatch from Bangkok, "His claim was later confirmed by three different diplomatic observers."

Many of the more than 3,000 students who were arrested after the massacre have since been released on bail. *New York Times* correspondent David A. Andelman reported October 9 that some of the released students "told stories of police firing into crowds of students who waved white flags of surrender and of police forcing students down five flights of stairs, kicking them and beating them with rifle butts along the way."

About 550 students were refused bail, however, including six top leaders of the

China After the Death of Mao

By Livio Maitan

[The following article appeared in the September 23 issue of *Inprecor*, a fortnightly news bulletin published by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

The death of Mao has provoked reactions that would have seemed paradoxical in other periods. The chieftain of American capitalism spoke of a "tragic loss" and his collaborators made no secret of their concern for the future. In Moscow there were open and indecent expressions of satisfaction and hope. Obviously, these reactions are linked to the international policy Mao had imposed during the last years of his life. After accusing the Kremlin bureaucrats of having capitulated to American imperialism since the end of the 1950s, Mao changed his battle cry, first taking a position of equal distance from the two "superpowers" and then adopting the thesis that "social-imperialism" is the main enemy, with all the consequences, from criticizing the western capitalists for not arming themselves sufficiently and for being too accommodating toward Moscow to red carpet welcomes in Peking for the likes of Fanfani and Strauss.

Nevertheless, in a more general sense Mao was a contradictory figure, and any historical evaluation of his work must emphasize this essential characteristic.

From 1927, drawing the balance-sheet of the defeat of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27 in his own way, Mao adopted a critical position in regard to the line imposed in China by the Stalinized Comintern and sketched out positions that differed from those of the leadership of the Chinese Communist party. Nonetheless, he refrained from openly contesting Stalinist orthodoxy, adopting Stalinist conceptions and utilizing substantially bureaucratic methods of organization and leadership. While continuing to proclaim more or less classical ideas about the leading role of the working class, at the right moment he perceived the fundamental importance of the peasantry in the specific Chinese context of that period, in particular within the perspective of a protracted war. On various occasions after the Comintern's turn to the policy of popular fronts, he assumed positions even further to the right than those of the other Communist parties. He not only advocated but also implemented a policy of collaboration with the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek, and during the second world war and immediately after he tenaciously sought a compromise with the old dictator.

U.S. documents published during the 1950s confirm that if no agreement was reached it was because of Chiang Kai-shek's refusal. But in spite of his desire for collaboration and compromise, in practice Mao never yielded on one essential point: he refused to give up the independence of his army, which at no time dissolved into the army of the Kuomintang, not even when there was a convergence of struggle against the armed forces of Japanese imperialism. At the decisive moment in the new revolutionary upsurge of the masses, when faced with an ineluctable choice, Mao placed himself at the head of the peasant insurrection, disregarding Stalin's advice, which was to seek an agreement with Chiang at any cost, and led the red army to the conquest of power. Ten years later he assumed the role of spokesman for left criticism of the policy of the Kremlin leaders and various Communist parties.

For forty years Mao stood at the head of a party that led a socialist revolution, one of the milestones of our century. But after introducing bureaucratic conceptions and methods of administra-

tion even in the liberated zones and after carrying through a Stalinization of the structures of the party, once in power he presided over a relatively rapid process of bureaucratization of the new workers state. Given his leading role and prestige, any attempt to absolve Mao of any responsibility and to lay the blame for the phenomena of degeneration on leaders other than Mao amounts to nothing but apologetics. Nevertheless, it is true that at a certain point Mao began to become alarmed at the consequences of what he himself defined as a "process of alienation" with respect to the masses. In a period in which many profound tensions had ripened, he took the initiative of the so-called cultural revolution, appealing to the masses even more than on other occasions, first the students and later, although with greater caution, the workers and peasants as well.

He proclaimed that the masses would decide everything, but in reality he constructed (and in the final phase of the cultural revolution reconstructed) a centralized and fundamentally monolithic apparatus based on an authoritarian paternalism of which the cult of the personality represented the crowning touch. He upheld the necessity of an intransigent struggle against imperialism and for some years severely criticized Moscow's policy toward the bourgeoisies of various colonial and neocolonial countries. But he unreservedly supported the collaboration with the bourgeoisie that led to the tragic defeat of the Indonesian Communist party and the paralysis of his followers in Pakistan and East Bengal, not to mention the positions of later years, which saw him side with the government of Sri Lanka in carrying out a ferocious repression, avoid any condemnation of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, and assume a hypocritical position of neutrality during the war in Angola. He tried to put himself forward as the inspirer of a battle against bureaucratization, which he presented as capitalist restoration, but despite the criticisms and differences in practice, to the very end he considered Stalin a great revolutionary and one of the leading theoreticians of Marxism.

Thus, in a concentrated and symbolic form, the figure of Mao more than any other reflected the contradictions of a historical epoch, the contradictions that have so far emerged in the phase of transition from capitalism to socialism. Lenin died only a few years after the October Revolution and thus passed into history primarily as the leader of the first socialist revolution. Trotsky, defeated because of the relationship of forces during the period in which he launched his struggle against the bureaucracy, became the symbol of intransigent defense of the conquests of the revolution. Stalin, an obscure figure before October, assumed historic stature as the protagonist of the bureaucratic counterrevolution. Mao, as we have seen, was simultaneously the top leader of a revolution and the major person responsible for the bureaucratic degeneration of the workers state that emerged from that revolution. As the leader of a victorious revolution he contributed to inflicting a historic defeat on the world imperialist system. But at the same time, he did not at all abandon the Stalinist conception of socialism in one country and of subordinating the interests of the revolutionary struggle of the masses of the world to the interests of the state.

The disappearance of a man who had played such a great part in the contemporary history of China incontestably represents an element of rupture which will trigger rather profound shake-ups.

At the time of the death of Stalin, revolutionary Marxists stressed the essential role his personality had played in assuring the cohesion of the bureaucratic caste and in the functioning of the mechanisms of leadership of the state and the party. In various respects, the role of Mao has been even more decisive.

Like Stalin, Mao held the ruling bureaucratic layer together and appeared as the only person who had the authority to have the last word during times of conflict. But Mao's "Bonapartism" operated not only within the bureaucracy but also within society as a whole.

Here we must recall certain peculiar features of the Maoist method of leadership and exercise of power, palpably different from those Stalin imposed in the USSR during the 1930s and 1940s. This method may be summed up as the effort to maintain more direct and living links with the masses and to resort to the more or less controlled and canalized intervention of the masses themselves during periods of special difficulty.

In order to survive and win victory in a long and bitter protracted revolutionary war, Mao had to rely not only on the support but also on the active participation of the masses. Similarly, he had to seek a certain mobilization of the masses when it came time for the gigantic work of building a new society, beginning from a material base that was even more backward than that of Russia in 1917, while having to contend with imperialist sabotage. This explains why the relations between the leaders and the masses in China have always been more direct than those between the masses and the Stalinist leading group in the USSR, which were virtually non-existent. It further explains why in spite of the bureaucratic degeneration, a sort of "horizontal democracy" (the term used by S.S. Wu—see *Inprecor*, No. 55, July 8, 1976, and No. 56, July 22, 1976) has existed in China, especially during certain periods. In other words, there is a certain degree of independence of decision-making on the local level in choosing the forms in which the general orientation decided at the top will be applied. This also explains why at various times Mao and other leaders have turned to the masses to extract themselves from situations of conflict or paralysis within the party leadership. Naturally, these leaders were always careful to establish a precise framework for the mobilizations they stimulated and, in the final analysis, to channel them. The experiences of the last months of 1966 and the first months of 1967 demonstrated, contrary to any apologetic interpretation, that barely as sectors of the masses began to act according to their own dynamic, pursuing objectives different from those set by the Maoist leadership, the latter did not hesitate to resort not only to a variety of massive ideological terrorism, but even, in the last instance, to repression.

(Let us recall that it was precisely the emergence of such explosive situations of tension that induced Mao to rely on the army, which for a certain period took on a prime function.) But all this does not change the fact that Mao's "system" assigns the masses a different role, one of more active participation, than was the case in the USSR during the Stalin and post-Stalin periods. On the other hand, the very raising of revolutionary-democratic and egalitarian themes on various occasions, despite all the tactical machinations and attempts at instrumentalization, inevitably had various consequences, objectively stimulating the tendency of the masses or the most mature layers of the masses to bring their weight to bear more forcefully, to fill the "horizontal democracy" permitted by the leading group with a real content.

The existence of a charismatic leader having sufficient prestige to call upon the masses at decisive moments but also capable of suddenly imposing discipline and a return to "normality" was essential for such a practice of the exercise of power and such a method of leadership—even more essential, let us repeat, than the personality of Stalin in the system of rule imposed in the USSR. In this sense above all, there can be no substitute whatever for Mao. His death thus introduces what may be called an element of "structural" imbalance into the Chinese political system.

In order to examine some hypotheses on possible developments in post-Mao China, it is first of all necessary to briefly recall some of the tensions that subsist structurally and politically, which were not overcome by the cultural revolution and the subsequent period.

According to official statistics, during the past several years the Chinese economy has registered successes which are not contested even by experts of the most diverse orientations. Overall, however,

taking a longer period into account, the pace of development remains relatively restricted. This means not only that the absolute levels achieved remain modest, but also that the gap between China, the USSR, and some capitalist countries has not narrowed or even threatens to widen, especially in some sectors. It is significant that in many discussions with foreign guests, according to the undenied accounts of the latter, both Mao and Chou En-lai continued to stress the persistent backwardness and poverty of China.

It must be recalled that after violently polemicizing against the USSR during the 1950s, because of Moscow's policy of increasing economic relations with the capitalist countries, China has done the same thing even more systematically, not only seeking to broaden commercial trade, but also acquiring machinery and even entire industrial complexes from the western countries and Japan. After a certain point, however, this policy began to conflict with a requirement set down as a norm by the Chinese leaders: that the country not build up a foreign debt. If this option were rigorously confirmed, the inevitable consequence would be a slowdown, not an acceleration, of the pace of industrial development, at least in some sectors. A policy of self-sufficiency and even basic autarky can be obligatory under exceptional circumstances (let us not forget that for years China had to contend with both the persistent imperialist blockade or partial blockade and the open sabotage of the Moscow bureaucrats), but in the long run it inevitably entails extremely negative consequences. To judge from allusions made in certain polemics, this problem has already been a source of conflict within the leading group. It is quite probable that it will be posed again more acutely in the future, even though the development of oil exports might lessen this contradiction.

Let us look at some quick considerations on agriculture. Not even Maoist China has been able to escape the dilemma facing bureaucratized transitional societies that have arisen on the basis of a low level of productive forces (a factor which must never be forgotten, with the permission of certain neo-utopians). This dilemma may be stated as follows: either to accept, after the radical reforms of the initial phase, the subsistence for an indefinite period of relations that are not collectivist but instead intermediary between private-plot or cooperative peasant agriculture on the one hand and collectivized agriculture on the other, with all the economic consequences and social risks that logically follow, or else to force the pace of collectivization, to a large extent ignoring the real possibilities of mechanization and leaving open the threats of dramatic breaks with vast peasant masses and repercussions that in the final analysis are negative for production itself. This problem, which was at the root of the regime's crucial choices in the countryside, from the massive launching of the cooperative movement in the middle of the 1950s to the largely voluntaristic attempts to form people's communes in 1958, to the subsequent rectifications, has still not been solved. On the one hand, the rates of development of production, again according to official figures, continue to be limited (which is especially serious since China continues to register consistent increases in population). On the other hand, the peasants tend to devote more care to their individual plots than to collective production. The consequences inevitably make themselves felt, first on the general economic level and second on the social level, since under such conditions it is inevitable that differentiations among various layers of the peasantry will persist and even deepen.*

In connection with the problems posed by the difficulties of economic development and the problems of agriculture in particular, a series of social tensions continue to arise and even to intensify, judging by certain signs. To give just one example, difficulties and contradictions have come up regarding the integration of new generations into the economic fabric. Imbalan-

*On this and other problems, it would be useful for readers to refer to the articles that have previously appeared in *Inprecor*, particularly those of S.S. Wu in Nos. 55 and 56. For more general observations and an analysis of developments in postrevolutionary China, permit me to mention my own book, *Party, Army, and Masses in China*, New Left Books, London, 1976.

ces arose on the one hand because of the still limited specific weight of the industrial and urban economy and on the other hand as a result of massive access to education (which, there is scarcely any need to recall, constitutes one of the major gains of the revolution). The existence of such problems has become clear, for example, in the polemics on the so-called educated youth sent to work in the countryside. For the time being at least, this involves relatively limited sectors, but the absolute number of youth involved, according to figures cited in the above-mentioned article of S.S. Wu, approaches 12,000,000. These youth do not always freely accept being transferred to the countryside, where living conditions are generally more arduous, and quite often they were not greeted with great enthusiasm by the peasants.

Hence, there has been a back and forth movement between the cities and the countryside, with some youth returning to the cities unauthorized. This threatens to result in the development of layers of youth who are uprooted in a certain sense, deprived of any stable place in society and thus tempted to operate on its fringes. According to some interpretations whose veracity we are not in position to check, such situations may have been at the root of the criminal incidents that have recently occurred in some cities, to which the official press has referred.

A series of problems and tensions are also posed on the purely political level. The critical analysis of revolutionary Marxists has demonstrated that from the very beginning the Chinese workers state has been characterized by the absence of a network of organs of proletarian democracy of the soviet type and even by a certain survival of the previously existing administrative apparatuses. (The negative influence of this latter element was denounced by the Maoists themselves during the 1966 and 1967 polemics.) The Chinese constitution calls for the election on the basis of local organs of a National People's Assembly, which is supposed to be the real repository of power. In practice, the Assembly, when it has met, has had no function except to formally ratify decisions that have already been made elsewhere, in the leading bodies of the party. (Let us not forget that Maoist conceptions assign the party a function of absolute preeminence and rigorous control, similar to the conceptions that held sway in the USSR both under and after Stalin.) Since it is practically impossible for the restricted leading bodies (even considered in the broad sense, that is, including all their various subcommittees and branches) to actually make decisions on all the problems that arise in a country as large as China, there is some margin for the exercise of "horizontal democracy" on the one hand and there is a tendency to create relatively independent regional or local power bodies on the other hand. The result is a precarious situation laden with conflict. In fact, on various occasions—and not only at the most dramatic point of the 1966-67 crisis—the masses have sought to lend a more substantial content to this "horizontal democracy" and centrifugal forces have thus developed within the bureaucracy (the recurrent polemics against people accused of having created "independent kingdoms" reflect these types of centrifugal tendencies).

International policy also holds a potential for tensions within the bureaucracy itself and even more so between the bureaucracy and the masses. The death of Mao may provide an additional stimulus toward drawing a balance-sheet for which the leading group itself must have already felt the need. For a whole period, and even now, the assertion of complete independence of the USSR has paid off for the Chinese bureaucracy both internally and in important sectors of the communist movement. Even the polemic against the "two superpowers" bore some diplomatic and political fruit, for it was able to correspond somewhat both with the interests of some "national" bourgeoisies and states and with the sentiments of some movements in colonial countries which were impelled by the necessities of the struggle against imperialist powers to seek the "friendship" of the USSR and thus had occasion to undergo bitter experiences of "collaboration" with the Kremlin leaders. But now, after nearly two decades, a general balance-sheet is needed, and so is a balance-sheet of the line of the past several years, which has been based on the supposition that "social imperialism" is the main enemy.

Now, while there is no doubt that the existence of the Washington-Moscow-Peking triangle has enabled one or another of the three to win conjunctural tactical advantages from time to time, the major benefit overall has been reaped by American imperialism. To mention only the central episode of the past ten years, while it is true that the Sino-Soviet conflict did not spare the imperialists their defeat in Vietnam, it must not be forgotten that the very sharpness of that conflict considerably broadened the maneuvering room of the White House and the Pentagon. It has since been shown by various documents that among the elements that induced Johnson to plunge into the Indochina adventure in 1965, one of the most important was the conviction that the United States would not have to face a united front of the major workers states. And there is no doubt that this division, like the limits of the military aid to the Vietnamese fighters for a whole period, contributed to significantly delaying the final outcome.

