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*The Forced Exile of Wolf Biermann*

*WSL Condemns Brazen New Moves in Healyite Frame-up*

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Ernest Mandel

*The International Capitalist Economy*

## **A Hesitant, Uneven, Inflationary Upturn**

## The Syrian Takeover in Lebanon

By David Frankel

The Syrian army completed the occupation of Beirut without a battle November 15, ending more than a year and a half of civil war in Lebanon. Although formally representing a multinational Arab peace-keeping force, the Syrians did not bother with the fiction of repainting their helmets and vehicles. Similarly, although they are supposedly under the command of Lebanese President Elias Sarkis, it is well understood that the real power in Lebanon is held by Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.

Now that Assad occupies Beirut, what will his next moves be? A number of points are clear.

- Assad will attempt to limit any changes in the discriminatory governmental and economic system that was one of the prime causes of the civil war.

Muslims are the majority in Lebanon, but the economy is dominated by a largely Christian ruling class. Among presidents of industries before the civil war, 105 were Christian and twenty-one were Muslim; in banking, Christian presidents outnumbered Muslims by 11 to 2; and in services, the ratio at the top between Christians and Muslims was 40 to 5.

Christian economic domination was fostered by a governmental system imposed by the former French colonial rulers. Christian sects were guaranteed a 6 to 5 majority in the parliament, the leadership of the armed forces, and the presidency. The only change in all this proposed by Assad was an agreement announced in February in which the Maronite Christians—estimated at about 20 percent of the country's population—would have continued to be guaranteed the presidency, while seats in the parliament would have been divided on a 50-50 basis, and religious quotas in other governmental posts would have been eliminated.

This plan would have still left the Christian minority in effective control of the government. There is no indication that Assad intends to go any further than this in dealing with the grievances of the Muslim majority.

On the contrary, he has made clear that he intends to rebuild the governmental apparatus in Lebanon by relying on the moderate representatives of Maronite domination. In May, for example, Sarkis was elected president of Lebanon by parliament only because of Syrian support.

"Some of the members of Parliament later charged that they had gone to the meeting because their protectors, uniformed officers of As Saiqa, the Syrian-

### Spanish Trotskyists Arrested

**One hundred and fifty persons were arrested November 20 while attending a meeting of the Spanish Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR—Revolutionary Communist League, a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International).**

**A force of armed police raided the Aranzazu monastery in the Guipuzkoa province of the Basque country, where the meeting was being held, the French Trotskyist daily *Rouge* reported in its November 22 issue.**

**Torture of political prisoners is common in Spain, but the authorities in the Basque country are notorious for their special brutality.**

**Among those arrested was Jaime Pastor. Pastor had been previously arrested in October following a meeting in Madrid demanding amnesty for Spanish political prisoners. Pastor was brutally beaten and then released, although he faced possible indictment.**

**At this time, there is no confirmed information on the whereabouts of those arrested, or what charges they face. *Rouge* says they may have been taken to the Central Commissariat in San Sebastián, well known for its torture chambers.**

controlled Palestinian guerrilla group, had threatened reprisals if they did not attend," *New York Times* correspondent Henry Tanner reported in a May 14 dispatch from Beirut.

Sarkis, a key man in the Lebanese government from 1959 through the late

1960s, failed to win the presidency by one vote in 1970. He created the secret police apparatus that became notorious for its suppression of political dissent in the 1960s.

- Assad will move to repress dissident political groups in Lebanon. A glimpse of this came during the lull in the civil war in February, when Saiqa commandos, acting in behalf of the Syrian regime, attacked two Beirut newspapers and killed seven journalists.

- Assad is also in a position now to put heavy pressure on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to fall in with his plans for a negotiated settlement with Israel.

But will the temporary stabilization of Lebanon and his newly gained leverage against the PLO help Assad win his larger objectives?

In practice, the immediate result of Assad's policy has been to enable Israel to extend its domination to much of southern Lebanon. The big winner in Lebanon so far has been the oppressor-state of Israel.

Assad is now working in a bloc with Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat and King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. They hope to see American-sponsored negotiations on the Middle East reopen this year, followed by an agreement leading to the return of Arab lands occupied by Israel in the 1967 war.

Reliance by Assad and his allies on the good will of the State Department is based on their fear of the alternative—the mobilization of the Arab masses. It was this fear, above all, that led Assad to carry out his risky intervention in Lebanon.

Having carried out his mission in Lebanon to the satisfaction of the American ruling class, Assad may think that he merits some reward, that perhaps Washington will now put some pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. But however much the imperialists may appreciate the servility of the Arab bourgeoisie, they know that Israel remains their firmest and most reliable bulwark against the masses in the Middle East. That fact will continue to guide American policy. □

## The Forced Exile of Wolf Biermann

By Gerry Foley

The East German government deprived the poet and singer Wolf Biermann of his citizenship November 16, while he was on a tour of West Germany. The Stalinist bureaucracy announced that it had taken this action in response to the poet's "gross defamation" of the East German state.

Politically, the Stalinist dictatorship will have to pay a heavy price for this arbitrary action. Biermann's consistent

dedication to socialism is well-known. He is a hero of the radical youth in West Germany, who face a ferocious reactionary witch-hunt.

Perhaps more than any other figure, Biermann has become a symbol of the revolutionary traditions of the German working class as a whole, East and West. He comes from a Hamburg working-class Communist family that was hard hit by

Nazi repression. It was the Metalworkers union that organized his tour in the West and put pressure on the Stalinist government to allow him to come. In his poetry and music, he has united the themes of the West German youth rebellion against capitalism and imperialism and the revolt of the youth and workers in East Germany against the Stalinist bureaucracy.

Unable to lead an advance toward socialism or to expand human rights, the East German bureaucracy had to build a wall to stop a massive flow of discontented citizens into the capitalist West. Now it wants to put this wall between its increasingly rebellious masses of workers and youth and a poet who dares to speak out against bureaucratic rule in the name of socialism.

Biermann's banishment was a blatant violation of the most fundamental human rights. By a bureaucratic decree, he has been separated from his wife and infant son. He was exiled from his home and family without the least possibility to defend himself. While he spoke out for socialism and the fundamental gains of the workers state in East Germany, and did this in the face of a virulent campaign against radicals in West Germany, he was deprived of his citizenship simply because he criticized the Stalinist bureaucracy.

Such an arbitrary, indefensible act can only help to deepen the crisis of the bureaucratic regime. It has already provoked public protest, previously a rare event. Thirteen leading literary and artistic figures in East Germany addressed an open letter to the Honecker government condemning the banishment. Signers included the novelist Stefan Heym, a Jewish refugee from the Nazis who was later driven out of the United States by McCarthyism; the sculptor Fritz Cremer, known for having fought the Nazis; and Jurek Becker, a survivor of Hitler's concentration camps. More than seventy other East German actors, authors, and artists have added their names to the protest letter.

Although East Germany does not have as severe economic problems as the other Stalinized countries, Stalinist despotism is particularly intolerable in an advanced and well-educated society.

Biermann's banishment cannot be defended as necessary to protect the gains of the workers in East Germany. It shows that Stalinist repression is not designed to defend socialism but to uphold the privileges of a bureaucratic caste.

But the bureaucracy is clearly on the defensive. If it was possible to force the bureaucrats to let Biermann go on a tour of West Germany, there is also a good chance that if the socialist and labor movement comes to his defense, it can force the bureaucrats to let him return to the society whose gains he defends.

Such a victory would be a major blow for the democratic and human rights of the East German masses and for socialism. □

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# A Hesitant, Uneven, and Inflationary Upturn

By Ernest Mandel

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## 1. The Upturn Is a Reality, and So Is the Return to Structural Unemployment

There can be no doubt that the generalized recession of the international capitalist economy came to an end in 1975—earlier in the United States, later in West Germany, Japan, and the other imperialist countries. It has since been followed by a phase of economic upturn.

From a Marxist point of view, there is but one basic criterion by which to judge whether there is a recession or an upturn in economic activity: the trend of material production and, closely linked to this, the trend of accumulation of capital (the volume and reinvestment of profits). To take the trend of unemployment or real wages as a criterion of upturn is to make a mistake about the character of the capitalist system. This is a system of production under which profit and the accumulation of capital are the goals of economic activity. The volume of unemployment or the evolution of real wages are only by-products.

Better, the "ideal" situation for capitalism is precisely a phase in the cycle in which, at least at certain points in the history of capitalism, the growth of production is accompanied by a high volume of unemployment and a stagnation or even decline of real wages. It is exactly during such periods that the production of surplus-value breaks records.

In this sense, the turn in the cycle that occurred at the end of 1975 is beyond dispute. It is clearly expressed in the following figures:

### Evaluation of Industrial Production

(in % in comparison with preceding year)

	1975	1976
United States	-8.9	+10.0
West Germany	-6.2	+8.0
Japan	-10.9	+15.0
France	-7.3	+9.5
Britain	-4.8	+2.0
Italy	-9.8	+3.5
Canada	-4.6	+4.0
Australia	-6.3	+5.5
Belgium	-10.0	+10.0
Sweden	-1.8	0.0

(Source: *Veckans Affärer*, September 2, 1976.)

These figures will most probably have to be revised downward for 1976 as a whole in view of the slowdown of the upturn that has occurred during the second half of the year. But the turnabout of the trend is too clear to be doubted, unless one resorts to non-materialist criteria in analyzing the conjunctural fluctuations of the capitalist system.

While the upturn is a reality, it nevertheless exhibits quite particular features which we correctly predicted when the recession was still underway and which observers are now belatedly noticing.

Growth has been too limited to reabsorb unemployment. For the international bourgeoisie, the "historic function" of the 1974-75 recession was precisely to put an end to "full employment" as a "priority objective" of the economic policy of bourgeois governments and to reintroduce permanent massive unemployment as a source of pressure on the "labor market." From this standpoint, the granting of the 1976 Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences to Professor Milton Friedman is symbolic of the "anti-Keynesian counterrevolution" that has occurred in the realm of bourgeois ideology. In fact, neither the recognized spokesmen of the international bourgeoisie nor the representatives of bourgeois science have minced words in this regard. Professor Karl Brunner, the top-ranking Swiss "monetarist," has asserted: "If you want to eliminate inflation, you have to pay a price, and that price is unemployment. Unemployment is therefore the social cost of putting an end to inflation. And don't come and tell me that there is another way out, because it's not true." (Interview published in the Belgian review *Tendances-Trends*, September 8, 1976.)

There could be no better confirmation of the analysis Karl Marx made in *Capital* more than a century ago: in the long run capitalism cannot survive without an industrial reserve army, in other words, without unemployment. All the upstanding Social Democrats and neoreformists who claimed that the "mixed economy" under which we are said to be living is no longer capitalist have once again been rebuked for their troubles.

The extent of the "residue" of structural unemployment left by the recession of 1974-75 is considerable, as the following figures show:

### Unemployment in the Imperialist Countries in September 1976

United States	7,400,000
Britain	1,319,000
Italy	1,145,000
Japan	1,130,000
West Germany	899,000
France	841,500
Benelux	444,000

(Source: *Financial Times*, October 25, 1976, except for Italy: *Le Soir*, October 28, 1976.)

If to these figures we add the figures for unemployment in Spain, Canada, Australia, and Denmark, we easily reach 14.5 million people on complete unemployment, and this does not take account of seasonal unemployment in winter, youth leaving school and unable to find jobs, and women who, to use the philanthropic language of bourgeois science, "have voluntarily withdrawn from the labor market."

Now, the unemployment figure for the imperialist countries at the worst point of the recession was barely more than 17.5 million. This means that the upturn has succeeded in putting a grand total of some 15% of unemployed workers back to work. *More than 80% of workers rendered unemployed by the crisis have not found jobs during the upturn.* Moreover, an aggravation of unemployment must be expected in coming months in countries like Britain, Spain, Belgium, and even Japan, in view of the policy of fierce rationalization being applied by the employers in these

## Average Increase in the Cost of Living

	Average from 1959-60 to 1972-73	1974	1975	From Sept.* or Aug. 1975 to Aug. 1976
United States	2.6	11.4	8.0	6.0
West Germany	3.3	7.0	5.8	4.0*
Japan	6.0	24.4	12.2	9.0
France	4.5	13.7	11.8	9.5
Britain	4.1	15.1	21.5	14.5*
Italy	4.6	19.1	16.8	17.0
Canada	2.6	10.5	11.0	6.0
Netherlands	5.0	10.0	10.5	9.0*
Sweden	4.6	9.9	9.5	9.5

(Source: *OECD Economic Outlook*, December 1975, p. 113 and *The Economist*, October 23, 1976.)

countries and the special features of the conjunctural phase their economies will go through this winter.

The growth of unemployment among youth is especially dramatic in this regard. According to the Milan journal *Mondo Economico*, 62% of Italians on complete unemployment in April 1975 (that is, 775,000 people) were youth between the ages of 15 and 24, of which 620,000 were still awaiting their first job. (*Mondo Economico*, February 28, 1976.) In the United States 18% of youth less than 20 years old who had finished their studies were unemployed as of July 1976. Among young Blacks 16-19 years old the unemployment rate was 34.1%! (*Business Week*, September 20, 1976.)

### 2. The Upturn Is Clearly Inflationary

If the causes of the turnabout of the cycle are examined, it becomes clear that the recession was halted and the upturn initiated by enormous deficit spending in 1975. The total figure for these deficits solely for the major imperialist countries most probably amounts to *more than \$160,000 million*.

It ought to be noted in passing that during the years 1974, 1975, and 1976 there was a reversal of the relationship between private and public debt as major source of inflation. For the first time in a long period, the growth of the public debt was greater than that of private debt. The private debt not only experienced a declining growth rate, but even tended to stagnate. Because of the conjunction of an upturn in the rate of profit, greater liquidity for the industrial trusts, and a very slow initiation of investment, these trusts somewhat reduced the excessive recourse to bank loans that had been characteristic of the preceding phase.

At first glance, it may appear paradoxical to speak of an inflationary upturn when everyone is stressing the slowdown in the rate of price increases. This slowdown is a reality for 1976 if this year's rate of inflation is compared with the rate during the record years of 1973 and 1974. But it is no longer a reality if the 1976 inflation rate is compared with the rate during an analogous "upturn year," for example 1971 or the average for the 1960s. This is clear in the figures in the table above.

It is thus clear that the rate of inflation is considerably higher than that of an initial phase of economic upturn, even in the context of the "permanent inflation" that has reigned throughout the international capitalist economy since the second world war. In fact, the cost of living and the prices of consumer goods continued to rise even in the midst of recession, in spite of a sharp decline of nearly all raw materials prices and a marked slump in many markets.

The inflationary character of the upturn confronts international capitalism with a dilemma:

- *Either* governments will continue to accord top priority to the "struggle against inflation," in which case they will be led to take severe deflationary measures as soon as inflation picks up a bit or

as soon as any given country departs too much from the international average. This would flatly amount to destroying the upturn. This is presently the case in Britain, where in the midst of an economic swamp, with industrial production practically stagnating, the interest rate has been raised to 15% and significant reductions have been imposed on public spending (reductions which, it is true, are still considered insufficient by the international bankers who have to "bail out" the pound sterling with increasingly substantial loans). Because of this, unemployment in Britain is expected to increase by half a million this winter, which would bring total unemployment close to the 2 million mark. The "austerity plan" that has just been decided on by the Andreotti government in Italy with the approval of the Communist party points in the same direction, although it does not go as far; it also includes a discount rate of 15%.

- *Or else* the bourgeois governments will abstain from taking any anti-cyclical measures during the first phase of the upturn in order not to curb the upturn. In this case, next year will probably see a virtually universal accentuation of inflation (with the possible exceptions of West Germany and Switzerland, thanks to the repeated revaluations of the currencies of these countries), which would place both France and Japan in the category of countries suffering double-digit inflation and would force the governments of these countries to take more severe deflationary measures toward the end of 1977, thus precipitating a new recession in 1978 or the beginning of 1979. In any event, either of the two variants of bourgeois policy will lead to the same result in the medium term, for a broken upturn would also lead to a recession toward the end of 1978 or the beginning of 1979, in particular in the wake of the exhaustion of the demand for consumer goods resulting from the increase of unemployment.

### 3. The Upturn Is Hesitant and Not Cumulative

One of the major features of the present economic upturn is its hesitant and non-cumulative character. The well-known "multiplier effect" has not functioned, or has functioned only in a partial and inadequate manner. The essential reasons for this are as follows:

- a. Domestic demand for consumer goods, "primed" by the enormous budget deficits of 1975 and 1976, has not been able to rise at the anticipated rate and has even begun to stagnate in the wake of the persistence or even aggravation of structural unemployment and inflation. Two phenomena must be distinguished here. Particularly in the United States, in spite of the maintenance of structural unemployment, the total volume of employment and therefore of household incomes has increased (which accounts for the upturn). Between March 1975 and September 1976 employment rose from 83.8 million to 87.8 million, an increase of 4 million. Household incomes rose from \$1,194 thousand million to \$1,392 thousand million, an increase of 16.5%.

But since the rate of inflation over these eighteen months was 9%, the overall increase in purchasing power was less than 7.5% in actual fact. (All these figures come from the April 21 and 28, 1975, and October 25 and November 1, 1976, issues of *Business Week*.) And one must take account of the greater caution being exhibited by consumers, which was particularly reflected both in an increase in savings rates (deferred consumption) among certain layers of relatively well paid workers during the recession (out of fear of losing their jobs and therefore of having to reduce current consumption too much) and in a moderation of recourse to consumer credit. Total retail sales increased only 8.5% in value and 3% in volume between September 1975 and September 1976. (*Business Week*, November 1, 1976.) This makes for an upturn, but a very modest one. In view of the persistence of significant unemployment and inflation and *above all in view of the stagnation or even decline of real wages*, overall consumer purchasing power ceased to grow as of the end of the first phase of the upturn.

b. The upturn in productive investment is much slower and more modest than anticipated. The major cause of this is not so much the low rate of profit (which is very clearly rising in the United States, where the volume of profits rose 30% in 1976, Japan, and West Germany) as the existence of great excess capacity in nearly all branches of industry, linked to the slim hope of a strong expansion of the market. Striking confirmation of this reticence may be seen in the fact that the volume of bank loans to American companies for the week ending September 29, 1976, stood at \$116.6 thousand million, compared with \$123.5 thousand million in the corresponding week of 1975, a decrease of 5.5% (in stable prices it would represent a reduction of more than 10%). (See *Business Week*, October 25, 1976.) In Britain not only have productive investments not turned up, they have even declined (in fixed 1970 prices) from £2,130 million in 1970 and £2,000 million in 1974 to £1,740 million in 1975 and £1,660 million in 1976. (*Financial Times*, October 5, 1976.)

The October 4, 1976, issue of *Business Week* estimated the rate of utilization of productive capacity for manufacturing industries in the United States during August 1976 (U.S. manufacturing operating rate) at 77%. *Newsweek*, citing government sources, offers a slightly higher figure, 82%. But according to the November 1, 1976, *Business Week*, the Federal Reserve Board (the American central bank) estimated the manufacturing operating rate at only 73.6% for the third quarter of 1976.

The situation is even worse in Britain, Italy, and Japan, where the rate of utilization of existing capacity stood at 80% at the beginning of autumn 1976. In an article eloquently entitled "Where Is the Capital Spending Boom?" the September 13, 1976, issue of *Business Week* wrote: "In the US capital spending is still running some 9% below the peak reached more than 2½ years ago, in the second half of 1973. In Japan capital spending is some 24% below the rate of this late 1973 period. In the four major countries of Western Europe—Germany, Britain, France, and Italy—the shortfall is some 11%. And if the US seems to be mounting the most successful capital spending recovery of any of the advanced countries, growth in it is still slower this year than in any of the five earlier postwar recoveries."

The same article cites five reasons for this delay in productive investment: the excessively low level of utilization of existing productive capacity; the increase in prices of investment goods, stronger than during previous phases of recovery; the higher level of real interest rates, combined with a lower level of gross profits; a more moderate rate of growth of the gross national product.

c. The "fiscal crisis of the state" does not permit further growth of public spending. In fact, the pressure of the bourgeoisie in all countries is in the direction of a reduction and even elimination of the budget deficits that have appeared previously. The enormous growth of the public debt during preceding years has been the price the system has paid in nearly all the imperialist countries for its attempt once again to transform the threat of a catastrophic crisis of the 1929-32 variety into a recession limited in duration and depth, even if it is the most severe since the second world war.

The scope of this increase in public debt appears not only in the great imperialist countries but also in the smaller ones, such as Austria or Sweden, where Social Democratic governments succeeded in strongly limiting the extent of unemployment in 1974-75. The "socioeconomic performance" of these governments has certainly been better than average, both in terms of defense of employment and in terms of maintenance of the real wages of the workers. This is explained essentially by the particular manner in which these countries are integrated into the world market. But an additional factor has been the accumulation of reserves, which permitted a more audacious anti-cyclical policy in 1974-75 than was pursued by other governments, without provoking double-digit inflation. Nevertheless, the growth of the public debt has been striking in these countries. It is thus improbable that they will be able to repeat this performance during the next recession. The figures for Austria indicate this.

#### Austrian Public Debt

	Absolute Figures (in billions of schillings)	% of GNP
1972	49.8	10.62
1973	56.2	10.55
1974	61.3	10.00
1975	100.3	15.34
1976	134.2	18.52
1977 (prediction)	165.6	20.50

(Source: *Die Presse*, October 22, 1976.)

Under these conditions, it is out of the question that the evolution of public spending will accelerate the upturn in most of these countries. An exceptional case may be provided by the United States in the event of a Carter victory in the presidential elections, for his economic advisers call for budget and monetary policies slightly more stimulating than those of the Ford administration. But such a "priming of the upturn" in 1977 would almost certainly be countered by stronger deflationary pressure in 1978 in view of the acceleration of inflation it would provoke.

Predictions of GNP growth for all the major imperialist countries except the United States have consequently had to be revised downward, both by the OECD and by private sources (Chase Manhattan Bank, McGraw-Hill, etc.). This is shown in the following table.

#### Rate of Growth of GNP in 1976 (in %)

	Prediction during First Quarter of 1976	Prediction in October 1976
France	+9	+5.0
West Germany	+8	+4.5
Japan	+7.5	+5.6
Britain	+4.5	+0.5
Italy	+4.3	-3.5

(Source: *Business Week*, November 1, 1976.)

In fact, in Japan industrial production actually diminished 1.7% in August 1976, by 1% again in September, and a new reduction is expected in October, followed, in the best of cases, by a new upturn in November. (*Financial Times*, October 28, 1976.) And in Australia after a modest increase of 3.4% of the GNP in the first half of 1976, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (October 29, 1976) noted: "Hopes of an early economic recovery . . . are dying rapidly. In fact, the Australian economy is still bumping along near the bottom of a trough, with inflation and unemployment

high and private capital spending depressed." The slowness of the upturn and the stagnation of investment have also provoked a real new recession in the European steel industry, where production for the fourth quarter of 1976 is expected to decline toward 30 million metric tons, the level of the 1975 recession, nearly 25% below the level of the fourth quarter of 1974. (*Financial Times*, October 11, 1976.)

#### 4. The Upturn Is Uneven Internationally and by Sector

Although the imperialist countries entered the 1974-75 recession almost simultaneously, the upturn has been neither simultaneous nor even in scope. *Grosso modo*, the international mechanism of the recovery has been as follows:

a. Upturn in production in the United States beginning with the second quarter of 1975, stimulated in particular by a strong recovery in the automobile industry (while the construction industry, the other detonator of the crisis, continues to weigh down the sectors of durable and non-durable consumer goods and is maintaining a very low level of activity).<sup>1</sup>

b. Upturn in Japan and West Germany, about six months out of phase with the U.S. upturn, primarily under the impetus of an export boom.

c. Upturn simultaneous with the West German one in most of the countries of the EEC and in countries like Austria and Switzerland, which "lean" strongly on the EEC. But while the German and Japanese upturns continued to be fueled by the export boom throughout 1976, there was a sudden break in the upturn in France and the Benelux countries during the second half of 1976, under the combined effects of lesser competitive strength of exported products, price increases superior to those of German products, and deflationary measures taken by the governments to combat inflation.

d. In Britain and Italy: much more hesitant upturn bordering on stagnation under the effect of severe deflationary measures that literally "strangle" the upturn.

e. A very important fact: The American expansion of the early months of 1976 was not accompanied by a pronounced rise in imports from the other imperialist countries, except Japan. (The semicolonial countries were able to increase their raw material exports, in both volume and price.) This is reflected in the fact that the American trade balance showed a credit in 1975, which, given the present monetary system practically based on the non-convertible dollar, in fact exercises the effect of a deflationary brake on world trade. From the third quarter of 1974 to the second quarter of 1976 the exports of the nine members of the Common Market increased 16.4% overall, while their exports to the United States declined 5.5%. (See *Eurostat*, monthly bulletin of foreign trade, No. 9, 1976, p. 24.) It is true that from the second half of 1975 to the first half of 1976 Japanese exports to the United States increased 40%, rising from \$5,400 million to \$7,500 million. Because of this, and because of the increase in oil imports, the U.S. trade balance may show a deficit in 1976.

How will these various factors interact during the coming six to nine months? A continuation of protectionist practices by the United States (including a new decline of the dollar relative to the European currencies and the yen), combined with an accentuation of deflationary measures in Britain, Italy, and even France, would clearly break the expansion of world trade, which has turned up during the past year. The price scales of raw materials, which had been strongly on the rise since the beginning of the upturn, have already been evolving downward for several months. The dollar index of industrial raw materials prices was down 2.5% on October 12, 1976, compared with the beginning of September; the

1. Homebuilding continues in its depression in the United States, with an annual level of 1.5 million new home starts at the beginning of autumn 1976, compared with a level of 2.5 million attained at the beginning of 1972. The average price of a new house has reached \$43,600, which is 13% higher than during autumn 1975 and double the price of 1970. Buying a house has thus been driven out of the reach of a growing portion of the American population. (*Business Week*, September 27, 1976.)

index for metals was down 10.5%. For copper the decline since July 1976 has been more than 20%, bringing the price back to something like the recession level. For all metals, the cumulative decline from the beginning of July 1976 to the beginning of October was on the order of 12-15%. (*The Economist*, issues of August 7, September 11, and October 16.) While the index for primary foodstuffs was still slightly on the rise (+0.3% in one month), this was due exclusively to the increase of coffee and cocoa prices caused by very bad harvests. In fact, in spite of the drought in Europe, prices of other primary foodstuffs were going down, considerably in the case of products like sugar (the price of which has collapsed from 38 U.S. cents a pound to 8 cents a pound). For the first time in a long while, the 1976-77 world grain harvest will be superior to consumption. Hence, grain stocks, which had declined by 100 million metric tons during the past seven years, will increase by 25 million tons and prices are going down. (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 29, 1976.)

If, on the other hand, protectionist pressure is relaxed somewhat in the United States, if inflation accelerates in Japan, and if Britain begins to reap the fruits of the dizzying fall of the pound sterling in the realm of exports and production, the variations of the upturn among the different imperialist countries could be attenuated somewhat. But even in this event, there would be a substantial difference between the 1977 rise of production in the United States, Japan, and West Germany on the one hand and in Britain and Italy on the other hand, with France occupying an intermediary position between the two categories of countries.

Competition and interdependence. Such are the reciprocal relations among imperialist countries today. And this imposes painful choices on the governments of these countries. Callaghan, the head of the British government, recalled this brutally just recently (although it must be said that the brutality was rather sad and genteel, a long way from the brutality of the days of old John Bull), when he threatened his competitors/partners with a withdrawal of the British army from the Rhine and a return to severe import controls (that is, a no-holds-barred trade war) if they would not step up their support to the pound. It is obvious that a return to the unlimited protectionism of the 1930s on the part of some important imperialist countries would inflict a decisive body blow to the upturn and would precipitate a stagnation, and even an ebb, in the volume of world trade for several years.

The unevenness of the upturn is no less pronounced as regards the major branches of industry than as regards the major imperialist countries. Automobile production, the vanguard, is running at a cruising speed clearly below that of the years of expansion. It has been confirmed that the expansion of the market for this branch is essentially finished, except in some countries, like Brazil, and that demand is becoming almost exclusively a replacement demand. Steel is still in a depression, as are shipbuilding and construction (which entails stagnation for the electrical appliance industry). Chemicals, machine building (especially for export), electronics, and the sector of energy equipment (with strong pressure toward technological renewal in electronics, where miniaturization is shaking the big computers sector), however, are on the rise.

In regard to this unevenness (which, moreover, takes on features in Japan different from its manifestations in the United States and Europe), the September 1976 issue of the Japanese review *The Oriental Economist* wrote:

"Such a wide gap in the pace of recovery by different industries, which was not witnessed in the past periods of business recovery, is attributable to the unique pattern of the latest rally. The brisk increase of export trade has taken the leadership of the latest business recovery, as under similar circumstances in the past. However, inventory and plant-equipment investments, which followed suit in previous periods, have not made a tangible rally after domestic business hit the bottom about one year before."

#### 5. The Intensification of International Competition

The unevenness of the economic upturn in the various imperialist countries can only intensify the inter-imperialist

competitive struggle. This intensification has taken different forms in the course of the past several months:

a. A pronounced recourse to protectionist measures in the weakest imperialist countries, primarily Italy (obligatory deposit of 50% of the value of exports and a tax on currency purchases) and Britain. The question of the generalized introduction of measures of quantitative control of imports has now been posed in Britain.

b. The inevitable result is an even more pronounced crisis of the Common Market, with the withdrawal of the French franc from the "snake" of European currencies and its consequent reduction to the deutschemark and its satellites (which, moreover, are staying in the "snake" only with growing difficulties). The project of European monetary union has been shelved indefinitely, until the day (mythical?) when both inflation rates and monetary, economic, and industrial policies are brought into line in the nine member states. But since the majority of these countries have not resorted to protectionist measures, for fear of back-sliding and a loss of the advantages of the Common Market, the situation in Europe has been characterized primarily by great indecision and growing paralysis of governments in face of the ups and downs of their economies on the international scene.

c. Increasingly impatient pressure from the European employers to put an end to this indecision. The most spectacular example of employer reaction to government indecision was the decision of the West German, Dutch, and Luxembourg employers in the steel industry to constitute a *European rationalization cartel excluding the French and Belgian employers*. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 11, 1976.) A realization of this project would have dealt a death blow to the European Coal and Steel Community, starting point of the Common Market. A compromise was finally arrived at, and a European cartel (EUROFER) was established, including the employers of the nine member states, essentially for defense against Japanese competition, including through protectionist measures. (*The Economist*, October 16, 1976.)

d. The maintenance of a pronounced tendency on the part of the big trusts and multinationals "of European inclination" to extend cooperation accords on a European scale. The reorganization of the heavy electrical equipment industry (turbines and generators), which began on a national scale, provides a good example. (See *Financial Times*, October 12, 1976.) In the context of restructuring accords in response to the crisis, the concentration and centralization of capital has been accentuated and there is a continued trend toward internationalization. *In this sense, it is important to stress the fact that in spite of its crisis, the Common Market has not broken up.* The relationship of forces between the "multinationals of European inclination" and those sectors of capital that favor protectionism within the Nine is such that the decisive test of the Common Market has been postponed (until the next recession?).

e. An increasingly avowed utilization of "floating exchange rates" to obtain commercial advantages. Thus, the United States has been able to improve its trade relations with Europe somewhat, especially with West Germany, by virtue of the depreciation of the dollar relative to the deutschemark, the Dutch florin, the Belgian franc, and the Swiss franc. Japan resorted to manipulation of exchange rates on the yen (see the study in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 26, 1976) in order to bolster its trade offensive, especially in color television sets in the United States and automobiles in West Europe.

f. Increasingly generalized practices of the multinationals aimed at "working around" the difficulties posed by the protectionism of governments and the unfavorable evolution of production costs in their countries of origin. There has now been a genuine reversal of the trend in this regard. Although during the 1950s and 1960s the (moderate) protectionism of the EEC and high wage costs in the United States led the multinationals of American origin to shift production centers to West Europe, today growing protectionism in the United States and increased wage costs in Europe (particularly because of the shifts in exchange

rates) are inducing European multinationals to establish production centers in the United States, while American multinationals are reducing their activities in Europe. The factors behind this are indicated in the following table.