Second, the policy of the Peking leading group, which has sacrificed the needs of the struggle of the working class and the anti-imperialist movements of various countries on the altar of diplomatic advantages (of dubious value in any event), has not only resulted in a loss of prestige for this leadership, which for many years had appeared as the protagonist of a great victorious revolution, but has also facilitated both reactionary regression in various countries and maneuvers of the so-called national bourgeoisie, in the final analysis in contradiction with the legitimate requirements of defense of the Chinese workers state. As far as the Communist parties are concerned, the balance-sheet of Maoist policy also leaves no room for doubt. Since a few successes of the early phases of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the attractive power of the Chinese Communist party has been constantly on the wane and the CCP's sphere of influence is now smaller than ever. Even among the far-left groups, which the cultural revolution and the Chinese criticisms of the Kremlin had contributed to creating, sometimes decisively, the hard-line defenders of Peking's positions increasingly fall into the category of political paranoia, while more critical and sophisticated tendencies prevail. (This is reflected in the dreary delegations of Maoist Communist parties received in Peking; the existence of these groups is often unknown in their countries of origin.)

But beyond the balance-sheet of the past fifteen years and beyond the conjunctural difficulties, sooner or later one fundamental contradiction must inevitably come to the surface in a more or less acute form. Regardless of Maoist theoretical deviations or propagandistic mystifications, the social character of the USSR is analogous to that of China and qualitatively different from that of the United States and the other capitalist countries. This hard fact is in contradiction to the thesis of "social imperialism" as the main enemy and even more in contradiction to its practical implications. This will be a source of inevitable conflict. The fact that on various occasions oppositionists who have fallen into disgrace have been accused (with how much justification it is difficult to say in most cases) of desiring a compromise with the "social imperialists" and of acting as their agents demonstrates that this is not a matter of speculation about the future but of understanding the significance of clashes that have already occurred within the leading group on various occasions.

All these potential conflicts may become that much more operative in the new phase now opening since changes have occurred or are occurring on an ever greater scale on two levels.

First, the generation that was born or grew up after 1949 is now becoming predominant. For the older generations, the essential reference point tended to be the conditions of prerevolutionary society. As difficult as the post-1949 situation may have been as a result of the mistakes or crimes of the bureaucracy, the contradictions of the new society seemed insignificant when compared to the oppression of the old China. For the new generations, the conquests of the revolution represent an already achieved starting point. Their attitude will be and already has been determined by the extent to which the transitional society is capable of responding to their needs and by whether or not

constant progress is made in all fields. Second, a replacement process has occurred or is occurring with ever increasing rapidity not only in the central leadership but also at all the various levels of the party. The "historic" leaders and cadres are disappearing and being replaced by leaders and cadres who will not be able to avail themselves of the prestige of the leaders of the revolution and will be judged on the basis of their present behavior, their present successes and failures.

Finally, Mao has disappeared from the scene at a time which, far from being one of stagnation or demoralization of the masses, is marked by a new rise of political sensitivity and combativity and a reemergence of critical cadres capable of taking courageous initiatives. The first signs of new ferment occurred as long ago as 1973, in Canton for example, where material presenting an antibureaucratic critique was circulated. But especially during the past two years, various events have shown even more clearly that the situation is in motion once again. Again in Canton there have been demonstrations of soldiers whose terms were running out, as well as various spontaneous strikes. In Hangchow the strikes reached such proportions that it was decided to order the army to intervene. The demonstration in Peking's Tien An Men Square last April 5 may have been, as claimed by official sources, the scene of maneuvers by the Teng Hsiao-ping tendency and thus may have originated in intrabureaucratic conflicts. But in the final analysis its size (tens of thousands of participants) and dynamic expressed a spontaneous explosion of criticism of the group that leads the party and the state.

What will happen in the coming period? It is not easy to reply, at least on the basis of the meager information we now possess. The battle within the bureaucracy will be extremely bitter. The very problem of succession is posed in dramatic terms. It is not only a question of appointing a successor to Mao, but also of filling all the voids left by deaths or political liquidations in various levels of the leadership (the case of the standing committee of the Political Bureau, now reduced to two or three members, is symbolic of a more generalized instability). The fact that in the very communiqué announcing the death of Mao (it would be interesting to know what body actually approved this communiqué) there were violent and repeated attacks, not only on past "deviationists," but also on the most recent victim, Teng Hsiao-ping, is a sure sign of a situation of persistent tension and fear among the group that emerged victorious from the conflicts of the first months of this year.

It is probable that the first round will end with some compromise solution. In fact, the very selection of Hua Kuo-feng was already a choice of this type.

More generally, there is no doubt that the tendency which more directly represents the apparatus, the tendency which appeared as the most conservative one as long ago as during the cultural revolution, the most prominent representatives of which were Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, which on various occasions has been able to recover after defeats, has been objectively strengthened by the disappearance of Mao, the only figure who had been able to oppose this tendency successfully. Nor can another Mao be constructed artificially.

The strengthening of such a tendency would probably be viewed favorably by all those who aspire to defend, consolidate, or increase positions of privilege, primarily the upper levels of the bureaucracy. But layers of intermediary cadres might also lean toward such a tendency, those who have greater links with the masses but exactly because of that have often had to pay the price of sharp turns, have been more directly targeted by the great "rectification campaigns" or have even been deliberately cast in the unenviable role of scapegoat. Thus, they may feel a genuine need to get out of the line of continuous fire and enjoy a period of greater tranquility. Finally, a tendency of this type could seek to assure itself a base in the countryside, probably not without some temporary success, by proposing a series of Khrushchev-type concessions to some sectors of the peasantry. (The reference to Khrushchev is purely indicative since the conditions in the Soviet

countryside when Stalin died were significantly different from those that now prevail in China.

Most commentators have raised the question of whether the post-Mao period will be marked by a turn in the orientation of Chinese international policy. We have already indicated the problems posed in this sphere, the tendencies that have already taken shape in the past within the leading group itself, and the contradictions that will eventually come to the surface. Without engaging in abject speculation, we can advance the hypothesis that changes will surely occur sooner or later. There is already pressure in this direction. Among other things, Moscow would have an interest in a détente, even in the near future, as was confirmed by the reactions to the death of Mao. A whole series of Communist parties, among them those with the greatest weight and international prestige, surely advocate not only a détente but even a rapprochement and recomposition of the front of "fraternal parties." From the Vietnamese Communist party to the most authoritative representatives of the so-called Eurocommunists to the Cuban CP, without exception and regardless of their present persuasion, all of them are convinced that an evolution in a positive direction could in no way lead to a return to the monolithism of the time of the Stalinized Comintern and Cominform but on the contrary would deprive Moscow of any possibility of once again imposing its control and hegemony and in general would increase the prestige and attractive power of all the Communist parties.

In conclusion, the death of Mao will certainly open a new chapter, although it would be idle speculation to try to predict which tendencies will prevail in the coming phases and what specific forms the crisis of the bureaucratic system will take. The Chinese masses have entered a new period of activity and critical reflection. The most probable objectives of the coming battles will be the improvement of living standards, reduction of inequality, actual exercise of workers democracy. These battles will be integrated into a more general perspective of antibureaucratic struggle.

The cadres who have been trained during the past several years will be able to make their weight felt in these battles. Let us not forget that the sharpest phase of the 1966-67 crisis saw the maturation of tens of thousands of cadres who, beyond the mystifications of the leading group, committed themselves to struggles of an antibureaucratic dynamic and provided themselves with various sorts of instruments of organization. In some cases—the literature on this has been extensively reproduced—extremely interesting efforts toward comprehensive criticism and theoretical generalization were made. The protagonists of these events lost out in the last phase of the cultural revolution; on occasion they were hard hit, in general they were marginalized. There were inevitable phenomena of demoralization. But now conditions have been recreated for new developments, for a reactivation of these cadres. They will now be able to make an especially important contribution, for the disappearance of Mao will tend to eliminate the major obstacle to their understanding of the nature of the regime and the leadership, rendering inoperative the myth of a Mao as the standard-bearer of the antibureaucratic struggle, a myth to which they had continued to cling. In other words, they will be able to avoid objectively becoming instruments in a struggle of one faction of the bureaucracy against another. And, linking themselves more directly to the masses, they will be able to assume a leading role in the struggle against the bureaucracy as a whole.

September 14, 1976

Just like Israel . . .

Gad Katz, the mayor of Israel's port of Elath, was quoted in the October 9 issue of the *Johannesburg Star* on his reaction to South Africa. The visiting mayor said, "I find South Africa a well-developed progressive state doing a great deal for its inhabitants."

The Fraud of 'Separate Development'

By Ernest Harsch

[Second of two articles]

The apartheid regime claims that the Transkei will become an "independent" country on October 26. According to Pretoria's policy of "separate development," the nine other Bantustans will eventually be accorded a similar status. But the Bantustans, as they now exist, can never be truly independent of white domination. They are an integral—and subordinate—part of the South African economy; the erection of artificial borders between them and "white" South Africa cannot change their fundamental role.

Since the establishment of the African reserves in the mid-nineteenth century, a goal of the white regime's Bantustan policy has been to maintain and increase the exploitation of the African labor force. In fact, the reserves, coupled with the migratory labor system, were essential to the capitalist development of South Africa.

In *South Africa: The Peasant's Revolt*, Govan Mbeki summed up their basic position in the economy:

From the outset the purpose of maintaining the reserves was to provide a source of cheap labour for White agriculture, mining, and industry. On the one hand the reserves have served as mating camps for the production of migrant labourers, while on the other they have proved suitable dumping grounds for the physical wrecks whom industry discards in the same way as waste fibre is thrown away after its juice has been extracted. [P. 67.]

The present degree of dependency of the Bantustan inhabitants on jobs in "white" South Africa is clearly revealed by Pretoria's own official statistics. In 1973, more than 75 percent of the income of all Africans in the Bantustans was earned outside of their borders. In the Transkei, there is only one wage-earner employed inside the territory to every eight migrant workers.

Since virtually all of South Africa's natural resources and industry are located in the "white" areas, the Bantustans are also totally dependent on Pretoria for all of their electrical power, transport, telecommunications, and postal services, and for most of their water. The few stunted industries in the Bantustans are equally dependent on the white-owned banks and commercial infrastructure.

'Interchangeable Units'

The relationship of dependency between the Black work force and the white economy is two-sided. Virtually all indus-

tries in South Africa are dependent on a continuous supply of cheap, Black labor. The rapid growth of South African capitalism would have been impossible without this African work force. D.F. Malan, the first National party prime minister, admitted this when he said in 1950, "Our whole economic structure is to a large extent based on nonwhite labor."

Apartheid is a system of total economic as well as political, domination over the Black population. Its intricate network of laws, backed up by coercion, is basically aimed at controlling and regulating the movement of African labor to ensure that white industries have an adequate supply when, where, and for however long it is needed. The restrictions on African trade-union and political rights are further designed to keep African wages at a depressed level and to hamper the African workers' ability to fight back.

The economy's dependence on a large Black proletariat, however, is the Achilles' heel of white minority rule. Even a limited strike by African workers could seriously affect some industries; a general strike could paralyze the country.

This vulnerability has been increased in recent years by the growth of a skilled and semiskilled layer among African workers. Between 1962 and 1974, the number of Africans holding skilled positions in the manufacturing sector increased by 175 percent. Since it is costly to train such workers, white employers are less able to resort to mass firings in response to strikes. The greater job security among skilled Africans, moreover, heightens their willingness to struggle for improved wages, conditions, and rights.

As part of its assault on African political rights, and to shield the apartheid system's weak spot, Pretoria has sought to further atomize the African working class and increase its insecurity by extending the migratory labor system as much as possible. The development of the Bantustans as dumping grounds for "superfluous" Africans and as compounds for migrant workers is an essential aspect of this scheme.

When the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act was introduced in 1959, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd declared that all urban Africans would become "inter-changeable units." A decade later, Minister for Bantu Administration and Development Michiel C. Botha said, "As far as I am concerned, the ideal condition would be if we could succeed in due course in having all Bantu in the White areas on

a basis of migratory labour only."

Pretoria began implementing this policy in the early 1960s. Hundreds of thousands of African families have been "endorsed out" of the "white" cities to the Bantustans. Many Africans in the cities had been born or had worked there for years and were thus legally entitled to remain as permanent residents under the Section 10 provisions of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act. Charles Mohr reported in the January 21, 1973, *New York Times* that many of these "qualified" Africans were also being deported each year.

Typically, the laborers then return to the "white" areas as migrant workers, forced to leave their families behind in the resettlement camps in the Bantustans. About half of the African work force in South Africa is now migrant. These workers are only allowed to work at a job continuously for one year, and must then return to the Bantustans to reapply. All Africans over the age of fifteen in the reserves must register with a Tribal Labour Bureau, where they are assigned to a specific occupation category and must accept whatever job is given to them.

So that those employers who trained Africans for skilled or semiskilled positions do not have to bear the costs of continuously retraining new workers, Pretoria has adopted a call-in card system, in which the skilled African worker must reapply for the same job with the same employer at the end of the one-year contract period.

Under the migratory labor system, the white regime has much greater control over African workers. Strikers and political activists can be removed from the "white" areas by simply denying them readmission after their contract has expired. Since there are few jobs in the Bantustans, the very threat of permanent banishment to the reserves has a dampening effect on labor struggles.

By regulating the flow of African labor from the Bantustans themselves, Pretoria can also keep out "redundant" workers, thus lessening the social impact of Black unemployment in the "white" areas during periods of recession.

The 'Discarded People'

As part of its campaign to extend the migratory labor system, the apartheid regime has carried out one of the largest forced resettlement programs in history. Entire African communities, including some that had been in existence for more

than a century, were uprooted. Homes were bulldozed. "Unqualified" African families were kicked out of the "white" cities and off the "white" farms. The victims were simply trucked to the Bantustans where they were dumped at squalid and barren resettlement camps.

In his book on the forced resettlement scheme, Cosmas Desmond quoted a 1967 government circular, which stated:

It is accepted Government policy that the Bantus are only temporarily resident in the European areas of the Republic, for as long as they offer their labour there. As soon as they become, for some reason or another, no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market, they are expected to return to their country of origin or the territory of their national unit where they fit in ethnically if they were not born and bred in the homeland. . . . It must be stressed here that no stone is to be left unturned to achieve the settlement in the homelands of non-productive Bantu at present residing in the European areas. [Pp. 21-22.]

The same circular then listed those Africans whom Pretoria considered "non-productive," including the "aged, the unfit, widows, women with dependent children," "Bantu on European farms who become superfluous as a result of age, disability . . . or Bantu squatters from mission stations and black spots which are being cleared up. . . ."

Between 1960 and 1970, an estimated 1.6 million Africans were moved, and at least another half million are slated for resettlement. The majority of those forcibly moved, nearly a million, were so-called rural "squatters," Africans who had worked and lived on white-owned farms, particularly in Natal Province. About 400,000 were "endorsed out" of the major cities. Nearly 200,000 were the victims of the campaign to rid the "white" areas of "Black spots." Pretoria has identified 332 such "Black spots" for elimination.

Under the provisions of the Group Areas Act, about 500,000 Coloureds and Indians have also been moved or are scheduled to be moved. Most resettlement areas for Coloureds and Indians are in the Western Cape. Attempts to evict Indian shopkeepers from a traditional Indian trading area in downtown Johannesburg led to a demonstration by several hundred Indian youths on July 13. The protest was broken up by police with riot clubs and dogs.

The African resettlement camps in the Bantustans are often little more than bare allotments of land, frequently with no water supply or even an access road. In some of the camps, the government provides small asbestos or tin huts (for which the residents must pay rent). In others the Africans must build their own shelters, from mud or salvaged materials. They are not allowed to keep cattle or plough the land. There is usually no work in the area.