	Appreciation of European Currencies Relative to the Dollar, From 1970 to 1975	Hourly Wages (in dollars)	
		1970	1975
United States	—	4.20	6.22
W. Germany	+48	2.32	6.19
Netherlands	+43	1.99	5.98
Belgium	+35	2.08	6.46
France	+29	1.74	4.57
Sweden	+25	2.93	7.12
Japan	+21	0.99	3.10
Italy	-7	1.75	4.52
Britain	-7	1.48	3.20

(Source: *Citybank Money International*, Vol. 4, No. 4, May 1976.)

The most spectacular initiatives in this regard have been taken by Volkswagen, Michelin, Fiat, and Saint-Gobain, which are building or buying large factories in the United States. As we have often stressed, while the appreciation of European currencies (and the yen) relative to the dollar favors American exports relative to European and Japanese exports, it also favors the purchase of factories and real estate in the United States by European and Japanese capitalists. In fact, to invest \$100 million in the United States a German or Swiss trust spends less than 50% as many deutschemarks or Swiss francs today as would have been required in 1970.

The branches of the European and Japanese multinationals established in the United States already account for 24% of all American exports. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 24, 1976.) In all, the direct investments abroad of West Germany and Japan have increased sevenfold since 1967. They amounted to only 7% of direct U.S. foreign investment abroad in 1967; they attained 25% of U.S. investment abroad in 1975. If the direct investments abroad of Britain, France, and the Netherlands are added, they come to two-thirds of U.S. investment abroad as of 1975!

g. An increasingly accentuated attempt on the part of the trusts of the imperialist countries most affected by the crisis to divert their production toward foreign markets. The share of exports in the overall production of Fiat, for example, rose from 40% in 1973 to 49% in 1975 and will soon reach 60%. (Arturo Cannetta in *Consigli*, No. 27/28, August-September 1976.) This effort goes along with a diversification of Fiat's production. The most profitable departments—tractors, road-building machinery, steelworks and special steelworks, machine tools—already account for more than 40% of the trust's turnover. (*Financial Times*, September 24, 1976.) Here is the share represented by capital exports relative to gross investments in the British manufacturing industries:

1960-61:	28.1%
1964-65:	28.8%
1968-69:	40.6%
1972-73:	60.2%

(*Bank of England Quarterly Review*, March 1976, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1967 and 1974.)

As could have been expected, this is reflected in a spectacular growth of profits realized abroad relative to the total profits of the trusts. Thus, in Britain, while income from abroad represented only 20% of gross profits before depreciation for all industrial and commercial companies in 1965, this percentage rose to 25% in 1970 to attain 34% in 1975. (*National Income and Expenditure Blue*



Book, 1965-1975, cited in *The Economist*, October 23, 1976.)

In this manner the British and Italian trusts transform the fall of the pound sterling and the lire into a source of additional profits. More and more they pay their workers in funny money while they sell their products for strong currencies. The banks imitate them as well, for one may note that in 1975 British banks held not less than 58,000 million pounds sterling in commercial paper or advances on current accounts expressed in foreign currency (as against only £23,400 million in direct investments of British capital abroad). (*Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin*, June 1976.) In fact, big capital in the countries especially affected by inflation has been able to protect itself adequately against the depreciation of these national currencies, whereas the working class, selling its labor power by the week, fortnight, or month, has not at all been able to do this.

h. Some spectacular successes have been registered by the competitors of the United States, in spite of the manipulation of exchange rates and in spite of the loss of low-cost energy after the "explosion" of oil prices in 1973. West Germany seems to have definitively overtaken the United States in exports of manufactured products. For the category "machines and transport material" West German exports increased from 17,000 million EUR\* in the third quarter of 1974 to 22,400 million EUR in the first quarter of 1976, an increase of more than 30%. West Germany and France have seriously eaten into the American monopoly on export of nuclear equipment and have developed aircraft prototypes technically superior to those of the major American trusts. A similar technological "breakthrough" has been achieved by the French rubber industry. It appears that an international cartel, essentially Anglo-French (and dominated by Rio Tinto Zinc), has succeeded in cornering the world uranium market and has driven the price up from \$6 a pound in 1972 to \$30-40 a pound in 1976. (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 10, 1976.)

Further, the Japanese export offensive has achieved sensational breakthroughs on the North American and European markets. In the case of West Europe this offensive has not at all been compensated for by an increase in EEC exports to Japan. Thus, Common Market exports to Japan stagnated around an average of \$225-230 million a month in 1975-76, while Japanese exports to the Common Market countries increased from some \$450 million per month to some \$575 million per month during the same period, creating a considerable trade deficit for the EEC, which threatens to reach \$3,000 million in 1976. Hence the anti-Japanese moaning and groaning of European capitalists, who are demanding protectionist measures—or else a broad opening of the Japanese market to their own commodities.

It must nevertheless be recalled that contrary to some conceptions that continue to prevail in some Marxist circles, the role of the state in supporting the big monopolies is absolutely essential in the imperialist epoch. If the present crisis has demonstrated anything, it is clearly the fact that in the long run the monopolies cannot at all escape either the law of value or the consequences of conjunctural fluctuations and thereby the influence of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Under these conditions, the role of the state as the guarantor of monopolistic superprofits is vital for them. They win or lose precious trump cards in the inter-imperialist competitive struggle according to whether the state is more or less powerful, more or less capable of playing this role *in the immediate period*.

Under these conditions, the relative power of the state in the United States and the capacity for rapid state intervention by Japanese imperialism, already less powerful, contrast painfully for the West European monopolies with the powerlessness of the "pre-state" structures of the EEC and the notorious weakness of the West European national states. A striking example is provided by the most recent ups and downs and the prospects for the

European aeronautics industry. This industry, which employs more than 400,000 workers (compared with some 1 million in the American aeronautics industry) and which has surpassed its American competitor in the realm of technology, furnished only 8% of the civilian aircraft sold on a world scale during the past ten years. (*The Economist*, September 9, 1976.) The main reason for this failure lies in the fact that the European governments, too weak and divided, have been unable to guarantee the European aeronautics industry sufficient outlets. It is clear that this industry is literally threatened with extinction if this situation is not altered in the medium term.

## 6. The Attempts to Restructure the World Market

Every overproduction crisis that manifests itself on the world market expresses both the basic imbalances of the capitalist production and circulation of commodities and the efforts of capital to surmount these contradictions by restructuring both production and the market. The efforts to restructure production aim at increasing the rate of profit through eliminating (or reducing) the less profitable firms, products, and processes of production, through rationalization investments, through saving on raw materials, energy, labor, and employment of fixed capital, through speeding up turnover time of capital (especially circulating capital), through an intensification of labor, and in general through increasing the rate of surplus-value. The efforts to restructure the world market relate to both the search for new markets and the redivision of old markets in accordance with the modified relationship of forces among imperialist trusts and powers.

We have already dealt with the most recent vicissitudes of inter-imperialist competition within the domestic markets of the imperialist countries themselves, which remain the major part of the world market in view of their wealth relative to the other parts of the world. Let us now examine the other modifications occurring in the world market:

a. The emergence of the countries of OPEC (or at least some of them) as an important market for the industries of the imperialist countries (especially the industries exporting equipment and transport goods). EEC exports to the countries of the Arab League rose from 6,000 million EUR in 1973 to 10,000 million EUR in 1974, to 14,300 million EUR in 1975, and will most probably reach 17,000-18,000 million EUR (about US\$21,000-22,000 million) in 1976. If to this we add EEC exports to Iran (which buys nearly as much from the capitalists of the Common Market as does the USSR or Spain), Nigeria, and Indonesia, Common Market exports to all these countries come to something like \$30,000 million, that is, some 9% of total EEC exports. It is above all West Germany and France that have profited from this expansion of the market, with Britain reserving a special piece for itself in the subsector of the Gulf emirates. Japan has also considerably expanded its outlets in the oil exporting countries (from 6.5% to 10% of total Japanese exports). The share of OPEC countries in U.S. exports rose similarly, from 7% to 10%, mostly as a result of arms deals.

This trend toward restructuring of the world market has thus permitted the European and Japanese capitalists to recover a portion of the world surplus-value they lost to the owning classes of the oil exporting countries in the wake of the increases in oil prices. The EEC countries' trade balance with the countries of the Arab League showed a deficit of 18,000 million EUR (\$22,500 million) in 1974. This deficit dropped to 9,000 million EUR (\$11,500 million) in 1975; that is, it was reduced by half. (It had been 6,000 million EUR in 1973.)

b. The emergence of a series of semicolonial countries in East Asia as significant partners in world trade. This is particularly the case for Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, and to a lesser extent for the moment (but with a greater growth potential), Indonesia and Malaysia.

Up to now it has been primarily Japanese imperialism that has profited from this development, both by picking up significant outlets and by finding special fields for capital investment.

\* The EUR is a Common Market accounting unit more or less equal to US\$1.25.

American imperialism preserves important positions here but is in clear retreat in comparison to its Japanese rival. For the European imperialists this new expanding sector of the world market is still largely unknown territory, apart from the traditional positions occupied by British imperialism in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia (nonetheless also in clear retreat in comparison to Britain's Japanese rival).<sup>2</sup>

These countries have undergone a significant process of industrialization during past years, which the 1974-75 recession curbed but did not at all break.<sup>3</sup> Hence, they are in turn beginning to export industrial products and even capital, competing with their former or present backers. For example, the East Asian electronic apparatus and watch assembly industries represent serious competitors for Japanese industry, not to mention U.S. industry. South Korean entrepreneurs have bid for more than a billion and a half dollars worth of construction contracts (roads, official buildings, shipyards, etc.) against Japanese, European, and American entrepreneurs. (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 15, 1976.) But precisely because of the relative success of industrialization in these countries, they form a supplementary outlet for certain branches of industry of the imperialist countries, primarily the branch exporting equipment and transport goods. A certain modification of the international division of labor is thus taking place, with some industries (above all the textile industry and the branches utilizing a relatively large unskilled labor force, such as assembly of simple electronic apparatuses) shifting toward less developed countries (specifically the most developed of the semicolonial countries), while the industrial center of gravity in the imperialist countries increasingly shifts toward the sector of "equipment and means of transport goods."

Certain of the successes of industrialization in the semicolonial Asian countries threaten important branches of industry in the imperialist countries. Taiwan has become the world's fourth largest producer of synthetic fibers, with an annual production of more than 500,000 metric tons. South Korea is trying to attain this same level by 1980-81 and to export a total yearly value of nylon and other synthetic fibers of more than \$3,500 million. (*The Oriental Economist*, August 1976.) In view of the excess capacity that already weighs on the world synthetic fiber market today, this expansion represents a serious threat to the German, Dutch, French, and Italian trusts. Imports presently account for 11% of sales in Europe, as against only 5% in 1969. They are increasing at a rate of 10% a year, while sales are increasing only 2% a year. (*The Economist*, September 9, 1976.)

A similar situation threatens to arise in basic petrochemicals. The Arab countries and Iran plan on making enormous investments in this sector, in which there is already excess capacity. The European producers are extremely worried about this. (*Financial Times*, September 19, 1976.)

Let us also mention that a Hong Kong financier, Wong Chong-po, has obtained control of the second-largest American watch

2. A significant result of this development has been the emergence of a market of Asia-dollars parallel to the market of Euro-dollars and centered on the banks of East Asia. According to the September 17, 1976, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, this market has expanded from the modest sum of \$390 million in 1970 to the already more alluring sum of \$13,700 million toward the middle of 1976. Nearly \$4,000 million of this total has been loaned to non-banking enterprises.

3. According to the June 4, 1976, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the gross national product per capita in Singapore rose from US\$659 in 1965 to \$1,113 in 1970 to \$2,331 in 1975; the corresponding figures for Hong Kong are \$596, \$962, and \$1,654. The rate of accumulation (gross domestic fixed capital formation as percentage of GNP) is extremely high in these two states, especially Singapore, where it now exceeds 33%. Forty percent of the work force in Hong Kong and 26% in Singapore are already employed in manufacturing industry. Singapore's exports break down as follows: 13.4% are sold to the EEC countries, 13.9% to the United States, 8.7% to Japan, and 5% to Australia, that is, more than 40% to the imperialist countries. For Hong Kong (leaving all re-exports out of account) this figure stands at 75%. The total of Hong Kong's industrial exports (not counting re-exports) is now in the vicinity of \$5,000 million, while Singapore's is about half that figure.

trust, Bulova, acing out Swiss high finance. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 23, 1976.)

c. Nevertheless, as a whole the semicolonial countries continue to be "marginalized" on the world market in view of the inability of the imperialist system to extract them from their state of stagnation and poverty in a comprehensive manner or at anything like a satisfactory rate. The successes registered by Brazilian-type "development models" (repeated in several countries) are based on a superexploitation of the working class and an impoverishment of the poor peasantry, which means that they generate a domestic market that covers barely one-fifth of the nation (the big and middle bourgeoisie, the new middle classes, the rich peasantry). This erects an upper limit both on their internal industrialization and on their ability to become a growing outlet for the commodities exported by the imperialist powers. In fact, the narrowness of their domestic markets compels them to plunge rapidly into the export race, as has been noted on many occasions in the case of Brazil and as has just been confirmed once again in the case of South Korea.

To take the example of the Common Market again, EEC exports to Brazil, India, and Pakistan stagnated or declined throughout 1975 and 1976. These three countries, whose total population amounts to nearly 800 million, together purchase fewer commodities from the nine countries of the Common Market than does Austria alone, with its population of somewhat less than 8 million!

The new and considerable impoverishment that has occurred in the non-oil-exporting semicolonial countries during the 1974-75 recession consequent to the collapse of raw materials prices and the increase in the costs of imports of energy and food reserves dramatically underscores a fundamental feature of the crisis of the system, which tends to cast more than half the earth's inhabitants onto the margins of the "accelerated economic growth" of yesterday and the slowed down economic growth of today and tomorrow. Hence the sharpness of the debates around the "new world economic order," to which a special article is devoted in this issue of *Inprecor*.

d. The share of the bureaucratized workers states in foreign trade of the capitalist countries is growing gradually, but it remains very modest. These countries (including Yugoslavia) purchased only 5.5% of the exports of the EEC countries during the first quarter of 1976, as well as 2.5% of U.S. exports and 6.5% of Japanese exports. On the other hand, the share of the imperialist countries in the imports of the countries of the Comecon rose from 25% in 1970 to 33% in 1975.

The major difficulty for a more rapid expansion of the markets of the bureaucratized workers states as buyers of capitalist commodities lies in the lack of competitive strength of their industrial products, which limits sales of these products on Western markets. Since their surplus of agricultural products is tending to disappear (some of these countries have even become net importers of agricultural products), an increase in purchases of Western goods can be financed by only three sources in the long run: increased exports of raw materials; increased export of gold; increased debt to the imperialist countries. The fall in the price of gold has reduced the import capacity of the USSR. The debt of certain bureaucratized workers states to the imperialist countries has reached dangerous proportions and will not be able to grow much larger. The USSR's trade deficit to the imperialist countries had reached \$5,000 million in 1975. The cumulative debt of the USSR and the rest of the Comecon countries to the imperialist countries stands at \$35,000 million. Servicing this debt already absorbs some 20% of their annual currency income. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 4, 1976.) And North Korea has even requested a moratorium and has ceased to service its debt of \$1,500 million. The only remaining major source for financing an expansion of their purchases of Western investment goods is increased export of their raw materials.

And in fact it is in this direction that Soviet and Chinese foreign trade has been oriented, primarily in the framework of

	Total Debt (in billions of \$)	Debt Increase March 1975-Oct. 1976 (in billions of \$)	Debt Servicing in Percentage of Currency Income 1976	
				1977
Philippines	4.4	0.5	16	17
South Korea	11.8	—	12.9	13
Pakistan	6.3	0.7	16.8	24
Singapore	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2
Sri Lanka	0.5	0.15	22.9	—
Indonesia	10.5	3.3	13.8	16.6
Taiwan	3.2	0.5	6.5	7.8
Thailand	1.3	1.0	14.6	—
India	10.8	1.9	13.5	—

(Source: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 8, 1976.)

certain bilateral accords such as the exchange of Soviet oil for American wheat or Chinese oil for Japanese steel. Since the growth rate of production of raw materials in the USSR is tending to decline, since a sharper growth of this production depends in turn on the import of imperialist machinery and technology, and since the domestic need for certain raw materials will tend to increase more rapidly than production in the future (particularly the need for petroleum products in the USSR consequent to advances in motorization), the Soviet bureaucracy will have to make some "rending choices."

The Soviet bureaucracy is now preparing to divert some of its oil resources previously reserved for members of the Comecon to the capitalist countries, which will compel the Comecon countries (especially East Germany) to get their supplies from the world capitalist market in the future, where the price is higher than provided for in the supply contracts with the USSR. The economic difficulties of several "people's democracies" thus threaten to augment at a time when their internal political situation is moving in a direction dangerous for the bureaucracy, as has recently been shown in Poland.

All in all, the efforts to restructure the world market, which are real, will produce only modest and even marginal results. Like the character in Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland*, imperialist capital has to run faster and faster just to stay in the same place, unable to really get anywhere. We find here a manifestation of the structural crisis of the system, the fact that it no longer commands the margins for adaptation of yesteryear.

### 7. Incidences of International Monetary Disorder

We have seen that several "national" bourgeoisies have been able to manipulate the system of floating exchange rates so as to obtain commercial advantages, although very temporary ones. But we must also stress another aspect of the interdependence between international monetary disorder on the one hand and the amplification of conjunctural fluctuations since the beginning of the 1970s on the other hand.

First the appearance of "petrodollars" and then the export offensive of West German and Japanese imperialism (and to a lesser extent of *all* the imperialist powers) have meant a considerable new swelling of credit and of credit money (credit money constantly depreciated by inflation) on the world market. We have seen that conjointly with this swelling of credit the debt of the capitalist trusts and firms has tended to slow down on national markets because of the upturn of the rate of profit (and the rate of self-financing) on the one hand and the delay of an "investment boom" on the other hand.

For the capitalist system as a whole, a growing share of sales has continued to be financed by credit. But the years 1975 and 1976 have been marked by a shift of the increase of credit to

foreign rather than "indigenous" buyers. In other words, *the upturn stimulated by exports* has been primarily an upturn stimulated by exported credits.

Although the market of "petrodollars" is cheerfully continuing to expand and has now attained the tidy sum of \$300,000 million (of which a portion is the property of the oil exporters), the debt of the semicolonial countries to the imperialist powers has grown even more disturbingly. A portion of these credits are accorded by imperialist governments and international public institutions controlled by imperialism (above all the World Bank, the Association of International Development, and the Asian Development Bank). A growing portion of credits to the semicolonial countries, however, come from the capitalist private sector and the imperialist banking system, especially American and British big banks.

Thus, the above table may be drawn up for some semicolonial countries.

Of these debts of around \$50,000 million, some \$14,000 million are owed to private foreign banks and other institutions (this figure does not include Pakistan's debt to private sources, which is unknown). For all the semicolonial countries taken together, private debt rose from \$25,000 million at the end of 1973 to \$60,000 million at the end of 1975 (including advances originating from the OPEC countries), while their public debt rose from \$46,000 million to \$65,000 million during the same period. The September 4, 1976, issue of *The Economist*, which cited these figures, added phlegmatically, "Bankers are now worried by these loans, but they kept trade flowing." According to the November 1, 1976, *Business Week*, the total of the debts of the semicolonial countries will amount to \$170,000 million by the end of 1976, of which \$70,000 million is owed to banks. Brazil alone already owes \$10,000 million to private U.S. banks. This expansion of private credit to the semicolonial countries is undoubtedly explained by the pressing need of imperialist capital to broaden its international outlets and to achieve a restructuring of the world market.<sup>4</sup> But

4. This expansion corresponds to a considerable growth of the balance of payments deficit of the semi-colonial countries that do not export oil, a deficit which, under the combined effect of the increase in oil prices and the decline in prices of other raw materials, rose from \$29,000 million in 1974 to \$37,000 million in 1975 and is estimated to be \$32,000 million for 1976, a total of nearly \$100,000 million for these three years. (*The Economist*, October 2, 1976.) In reality, then, Western and OPEC loans to these countries are concessions to exporters who would have had to drastically reduce their sales to the "third world" if the tide of credit had not flowed in this direction (nearly 50% of the total goes to a few countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan). To this deficit one must add the deficit of the bureaucratized workers states (\$20,000 million) as well as that of the countries of southern

it introduces a new element of instability into the international banking and monetary system. While the years 1974 and 1975 were marked primarily by fear of a collapse of big banks because of the insolvency of some of their indigenous creditors, the year 1976 in the banking world was marked by growing fear of the insolvency of international creditors. One after the other Zaïre, Indonesia, Argentina, and Peru stood on the brink of having to demand a debt moratorium. Once one realizes the total amount of the debts of the semicolonial countries, the weight of foreign debt servicing relative to the inflow of currency, and the uncertainty that hangs over any expansion of this inflow (that is, over the increase of their exports), one can understand the extent of this uneasiness, which has at times approached panic.

The speculative movements against the pound sterling have been caused in part by the tendency of the so-called countries of the sterling zone to gradually get rid of their holdings in pounds. This applies primarily to certain oil-producing countries which have already suffered significant losses because of the fact that they keep their holdings in London. (According to the October 16, 1976, *Economist*, they had deposited £2,500 million in London during the fifteen months prior to March 1975 and withdrew £1,500 million during the following fifteen months.) But speculation has other causes as well, particularly simple anticipation if the balance of payments deficit of a country grows (this is what happened with the French franc in the spring of 1976) and flight of capital for fear of socio-political "trouble" [takes place]. There was just such a flight of capital from Portugal, particularly toward Brazil, during the revolutionary year 1975 in that country; Spain, Italy, and France have since experienced flights of capital in 1976 amounting to several thousand million dollars. The flight of Italian capital to Switzerland has taken on gigantic proportions.

A contradiction must nevertheless be stressed. On the one hand there is an incontestable influx of European capital to North America, primarily to take advantage of the more rapid expansion (and reduced wage costs) of the American economy, and secondarily to seek shelter from the revolutionary shocks now looming on the horizon in southern Europe and from the socio-political turbulence of Britain. But at the same time the dollar is continuing to depreciate relative to the deutschemark and the Swiss franc, particularly because the rate of inflation is higher in the United States than it is in West Germany or Switzerland. The portfolio investments and bank deposits of European capitalists in the United States thus depreciate relative to equivalent deposits and investments in West Germany and Switzerland. This can only lead to a distortion of interest rates, which is already clear and which should have the ricochet effect of fostering productive investments in West Germany over those in the United States.

Compensating for this movement would require either a new devaluation of the dollar (which could in fact be fostered by an aggravation of inflation in 1977) or a new relative rise in wages in West Germany. But how long will the American workers be satisfied with a stagnation and even erosion of their purchasing power (which has been going on for nearly a decade now!)? It can be seen to what extent the curve of the class struggle is intertwined with the curve of the economic cycle and international competition, while not being identical to it.

At least when they talk among themselves, the capitalists and bourgeois international technocrats exhibit few illusions about the reorganization of the international monetary system laboriously under way since 1971. One of the major leaders of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Tom de Vries of the Netherlands, wrote frankly about the latest monetary accords reached in Jamaica: "All the above means that the prospects for gold during the next few years are uncertain. This uncertainty concerning such an important element of the system once again underscores the interim character of the Jamaica accords; they do

not introduce a new monetary system in a concrete sense." (*Finances et Développement*, quarterly review of the IMF, Volume 13, No. 3, September 1976.) In fact, contrary to what has been claimed, the Jamaica accords do not at all imply a progressive demonetization of gold. They simply eliminated the fixed buying price of gold among central banks. To be sure, the massive sale of gold held by the IMF provoked a considerable fall in the free market price (from nearly \$200 an ounce to some \$115 an ounce). But at the same time this means an upward evaluation of the stocks of gold held by the central banks (especially the European central banks) from \$42 to \$115 an ounce; in other words, the "countable" value of this stock was tripled at the stroke of a pen following the Jamaica accords.

What will be the future evolution of the "price of gold"? Many factors will come into play here in coming years: the fate of successive harvests in the USSR; the evolution of costs of production (both in terms of technology and in terms of the social and political situation!) in South Africa; the fluctuations in private stockpiling and unloading in India, the Middle East, and France. But one factor remains decisive: the pace of inflation, especially of the dollar. If this inflation persists and intensifies in the medium and long term, it is difficult to see how the price of gold could avoid rising. In a society based on private property and in the absence of a world state, in the long run no "gentlemen's agreement" and no "international accords" will be able to compel owners of commodities to accept depreciated bank notes instead of that "hard and shiny stuff" in exchange for their commodities (or more exactly, in exchange for the balance of their commodity transactions abroad).

#### 8. Deeper Causes of a Hesitant and Uneven Upturn

Some people have reproached us for attaching excessive importance to market phenomena—that is, to the sphere of circulation—in explaining the recession and the upturn. They even detect concessions to "Keynesianism" here, although we were among the severest critics of Keynesian illusions at a time when these illusions were still shared nearly universally. At the root of these reproaches is a lack of comprehension of one of the fundamental aspects of the Marxist analysis of the capitalist mode of production.

It is true that for this analysis the sphere of production is primordial compared to the sphere of circulation. All realized surplus-value must first have been created in the process of production. The market can only redistribute what has first been produced. The disproportions and imbalances originate in the sphere of production.

But these disproportions cannot be reduced to disproportions in the sphere of production. They also include disproportions between productive capacity and purchasing power based on the capitalist mode of distribution. Those who try to reduce all the problems of the capitalist economic cycle to modifications in the sphere of production forget the contradiction between exchange value and use value, forget that capitalist production is production of *commodities* and that this *production* in no way implies the automatic *sale* of the commodities produced. Belated adepts of Say's Law or of the late lamented "law of outlets," they presuppose more or less automatically resolved what in fact occurs under the capitalist mode of production only in the long run, on the average, and only for a portion of capitalist commodities: the sale of commodities at prices yielding the average rate of profit.

It is thus indispensable to follow market trends (especially those of the world market) in order to understand and explain the highs and lows of the economic cycle. That is the method Marx himself applied in explaining particularly the overproduction crises of 1857 and 1866, which he studied in detail. He carefully refrained from reducing these crises simply to restructurations in the sphere of production (to the investigation of the altered value of commodities).

But that said, once all the imbalances of the market are

Europe (\$23,000 million). The surpluses of the OPEC countries (\$143,000 million) and the imperialist countries (\$20,000 million) correspond to this. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 2, 1976.)

revealed, these ups and downs must in the final analysis be linked to what has occurred in the realms of production and the class struggle.

The hesitant, uneven, and unstable character of the upturn of the international capitalist economy is explained above all by the fact that it occurs in the context of a "long wave of predominant stagnation." Such a long wave, such as that experienced by the capitalist economy between 1913 and 1939, is characterized by longer and deeper overproduction crises and by shorter and more hesitant upturns.<sup>5</sup>

In other words: the rate of profit is certainly rising compared with the levels of the years 1973 and 1974. But it is not rising to the "golden" averages of the 1950s and most of the 1960s. The big technological windfalls (monopolistic superprofits) realized by branches like electronics, automobiles, chemicals, scientific equipment, and so on are disappearing. New inventions and discoveries are vulgarized and their application spreads increasingly. The market is beginning to be saturated for some of these branches.

Insufficiency of outlets has continued to be compensated for by inflation of credit during the past several years, above all the public debt and loans to the non-imperialist countries which are also not members of OPEC (the total volume of these two categories of debts most probably increased by more than \$400,000 million during the three years 1974, 1975, and 1976).

5. We are not alone in emphasizing the effect of this "long wave" on the economic cycle. The September 3, 1976, issue of the *Bulletin of the Berliner Handels und Frankfurter Bank* devoted an interesting article to the interpretation of the hesitant economic recovery in the United States presented by the advocates of Kondratieff's theory of cycles. They draw particular attention to the fact that the lowest inventory level at the end of the recession (June 1975: \$263,000 million) was only \$10,000 million lower than the highest level (December 1974), a level reached again at the end of May 1976. This indicates both the extent of the glut (the crisis of overproduction) and the narrow limits of the devaluation of capital. Another confirmation of the reversal of the long wave, this time in West Germany, is that the average annual increase in productive capacity in industry was 6.1% between 1960 and 1965 and 3.9% between 1965 and 1970. The figure was only 1.8% in 1975 and 1.5% in 1976. (See A. Blechschmidt, "Perspektiven der Krisenentwicklung," in *Links*, November 1976.)

Hence the persistence of the depreciation of the paper money of the imperialist countries, in spite of all the pledges about the "top priority of the struggle against inflation." In fact, the austerity proclaimed in these countries under the pretext of the "struggle against inflation" is but an instrument for the redistribution of the national income at the expense of wages and to the advantage of capitalist profits, a means of making the working class pay the costs of the crisis and inflation.

True, the stagnation of the rate of surplus-value, a result of the "full employment" of the 1960s, has been broken down by the offensive of the employers and the universal "austerity" policy of bourgeois governments (whether "rightist" or "leftist") under the cover and threat of unemployment. But up to now the losses in real wages suffered by the working class have been only limited. The resistance of the class is growing progressively as the aggression intensifies. The upturn should encourage this resistance, although the massive structural unemployment is a serious handicap. The bourgeoisie has thus not succeeded in raising the rate of surplus-value sufficiently to compensate for the rise of the average organic composition of capital, freshly accentuated both by rationalization investments and by the increase in the cost of energy (and in the long run of all raw materials) compared to the level of the 1960s.

Insufficient devaluation of capital, insufficient increase in the rate of surplus-value, a working class driven onto the defensive but not beaten: such are the causes of a rise in the rate of profit that is still insufficient in the eyes of capital.<sup>6</sup> This is reflected in an upturn in the accumulation of capital, but an upturn insufficient to bring back the levels of the 1950s and 1960s. The great confrontations of the class struggle lie ahead of us, not behind us. And they will exert decisive influence on the destiny of the international capitalist economy.

November 1, 1976

6. To this must be added the negative (that is, retarding) effect of the persistent rate of inflation on the realization of investment projects. The trusts no longer carry these projects out unless they promise returns of 20%, 25%, or even 30% in current money. (*Business Week*, September 13, 1976.) We had predicted this effect in the book *Late Capitalism*.

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## FBI Informers Ordered to Leave Socialist Workers Party

By Diane Rupp

[The following article appeared in the November 26 issue of the *Militant*, a revolutionary-socialist newsweekly published in New York.]

\* \* \*

The Socialist Workers party has again forced an unprecedented retreat on the FBI.

The agency has ordered its field offices to urge their informers to get out of the SWP and Young Socialist Alliance.

This latest retreat was disclosed when Leonard Boudin, the socialists' attorney, questioned FBI Director Clarence Kelley for the SWP and YSA lawsuit against government harassment.

Syd Stapleton, an SWP leader who was present during Kelley's testimony, explained, "The fact is that Kelley was compelled to issue the order to informers on November 1 because he knew he was required to testify under oath in our suit on November 3."

The FBI chief knew he would face questions about the supposed halt to the FBI's "investigation" of the SWP announced by Washington in September. So on November 1, Kelley sent a teletype order to the FBI's fifty-nine field offices.

"Immediate," the teletype was labeled. A prominent note on the front page called attention to a postscript at the end of the order. The postscript warned agents: "NOTE: Mr. Kelley will be deposed in this lawsuit on 11/3/76, in Washington, D.C." That was a not-so-subtle explanation of why Kelley wanted the field offices to act and report back "no later than noon, 11/2/76."