In a report in the April 27, 1971, London *Times*, correspondent John Sackur des-



Africa Report

MATANZIMA: Transkei chief minister vows war on "industrial troublemakers."

cribed the conditions at the resettlement sites:

It is common for a family in these camps to have only £2 a month to live on, after rent. Food is bought from traders, whose shop may be miles away, and runs out well before the end of the month. However recent the settlement, it always looks old-established because of the number of gravestones in the cemetery, marking the effects of epidemics, starvation and a terrible rate of infant mortality, estimated by doctors as approaching 50 per cent.

Besides the resettlement camps, Pretoria is setting up "rehabilitation centers" in the Bantustans, to which pass law offenders, "idlers," and "undesirables" may be sentenced for up to three years' imprisonment with compulsory labor. Two such centers, in Lebowa and the Ciskei, are already under construction.

Islands of Poverty

Those Africans who are shipped off to the reserves are condemned to the most abject poverty, to disease, and to death. The Bantustans were seriously overcrowded even before the current resettlement program was launched.

In 1970, the average population density in the reserves was 119 persons per square mile, compared to 35 persons per square mile in the rest of the country. In KwaZulu, the figure was 173 persons per square mile. But even these figures are deceptive, since some of the Bantustans, like the Transkei, are predominantly mountainous.

Because of the overcrowding, the land in the Bantustans erodes rapidly and crop yields decline. In KwaZulu, about 70 percent of the land is uncultivable and crop yields per acre are often one-third to one-fourth of those on white-owned farmland.

The high population density also means that the peasants in the Bantustans have landholdings that are frequently too small for even subsistence farming. In KwaZulu, most landholdings are less than half the size necessary for subsistence. In the Ciskei 98 percent of the households own less than 5.25 hectares and in the Transkei 95 percent own less than 4 hectares, the levels necessary for bare subsistence. (One hectare is equivalent to 2.47 acres.)

In an essay on the Bantustans in the October-December 1976 issue of *Socialist Revolution*, Richard Morrock wrote:

Out of thirty-six million acres in the Reserves, only five million are under field crops. Of this, more than ninety-nine per cent is devoted to grain, mostly corn, which is the staple of the African diet. Yet the Reserves must import corn in order to feed their inhabitants. Between 1948 and 1968, far from keeping pace with the huge growth of their population, the Bantustans' corn production actually declined by twelve percent. Only the wages sent home to their families by the absent men make it possible for the population of the Reserves to survive. When jobs become scarce, famine results.

Unemployment in the reserves is high and increasing. Although no precise figures are available on the situation in the Bantustans as a whole, an estimate of African unemployment and underemployment in the Port Natal Bantu Administration Board area stands at 37 percent. In a study of KwaZulu, Lawrence Schlemmer and Tim J. Muil note, "High or rising unemployment in the rural homeland areas, by augmenting the labor surplus, adversely affects the bargaining strength of urban African workers."¹⁶

The average per capita income in the Bantustans was only £3 a month in the early 1970s. In the Ciskei, the average household income, including wages sent by migrant workers, is only 35 percent of the Poverty Datum Line, the official subsistence level designated by Pretoria.

As a result of these wretched conditions, many Africans in the reserves die at an early age. The average life expectancy for Africans in the entire country is 36.4 years, compared to 66 years for whites. Diseases like tuberculosis, pellagra, diphtheria, and kwashiorkor (a protein deficiency disease) are rampant in the Bantustans. In the Transkei, Pretoria's "showcase," about 40 percent of African children die before the age of ten as a direct or indirect result of malnutrition.

The poverty in the Bantustans is the result of a conscious government policy to keep them underdeveloped, despite its claims that it intends to build up industries in them. "The government," Mbeki pointed out, "has no intention of letting Africans develop industries in their 'homelands' and so undermine the whole system of migrant labour." The architects of

16. "Social and Political Change in the African Areas: A Case Study of KwaZulu," in *Change in Contemporary South Africa*, p. 114.

apartheid realize that physical hunger in the reserves is the main driving force that assures them of generation after generation of African workers.

Since the regime directly controls the flow of all investments to the Bantustans, it is able to ensure that no real industries develop that could offer African workers an alternative source of employment. Although 140,000 Africans join the workforce annually, only about 12,000 jobs are created in the Bantustans each year.

Botha commented that "in the economic framework of the country, the economy of the homelands is interwoven with that of the republic. And it stands to reason that the development of the homelands cannot be carried out at a pace which would have a detrimental effect on the economy of the country. . . ."

In order to drive even more Africans onto the labor market, Pretoria has also begun to dispossess many African peasants in the reserves. According to Mbeki, it is estimated that about half the existing population of the reserves will be moved off their land. They are to be resettled in rural townships in the Bantustans to provide a labor supply for those small industries that are established within the reserves and for the larger industries that are being set up just outside of them.

More Profits for Apartheid

Closely connected to the Bantustan program, and an important element in the regime's plans to increase its exploitation of Black labor, is the establishment of the so-called border industries on the outskirts of the reserves.

Verwoerd explained the place of the border industries in the South African economy in the House of Assembly in June 1959: "White South Africa will have two industrial legs, the one being the white industry deep in the white interior and the second the industries owned by white people and employing the Bantu labour coming from the Bantu areas, because those industries are in the border areas. The majority of the workers can be absorbed there in the service of the white people."

In the past fifteen years, about \$256 million has been invested by government agencies and private firms in the border areas of KwaZulu alone. More than 10 percent of South Africa's gross output is now produced in the border areas.

Because of the high concentration of existing industries in the southern Transvaal, the Western Cape, the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage and Durban-Pinetown areas, water supplies and land suitable for industrial expansion are becoming scarce in those regions. The concomitant concentration of Black labor is another worry of the regime. Pretoria has therefore sought to encourage some decentralization of industry, offering incentives to companies

to move to the border areas near the Bantustans.

The primary motivation for the border industry scheme, however, is the more effective exploitation of African workers living in the rural townships of the reserves. According to William Beinart,¹⁷ average African male earnings in 1956-57 in the border areas and reserves of the Cape and the Transvaal were between 45 percent and 60 percent of those in the industrial region of the southern Transvaal.

A few such industrial centers have also been established within the Bantustans. At Babelegi, in Bophuthatswana, white industrialists are allowed to build or lease factories for a period of sixteen years. In the clothing industry, the starting wage in Babelegi is only \$4.20 a week, compared to \$10.50 in Johannesburg. Black workers in Babelegi also put in longer hours. Since these workers live in the reserves, the apartheid regime does not have to provide even the minimal services and housing given to Blacks living in the "white" cities.

Pretoria has consciously sought to use its Bantustan scheme to attract increased foreign investment to South Africa. Companies in Europe can manufacture their products more cheaply in the Bantustans—including the cost of exporting the goods back to Europe—than they can in their own countries.

The labor policies in the Bantustans are also an important inducement. Chief Minister Kaiser Matanzima of the Transkei has pledged that no trade unions would be allowed under an "independent" Transkei. He has told white businessmen that the absence of "industrial troublemakers" would be assured.

The Bertrand Group of Milan, a textile firm, plans to invest \$15 million in the Transkei, while the Dutch chemical company, Akzo, plans to join with British Chemical Holdings to build a \$2 million plant in KwaZulu. The foreign investment in the Bantustans, however, cannot even begin to compare to the investments in the rest of the country.

The Black officials in the Bantustans have taken an active part in helping Pretoria attract new foreign investments to South Africa. Matanzima has stated that his administration's policy "will be one of capitalism with a conscience" and that there would be "unparalleled opportunities for investors."

In an advertisement that appeared in a number of international magazines, Chief Wessels Mota of Basotho Qwaqwa declared:

Many American and European owned compan-

17. "The Policy of Industrial Decentralisation in South Africa," in *The Conditions of the Black Worker*, edited by the Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia (South West Africa) (London: Africa Publications Trust, 1975), p. 114.

ies are growing fat in South Africa.

Many more would like to invest here, but fear the wrath of their shareholders.

My message to all of you is simply to stop pussyfooting around.

If you want a nice, fat highly profitable overseas operation, invest in South Africa.

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZulu, who has criticized some aspects of Pretoria's Bantustans program, also is an active advocate of foreign investments in South Africa and has made pleas to American companies in particular.

These Bantustan administrators, however much they may criticize apartheid or "independence" for the Bantustans, are providing Pretoria with an invaluable service by giving political cover to the American, Western European, and Japanese corporations that are collaborating with the apartheid regime and sharing in the exploitation of South Africa's Black population. A typical argument used by these tribal chiefs is that foreign investments actually aid Blacks, rather than further entrenching the apartheid system.

For instance, Chief Councillor of the Gazankulu Legislative Assembly H. Ntsanwisi was quoted in the October 1975 *South African Scope* as saying, "I told these [British and Swiss] businessmen that if they supported industries in the homelands and invested money in South Africa, they were not supporting separate development, but assisting the black people of this country.

"I tried to impress on them that investment in South Africa would benefit my people."

If the "independence" of the Transkei and other Bantustans gained recognition by some of the Black-ruled African states, the South African imperialists would then be able to use the Bantustans as springboards for increased economic penetration of the rest of the continent.

Wall Street Journal correspondent Neil Ulman, reporting from Pretoria in the September 19, 1975, issue, said, "Companies such as Elvinco Products Co., a Pretoria maker of plastic moldings, can't sell directly from its South African factories to black African nations such as Nigeria that refuse to do business with the republic. But it believes it might be able to open an export avenue through an independent Transkei."

After Soweto

During the massive Black protests that first erupted in Soweto in mid-June, the apartheid regime made a minor concession in its Bantustan policy. Botha announced in early August that urban Africans, except for those living in the Cape, would be allowed to buy or build their own homes without first becoming "citizens" of the Bantustans, as Pretoria had previously insisted.

At the same time, the Vorster regime made it clear that the essentials of the

Bantustan scheme would remain.

On June 25, shortly after his first meeting with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in West Germany, Vorster defended the Bantustan policy at a news conference. Asked if the Blacks of Soweto would be considered citizens of another country, Vorster answered, "the same as 93,000 Mozambicans working in South Africa are citizens of Mozambique."

According to a report in the July 17 London *Economist*, "The prime minister, Mr Vorster, is also pressing ahead with his plan to strip all Xhosa-speaking Africans of their South African citizenship when the first of the bantustans or tribal homelands, the Transkei, becomes independent on October 26th. Black parents are now having to register all babies born in the townships as homeland citizens, according to their ethnic origins."

Chief Director of the Central Bantu Affairs Administration Board C.H. Kotze announced in early July that a program would be launched in April 1977 to begin clearing all Blacks who are not key workers in the service industries out of Pretoria each night. The plan, he said, would cost millions of dollars to house the Black workers in the townships of Mabopane East and Mamelodi. The aim is that by 1983, Pretoria will be "white by night."

The one factor that could totally upset the apartheid regime's plans, however, is the response of the Black population to these new attacks on their rights. Virtually all of the major Black nationalist groups—from the outlawed African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress to the South African Students Organisation, the Black People's Convention, and the South African Students Movement—are opposed to the entire Bantustan system.

The opposition of the Black masses to the phony "independence" maneuvers has put considerable pressure on the tribal chiefs themselves. The only Bantustan administrations which have accepted "independence" so far are those of the Transkei and Bophuthatswana.

The chief ministers of the other Bantustans met in Johannesburg August 21 and issued a statement reiterating that they "have no intention whatsoever of opting for the so-called independence, as we do not want to abdicate our birthright as South Africans, as well as forfeiting our share of the economy and wealth, which we have jointly built."

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has been the most vocal of these Bantustan officials. At a rally of 16,000 Blacks in Soweto on March 14, three months before the first uprisings, he declared, "Those who are attempting to divide the land of our birth are attempting to stem the tide of history. . . ."

"The majority of black people do not want to abandon their birthright. They have toiled for generations to create the wealth of South Africa. They intend to participate in the wealth of the land."

Buthelezi added that instead the entire country "must move towards majority rule."

This broad opposition to the Bantustans has also prompted the Organization of African Unity, as well as the United Nations, to declare that they will not recognize the Transkei as an "independent" state.

Since the June rebellions, the situation in South Africa has become much more explosive. Whatever frictions Pretoria had been able to foster among Africans—and between Africans, Indians, and Coloureds—have become increasingly submerged as the Black population achieves greater unity in its common struggle against the apartheid system. The Bantus-

tans have not been immune from this unrest.

In Bophuthatswana, students shouting Black power slogans burned down the main parliament building in Mafeking August 8. In the Transkei, police arrested 266 students who had staged a sit-in demonstration in Lady Frere in solidarity with the Black uprisings. Protests were also held in at least three other Bantustans: Lebowa, Venda, and Basotho Qwaqwa.

The Transkei "independence" ceremonies on October 26 could have a profound impact throughout South Africa. At a time of rising Black militancy, Pretoria's attempt to take away the citizenship of three million Africans can only intensify Black opposition to the racist regime. □

José Páez Still Behind Bars

Four Trotskyists Murdered in Argentina

Four members of the Argentine Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST—Socialist Workers party) have died at the hands of the Videla junta's repressive apparatus since the beginning of July.

Adolfo Fenon Carrera, Armando Navarro, Cristina Isarregui, and a party member whose last name was Cabello were all kidnapped and murdered by unidentified persons, according to a news bulletin issued October 5 by the PST leadership in exile.

Fenon Carrera was a government employee in the tax administration bureau. He was seized at the home of his parents in July. The following day his body was found in an empty lot in Buenos Aires.

Navarro and Cabello worked at the Swift meat-packing plant in Berisso. Both were kidnapped from their homes in mid-September by masked men who said they were part of the army. Their bodies were found a few days later.

Isarregui was a student who also worked in a law firm. She was kidnapped in the street in August. One week later the police called her parents to come identify her body in the Buenos Aires morgue.

This list includes only "those whose bodies have already been found," the PST said, "since the list of those who have disappeared is much longer."

The bulletin also reported the latest news on José Páez, a central leader of the PST who has been in prison in Córdoba since January 1976. On August 6, the judge granted him provisional release, but as of October 5 he was still being held. A writ of habeas corpus was filed on September 13, demanding an end to the delay, but the government has not responded to it.

In the case of PST member Arturo Pedro Apaza, a leader in the metalworkers union who was kidnapped a few days after the March 24 military coup, the PST reported: "There could be good news, but it has not yet been confirmed. His wife received a letter in the city of Salta, allegedly from him. Although its authenticity has not been absolutely confirmed, it is an indication that our campaign is beginning to bear fruit."

The case of another PST member, Luisa Segura, was reported in the October 7 issue of *La Opinión*. Segura, a student leader at the University of Tucumán, has been in prison since November 17, 1974. No charges were ever placed against her. Before the March 1976 coup, she had requested to leave Argentina—a right of prisoners who were not under indictment. *La Opinión* reported that her request had been denied on the grounds that this right was suspended by order of the junta.

The news bulletin reported a broad range of prominent individuals and organizations in Colombia, Venezuela, and Portugal who had sent letters and telegrams to Videla protesting the victimization of PST members.

Among them were protest letters signed by twenty-eight members of the Colombian legislature, headed by Liberal party leader Luis Villar Borda; by members of the Venezuelan parliament from most of the political parties holding seats; and by a number of trade unions in Portugal. □

Fox Sizes Up Chicken Coop

"CIA Aiding Investigation of Letelier Slaying"—headline in the October 9 *Washington Post*.

Selections From the Left

rouge

"Red," Revolutionary Communist daily published in Paris.

In the October 13 issue, Frédéric Carlier comments on the current campaign against the Chinese Communist party leaders most closely identified with the Cultural Revolution.

"The situation is excellent," Chinese deputy premier Li Hsien-nien said. In fact, the situation has never been so good for the right wing of the Chinese bureaucracy since the Cultural Revolution.

"The facade of unity has been broken by the arrest of all the leaders of the 'left' in the apparatus, who had come to prominence during the 'Cultural Revolution.'