The order told the Special Agents in Charge of field offices to "personally insure that all SWP/YSA cases in your office have been closed." They were also to "personally insure that the following statement is read as soon as possible to each informant who was furnishing information regarding SWP/YSA at the time these investigations were discontinued."

Kelley's message to informers in the SWP and YSA was, ". . . we suggest that you remove yourself from the SWP and YSA. . . ."

"You are not to report to the FBI information concerning the SWP, YSA, their chapters, leaders or members, nor are you to obtain any documents, copies of documents, any things, or other materials from the SWP, YSA, their leaders or members and furnish these to the FBI."

The SWP lawsuit has already exposed

### CIA to Continue Spying on SWP

[The following item appeared in the November 26 *Militant*.]

"We have noted that information disseminated by the CIA to the FBI indicates a significant link between the Socialist Workers Party and a foreign based political group," states a newly released memo from Attorney General Edward Levi to FBI head Clarence Kelley.

It's one of the escape clauses in the Justice Department's "termination order" for spying on the SWP.

"This type of information should be carefully watched to see whether in the future a reconsideration of this case is required," continues the September 9 memo. "Similarly, if new facts or circumstances emerge which change the character of the group's domestic conduct in such a way as to justify investigation, a reconsideration would be in order."

The above document was turned over to the SWP at the time of Kelley's questioning by the socialists' attorney November 3.

The SWP's "significant" international link—which Levi told Kelley to keep his eyes on while keeping his eyes off the SWP—is not the dark secret that the government pretends it is.

SWP National Secretary Jack Barnes testified about this matter under questioning by government attorneys in the socialists' lawsuit. He was asked about the Fourth International, the worldwide

Trotskyist organization the SWP collaborates with. Barnes said:

"Revolutionaries believe that you must have an international organization that can share the experiences of revolutionaries in every country and analyze and see the world as a whole, the interrelated developments, and the general trends."

He went on to explain that revolutionaries realize that parties must be developed in each country, each with its own leadership.

"The Fourth International believes in democracy. . .," Barnes said. "The main purpose of the Fourth International is to apply the Marxist program and analyze world politics as a whole, and to aid the construction of revolutionary parties in every single country."

Out of this, the CIA has fashioned a distorted justification for spying on SWP members and their cothinkers all over the world.

Political Rights Defense Fund spokesperson Wendy Lyons points out that CIA spying overseas is sacrosanct, as far as Congress and the courts are concerned.

"Our challenge to the CIA's operations will be strengthened by the latest admission that the agency is collecting information on the Socialist Workers party, a group that even the FBI admits is guilty of no crime," Lyons said.

"We intend to pursue this aspect of our suit to the end."

just how informers "obtain" materials. FBI informer Timothy Redfearn broke into YSA members' apartments to steal files. He was recently indicted for burglarizing the Denver SWP headquarters only last July.

The informers were also told to apply for a new job. "If you desire to furnish information concerning another matter," Kelley's message suggested, "you are encouraged to advise the FBI."

Why did the FBI take these new steps? Because earlier government attempts to convince the American people that the FBI has stopped its attacks on democratic rights have failed.

Since the socialists' lawsuit against government political police agencies was filed in 1973, it has uncovered a seemingly endless stream of FBI crimes: burglaries, disruption programs, illegal mail covers, wiretapping, poison-pen letters, and—as recently as last summer—black-bag jobs by informers.

Two months ago, the government took steps it hoped would stop this flood of revelations and mounting public outrage. On September 9 Attorney General Edward Levi ordered a halt to the FBI's domestic security investigation of the SWP and YSA.

But the SWP and YSA did not drop their

## Text of FBI Chief's Directive for Informers

[The following is the text of the teletype order sent by FBI Director Clarence Kelley to all field offices November 1, two days before he was to be questioned by attorneys for the Socialist Workers party. The teletype is headed "Immediate" and a prominent line at the bottom of the first page calls attention to the note at the end of the order. We have taken the text from the November 26 issue of the *Militant*.]

\* \* \*

Rebutels dated 9/13/76 and 9/23/76 [refers to earlier Kelley teletypes about the SWP and YSA]

Referenced communications instructed that investigations of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), their chapters, leaders and members were to be discontinued and that SWP/YSA informants were to be either directed to other investigations or closed.

At this time, I request that the following actions be taken: First, personally insure that all SWP/YSA cases in your office have been closed, and advise the bureau, Attention: General Investigative Division, no later than noon, 11/2/76, of this fact. Second, personally insure that the following statement is read as soon as possible to



Powell/News and Observer

each informant who was furnishing information regarding SWP/YSA at the time these investigations were discontinued.

"The FBI has terminated its investigations of the SWP, the YSA, their chapters and members, and any individuals or groups being investigated because of his (her) or its affiliation with the SWP or YSA. Thus, we suggest that you remove yourself from the SWP and YSA. You must no longer act in behalf of the FBI in regard to your membership in the SWP or YSA, related activities, or, contacts with SWP or YSA members.

"You are not to report to the FBI information concerning the SWP, YSA,

their chapters, leaders or members, nor are you to obtain any documents, copies of documents, any things, or other materials from the SWP, YSA, their leaders or members and furnish these to the FBI.

"Unless you have been redirected and are willing to furnish information concerning another investigation, you are to discontinue contact with the FBI. If in the future, however, a problem should arise because of your having furnished information to the FBI or if you desire to furnish information concerning another matter, you are encouraged to advise the FBI."

Advise the bureau, Attention: General Investigative Division, after you have been assured by contacting agents that the above statement has been read to each informant.

Your cooperation concerning this matter is appreciated. I am taking these extraordinary measures to assure all involved in this litigation, including the court, that the FBI's investigations of SWP/YSA are terminated in all respects.

NOTE: Mr. Kelley will be deposed in this lawsuit on 11/3/76, in Washington, D.C.

This teletype sets forth pertinent instructions to each SAC [Special Agent in Charge of the field office].

campaign against government crimes. Instead, they demanded that Levi's order be put into practice by removing the sixty-six informers the FBI admitted were in the SWP and YSA and by turning over the eight million pages of files the agency admitted having on the two organizations.

On September 13, Kelley sent an order to FBI field offices "closing" the case. When it became clear that Kelley's order would be made public through the lawsuit, the FBI chief sent another teletype "clarifying" his first message.

While claiming to end the case on the SWP as an *organization*, however, both these orders gave the FBI a go-ahead to continue investigating SWP *members*.

One Justice Department official admitted to the *Washington Post* that Kelley's instructions might be considered "a covert signal to continue pursuing the party."

In response to the socialists' demands that the FBI remove its informers, Justice Department spokesperson Robert Havel answered, "It will be up to them [the informers] to decide."

So, the SWP and YSA stepped up their demands to have the informers removed and the records made public.

The FBI faced not only the socialists' legal offensive, but growing public pressure as well. Editorial support came from newspapers and from magazines, such as the *Nation*. *The Nation* wrote:

"The investigation has supposedly been halted. . . . But in the light of Kelley's pledge to keep an eye on party members who are 'likely to use force of violence in violation of federal law,' and in view of the bureau's admission that it has sixty-six informants within the party, the SWP is understandably skeptical. . . .

"A court decision to unveil all the Timothy Redfearns within the SWP would be a giant victory for everyone who cares about the Constitution."

Endorsement of the lawsuit by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, approved by the union's International Executive Board in October, dramatized the broad support that the socialists' efforts were winning. These many supporters of civil liberties recognized that Levi's vague administrative order would not end FBI crimes.

The government had to do more in its attempt to restore the FBI's credibility and usefulness.

"The campaign against government surveillance and harassment that won this victory from the FBI must continue," Stapleton said. "The job is far from done.

"The FBI is still armed with the weapons it used to carry out its vendetta against our organizations—the eight million files it has on our members. We demand that these be turned over to us immediately," he said. "The American people have a right to know the full truth about the FBI's illegal operations against two legal political organizations."

Getting the complete FBI record on the socialists is an essential part of the socialists' campaign to prevent the government from renewing its attacks. There is still nothing to prevent the Justice Department from reopening the FBI "investigation" whenever it likes.

In addition, previously censored portions of Levi's September order to the FBI show that the CIA is continuing to spy on and harass the SWP.

The FBI, after all, is only one of Washington's political police agencies being sued by the socialists. In addition, there are the CIA, the Secret Service, Military Intelligence, the supersecret Na-

tional Security Agency, the post office, and civil service.

Another defendant is the Alcohol, Firearms and Tobacco Division of the Internal Revenue Service, which is currently trying to frame up trade unionists in Springfield, Massachusetts, on phony bomb conspiracy charges. This infamous unit has also used its informers and provocateurs to victimize Chicano activists.

"The government will simply have its informers reporting to other agencies instead of the FBI if they can get away

with it," Stapleton warned. "That is why we will continue our efforts to have the court call a halt to this kind of activity by any government agency."

Other evidence also shows that the government plans to continue its spying and disruption of dissenters. The Justice Department, for example, has decided to continue the FBI's "investigation" of the Communist party.

The CP, like the SWP, is a legal organization that the government admits has broken no laws.

As long as the government claims the right to "investigate"—a code word for harass—any legal political organization whatsoever, everyone's democratic rights are threatened.

The FBI retreat won by the SWP "shows that victories can be won by concerted effort with broad public support," Stapleton explained.

"It must be used as a stepping-stone in the fight to end all government restrictions on and interference with constitutional rights."

## Castro Denounces CIA Terror Campaign Against Cuba

Responsibility for the October 6 bombing of a Cuban passenger plane lies squarely with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro declared at an October 15 mass meeting of several hundred thousand persons in Havana. Seventy-three persons were killed when the sabotaged jet crashed off the coast of Barbados.

"At first, we had doubts as to whether the CIA had directly organized the act of sabotage or had carefully worked it out through its cover organizations made up of Cuban counterrevolutionaries," Castro said. "Now, we definitely favor the first idea: the CIA participated directly in the destruction of the Cubana airliner in Barbados."

Castro pointed out that the plane crash came in the context of a series of terrorist acts carried out against Cuba in the preceding months:

"• April 6. Pirate boats from Florida attacked two fishing boats, the *Ferro 119* and *Ferro 123*, causing the death of fisherman Bienvenido Mauriz and heavy damage to the boats.

"• April 22. A bomb was placed in the Cuban embassy in Portugal, causing the death of two comrades and serious injuries to several others; the offices were completely destroyed.

"• July 5. The Cuban mission at the UN was the object of an attack with explosives, resulting in considerable material damage.

"• July 9. A bomb exploded in Jamaica in the cart carrying baggage for a Cubana Airlines flight minutes before the baggage was to be loaded.

"• July 10. A bomb exploded in the offices of British West Indies Airways in Barbados. That airlines represents the interests of Cubana Airlines in Barbados.

"• July 23. Artagnán Díaz Díaz, a technician of the National Institute of Fishing, was murdered when an attempt was made to kidnap the Cuban consul in Mérida.

"• August 9. Two officials of the Cuban embassy in Argentina were kidnapped;



CASTRO

nothing has been heard of them since.

"• August 18. A bomb exploded in the offices of Cubana Airlines in Panama causing considerable damage."

"Those responsible for these crimes," Castro pointed out, "travel everywhere with impunity; they have unlimited financial resources; they use U.S. passports as naturalized citizens of that country or real or false papers from many other countries; and they use the most sophisticated methods of terror and crime.

"Who, if not the CIA, under the protection of the conditions of domination and impunity which the imperialists have established in this hemisphere, could do such things?"

Referring to the reports linking the attack on the Cubana plane to Cuban counterrevolutionaries living in Venezuela, Castro said, "There is no doubt that the territory of Venezuela was used for the preparation of the act of sabotage in its final stage, and there's no doubt, either,

that the perpetrators of the horrible crime are Venezuelan citizens. . . .

"It is true that there is a group of notorious Cuban counterrevolutionaries in Venezuela who have some access to certain political circles."

However, Castro continued, "The recruiting of citizens from foreign countries and the use of other countries' territories for acts of this kind are typical methods of the CIA." The CIA used Nicaragua and Guatemala as staging grounds for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, he pointed out.

Castro also took up the question of the so-called Coordinación de las Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas (CORU—Commando of United Revolutionary Organizations) and its role in the terrorist attacks.

"In nearly every case, the terrorist organizations that are based in the United States . . . especially the five that make up CORU—have taken credit."

Such groups "publicly proclaim their crimes and announce that there will be new criminal acts," he said. As an example, he cited a "war communiqué" reporting the blowing up of a car outside the Cuban embassy in Colombia and the destruction of the Air Panama offices. The "communiqué," published in a Miami newspaper in August, announced: "We will soon be attacking planes in flight." It was signed by the five Miami-based terrorist organizations that make up CORU.

"It would not be surprising to learn that these same individuals were responsible for the murder of Chilean former Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier," he added. (Letelier was murdered in Washington, D.C., September 21, by a bomb placed in his automobile.)

But what must be kept in mind, Castro pointed out, is the "well-known fact that, every time the CIA hatched a plot against Cuba . . . it always sought to conceal its activities under the cloak of specific Cuban counterrevolutionary organizations. It is impossible to list all the names and acronyms which this sinister Yankee organization has created." □



### PQ Ousts Liberal Party in Québec Elections

By Art Young

[The following article appeared in the November 22 issue of *Labor Challenge*, a revolutionary-socialist fortnightly published in Toronto.]

\* \* \*

There was dancing in the streets of East-End Montréal when the results of the Québec election came in on the evening of Nov. 15.

As the defeat of one cabinet minister after another was announced, French-language television viewers could hear the jubilant cheering of television technicians in the background.

At the news of the Parti Québécois [PQ—Québec party] victory, French-speaking Montrealers poured out of their houses and paraded through the streets carrying the Québec flag and Parti Québécois banners, exchanging “V-for-victory” and clenched-fist salutes.

Ten thousand PQ supporters crammed a victory rally in the Paul Sauvé arena. The arena resounded with nationalist songs and chants of “Le Québec aux Québécois” (Québec for the Quebeckers).

What did the defeat of the hated Liberal government of Robert Bourassa mean to them? The message was plain. It is time for national rights, time for social justice, time for a profound change and for rapid action.

But the masses of working people who elected the PQ are far from victory.

The Parti Québécois is committed to defend big business rule, to oppose the rights of the labor movement, and to oppose the key demands of the Québécois for national rights. Whatever concessions the PQ government may be forced to grant, the masses of Québécois will now have to face the reality of the Parti Québécois—a party firmly opposed to their rights and their demands.

#### Liberals Crushed

The Liberals were crushed, winning twenty-eight seats to the PQ's sixty-nine. (In 1973 the Liberals took 102 of the 110 seats.) Even Bourassa lost his own riding to the PQ.

It was a bitter pill for [Prime Minister Pierre Elliot] Trudeau, who six years ago unleashed the War Measures Act and jailed hundreds of Québécois without charges in an attempt to intimidate and bury the growing nationalist movement. Not long ago Trudeau declared, “Separa-

tism is dead.” Now a party promising to take Québec out of Confederation holds office in Québec City.

The feeling against the Bourassa regime was so strong that one of the Liberals' own candidates described Bourassa as the most despised man in Québec.

Economic issues weighed heavily in most voters' minds: record high unemployment, expected to get worse; continuing inflation combined with wage controls; an anticipated budget deficit of more than \$1 billion; taxes among the highest in the country; a series of scandals involving the inept and corrupt squandering of public funds.

Bourassa alienated the unions with his antilabor legislation, union busting, and poor contract offers. All three major labor federations opposed the Liberals, supporting the PQ in one form or another.

In face of the mounting conflict over the privileged status of the English language in Québec, the Bourassa regime had attempted to play French and English against each other. Its Law 22 purported to make French the official language of Québec; yet it changed nothing of substance and alienated the large immigrant community, making it the scapegoat for Québec's Anglicization.

Bourassa lost the support not only of those who defend the rights of Québécois to live and work in French, but of a significant part of the English-language chauvinist element. English-language and immigrant voters gave substantial support to the Union Nationale [National Union], which promised to abolish the language law in order to remove any limitations on the expansion of the privileged English-language education system.

#### Independence Issue

But in the absence of a viable labor alternative, the election was largely a two-way race between the Liberals and the Parti Québécois opposition. The PQ played down its stand for independence during the campaign, substituting a promise of a referendum to convince voters that they could elect the PQ without voting for immediate independence.

Trudeau, among others, seized on this to declare that the new PQ administration has a mandate only to govern Québec as a province within Canada, and not to take it out of Confederation.

Yet while it is true that the election was not a plebiscite on independence, Trudeau

and the other federalist politicians can derive little comfort from the outcome of the vote.

In the final weeks of the campaign, Bourassa staked everything on a massive scare campaign against “separatism.” In the two previous elections it worked. This time the scare campaign was on an even higher scale, and more strident. But there was no sign that PQ support fell off as the independence question came to the fore.

A *Toronto Star* reporter at the joyous PQ victory celebration on election night wrote: “While a referendum is still required for the Parti Québécois to proceed towards independence, anyone standing in the arena last night couldn't help but wonder about the accuracy of polls showing only 18 percent in favor of a separate Québec.

“Every mention of independence drew a roar. A report that Ontario Premier William Davis claimed the PQ's massive win was not a defeat for Canada drew hoots of derision and renewed chants of, ‘It's only a beginning.’”

#### Instability, Rising Tensions

What will happen now?

The masses who elected the PQ—workers, students, and other nationalist-minded discontented layers of the population—expect the new government to take measures that will substantially improve their lives. They expect national equality and better living conditions. But PQ leaders have made it clear that they intend merely to rule more honestly and efficiently than the Liberals, introducing a number of quite limited reforms.

Without challenging the domination of Québec by foreign, English-speaking imperialism, it will be impossible for the PQ to meet the expectations of its supporters. The PQ takes office in the context of a stagnant economic situation that leaves little margin for costly reform projects within the capitalist framework.

The Québécois are entering a new, richer, and more intense political experience as a result of the PQ victory. They have high expectations of [the new Québec Premier René] Lévesque and his cabinet. But as the PQ increasingly reveals its real character, illusions in it will dissipate, producing heightened tensions within the party and clashes between the PQ and the labor and nationalist movements.

Larger numbers of Québécois will come to understand that a PQ government cannot advance their interests, and that they need a workers government to lead the struggle for an independent and socialist Québec. Pressure will grow on the unions to break from the PQ in this direction by launching their own mass labor party.

The prospect of the referendum on independence will bring into sharp focus all aspects of the national oppression of Québec, as the debate grows on how to

overcome that oppression.

There is no question that the PQ's overwhelming victory is a severe setback for the plans of Canada's rulers. They need to take new measures to attempt to firm up their control of Québec. Their alarmed statements reflect their fear not of the Parti Québécois but of the mass nationalist and prolabor sentiment that brought it

to office.

Trudeau told the House of Commons November 16 that he remains dedicated to an "inseparable Canada, a Canada which is indivisible," and that he has no intention of negotiating "any form of separatism" with Québec.

These are ominous words coming from the man who ordered troops into Québec

during the War Measures Crisis.

English Canadians should reject Trudeau's approach. They should affirm their belief that the Québécois have the right to decide their own fate, free of pressure and threats from outside Québec. As an oppressed nation, the Québécois must be able to take whatever measures they feel necessary to free themselves. □

## A Further Shift in the Relationship of Forces

# The American Left and the Presidential Election

By David Frankel

For the past year the preliminary jockeying in the presidential election campaign and the campaign itself have been at the center of American politics. The question of how to take advantage of the elections to reach the American people was posed for every group on the American left.

The Trotskyists in the Socialist Workers party (SWP) ran their own presidential ticket, along with more than seventy state and local candidates. (See *Intercontinental Press*, October 11, p. 1438.) Through its campaign activity the SWP:

- Distributed some two million pieces of socialist literature—a figure that does not include literature produced by local campaign committees.
- Obtained ballot status in twenty-eight states.
- Gained hours of radio and television time to explain its program, and reached millions of persons as a result of articles on the socialist campaign in major dailies around the country.
- Addressed hundreds of meetings of trade unionists, Black and Chicano activists, students, and women's liberationists on the need for a working-class alternative to the two capitalist parties.

What did the rest of the American left do?

### CP Adopts a More Flexible Approach

The only other significant campaign run by a group on the left was that of the Communist party (CP), which put forward a presidential ticket of party leader Gus Hall and former CP youth leader Jarvis Tyner. Hall and Tyner announced a goal of achieving ballot status in some thirty states. Although they were actually successful in twenty states, this still represented the biggest electoral effort by the Stalinists in decades.

The CP did run presidential campaigns in 1968 and 1972, but its 1976 campaign was still something of a novelty. The 1968

campaign was simply a token effort, and the Stalinist ticket that year was on the ballot in only two states. Before that campaign, the CP gave its support to the Democratic party presidential contenders, backing Johnson in 1964, Kennedy in 1960, and Stevenson in 1952 and 1956.

Independent working-class political action was one of the traditions abandoned by the American Stalinists when Stalin made his turn to the policy of the popular front in the mid-1930s. The Stalinist policy of forming governmental coalitions with the capitalists was translated in the United States into support for the Democratic party and Roosevelt's New Deal. Brief detours from this pro-Democratic party line occurred during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact in 1939, and during the opening stages of the cold war, when the CP supported the short-lived Progressive party of Henry Wallace, a third bourgeois party, in the 1948 election.

The phony campaign run by the CP in 1968 was not a departure from this tradition. It was meant merely to relieve some of the pressure on the ranks of the CP as a result of the SWP presidential campaign that year. But in 1972, the Stalinists were forced to respond to a new development.

This was the era of détente. Richard Nixon traveled to Moscow in May 1971, and welcomed Soviet CP chief Brezhnev to Washington the following year. And the Kremlin made no secret of its preference for Nixon in the 1972 election. A dispatch from Moscow in the October 5, 1972, *Los Angeles Times* noted that Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny "came very close to endorsing the reelection of President Nixon."

The CP's old policy of simply backing the Democratic party presidential ticket was no longer tenable. A more flexible approach was needed.

Outright support to Nixon was ruled out. It would have cost the Stalinists too much

on the domestic political scene. Instead, the CP handled its dilemma by running its own campaign in 1972, dressing up its move as a shift to the left.

In a postelection report to the CP's Central Committee in December 1972, Gus Hall declared, "The Left forces should seek to turn the independent forces away from trying to become an opposition within the Democratic Party. . . ."

"The moment is ripe for active steps toward organizing a mass, working-class-based anti-monopoly party."

This type of talk also helped the Stalinists cope with the growing pressure being exerted by the SWP election campaign. However, what was involved was merely a tactical turn, not any change in strategy. The tactic of running open CP campaigns was conceived of as an adjunct to the overall class-collaborationist perspective of the Stalinists.

Hall made this clear in his 1972 report, saying that the "policies of the Party must be carried out with thought and with common sense. . . . For instance, we must not do what the Trotskyites do in elections. . . ."

Especially grating to Hall was the refusal of the SWP to support the liberal Democratic party politicians backed by the Stalinists. He cited Black Democrat Louis Stokes and New York Democratic party operator Bella Abzug as examples, accusing the SWP of "picking election campaigns such as those of Stokes, Abzug and others, but especially campaigns where there are Black candidates, and running Trotskyite candidates specifically against them—against Black, liberal, working-class candidates."

Talk about supposedly "independent," or even "working-class candidates" inside the Democratic party was always the way the Stalinists justified their support to capitalist politicians. But after decades of being buried inside the Democratic party, the switch to running independent CP cam-

paigns in addition to supporting liberal capitalists in the Democratic party was not easy for many in the CP.

"My guess," Hall said, "is that 30 per cent, maybe 40 per cent, of Communists did not vote for the Communist Presidential ticket. In some areas it may be even higher." Moreover, Hall added, many of those in the CP Central Committee also failed to vote for their leader.

The CP's 1976 election campaign was an extension of the tactic worked out in 1972. Although the Kremlin leaned to Ford, it was well aware that a Carter victory would make little difference in its relations with Washington. The CP therefore ran its own campaign around the theme of détente.

This perspective was spelled out by Hall in a report to the CP leadership in March. "The U.S. policies of support for detente continue," he said, "but under the pressures of the election campaign there is hesitation and retreat. . . .

"We must expose the charge that detente has been a one-way street.

" . . . even if we limit our electoral work to this debate, it would be reason enough for us to go all-out in this campaign. The campaign provides a great opportunity to expose this imperialist demagoguery."

An unwary reader would assume from the CP's material on the 1976 election that it had renounced support to the Democratic party. "Votes for Carter or Ford only make it easier for big business to carry out its anti-labor, racist offensive, piling the burdens of inflation and economic hardships on the masses of people," an editorial in the October 30 *Daily World* declared.


"End the corporations' monopoly of the elections! That is the big issue in this election—the key to successful battles against inflation and racism, for jobs and peace.

"A vote for either Carter or Ford is also a vote for the two-party system—for the undemocratic, prison-like monopolization of the elections. Whether Carter or Ford is elected, neither would 'run' the country. Big business does that, as matters now stand. Who wants four more years of that?"

On November 3, the day after the election, another *Daily World* editorial stated, "The people did not find what they want in the two-party system. All the more reason to build a viable independent political instrument. The people are ready to fight for what they so urgently need, but that requires a political vehicle independent of big business control. Until they get it, the people will be at the mercy of the big business-dominated two-party system with its Tweedledee-Tweedledum candidates."

In fact, the CP's rhetoric was belied by its actions. It continued to support Democratic party candidates in numerous state and local races.

For example, in discussing the Democratic party primary election in California the CP's West Coast weekly said in its



CP CANDIDATE GUS HALL

June 5 issue, "The effective campaign of Tom Hayden has already put pro-monopoly, anti-labor incumbent candidate Senator John Tunney on the defensive. California would make a contribution to the nation by rejecting the old politics of Tunney with the new politics of someone effective, humane and articulate like Hayden."

When Hayden lost the Democratic party nomination, the Stalinists gave backhanded support to Tunney, warning of "the problem posed in the U.S. Senatorial race by ultra-rightist S.I. Hayakawa. . . ." (*People's World*, October 9.)

Although the Stalinists talk about the need for "a viable independent political instrument," and "the big business-dominated two-party system," they remain opposed to the independence of the working class from all capitalist politics. They call for an "antimonopoly coalition"—a coalition that would include the supposedly progressive, "antimonopoly" wing of the American capitalist class. That is what they mean by "a political vehicle independent of big business control."

But the CP had to make a pretense of favoring independent working-class political action in order to compete with the SWP. Increasingly, the Trotskyists are being seen as the most important group claiming the mantle of socialism.

Most of the CP's campaign activity was an attempt to offset this fact. Even the CP's target of getting on the ballot in thirty states was conceived of in the context of an SWP ballot drive aiming at the same number.

In his March report, Hall complained about the pace of the CP ballot drive. He insisted that "by far the biggest obstacle is in the Party. One has to take into consideration the unusually bad weather and the flu, but I don't think that explains the sluggishness. The basic problem is that we have not politically convinced the Party. The root of the weakness is in the leading cadre."

One advantage that the Stalinists did have was money. In the final months of the campaign they spent tens of thousands of dollars buying radio and television time to plug their ticket. However, the CP campaign was never able to overcome the impact made by the Trotskyists.

This was particularly evident in the breadth of the endorsements gained by the SWP campaign, which were far greater than those obtained by the CP. Endorsers of the Camejo-Reid ticket included many of the most respected Chicano leaders in the country; antiwar activists like Daniel and Philip Berrigan; Black leaders like Robert F. Williams and Robert Allen; numerous activists in the women's liberation movement; and figures like film maker Emile de Antonio, Nobel Prize winner Salvador E. Luria, and authors Howard Zinn and Walter and Miriam Schneir.

#### Defending American Menshevism

The attractiveness of the SWP campaign was also a problem for the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee (DSOC), the Social Democratic tendency led by Michael Harrington. An author and professor, Harrington is perhaps the best known socialist in the United States today.

The DSOC was formed as a result of a split in the American Social Democracy. One wing formed the Social Democrats, USA. This group is linked to the most hardened, reactionary section of the American trade-union bureaucracy. Two of its heroes are AFL-CIO\* President George Meany and American Federation of Teachers President Albert Shanker.

Social Democrats, USA, opposes détente from the right, and has helped to spearhead the struggle against preferential hiring and admissions policies designed to offset discrimination against oppressed minorities and women. In the election, it first supported the candidacy of Senator Henry Jackson, later switching to Carter.

The DSOC looks to a more liberal and

\*American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, the country's trade-union confederation.

"enlightened" section of the trade-union bureaucracy, exemplified by the leadership of the United Auto Workers. Unlike the pro-Meany Social Democrats, the DSOC appeals to radicalizing youth and is involved in some struggles.

"I intend to vote for Carter and to work as hard as I can for his election," Harrington wrote in the fall issue of *Dissent* magazine.

"Ford's election would be a catastrophe. Carter's election could be a point of departure. The trade unionists, minorities, feminists, and reformers would be in movement the day after a Carter victory and in paralysis the day after a Ford victory."

An article by Jack Clark in the DSOC's *Newsletter of the Democratic Left* defended support to Carter by arguing, "Carter's victory will be totally inadequate for the country and for the Left. But Carter's defeating Ford is an absolute precondition for social progress in the next four years."

But as the campaign went on this line became progressively harder for many of those in and around DSOC to swallow. The attractiveness of the socialist alternative put forward by the SWP was brought home by an article in the *New York Village Voice*—a prominent liberal weekly—commenting favorably on SWP senatorial candidate Marcia Gallo. This was followed by a letter from eleven women on the *Voice* staff in which they declared their endorsement of Gallo.

Harrington was faced with the possibility that many in DSOC and in the DSOC periphery would vote for Camejo and Reid. As a result, he agreed to debate Camejo on the eve of the election. He also may have feared that in a close race in New York—as was then expected—the SWP ticket might take enough votes from Carter to make the difference in whether he could carry the state. The debate was broadcast twice on WBAI, a New York listener-sponsored radio station.

"In an America in which Gerald Ford is within a hair of winning the presidency of the United States, to talk about revolutionary and cataclysmic possibilities, which is what the SWP does, is to talk, in my opinion, fantasy," Harrington said. He presented what he himself called a defense of "American Menshevism" against the revolutionary perspective of the SWP.

The response to the debate from listeners who called the station after the broadcast was symptomatic of the changing attitudes of many radicals and even liberals. Although most said that they voted for Carter, many were already feeling bad about it and saying that their heart was with Camejo. The SWP campaign was seen as the expression of the revolutionary alternative—an alternative that is winning more and more respect.

Another development that reflected the

standing of the SWP on the left was the wide support won by the Camejo-Reid ticket in the Chicano movement. This included the endorsement of the New Mexico Raza Unida party, which organized a tour for Camejo in that state and campaigned actively in support of the SWP ticket.

### Maoists Sit Out the Election

While the Trotskyists, the pro-Moscow Stalinists, and the Social Democrats all intervened in the election campaign with their own programs, the American Maoists played no independent role at all. They were simply not a factor in the election.

All of the major Maoist factions called for a boycott of the presidential election. The editorial in the October 20 issue of the *Guardian* newspaper under the headline "Don't vote, it only legitimizes them," was typical.

The Maoists simply continued with their routine activities throughout the election period, making no special efforts to reach the American people with socialist propaganda, or even with their calls for a boycott of the election. In fact, the boycott position had nothing to do with the needs of the American working class or the demands of the American class struggle. Its only purpose was to get the Maoists off the hook, since otherwise they would have had to either back Carter or give critical support to the SWP or CP campaigns.

"As to the CP and the SWP," the editors of the *Guardian* wrote, "both of these parties are so riddled with reformism that a vote for either—far from being a 'protest'—is in essence an accommodation to the capitalist system. Both are based on the proposition that capitalism can be made to 'work.' A vote for either is a vote against class struggle and can only serve to hold back the urgent task of bringing into being a genuine revolutionary party of the working class."