"Hardly a month after Mao's death, the differences have been settled in the best Stalinist traditions by a 'palace revolution' leading to the imprisonment of the leaders of one faction by another."

Carlier suggests, however, that the ascendancy of the faction represented by Li Hsien-nien may not prove very long lasting: "In order for the right wing of the bureaucracy to win a real victory and to be able to apply its policy, two things are necessary: The supporters of the 'Shanghai Group' [the faction most identified with the Cultural Revolution, including the four Political Bureau members now being publicly denounced] will have to give up without a fight. Contrary to what happened in the Cultural Revolution, the masses will have to stay out of the conflict.

"Only on these conditions can the new leadership around Hua Kuo-feng stabilize itself, and so, to say the least, such a development seems improbable.

"In the coming confrontations, we will support every step forward the Chinese masses make toward breaking the bureaucracy's monopoly of political power and toward establishing real workers democracy in China. . . .

"Those currents in the far left that have always identified with Maoism and the 'Chinese road' for building socialism, who accepted all the Chinese leadership's turns, from the halt of the Cultural Revolution to the ouster of Teng Hsiao-ping, because the 'Great Helmsman' was in command, will now have to choose their camp."

The "Shanghai Group" was described in a short separate article: "The four members of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist party [under attack] are all members of what is called the Shanghai Group. They represent the 'left' faction in the apparatus.

"In fact, it was in Shanghai that the

Cultural Revolution began in 1965, when the party apparatus in Peking was in the hands of supporters of Liu Shao-chi.

"If the 'Shanghai Group accepted the compromise Mao made with the right' in the apparatus to halt the extension of the Cultural Revolution, it was nonetheless reticent about the return of the old bureaucrats who had been purged after the ouster of Lin Piao.

"It was the Shanghai group also who in the press and in the sectors they controlled were in the forefront of the campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping and 'the right deviationist wind.'

"They had an important influence in their Shanghai bastion, in the media, in the militia, and in certain universities. They seem also to have supporters in many provinces and were considered to be those politically closest to Mao."



"*Sekai Kakumei*" (World Revolution), weekly central organ of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International.

Under the headline, "Mourn the Death of Mao Tsetung," a front-page article in the September 20 issue declares that "800 million people of China have gone into mourning, feeling as if they have lost their father, grieving the death of Chairman Mao. The Japanese section of the Fourth International expresses its heartfelt condolences on the occasion of Chairman Mao's death."

Assessing Mao's political career, the article states that he was "truly a great revolutionist." The "work of liberating the revolutionary energy of the Chinese people from the yoke of the ancient feudal system and the cruel oppression of foreign imperialism, the work leading to the proletarian dictatorship, was accomplished under his leadership. Mao more than anyone else can be credited with the achievement of making the peasants and workers . . . rise up from their daily lot of starvation. . . .

"But the greatness of Mao Tsetung lies not only in these accomplishments. Mao was an independent, self-reliant communist of revolutionary spirit and passion. . . . He lived among the masses, seeking to develop his thought by verifying it in their struggles. Mao Tsetung possessed a greatness that every communist in the world must study and grasp.

"At a time when communists all over the world were turning into faithful servants of Stalin, Mao boldly resisted, choosing an independent revolutionary line. It is this fact . . . which is so impressive."

The article notes, however, that Mao's policies "included many zigzags, and at

times grave errors," reflecting the "tremendous difficulties imposed on the heroic Chinese revolution by the Stalinist disintegration of the Third International and the degeneration of the Soviet workers state."

In his last years, the article states, Mao devoted himself "to the problem of how to resist the heavy pressure of the despotic Soviet bureaucracy and reinforce the independent development of revolutionary China. He tried to accomplish this under a general line of 'opposing Soviet social imperialism while advancing peaceful coexistence between China and the United States.' . . .

"This line of Mao's is absolutely mistaken. It can never be accomplished in reality. When he formulated this line Mao committed the worst error of his life, and left an indelible stain on his name. . . ."

The view expressed by the imperialists that under Mao's heirs "probably nothing will change" is questionable, the article states. "We predict that China is surely heading toward upheavals, for two reasons."

First, because Peking's "pro-U.S./anti-Soviet Union foreign policy is a grave impediment to China's development toward socialism. It will absolutely fail to resolve China's internal contradictions and difficulties—in fact it will heighten and exacerbate them. . . .

"Second, the death of Mao Tsetung provides a perfect situation for the privileged bureaucracy to strengthen its control. Mao was a very big support to the Chinese masses' resistance to the rule of the privileged bureaucratic caste. The Stalin-type line of socialism in one country, to which Mao finally capitulated, always provided a base for bureaucratic degeneration. But in spite of this fact, the radical revolutionary line and revolutionary spirit of Mao himself continued to be powerful weapons for the masses' resistance.

"But now the biggest obstacle to the bureaucracy has been removed, and it will probably start stirring, seeking to move toward a despotic system. This will bring on new clashes between the bureaucracy and the masses."

The article concludes: "We had fervently hoped to struggle to the victory of the revolution in this proletarian country, and as revolutionists of the Socialist Republic of Japan, to meet Mao Tsetung. We were confident that Mao, with his vast accumulated experience, and in spite of his opposition to Trotskyism, would certainly not refuse to have a sincere heart-to-heart talk with us about the methods of cooperation and comradesly solidarity. And now this is impossible!

"But the greatness of Mao Tsetung is the greatness of 800 million Chinese people. It

was the great Chinese people who gave birth to the great Mao Tsetung. If we can learn from Mao, by the same token we can learn all the more profoundly from the Chinese people.

"By boldly striking ahead on the road to revolution, we will someday win the opportunity to embrace those 800 million Mao Tsetungs. . . ."

"A communist has died. Communists pay their respects."

QUÉ HACER?

"What Is To Be Done?" organ of the Socialist Workers Organization, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Costa Rica. Published in San José, Costa Rica.

The first issue, dated September, features an analysis of the latest economic measures taken by President Daniel Oduber.

"In his August 31 speech," the paper reports, "Oduber announced the repeal of the executive decree raising export taxes on coffee."

The president claimed he was taking this step to benefit the small coffee producer, but the paper points out, "If the government had wanted to protect the small coffee producer, it would have taken steps to ensure that the tax would fall only on the big producers and profiteers."

What really was involved was an effort to turn public employees against the small coffee producers, since a cut in this tax, the government claimed, would make it impossible for it to grant wage increases to its employees.

To counter this maneuver, revolutionists must explain "that the problems of one sector of the population are not solved at the expense of another. They are solved by a unified struggle against the government and the bosses. A united defense of the struggles of any sector of the population today is needed more than ever. The public workers are the first target of the attacks, so it is necessary for all sectors to show solidarity with their demands."

labor Challenge

Twice monthly newspaper published in Toronto, Canada.

"All out Oct. 14!" is the headline of the October 11 issue. Six pages are devoted to the Trudeau government's program of cutbacks and wage controls, and the October 14 day of protest called by the Canadian labor movement to demand an end to the "anti-inflation package."

There are reports on the activities to build the day of protest in Ontario, Québec, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Other articles analyze the economic impact of the government's policies; explain the stake women have in the fight against wage controls; and explain the

necessity for continued mass actions by the labor movement.

"The battle against wage controls has united the union movement as it never was before," Ray Warden notes in one article. "The powerful mass actions the CLC [Canadian Labour Congress] has organized have enormously increased its prestige among workers. The political weight of the Congress has been magnified accordingly."

However, the CLC leaders have hesitated in using the power of the labor movement to advance the interests of the working class. They supported the call for a general strike on October 14 only reluctantly. Their perspective was summed up in a manifesto proposing "a 'partnership' of business, government, and labor in making key economic decisions about the country's future."

According to Warden, "The course proposed by the CLC Manifesto would sacrifice labor's independence. . . ."

"Workers' interests can only be advanced in relentless struggle against the employers and their governments, not in partnership with them. . . ."

DIRECT ACTION

Socialist weekly published in Sydney, Australia. Presents the views of the Socialist Workers party.

Under the front-page headline "Sept 30 strike a huge success!" the October 7 issue features extensive coverage of the first national student strike ever held in Australia. About 18,000 students participated in the demonstrations held around the country to protest cutbacks in education and a freeze on increases in student allowances. About one-third of all college and university students boycotted classes.

"The biggest demonstrations were held in the capital cities," Dave Deutschmann reports: "Adelaide 3000, Brisbane 2000, Canberra 600, Melbourne 4500, Hobart 1000, Perth 700, Sydney 3500."

"September 30 was a turning point for the student movement," he writes. "It has put the Australian Union of Students and the student movement once again on the path of mass action. For many months AUS had restricted itself to the channels of lobbying and petitioning. . . ."

"The centrality of mass action to the cutbacks fight should become the perspective of AUS. September 30 was only the beginning. . . ."

politisk revy

"Political Review," an independent left fortnightly published in Copenhagen, Denmark.

An article in the October 15 issue reports spreading pollution in Denmark's arctic

colony, Greenland.

"The Canadian-owned Greenex mine working the lead and zinc deposits at Marmorlik has pumped out so much polluted water in its first year of operations that it has already produced alarming changes in the ecology.

"This is shown by the first ecology study made since the mine began operations. The results of this study demonstrate that the conditions of the concession have already been violated.

"One of the conditions was that water pumped out should not lead to 'significant accumulations of material from the mine in the water, fauna, flora, and sediments outside a narrowly circumscribed control zone.

"This recent study has shown that in the control zone and the areas covered by stations outside it, the lead content of seaweed has increased from two to six parts per thousand in the course of a year.

"For shellfish, the concentrations have increased from three parts per thousand to thirteen."

The article notes that Greenland is exempted from Denmark's antipollution laws. It calls for protests to the Ministry for Greenland against Greenex's violation of the terms of the concession.



"Socialist Word," an organ of workers' and students' news published in Lima, Peru.

The August 26 issue features an appeal for a united campaign to win the repatriation of Hugo Blanco and Ricardo Díaz Chávez, who were deported from Peru earlier this year. Blanco is a revolutionary socialist, best known for the role he played in organizing peasant unions in the Cuzco region in the 1960s. Chávez is a civil liberties and labor lawyer.

The reason for Blanco's deportation is to be found in his "revolutionary loyalty to the working masses of the country," the appeal states. It points out that Blanco was in Cuzco attending meetings of the peasant movement at the time he was allegedly "intellectually promoting" mass mobilizations in Lima against the Morales Bermúdez regime's austerity program—the pretext cited for his deportation.

"The government and the bourgeoisie are failing in their desperate attempt to overcome the economic crisis by increasing the exploitation of the workers," the statement says. "This is why they could not allow Hugo Blanco to remain in the country. His example and his prestige among the masses, who recognize him as a consistent fighter against imperialism and the oligarchy and in favor of socialism, is a constant danger, especially at a time when the people are increasingly disenfranchised with the regime."

AROUND THE WORLD



Frame-up Charges Dismissed in Athens

The case against fourteen persons charged with "moral responsibility" for the clashes between police and demonstrators during the Greek general strike of May 24-25 was dismissed October 8 by a three-judge tribunal in Athens.

The defendants had included Giannis Felekis and A.K. Ambave, leaders of the Greek section of the Fourth International. All the accused were from groups based primarily on the radicalized youth, which played the leading role in bringing down the dictatorship of the colonels.

In its October 9 issue, the Athenian daily *Eleftherotypia* hailed the acquittal as a "historic decision."

"It was historic for two reasons. First, it closed the door to those who either out of cunning deliberation or stupidity were out to undermine our legal institutions by criminalizing political opinions. Secondly, this decision was a positive sign to judges throughout the country. It was a sign to make their judgements in accordance with the constitution and their conscience . . . and not in accordance with dubious organic laws [legislation limiting democratic rights passed by the Caramanlis parliament]."

Philippine Police Attack Protest

Shouting "Down with martial law," and "Marcos, Hitler, dictator, puppet!" about 5,000 demonstrators led by militant Roman Catholic priests and nuns tried to march on the presidential palace in Manila October 10. Police attacked the march with clubs, breaking it up.

This was the latest incident in the campaign launched by opponents of the Marcos dictatorship for a boycott of the referendum on martial law. The dissidents charge that the vote, scheduled for October 16, has been rigged in advance, as have previous ones.

Investors Worried About U.S. Economy

Fears that the economic recovery in the United States may be petering out have been reflected on Wall Street in a sixty-point drop in the Dow Jones industrial average over a three-week period. Prices on the New York Stock Exchange tumbled 12.71 points October 8, carrying the market to its lowest point in eight months.

The decline in the market was spurred by the news that wholesale prices had increased in September by 0.9 percent, the

biggest monthly rise in eleven months. Increases in the wholesale price index in July and August were 0.7 percent, compared to an average of 0.3 percent during the first six months of 1976.

Earlier, the U.S. Commerce Department announced that its composite list of leading business indicators had taken a sharp drop—the first decline in a year and a half.

Curfew in Hebron Enters Tenth Day

A punitive curfew against the city of Hebron in the Israeli-occupied West Bank entered its tenth day October 12. More than 100 of Hebron's 60,000 inhabitants have been arrested, and the remainder can be shot on sight if they set foot outside of their houses, regardless of whether they need food, water, or medical attention.

The curfew was imposed after Zionist fanatics provoked a conflict with Muslims in the Tomb of the Patriarchs, a religious shrine sacred to both Muslims and Jews.

Spanish Generals Censor Magazine

Sábado Gráfico, a Spanish weekly, listed eleven persons in a recent issue and implied they were involved in taking payoffs from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Eight of those named were generals.

Eugenio Suárez, the publisher of the magazine, was threatened with confiscation of the whole issue. He agreed to rip out the offending page in undistributed subscription copies, but was indicted for insulting the armed forces. If found guilty by a court-martial, Suárez could be jailed for six years.

Meanwhile, *Sábado Gráfico* has printed an apology "to those who are and should be above any suspicion."

Municipal Elections Held in Cuba

The first nationwide elections since the triumph of the Cuban revolution were held October 10, when Cuban voters went to the polls to elect 169 municipal assemblies. A field of 30,000 candidates competed for the 11,000 posts to be filled. Prime Minister Fidel Castro called the election "a significant step forward in the consolidation and institutionalization of the revolution."

Castro noted that 13.4 percent of the candidates were women, compared with 7 percent in a 1974 election in Matanzas Province.

The candidates, more than 70 percent of whom were members of the Cuban Communist party or its youth arm, were chosen at local meetings attended by four million Cubans. No party designations appeared on the ballot.

Needs of French Women Brushed Aside

One of the first casualties of French Prime Minister Raymond Barre's newly announced austerity program has been a government-endorsed plan for upgrading the status of women. The plan, which included 111 proposals, was drawn up after the regime created the cabinet-level post of state secretary for women's affairs. Among the proposals were financial relief for elderly women living alone, special funds for needy mothers with infant children, elimination of sex discrimination in textbooks, and enforcement of the law calling for equal pay for men and women.

In August, Barre announced the formation of a new cabinet in which the post of state secretary for women's affairs was eliminated. Women are 40 percent of the French work force and have been hit hardest by the economic crisis, but implementation of the proposed program would have cost the government about \$4 billion.

Spanish Regime Moves to Legalize Unions and Impose Wage Controls

The draft of a law that would legalize independent trade unions in Spain was approved by the government of Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez October 8. But the regime's new concession to the working class has yet to pass through the tortuous maze of governmental committees left by late dictator Francisco Franco as a barrier to change.

Meanwhile, the government has also announced that it plans to limit wage increases and to amend the old labor law to make it easier for workers to be fired.

Canadian Prisoners Win Victory

Prisoners at the British Columbia Penitentiary in New Westminster, Canada, ended a four-day protest October 1 after winning an agreement recognizing an inmate committee and establishing a citizens' advisory committee that will participate in further negotiations on prison conditions. The government also

promised to ease transfers out of the ninety-eight-year-old institution and to carry out an investigation of the conditions there.