Also refraining from any active intervention in the election were most of the sectarian groups on the American left. The International Socialists, a tendency that claims that the Soviet Union is a bureaucratic collectivist state ruled by a new exploiting class, ran an editorial in the November 1 issue of its newspaper saying, "We say, don't vote, or cast a blank ballot by closing the curtain and opening it again."

The editorial was titled, "election '76 VOTE NO!" with a subhead, "It's Time to Build a Working Class Alternative." But the only working-class tendencies running in the election were never mentioned, much less supported.

At least the Spartacist League—a small sect claiming to be Trotskyist—took note of the existence of a working-class alternative in the election. But while admitting that the SWP and CP were both part of the working-class movement, the Spartacists

refused to support either campaign. The group's newspaper declared in an October 29 article, "... capitalism can be reformed. This is the consistent and fundamental message of the campaigns of the SWP's Peter Camejo and the CP's Gus Hall, the reformist left's Tweedledee and Tweedledum lookalikes. . . ."

Proof of the SWP's reformism was that "the SWP has virtually become a darling of the media with its civil libertarian propaganda surrounding its anti-FBI court suit."

Abstention was also the stance taken by the Workers World party, another sect. The American followers of Gerry Healy, organized in the Workers League, did their best to ignore the Camejo-Reid campaign as well. They focused on their own local campaigns.

However, in the October 29 issue of its newspaper, the *Bulletin*, the Workers League finally called for a vote for the SWP candidates. It must have taken considerable reflection for them to take this stand, since according to their ongoing slander campaign the SWP is led by accomplices of the Stalinist secret police and collaborators in the murder of Leon Trotsky.

*Spark*, the newspaper of the American group affiliated with the French Trotskyists of Lutte Ouvrière, gave critical support to the SWP.

A bizarre sidelight in the campaign was the role of the National Caucus of Labor Committees (NCLC). This right-wing group, which ran a presidential ticket under the name of the U.S. Labor party, is often misidentified by the mass media as a Marxist group.

On the eve of the election, the NCLC won a government decision requiring one of the three major television networks to sell it a half hour of prime evening time on national television. Representatives of the NCLC brought a paper bag filled with \$95,000 in small bills into the network offices to pay for the telecast. NCLC candidate Lyndon Larouche claimed that a victory for Carter would lead to thermonuclear war by October 1977 unless a large vote for the NCLC deterred this. He also praised the many "honest Republicans" voting for Ford.

\* \* \*

Overall, the 1976 election campaign indicated a further shift in the relationship of forces on the American left. Every group on the left had to take account of the SWP campaign and define its own position in relation to it. The SWP's impact on the election was far greater than that of any other tendency.

Although Stalinism and Social Democracy remain the main opponents of the SWP in the working-class movement, never before have the Trotskyists been in such a favorable position. □

## Portuguese Social Democrats Chart Rightward Course

By Gerry Foley

In the first two weeks of November, the Portuguese Socialist party, the SP youth, and the Communist party held congresses. In each case, the reformist leaderships reconfirmed their willingness to help run the government for the capitalists.

The CP leaders couched their proposals in more left-sounding language, partly at least because they have been excluded from the cabinet. But Stalinist General Secretary Alvaro Cunhal fundamentally used the familiar argument that the bourgeoisie needs the CP in order to run the government effectively. "Democracy cannot be built in Portugal without the Communist Party and much less against it," he said in his closing speech.

None of these three mass organizations offer leadership to the workers and peasants who face an offensive by the bosses and landlords. Instead, they serve as a transmission belt in the workers movement for the stepped-up pressure from the Portuguese bourgeoisie and the other imperialist powers.

### Confrontation at SP Congress

The offensive against the Portuguese workers was clearly reflected in the SP congress. The SP is the largest workers party. It has been encharged with running the government for the bourgeoisie. To do its job, the Soares leadership now has to crush all those elements susceptible to pressure from the workers and poor masses.

The "all inclusive" SP was buried at this congress. On the opening day, Soares was quoted by *Jornal Novo* as saying: "A party gains strength by purging itself of bad elements."

The Soares leadership set out to crush the very sections of the party that played an essential role in building the SP during the revolutionary upsurge and enabled it to compete with the CP, which began with a much larger base of activists and far greater influence in the factories and in the countryside.

Now the SP leadership has to dragoon the entire party into defending the Soares government's policy of austerity and "restoration of order" in the factories and the countryside. Such a line conflicts with the immediate interests of SP activists engaged in mass work.

Soares must force SP unionists, youth leaders, and local organizers to pay the price for the party's unpopular policies. And that could not be expected to be easy.



SOARES

The stage was set for a confrontation at the SP congress over the weekend of October 30-November 1.

Facing an unrelenting attack by the leadership, the left wing was forced to present its own slate (List B) in the elections for the National Committee. It got 210 votes, as against 610 for the leadership's slate (List A).

According to the proportional representation system used, List B got 39 representatives on the National Committee, as opposed to 112 for the Soares slate. However, no representatives of the minority slate were included in the National Secretariat or in the Executive Committee elected on the weekend following the congress. Thus, the left was in fact excluded from the SP leadership.

The comment by *Jornal Novo*, which has become an undisguised representative of the Confederation of Portuguese Industry, was, "from now on Mário Soares will have a strong and cohesive Socialist executive, able to carry forward the party's work of supporting the government's policies."

Within two weeks after the SP congress, the Soares leadership had made it clear that it has no intention of tolerating a

minority that will not support the government's attacks on the workers and the rural working people. It opened up a campaign to purge the SP's labor fractions, where the supporters of List B have been concentrated.

### Soares Throws SP Left to Wolves

In its November 6 issue, *Jornal Novo* reported that the national leadership of the SP's labor commissions had been suspended on Soares's orders. The article was written in a way that fitted in with the witch-hunt campaign this capitalist newspaper launched against the SP left in the week preceding the congress:

After the party congress, the national Labor Commission tried to hold meetings last Tuesday and Thursday with the factory nuclei so as to continue its campaign opposing the party line. In these meetings, which were not authorized by the general secretary, the Labor Commission even tried to carry out a "reorganization," removing elements that supported the majority slate in the congress. . . .

It is known moreover that members of the Labor Commission, such as Carmelinda Pereira, Maria Iaressema, Florival Nobre, and José Luís Mendes [who headed List B] are trying to continue their campaign against the party line in the SP rank-and-file bodies, especially in the factory nuclei.

Soares appointed the minister of labor, Marcelo Curto, to direct the labor commissions. Apparently the discussion in these SP labor groups became heated. In a Lisbon-wide meeting November 10, supporters of List B presented the following resolution:

The members of nuclei and coordinating committees are surprised that meetings called according to standard procedure for Thursday (November 4) and Tuesday (November 9) were prevented from taking place by Comrade Marcelo Curto, who disgracefully called on security forces, who used toxic gas. [*Jornal Novo*, November 11.]

The resolution noted that the SP congress had decided there would be no changes in the party's structures before a special conference called for January to review the statutes. According to *Jornal Novo*, the resolution was booed by a majority of those present.

The capitalist and right-wing Social Democratic press has done its best to create an atmosphere in which the left wing of the SP can be howled down. The bias in *Jornal Novo's* reports on the SP

Congress was particularly blatant.

The left-wing speakers were supposed to have delivered "furious attacks on the government's economic and political policies, a peroration against the 'big capitalists and landlords, all linked to Salazar and Caetano.'" In their frenzy, they were supposed to have attacked "even Mário Soares."

The left wing was supposed to be "submarines" that were finally surfacing in the SP. But there was never any explanation of what precisely these "submarines" represented, or how they had managed to submerge in the SP.

The leaders of the left wing were portrayed as beady-eyed fanatics, while the article referred to Soares as "smiling and calm."

The opposition was said to include "elements already removed from the SP local federations." It was supposed to be confined to Lisbon. The article featured a statement from an unnamed northern delegate, who was quoted as saying: "In order for Lisbon to live well, the rest of the country has had to tighten its belt."

Hidden under all this elaborate stage managing, some of the themes stressed by the opposition speakers did emerge. José Luis Mendes reportedly appealed to the party not to yield to the pressures of the Confederation of Portuguese Industry or the Portuguese Farmers Confederation, a right-wing group manipulated by the big landlords. This latter organization has made the SP minister of agriculture, Lopes Cardoso, the special target of a furious red-baiting campaign. A leader of the SP youth in the university town of Coimbra denounced the massive firings of teachers by the right-wing SP minister of education, Sottomayor Cardia.

In another article in the same November 2 issue of *Jornal Novo*, the presentation of an opposition slate for the National Committee elections was described as a "theatrical stroke, reminiscent of Manuel Serra's coup two years ago."

Serra led a split when his faction did not get the number of posts in the leadership it thought it was entitled to. After leaving the SP, it formed a crudely opportunist centrist group called the Socialist People's Front, which served only as a pawn in the CP's attacks on the democratic rights of the SP in 1975.

It was Serra's group, for example, that led the attack on SP marchers at Lisbon's Estadio Primeiro de Maio on May 1, 1975, the incident that marked the beginning of the campaign against the SP by the Stalinists and the Gonçalves faction of the Armed Forces Movement. *Jornal Novo's* comparison of the SP left, which played a leading role in the mass demonstrations that turned back the attacks on the party, with Serra's group was slanderous.

The fact that the right-wing SP leaders have not defended the left wing against this witch-hunt whipped up by the bourgeois press, the fact that they have

connived in it, shows how disloyal they are to the party rank and file. In this way they have shown how ready they are to throw to the rightist wolves the very activists on whose backs they climbed into their ministerial chairs.

#### SP Unionists Pushed to Wall

*Jornal Novo* itself said that the SP opposition tried up till the last minute to arrive at a compromise with Soares. "It is



KISSINGER

known that right up to the eve, there was an attempt to put together a common slate. But the negotiations failed. The reason for the break was the government's economic policy . . . and the draft statutes eliminating the Labor Commission." The law allowing capitalists to fire workers was reportedly one of the main sticking points for the left wing.

Even before the congress, the most important SP-led unions issued statements denouncing the firings law. On October 22, the Bank Workers Union of South Portugal and the Islands issued a release saying:

In the name of "concern for safeguarding the job security expressly guaranteed by the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic," they are introducing into labor law the principle that a worker can be fired after an oral examination and summary without the least possibility for defending himself or herself. The right not to be condemned without the opportunity to defend yourself is one that antifascist democrats have always fought for. We ask, what is more grave than to arbitrarily deprive a worker of his or her inalienable right to a job?

The Lisbon Retail Clerks Union issued a statement that concluded: "Down with the law on firings. Forward for the defense of the workers' gains."

The opposition among SP workers to the firings law was apparently so strong that the Soares leadership preferred to avoid debate on this question during the congress.

In the congress, one of the leading SP unionists and one of those heading up List B, José Luís Gaspar, president of the

Lisbon Office Workers Union, stressed the party's responsibility to the workers who supported it:

It is our responsibility to open up a future for the working people of this country . . . to protect the workers from unemployment, poverty, and ignorance through a fundamental reorganization of the economy, through a plan agreed on by the workers and supervised by them, to prevent the bosses from regaining their domination and their old privileges and from coercing the workers. The ones who should pay are those who for years and years reduced working-class families and the youth, the entire population, to poverty and despair, that is, the capitalists and the landlords.

#### Wall Street Tightens the Screws

What forced the left to come out openly against Soares is that he intends to press his offensive against the workers and rural poor. If he is to administer a government of the Portuguese bourgeoisie at this time, he has no choice. The country's exchange reserves are exhausted. The world economic crisis and the economic sabotage of the Portuguese capitalists, along with the pressures brought to bear by foreign capitalists, have thrown Portugal's economy into chaos.

But capitalist reconsolidation is inevitably going to mean brutal blows against the working people. The sections of the party closest to the masses cannot defend such a policy.

The SP is set so firmly on a rightward course that even the left face of the Soares leadership, Lopes Cardoso, was forced to resign. In his statement of resignation, published in the November 11 issue of *Portugal Socialista*, he indicated the dilemma of the SP leaders identified with the former policy of riding the wave of the mass upsurge:

Of course, the general secretary and I do not differ on the program of our party, we . . . do not differ on the broad objectives of the government. The same, however, cannot be said as regards the tactics to be adopted.

Tactical differences are not so grave in a party . . . that does not want to be monolithic . . . but this is not true in a government. In the present circumstances especially, the government has to be homogeneous in order to function.

Since both Soares and Lopes Cardoso are reformists and have no intention of abolishing capitalism, it may be imagined what the tactical differences were about.

The Lisbon daily *Página Um* reported that before leaving office, Lopes Cardoso told his journalistic contacts that there were only two possible policies for defeating the CP in the radical farming area of Alentejo, his policy or repression. He allegedly said that Soares would be obliged to follow his policy since the prime minister could not take the repressive option.

It is true that it would be difficult for Soares to turn to repression as the main means of dealing with the peasant movement in Alentejo. But he has clearly opted

to make concessions to the landlords at the expense of the rural working people. That means less state support for peasants and laborers who occupy lands and set up cooperatives. It also inevitably means more repression. It is impossible to push back the gains of the workers and rural working people without using force to some degree.

In fact, the resolution put before the Lisbon SP factory nuclei November 10 indicates that the Soares leadership has already resorted to using police measures against the party's left wing.

The West European Social Democratic parties sent high-powered delegations to the Portuguese SP congress, including such figures as Willy Brandt; François Mitterrand; Olof Palme; Felipe González, head of the Spanish Social Democrats; and Austrian Prime Minister Bruno Kreisky. Most put their weight behind Soares.

### Lure of Big Money

Other support for Soares's right-wing course came to light after the conclusion of the congresses of the SP and the SP youth. On November 16, Washington announced that it was extending a \$300 million emergency aid loan to Portugal. The same day, Kissinger said that Washington would contribute 30 percent of a \$1.5 billion aid package to be provided by a consortium of the major Western capitalist countries.

Soares's prospects for continuing to administer the government for the Portuguese capitalists depend on massive aid. The only other way the capitalists can defend their profits is by launching an all-out attack on the workers, and for that an SP government is not the proper instrument.

It is clear that Washington's offers of aid have political conditions attached. For example, correspondent Paul Ellman wrote in the November 18 *Washington Post*:

The Soares government is known to have been seeking financial support abroad for two months, but U.S. agreement to grant the loan is understood to have been kept under wraps until after the Socialist Party convention. . . .

At the convention, Soares defeated a sizable left-wing revolt and secured support for his Cabinet's economic policies. . . .

U.S. officials in Lisbon, while reluctant to discuss the mechanism through which the \$300 million loan will be granted, agreed that it could be termed a reward to the Soares Cabinet for sticking to its policies.

In reality, the SP is going to have to pay for following the policies Washington demands. Ellman made it clear that as a result of Soares's unpopular measures, the SP can expect major losses in the upcoming elections. He also assumed that a consequence of such losses would be that Soares would have to abandon his all-SP government and form a new coalition with one or both of the main bourgeois parties. This is also a move that representatives of

American imperialism, such as the editors of the *New York Times*, have been urging Soares to take.

### Stalinists Prescribe Patience

It is possible that the CP, which is not directly responsible for the government's measures and is the target of red-baiting



CUNHAL

by the capitalists and landlords, will gain in the elections at the SP's expense. But Washington has little to fear at this point from a larger CP vote. The momentum the party had after the fall of Caetano has been broken. The Stalinists have been effectively isolated.

What is more, the Stalinists have made it clear that they are mainly interested in posts in the government that the SP is running in the interests of the capitalists. The CP's criticisms of the Soares government are only a cover for that objective. This shows up clearly in a November 14 dispatch from Marvina Howe to the *New York Times*:

The [CP] congress condemned the Government for "antilabor" policies and warned that it would fight them. It insisted that the Government could solve its economic and social problems only with the participation of Communists in the Government and the cooperation of Communist-led workers.

In other words, Soares's "antilabor" government would be transformed by giving the CP a few posts.

The CP leaders made it clear at the party congress November 10-14 that they have no intention of changing the policies that

led to defeat. The Stalinist leadership did criticize the rightist policies of the SP government sufficiently to stake out a position to the left of Soares for the elections. But it did not offer any effective alternative for the workers and peasants looking for a way to fight back against the capitalist offensive.

On the land occupations in Alentejo, Cunhal's stated policy did not differ from that of the SP right wing. That is, he called for enforcing the limitations written into the agrarian reform law. In the November 16 *Le Monde*, he was quoted as saying: "We are not impatient. Even though there are still 500,000 hectares to be expropriated, there won't be occupations like last year. Everything will be done in strict accordance with the law."

At his news conference before the gathering began, Cunhal said it would be the congress "of confirmation of the correctness of the Portuguese CP's political line." He made it clear that the PCP would continue to be a close follower of the Kremlin: "The party is not prepared to revise its international relations to suit certain Portuguese political forces." The Kremlin's representative, Boris Ponomarev, praised the "profound internationalism" of the PCP conference. For the Stalinist bureaucracy that means toeing the Kremlin line.

Moreover, the CP has not abandoned its policy of offering to use its organization in the factories to increase productivity for the capitalists. In the November 12 issue of the French Trotskyist daily, *Rouge*, Charles Michaloux and Charles-André Udry wrote:

"More and more in nationalized industry, workers control is becoming codetermination. The workers commissions dominated by the PCP are intended to be the instrument for this. Against 'capitalist reconsolidation,' the PCP offers the perspective of managing and reorganizing the nationalized sector so as to demonstrate its dynamism by comparison with the private sector."

To what extent the forces in the SP left wing will resist the continued rightward course of the government is hard to predict. But it is clear that Soares is determined to crush them.

Numerically, the SP left is strong. In the youth congress that followed the party one, the wing associated with List B got 147 votes against 152 for the Soares supporters. However, unless they offer a revolutionary political alternative to the government's reformist perspective, the forces that rallied behind List B cannot stand up long against an all-out offensive by the party leadership, backed by the Portuguese bourgeoisie and the big imperialist powers. And to offer such an alternative, they would have to break completely from the program and the organizational practices of Social Democracy. □

## WSL Condemns New Brazen Moves in Healyite Frame-up

[The following article, under the title, "WRP Maintains Hansen Frame-up," appeared in the September 22 issue of the *Socialist Press*, the fortnightly paper of the Workers Socialist League, a British grouping that originated in a split from the Healyite Workers Revolutionary party.

[As noted in the article itself, the Workers Socialist League had already condemned the frame-up. For the text of their original statement, see the January 19, 1976, issue of *Intercontinental Press*.]

\* \* \*

At the beginning of August Joseph Hansen, veteran member of the American Socialist Workers Party, published a lengthy reply to the slanders levelled against him in the publications of the Workers Revolutionary Party.

In his reply Hansen demolished the main pillars of the mountainous fabrication of "evidence" erected by the leading clique of Gerry Healy in the WRP who allege that he has been for almost 40 years an agent of the Stalinist GPU.

The reaction of the WRP leadership since Hansen's reply has confirmed to the hilt the assessment we made earlier of Healy's investigation—that it is a deliberate and cynical frame-up, which marshalls its "evidence" by distortions, lies and concealment, and which serves only to divert from the sharp political struggles which are necessary in the rebuilding of an international Trotskyist leadership of the working class. (See "WRP Frames Hansen" in *Socialist Press* of December 31st, 1975.)

Then as now, we spoke up in defence of Hansen against these slanders, despite the fundamental differences which divide us from the revisionist politics of the "United Secretariat of the Fourth International" (with which the Socialist Workers Party is in political sympathy, though prevented by reactionary legislation from affiliating).

We did so not only because we believe that slanders of such a vicious and serious character must be combatted on principle wherever they appear within the workers' movement, but because the political crisis of the world Trotskyist movement poses tasks of such urgency and importance for the international struggles of the working class that—more than at any other time in the post-war period—it is impermissible to allow methods such as those of Gerry Healy and Cliff Slaughter to foul and obstruct the political struggles that are on the agenda.

Nothing short of a book could examine in detail the whole of the WRP's accusations. But it will be highly illuminating of their methods to focus on the key items. Examining in detail the reactions of the WRP leadership to Hansen's reply will make clear the character of the frame-up.

Among all the volume of "evidence" unearthed by Healy's "investigators" only one single item is related to Hansen individually. This was a report prepared by an official of the US Consulate in Mexico City of his conversation with Hansen on Saturday August 31st, 1940.

This was eleven days after Trotsky was murdered at his house in Mexico City by Stalin's agent, Mercader.

The report was forwarded to the State Department in Washington the day after it was written and was recently unearthed in the State Department archives by the WRP's "investigating" team (who give no precise location for the document).

In his report, the consular official, Robert G. McGregor, wrote that Hansen had suggested various lines of enquiry in the United States which might uncover the responsibility of the GPU apparatus for Trotsky's murder.

Hansen reportedly told McGregor that he himself had been in contact with a GPU agent in the US for several months. The passage reads:

"For, while Hansen is convinced that the murder is a GPU job, that very fact makes it hard to unravel. Hansen stated that when in New York in 1938 he was himself approached by an agent of the GPU and asked to desert the Fourth International and join the Third.

"He referred the matter to Trotsky who asked him to go as far with the matter as possible. For three months Hansen had relations with a man who merely identified himself as 'John,' and did not otherwise reveal his real identity."

(Quoted in *How the GPU Murdered Trotsky*, Chapter 17, no page number.)

McGregor's memorandum immediately became the star exhibit in Healy's "case." It had the advantage for them that—unlike virtually all the rest of the material—it related to Hansen as a named individual, rather than just the SWP or its leadership as a whole and it showed a conscious contact with the GPU.

The WRP used it to try to establish two distinct, and in fact mutually exclusive, charges against Hansen. (Perhaps there were at one stage too many cooks stirring the broth.)

Firstly: that Hansen had some kind of illegitimate relationship with the US

authorities and/or the FBI, concealed from the Trotskyist movement, and (they insinuated) that he might even be an FBI agent.

The "evidence" for this was the fact that Hansen met McGregor on a Saturday (i.e. outside normal office hours) and appeared to have "a familiar relationship" with him.

But this allegation simply collapsed under the fact that (as is clear even from the WRP's own material) Hansen was only one on several members of the Fourth International (including Trotsky himself) who had had quite open conversations with McGregor.

The document was thus used as the number one prop in the allegation that Hansen was and is an "accomplice of the GPU."

"Is it seriously suggested," the WRP asked, "that Trotsky, the leader of the Red Army, would ask a relatively inexperienced newcomer from Salt Lake City [i.e. Hansen] to infiltrate the most skilled terror machine of the GPU? What could have been the purpose of this infiltration? There are no published records to show that Trotsky evinced an interest in infiltrating the GPU."

(*How the GPU Murdered Trotsky*, Chapter 17.)

The WRP's rhetorical questions are answered in what is perhaps the most important item in Hansen's reply.

Trotsky *did* (Hansen relates) attempt to use him to infiltrate the GPU apparatus in the US and thereby to gain vital knowledge of the Stalinists' plots against the movement and Trotsky himself.

This took place in 1939—McGregor is mistaken in placing it in 1938. Secret communications between Hansen in New York and Trotsky in Mexico went through one V.T. O'Brien, an American guard of Trotsky, who is still alive and has testified in writing to his role in the operation.

And moreover, on Trotsky's advice, the SWP leadership in New York drew up a confidential record of the matter, which was signed by James Cannon, Max Shachtman and Hansen himself (though Hansen was not then a member of the leadership).

Hansen has now published this report (*Intercontinental Press*, 9th August, 1976, p. 1210).

It is worth reprinting, both for the light it sheds on the serious manner in which Trotsky and the American Trotskyist leadership approached the overwhelming task of protecting the movement against Stalin's murder-squads, and in order to



appreciate the utter cynicism of the WRP's reaction to it.

April 7, 1939

To the Political Committee  
of the Socialist Workers Party.  
Comrades:

Upon his return to the United States from Mexico, Comrade Joe Hansen chanced to meet an agent of the G.P.U. This agent introduced Hansen to a superior in the G.P.U., a man apparently the head or one of the heads of the American division of the G.P.U. This man whose real name Hansen does not know but who may be called "Y" sounded out the possibilities of converting Hansen into an agent of the G.P.U. Hansen immediately informed Comrades Trotsky, Cannon, and Shachtman. Under their direction and with their full approval he conducted for purposes of reconnaissance in the American G.P.U. organization a series of conversations with "Y" upon the Stalin book which Comrade Trotsky is now writing, the internal status of the S.W.P. and the internal conditions at Mexico, in all cases giving equivocal, misleading answers to "Y's" questions or telling him things that are semi-public knowledge, reporting in detail after each meeting to Comrades Trotsky, Cannon, and Shachtman. Through these conversations valuable information has been gained for the Fourth International. Hansen is disinclined—for fear that the story might leak out and because the reconnaissance is not yet completed—that the entire P.C. should be made aware of this affair at present without full guarantees that his personal safety and the further political gains which might accrue be safe-guarded by complete silence on the part of P.C. members with their friends, political associates, and correspondents regarding this affair. Even the most guarded allusions or hints might cause the failure of further work in this respect.

J.P. Cannon  
Max Shachtman  
Joe Hansen

How have the WRP responded to this document? *At no point* have they challenged its authenticity. On the contrary they have—in an astonishing logical somersault—taken it as *additional* evidence for their "indictment"!

A hurriedly-prepared leaflet issued to the WRP's London meeting on August 15th—ostensibly organised to "commemorate" Trotsky, in reality to "indict" Hansen and pollute Trotsky's memory—carried the astonishing headline "Hansen Admits the Charges!"

This leaflet—like the other statements on the matter produced by the WRP since then—manages to avoid *any* explicit mention of the very existence of the document quoted above, although the leaflet is quite obviously an attempt to obfuscate the fact that it destroys the only item in the WRP's "case" that had any direct bearing on Hansen's individual role.

As Cliff Slaughter, Secretary of Healy's "International Committee" (and now coming forward as one of the main architects in the attempt to shore up the fabrications) has rightly commented it is "circumstantial evidence" that "abounds in situations of this sort." (*News Line*, August 21st.)

Evidently, a report dealing in detail with

the matter, clearing Hansen and signed by James Cannon, is so "circumstantial" that its very existence must not be mentioned by Healy's allegedly "meticulous" investigators!

The *political* direction of the WRP's



Workers Press

HEALY

"investigation" emerged with dazzling clarity over the weekend of Sunday, August 15th.

Far from pausing for even the briefest re-evaluation of their case, the WRP leadership turned immediately to the capitalist press (as they have accurately described them, "the sewers of Fleet Street").

Healy's apprentices in the matter of frame-ups turned without hesitation to experienced practitioners.

The *Sunday Times* of August 15th carried an article by Anthony Holden summarising uncritically the WRP's case, and including a plug for their meeting that day.

It is impossible to avoid the supposition that Mr. Holden—at best—naively swallowed "information" offered by courtesy of his former colleague as a *Sunday Times* journalist Alex Mitchell, now editor of the *News Line*.

Next day the campaign hotted up. Revealing the leverage they seem to have over the "jackals" who inhabit "the sewers of Fleet Street" (*their* epithets, though we agree with the spirit!) the WRP called a "press conference" to which the capitalist press and *only the capitalist press* were invited!

Pieces duly appeared in the *Guardian* and *The Times* the next day. They did not, of course, mention Hansen's reply nor has any of the capitalist press yet done so.

And to top it off, an interview was conveniently arranged on the BBC's Radio

4 "PM" programme on Monday evening for Harold Robins, a former SWP member and one of Trotsky's guards in Mexico, who has lent his name to the WRP's campaign.

In it, Robins—though not completely coherent—attempted to revive the theory that Hansen was (and is?) an agent *both* of the GPU and the FBI:

"The Socialist Workers Party . . . was successfully penetrated by GPU agents, and they weren't just GPU agents, I'm convinced that some of them were double agents, agents for the American Government who wanted to kill Trotsky precisely because they didn't want to have what they had after World War 1" ("PM", August 16th).

From their proposals for a "parity commission" of the Trotskyist movement to investigate their spurious allegations, the WRP leadership overnight switched horses, apparently without batting an eyelid, to attempt to get a witch-hunt rolling through the capitalist press and media.

There could be no clearer indictment of the factional, slanderous and *anti-political* character of their campaign.

Any honest assessment of the evidence highlights, in fact, the serious and revolutionary manner in which Trotsky and the small cadres of the Fourth International in the 1930s faced up to the task of defence against the avalanche of slander and violence launched by Stalin.

And, if the SWP report which Hansen publishes is authentic (which the WRP have at no point challenged) it shows that his own role, though secondary, was a courageous one.

Not only was he in the firing line as one of Trotsky's guards in Mexico, but he exposed himself to the serious risk of "liquidation" at the hands of the GPU if they discovered he was hoodwinking them: a GPU machine which had already taken the lives of thousands of Stalin's political opponents.

It is necessary to comment also on the way in which the slander campaign against Hansen highlights the enormous acceleration in the political degeneration of the WRP and its leadership, a degeneration in the fight against which the founding members of the Workers Socialist League were illegally and bureaucratically expelled by Healy at the end of 1974.

Cutting themselves off from their base in the organised workers' movement, turning their backs on the day-to-day struggle for leadership in the unions, mouthing a few sectarian slogans to cover over their opportunist adaptation *in practice* to the labour bureaucrats (including entry into scab "participation" committees)—all these tendencies show Healy's "Trotskyism" being driven swiftly under pressure of the class struggle, into its opposite: phrase-mongering and intrigue.

Healy and his associates move increasingly in a narrow circle of petit-bourgeois

dilettantes, actresses and bourgeois journalists.

In such circles the fraudulent and frenzied search for "conspiracies" to explain the problems of the organisation easily push out any *serious* attention to questions of security against agents provocateurs and spies.

Similarly, light-minded speculation and metaphysics take the place of the political, scientific study of real developments in the workers' movement.

In this atmosphere the most ethereal "explanations" can flourish. It has been suggested (though this is not a version the WRP leadership has yet put into print) that there is a version of Hansen's "complicity" with the GPU which could survive the evidence he presents in his defence.

It is this—that Hansen was a trained agent of the GPU, in place in the SWP since well before the events of 1938-40. As a skilled operator in intrigue he (or his masters) conceived a plan which would allow him to meet more openly with his GPU controllers in New York, and at the same time protect himself against accusations from the Trotskyist ranks that he should *pretend* to infiltrate the GPU on behalf of the SWP, meanwhile pretending to the SWP leadership that he was pretending to do the opposite on behalf of the GPU, and getting a report signed by Cannon on file to cover himself.

He thus became an agent (or "accomplice") of the GPU within the SWP, cunningly disguising himself as an agent of the SWP inside the GPU ostensibly *pretending* to be an agent of the GPU in the SWP—or so on ad nauseam!

No doubt, if the WRP leadership chooses to come forward with this version, they will find excellent "philosophical" and "dialectical" reasons to buttress it with.

And these are the best reasons they can find, since in the nature of the case, the "facts" of the matter as they have emerged so far can—"logically"—neither prove nor disprove it.

It is, like all the WRP's recent "philosophy," inherently metaphysical.

It is the sort of "theory" which would allow the WRP's "investigators" to leave aside all the "circumstantial evidence"—including the detailed history of Joseph Hansen's more than forty years in the Trotskyist movement—except where it was convenient for them to select from it.

It allows Healy's International Committee to represent all the important post-war splits of the Trotskyist movement not as real political battles but as crises fomented and manipulated by Stalinist agents.

And, like their campaign against Hansen to date, it represents not an attempt to protect and strengthen the Trotskyist movement, but a slanderous and incompetent invention. □

## Despite Foot-Dragging by French Stalinists

### Stiff Resistance to Giscard's Austerity Program

By F. L. Derry

PARIS—A major struggle between the French workers and the government is taking shape. The government struck the first blow September 23 with the announcement of an austerity program that includes limitations on wage increases, higher taxes, and cutbacks in social services.