A simultaneous protest was carried out against overcrowding by prisoners in the Laval Institute in Montreal.

Greek Torturers Get Light Terms

Six former security police under the former Greek dictatorship were found guilty October 12 of having tortured political prisoners. The six were sentenced to terms ranging from ten months to two years in prison after having pleaded that they were only following orders.

All the former torturers were released pending appeal. Moreover, some will not have to go to jail at all since presentencing detention counts against their terms, and those who have less than a year left to serve will be able to buy their way out with a fine equivalent to \$9 a day.

Canadian Defense Minister Quits, Attacks French Language Rights

Canadian Defense Minister James A. Richardson, a member of Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau's cabinet since 1968 and head of the Defense Department since 1972, resigned his post October 13. Richardson was protesting the inclusion of a provision in the proposed Canadian constitution that would give the French language equal status with English.

Although a law to that effect is already on the books in Canada, which has no written constitution, Richardson told a news conference that "we shouldn't lock the language policy in."

Richardson was the fourth minister to resign from Trudeau's cabinet in less than a month.

Hiroshima Reenactment 'a Blasphemy'

Mayor Takeshi Araki of Hiroshima sent a letter of protest to the U.S. embassy October 12 after retired Air Force General Paul Tibbets reenacted the atomic bombing of that city. Tibbets, who piloted the bomber Enola Gay on August 6, 1945, reenacted the bombing in Harlingen, Texas, October 9 and 10 as part of an effort to raise money for a group that preserves World War II aircraft.

Araki said in his letter that the show "trampled on the spirit of Hiroshima and was a blasphemy against the many people still suffering from the aftereffects of the blast." Protests also came from the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs and the Hiroshima Prefecture's Council of Atomic Bomb Victims.

Camejo Blasts Supreme Court Ruling

On October 12, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear a challenge by the Socialist Workers party demanding that its candi-

dates either be included in the presidential debates or else be granted equal time on radio and television stations carrying the debates. The court gave no reason for refusing to hear the case.

In a statement to the press October 12, SWP presidential candidate Peter Camejo denounced the high court's decision as "an undemocratic move toward limiting the air waves and the ballot box to the Democrats and Republicans."



BERLINGUER

Italian Stalinists Under Pressure for Supporting Austerity Program

"Italy's powerful Communist Party is coming under growing criticism from rank-and-file members for supporting the new Christian Democrat Government's austerity program," David Willey reported in a dispatch from Rome in the October 13 *Christian Science Monitor*.

Stalinist leader Enrico Berlinguer felt it necessary to assure his followers in Naples in a recent speech that the CP "is and will always remain a Communist party." Nevertheless, doubts must be increasing at a rapid rate in view of the CP's tacit support to the government, which would fall without the abstention of the Stalinists on important parliamentary votes of confidence.

"This has been a bad year," Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti explained earlier this month. "New sacrifices will be needed by all."

As is always the case when a capitalist government talks about "sacrifices by all," however, Andreotti's austerity program puts the burden of the crisis of Italian capitalism on the working class and the most oppressed. The government has abolished five paid holidays; it has raised railway fares, postal charges, and other public service costs; and it has frozen cost-of-living increases on salaries above \$7,000 a year. Inflation is expected to run over 20

percent this year, with price increases planned for medicines, pasta, electricity, newspapers, urban transport, telephone service, and gasoline.

Philippine Prisoners on Hunger Strike

Sixty-five persons jailed under Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos' regime of martial law announced October 2 that they were initiating a hunger strike. The prisoners are demanding the release of at least forty-four of their number who have been jailed without charges—some for more than three years.

Four Death Squad Members Face Trial

Four Brazilian policemen are under arrest for carrying out an execution in which one of their intended victims survived. The four are members of the notorious Death Squad, which has carried out thousands of murders of left-wing activists and alleged criminals over the years.

Although the Death Squad has operated in the past with impunity, and with the connivance of high officials in the Brazilian regime, there has been growing pressure against its activities. In this particular case, three young men were arrested near Rio de Janeiro on suspicion of possessing marijuana. They were taken to a deserted road and executed.

However, one of the victims, twenty-three-year-old Daniel Sousa, survived. Sousa's parents produced proof that he had never been arrested before, that he had held a steady job until recently, that he had served in the Brazilian army and been honorably discharged, and that he was duly registered with Brazilian income tax authorities.

International Appeal to Save Murrays

Fifteen thousand persons in West Germany, along with several internationally known personalities, signed a statement in defense of Noel and Marie Murray, sentenced to death in Ireland on the charge of shooting a policeman (see *Intercontinental Press*, September 20, p. 1320 for an account of the case). It was sent in early October to the president of the Irish Supreme Court, which will begin hearing the Murrays' appeal on November 1.

The statement particularly condemned the use of torture to extract false confessions as well as the fact that the sentence was handed down by a Special Court without a jury and without the common law safeguards regarding verification of evidence.

Signers included Ernst Bloch; Heinrich Böll, Nobel-Prize-winning author; Professor Gerhardt Schneider; Franz Peter Hancke; Peter Bruckner; Hans Magnus Enzensberger; Professor Alexander Mitscherich; and Jean-Paul Sartre.

DOCUMENTS

[The following appeared as the lead editorial in the September 27 issue of the *Washington Post*. The *Post*, which has a circulation of more than 500,000, is one of the leading daily newspapers in the United States.]

* * *

It was the first appearance of the director of the FBI before the new Senate Intelligence Committee, and Clarence Kelley's disclosures made the most of it. Mr. Kelley announced that the FBI's domestic intelligence caseload had been reduced by 97 per cent, from 21,414 investigations in 1973 to 626 cases currently. This was, Mr. Kelley said, in line with the bureau's new emphasis on "quality over quantity." It's not every day that an agency of government announces the virtual abolition of an activity, and the significance of Mr. Kelley's announcement cannot be overemphasized, for it represents further evidence that the FBI is emerging from the dark shadow of its past.

But it ought not to be forgotten that Mr. Kelley's announcement is also a stark indictment of that past. His very use of the words "quality over quantity" in describing the elimination of practically all domestic intelligence cases tends to confirm what many had suspected about the bureau's activities: that the FBI had become a bureaucracy in relentless pursuit of political groups that gave top FBI officials ideological or social offense.

And nothing better illustrates this point than the saga of the FBI and the Socialist Workers Party. It may never be known or understood what aroused the interest of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI in the SWP back in 1938. One might guess that it was the inevitable result of a time of great concern about communism, socialism and "isms" generally. Still, nothing can justify or excuse the infiltration, bugging and harassment of a legitimate political party in the manner of the FBI operation. That the FBI enterprise lasted for 38 years and was closed down by the Justice Department only two weeks ago defies all understanding.

To this day, the FBI's justification for this affront to the democratic process has not been made public. No particular crime was alleged, no violence on the part of the SWP was suggested, and no evidence of espionage was brought forward as far as we know. In short, none of the reasons a police agency should have for being interested in a political group appears to have played any part in the FBI's decision.

Nevertheless, the FBI had 1,600 informers in the SWP over those four decades, and 66 of them were still functioning in the party at the time the Justice Department finally decided enough was enough. The SWP has brought a \$40 million lawsuit against the FBI and others associated with the campaign against the party. In one poignant paragraph, the lawsuit says that the party has been so thoroughly infiltrated that it is impossible for its leaders to tell when some aspects of the party's work might have been directed by FBI infiltrators.

Within the FBI, there appear to have been no brakes and no place where the effort was evaluated or where some rigorous standard was set for what constituted a proper use of agency manpower. Surely any such review at any point along the way in nearly 40 years might have suggested to someone at the top of the agency that perhaps it would do well to shut down the Socialist Workers desk.

Instead, something quite different appears to have happened: What was done to the SWP was done to others. By the mid-1960s, that kind of operation was standard operating procedure, and it even had a name of its own, COINTELPRO, standing for counterintelligence program. The program had as its major and enduring target the Communist Party, of course, but it soon came to include many others. The same slovenly standards for what should be a target of government attention applied to all—they needed only to have offended some FBI standard of conduct, or to have had the name "black" or "liberation" in their title. Some had shown violent tendencies, but many, if not most, had not.

Regardless, they were spied upon, had their mail covered, their phones tapped, their meetings bugged. They became the victims of government-sponsored pranks and dirty tricks, some quite deadly. As far as anyone can tell, the biggest intelligence yield from the FBI's labors in the Socialist Workers' vineyard was a great deal of intelligence, if we can use that word, on the sex lives of SWP members, stuff that is no business of the FBI.

As Mr. Kelley's Senate testimony suggests, there is a great struggle going on to clean up the FBI and make it a police agency again and not a malevolent busybody. That effort is laudable and necessary. But those files of dirty information about members of the SWP and other groups should have been destroyed long ago. An FBI task force at the Justice Department is now in the process of studying the accumulation of such files to determine their future disposition. Where

the files contain information about the personal lives of individuals having no bearing on crimes and law enforcement, that material should be destroyed—period. This kind of information has a great potential for harm—and virtually no potential for good.

Others have obligations too. Those of us who were pleased to leave all the crime-busting and Red-chasing to the FBI without asking what they were doing can see now why citizens should continue to show an active interest in what government does in our name—and what Congress does on our behalf. The FBI had so many friends in Congress it never had to give any real account of itself. The bureau has said that it sent reports to the various Attorneys General over the years describing COINTELPRO. Practically all living former Attorneys General express surprise at that, claiming to have heard little or nothing of the sort of thing coming out. That is not good enough. Those responsible in the executive branch should be put on notice that the public expects them to know what the government's police agencies are doing. Not knowing, in these situations, is not a matter of mere ignorance; it is a matter of gross negligence.

Nazi War Criminal Tied to CIA

Edgars Laipenieks says that between 1941 and 1943 he hunted "Russian terrorists." Others say that as an intelligence officer with the pro-Nazi Latvian police he participated in the murder of prisoners at the central prison in Riga. In any case, after World War II Laipenieks changed employers and became an anti-Soviet spy for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Laipenieks's case came to light as a result of moves by the U.S. immigration department to deport thirty-seven war crimes suspects. He publicized a letter from the CIA indicating that the agency had intervened to block an earlier investigation of his wartime record. The CIA described Laipenieks as a man who "rendered some assistance to the agency in the past."

Connections between the American government and war crimes suspects have also emerged in the case of another of the thirty-seven persons facing deportation from the United States. Dr. Hubertus Strughold, a scientist who worked in the American space program after the war, was the director of the Nazi Aviation Ministry's Medical Research Institute for Aviation, whose scientists performed torture experiments on concentration-camp prisoners.

La Policía Masacra Estudiantes en Bangkok

Por Ernest Harsch

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Bangkok Police Massacre Student Demonstrators," que apareció en el número del 18 de octubre de nuestra revista. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

La primera acción de los militares tailandeses al tomar el poder el 6 de octubre, fue tratar de aplastar el movimiento estudiantil.

Miles de estudiantes, dirigidos por el Centro Estudiantil Nacional de Tailandia (CENT), ocuparon la Universidad Thammasat en Bangkok como protesta porque el Primer Ministro Seni Pramoj se negaba a expulsar o arrestar al exdictador militar Thanom Kittikachorn.* Thammasat ha sido desde hace algún tiempo el centro del movimiento estudiantil tailandés.

La policía dijo que le dispararon cuando fue a negociar con los estudiantes que ocupaban la universidad, y entonces se retiró. El corresponsal del *Washington Post* Lewis M. Simons informaba en una nota fechada el 6 de octubre en Bangkok, que la policía regresó pasada una hora, "una vez que el Primer Ministro Seni y, según una fuente informada, 'incluso alguien más alto,' le habían dado la luz verde."

Lo que siguió fue una masacre a sangre fría. Unidades aerotransportadas, de la patrulla fronteriza, de la marina, de la policía antidisturbios y de otras fuerzas policiales especializadas cubrieron el área universitaria con fuego de armas automáticas pesadas durante cuatro horas. "En ocasiones, cuando los policías disparaban miles de descargas, el ruido se convertía en un ensordecedor crescendo," informaba Simons.

Un equipo de la policía aerotransportada disparó un fusil sin retroceso de ocho pies de largo, que se utiliza generalmente como arma antitanques, contra uno de los edificios que ocupaban los estudiantes. Tiradores expertos de la policía, armados con rifles de alto poder y mucha precisión, asesinaron varios estudiantes.

Era obvio que la policía tenía órdenes de tirar a matar. Simons citaba el comentario de un fotógrafo, que había pasado cuatro años en Vietnam: "Estaban sedientos de

sangre. Fue el peor combate armado que he visto."

Una multitud de varios miles de derechistas ayudó a la policía a realizar la matanza. Los derechistas rodearon el campo universitario; armados con rifles, pistolas, espadas y garrotes irrumpieron en los terrenos de la universidad y atacaron a los estudiantes que trataban de escapar del baño de sangre.

El diario neoyorquino *Daily News* informaba el 7 de octubre que "los derechistas colgaron" a dos estudiantes, "les sacaron los ojos con estacas y les cortaron la garganta. Otra víctima fue decapitada."

Simons informaba: "Dos personas que trataban de huir fueron atrapadas y golpeadas hasta que casi quedaron muertas, después las colgaron de un árbol que está en la orilla del Campo Pramaine [cercano a la Universidad Thammasat]. Después de todo eso, los rociaron con gasolina y les prendieron fuego, junto con otros dos que estaban muy golpeados pero que aún vivían, ante los gritos de aprobación y el aplauso de la multitud."

Según cifras oficiales, hubo treinta y nueve muertos, la mayoría estudiantes, durante el sitio de la universidad. Cientos de personas resultaron heridas.

Cuando finalmente la policía dejó de disparar, llevaron a los sobrevivientes a las canchas de fútbol, ubicadas en el centro de la universidad. Simons describió lo que sucedió a continuación:

A culatazos y pateándolos con sus pesadas botas, la policía obligó a los estudiantes de sexo masculino a desvestirse hasta la cintura y a quitarse los zapatos, los relojes, los anteojos y los medallones religiosos. "Son comunistas," explicó una policía que sudaba abundantemente. . . .

Los estudiantes fueron obligados a arrastrarse hasta el centro del campo, donde se les ordenó que se acostaran boca abajo con las manos cruzadas en la nuca. Tres doctores vestidos de blanco estuvieron ahí por más de dos horas observando a los heridos, muchos de los cuales sangraban profusamente mientras las moscas volaban sobre ellos bajo el Sol ardiente. . . .

Finalmente, aproximadamente a la 1 p.m., cuando azotó un monzón torrencial, los últimos estudiantes fueron comprimidos en autobuses y llevados a un centro de entrenamiento de la policía en las afueras de la capital para ser interrogados.

El 8 de octubre, soldados fuertemente armados regresaron a Thammasat y echaron a los últimos estudiantes que habían seguido resistiendo desde el primer asalto. Según un comunicado oficial de ese mismo día, más de 3,000 personas, la

mayoría de las cuales eran estudiantes, fueron arrestadas en la universidad inmediatamente después del ataque de la policía, y en toda la ciudad durante los días siguientes.

Aunque el ejército no participó directamente en el ataque contra la Universidad Thammasat, era claro que la masacre fue el primer paso del golpe que estaba planeado. A las pocas horas, una junta militar encabezada por el Almirante Sangad Chaloryu tomó el poder y derrocó al régimen civil de Seni Pramoj. El baño de sangre en la universidad tenía el objetivo de eliminar la fuente más abierta de oposición a la restauración del gobierno militar directo.

El movimiento estudiantil tailandés ha sido un crítico permanente del gobierno civil y de la jerarquía militar, y ha sido una fuerza política poderosa en el país desde hace casi tres años.

En octubre de 1973, decenas de miles de estudiantes universitarios y de las escuelas medias realizaron protestas organizadas por el CENT en contra del régimen militar de Thanom Kittikachorn y Praphas Charusathien. Exigían la libertad de los dirigentes estudiantiles que estaban detenidos y pedían una nueva constitución. Más de setenta estudiantes y jóvenes resultaron muertos cuando el ejército trató de aplastar las manifestaciones.

Los enfrentamientos desataron un levantamiento popular masivo en Bangkok, en el que un millón de personas, o quizás más, salieron a las calles para expresar su odio contra el régimen militar. A los pocos días cayó la dictadura, Thanom y Praphas huyeron del país y se instaló un régimen civil.

Aunque muchos funcionarios de la dictadura siguieron formando parte del nuevo gobierno y los militares seguían teniendo mucha influencia tras bambalinas, el régimen civil se vio obligado a dar concesiones pues los estudiantes continuaron sus movilizaciones.

Los estudiantes realizaron protestas contra funcionarios corruptos, contra la intervención de la CIA en Tailandia y

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*Thanom, que fue derrocado en octubre de 1973 por las luchas masivas de obreros y estudiantes, había regresado a Tailandia dos semanas antes, supuestamente para convertirse en monje budista.

contra la visita del primer ministro japonés Kakuei Tanaka a Bangkok en enero de 1974. Ayudaron a organizar sindicatos y asociaciones campesinas y apoyaron activamente varias huelgas. En agosto de 1975, el CENT obligó al régimen a liberar a varios dirigentes estudiantiles y campesinos. En marzo de 1976, los estudiantes tailandeses organizaron manifestaciones masivas para exigir la retirada de los últimos 4,000 soldados norteamericanos que estaban en el país. Pocos días más tarde, el primer ministro ordenó que se retiraran.

Cuando los odiados generales trataron de regresar a Tailandia, los estudiantes se movilizaron de nuevo. Thanom intentó regresar en diciembre de 1974, pero fue echado del país después de tres días de manifestaciones. Praphas corrió la misma suerte en agosto de 1976. Sin embargo, el golpe de estado cortó las acciones estudiantiles contra el segundo intento de Thanom por regresar al país.

Las acciones masivas independientes de los grupos estudiantiles, los sindicatos y las asociaciones campesinas que siguieron a la lucha de octubre de 1973, preocupaban a la clase dominante tailandesa, que hizo todo lo posible para frenarlas.

Los asesinatos y ataques terroristas contra activistas políticos, obreros y campesinos comenzaron aproximadamente un año después de esas luchas, y llegaron a un punto muy alto en los meses que precedieron al golpe. Docenas de personas fueron asesinadas en Bangkok y en las provincias. En febrero, la víctima más destacada de las bandas terroristas fue Boonsanong Punyodyana, secretario general del Partido Socialista. Dos grupos derechistas paramilitares, los Red Gaurs y Navapol, tienen vínculos directos con el ejército.

Norman Peagam informó en el número del 12 de marzo de *Far Eastern Economic Review*: "Según algunos observadores estos ataques, que aparentemente van destinados contra todos los grupos que están por el cambio social y la reforma económica, podrían tener el objetivo de contribuir a crear una atmósfera de caos, inestabilidad e inseguridad que sirviera como pretexto para la intervención militar."

Parece que a mediados de 1976, la clase dominante tailandesa ya había decidido que era tiempo de que los militares intervinieran abiertamente. Simons informó desde Bangkok el 23 de julio: "La mayoría de los hombres de negocios tailandeses darían la bienvenida a la ley y el orden de un gobierno apoyado en los militares, si bien no a un retorno extremo al tipo de dictaduras militares que gobernaron el país durante 35 años."

En una nota fechada el 7 de octubre en Bangkok, el corresponsal del *New York Times* David A. Andelman confirmaba que el golpe había sido preparado cuidadosamente con meses de anticipación: "Fuentes cercanas a la junta dijeron esta noche que

las primeras nueve directrices más importantes que dio ese organismo fueron elaboradas en enero."

Entre estas directrices estaban la abolición de la constitución, la destitución de todos los ministros, la ilegalización de todos los partidos políticos, la prohibición de reuniones políticas de más de cinco personas y la imposición de la censura de prensa. El Primer Ministro Seni fue arrestado brevemente y se impuso el toque de queda de la media noche al amanecer durante un día. La policía allanó los centros de noticias para recoger la "literatura subversiva."

Se reimpuso una ley anticomunista elaborada hace veinticuatro años, que da a los tribunales militares el derecho de condenar a muerte. Según Andelman, se espera que los estudiantes sean juzgados por tribunales militares.

Tratando de justificar el golpe, Sa-ngad declaró el 6 de octubre: "Esto es para que el país pueda sobrevivir y para evitar que Tailandia caiga en el imperialismo comunista." Dijo que "terroristas comunistas de Vietnam" participaron en las acciones estudiantiles, y la policía afirmó que varios jóvenes "de apariencia vietnamita" se encontraban entre los arrestados.

En vista de la amplia oposición que había contra el gobierno militar directo, parece que los generales han decidido adoptar una cobertura civil. Sa-ngad anunció la noche del 8 de octubre que el Rey Phumiphol Aduldet había designado a Thanin Kraivichien como primer ministro. Dijo que Thanin entraría en funciones dos semanas después de que se hubiera nombrado a todo el gabinete y se hubiera "estabilizado" la situación del país.

Según Andelman, en una nota del 9 de octubre, Thanin enfatizó en su primer discurso que las prioridades del nuevo régimen incluían la lucha contra el "comunismo" y poner fin a los intentos por cambiar la monarquía constitucional del país.

Andelman informaba en el *New York Times* el 8 de octubre que se pensaba que los generales "se inclinarían mucho más hacia occidente, y particularmente hacia los Estados Unidos, que el derrocado gobierno del Primer Ministro Seni Pramoj. . . ."

Eso no sería sorprendente. Los generales tailandeses fueron armados y entrenados por Washington.

En el momento más álgido de la guerra de Vietnam, más de 50,000 soldados norteamericanos estaban estacionados en Tailandia, y muchos de los bombardeos masivos contra Vietnam, Camboya y Laos fueron lanzados desde las siete bases aéreas norteamericanas que había en Tailandia. Aunque estas tropas se retiraron de Tailandia, tras el colapso de los regímenes patrocinados por los Estados Unidos en Vietnam del Sur, Camboya y Laos en 1975, cerca de 270 consejeros norteamericanos permanecen en el país. Los Estados Unidos darán este año a los

militares tailandeses ayuda por 54.1 millones de dólares.

Washington no vaciló en dar muestras de su aprobación al golpe militar. Según el *Daily News* del 7 de octubre, "un funcionario norteamericano en Bangkok dijo que los Estados Unidos tomarían medidas para establecer buenas relaciones con los dirigentes del golpe. . . ." □

Viejo Comunista Denuncia al Kremlin por Traicionar la Revolución

Arnosht Kolman, comunista desde hace cincuenta y ocho años, denunció a la dirección del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética por traicionar los ideales de la revolución bolchevique. Kolman nació en Praga hace ochenta y cuatro años, llegó a Rusia como prisionero de guerra durante la Primera Guerra Mundial e ingresó al Partido Bolchevique en 1918.

Kolman, que estuvo preso durante los últimos años de la era estalinista, fue rehabilitado posteriormente y sirvió como director del Instituto de Filosofía de Praga. Se retiró en 1963 y regresó a vivir a la Unión Soviética.

Kolman, que pidió asilo político en Suecia, dio a la publicidad el 6 de octubre una carta abierta al jefe del Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética, Leonid Brezhnev. En la carta, Kolman dice que comenzó a comprender "lo deformado que estaba el partido," a partir de las revelaciones de Jrushchev que detallaban los crímenes de Stalin. Se desilusionó totalmente después de la invasión de Checoslovaquia en 1968.

"Comprendí que hacía mucho tiempo que el Partido Comunista de la Unión Soviética había dejado de ser un partido político, y que se había transformado en una 'sociedad de beneficio mutuo para el temprano cumplimiento del plan quinquenal.' Sus miembros, los congresos, incluso el Comité Central no tienen realmente ninguna influencia sobre la elaboración de la política, que es determinada personalmente por usted, desde su alto nicho gobernante," decía Kolman en su carta a Brezhnev.

"Y en cualquier caso," añadía, "¿de qué tipo de socialismo se puede hablar en la Unión Soviética, cuando el lugar de las antiguas clases explotadoras capitalista y terrateniente ha sido tomado por las castas privilegiadas de la burocracia del partido y del estado? Ellas están nadando en la riqueza, viven aisladas del pueblo, por encima de él, y desprecian a las personas comunes y corrientes, porque ni quieren ni pueden comprender sus necesidades y su sufrimiento."

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Ola de Terror Antisemita en Argentina

Por Judy White

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Argentina—Mounting Wave of Anti-Semitic Terror," que apareció en el número del 11 de octubre de nuestra revista. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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La creciente evidencia de la participación directa del gobierno argentino en la violencia derechista que ha ido en aumento, fue el tema de las audiencias de un subcomité del Congreso de los Estados Unidos que empezaron el 28 de septiembre.

Un punto que recibió atención particular fue la terrible amenaza que representa la campaña de terror para los 500,000 judíos que residen en Argentina. La comunidad judía se ha convertido en uno de sus blancos favoritos.

Hay una "campaña organizada," destinada a "desacreditar e intimidar" a los judíos de Argentina, afirmó Burton Levinson cuando le fue tomada su declaración el primer día de las audiencias. Levinson es presidente del Comité para Asuntos Latinoamericanos de la Anti-Defamation League de B'nai B'rith [Liga del B'nai B'rith contra la Calumnia].

"Una propaganda masiva" y ataques físicos han sido parte de esta campaña, dijo.

"El mes pasado, fue atacado el 'Barrio Once,' que es el barrio judío. Asaltantes que no fueron identificados recorrieron en automóviles las calles de los vecindarios predominantemente judíos; ametrallaron las tiendas que son propiedad de judíos; y colocaron bombas en las sinagogas, en las escuelas judías y en instituciones culturales."

Entre el 1 de agosto y el 21 de septiembre se colocaron once bombas en ese tipo de lugares.

Levinson también informó sobre el secuestro y asesinato del Dr. Salvador Akermann, realizados el 4 de junio. Los asesinos dijeron que Akermann había participado en la captura del criminal de guerra nazi Adolf Eichmann.

Un folleto sobre la violencia antisemita en Argentina distribuido por el U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin American Political Prisoners [Comité Norteamericano pro Justicia a los Presos Políticos Latinoamericanos—USLA]* cita otros ca-



VIDELA

sos de secuestros y asesinatos de judíos en Argentina:

- Entre los cadáveres de treinta víctimas de los ataques terroristas, que fueron encontrados el 20 de agosto en un suburbio de Buenos Aires, estaban los de "varios jóvenes judíos."

- El hijo y la hija de Juan Gelman, destacado poeta judío argentino que actualmente se encuentra exiliado, fueron secuestrados hace poco en Buenos Aires. Con ellos fue secuestrada también la esposa de su hijo, que estaba embarazada. Los secuestradores le dijeron a la esposa de Gelman que esto era una represalia contra su esposo.

- La casa y la oficina de un doctor judío de San Fernando llamado Max Krawczyk, fueron asaltadas el 27 de marzo y el 16 de mayo. Durante el primer asalto, los atacantes—que usaban uniformes militares—dejaron un mensaje en la pared: "Judíos e Izquierdistas: Volveremos." El 16 de mayo, fue secuestrada la esposa de Krawczyk y su hija de ocho años fue interrogada a punta de pistola durante bastante tiempo.

Además de los casos anteriores, veinticinco refugiados políticos latinoamericanos que fueron secuestrados y luego liberados en Buenos Aires, informaron que sus captores cantaban canciones nazis y

gritaban consignas contra los judíos.

USLA organizó una delegación de personalidades destacadas para protestar por el antisemitismo en Argentina. El 24 de septiembre, la delegación visitó al embajador argentino ante las Naciones Unidas, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, y al director de la División de Derechos Humanos del Secretariado de las Naciones Unidas, Marc Schreiber.

Ortiz de Rozas negó que el gobierno argentino tuviera una política oficial o extraoficial de tolerar los ataques terroristas. No explicó qué medidas se estaban tomando para aprehender a los responsables.

Schreiber pidió a la delegación que presentara un resumen por escrito en el que se detallara la situación, para que se pudiera investigar.

USLA ha anunciado que planea seguir documentando y denunciando el terrorismo antisemita en Argentina, como parte de su campaña general contra la represión política del régimen de Videla.

Otro testigo que se presentó ante el comité del Congreso fue el Rvdo. James Weeks de la La Sallette Mission Society [Sociedad Misionera La Sallette]. Weeks vivió once años en Argentina, hasta que fue expulsado de ese país después de ser arrestado el 3 de agosto.

"Por la tarde del 3 de agosto, ocho hombres armados entraron violentamente a nuestra casa, diciendo que eran policías, pero vestidos de civiles," dijo. "Desde alrededor de las cinco hasta aproximadamente las 10:30 p.m., estuvieron hostigándonos y amenazándonos con que iban a torturarnos y a matarnos."

Cuando Weeks y los cinco seminaristas con quienes compartía la casa fueron llevados finalmente al cuartel de la policía, otras dos personas permanecieron en la casa, con instrucciones de que esperaran tres horas y luego comunicaran a la prensa que los religiosos habían sido secuestrados por los Montoneros, uno de los principales grupos guerrilleros de Argentina.

Weeks señaló que lo sucedido a él era sólo parte de "una persecución contra toda la Iglesia, no únicamente contra los miembros más progresistas. . . . No ha servido de nada informar a la policía de estos casos. Nunca han sido investigados ni se ha castigado a nadie."

Weeks leyó ante el subcomité el testimonio de otras víctimas de la represión:

Los que atacaron a mi esposo parecían salvajes. Después de golpearlo ferozmente con los puños, lo arrastraron a la cama y comenza-

*Para obtener copias de este material, se debe escribir a USLA, 853 Broadway, Suite 414, New York, New York 10003.

ron a azotarlo con una toalla mojada. Durante todo el tiempo lo estuvieron amenazando de muerte, al mismo tiempo que lo interrogaban sobre sus convicciones políticas. Insistían en que tenía inclinaciones izquierdistas, y comenzaron a preguntarle por personas y cosas de las que no sabía nada. No pudo darles la información que buscaban. Entonces me agarraron a mí y le dijeron que me iban a matar si no hablaba. . . .

La pareja fue llevada a un centro de detención.

Me llevaron a un edificio donde escuché la voz de mi marido. . . . Cuando él escuchó mi voz, me llamó; entonces ellos le pegaron y le dijeron que estaba prohibido hablar. Inmediatamente después lo trajeron al cuarto contiguo a donde yo estaba y comenzaron a torturarlo. Sus gritos de

desesperación llegaban a mis oídos mezclados con la risa de esos monstruos. Uno de ellos me golpeó en la cabeza y me dijo que era seguro que confesaría cuando llegara mi turno. . . .

Mi marido fue torturado brutal y salvajemente todos los días. Según el doctor, sus bronquios y partes genitales resultaron afectados. Lo torturaron con choques eléctricos y agua, y lo golpearon con cachiporras. Su pecho y abdomen estaban cubiertos de quemaduras, su boca estaba completamente hinchada, y sus partes genitales estaban infectadas. . . .

Los torturadores se regocijaban al verlo, pero se quejaban del alto costo de las baterías que necesitaban para su equipo de torturas. . . .

Weeks terminó su testimonio citando varias características comunes de las

experiencias de las víctimas con quienes ha hablado. Entre otras citó las siguientes:

Los secuestradores eran, invariablemente, policías o militares, aunque nunca presentaron su indentificación ni órdenes de allanamiento.

Los secuestrados eran llevados a centros de detención o a cuarteles de la policía o del ejército.

La conversación y el comportamiento de los secuestradores mostraban simpatías antisemitas y profascistas.

Aunque no se presentaron formalmente cargos legales contra las víctimas, generalmente se les acusaba de tener inclinaciones izquierdistas o marxistas.