On October 7, the unions organized a general strike and some of the largest demonstrations since May-June 1968 in protest of the austerity plan.

The French capitalists demonstrated their lack of confidence in the outcome of this test of strength—on October 12, the franc fell sharply and one of the steepest declines in the recent history of the stock exchange took place.

François Renard, writing in the October 14 *Le Monde*, compared the situation to the stock market decline in 1974 preceding the world economic slump: "This time the stockbrokers are much gloomier and are talking about a crisis of confidence at all levels. Their apprehensions about the economy have just been compounded by fears about the political situation."

The general strike and mass demonstrations were called by two major trade-union federations, the CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail—General Confederation of Labor) and the CFDT (Confédération Française et Démocratique du Travail—French Democratic Confederation of Labor), as well as the FEN (Fédération de l'Éducation Nationale—National Education Federation), the largest union of teachers. The FEN and the CFDT have ties to the Socialist party. The CGT is dominated by the Communist party. The more conservative union, Force Ouvrière (Labor Force), which is also linked to the Socialist party, opposed both the strike and the demonstrations.

Interpretations of the size and impact of the October 7 actions differed widely. The Communist party daily *l'Humanité* claimed that more than six million went out on strike and two million demonstrated throughout the country, with 500,000 demonstrating in Paris. *Le Monde* called the demonstrations the "most important since 1968."

The headline in *Le Figaro* said that "passivity more than anger" marked the day's events and that the action was uneven throughout the country. *L'Aurore*, the conservative daily, simply sighed in relief that "the strike did not paralyze the country."

The Paris police were able to count up only to 70,000 demonstrators, after which,

presumably, they ran out of fingers and toes.

It took six and one-half hours for the Paris demonstration to pass this reporter, and it was clearly in the hundreds of thousands. By comparison, the massive May Day demonstration took three and one-half hours to pass a given point.

While some contingents were larger than their May Day counterparts, others were smaller. The delegation of teachers from the FEN, for example, was much larger than in May. Other large contingents included postal workers, subway and bus operators, hospital workers, government employees, and workers in the printing and publishing industries.

Notable by their relatively smaller size were the contingents of the Stalinist-dominated unions in heavy industry. The metalworkers federation, the bastion of the CGT, had a relatively small mobilization. The contingent from the giant Renault plant at Boulogne-Billancourt was only 800 strong, although the plant employs 32,000. The CGT did not call for a full strike in the plant but only a three-hour work stoppage.

Thus, while there was a large mobilization of public and service workers, it was not matched in the heavy-industry sector. This reflects the fact that the austerity measures will strike especially hard at education, health, and other public and service workers. But it is also the result of the foot-dragging of the CP leadership. None of the union tops, nor the leaderships of the mass reformist workers parties, wanted this strike. The more disciplined CGT, however, was better able to limit the mobilization than the more loosely controlled CFDT and FEN.

A separate "revolutionary contingent" also took part. They were kept to the very end of the march by a *cordon sanitaire* of CGT marshals. Exactly 120 files averaging about twenty persons each, composed of members and supporters of the French Trotskyists of the LCR (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire—Revolutionary Communist League), marched by. The end of the "revolutionary contingent" was composed of about 660 members and supporters of the Trotskyist current Lutte Ouvrière (Workers' Struggle).

#### Government Crisis

The launching of the austerity program was preceded by a political crisis that resulted in the August 25 resignation of the government headed by Prime Minister

Jacques Chirac, and President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was forced to select a new cabinet.

Two issues were behind this crisis—the austerity program and the impending elections. Jim Hoagland, in the September 30 *International Herald Tribune*, dealt with the latter: “Differences over strategy for confronting the leftist challenge led to the break last month between Mr. Giscard d'Estaing and Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac, who resigned as Prime Minister after Mr. Giscard d'Estaing turned down a proposal to advance the elections by two years to catch the left off guard.”

The question of electoral strategy is becoming one of the central questions for all French political groups. This is because the growth in militancy among French workers is being reflected in the rapid growth of support for the two mass workers parties, the Communist and Socialist parties.

The regional elections in March of this year resulted in the workers parties receiving a majority. The left, not counting the bourgeois Left Radicals, got more than 54% of the vote. Municipal elections are scheduled for March 1977, and the national legislative elections are set for one year later. If current trends hold, the government is likely to lose its majority in the National Assembly at that time.

The regional elections held this year saw a continuation of the growth in the electoral strength of the Socialist party. In the 1969 presidential elections the Socialist party received only 5% of the vote. In the March elections it received 26.5% of the vote, and is now the largest party in terms of electoral support. Recent polls put the SP's support at more than 30%. One year ago, the SP claimed to have 150,000 members, more than double its membership of two years earlier.

The Communist party's vote has not been increasing in the same way the SP's has. In the March elections the CP got 22.8%. In the five legislative elections held since 1958, the CP vote has not changed by more than one or two percentage points. The real growth of the CP has been reflected in the sharp increase in the number of its members.

Annie Kriegel, a former CP leader now disillusioned with their politics and a leading expert on the history of the French CP, estimates the real membership of the party as 491,000 at the end of 1975 (*Le Figaro*, October 8). Official CP figures for 1975 show a recruitment of more than 93,000 persons. Pierre Julien, writing in the September 17 issue of the Trotskyist daily, *Rouge*, noted that “60% of the [Communist] party members have joined since 1972.”

Kriegel points out that this growth began slowly at the end of the 1960s, and has been picking up ever since. It seems that after a short period of crisis in the ranks of the CP, one of the long-term effects of the near-revolutionary upsurge of

May-June 1968 was to reverse the trend of declining membership in the CP and declining vote and membership for the SP. Whole layers of the working class, includ-



GISCARD D'ESTAING

ing a new generation of post-1968 youth, are now joining and voting for what they believe to be militant working-class parties.

In face of this trend, it is now known that Chirac had secretly urged that the 1978 elections be moved up. His disagreement with Giscard on this point, however, was only one of the reasons for his downfall.

#### Recovery Falters

The second point of disagreement concerned economic policy. Mounting economic problems finally forced Giscard to take drastic measures. Chirac preferred not to take the blame for them.

The decline in industrial production in France during the 1974-75 worldwide economic slump was particularly sharp, dropping 16% in eight months. Production picked up rapidly in the second half of 1975. By February of this year, it was only 5% below its previous peak. However, it has stagnated since then.

Unemployment has continued at a high level, and has once again begun to climb. On a seasonally adjusted basis, it is now higher than during the deepest point of the slump.

The drop in industrial production and continued high unemployment have not solved the problem of inflation. Since the beginning of the year, inflation has been running at an average rate of 10%. While Italy and Britain, the two “sick” economies of Europe, have higher inflation rates, Germany and the United States have lower.

Both Germany and the United States have been much more successful in keep-

ing down increases in wages than France. Increases in the wages of French workers have been averaging two and one-half times those for German and American workers. This has exacerbated a growing trade deficit and the decline in the franc.

It became increasingly clear earlier this year that the government would have to follow in the footsteps of other capitalist powers and launch a direct attack on wages. The problem was, who would carry out this unpopular task?

On June 23, Chirac told a radio audience:

Of course, a wage and price freeze might be envisaged. We will not undertake such a step because we think that such crude techniques do not correspond to our needs and would find little support. For the same reasons, we will not introduce a real “incomes policy” because we do not have the means to apply it and because it would find little support among any of the social sectors in France.

Chirac of course is not opposed to an incomes policy on principle. He simply did “not have the means” to apply such a policy and survive the 1978 legislative elections. As a leader of the Gaullist UDR (Union des Démocrates pour la République—Union of Democrats for the Republic), Chirac did not want his wing of the “presidential majority” to be saddled with responsibility for implementing the unpopular program.

The new government is led by Raymond Barre, a well-known economist. Barre is considered “nonparty,” that is, he is not directly tied to the UDR or to Giscard's Independent Republicans, the two main parties of the ruling coalition. It was his job to announce the austerity measures.

The “Barre plan” is the sharpest attack on wages and living standards of the French working class in more than a quarter century. The austerity measures include a 50% increase for automobile licenses; a 15% hike in gasoline prices (a liter of gasoline will now cost 2.50 francs, or about \$2 an American gallon); a 4% increase in most income taxes; and a “voluntary” limit on wage increases, restricting them to 6½% for the coming year, under the presumption that inflation will be brought down to the same rate.

Other aspects of the program include increased charges for social security and cutbacks in medical benefits, the educational system, and other social services.

The French capitalists seem intent on pushing through their program. The day after the general strike, Barre warned that “the government will determine its policies independently of the size of the demonstrations. . . . I have no reason to doubt the [parliamentary] majority or to fear the opposition.” On October 16, he added, “No matter what the protests, we will apply our plan.”

On the other side, the workers are beginning to demand that their leaders launch a real struggle against the austerity program. □

## Trotsky on the Second Chinese Revolution

Reviewed by Fred Feldman



*Leon Trotsky on China* is a comprehensive collection of Trotsky's writings on one of the great revolutionary upheavals of the twentieth century. It is indispensable for all who wish to study the Chinese revolution, the nature of the Chinese Communist party, and the conditions under which the Stalinist leadership headed by Mao developed its program and methods of rule.

Previously a more limited selection of Trotsky's writings of 1927 and 1928 on this topic had been available in *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, issued by Pioneer Publishers in 1932 and reprinted in 1967 by the University of Michigan's Ann Arbor Paperbacks. All of Trotsky's contributions to this collection appear in *Leon Trotsky on China*, together with fifty-three additional articles and documents, many appearing in English for the first time.

An introduction by the veteran Chinese revolutionist Peng Shu-tse sheds new light on the early years of the Chinese Communist party, of which Peng was a founding member.

*Leon Trotsky on China* brings the evolution of Trotsky's views on the revolution of 1925-27 into sharper focus. It provides the reader with a rounded picture of Trotsky's views on the peasant "Red Armies" and "soviets" initiated by the Chinese Communist party after the crushing of the second Chinese revolution by Chiang Kai-shek. Materials on the Sino-Japanese War illustrate Trotsky's support for the struggle against Japanese imperialism and his opposition to the popular frontism practiced by the Chinese CP during the war.

The book is thus a guide to revolutionary strategy and tactics as developed and defended in the course of great revolutionary events and in opposition to the disastrous course followed by the Stalinist bureaucracy.

The first Chinese revolution of 1911 overthrew the Manchu emperor. Led by Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the bourgeois-nationalist Kuomintang, it soon declined; and China fell under the domination of regional military dictators called warlords.

The second Chinese revolution, to which half of this book is devoted, broke out in May 1925, when British troops fired on a crowd of protesting workers and students in Shanghai. The upsurge spread rapidly, with general strikes and boycotts of

foreign goods spreading to Canton and Hong Kong. Trade unions burgeoned while peasant leagues comprising millions of members appeared in the countryside to challenge the domination of the landlords.

The Russian revolution had vast prestige in China, and even many reactionaries felt compelled to identify themselves with the Soviet Union to retain credibility with the masses. The young Communist

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*Leon Trotsky on China*. Introduction by Peng Shu-tse. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976, 688 pp., \$6.95.

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party was thus in an unusually good position to rapidly become a mass party capable of leading the workers and peasants against their oppressors.

Trotsky demonstrates irrefutably that this revolutionary situation was betrayed by Stalin, who was then consolidating his bureaucratic grip in the Soviet Union. The policies that destroyed the second Chinese revolution were not the "errors" of local leaders, as Maoist admirers of Stalin are wont to argue, but were imposed by the Kremlin.

Over Trotsky's opposition, the CCP had been compelled to join the bourgeois Kuomintang in 1923. When the revolution broke out, Stalin insisted that the CP remain in the Kuomintang at whatever cost.

Stalin sought to justify this policy with the theory that the revolution had to pass through two distinct stages. Holding that the current "stage" of the revolution was bourgeois, Stalin insisted that the Chinese Communists support the bourgeois leadership of the Kuomintang as the legitimate leadership of the revolution. This included supporting the class-collaborationist and procapitalist program of the Kuomintang. Stalin bluntly called for the subordination of the workers and peasants movement to the Kuomintang. He described the latter as a "bloc of four classes" that was supposedly capable of simultaneously representing the interests of workers, peasants, the urban middle classes, and the capitalists.

Stalin attempted to present this strategy, which was identical to the Menshevik strategy in the Russian revolution, as an application of the concept of "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the

peasantry." Lenin had put forward this slogan during the 1905 revolution in Russia but rejected it as outmoded in 1917.

Trotsky argued that the Chinese bourgeoisie was incapable of mounting a decisive challenge to imperialism and landlordism. Therefore it would be incapable of carrying out the bourgeois-democratic tasks of the Chinese revolution. He proposed that the CP withdraw from the Kuomintang, reject its program, and organize the workers and peasants on an independent basis. He predicted that the Kuomintang leaders, who were presenting themselves as extreme radicals and even Bolsheviks, would turn on the workers and peasants movement.

The policy of supporting the Kuomintang led Stalin to oppose forming soviets and arming the workers. With similar logic, Stalin called for restrictions on workers' strikes and peasant struggles for land. Trotsky called for the creation of soviets with the aim of broadening and coordinating the workers and peasants movements, and drawing into action the rank-and-file soldiers of the Kuomintang and warlord armies.

To stress his confidence in the Kuomintang, Stalin had it admitted to the Communist International as a sympathizing party.

These opposed lines were decisively tested in Shanghai, where workers rose up in March 1927 to throw off the domination of the local warlord and establish their own government, predominantly Communist in composition. As Chiang's armies approached, Trotsky insistently warned that the Kuomintang leader would seek to smash the workers movement. Stalin, on the other hand, ordered the CCP to turn the government over to Chiang and to welcome his troops to the city. The result was a bloody massacre of workers and peasants that rapidly spread to other parts of China.

Instead of correcting his mistake and breaking with the Kuomintang, Stalin ordered the CP to switch its allegiance from Chiang Kai-shek to another faction of the Kuomintang, headed by Wang Ching-wei. As Trotsky had warned, Wang soon turned on the CCP, carrying out massacres modeled on those perpetrated by Chiang.

Peng Shu-tse explains in his introduc-

tion how the Chinese Communists were blocked from objectively considering Trotsky's criticisms and proposals. The whole apparatus of the Comintern was thrown into the task of suppressing and misrepresenting them.

Maoist mythology today places full blame for the errors of those days on the "counterrevolutionary line" of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the founder of the Chinese Communist party. Peng demonstrates that Stalin repeatedly overrode the objections of Chinese CP leaders like Ch'en, who had grave doubts about Stalin's line, and Peng, who opposed it. One CCP leader who accepted Stalin's line with enthusiasm was Mao Tsetung.

The materials collected in *Leon Trotsky on China* provide a grim record of the methods Stalin used to preserve the aura of infallibility after the defeat of the revolution. Instead of patiently seeking to rebuild the party and its base in the working class, Stalin ordered immediate insurrections in an effort to recoup his losses. When this led only to new massacres, Stalin converted the critics of his line into scapegoats for the failure of his policies. Leaders like Peng Shu-tse and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, who now agreed with Trotsky and sought to frankly criticize Stalinist policies, were ruthlessly driven out. It became impossible to oppose Stalinist policies inside the CP.

These sections of the book make enlightening but painful reading. The policies that ruined the Chinese revolution of 1925-27 were the first effort by the Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union to attain its ends through class collaboration. Although this strategy was at first presented as applicable only to colonial lands, it eventually became the basic Stalinist policy in the whole capitalist world. The concepts Stalin put forward at this time—such as the "two-stage theory of revolution" and the "bloc of four classes"—have characterized Stalinists of all varieties ever since.

The Chinese revolution was also a watershed in the development of Trotskyism. Having begun as opponents of the bureaucratization of the government apparatus in the Soviet Union, the Left Oppositionists were compelled to defend the most basic programmatic concepts of Marxism, such as working-class independence from the bourgeoisie.

The collection of Trotsky's writings in this book illuminates the evolution of Trotsky's views on the nature of the Chinese revolution. At the beginning of the 1925 revolution, Trotsky held that the main tasks of the Chinese revolution (national independence, unity, and agrarian revolution) were bourgeois-democratic in character. The revolution would be based on an alliance of the workers and peasants against the bourgeoisie and the imperialists, with the working class in the lead. However, Trotsky left open the role

that might be played in a future revolutionary government by independent peasant organizations and sometimes expressed doubts that the Chinese revolution could pass beyond capitalist property relations without revolutions in the imperialist countries.



Vrij Nederland

#### TROTSKY

The experience of the revolution of 1925-27 convinced Trotsky that only through a proletarian dictatorship that ended capitalist property relations as well as landlordism and the grip of imperialism could the bourgeois-democratic tasks be accomplished. He concluded that the theory of permanent revolution, originally developed to explain the dynamics of revolution in Russia, was applicable to the colonial world as well. Since that time, the theory of permanent revolution has played a central role in the arsenal of revolutionary Marxism. This development is well summarized in a preface by editors Les Evans and Russell Block.

Nearly half of the book is devoted to problems of revolutionary strategy and tactics in the decade that followed the defeat of the second Chinese revolution.

The Chinese Communist party—purged of all critics of Stalinist class-collaboration and stripped of its once-powerful base of support in the working class—now turned to peasant war as a method of preserving itself and fighting Chiang Kai-shek. This turn was eventually given after-the-fact theoretical justification in the concept of "people's war" developed by Mao and Lin Piao.

Trotsky was unyielding in his opposition to this shift on the part of the Chinese CP. He wrote:

At this juncture the Chinese Communists need a long-range policy. They must not scatter their forces among the isolated flames of the peasant revolt. Weak and small in number, the party will

not be able to take hold of this movement. The communists must concentrate their forces in the factories and the shops and in the workers' districts in order to explain to the workers the meaning of what is happening in the provinces. . . . Only through the process of activating and uniting the workers will the Communist Party be able to assume leadership of the peasant insurrection, that is, of the national revolution as a whole. ["Manifesto on China of the International Left Opposition," p. 481.]

Trotsky stressed in particular the potential role of democratic demands in reviving the workers' movement and linking it to the peasant struggle:

The struggle against the military dictatorship must inevitably assume the form of *transitional revolutionary democratic demands*, leading to the demand for a Chinese constituent assembly on the basis of universal direct, equal, and secret voting, for the solution of the most important problems facing the country: the introduction of the eight-hour day, the confiscation of the land, and the securing of national independence for China. . . .

If the communists stand back, the revival of political struggle will go to the benefit of petty-bourgeois democracy, and it is possible to predict in advance that the present Chinese Stalinists will follow in its wake, giving the democratic slogans not a revolutionary, but a conciliatory interpretation. ["The Political Situation in China," p. 407.]

Trotsky held that the strategy he proposed would make it possible for the Communist party to "emerge, not as the technical guide of the Chinese peasantry, but as the political leader of the working class of the entire country" ("What Is Happening in the Chinese Communist Party?" p. 513).

Trotsky denounced the Stalinists in sharp terms for rejecting this strategy in favor of one based on the peasantry. In a key article on this question, "Peasant War in China and the Proletariat," he wrote:

The Russian Narodniks used to accuse the Russian Marxists of "ignoring" the peasantry, of not carrying on work in the villages, etc. To this the Marxists replied: "We will arouse and organize the advanced workers and through the workers we shall arouse the peasants." Such in general is the only conceivable road for the proletarian party.

The Chinese Stalinists have acted otherwise. During the revolution of 1925-27 they subordinated directly and immediately the interests of the workers and the peasants to the interests of the national bourgeoisie. In the years of the counter-revolution they passed over from the proletariat to the peasantry, i.e., they undertook that role which was fulfilled in our country by the SRs when they were still a revolutionary party. . . .

The party actually tore itself away from its class. Thereby in the last analysis it can cause injury to the peasantry as well. For should the proletariat continue to remain on the sidelines, without organization, without leadership, then the peasant war even if fully victorious will inevitably arrive in a blind alley. [P. 527.]

These views, stated and reiterated by Trotsky throughout the years following 1927, probably constitute the most controversial aspects of *Leon Trotsky on China*.

The perspicacity of Trotsky's criticisms of the policies followed by the CCP in 1925-27 has been widely recognized, and is sometimes conceded even by the more open-minded votaries of the Mao cult.

The reception accorded Trotsky's later views has been rather different. Many assume that the CCP's success in taking power in 1949 at the head of a peasant army and later overturning capitalism proved the correctness of basing a revolutionary strategy in China on the peasants rather than the workers. Still others draw the further conclusion that the Chinese revolution demonstrated that the peasantry is the fundamental revolutionary force in colonial and neocolonial lands where peasants constitute a majority of the population.

Typical in this regard was the view expressed by Irwin Silber in his eulogy of Mao that appeared in the September 22, 1976, issue of the New York weekly *Guardian*. Silber argued that Mao's "chief 'heresy' in the eyes of many orthodox Marxists of the time was Mao's conception that China's revolution had to be based on the peasantry—representing the overwhelming majority of the Chinese masses—rather than on an infinitesimally tiny industrial proletariat."

According to Silber, the early Chinese CP was guilty of a "somewhat mechanical application of Marxist theory to the concrete conditions of China" in orienting to the workers instead of the peasants.

This view of the role of the peasantry in socialist revolutions raises in a new form the debate in the Russian revolutionary movement between Lenin and Plekhanov on the one hand and the Socialist Revolutionaries on the other. The latter held that the vast oppressed peasantry of Russia—not the "infinitesimally tiny industrial proletariat"—would be the driving force of the Russian revolution. Lenin and Plekhanov argued that modern industry had become economically decisive for Russia, and the cities were politically decisive. The working class, they held, would be impelled toward revolutionary leadership because it was organized, disciplined, and exploited on the basis of the most advanced and important productive relations in the country. This prediction was tested in 1917.

Contrary to what sympathizers of Maoism like Silber may believe, a similar test occurred in China in 1925-27. Here the working class initiated and spearheaded a great national movement against imperialism and landlordism, pressing its own anticapitalist demands in the process. Despite their small numbers, the Chinese workers clearly demonstrated their ability to accomplish what the Russian workers had accomplished in 1917. Their defeat was not the result of some inherent incapacity of the workers in colonial lands. The defeat was a consequence of Stalin's

political subordination of the CCP to the Kuomintang.

A closer examination both of Trotsky's analysis of the role of the Chinese peasantry and the CP, and of the course of the



MAO TSETUNG

Chinese revolution after 1927, demonstrates that it is a mistake to dismiss Trotsky's views on the grounds that he failed to predict Mao's military victory and its aftermath. Although Trotsky did not expect the peasant war to achieve the successes it did in the absence of massive working-class struggles, his observations point the way to understanding the course and outcome of the third Chinese revolution.

Trotsky denied that the peasants could lead a struggle for the creation of a workers state, which was indispensable if landlordism and foreign domination were to be eliminated. In "Peasant War in China and the Proletariat," he wrote:

The worker approaches questions from the socialist standpoint; the peasant's viewpoint is petty bourgeois. The worker strives to socialize the property that is taken away from the exploiters; the peasant seeks to divide it up. The worker desires to put palaces and parks to common use; the peasant, insofar as he cannot divide them, inclines to burning the palaces and cutting down the parks. The worker strives to solve problems on a national scale and in accordance with a plan; the peasant, on the other hand, approaches all problems on a local scale and takes a hostile attitude to centralized planning, etc.

It is understood that a peasant also is capable of raising himself to the socialist viewpoint. Under a proletarian regime more and more masses of peasants become reeducated in the socialist spirit. But this requires time, years, even decades. [P. 524.]

Trotsky rejected Stalinist assertions that "soviets" and "soviet power" had been established in the areas of the countryside controlled by the CCP. "Soviets are the organs of power of a revolutionary class in opposition to the bourgeoisie. This means

that the peasantry is unable to organize a soviet system on its own" ("Manifesto on China of the International Left Opposition," p. 480). In reality, of course, the "soviets" established in rural China by the CCP had nothing in common with the soviets established in Russia in 1917. Whereas the latter had an inherent tendency to counterpose proletarian to bourgeois rule, the "soviets" in China neither debated policy nor governed, but acted as an administrative apparatus through which the CCP leadership controlled the peasant masses.

Trotsky's analysis helps to pinpoint the social basis of Mao's program. During the long and arduous civil war, the Chinese peasantry never initiated or led a struggle directed at the overthrow of capitalism. It fought for land and national independence.

The leadership of the peasant movement, the CCP, continued to hold to the two-stage theory of revolution and the "bloc of four classes," which restricted the struggle to bourgeois objectives.

After the so-called Third Period, in which Stalin followed an ultraleft course, Mao used the peasant contingents under his command as bargaining chips in his search for an alliance with Chiang Kai-shek and other bourgeois forces. These, and not the Chinese workers, were the urban allies he sought. Even during the final years of the civil war, when Chiang's regime came to pieces at the seams, Mao adamantly denied any intention of overthrowing capitalism.

The Chinese peasants did not fight under a proletarian program, as the analysis of Silber would imply, but under a Stalinist program that was petty-bourgeois through and through.

Trotsky's realistic view of the nature and goals of the peasant struggle did not prevent him from fully supporting it. In a letter to the Chinese Oppositionists on August 22, 1930, he stated:

... we must devise a means to raise the workers' spirits through these insurrections. At the same time, we must visibly support the insurrectionists in their demands and programs, while opposing the landlords, officials, and bourgeoisie in their rumors, slanders, and repression. It is upon this foundation, and only this foundation, that we can expose the tricks of the Comintern organizations. [P. 440.]

Trotsky did not exclude the possibility that the Stalinist-led peasant fighters might win a military victory, bringing their commanders to political power. He warned, however, that a regime established in this way could not solve China's fundamental problems—even if it carried out a radical agrarian reform. On the contrary, he predicted that it might come into conflict with the Chinese workers:

Occupying in daily life an intermediate, indeterminate, and vacillating position, the peasantry at decisive moments can follow either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. The peasantry

does not find the road to the proletariat easily but only after a series of mistakes and defeats. The bridge between the peasantry and the bourgeoisie is provided by the urban petty bourgeoisie, chiefly by the intellectuals, who commonly come forward under the banner of socialism and even communism.

The commanding stratum of the Chinese "Red Army" has no doubt succeeded in inculcating itself with the habit of issuing commands. The absence of a strong revolutionary party and of mass organizations of the proletariat renders control over the commanding stratum virtually impossible. The commanders and commissars appear in the guise of absolute masters of the situation and upon occupying cities will be rather apt to look down from above upon the workers. The demands of the workers might often appear to them either inopportune or ill-advised.

Nor should one forget such "trifles" as the fact that within cities the staffs and offices of the victorious armies are established not in the proletarian huts but in the finest city buildings, in the houses and apartments of the bourgeoisie; and all this facilitates the inclination of the upper stratum to feel itself part of the "cultured" and "educated" classes, in no way part of the proletariat. ["Peasant War in China and the Proletariat," p. 526.]

The actual course of the CCP in the following years strikingly confirmed Trotsky's analysis. The CCP's peasant "soviets" were crushed by Chiang's forces, forcing the CCP to undertake the epic 6,600-mile Long March with Chiang's army in hot pursuit. The survivors were saved from destruction when some of Chiang's warlord allies, favoring an alliance with the CCP and the Soviet Union against the Japanese, kidnapped Chiang and compelled him to negotiate with the CCP.

In 1937, the CCP formed an "Anti-Japanese United Front" with Chiang Kai-shek. The "soviet" governments were formally dissolved, land reform was halted, the Kuomintang program was endorsed as the embodiment of the bourgeois "stage," and Chiang Kai-shek was recognized as the leader of the national struggle against Japanese imperialism. Chiang was formally recognized as the commander of the peasant armies (no longer called "Red"), although they retained their own hierarchy. While Trotsky favored united action with the Kuomintang to fight the Japanese invaders, he denounced the popular front between the CCP and Chiang as a betrayal of the Chinese masses. As Peng Shu-tse points out, Trotsky considered this point so important that he included it in the Transitional Program, the founding programmatic document of the Fourth International.

After the Second World War, Mao's efforts to form a coalition government headed by Chiang failed. Under heavy attack by Kuomintang forces, the CCP was compelled for reasons of self-preservation to launch a fight to the finish against Chiang and to countenance a sweeping agrarian revolution.

Chiang's regime, discredited by its failure to wage a real fight against Japanese imperialism, disintegrated rapidly while U.S. imperialism was unable to come to its aid effectively. Under these



Laura Gray/Militant

#### STALIN

conditions the CCP armies defeated Chiang's forces and marched into the cities, installing the Mao leadership in power.

Although with some delays and hesitations, the regime continued and even deepened the agrarian reform. Its policy toward the urban workers followed a different course. The CCP sought to form a coalition government, not with representatives chosen by the workers, but with the remnants of the bourgeois parties. Mao promised to retain capitalist property relations for decades.

The regime banned strikes and all other forms of independent working-class expression. The Trotskyists, who had devoted themselves to building a revolutionary workers party in the cities after the Stalinists turned to the peasantry, were arrested and imprisoned without charges or trial. The conflict with the working class that Trotsky predicted might happen took place, although in an attenuated form owing to the lack of a massive organized working-class movement.

Despite the class-collaborationist orientation of the CCP leaders, they were unable to forge solid alliances with any sector of the bourgeoisie. The new government remained independent of the capitalists, a "workers and farmers government" of the type mentioned by Trotsky in the Transitional Program.

When the U.S. invaded Korea and threatened China with a direct military assault, the Chinese bourgeoisie took heart and began to actively sabotage the new regime, making maximum use of its still-

powerful positions in the economy. The half-measures adopted by Mao had proved incapable of solving China's economic problems, which required not only political independence and agrarian reform but a planned economy. The CCP's attempt to create a "new democratic" regime had arrived at the "blind alley" Trotsky predicted.

Like the Stalinists in Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, the CCP broke out of the impasse by calling for the overthrow of capitalist property relations. Under the circumstances created by the Soviet victory in World War II and the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, the CCP was able to go further than Trotsky had thought possible for such a regime.

Mao found himself obliged to mobilize the urban workers against their employers—a course he had bitterly opposed during the preceding decades. The example of Eastern Europe had shown Mao that such mobilizations could be carried out without producing a direct challenge to the bureaucratic tops, provided they were tightly controlled, and no revolutionary party rooted among the workers existed as a pole of attraction.

At this decisive stage in the social revolution it was the workers who played the major part, with the peasants following in their trail. Unfortunately, both the workers and the peasants were politically subordinated to the bureaucratic commanders of the Stalinist CCP.

The overturn of capitalism represented a fundamental turning point for the Chinese revolution, one in which the cities and the working class began once again to demonstrate their dominant social role. Without this development, neither the military victory of Mao's armies nor the agrarian reform would have been enough to guarantee the victory of the third Chinese revolution.

The Maoist leadership took shape as the political and military command of a peasant army. On taking power in the whole country, they accorded themselves privileges in line with what they viewed as their rank and responsibilities. With the transformation of the economy, this layer now became the privileged bureaucratic caste of a workers state, the major internal obstacle to the further progress of the Chinese revolution. This caste is committed by its social interests, its historic methods of rule, and its program to oppose any steps toward real workers democracy.

It is a striking fact that from the "hundred flowers bloom" campaign of 1957 and the strikes of the Shanghai workers during the Cultural Revolution to the demonstration at Tien An Men Square in April 1976, it has been the Chinese working class that has presented the main social and political challenge to bureaucratic rule, although it remains a small minority of the population.

The question remains: If the peasantry

was not the fundamental revolutionary class in China, as Trotsky argues in this book, then why didn't the Chinese Trotskyists build a mass revolutionary alternative to Stalinism among the urban workers? The shattering effects of the defeat of the second Chinese revolution provide only part of the answer.