Todas las víctimas fueron torturadas. □

PROYECTOS DE RESOLUCION

Resolución de la Minoría sobre Angola

[La siguiente resolución fue presentada por la Fracción Leninista Trotskista para su discusión en la base de la Cuarta Internacional, en preparación para el próximo congreso mundial de la organización trotskista internacional. La resolución que presenta el punto de vista de la Tendencia de la Mayoría Internacional sobre la situación en Angola fue publicada en español en el número del 19 de abril de nuestra revista (p. 667). La traducción de esta resolución de la FLT es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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1. La intervención imperialista en la guerra civil angoleña llegó a un punto álgido a finales de 1975 y principios de 1976, con la intervención de Sudáfrica y la utilización de mercenarios pagados principalmente por la CIA. Los marxistas-revolucionarios y los defensores de los derechos democráticos tenían el deber elemental de dar apoyo material a la lucha militar contra la intervención imperialista y de organizar una campaña internacional con las consignas generales "¡Fuera de Angola!" "¡Fuera Sudáfrica de Angola!" y, en vista de la amenaza del imperialismo norteamericano contra Cuba por la ayuda que ésta dio al MPLA, "¡Hay que Defender a Cuba!"

2. Las tres principales organizaciones involucradas en la guerra civil angoleña (el FNLA—Frente Nacional de Liberación de Angola, el MPLA—Movimiento Popular por la Liberación de Angola, y UNITA—Unión Nacional por la Independencia Total de Angola) tienen un carácter nacionalista.

Era incorrecto caracterizar que el MPLA

era más progresivo que UNITA o el FNLA, y decir que era una "corriente revolucionaria nacionalista pequeño-burguesa" a la que se debía apoyar no sólo en su lucha militar contra la intervención imperialista sino también en su batalla política contra el FNLA y UNITA por la dirección de Angola.

La guerra civil no era un enfrentamiento decisivo entre fuerzas de clases antagónicas en Angola. Cada grupo tenía sus raíces en diferentes nacionalidades que se encuentran en distintas regiones de Angola.

La base del MPLA estaba en las áreas mbundu de la parte central del norte de Angola y entre los mestizos (de origen africano y portugués) de todo el país.

La base del FNLA estaba entre el pueblo bakongo, en la zona noroeste de Angola.

La base de UNITA estaba entre los ovimbundu, en las regiones del centro y sur de Angola.

Los tres grupos ganaron estas posiciones a través de su participación en la lucha de independencia contra Portugal, que comenzó en 1961. Cada grupo contribuyó significativamente a la lucha que forzó finalmente a Portugal a salir de Angola.

El apoyo que dieron la clase obrera, la clase media urbana, los trabajadores agrícolas y el campesinado pobre, incluso los sectores más combativos, a uno u otro de los tres grupos nacionalistas en la guerra civil de 1975-76 tendía a seguir diferencias nacionales, no de clase.

Un elemento clave de la guerra en Angola era la lucha por el poder entre las direcciones pequeño-burguesas del MPLA, FNLA y UNITA. Los imperialistas trataron de utilizar esta lucha por el poder para avanzar sus propios objetivos. En este sentido, pudieron aprovechar las friccio-

nes, los temores y el antagonismo que había entre las nacionalidades, y la manera en que explotaban estas divisiones las direcciones del FNLA, UNITA y MPLA.

La aguda lucha que se dio entre el MPLA y sus rivales no sirvió para avanzar la causa de la clase obrera o la lucha por la liberación nacional contra el imperialismo portugués.

a. Esta rivalidad tendió a exacerbar la animosidad entre los diferentes grupos nacionales de Angola. La manera en que estas tres organizaciones explotaron esa animosidad, representó la continuación de la política de divide y vencerás que desde hace tanto tiempo habían utilizado los amos portugueses. Para unificar a las masas angoleñas en la lucha contra el imperialismo se necesitaba la política contraria: la defensa de sus derechos nacionales, incluido el derecho de autodeterminación.

Se ha argumentado que las nacionalidades de Angola no son más que agrupamientos étnicos y regionales, que no son nacionalidades plenamente desarrolladas, y que por eso no tienen derecho a la autodeterminación. Sin embargo, bajo la dirección de Lenin y Trotsky el gobierno soviético garantizó los derechos nacionales de pueblos que apenas habían surgido de culturas históricamente primitivas y que carecían de muchos de los atributos nacionales que se han desarrollado entre los pueblos angoleños.

b. La rivalidad fraccional facilitó la intervención permanente de los imperialistas. Esto fue exacerbado todavía más por la competencia entre las tres organizaciones por conseguir el apoyo de las diferentes compañías imperialistas que operan en

Angola y de otros intereses imperialistas que estaban ansiosos por penetrar en Angola.

c. Los dirigentes nacionalistas pequeño-burgueses y las potencias imperialistas utilizaron la lucha fraccional para desviar a las masas trabajadoras angoleñas de la lucha por sus propios intereses de clase. Con la excusa de la lucha fraccional, todos los grupos lanzaron ataques contra sectores de los trabajadores y campesinos de Angola.

3. Por los intereses a largo plazo del movimiento socialista internacional, los marxistas-revolucionarios tenían que mantenerse políticamente independientes de los tres grupos. Su deber era ayudar a unificar a la clase obrera angoleña en su conjunto y tratar de desarrollar su conciencia de clase como la única fuerza social capaz de dirigir la revolución angoleña a la victoria. El objetivo era avanzar las luchas concretas contra el imperialismo, contra la explotación capitalista, y por los derechos democráticos y la independencia política.

Durante la guerra civil, la tarea central en Angola seguía siendo la construcción de un partido obrero marxista-revolucionario, que contara con el apoyo del campesinado y las masas populares para ser la dirección de la lucha nacional y social. Ninguno de los tres grupos nacionalistas podía convertirse en un partido de ese tipo. Como tarea aún por realizar, la construcción del partido tiene que hacerse en la lucha política consciente contra estas direcciones y programas, puesto que los tres—o cualquier posible combinación de ellos—están a favor de mantener las relaciones de propiedad capitalistas, y se han comprometido a defender los intereses de la naciente burguesía angoleña.

En la lucha contra la intervención imperialista, la política basada en avanzar los intereses de la clase obrera puede colocar a los marxistas-revolucionarios en un bloque coyuntural con uno u otro grupo nacionalista de Angola, según sea la situación. Pero en todo momento los marxistas-revolucionarios deben mantener su independencia política de los planteamientos procapitalistas y neocolonialistas de este tipo de formaciones, al mismo tiempo que los combaten.

4. Solamente la clase obrera puede dirigir la lucha por la liberación nacional contra la opresión imperialista a una conclusión exitosa, en tanto que para lograrlo se necesita abolir el capitalismo y realizar la revolución socialista. Las direcciones nacionalistas burguesas y pequeño-burguesas que defienden las relaciones de propiedad capitalistas, defienden objetivamente la dominación imperialista, a pesar de sus pretensiones nacionalistas. Esto las coloca contra los intereses de la clase obrera y las masas trabajadoras, y las obliga a profundizar sus vínculos con el imperialismo internacional.

La defensa de las relaciones de propiedad capitalistas por parte del MPLA, el FNLA y UNITA, así como sus intentos por

conseguir el apoyo de aliados imperialistas, los pone, a pesar de las intenciones y los deseos de cualquier individuo, en la posición de opositores neocolonialistas a la culminación de la lucha de liberación nacional.

Esto se mostró claramente cuando los tres grupos participaron en el gobierno de transición, de enero a julio de 1975. El MPLA, junto con el FNLA y UNITA, aprobó decretos gubernamentales que imponían una legislación antihuelgas, la militarización de las capas combativas de la clase obrera y el aplastamiento de los derechos democráticos de las masas trabajadoras.

Los tres grupos demostraron en la práctica que tenían un mismo programa neocolonialista cuando aceptaron los acuerdos de Alvor en enero de 1975, en los que se establecía el gobierno provisional bajo la tutela del imperialismo portugués, y que incluían disposiciones formales para proteger la propiedad y los intereses imperialistas. Los tres grupos reafirmaron esta posición cuando apoyaron los acuerdos de Nakuru en junio de 1975, que trataban de poner fin a la guerra civil reiterando el acuerdo de Alvor y limitando aún más los derechos de las masas.

Esto no quiere decir que el FNLA, el MPLA y UNITA estuvieran lanzando continuamente ataques frontales contra las movilizaciones populares. En algunas ocasiones, las direcciones de estos grupos, particularmente del MPLA y de UNITA—que tenían una base más urbana que el FNLA—trataron de utilizar las movilizaciones para su propio beneficio fraccional en la lucha contra sus oponentes. Sin embargo, los tres grupos tenían a las movilizaciones independientes, estaban de acuerdo en la necesidad de ponerlas bajo control, y estaban dispuestos a recurrir a las formas represivas más brutales si se hacía necesario. Un ejemplo de esto fue la represión que llevó a cabo el MPLA contra los obreros y jóvenes que se habían organizado en comités de barrio después de la expulsión de UNITA y el FNLA de Luanda en julio de 1975.

Los vínculos del MPLA con el imperialismo portugués se mostraron de manera particularmente clara durante el periodo en que el MFA designó al Almirante Rosa Coutinho como gobernador de Angola a fines de 1974.

Tanto durante el quinto gobierno provisional como durante el sexto, las fuerzas armadas portuguesas brindaron ayuda militar y de otro tipo al MPLA. Cuando el MPLA expulsó por la fuerza al FNLA y a UNITA de Luanda en junio de 1975, el mando portugués amenazó con utilizar sus tropas para impedir que esos grupos volvieran a entrar a la ciudad.

De hecho, en una declaración dada a conocer en marzo de 1975, el MPLA atacaba la "pasividad de las Fuerzas Armadas portuguesas en Angola," llamando implícitamente a que el régimen portu-

gués jugara un papel más activo. A principios de mayo, el Presidente del MPLA, Agostinho Neto, dijo que el pueblo angolés "continúa esperando que el alto comisionado y el ejército portugueses asuman sus responsabilidades."

Cuando el gobierno transicional de coalición se derrumbó en el verano de 1975, el régimen portugués transfirió el control administrativo del país a ministerios controlados por el MPLA. Y cuando se declaró la independencia formal en noviembre de 1975, el sexto gobierno provisional dio equipo militar al régimen del MPLA.

5. Los dirigentes del imperialismo norteamericano no vieron ninguna diferencia apreciable entre las tres fracciones nacionalistas, ya fuera en su naturaleza de clase, su actitud hacia la penetración económica imperialista o en su programa político y social. Incluso en el cenit de la agresión sudafricana patrocinada por los Estados Unidos durante el otoño e invierno de 1975, los dirigentes del MPLA se jactaban de sus "excelentes" relaciones con la Gulf Oil (de propiedad estadounidense) y la Diamang (de propiedad sudafricana y británica), que son las dos concesiones imperialistas más grandes de Angola.

Durante los primeros meses del régimen de transición, Washington tendió a dar casi todo su apoyo al FNLA. Parece ser que Kissinger pensaba que este grupo iba a ganar, porque supuestamente tenía una organización militar superior. El apoyo que dieron el Departamento de Estado norteamericano y la CIA al FNLA se basaba también en la apreciación de que esa organización sería más amistosa hacia los intereses norteamericanos por los estrechos vínculos que tiene con Pekín y con el régimen de Mobutu en Zaire.

El gobierno de los Estados Unidos dio relativamente poca ayuda a UNITA a principios de 1975. Esta ayuda aumentó en el verano de ese año, cuando parecía que UNITA podría resultar vencedor en la lucha porque aparentemente tenía un apoyo popular más amplio.

Uno de los objetivos iniciales de Washington era lograr una relación de fuerzas entre los grupos que le permitiera balancearse entre ellos, lanzado a uno contra otro. El gobierno de Ford trató de hacer que siguiera la lucha fraccional, que es lo que más le convenía para obligar a todos los bandos a hacerle concesiones y para debilitar a cualquier régimen angolés que surgiera finalmente de la lucha.

Después de la intervención militar de Sudáfrica, que llevó al MPLA a pedir más ayuda a la Unión Soviética y Cuba, el Departamento de Estado norteamericano aumentó sus acciones agresivas, incrementando la ayuda militar que daba al FNLA, a UNITA y a Sudáfrica. Se reclutaron mercenarios, en gran medida bajo los auspicios de la CIA. Los aviones militares estadounidenses llevaban abastecimientos; unidades navales y aéreas de los Estados

Unidos se desplegaron amenazadoramente.

El gobierno de Ford inició una belicosa campaña diplomática contra la Unión Soviética, el MPLA y especialmente contra Cuba. Los imperialistas norteamericanos temían el impacto que pudiera tener la participación soviética y cubana en el resto de África del sur, área que según Washington forma parte del "mundo libre." La derrota de Sudáfrica, especialmente después de la retirada del aparato gobernante del imperialismo portugués, podría inspirar a las masas africanas oprimidas de Namibia, Zimbabue (Rhodesia) y de la misma Sudáfrica. Washington también temía que aumentara la influencia de Moscú en África si se daba la impresión de que la ayuda soviética había sido el factor decisivo en el desenlace de la lucha.

6. Al principio, las direcciones de UNITA y el FNLA se opusieron a la intervención militar sudafricana en Angola. De hecho, los dos grupos trataron de combatir la incursión militar en el verano de 1975, igual que hizo el MPLA. UNITA, que es el grupo que contaba con más apoyo popular en la zona donde ocurrió el ataque inicial de Sudáfrica, así como el que tiene vínculos más estrechos con el movimiento de liberación de Namibia, resistió militarmente a las fuerzas sudafricanas en julio y agosto de 1975.

En septiembre de 1975, en un esfuerzo por avanzar su posición en la lucha fraccional por el poder, los dirigentes del FNLA y UNITA cambiaron su posición anterior y se aliaron con la intervención militar sudafricana patrocinada por los Estados Unidos. Esto constituyó una gran traición a las luchas de liberación de Angola y de África.

La traición fue facilitada por el curso que siguió el MPLA, que impulsó la aguda lucha fraccional y se negó a movilizar a las masas angoleesas en base a un llamado a la acción unificada contra los invasores. Ese llamado hubiera sido muy efectivo, puesto que muchos angoleeses consideraban al FNLA y a UNITA como su dirección.

7. La decisión del Kremlin de dar apoyo político y ayuda militar al MPLA durante la guerra civil angoleesa surgía de la posibilidad de ganar prestigio político y diplomático en África e internacionalmente. El Kremlin también quería fortalecer su posición de negociación dentro del contexto de la distensión con el imperialismo norteamericano.

Además, Moscú vio la posibilidad de ganar prestigio a expensas de Pekín (que apoyó al FNLA y a UNITA en el conflicto), garantizando la victoria del MPLA.

Castro vio la posibilidad de apuntalar la posición de Cuba en el terreno internacional brindando ayuda material al MPLA. La acción de Castro, que fue un audaz reto contra el gigante imperialista norteamericano, animó a las fuerzas de África y de otras partes del mundo a profundizar su

lucha por la liberación nacional.

Tanto Moscú como La Habana dieron apoyo político a la dirección nacionalista pequeño-burguesa del MPLA. De hecho, mucho antes de la guerra civil, Cuba, el Kremlin y los partidos estalinistas que lo siguen difundieron calumnias contra UNITA y el FNLA que obstaculizaron, debilitaron y dividieron la lucha de liberación de Angola y a quienes la apoyaban internacionalmente.

Ni Moscú ni La Habana han criticado los ataques del MPLA contra la clase obrera, la juventud, maoistas conocidos, trotskistas y otras tendencias políticas. No han dicho nada sobre la política neocolonialista de la dirección del MPLA, que es contraria al curso que hizo triunfar a la revolución cubana.

A pesar de estos aspectos negativos, la ayuda material que dieron la URSS y Cuba al MPLA fue decisiva para derrotar la agresión sudafricana y superar la presión de Washington. Si el MPLA no hubiera recibido esta ayuda, los imperialistas se hubieran vuelto más audaces para intensificar sus ataques contra la lucha de liberación de Angola.