More important in prolonging the absence of the workers from the revolutionary field was the international weight of Stalinism. Because of the prestige of the Soviet Union and the wide identification of its progressive social basis with the bureaucratic regime, the Chinese workers accepted the CCP and its policies as the authentic representatives of socialism. The Soviet successes against the Nazis and the Red Armies' struggle against the Japanese in World War II increased this standing.

This powerful political force counseled passivity to the workers, educating them in the belief that the Chinese revolution confronted only bourgeois-democratic tasks. It assured them that the real movement of the Chinese proletariat was not to be found in the factories or the cities, but only in the CCP-led peasant armies, which declared themselves to be the sole representatives of the workers. As Trotsky wrote in 1932, "the revolutionary peasantry of China, in the person of its ruling stratum, seems to have appropriated to itself beforehand the political and moral capital which should by the nature of things belong to the Chinese workers" (p. 526).

The role of the Chinese workers in the present battles against the Maoist bureaucracy means that this historic detour in Chinese history has come to an end. With the new rise of workers' struggles, the most important opportunity for the building of a mass revolutionary Marxist party in China since the 1920s is coming into being. Such a party is indispensable if the Chinese workers state is to be freed from the stranglehold of the bureaucracy.

Revolutionary-minded militants in the colonial world who accept Mao's methods as the road to revolution in their own countries are making a grievous mistake. The third Chinese revolution was a product of the worldwide revolutionary upsurge at the end of World War II. In most of the world, Stalinist practices succeeded in preventing revolution. In a few countries where the Stalinists were forced to fight because of the recalcitrance of their bourgeois enemies, the revolutions took an extremely distorted form because of the bitter opposition of the Stalinists to the mobilization of the working class. Among the grossest expressions of these distortions are the bureaucratic dictatorships that Mao imposed in China and Ho Chi Minh installed in Vietnam.

Basing themselves on the peasants, the Chinese Stalinists fought on the basis of class-collaborationist and populist programs that put off the socialist revolution

to the far future. Although Chiang Kai-shek refused to attempt to co-opt such a program after World War II (as he had done in 1925-27), many bourgeois nationalist forces have emerged in the colonial



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#### CHIANG KAI-SHEK

world who have played that role with disastrous consequences for the workers and peasants. Sukarno in Indonesia, Bandaranaike in Sri Lanka, Nasser in Egypt, and Boumediene in Algeria, are examples.

The struggle against such populist demagogues requires a revolutionary-socialist party that bases itself on the working class. Such a party must seek to combine the demands for national liberation, the workers struggle against capitalism, and the peasant battle for land in a strategy aimed at winning power.

The record of "people's war" must be examined critically. The last thirty years have seen attempts in dozens of colonial lands to achieve victory along the path of rural guerrilla war. In only a few have victories been won. In many of these (such as Algeria, Mozambique, and Angola) the leaders, unable to decisively break the power of imperialism, have turned against the workers. Despite the widespread utilization of guerrilla war, the great bulk of the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America continue to suffer imperialist domination in its neocolonial form.

At the same time, the social changes that underlay Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution have continued to deepen. The industrialization of the neocolonial lands has increased significantly, the working class has grown substantially, while the social weight of the peasants has declined somewhat. Is it correct under

these circumstances for revolutionists to desert the working class in favor of a peasant orientation, or would it prove wiser to continue to focus on the one class with a direct stake in the battle for socialism?

The conditions that pushed the working class into the background of revolutionary struggle in the colonial lands during the post-World War II period are changing. Significantly, the ability of the Stalinists to effectively mislead and stifle the workers movement has weakened.

The prestige of the Moscow variety of Stalinism has been dealt severe blows by Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's crimes. The Maoist brand is now experiencing a similar fate as millions recoil from its counterrevolutionary foreign policy and as growing internal protest exposes the anti-working-class character of the government.

Under these circumstances, it is likely that revolutionary opportunities in the neocolonial lands will tend increasingly to resemble those of the second Chinese revolution.

Trotsky's criticisms of Stalinist policy in China, including his critique of what came to be called "people's war," have weathered the test of events. The strategy proposed by Mao is leading its remaining adherents to a dead-end.

In the coming years the ideas embodied in *Leon Trotsky on China* will demonstrate their usefulness as a guide to the problems of revolutionary strategy in the colonial world. Understanding them will prove to be a decisive factor in building revolutionary parties capable of preventing tragic defeats like that dealt to the second Chinese revolution. □

#### Dr. Morgentaler Faces Fourth Trial

The Canadian government has set December 13 as the date for the fourth trial of Dr. Henry Morgentaler on charges of performing an illegal abortion. Morgentaler has been acquitted of the charges against him by three separate juries, but the Québec government is continuing its vendetta against him. It has eight charges of performing illegal abortions still pending against Morgentaler.

#### African and Asian Writers Demand Release of Kim Chi Ha

A meeting of writers, poets, literary critics, and translators representing about fifty Asian and African countries has demanded the release of Kim Chi Ha, the imprisoned South Korean dissident, New Asia News reported November 5. The meeting, sponsored by the Afro-Asian Writers Association, was held in Tashkent from September 28 to October 3.



# Selections From the Left

## was tun

"What Is To Be Done," weekly paper of the International Marxist Group. Published in Frankfurt, West Germany.

Outside of Scandinavia, West Germany is probably the country where Maoist sects are strongest among the radicalized youth. In its November 4 issue, *Was Tun* examined the reaction of the three major groups that follow the Peking line to the purge of the "four dogs."

"As it did at the time of the ouster of Teng Hsiao-p'ing last spring, the KBW [Communist League of West Germany] preferred, until the question of power was clear in China, to cover itself by publishing correspondents' reports from the People's Republic.

"In the October 21 issue of *Kommunistische Volkszeitung*—that is two weeks after numerous reports in the bourgeois press about the rise of Hua Kuo-feng as the new party chairman and the ejection from power of the 'Shanghai Group,' there was not a word about the events in China. . . .

"A week later, with the official proclamation on Tien An Men square, they had firmer ground under their feet. Was this enough for them to write their own article? Far from it. The paper published a dispatch from Uwe Kräuter from Peking, which was already 100 percent in accordance with the line. It hailed all the 'revelations' about the 'gang of four' (including all the stories and slanders and the standard bureaucratic insults but without offering anything that would prove that the four were 'typical representatives of the bourgeoisie'. . . . To gild the lily, Kräuter wrote reassuringly that 'the movement has not stopped here; it will continue step by step to reveal the concrete content of the differences.' . . .

"The KPD [Communist party of Germany, a Maoist outfit that has adopted the old name of the West German CP] broke its silence only in the October 27 issue of *Rote Fahne*. In contrast to the KBW, it published its piece not on the third page but on the front one. Moreover, it made its comment not indirectly by publishing a correspondent's dispatch, but with an editorial and a telegram expressing the Central Committee's 'heartfelt' good wishes to the new Chinese leadership.

"With the stroke of a pen, with a servile recitation of Peking's new official formulas, this group has wiped out all it said over the years about Mao's 'closest companions in struggle.' . . .

"The KPD-ML really got itself caught in a briar patch. . . . The October 23 issue of *Rote Morgen* published prominently a long

article from the Peking and Tsinghua University Mass Criticism Group, a 'Criticism of Teng Hsiao-p'ing.' This 'Criticism Group' was an ideological center for the ousted 'gang of four.' It was dissolved on October 12 and its leading members arrested. What is more, an article hailed the Revolutionary Peking Opera—a special project of Mao's widow, the ousted Chiang Ch'ing. . . . Two pamphlets by the ousted Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao were recommended as 'timely.' . . . An article on the front page, entitled 'On the Events in China,' said:

"'As we go to press, wild speculations about events in the People's Republic of China, neither confirmed nor denied by Hsinhua News Agency or Radio Peking, are filling the columns of the bourgeois papers.'"

*Rote Morgen* commented: "As Comrade Ernst Aust said in his speech commemorating the death of Comrade Mao Tsetung, 'It is certain that some forces, counterrevolutionaries, revisionists, and renegades, will crawl out of their holes, and that they will try to cite the teachings of Mao Tsetung so as to rob them of their revolutionary content. . . . This has happened more rapidly than we expected.'"

Obviously the KPD-ML was rooting for the group now known as "the four dogs." So, now it faces a difficult decision. *Was Tun* points out: "To be consistent, it will have to say that 'bourgeois lords' have won in Peking."

There is also a Maoist group in Germany that tries to appeal to the centrist milieu, the Communist League (KB). This group was apparently already becoming convinced before Mao's death that identification with Peking was becoming politically unprofitable. The purge of the "four dogs" was the last straw. It denounced the event as a "rightist putsch." However, *Was Tun* points out, the KB cannot get off the hook so easily:

"Last spring the KB denounced as 'insolent speculation' our estimate that the Chinese working masses were confused about the differences in the party and state apparatus. How does the KB explain the fact that today millions of persons have been mobilized for the 'rightists'?"

RECONSTRUCT THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL!  
**TORCH**

Newspaper of the Revolutionary Socialist League, published monthly in New York.

Assessing recent developments in China, Jack Gregory and Ron Taber write in the November 15-December 14 issue: "The 'moderates' have carried out a surprisingly rapid and effective political coup against

their 'radical' opponents. In the name of Mao, they appear to have successfully liquidated virtually the entire faction in the party most closely identified with the deceased leader.

"In short, the Cultural Revolution has been reversed. The people surrounding Hua Kuo-feng are the same ones who were with Liu Shao-chi. Mao's collaborators in the Cultural Revolution are behind bars. The 'moderate' faction has seized complete control.

"This turn of events will have profound implications for China's domestic and foreign policies."

There are limits, however: "The struggle going on today does not in any way involve the class nature of China. There will be no 'restoration of capitalism' as a result of the 'moderate' victory. China has always been capitalist. Now, however, the 'proletarian-socialist' disguise of the regime is being stripped away."

## מצפן מרניסטי

"Matzpen Marxist" (*Marxist Compass*), organ of the Revolutionary Communist League. Published in Tel Aviv, Israel.

The October issue comments on the Great Helmsman's political career. "Few men leave their imprint on an era as Mao Tsetung did on our times," the article begins. "Hundreds of thousands of revolutionists mobilized behind this figure and his ideas. At the very mention of his name millions of hearts beat with the hope he symbolized. . . .

"Above all, Mao symbolizes the victorious Chinese revolution. He spearheaded the revitalization of the Communist party, previously destroyed by both Chiang Kai-shek and the criminal policies of the Stalinist Comintern. He mobilized masses of peasants, built the Red Army, and liberated China from the rule of imperialism and the Kuomintang. He founded and led the second workers state in history. . . .

"Mao also symbolizes the construction of a workers state to be distinguished both from Marxist proletarian democracy and from the Stalinist model. Mao maintained the Stalinist-school principle of party rule over and against the concept of soviet democracy. . . . However, in contrast to Stalin and the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy, Mao and his faction always saw to it that the masses were left with a certain degree of initiative. They even worked toward a reduction of privileges among layers of the bureaucracy so as not to widen the gap between the masses and the establishment."

Although in foreign policy "Mao still

remained bound to his Stalinist origins," he was the "theoretician of the partial, empirical break with Stalinism, a perspective that enabled the CCP to seize power, destroy Chinese capitalism, and avoid the grave errors committed by the Stalinist bureaucracy twenty-five years earlier.

"For a time Maoism did indeed appear as a left alternative to the traditional Communist parties. This appearance ended with the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution, the rightward shift in Chinese foreign policy, and the transformation of the Maoist organizations into Stalinist sects. Mao's death came well after the demise of Maoism in its critical stance toward Stalinism."

## workers world

*Weekly newspaper reflecting the views of the Workers World party. Published in New York.*

The October 15, 22, and 29 issues contain a three part series on "The suppression of the left in China" by Sam Marcy. According to Marcy, the purge of Mao's wife and her three associates is part of "a terrifying effort to turn the clock of history back in China. . . ."

"The elimination of these four from the leadership and their suppression mean that Mao's party is virtually being liquidated. . . ."

"The very large Tien An Men demonstration last April after Chou En-lai's death was a storm signal of what lay ahead. In a certain sense it was the last possible warning that the rightist reaction was strong, with solid social support in the upper layers of Chinese society far beyond what the numbers at the demonstration indicated."

Marcy argues that the purge of the "left" signifies the triumph of a "Thermidorian reaction," although not the restoration of capitalist property relations in China. "It should be stated that the entire struggle in China which began with the Cultural Revolution and which has lasted for well over a decade constituted a heroic effort to avoid a Thermidor," Marcy says.

He also notes that "the failure of the Shanghai working class to rally to their [the "left" leaders] defense has allowed the attack against the left wing to become a rout." He claims that "the masses were either tired, confused, or apathetic—a classical situation made to order for the triumph of a Thermidorian reaction."

Marcy, who sees the Cultural Revolution as "the high point of the Chinese Revolution," argues that "political reaction rose to formidable proportions in China in the early 1960s. To halt the trend, which came in the form of a revisionist assault unleashed by the Khrushchev report and the denunciation of Stalin, the CCP [Chinese Communist party] under the guidance and

initiative of Mao opened a revolutionary polemic against the leadership of the Soviet CP."

Certain excesses occurred later, however. "In the course of trying to annihilate the domestic rightists in China, the Mao leadership overextended itself and carried the struggle against the Soviet bureaucracy much further than was warranted, going to the extent of equating it with imperialism and even further to characterizing the real imperialists as a lesser evil."

## Guardian

*An independent radical newsweekly, published in New York.*

The November 10 issue contains the third article in a continuing series by managing editor Jack A. Smith, who is attempting to explain the twists and turns of Mao's successors in Peking.

Although in the previous installment Smith cast considerable doubt on the charges against the "four dogs," this week the purge is viewed in a more positive light. As Smith notes, "The 'gang of four'—the leftist leadership within the top ranks of the Communist Party—is swiftly on its way to political oblivion."

Smith takes the long view, pointing out that "the 'gang of four' rose to political prominence and power during the cultural revolution as dedicated followers of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line.

"But the cultural revolution did not—and could not—get China back on a socialist course once and for all. It achieved its immediate objective but Mao himself warned that such upheavals may be required periodically to defeat the tendency toward the growth of the bourgeoisie within the party. (Why within the party? Because under the dictatorship of the proletariat, where else could a bourgeoisie take root?)"

After defeating the "rightists" in the Cultural Revolution, Mao restored them to a portion of their power by rehabilitating Teng Hsiao-p'ing, according to Smith. "The chairman evidently figured that if Teng was sincerely self-critical for his past rightist deviations and promised (as he reportedly did) not to introduce practices that would restore capitalism, his old enemy might be a good transitional leader for China after he and Chou died. . . ."

But, Smith explains, the "gang of four" refused to take Teng's promise not to restore capitalism for good coin. "None of this was the subject of direct public debate but in retrospect it is apparent that the struggle these last several years was especially acute. . . ."

"Faced with the awesome responsibility of governing the entire country at a period the Communist Party now defines as 'the most difficult' since 1949 . . . Chairman Hua evidently decided to galvanize the middle forces and defeat the party left

before China was turned upside down again without a Chairman Mao or Premier Chou to set things straight once more."

Exit the "four dogs."

## NEISTI

*"Spark," published monthly by the Revolutionary Communist League in Reykjavik, Iceland.*

As in most Scandinavian countries, Maoism has been a strong current among radicalized students. *Neisti* asked representatives of the Maoist groupings KFMml and KSMLb to comment on the recent purge of the "four dogs," publishing the results of the inquiry in its September 28 issue.

The KSMLb declined to comment because, they said, "we have no information except what is in the bourgeois press." However, Gunnar Andrésson of the KFMml, who was evidently able to make a rapid estimate of the events, offered the following statement:

"It is our judgment that this is a struggle against the revisionist course and the revisionism that Wang Hung-wen and the others stood for. It is our appraisal that Hua Kuo-feng is faithful to Marxism-Leninism and the working class. It is not true, as the bourgeois mass media has suggested, that this is a struggle for power among individuals. What has been going on in China and continues to go on is a class struggle between two classes, the bourgeois class and the proletarian class.

"This struggle has been under way since the end of the Tenth Congress. Thousands of mass meetings have been held in the villages, workplaces, and cities. At a certain point this led to the clique around Teng Hsiao-p'ing being unmasked. Although Wang and his associates were not supporters of Teng and his revisionist course, they were only the left face of revisionism. The Chinese Communist party has been strengthened by this struggle."

## HAYTH

*"Aughe" (Dawn), the morning paper of the left. Published daily in Athens. Reflects the views of the Greek Communist party (interior).*

The November 14 issue has a long article on the Albanian Communist party congress, signed "Commentator." It gives a detailed summary of the foreign-policy line laid out at the meeting by the Albanian CP chief Enver Hoxha. The tone is distinctly friendly despite a listing of major differences between the views of the Greek CP (interior) and the Albanian party of Labor:

"Of course, we have fundamental differences with the Albanian views both on world politics and Balkan affairs. We categorically reject the view that the USSR

is an 'imperialist' power. . . .

"We reject the view that in the Balkans Bulgaria represents a danger for all the other Balkan peoples [as the agent of "Soviet social imperialism"]. We think that the danger comes from American imperialism and Turkish expansionism. We do not accept the advice offered by the Albanians that we should ally ourselves with the Turks to confront a nonexistent Bulgarian threat."

The CP (interior) has taken a stance of relative independence from the Kremlin, and is allied with the Italian, Yugoslav, and Romanian CPs. Accordingly, it has been able to align itself more consistently with Greek bourgeois nationalism.

At present it is engaged in a polemic with the CP (exterior), which closely follows the Moscow line, over whether or not the Soviet Union is giving Greece the proper support in its dispute with Turkey.

"Commentator" notes a number of differences in the line of the Hoxha leadership and Peking. He points out that a certain coldness has been perceptible in the relations between Tirana and Peking since Mao's death: "The name of Hua Kuo-feng is never mentioned, just as the Group of Four is never mentioned, although the Albanians did talk about the deviations of Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing."

What prompted the friendly tone in *Avghe* was apparently Hoxha's statements about Tirana's intentions to seek improved relations with the other Balkan countries, except for the Bulgarian Trojan Horse.

"Commentator quotes Hoxha as saying: "The present Greek government has maintained a friendly attitude toward Albania, which is in the interest of our two countries and to the detriment of our common enemies."

The CP (interior) has played up its friendly relations with the Yugoslav and Romanian CPs, offering its services to the Caramanlis government as an interlocutor able to secure important alliances for Greece. Apparently it is attentive to the possibility that after Mao's death, the Hoxha regime will seek new political and diplomatic alliances to avoid being left isolated by shifts in Peking's foreign policy.

## adelante!

"Forward!" a bulletin of news and opinion published in Buenos Aires.

The November 3 issue reports on a major repressive operation carried out south of Buenos Aires October 27.

"Four hundred blocks were totally surrounded during the day and military troops searched the majority of the houses and all the people who were in the area.

"This operation adds a new element to the vast regime of repression instituted

March 24—a massive dragnet for worker activists, intellectuals with progressive ideas, and any sort of enemy of the repression."

The target of the October 27 operation was made clear by the fact that it was centered in the neighborhoods where the striking light and power workers at SEG-BA (Electric Services of Greater Buenos Aires) live. It went "far beyond a search for guerrillas," the article points out. "The troops were not mainly looking for arms," *Adelante!* reports. They were there to interrogate the population, to find out the political opinions of the residents, and to promote informing by neighbors on each other.

The raid was preceded by a more limited drive west of the capital in an area where many foreign workers live. Foreign workers have been a special target of the junta's repression.

## labor Challenge

*Twice monthly newspaper published in Toronto, Canada.*

The escalating attack on the right of Québec's French-speaking majority to conduct its affairs in its own language is taken up by Dick Fidler in the November 8 issue. "The issue has emerged in its sharpest form yet in the Quebec election campaign," Fidler says.

At issue is Bill 22, passed in 1974. "The bill had the modest goal of making French the official language of Quebec—that is, of giving French the same status in Quebec that English enjoys in the other nine provinces. . . .

"Far from imposing French unilingualism, the legislation gave legal force to bilingualism. It went to great lengths to recognize the use of English as well as French. . . .

"The English-speaking corporate rulers of Quebec refuse to even consider the demand for a unilingual French Quebec. . . . The oppression of the French majority in Quebec reinforces the exploitation of French-speaking workers in Quebec and across Canada, maintaining them as a pool of low-wage labor distinguished above all by their language.

"Bill 22 has proven to be a rather ineffectual weapon in confronting this problem. . . .

"The deficiencies in Bill 22 were strongly attacked by Quebecois nationalists when the legislation was being adopted. But the major attack on the bill today comes from a quite different direction. Many of the opponents of Bill 22 want to force the withdrawal of any legislation that would give French priority over English in Quebec. Unfortunately, some provisions of Bill 22 provide them with a handle to further this reactionary aim.

"Instead of tackling the corporate and constitutional roots of discrimination

against the French language, the Bourassa government [in Québec] singled out immigrants as its major target, making them in effect the scapegoats for Quebec's anglicization.

"Traditionally, most immigrants in Quebec have opted to be educated in English. As the editors of *La Presse* explained Sept. 23, 'they quickly discovered, as have many French Canadians, that you must learn English to earn a good living; and the best way to learn English is to enroll in an English school since the French schools teach it badly.'

"Bill 22 maintains the English school system. But it forces the children of francophones and immigrants who want to attend English schools to pass a test to prove they have a 'sufficient knowledge' of English.

"The effect is to increase discrimination, not lessen it. English becomes more than ever the exclusive privilege of the minority whose mother tongue is English. . . .

"The logical approach would be to establish a unilingual French-language school system, open to all children, with other languages, such as English, or Spanish, or whatever, taught as secondary options. . . .

"But a unilingual school system, based on the assumption that Quebec will be French, implicitly challenges English domination in other spheres, especially business and commerce. It raises the whole question of what social class is to rule Quebec. And that is why Quebec's capitalist politicians oppose it."

## AZAD HAY

*"Free Armenian," an Armenian revolutionary bulletin published in Toronto, Canada.*

Issue No. 7-8, printed in English, features a twenty-eight-page article offering a brief history and overview of the Armenian national struggle and its relation to the world revolution. In a statement on the inside cover, the editors present their political point of view:

"Contrary to generally held views, contrary to the propaganda of the three Armenian political parties, the Armenian Question is not only a land problem. . . .

"The Armenian Question is the right of every Armenian to self determination, whether she/he lives in Soviet Armenia, or elsewhere in the diaspora. This means:

"A. In the diaspora, (1) the right of the Armenian communities, in the countries in which they exist, to cultural autonomy, with the financial help of the local governments, but under the control of the community. (2) The right of every Armenian to return to Turkish 'Occupied Armenia' if he/she so desires.

"B. In Soviet Armenia, the right of the people to form an independent, socialist state."

# AROUND THE WORLD



## U.S. Congressmen at Work

U.S. Congressmen take their work of running the world seriously. According to Pentagon records, six planeloads of them left Andrews Air Force Base in one week for Australia, Hong Kong, India, Finland, and Iran.

A military officer is assigned to accompany each flight. He carries extra spending money, "amounts of \$10,000 cash aren't uncommon," according to the *Chicago Tribune*.

Navy files for one Asian trip illustrate how the money is used.

Capt. Richard Hooper spent \$8,276 on eight congressmen and their wives. The expenses included \$500 for liquor and other "beverages," \$1,471 for "meals and refreshments," \$1,419 for "entertainment," \$1,140 for "transportation," and \$4,245 for "miscellaneous."

"The \$1,419 for entertainment went to rent tennis courts, take the congressmen scuba diving in Hawaii, buy snorkles and tour tickets," continued the *Chicago Tribune*.

"The Navy spent \$789 to set up a 'control room' at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, which was a hospitality suite and gathering place during the Hawaiian visit. Another \$245 was spent on a similar 'control room' on Guam.

"The delegation visited Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Guam, Okinawa and Hawaii.

"The biggest 'black bag' spending was \$3,825 for the congressmen's hotel rooms, even though each drew \$75 a day from embassy funds. While on U.S. soil each got \$50 in government funds to cover their daily expenses."

### Voters Prefer Beans to Candidates

The legal opposition in Brazil appears to have won a victory in the large cities in the municipal elections held throughout the country November 15.

United Press International reported that the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB—Brazilian Democratic Movement) had a 2 to 1 lead over the government party, Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA—Alliance for National Renewal), in Rio de Janeiro. It was also credited with a wide margin in São Paulo and other coastal cities.

Only the MDB and ARENA were permitted to field candidates. In addition, the campaign was not allowed to begin until one month before the elections, and candi-

dates were banned from using radio or television for campaigning—except to state their names, party affiliation, a brief summary of their background, and the time and place polls would be open.

Accordingly, many void ballots were cast in protest. Some voters reportedly wrote "beans" on their ballots instead of the name of a candidate, in protest against the scarcity of this basic food item.

### Franco's Torturers Still at Work

The political changes after November 1975 have not stopped the practice of torture in Spain," Amnesty International reports.

"At the present time torture almost always is inflicted on those persons who are being interrogated within the legally authorized 10 day limit. They are frequently released without being charged. The exact number of persons subjected to this treatment is not known but as only a minority of torture victims testify to their treatment it can be assumed that there are at least several hundred cases. This situation has not been affected by the partial amnesty for political prisoners announced on 4 August 1976."

### Maoist 'Democracy' in Action

Official notices in Changsa—the capital of Mao Tsetung's native Hunan province—report that a man has been executed for scratching out the name of Communist party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng on wall posters there. According to a November 14 Reuters dispatch, the man, who reportedly refused to repent, was sentenced to death "for crimes of counterrevolution."

Other notices in Changsa, according to travelers arriving in Peking, announced the execution of a woman accused of prostitution.

### Austerity Moves in Israel Set Off Wave of Strikes

Cuts in government subsidies of basic foodstuffs and other commodities have resulted in sharp price increases in Israel. Food prices went up by 20% in the beginning of November, and fuel prices rose 11%. Inflation this year is running at a rate of about 35%.

The austerity moves were part of a series of cutbacks intended to reverse Israel's balance of payments deficit and overcome the stagnation of the economy at the expense of the working class. The Israeli

gross national product increased only 1% in 1975, and it is expected to do only slightly better this year. The balance of payments deficit was \$4 billion last year and it is expected to be about \$3.5 billion this year.

The new attacks on the standard of living were answered by strikes involving about 115,000 workers in the public sector. Hospital workers, social workers, civil engineers, aircraft workers, bank employees, city workers, harbor pilots, and others went on strike. Workers at one factory detained their bosses for thirty-six hours to protest threatened layoffs.

### Irish Labour Party Under Fire for Role in Bourgeois Coalition

Delegates to the annual convention of the Workers' Union of Ireland voted unanimously in Dún Laoghaire October 31 to call a special conference to review the position of the Labour party in the ruling coalition government. The Workers' Union is the second largest trade union in the Dublin-ruled part of Ireland.

The conference is to include union delegates, as well as members of national and local government bodies who belong to the union. A motion calling on the Labour party to withdraw from the coalition was tabled and referred to the special meeting.

The coalition government is dominated by Fine Gael, the historically more proimperialist of the two main bourgeois parties in the neocolonialist Irish state. It was elected in 1973 on a platform that promised to keep the conflict in Northern Ireland from spreading to the south and pledged certain social reforms. In the preceding period, increased imperialist investment had brought relatively greater prosperity.

However, since the coalition's victory this relative prosperity has largely vanished. In a climate of sharpening class struggle, the unions feel threatened by new repressive legislation ostensibly designed to crush the militant nationalist movements.

At the Workers Union convention, the coalition came in for strong criticism. Delegate Dermot Boucher said: "Coalition has not been in the interests of working people. In four years of Coalition the cost-of-living has almost doubled; unemployment in real terms is more than double. Social welfare benefits are the same in real

terms as those of Fianna Fáil [the bourgeois party defeated in 1973]."

Workers' Union General Secretary Denis Larkin said that if the government failed to make the promised improvements in social benefits, the Labour party should withdraw from the coalition.

In the November 1 *Irish Times*, a special correspondent on trade-union affairs commented that the convention decision to call a special meeting to review the coalition "will come as something of a shock to Labour Ministers.

"Up to very recently the union was the strongest for Labour Party affiliation."

### Abortion Protest in Florence Jail

Three Radical party deputies began a sit-in in Florence's La Murate prison November 4. They got in by using their parliamentary prerogative to talk to prisoners. The deputies demanded the release of Dr. Giorgio Conciani, held in prison since early September awaiting trial on charges related to his work with the abortion clinic in Florence.

Two of the three Radical deputies, Emma Bonino and Adele Faccio, have also been charged for their work with the abortion clinic. Faccio is a leading figure in the struggle for the right of Italian women to control their own bodies. The third deputy was Mauro Mellini.

The Radical party deputies also demanded the application of the Italian prison reform law and an end to imprisonment of persons awaiting trial. Two-thirds of the prisoners in La Murate are in that category. Soon after the sit-in began, an organization of prisoners in La Murate got out a leaflet supporting the Radical deputies. The next evening, hundreds of prisoners in the Regina Coeli jail in Rome began raising demands for application of the reform law.

In the November 14 issue of the Rome weekly *L'Espresso*, Tullio Fazzolari reported that the Radical party was considering trying to get the parliamentary right of inquiry extended to allow deputies to go into other public institutions, such as military bases.

### Four Sentenced in Sri Lanka for Alleged Role in 1971 Revolt

The Sri Lanka Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) has concluded the last of its trials against suspected participants in the April 1971 insurgency, which was led by members of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP—People's Liberation Front).

On November 4, the CJC convicted four more young activists on the insurgency charges. B. Wijeratne was sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment, but had his sentence suspended for medical reasons. G. Kularatne and W.A. Somadasa were both sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment. B. Gnanapala drew a term of three years rigorous imprisonment.

According to the November 5 *Ceylon Daily News*, Gnanapala was found guilty "of having conspired to overawe by means of criminal force the government of Ceylon and waging war against the [British] Queen."

Kularatne, Somadasa, and Gnanapala will join about 2,000 other JVP members and sympathizers who are still in the jails of Sri Lanka.

### Carlos Fonseca Amador Reported Slain in Clash with Nicaraguan Troops

According to a November 13 Reuters dispatch from Havana, the Sandinist guerrilla movement reported that its leader, Carlos Fonseca Amador, was killed November 8 in a clash with government troops in Nicaragua's mountainous northern region.

Speaking in behalf of the Sandinist movement José Escobar accused the United States government of supporting the Somoza dictatorship with 1,100 specially trained troops.

### Women Invade Court in Madrid to Protest Adultery Charges

Representatives of women's organizations invaded a court in Madrid November 16 to protest the trial of a woman and her employer charged with adultery and facing prison terms of up to six years.

In another action, women handed the Ministry of Justice a petition containing 12,000 names demanding that the law making adultery a crime be repealed. The law is applied far more often against women than men and has thus become a special target of the women's liberation movement.

This was the third time in less than two months that demonstrations have been staged at trials of women accused of adultery.

### New Bomb Gives Israeli Regime Greater 'Pre-emptive Capability'

Israeli sources have denied that they want to use the new fuel-air explosive bombs being provided by the Ford administration as antipersonnel weapons. The new bombs are capable of generating a blast with the force of 300 pounds per square inch. An arch of reinforced concrete six feet thick will collapse under the impact of 100 pounds per square inch, and the Egyptian air force was housed in such shelters following the Israeli attack of 1967, when it was caught on the ground and destroyed.

Noting that heavy concrete blast doors make the Egyptian shelters nearly immune to conventional explosives, the authors of a recent study argue that without the fuel-air explosive bomb, Israel's only recourse in a future war would be to use nuclear warheads.

The argument that the Israeli regime

will be "forced" to use nuclear weapons if it is not armed to the teeth with every other means of mass destruction available has also been made by the Israelis themselves in their demands for more arms. In any case, the authors of the study—Steven J. Rosen and Martin Inyk of the Australian National University—say that the new bombs may "in the not too distant future once again" provide the Israeli air force "with an effective pre-emptive capability to knock out hundreds of aircraft on the ground—in their shelters if necessary—and alter the air balance within hours of a decision to strike."

### ACLU Supports Irish Newspaper Against Justice Department Action

The American Civil Liberties Union has asked Attorney General Levi to halt an attempt by the Justice Department to force the *Irish People*—a newspaper published in the United States—to register as an agent of the Irish Northern Aid Committee. The ACLU said that the department's move smacks of censorship.

The action against the newspaper is pending in a federal court in Washington. The Justice Department claims that the newspaper should be registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, alleging that it has received financial and other assistance from the INAC, which is itself registered as the "agent of a foreign principal."

The ACLU said that the application of the Foreign Agents Registration Act to a newspaper is a "distortion" of the purpose of the legislation.

By stretching the law to include the newspaper, the ACLU contends, the department could further stretch it to include anyone who purchases a copy of the paper or writes a letter to the editor.

The newspaper supports the Irish Republican Army. However, the ACLU letter said, other ethnic and religious newspapers published in the U.S. are "as committed to their variety of causes."



"Check everything! If there's life up there, there should be some record of arms sales from the U.S."

# Capitalism Fouls Things Up



## Can You Entomb Toxic Kepone 'Forever'?

Last May, the Allied Chemical Corp. was indicted by a federal grand jury on 1,094 criminal charges for dumping industrial wastes into the James River. The discharges included Kepone, an ant and roach poison found to have caused tremors and impairment of sight in those exposed to it.

The discovery of the chemical in federal water led to a ban on commercial fishing on the sixty-mile stretch of water below Hopewell, Virginia. A multimillion-dollar industry based on shad and oysters was especially affected.

Fined \$13.3 million on October 5, the corporation stopped manufacturing the pesticide. However, it still faces the problem of getting rid of the Kepone wastes that it is holding in Baltimore.

A large amount of the poison is stored in scrap metal. Tests are now being made at a research laboratory in Toledo, Ohio, to destroy 85,000 pounds by high-temperature incineration.

However, another 5,000 pounds of Kepone is mixed with arsenic, a poison that cannot be burned, since it would be released into the air.

Besides this, there are sixty tons of Kepone sludge in barrels that are not easily burned, and five tons of contaminated steel and other junk from dismantled manufacturing facilities.

The company decided to open negotiations with an outfit in Idaho, 2,000 miles away. The problem might be solved there.

Thirteen underground missile launching cylinders built forty miles south of Boise in the 1960s were later deactivated and sold by the federal government. The Wes-Con Company, a Twin Falls disposal concern, acquired them in 1973 and is now using them for disposal of various wastes.

The silos are 160 feet deep, fifty feet in diameter, with concrete walls six feet thick, and floors thirteen feet thick.

Representatives of Wes-Con and Allied Chemical told Idaho officials that the unburnable material could be entombed in one of the silos, theoretically forever.

However, some people are dubious. They think that the silo would eventually deteriorate, possibly releasing the Kepone.

The president of Wes-Con brushed this objection aside, saying that the deposit would be crushed into a virtually solid mass through a concrete-like "encapsulation" of clay and lime.

N. Ed Barker, solid waste director of the Health and Welfare Department, said the silos were far above any water table, and had been designed to resist even the shock of an atomic bomb.

For the time being, the Idaho authorities are thinking it over, probably awaiting the public's reaction to the proposed deal.

A possibility not reported in the press is that any leaks developed in transporting the stuff could leave a 2,000-mile path in the United States remarkably free of ants and roaches.

## Eating Swordfish Steaks May Have 'Subtle Effects'

In 1970 a total of 19,240,841 pounds of swordfish steaks and 8,779,171 pounds of whole fish were imported in the United States. By 1974 the total had plummeted to 4,745 pounds of steaks and 20,736 pounds of whole fish.

The decline is ascribed to a report issued in May 1971 by the Federal Food and Drug Administration, revealing that more than 90 percent of samples tested exceeded the 0.5 parts per million of mercury considered by the agency to be the safety limit.

Dr. Samuel Shibko, an FDA toxicologist, said, "I myself am unaware of anyone in the United States" suffering damage from

consuming swordfish.

However, he admitted: "There's always the possibility of subtle effects that at present we don't have techniques to measure."

## Odds Rise Against Las Vegas

Las Vegas, Nevada, the sun-drenched oasis for gambling and other lucrative forms of entertainment, is now facing serious air pollution, and it's getting worse, according to a November 9 AP dispatch.

Carbon monoxide levels have increased steadily in the last three years, Mike Naylor, a county official, reported. The cause, he said, is "more people driving more cars" moving into the city. An industrial complex in nearby Henderson adds to the problem.

## Smog Reaches Death Valley

According to a study made public by the National Park Resources Unit, Death Valley's desert holly plant is facing extinction because of ozone believed to be traveling almost 200 miles from Los Angeles.

In August 1975, ozone measurements showed 0.8 parts per million. A smog alert is called in most major cities in the USA when the ozone level reaches 0.2 parts per million.

## Rotten-Egg Smell Under Attack

Under new rules proposed by an agency of the United States government, the rotten-egg smell from new kraft pulp mills that process wood chips for the production of paper products will be greatly reduced.

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, the odor problems from such mills are a "serious environmental concern to residents living near a plant."

Under the proposed rules, the allowed emissions of particulate matter would be reduced 89 percent. Sulphur compounds, which are responsible for the rotten-egg smell, would be reduced about 95 percent.

The rules, if accepted and enforced, would apply to about seventy new or rebuilt mills in the next five years.

The EPA said that the effect on the growth of the industry would be "negligible."



Tom Wilson/Washington Post

## Bernadette Devlin: ¡Salven la Vida de los Murray!

Por Gerry Foley

[El siguiente artículo apareció en el número del 22 de noviembre de nuestra revista, con el título "Bernadette Devlin Campaigns Across U.S. to Save Murrays." La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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Bernadette Devlin McAliskey comenzó una gira de dos semanas por Estados Unidos el 7 de noviembre. En una conferencia de prensa en la ciudad de Nueva York, hizo un llamado a los irlandeses-norteamericanos, a las personas humanitarias y a los defensores de las garantías individuales a que se pronuncien de inmediato para salvar de la horca a una joven pareja irlandesa. Ha repetido este llamado en reuniones, conferencias y actos por todo Estados Unidos.

Una semana antes de la llegada de McAliskey a Estados Unidos, se presentó ante la Corte Suprema irlandesa la apelación final de Marie y Noel Murray. Los dos tienen menos de treinta años. El 10 de junio fueron condenados en Dublín a morir ahorcados porque supuestamente habían asesinado a un policía que no estaba en servicio, cuando escapaban tras haber asaltado un banco.

Dos de los tres diarios de mayor circulación en Nueva York, el *Daily News* y el *New York Post*, informaron sobre la declaración inicial de McAliskey.

En Philadelphia, la primer ciudad donde habló en un acto público, los medios de información comentaron extensamente las declaraciones de McAliskey.

Reglamentos heredados de la jurisprudencia inglesa prohíben a la prensa irlandesa publicar comentarios sobre el caso de los Murray. Según estos reglamentos, el tratar de influenciar decisiones en casos criminales es considerado un desacato a la corte. Cualquier persona que hable públicamente a favor de un acusado y cualquier periódico que publique tales declaraciones pueden ser procesados.

Los dos periódicos más respetados de Irlanda, el *Irish Times* y la revista quincenal literaria *Hibernia*, ya han sido llevados a la corte por publicar declaraciones acerca del caso. En cuanto al primero, el comentario ofensivo era una cita extraída de un comunicado de prensa por parte de la Association for Legal Justice [Asociación pro Justicia Legal], un grupo que defiende las garantías individuales. Respecto al segundo, era la carta de un lector.

Mientras que la ley que prohíbe comen-

tar públicamente un juicio se observó estrictamente en el caso de los Murray, a la mayoría de las demás leyes de la jurisprudencia británica e irlandesa se las ignoró por completo. Fueron condenados a muerte por un tribunal especial. Se les negó el derecho a ser juzgados por un jurado compuesto por sus iguales. No se aplicaron los reglamentos normales referentes a las pruebas de culpabilidad.

El juicio se realizó en un ambiente de cacería de brujas contra los militantes nacionalistas, a quienes el gobierno acusa de reunir fondos por medio de crímenes violentos para operaciones militares contra las fuerzas británicas. A principios de abril, sólo pocas semanas antes de que se sentenciara a los Murray, la policía detuvo a más de veinte miembros de la organización nacionalista militante más pequeña y vulnerable, el Irish Republican Socialist Party [Partido Socialista Republicano Irlandés—IRSP], porque supuestamente eran sospechosos de haber participado en el asalto a un tren. Los carceleros intentaron arrancarles "confesiones" a fuerza de golpes. La evidencia de las brutales palizas que recibieron era tan obvia que causó un escándalo nacional. El director del periódico del IRSP sufrió un derrame cerebral.

Los Murray, que anteriormente apoyaban activamente al movimiento republicano Oficial,\* dicen que les extrajeron declaraciones por medio de torturas e intimidación, y luego las citaron para comprobar que eran culpables.

El 9 de noviembre, McAliskey habló ante más de quinientas personas en la Universidad de Temple en Philadelphia, frente a un cartel enorme que decía: "Dublín: No Ahorques a Marie y Noel Murray."

En un artículo en el *Daily News* de Philadelphia, uno de los diarios de mayor circulación de esa ciudad, Jack McKinney informó:

"No se ha ahorcado a nadie en la República de Irlanda en más de 30 años, señaló Bernadette, pero el gobierno daría marcha atrás a la historia ahorcando a la pareja de jóvenes anarquistas llamados Marie y Noel Murray el mes que viene. . . ."

\*En 1969 hubo una escisión del movimiento republicano entre la mayoría encaminada hacia una política socialista, y los nacionalistas menos politizados. A la mayoría se le llamó "Oficial" y a la minoría "Provisional." En 1975, elementos estalinistas sectarios ganaron el control de los "Oficiales."

"O bien el viejo Pierpont [el verdugo que Dublín acostumbraba a importar de Inglaterra para las ejecuciones que no quería hacer ningún irlandés] se murió, o está demasiado endeble para hacerlo," añadió. "Por eso han traído otro verdugo, nada menos que desde Rhodesia."

McAliskey dijo que el gobierno escogió a estos dos individuos aislados para probar si se podía restablecer la pena de muerte:

"Como son anarquistas y no pertenecen a ninguna agrupación política formal, el apoyo al caso de los Murray se movilizó lentamente," señaló Bernadette. "Pero el ahorcarlos renovarían la dimensión más fea de la justicia irlandesa, y no serían ellos sus últimas víctimas. Sólo esperamos que nuestros esfuerzos no sean demasiado poco ni lleguen demasiado tarde."

En la Iglesia Metodista Unida del Calvario, en las afueras del ghetto negro en Philadelphia, McAliskey habló sobre la importancia de la lucha contra la represión en Irlanda para los norteamericanos. John Dubois informó en el *Evening Bulletin* sobre lo que ella dijo:

"Lo que más rotundamente quiero hacer entender," dijo, es que las organizaciones irlandesas-americanas tienen tanta responsabilidad de ayudar a los oprimidos en su propio país como en Irlanda.

"Sin embargo, dijo la Sra. McAliskey, los norteamericanos hoy en día 'no pueden esquivar la lucha irlandesa' y seguir diciendo que están a favor del mejoramiento de la humanidad.

"Para algunos norteamericanos la lucha en Irlanda se ha vuelto un ciclo fastidioso e 'interminable de bomba tras bomba, muerte tras muerte,' continuó. Y a algunos el problema irlandés les parece un residuo medieval que enfrenta interminablemente al 'republicano contra el realista, al católico contra el protestante.'

"Pero la lucha es real, declaró, y está 'relacionada' a las luchas contra la opresión en Estados Unidos y el mundo entero. . . ."

"En otro momento dijo: 'No puede haber paz mientras exista un instrumento de opresión. En Irlanda éste es el imperialismo británico.

"Si quieren acabar con la violencia en la política irlandesa, retiren de Irlanda la fuerza armada más grande, los 20,000 soldados británicos.'

"Comparó las fuerzas británicas que están en Irlanda con la inmensa fuerza norteamericana que fue a Vietnam para 'arbitrar' la guerra en ese país. 'Uno no pone esa cantidad de hombres armados en

un país para que sirvan de árbitros; [a menos] que participe en la guerra,' dijo."

En un artículo sobre McAliskey en el *Inquirer* de Philadelphia del 10 de noviembre, Elizabeth Duff informaba:

"Ella dice que a los jóvenes de Ulster no les 'atraen' las organizaciones militantes, sino que buscan 'una forma política de luchar contra sus opresores,' los británicos, quienes, según ella, les niegan empleos y garantías individuales.

"Pero también ha venido a predicar un poco a los norteamericanos. Su tema: la integración racial de las escuelas.

"A nosotros nos resulta extraño ver a nuestra gente en Estados Unidos, los irlandeses-norteamericanos, ponerse en contra de aquello por lo que estamos luchando en nuestro país. Cuando uno ve

en los noticieros internacionales lo que ocurre, sobre todo en Boston, hace que uno se estremezca.

"Es importante explicarles las contradicciones que ellos mismos tienen. Sus argumentos son muy realistas [es decir, como los que utilizan los colonizadores protestantes contra los católicos oprimidos]."

McAliskey fue una de las principales oradoras en la conferencia de la Student Coalition Against Racism [Coalición Estudiantil contra el Racismo], que se realizó en Boston el 19 de noviembre.

En la Universidad de Maryland en College Park el 10 de noviembre, McAliskey habló ante mil personas. En la Universidad de California en Los Angeles, 400 personas acudieron a su conferencia.

En el Immaculate Heart College, en la misma ciudad, 600 personas asistieron al acto. La gira culminó con un foro en el Barnard College de Nueva York el 20 de noviembre.

En la mayoría de las ciudades que visitó, McAliskey habló ante grupos de activistas irlandeses, exhortándolos a que defiendan a los Murray. En sus conferencias se circularon peticiones a favor de la joven pareja. En la Ciudad de Nueva York se formó el Ad Hoc Murray Defense Committee [Comité Ad Hoc para la Defensa de los Murray] para movilizar apoyo para ellos. Este convocó una manifestación frente a las Aerolíneas Irlandesas en la Quinta Avenida, el 20 de noviembre, en la que habló McAliskey.

## La Burocracia Responde con Falsificaciones al Acto de París

# Apoyo del PCF a Disidentes Presos Molesta al Kremlin

Por Gerry Foley

[A continuación traducimos el artículo "Kremlin Stung by French CP Support to Imprisoned Dissidents," que apareció en nuestra revista el 22 de noviembre. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

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En el número del 27 de octubre de *Literaturnaia Gazeta* [Revista de Literatura], se informó por primera vez al público soviético sobre la participación del Partido Comunista Francés en el acto del 21 de octubre en la Mutualité de París, donde se planteó la defensa de las víctimas de la represión política en América Latina al mismo tiempo que la de las víctimas de la represión burocrática en la Unión Soviética y Europa Oriental.

Inmediatamente después del acto de la Mutualité, la agencia noticiosa soviética TASS hizo una declaración de denuncia. Pero ésta no fue publicada en la URSS. Aparentemente, su objetivo era servir de advertencia para los partidos comunistas de los países capitalistas.

El acto de París molestó claramente a la burocracia del Kremlin. Parece que la respuesta en *Literaturnaia Gazeta* tenía el objetivo de reforzar a los sectores "ideológicos" de la burocracia para enfrentar la amenaza que representa el hecho de que uno de los grandes partidos comunistas de Europa Occidental se haya asociado a las protestas contra la represión en el "mundo socialista."

El comentario de la revista soviética comenzaba con un breve artículo, firmado "Gregory Kozlov," que tenía un tono furibundo:

El jueves pasado, en la sala de la Mutualité de París, se realizó una ruidosa manifestación antisoviética. La abigarrada concurrencia fue convocada por el llamado Comité de Matemáticos, que es conocido desde hace mucho tiempo por su antisovietismo. En el presidium del mitin, junto al presidente de ese comité, Laurent Schwartz, estaban uno de los cabecillas de la contrarrevolución en Checoslovaquia, Pelikan; una señora de Amnistía Internacional—conocida firma internacional que se especializa en falsificaciones antisoviéticas; un representante de la federación sindical reaccionaria Force Ouvrière; el escritor Pierre Emmanuel, que demostró el odio que siente por nuestro país cuando fue presidente del PEN club internacional. En los corredores se distribuían gratuitamente papeluchos antisoviéticos. Desde la tribuna, los oradores dijeron todo tipo de necedades acerca de la Unión Soviética, "acusando" a nuestro estado de "persecuir" a "personas inocentes" por sus "opiniones."

El artículo enfatizaba que el Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Uruguay había protestado contra la asociación que se hizo en el acto del caso de su camarada José Luis Massera con el de los presos políticos soviéticos y de Europa Oriental. Citaba una declaración de la dirección del PC uruguayo, la mayoría del cual se encuentra probablemente exiliada en la URSS, donde se decía que era inadmisibles "utilizar el nombre de los patriotas uruguayos para realizar una campaña cuyo verdadero objetivo es distorsionar la situación real de los países socialistas."

Se citaba otra parte de la declaración del Comité Central del PC uruguayo donde se decía que el acto había estado al servicio de la "reacción internacional, que está tratando de acabar con la distensión y con la paz y la libertad entre los pueblos. En

nombre de todos los patriotas uruguayos, condenamos esta actividad."

Los oradores del acto, decía el artículo, trataron de "demostrar algo para lo que no hay ninguna prueba: que en la URSS no hay libertad ni democracia, y que en este país se violan los derechos de los ciudadanos." Terminaba diciendo: "En este contexto, es difícil entender por qué había representantes del Partido Comunista Francés entre los participantes del acto en la Mutualité."

El gacetillero del Kremlin que escribió este artículo se burlaba de que los oradores hubieran tratado de convertir al luchador antiburocrático Vladimir Bukovsky "en una especie de superhéroe." En cuanto a este "individuo," sin embargo, dejaba la palabra al Primer Viceministro de Justicia A.Y. Sujarev, con quien se publicaba una entrevista en el mismo número de la revista, para que explicara los verdaderos hechos.

La entrevista con Sujarev ocupaba toda la siguiente página. Había una ilustración muy prominente del ministro, y las columnas estaban enmarcadas con líneas negras. Al parecer, esto debía servir como una respuesta contundente para las protestas contra la represión en la Unión Soviética.

En su primera pregunta, el "corresponsal especial" de *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, V. Aleksandrov, pidió al ministro que hablara sobre la "propaganda burguesa" acerca de la represión en la URSS. Sujarev empezó por explicar que la burguesía mundial estaba haciendo todo lo posible por desprestigiar al estado soviético.

La segunda pregunta era la siguiente: "Uno de los argumentos favoritos de los



propagandistas burgueses es que en la URSS se encierra a los llamados disidentes en hospitales psiquiátricos. ¿Que puede decir al respecto?"

Sujarev respondió:

Lo absurdo de esas declaraciones resulta obvio para cualquiera que conozca mínimamente nuestras leyes y nuestra práctica legal.

No es necesario decir que el pueblo soviético condena a quienes sostienen puntos de vista contrarios a los intereses fundamentales del pueblo, a las normas políticas e ideológicas que imperan en nuestra sociedad. Pero quiero subrayar que, según las leyes soviéticas, los ciudadanos no tienen que responder ante cortes criminales ni administrativas por las opiniones que tengan. Y los señores propagandistas saben muy bien que no se trata de "disidencia," sino de actos concretos.

Unos cuantos párrafos más adelante, Sujarev menciona los "actos concretos" por los que fue procesado Bukovsky. "En 1963, fue sentenciado por reproducir y distribuir sistemáticamente literatura anti-soviética, que llamaba a organizar actividades en contra del régimen que existe en nuestro país. Repito, no fue por 'disidencia,' sino por acciones concretas."

La implicación era que Sujarev estaba orgulloso del avance que se ha visto en lo que respecta a los derechos de los ciudadanos soviéticos desde la muerte de Stalin. Es decir, ahora por lo general ya no se les condena por los puntos de vista que sostengan en privado o que mantengan dentro de un restringido círculo de amigos, siempre y cuando no se escriba nada. Esto constituye una importante reducción del terrorismo oficial. En tiempos de Stalin, la policía perseguía incluso los pensamientos disidentes, tal y como hace hasta nuestros días la policía maoísta.

Sin embargo, era indudable que Sujarev se daba cuenta de que el hecho de que el Kremlin permita que los ciudadanos piensen en privado ideas disidentes no da la impresión de que en la URSS haya una libertad política muy amplia, ni siquiera ante los ojos de los lectores soviéticos. Por eso se apresuró a advertir a los lectores que no pidieran "lo imposible":

¿Podían permanecer indiferentes los órganos de justicia soviéticos ante la sistemática actividad antigubernamental de Bukovsky? No, claro que no podían. ¿Pueden señalar los "defensores" de Bukovsky algún país donde las leyes no prevean la defensa del sistema de gobierno existente? Todo el mundo sabe que ese estado no ha existido nunca y no existe actualmente.

Esta declaración franca puede reflejar lo que Sujarev piensa realmente. La policía secreta de todo el mundo se justifica en términos similares.

Sin embargo, el siguiente párrafo tenía un tono hipócrita. Sujarev dijo que en contraste desafortunado con las libertades de que gozan los ciudadanos soviéticos, en Alemania Occidental se persigue a las personas por sus creencias, por medio de una lista negra. No puede dejar de reconocer que estas regulaciones represivas se

aplican contra personas que pertenecen a organizaciones que se oponen al "sistema gubernamental existente" o que participen en manifestaciones que se considera que



VLADIMIR BUKOVSKY

tienen ese fin; es decir, contra personas que cometen "actos concretos."

En el mismo tono hipócrita, Sujarev seguía argumentando que el hecho de que en la URSS se encierre en manicomios a quienes cometen actos "criminales," demuestra lo humano que es el sistema penal soviético.

En occidente, dijo, frecuentemente se encarcela a las personas mentalmente enfermas. Es cierto que incluso bajo las formas más democráticas de dominación capitalista, frecuentemente se encierra en prisiones a los enfermos mentales, en lugar de darles tratamiento científico en los hospitales. Sin embargo, solamente las dictaduras represivas consideran que reproducir y distribuir volantes criticando al gobierno sea un crimen o una prueba de "enfermedad mental" grave.

Sujarev enfatizó, sin embargo, que el régimen soviético, no suprime la crítica:

Esa afirmación sólo la puede hacer gente que nunca haya tenido en sus manos una revista o un periódico soviéticos, o quienes sean unos mentirosos descarados. . . . En nuestro país está completamente prohibido suprimir la crítica, y tan es así, que cualquiera que sea culpable de esto puede ser destituido de su puesto.

En relación a esto, es esencial señalar la enorme atención que se dedica en la Unión Soviética a trabajar con cartas y quejas de los trabajadores. Este problema se discutió en el

vigésimo quinto congreso del partido, y recientemente se aprobó una resolución especial del Comité Central del PCUS al respecto.

En esta resolución, se recomendaba específicamente a los "directores de periódicos centrales y locales, a los periodistas, y a los reporteros de radio y televisión, que regularmente pongan ante el público cartas de trabajadores e informen sobre las medidas que se tomen a consecuencia de éstas."

Leí siete periódicos centrales durante un día (el 11 de agosto) y encontré en ellos veintisiete materiales críticos.

Por otro lado, señaló el ministro:

Hay crítica y crítica. Está la crítica constructiva, que no solamente señala los errores sino también la manera de superarlos. Y está la crítica de otro tipo, cuando los "acusadores" quieren pintar completamente de negro la situación de nuestro país.

Después de esta defensa del sistema de justicia soviético, el corresponsal de *Literaturnaia Gazeta* formuló su última pregunta: "¿Significa esto que ya no se puede mejorar nuestro sistema legal?" Sujarev reconoció que se pueden perfeccionar algunos aspectos:

Desde luego que se puede mejorar, y se tiene que mejorar para cumplir varias tareas de vital importancia, como fortalecer aún más la legalidad socialista y el orden social, para lanzar una lucha decidida contra el desperdicio, contra las violaciones a la disciplina del estado y en el trabajo, y para educar a la gente en el espíritu del cumplimiento honesto de su deber social y cívico para que se apegue de manera precisa y total a la ley.

Para terminar, Sujarev señaló que frecuentemente se han malinterpretado las campañas de la dirección soviética para fortalecer la disciplina. Para clarificar este punto, citó al Secretario General del PCUS L.I. Brezhnev diciendo que "sin disciplina y un orden social poderoso no se puede lograr la democracia." Luego, alabó la declaración de Brezhnev como "palabras ciertas, llenas de pensamientos profundos."

No es muy probable que la entrevista de Sujarev convenciera a los ciudadanos soviéticos de que gozan de amplios derechos democráticos. Lo más probable es que el mensaje que recibieron fue que no importa lo que hagan los partidos comunistas de Europa Occidental, si el secretario general del partido dice que la noche es el día, cualquiera que diga lo contrario recibirá el mismo trato que Bukovsky. Esto es, desde luego, tratamiento psiquiátrico humanitario para curarle su evidente "enfermedad mental" o un castigo adecuado por cometer "actos concretos."

De cualquier manera, la participación del PC francés en el acto de la Mutualité minó las pretensiones en que se basa la represión totalitaria del Kremlin. Esto es lo que ocasionó una respuesta tan dura por parte de los burócratas soviéticos. Si los partidos comunistas estalinizados de otros países no hubieran defendido a la burocracia soviética contra la crítica dentro del

movimiento obrero, le hubiera resultado mucho más difícil a Stalin consolidar su sistema totalitario. Por otro lado, la

reafirmación de las falsificaciones totalitarias hace que ahora le resulte más difícil al Partido Comunista Francés convencer a

los votantes de que el estalinismo es cosa del pasado y que está siendo superado en la misma Unión Soviética. □

## La Protesta Continúa a Pesar de los Ataques

# Obreros Polacos Exigen Reinstalación de Sus Compañeros

[La siguiente es una traducción del artículo "Polish Workers Demand Job Mates Be Rehired," que apareció en el número del 22 de noviembre de nuestra revista. La traducción es de *Intercontinental Press*.]

El 4 de noviembre, 889 trabajadores de la fábrica Ursus de las afueras de Varsovia, enviaron una declaración firmada al jefe del Partido Comunista polaco, Edward Gierek. Exigían la reinstalación de todos los trabajadores que han sido despedidos en esa fábrica por participar en las manifestaciones del 25 de junio contra el aumento de precios decretado por el gobierno.

El texto completo de las exigencias de los trabajadores fue publicado en el número del 6-7 de noviembre de *Rouge*, diario trotskista francés. Decía:

"Nosotros, los trabajadores de Ursus, exigimos la reinstalación de todos los que fueron despedidos como resultado de la huelga y la manifestación del 25 de junio de 1976.

"Consideramos que esto es indispensable a causa de la difícil situación del país, de la tensión que existe en la fábrica y de las dificultades para cumplir el plan de producción que han resultado de la falta de personal calificado.

"Exigimos que se les permita retornar al trabajo en las mismas condiciones que tenían antes, con todos sus derechos de antigüedad y que se les paguen los salarios correspondientes al periodo en que estuvieron sin trabajo.

"Estamos convencidos que solamente después de que todos los obreros hayan sido reinstalados podremos, junto con todos los polacos, hacer frente a la difícil situación económica en que se encuentra nuestra patria."

Antes de la huelga del 25 de junio, la fuerza de trabajo total de Ursus era de 5,000 personas. Después de la huelga, varios cientos de trabajadores fueron despedidos. Por lo tanto, quienes firmaron esta declaración deben haber constituido casi una cuarta parte de los trabajadores que siguen empleados en la planta. Una exigencia pública y formal como la que presentaron, dirigida al jefe de un estado obrero estalinizado por parte de un sector considerable de los obreros de un centro industrial de primera importancia, es un



GIEREK

indicador de lo masiva y abierta que se ha vuelto la oposición a la dictadura burocrática en Polonia.

El Comité de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Víctimas de la Represión, organizado en Varsovia para defender a los huelguistas que han sido victimizados, ha seguido funcionando abiertamente a pesar de los ataques de la burocracia. Ha reunido y distribuido 360,000 zlotys (20 zlotys equivalen aproximadamente a un US\$1) para ayudar a las familias de los obreros despedidos.

Un miembro del comité, Baranczak, fue arrestado, según informa *Rouge*, por haber "solicitado dinero ilegalmente." El gobierno dice que los fondos reunidos "no llegaron a quienes estaban destinados."

Otros dos miembros del comité, Miroslav Chojewski y Antoni Macierewicz, fueron despedidos de sus trabajos. El primero trabajaba en el Instituto de Investigación Atómica. El segundo era profesor de historia en la Universidad de Varsovia.

El gobierno sostiene que el comité es una asociación ilegal. Los organizadores afirman que en septiembre solicitaron el registro que exige la ley, pero les fue negado.

En una declaración citada en *Le Monde* el 6 de noviembre, los organizadores enfatizaron que la actividad del comité es completamente pública y que dejará de ser necesaria "cuando los sindicatos y las organizaciones oficiales correspondientes cumplan con su deber, cuando termine la persecución y cuando los trabajadores despedidos puedan regresar a sus trabajos con la misma calidad que tenían anteriormente."

Además de hostigar a miembros del comité, el gobierno ha recurrido al truco de publicar declaraciones falsas a nombre del comité. Por ejemplo, en un supuesto "Comunicado No. 3," que el comité denunció como una falsificación, se decía que "recientemente se han dado concesiones importantes y se permitió la reinstalación de muchos trabajadores." Obviamente, la intención era difundir la idea de que estaba siendo menos necesario defender a los huelguistas victimizados.

El gobierno también ha tratado de desmoralizar al comité, informaba *Rouge*, esparciendo la falsa información de que uno de sus miembros, Lipinski, había renunciado después de una charla con el ministro del interior.

Sesenta obreros de Ursus fueron sentenciados por cortes ordinarias, veintiuno lo fueron por cortes criminales y ocho más están bajo proceso, informa *Rouge*. Tres obreros están presos esperando a que se les juzgue, incluso uno, Malewski, que se encuentra en el hospital de la prisión a causa de los malos tratos recibidos.

En Radom, setenta y tres obreros fueron sentenciados y cuarenta y cuatro de ellos recibieron condenas de más de dos años de cárcel. El informe de *Rouge* está basado en el "Comunicado No. 2" del Comité de Apoyo de Varsovia, donde también se decía que once personas fueron asesinadas en el enfrentamiento del 25 de junio entre los trabajadores y las fuerzas represivas. Dos de estas personas fueron asesinadas en las barricadas en Radom.

La formación del Comité Francés de Solidaridad con los Trabajadores Polacos se anunció en *Le Monde* el 7 de noviembre. Entre los patrocinadores del comité están Simone de Beauvoir, Roger Garaudy, André Gorz, Jean-Paul Sartre y Claude Roy. La dirección del comité es c/o *Cahiers du Cinéma*, 9, passage de la Boule-Blanche, 75012 Paris, Francia. □

# Selecciones de la Izquierda

## was fun

*"Qué Hacer," semanario del Grupo Marxista Internacional. Se publica en Frankfurt, Alemania Occidental.*

En el número del 16 de septiembre, H. A. comenta la muerte de Mao Tsetung: "Ha muerto el personaje más importante de la revolución mundial desde Lenin y Trotsky, los dirigentes más destacados del Octubre Ruso. Inseparablemente ligados a su nombre estaban la revolución socialista en China, la construcción de un estado obrero en el país más poblado del mundo y el establecimiento del primer estado obrero en un país del Tercer Mundo. Esta victoria cambió la faz de la tierra y el curso de la historia mundial. Comenzó la histórica marcha triunfal de la revolución colonial, infringió al imperialismo mundial una derrota que dislocó toda su estructura y de la cual nunca se ha recuperado enteramente.