8. Desde la victoria militar del MPLA, el curso de los acontecimientos en Angola ha confirmado lo correcto de este análisis general de la situación.

El retroceso que sufrió el imperialismo sudafricano demuestra lo correcto que era apoyar la lucha militar contra la intervención militar de Sudáfrica. El que Washington no pudiera intervenir más directamente a causa de la oposición interna que aumentó rápidamente en los Estados Unidos, fue un factor importante en el fracaso de Pretoria.

Este retroceso y la incapacidad de Washington para intervenir directamente en Angola han dado nuevo ánimo a la lucha contra el imperialismo sudafricano en Namibia y en la misma Sudáfrica. En Zimbabue, el estado de ánimo de las masas se ha vuelto más combativo contra el régimen de Ian Smith.

9. Por otro lado, el régimen del MPLA no ha superado el antagonismo que existe entre las diferentes nacionalidades y no ha establecido un régimen que tenga una verdadera base de apoyo entre los pueblos ovimbundu y bakongo.

Parece ser que UNITA sigue teniendo apoyo entre los 2.5 millones de ovimbundus del sur y centro de Angola. UNITA sigue realizando operaciones de guerrilla rural contra el ferrocarril de Benguela y contra otros blancos. Los funcionarios del MPLA han reconocido que esto ha sido posible gracias a la importante base de apoyo que tiene UNITA en esa región. Este apoyo sigue existiendo a pesar de la ocupación militar del MPLA y las fuerzas cubanas en la zona, a pesar de que el MPLA ha enviado cuadros que hablan lenguajes ovimbundus, a pesar de que el MPLA ha hecho llamados a los jefes tradicionales ovimbundus, y a pesar de que

se ha incluido a algunos exdirigentes menores de UNITA en organismos administrativos locales.

La base de apoyo del FNLA entre el pueblo bakongo, del norte de Angola, fue erosionada por los ataques contra la población civil que realizaron los mercenarios, las tropas de Zaire y algunas fuerzas del FNLA. Pero miles de bakongos huyeron con el FNLA hacia Zaire ante el avance de las fuerzas armadas cubanas y del MPLA.

10. La política del MPLA hacia los inversionistas imperialistas en Angola consiste en colaborar con ellos y animarlos a invertir en Angola—de la misma manera que hacen otros regímenes neocoloniales pseudo-socialistas de África—aunque ha realizado algunas nacionalizaciones dentro del marco del programa económico común del gobierno de transición que fue elaborado por las autoridades portuguesas y aceptado por UNITA, el FNLA y el MPLA en junio de 1975.

El MPLA ha animado a la Gulf Oil a reanudar sus operaciones. Ese gigantesco monopolio imperialista estadounidense puede presionar al gobierno del MPLA, puesto que los ingresos que representa la operación de la Gulf constituyen por sí solos el 80% de las divisas del régimen de Luanda.

En las negociaciones para la reapertura de las minas de diamantes, el MPLA ha dejado el control de las operaciones en manos de Diamang, que es un consorcio de capitales británicos, sudafricanos, belgas y estadounidenses. La venta de los diamantes angoleeses sigue a cargo de la Central Selling Organization [Organización Central de Ventas—CSO], que es parte del trust sudafricano De Beers.

El MPLA también aceptó proteger el proyecto hidroeléctrico del río Cunene (de propiedad sudafricana) que se encuentra en el sur de Angola, en la frontera con Namibia. En el pasado, los combatientes por la liberación de Namibia habían amenazado con atacar ese proyecto.

11. Dentro del marco de la subordinación neocolonial hacia el imperialismo, el régimen del MPLA está tratando de fortalecer su posición de negociación con el imperialismo. Con ese fin, el régimen ha planeado más nacionalizaciones, según la línea del plan económico de 1975.

Sin embargo, hasta ahora las nacionalizaciones se han limitado básicamente a empresas de propiedad portuguesa que fueron abandonadas. Han abarcado las fábricas de acero Champalimaud, una fábrica de cemento, compañía textiles y azucareras, y doce complejos agrícolas. El gobierno del MPLA ha protegido la propiedad de inversionistas no portugueses en los negocios y granjas abandonados.

La única nacionalización de una empresa importante que no es de propiedad portuguesa que ha discutido el régimen de Luanda es la del ferrocarril de Benguela, que es de propiedad sudafricana, británica y norteamericana, así como del estado

angolés. Esta nacionalización está planeada para cuando el ferrocarril termine de pagar su deuda de 40 millones de dólares. Actualmente, el régimen del MPLA está subsidiando los salarios de los empleados del ferrocarril con una cantidad superior a un millón de dólares mensuales.

La política agraria del MPLA incluye la promesa de indemnizar a los dueños de las plantaciones, portuguesas o de cualquier otra nacionalidad, que no hayan huido del país. Esto forma parte del plan para nacionalizar la mayoría de las plantaciones. Esta política tiene el objetivo de animar a los antiguos dueños de plantaciones a quedarse como administradores y "expertos."

Salvo en estos casos, el régimen ha realizado una campaña para impulsar la inversión imperialista.

12. De acuerdo con su política neocolonialista hacia el imperialismo y con su defensa de las relaciones de propiedad capitalistas, el régimen de Luanda ha seguido tratando de suprimir las luchas de las masas angoleesas por reivindicaciones económicas y por derechos democráticos y políticos elementales.

El régimen ha tratado de encadenar al movimiento obrero por medio de organismos sindicales y de "poder popular" que están controlados directamente por el MPLA, y exhortando a las masas a "sacrificarse por la revolución." Al mismo tiempo, el MPLA ha reprimido a quienes siguen tratando de organizarse independientemente o de plantear demandas que responden a las necesidades de las masas trabajadoras.

En la primavera de 1976 se dio una importante serie de huelgas, que fueron condenadas por el gobierno del MPLA y la UNTA (Unión Nacional de los Trabajadores de Angola), que es el sindicato controlado por el MPLA. El régimen arrestó a varios huelgistas y continuó su campaña para aumentar la productividad y las horas de trabajo.

El régimen del MPLA también ha arrestado a muchas personas que están a su izquierda o que son políticamente independientes de él.

El régimen ha utilizado contra esas personas el mismo tipo de calumnias y juicios preparados que caracterizaron su lucha fraccional contra UNITA y el FNLA. Disidentes políticos y dirigentes obreros han sido acusados de ser "reaccionarios," "ultraizquierdistas," "traidores," "saboteadores," "racistas," "divisionistas," o "agentes del imperialismo." Han sido arrestados o destituidos de sus trabajos o de las posiciones que ocupaban en organizaciones de masas.

Entre las víctimas de la represión se encuentran varios miembros del grupo de oposición dentro del MPLA llamado Revolución Activa, miembros de distintos grupos maoistas y de izquierda así como activistas del MPLA asociados con organi-

zaciones dentro de las masas trabajadoras.

Dirigentes del MPLA, como Nito Alves, ministro del interior del régimen de Luanda, han amenazado con ejecutar a algunos disidentes. Se han creado campos de detención.

De acuerdo con su política neocolonialista, el MPLA ha venido consolidando su aparato represivo. Ha reorganizado y expandido la policía, la milicia y las fuerzas armadas, estableciendo la conscripción permanente.

También ha organizado DISA (Directorio de Información y Seguridad de Angola), una fuerza de policía secreta que ha jugado un papel importante en la represión contra los disidentes obreros y de izquierda.

13. De la misma manera que los regímenes neocoloniales similares de Tanzania y de la República Popular del Congo (Brazzaville), el régimen del MPLA mantiene una serie de comités y estructuras controlados burocráticamente, que le sirven para contener a las masas, aunque los presenta como órganos de "poder popular." Con esa máscara de participación de las masas, comités que casi no tienen ningún poder y que son organizados de arriba hacia abajo, son utilizados para movilizar y disciplinar a los angoleeses de acuerdo a las necesidades de la producción capitalista y para salvaguardar el monopolio político del MPLA.

Aunque algunos de estos comités surgieron como instrumentos de la lucha de las masas durante el periodo que siguió al golpe de abril de 1974 en Portugal, ahora han perdido toda independencia, después de haber sido aplastados y puestos bajo control burocrático.

Los comités sólo tienen poder para realizar algunas tareas cívicas, como enseñar a leer y escribir, introducir controles de higiene y establecer mercados para distribuir comida. Solamente existen a nivel local y regional. Todas las decisiones políticas las toman dirigentes del MPLA, pues el régimen de Luanda no ha planeado establecer ningún organismo de "poder popular" electo nacionalmente.

El MPLA investiga cuidadosamente a los candidatos a los comités locales. Solamente el MPLA y las organizaciones de masas que él controla pueden presentar nominaciones. No se permite votar a quienes la dirección del MPLA califica de antiguos miembros o simpatizantes del FNLA o UNITA. De manera similar, el "poder popular" tampoco permite votar a quienes el MPLA acusa de ser "racistas," "tribalistas," o "regionalistas," como se llama a quienes plantean reivindicaciones en interés de alguno de los pueblos de Angola. Finalmente, tampoco pueden votar quienes se cree que son culpables de "sabotaje económico" y "pereza," que son los términos favoritos del MPLA para referirse a la militancia obrera. Quienes pudieran tener una posición mínimamente

independiente o crítica de la dirección del MPLA no pueden participar en el "poder popular."

14. El régimen del MPLA es un régimen neocolonialista basado en relaciones de propiedad capitalistas, que incluyen una importante inversión imperialista. Subordina las necesidades de las masas trabajadoras al mantenimiento de la propiedad privada. Ataca cualquier actividad política que no esté bajo su control. El régimen del MPLA impulsa la inversión extranjera y el desarrollo de lo que llama "la burguesía patriótica" de Angola.

La única manera de hacer avanzar la liberación de Angola es realizando las demandas democráticas y sociales de la clase obrera, el campesinado pobre y los pobres de las ciudades por medio de una revolución socialista. Este es el único camino hacia el desarrollo económico y la independencia respecto al imperialismo.

La necesidad más importante es la construcción de un partido marxista-revolucionario, un partido que se adhiera al programa de la Cuarta Internacional, el único tipo de partido que puede dirigir esta lucha. Ese partido sólo se puede construir sobre la base de una intransigente oposición política al MPLA y a sus fuerzas hermanas nacionalistas pequeño-burguesas de Angola.

La tarea más importante de la Cuarta Internacional en relación a Angola es ayudar a los militantes angoleeses a construir ese partido. Y el primer requisito para lograrlo es tener una línea política correcta hacia la revolución angoleesa. □

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FROM OUR READERS

The following comments from George Wright of New Jersey may prove of interest to a number of our readers:

"I just finished reading George Novack's two-part feature article on his philosophical itinerary and enjoyed it immensely. I was hoping Mr. Novack might be able to comment on a statement by the historian John P. Diggins in an article he wrote on Max Eastman which appeared in the *American Historical Review* in 1974. In discussing the debate with the Burnham faction in 1940, Diggins, in a footnote, quotes at length from Trotsky's book, *In Defense of Marxism*. On page 84 in his 'Open Letter to Burnham' Trotsky writes:

"Even animals arrive at their practical conclusions not only on the basis of the Aristotelian syllogism but also on the basis of the Hegelian dialectic. . . . No little development occurred before nature's inner relationships were converted into the language of the consciousness of foxes and men, and man was then enabled to generalize these forms of consciousness and transform them into logical (dialectical) categories, thus creating the possibility for probing more deeply into the world about us."

"Following this quote, Diggins quips, 'This fantastic discussion, which suggests a structure of mind in nature mediated through forms of language and behavior, could make Trotsky something of a precursor of French Structuralism. As Carl Becker might have said, not being a fox, I'm in no position to judge.' Diggins' characterization of Trotsky as an 'unconscious' structuralist seems entirely spurious, but nevertheless deserving of some attention because of his reputation as an historian of the American left."

George Novack's comment:

"Prof. Diggins is a better recorder of renegecy than a commentator on the nature of logic. He makes out Trotsky to be an idealist who finds a mental structure in nature and a structuralist who deals in abstract universals. This is sheer misrepresentation. Trotsky was neither of these but a dialectical materialist in his views on logic as on other matters.

"Trotsky was discussing a pivotal problem of the status of logic: the relation of our thought processes to the external world. What is the ultimate source of the categories in our minds that we think with? Are they self-generated and self-enclosed in the head or do they have a more objective origin and reference? According to the materialist theory of knowledge, the underlying basis and content of all our ideas is lodged in nature mediated by the historical development of social conditions and the increasing capacities of language, thought and science that enable

us to acquire a more profound knowledge and understanding of reality.

"I have tried to elucidate this question of the natural foundations of logic that the citation from Trotsky raises in two places. The chapter in *Humanism and Socialism* on 'The Emergence of Society, Speech and Thought' explains both the similarities and the qualitative differences between the reasoning powers of the 'foxiest fox' and the dullest human.

"Chapter 8 of *Pragmatism Versus Marxism* on 'Dewey's Logical Method' gives a more extensive treatment of the linkage between logic and the rest of reality. There I demonstrate the merit of Dewey's attempt to provide an empirical basis for the thought processes in the biological responses of animals and humans and criticize his failure to delve deeply enough into the roots of logic which are located in the interrelations of the physical world and human interactions with them.

"Is it, or is it not, true that 'the formation of intelligence in humans was preceded and prepared by the evolution of sagacity among animals' as I state on p. 123? To deny any connection or continuity between the two would violate the principle of evolution. Not to see the qualitative changes brought about by the labor process and all the cultural capacities emanating from it as our species has progressed is to think undialectically and fall into the trap of biologism or behaviorism.

"Prof. Diggins simply disdains to come to grips with the problem of the original derivation, historical development and causal relation between nature and logical thought which is at the basis of all scientific knowledge about the world.

"Ridicule is no substitute for reasoning and his 'wisecracks' exhibit little wisdom."

A group of young Palestinians in Haifa asks that we begin an airmail subscription, explaining:

". . . we happened to get a copy of your paper. At this time, when our people here are beginning to stand on their own legs, and looking for a political way for our struggle, we are very interested to [get] your paper, especially for its information in the class struggle all over the world, which ours is part of."

Pathfinder Press, London, forwarded the following letter to us from an island in the Caribbean:

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"My compliments on the excellent coverage of the historic events of South Africa," M.A. of Dallas, Texas, writes. "The thoroughness of all your African coverage over the last couple of years has been critical, I think, for those of us unfamiliar with the previous 10 years of revolutionary politics in Africa. All the ramifications of the revolutionary rebirth of this slumbering giant must be understood to adequately welcome its coming."

P.M., Toronto, Canada, writes that he is sorry to be so late in sending his renewal subscription. He explains that he "didn't get a job till recently and couldn't afford a sub. . . . Please send me issues from the last one I received (I believe it was April 14, approximately). Also can back issues (ten assorted copies) be ordered?"

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D.T. of Hollywood, California, complains: "It has become more and more difficult for me to obtain copies of the IP. The only way to be sure of getting a copy is to be on hand when the bundle arrives. The time has come for me to subscribe."

That's the surest way of getting a copy of every issue.

A.K.S. of Indianapolis, Indiana, sent the following letter:

"I accept your offer tendered in the July 2, '76 Militant; please mail me a sample copy of the Intercontinental Press.

"I have never seen an issue of this magazine, but I'm afraid I shall like the one you send. I say 'afraid' because I have seen the yearly subscription price listed somewhere, and remember it to be exorbitant. Not being able to afford what you truly want is a frustration."

Relatively, the price is not "exorbitant"—only \$12 for six months. □

Repression in Chile Widens

A United Nations panel of inquiry has charged that the Chilean military junta is systematically extending its suppression of human rights to broader layers of the population, including the church, trade unions, academics, and professional groups. The panel of five diplomats said that although torture appears to have decreased, "it is undeniable that the methods used have been considerably refined."

The 229-page report, made public October 14, urged UN members to exert economic pressure against the junta to force it to abandon its practices.