"Todos aquéllos que subestiman la importancia histórica de la revolución china—incluida la importancia histórica de Mao Tsetung como una personalidad—para la revolución mundial, ya sea a causa de sus estrechos intereses burocráticos (como la dirección del Kremlin) o a causa de la justificada indignación contra la política exterior contrarrevolucionaria y el desarrollo interno burocrático de China, se autoeliminan como marxistas y revolucionarios. Por tanto, el Grupo Marxista Internacional expresa a los obreros y campesinos de China sus condolencias por la muerte de Mao Tsetung."

H.A. sigue explicando que "después del colapso de Japón en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Mao actuó con decisión para aprovechar el vacío de poder imperialista en beneficio de la revolución.

"Sin embargo, en el proceso estableció un partido y una dominación burocráticos según el modelo de Stalin. Impidió que la clase obrera instaurara su propio poder, y la redujo a la condición de apéndice impotente de su partido.

"Mao se opuso a la política de 'incentivos materiales' en la producción y llamó a las masas a enfrentar las tendencias tecnocráticas dentro del partido. Pero al mismo tiempo, impidió que las masas ejercieran el poder y aplastó brutalmente las movilizaciones de masas que él mismo desató, como en la 'Revolución Cultural,' tan pronto hubo conseguido su objetivo fraccional.

"Mao se opuso a la política de Jrushchev de acomodación con el Occidente, llamada 'coexistencia pacífica,' y de esta manera impulsó a los países coloniales. Pero llevó tan lejos su ruptura con la Unión Soviética

(que fue brutalmente provocada por Jrushchev) que negó su carácter como estado obrero y declaró que era 'el enemigo principal.'"

De esta manera, Mao llevó a la práctica la "política exterior más contrarrevolucionaria desde el peor periodo de la dominación de Stalin." Incluso "apoyó a la OTAN contra los estados obreros europeos y se puso del lado del imperialismo en Angola."

Por lo tanto, ahora: "La muerte de Mao deja al partido y al estado en una profunda crisis de dirección. Esto es parte del precio que se debe pagar por el carácter burocrático-stalinista de su régimen."

## revolución socialista

*Órgano del Bloque Socialista. Se publica semanalmente en Bogotá, Colombia.*

En el número del 17 de septiembre de 1976, un artículo sobre la muerte de Mao destaca las alabanzas que le dedicaron la prensa capitalista y las figuras burguesas más reaccionarias:

"Nunca la prensa burguesa e imperialista había dedicado tantas páginas a un acontecimiento de este tipo; ni siquiera a la muerte del último Papa. Pero no sólo cuentan las páginas sino también su contenido: pocos hombres han merecido tantos elogios a su muerte, por parte de estos sectores, como 'El Gran Timonel' de la Revolución China. . . . Si el imperialismo y las burguesías autóctonas (nacionales) del mundo colonial y semicolonial se han expresado de ese modo, es en agradecimiento a los favores recibidos por la China Popular y en procura de que los sucesores de Mao mantengan esa línea de conciliación de clases."

El artículo se refiere también a la política externa e interna del régimen de Mao, y afirma: "Sus pilares son: la 'revolución por etapas' (acuñada por Stalin) y el famoso 'bloque de las cuatro clases.'"

"Por la primera, no sólo se atrasó veinte años la Gran Revolución China, sino que, una vez tomado el poder en 1949, Mao se negaba rotundamente a hacer la revolución socialista," hasta que lo obligó la presión del ascenso de la lucha campesina en el sur y la agresión imperialista en Corea.

"'El bloque de las cuatro clases' . . . es lo opuesto por el vértice a la 'independencia política de la clase obrera,' pieza fundamental del marxismo leninismo. Con aquél, no sólo se terminaba de justificar la historia de las alianzas con la burguesía, la disolución del partido comunista al Kuomintang y la necesidad de consolidar, en los países de escaso desarrollo capitalista, una etapa democrático-burguesa lidera-

da por los patronos nacionales, históricamente separada de la dictadura del proletariado, sino que además, ofrecía los 'requisitos teóricos' necesarios para justificar todo tipo de claudicaciones al nacionalismo burgués.

"Mao generalizó luego estas concepciones, así como el rol jugado por el campesinado en la revolución del 49 y el método con que consiguió su triunfo, elevando las tendencias momentáneas, circunstanciales de la realidad a la categoría de una nueva 'teoría,' la otra 'vía' al socialismo. El revisionismo maoísta que tuvo su auge en los años 60, se asentó sobre el desconocimiento del rol del proletariado y del partido, planteando que la revolución tenía sus ejes en los países semicoloniales, su fuerza motriz en el campesinado y 'su' método en la guerra de guerrillas. . . .

"Los fracasos de esta concepción saltan a la vista. Hoy, que el epicentro de la revolución ha pasado nuevamente a Europa, que el proletariado urbano está jugando de nuevo el rol protagónico fundamental en Portugal y España, todos los revolucionarios del mundo reconocen el rol fundamental del partido para que las nuevas explosiones terminen con el triunfo de la revolución socialista. El mismo mundo colonial demostró. . . el rol fundamental del proletariado y la necesidad de su partido. . . ."

## rouge

*"Rojo," diario comunista revolucionario que se publica en París.*

El número del 10 de septiembre dedica ocho de sus dieciséis páginas a la muerte de Mao Tsetung. En el artículo central, Ernest Mandel escribe: "La tercera revolución china pudo triunfar porque, a pesar de textos erróneos como 'Sobre La Nueva Democracia,' en la práctica Mao se negó a subordinar el ejército de liberación popular que había nacido de la guerrilla antijaponesa al ejército de Chiang Kai-shek; se negó a sacrificar los levantamientos campesinos en aras de un gobierno de coalición con la burguesía. La tercera revolución china produjo la creación de la República Popular de China, estado obrero gracias al cual el pueblo chino se convirtió en una gran nación independiente en el mundo, libre del estancamiento y el hambre. Ningún acontecimiento posterior puede eliminar el mérito histórico que le corresponde a Mao por el papel clave que jugó en la victoria de la revolución socialista en China."

El régimen que resultó de la revolución, continúa Mandel, "tiene rasgos comunes

con el régimen estalinista de la URSS." Esto fue producto no sólo del atraso que heredó la nueva nación, sino también del papel del partido. "Es aquí donde aparece la dimensión verdaderamente trágica del Mao anciano. Le preocupaban las consecuencias de la burocratización del partido y del país en cuanto a la despolitización de las masas, de manera parecida a lo que sucedió en la URSS. Habiendo quedado en minoría en la dirección del partido, después del fracaso del 'Gran Salto Adelante,' se dirigió a las masas pasando por encima del aparato del partido. Este fue el principio de la revolución cultural, que tuvo rasgos comunes con la radicalización de la juventud en el resto del mundo. Fue lanzada bajo la bandera de la fórmula: 'En último análisis, las lecciones de la historia se reducen a esto; la revolución está justificada.' Pero cuando las movilizaciones de las masas empezaron a desbordar cada vez más el control de la fracción maoista, cuando empezaron a producir el surgimiento de tendencias opositoras de izquierda, cuando comenzaron a atraer a los trabajadores y a llevarlos por el camino de la huelga, Mao revirtió el curso y se reunió con la mayoría del aparato."

D.R., en un artículo titulado "Mao Tsetung en la Revolución China," se refiere a la carrera de Mao y hace un balance de sus relaciones con Stalin y el estalinismo. Escribe:

"El maoísmo nació de la derrota de 1927. Mao no pudo hacer un análisis global del estalinismo y de sus repercusiones en China y siguió siendo fiel a la teoría de la revolución por etapas, pero de 1927 sí sacó varias lecciones que no olvidaría jamás: comprendió que había que desconfiar del Kuomintang traidor, que había que preservar la autonomía política y organizativa del Partido Comunista, y que había que construir una relación de fuerzas política y militar que garantizara al PC la dirección del proceso revolucionario. Comprendió también que había que desconfiar de las directrices de la Comintern, en tanto que fueran contradictorias con los intereses de la revolución china."

Mao, escribe D.R., "dirigió la revolución china en contra de Stalin, y eso, desde 1927."

"... al practicar una política de alianza de clases sin someterse a la burguesía nacional, Mao regresó más bien a la política que Lenin definió en 1920 para los países coloniales que al 'menchevismo' de Stalin. Pero un leninismo corrompido, porque Mao no evitó los 'excesos' oportunistas (en teoría y en la práctica) antes mencionados."

En sus últimos años, escribe D.R., Mao se preocupó por la burocratización del estado chino. "Fue para contrarrestar los efectos sociales (diferencias sociales en el campo y entre la clase obrera, formación de una 'burocracia' de tipo 'estalinista' completamente aislada de las masas) y los

efectos políticos de la línea de 'los moderados' [Liu Shao-ch'i], así como para 'recuperar el poder' del partido y del estado, que Mao no cesó de lanzar campañas políticas de amplitud sin igual, antes y después de su intento más arriesgado por reimponer su línea política, la Revolución Cultural."

Mao estaba impulsado "por un innegable deseo de frenar el desarrollo 'natural' de la burocracia, pero como nunca consideró el desarrollo de órganos de verdadera democracia proletaria, sus tentativas se quedaron cortas y se redujeron a una preocupación permanente por movilizar a las masas por las razones que enumeramos más arriba, sin darles jamás un medio que les permitiera tomar la dirección del estado chino en sus manos."

Frédéric Carlier, en un artículo sobre "La lucha por el Poder" en China tras la muerte de Mao, sugiere que un punto clave entre los contendientes por la dirección del partido será si continúan aplicando un modelo económico claramente maoista o si regresan al "modelo soviético" de mediados de los años cincuenta. La política maoista, escribe, "implica una verdadera descentralización de la toma de decisiones, la confianza en un cierto grado de iniciativa de la base, así como la verdadera participación, sin restricciones, de los trabajadores chinos, a diferencia del 'modelo soviético' que se basa únicamente en la represión."

El resto de la información de *Rouge* incluye largas citas de Mao en favor de la liberación de la mujer, contra el burocratismo, por la libertad de expresión para los trabajadores, a favor de dejar la toma de decisiones en manos de las masas y no de los cuadros del partido, así como su telegrama de condolencias por la muerte de Stalin. Una página está dedicada a los poemas de Mao.

## INFORMATIONS OUVRIERES 753

"Informaciones Obreras," tribuna libre de la lucha de clases. Se publica semanalmente en París.

El comentario sobre Mao, que aparece en el número del 15 septiembre, comienza con una nota crítica.

"La muerte de Mao Tsetung provocó una competencia de elogios fúnebres y un coro unánime de alabanzas para el dirigente del Partido Comunista chino que, sin duda, no tienen precedentes. Un denominador común de estos homenajes póstumos es la exclusión de las masas obreras y campesinas de China de todo papel decisivo en las profundas revueltas sociales y en las inmensas transformaciones que se han operado en China, y a las cuales va indiscutiblemente ligado el nombre de Mao Tsetung. Supuestamente la actividad de Mao lo explica todo."

Luego se afirma que el avance de China en estos últimos veinte años, así como su liberación del imperialismo es "consecuen-

cia de un proceso revolucionario de muchos años, que involucró la lucha de decenas de millones de hombres, algo que no puede ser reducido, ni siquiera por los más idólatras, a la sola intervención del 'Gran Timonel'...

"A riesgo de romper las formalidades del duelo, es mejor evaluar el papel político que jugaron la dirección del Partido Comunista chino y Mao Tsetung en los momentos cruciales de este proceso revolucionario, en lugar de repetir como los demás una leyenda dorada." Lo que es más, señala el artículo, es en esta historia donde se puede encontrar la explicación para la lucha de poder que había comenzado incluso antes de la muerte de Mao.

"El joven Partido Comunista chino (fundado en julio de 1921) jugó un papel esencial en esta movilización [la lucha de 1925-27], pero seguía estando bajo la dirección de la Internacional Comunista, que ya estaba controlada por la fracción estalinista. Fue esa dirección quien le impuso... una orientación de sumisión a la 'burguesía nacional,' es decir, a Chiang Kai-shek, que condujo al desastre y a la masacre de muchos cuadros obreros.

"Al principio, el fundador del Partido Comunista chino, que no fue Mao Tsetung sino Ch'en Tu-hsiu, siguió ciegamente esta política, y denunció 'el aventurerismo trotskista.' Posteriormente tuvo el raro valor de reconocer su error y denunciar la responsabilidad de Stalin, uniéndose a la Oposición de Izquierda internacional. Este crimen le valió ser eliminado de la historia 'oficial.' Se necesita mucha cobardía intelectual para hoy ni siquiera recordar su existencia, mientras que se alaban los méritos de Mao."

El PCCh siguió los zigzags de la política oportunista de la burocracia del Kremlin. Sin embargo, resultó imposible la colaboración de clases con una burguesía excepcionalmente débil, que había sido fuertemente sacudida por la Segunda Guerra Mundial y la invasión japonesa.

Mao tuvo que escoger entre la subordinación al desesperado régimen de Chiang, lo que hubiera equivalido al suicidio, y ponerse a la cabeza de la revolución que ya había comenzado. Mao optó por aprovechar la oportunidad.

Sin embargo, Mao no dirigió conscientemente la revolución china: "Pero el respeto estricto a la verdad histórica nos lleva a constatar que no fue gracias a la política que impulsó la dirección del PCCh, sino contra ella y negando las justificaciones teóricas que Mao había elaborado para ella... que las masas trabajadoras de China acabaron con la dictadura de Chiang Kai-shek."

Desde el principio del nuevo régimen, la burocracia ha tenido un poder absoluto. "La principal característica de la burocracia china es el hecho de que ejerce por sí sola el poder político. Es el caso típico de un estado obrero que es burocrático desde su origen, al contrario del estado obrero

soviético, que al principio se basaba en la dictadura del proletariado ejercida por los soviets, que tuvieron que ser destruidos por la burocracia para poder usurpar el poder político.

“Es como componente de la revolución proletaria mundial que la revolución china triunfó en 1949. Ese triunfo de la revolución es, en realidad, una nueva victoria de la revolución de octubre.

“Pero si la existencia del estado obrero ruso . . . planteó problemas que no se podían resolver dentro de los límites de Rusia, el régimen que surgió en 1949, en el que el proletariado no disponía de ningún medio que le permitiera ejercer su poder político, tenía que enfrentarse rápidamente a problemas nacionales e internacionales aún más graves.”



“Semanario Rojo,” periódico del Grupo Marxista Internacional, sección británica de la Cuarta Internacional.

En el número del 16 de septiembre aparece un artículo firmado por Shan Shuang, titulado “China Después de Mao.” Una nota editorial que acompaña el artículo dice: “El efecto de la muerte de Mao en China y en el Partido Comunista de China [PCCh] se podría comparar con la situación que se produjo en la Unión Soviética tras la muerte de Stalin. Sobre la mayoría de los puntos básicos no hay diferencias de principio entre las dos fracciones que ahora compiten por el poder—como no las había entre las fracciones de Malenkov y Jrushchev después de la muerte de Stalin.

“Aunque en términos de método y de política hay muchas diferencias entre las fracciones llamadas ‘radical’ y ‘moderada’ de las altas capas del partido, hay un acuerdo total sobre la orientación básica y la estrategia a largo plazo. Ambas fracciones apoyan decididamente la teoría del socialismo en un solo país; las dos igualan la dictadura del proletariado con la dictadura de la burocracia, y la democracia proletaria con el anarquismo.”

Shan Shuang escribe: “Habiendo abandonado el internacionalismo y la orientación estratégica de vincular la reconstrucción social de China a la revolución mundial, los dirigentes de las diferentes fracciones del PCCh se concentraron, en cambio, en buscar una manera de manipular más efectivamente a los obreros y campesinos—para que produjeran más, consumieran menos y no se quejaran.”

No se hace ningún balance específico de Mao Tsetung como individuo, pero sí se evalúa la creciente oposición de masas a su régimen que se ha producido en los últimos meses:

“La manifestación más destacada del nuevo estado de ánimo fue la lucha de los obreros y estudiantes de Hangchow a

principios del verano de 1975. Según la ‘Resolución del Comité Central del PCCh y el Consejo de Estado sobre los Problemas en la Provincia de Chekiang’ del 4 de julio de 1975, los huelguistas ‘interrumpieron el suministro de agua y electricidad, sabotearon las comunicaciones, hicieron emboscadas contra el ejército, atacaron instituciones de seguridad pública (y) robaron material perteneciente al estado.’

“Es claro que los acontecimientos de Hangchow adquirieron dimensiones de insurrección armada. Aunque decenas de miles de soldados aplastaron rápidamente el levantamiento, la ola de descontento se ha extendido por gran parte de China. Los motines sucedidos en la Plaza Tien An Men en abril de este año [1976], muestran que no ha desaparecido el odio de las masas contra la burocracia, sino que se ha intensificado considerablemente y se vuelve cada vez más político (hay que señalar que en los disturbios de Hangchow la demanda más importante era el aumento de salarios.”



“Sekai Kakumei,” (Revolución Mundial), órgano central semanal de la Liga Comunista Revolucionaria de Japón.

Bajo el titular “Lamentar la Muerte de Mao Tsetung,” un artículo de primera página del número del 20 de septiembre declara que “800 millones de personas en China están de duelo, sienten como si hubieran perdido a su padre, lamentando la muerte del Presidente Mao. La sección japonesa de la Cuarta Internacional expresa sus sentidas condolencias por la muerte del Presidente Mao.”

Al evaluar la carrera política de Mao, el artículo declara que era “verdaderamente un gran revolucionario.” Seguía diciendo: “. . . bajo su dirección se realizó el trabajo de liberar la energía revolucionaria del pueblo chino del yugo del antiguo sistema feudal y de la cruel opresión del imperialismo extranjero, el trabajo que condujo a la dictadura del proletariado. Mao, más que ninguna otra persona, tiene el mérito de haber logrado que los campesinos y los obreros . . . salieran de su destino permanente de hambre. . . .”

“Pero la grandeza de Mao Tsetung no está únicamente en estos logros. Mao era un comunista independiente, autosuficiente, con un espíritu y una pasión revolucionarios. . . . Vivió entre las masas, tratando de desarrollar su pensamiento a través de verificarlo en sus luchas. Mao Tsetung tenía una grandeza que todo comunista del mundo debe estudiar y comprender.

“En una época en que los comunistas de todo el mundo se volvían leales sirvientes de Stalin, Mao resistió valientemente, tomando una línea revolucionaria independiente. Es este hecho . . . el que resulta tan impresionante.”

En sus últimos años, declara el artículo, Mao se dedicó “al problema de cómo

resistir la dura presión de la despótica burocracia soviética y cómo reforzar el desarrollo revolucionario independiente de China. Trató de lograrlo a través de una línea general de ‘oponerse al social imperialismo soviético al mismo tiempo que se avanza la coexistencia pacífica entre China y los Estados Unidos. . . .’

“Esta línea de Mao está completamente equivocada. Nunca se podrá alcanzar en la realidad. Al formular esta línea, Mao cometió el más grave error de su vida y manchó para siempre su nombre.”

Es discutible la opinión expresada por los imperialistas de que bajo los herederos de Mao “probablemente no cambiará nada,” dice el artículo. “Nosotros predecimos que China se dirige seguramente hacia más luchas, por dos razones.”

En primer lugar, porque la política exterior de Pekín “a favor de los Estados Unidos y contra la Unión Soviética es un grave obstáculo en el desarrollo de China hacia el socialismo. Fracasar rotundamente en resolver las contradicciones y dificultades internas de China. . . .”

“En segundo lugar, la muerte de Mao Tsetung ofrece una situación perfecta para que la burocracia privilegiada fortalezca su control. Mao era un apoyo muy grande para la resistencia de las masas chinas contra la dominación de la casta burocrática privilegiada. La línea estalinizante del socialismo en un solo país, a la que Mao capituló finalmente, ofrece siempre una base para la degeneración burocrática. Pero a pesar de este hecho, la línea revolucionaria radical y el espíritu revolucionario de Mao siguieron siendo poderosas armas en la resistencia de las masas.

“Pero ahora ha desaparecido el principal obstáculo para la burocracia, que muy probablemente comenzará a buscar aperturas, tratando de avanzar hacia un sistema despótico. Esto producirá nuevos enfrentamientos entre la burocracia y las masas.”

El artículo concluye: “Deseábamos fervientemente luchar por la victoria de la revolución en este país proletario y, como revolucionarios de la República Socialista de Japón, conocer a Mao Tsetung. Confiábamos en que Mao, con su vasta experiencia y a pesar de su oposición al trotskismo, seguramente no se negaría a tener una charla sincera, de corazón a corazón, con nosotros sobre los métodos de la cooperación y la solidaridad entre camaradas. ¡Y ahora esto es imposible!

“Pero la grandeza de Mao Tsetung es la grandeza de 800 millones de chinos. Fue el gran pueblo chino el que dio nacimiento al gran Mao Tsetung. Si podemos aprender de Mao, por ese mismo símbolo podemos aprender todo lo más profundo del pueblo chino.

“Lanzándonos valientemente por el camino de la revolución, algún día tendremos la oportunidad de abrazar a esos 800 millones de Mao Tsetungs. . . .”

“Un comunista ha muerto. Comunistas le presentan sus respetos.”

## Perspectivas para España y Otros Países Imperialistas

[La siguiente entrevista apareció en el número del 23 de octubre de *Mundo*, una revista semanal de Barcelona. Fue realizada por Antonio Ubierna, autor de *Qué es el trotskismo*, y Jean Pierre Male, profesor de "Relaciones económicas internacionales" en la Universidad Autónoma y coautor de *La crisis económica y su repercusión en España*.]

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Ernest Mandel es profesor de la Universidad Libre de Bruselas y catedrático de economía de la Universidad de Berlín Oeste, ha publicado numerosos libros sobre economía y teoría política de los que se han traducido al castellano: *Tratado de Economía Marxista* (en dos tomos, Editorial Era, México), *Ensayos sobre el Neocapitalismo* (Era), *Introducción a la Economía Marxista* (Nova Terra, Barcelona), *Proceso al Desafío Americano* (Nova Terra), *La Crisis* (Editorial Fontamara, Barcelona), así como libros en otros idiomas sobre la autogestión, la formación del pensamiento económico de Marx e innumerables artículos en publicaciones de los cinco continentes.

El material para la presente entrevista es resultado de horas de conversaciones, y de la asistencia a sus conferencias durante su reciente estancia en Barcelona. Las respuestas de Mandel han sido extensas y muy matizadas, pero las exigencias de espacio nos han obligado a sintetizarlas.

*Pregunta: ¿Cuál es el carácter y la naturaleza profunda de la crisis (o de las crisis) que atraviesa el capitalismo actual?*

*Respuesta:* Creo que el periodo que vivimos es un momento de convergencia de varias crisis diferentes.

En primer lugar, hay una inversión de la tendencia a largo plazo. Estamos pasando de un ciclo largo a tendencia expansiva—que favoreció a Europa desde 1948 hasta por lo menos 1968—a un periodo semejante al comprendido entre los años 1913 y 1939, es decir una onda larga con tendencia estacionaria.

La expansión rápida y la elevada tasa de crecimiento que caracterizaron el capitalismo mundial de la posguerra, forman ya parte del pasado. Se acabó y para mucho tiempo.

*P: ¿Quiere decir esto que no se encontrará fácilmente la forma de volver a impulsar el desarrollo de la economía mundial?*

*R:* Aquí, hay que articular el análisis a



F. Elvira/Mundo

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largo plazo con el análisis coyuntural. Efectivamente, a la inversión de la tendencia a largo plazo se suma en este momento una crisis periódica de superproducción. Se trata de un fenómeno clásico podríamos decir—limitado o particularizado por la persistencia de la inflación—o que acentúa en este momento la depresión. Pero dentro de la tónica estacionaria a largo plazo, puede haber en el futuro periodos coyunturales de relanzamiento.

*P: ¿Ha sido la crisis del petróleo el detonador de la crisis?*

*R:* Para mí, esto constituye un tercer aspecto de la situación actual. Hay una crisis de las relaciones entre el centro del capitalismo mundial y la periferia, más concretamente, una crisis de relaciones entre la burguesía imperialista y la burguesía semicolonial. Mediante el alza duradera de los precios del petróleo y de las demás materias primas, empezó un trasvase real de recursos hacia la burguesía periférica. Esta tendencia es limitada, amenazada e insuficiente para ser la base de un nuevo orden económico mundial. Pero provoca una serie de adaptaciones dolorosas y de contraestrategias violentas que sacuden actualmente al capitalismo mundial.

*P: ¿Cuál puede ser la salida de la situación?*

*R:* Para la burguesía, y en el marco de su sistema, la solución normal y lógica de esta situación de crisis coincidentes sería un aumento considerable de la explotación de la clase obrera para compensar los efectos negativos señalados y para relanzar a largo plazo la economía. En este sentido, incluso la recesión tiene una función precisa, la de crear una masa de parados necesaria para ejercer una presión suficiente sobre la clase obrera, a fin de que acepte el aumento de la explotación.

*P: ¿Es capaz la burguesía de imponer esa política económica?*

*R:* El mayor problema para la burguesía, es la coincidencia de los tres tipos de crisis que he mencionado, todas de esencia económica, coincidiendo, además, con un ciclo ascendente de las luchas de clases en Europa Occidental que se extenderá—me parece—al conjunto de los países imperialistas.

La organización y la combatividad actuales de la clase obrera son muy superiores a lo que fueron en anteriores periodos de crisis del capitalismo y la hacen capaz de rechazar la solución burguesa.

*P: ¿Cómo ve entonces la situación en el futuro inmediato?*

*R:* Si a medio plazo la burguesía no es capaz de aplicar sus soluciones históricas, la clase obrera, por su parte, no tiene la madurez suficiente—teniendo en cuenta su conciencia política y su nivel de organización—para imponer las suyas.

Por lo tanto se abre un periodo de inestabilidad política y social extrema en el cual las dos clases fundamentales de la

## Sobre la Liga Comunista Revolucionaria

La Liga Comunista Revolucionaria [LCR], como Ernest Mandel, pertenece a la "tendencia mayoritaria" de la Cuarta Internacional. En las vísperas de la visita de aquél, LCR se presentó en diversas ruedas. Lluís Ma. Bonet i Llovet acudió a la de Barcelona, en lujoso hotel y con cita y control previos.

Roser Rius i Camps, obrera de Artes Gráficas, catorce meses recientes en la madrileña cárcel de Yeserías, Pau Pons Sagrera, enseñante y Joaquín Nieto Sainz, obrero de la construcción, de la LCR de Catalunya, fueron los que dieron la cara. Fueron los militantes que sin especificar ni concretar sus respectivos cargos en la organización, cuidaron de ir desgranando lo que es la LCR.

Formada hace seis años por militantes de las recién extinguidas "organizaciones Frente" (FLP, FOC, ESBA), se constituyó como LCR, "organización simpatizante de la Cuarta Internacional," o sea con ideología trotskista. Sin embargo, este último punto, tan absolutamente central, parece actualmente matizado.

No solamente porque en la Rueda ni una sola vez fue nombrado Trotsky (ni tan sólo como fundador de la Cuarta Internacional), sino porque se definieron explícitamente más como "marxistas revolucionarios" (lo que les aproxima a las definiciones de grupos como Acción Comunista, POUM [Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista] o Unión Comunista de Liberación, no trotskistas a pesar de etiquetas frívolamente colgadas) que como trotskistas.

En 1971 hubo la escisión más importante de LCR, quedando, al parecer, ambas fracciones empatadas en cuanto a número de militantes. De aquí salió Liga Comunista [LC]. Y ahora, LCR plantea la necesidad de un rápido encuentro, de una inmediata refusión.

"La escisión fue un desastre" es lo que actualmente opinan. Entonces, la escisión se explicó como fruto de una diferente concepción estratégica en España. Ahora, la fusión la justifican en la misma estrategia internacional que tienen (ambas, simpatizantes de la Cuarta Internacional). LC, sin embargo, no ve esta operación como inmediata, sólo como necesaria en abstracto.

A partir del momento de aquella escisión, LCR valora como muy importante su fusión con ETA-VI Asamblea,\* producida a finales de 1973. Entonces, según proclaman, empezó la historia de LCR. Antes era prehistoria.

Actualmente tienen, según sus cifras, mas de 3,500 militantes en todo el estado español, en las principales localidades, de los que dos terceras partes se han incorporado en este último año. El 45% es de origen obrero, el 60% son trabajadores asalariados y el 32% mujeres, con una media de edad general de 23 años.

LCR propugna un gobierno de los trabajadores y se opone a un gobierno "de colaboración de clases." Por ello, propone un frente único de clase que mediante la huelga general imponga tal gobierno.

\*Euzkadi ta Askatasuna-VI Asamblea (Patria Vasca y Libertad-VI Asamblea).

La clase obrera, pues, confrontada a una constante degradación del nivel de vida, ha de jugar un papel de vanguardia, impulsar combinadamente el esfuerzo por las libertades y esta misma libertad, instrumento necesario para defender las conquistas sociales. Para ello, sin embargo, se niegan a suscribir cualquier pacto social.

Esta perspectiva de independencia de clase comporta por un lado la autonomía organizativa de esta clase y la desconfianza en la colaboración interclasista.

LCR rechaza toda negociación de los estatutos de autonomía. Cree que la Generalitat de Catalunya [el gobierno autónomo de catalán] es fruto de recortes y negociaciones. Rechaza un gobierno catalán (o gallego o vasco) autoproclamado que no haya salido de la voluntad popular.

Por contra, está a favor de la convocatoria de elecciones generales para una asamblea nacional soberana. En estas elecciones deben estar presentes, a su juicio, "todas las opciones incluídas las que propugnan separaciones."

Una vez constituída dicha asamblea, LCR defenderá "la república federal en el estado español, basada en la libre unión de los pueblos oprimidos."

En el orden sindical, LCR está por un sindicato único de clase, salido del congreso sindical constituyente en base a asambleas de talleres, fábricas, etc. En base a la construcción de organismos unitarios en cada empresa, "que ya han empezado a constituirse." Y todo ello, a partir de Comisiones Obreras que, reforzadas, deben impulsar la unidad sindical.

sociedad quedan en un equilibrio muy frágil con la posibilidad de cambios bruscos en un sentido o en otro. O bien la clase obrera logra resolver su problema de dirección política y alcanza el nivel de conciencia necesario para imponer soluciones socialistas, o bien la burguesía impondrá las suyas que podrán ser extremadamente violentas y sangrientas.

*P: ¿Cómo ve los problemas derivados de la dirección y encuadramiento de la clase obrera por los partidos comunistas y socialdemócratas en este contexto de debilidad social de la burguesía?*

*R:* Creo que hay que hacer un análisis dialéctico sobre la evolución de los partidos reformistas y neoreformistas. Es cierto que esos partidos siguen siendo partidos de colaboración de clase y en ese sentido son las últimas alternativas del orden burgués.

Sin ellos la burguesía no podría hacer frente a la inmensa combatividad de las masas, desviándola con luchas parciales a objetivos y reformas compatibles con la supervivencia del sistema capitalista y del estado burgués. La Unión de la Izquierda en Francia, el compromiso histórico en Italia y el pacto social en España cumplen esa función objetiva. Sin embargo, hay una verdadera dialéctica entre lo que quieren los dirigentes reformistas y lo que quieren las masas y no podemos simplificar el problema acusando de traidores a esos dirigentes. La evolución llamada *eurocomunista* de los partidos francés, italiano y español significa desde el punto de vista doctrinal, del programa, un viraje a la derecha muy claro: abandono de la dictadura del proletariado, abandono de toda referencia a la Internacional Comunista y a la Revolución de Octubre; en cierta medida abandono, incluso, de toda referen-

cia al comunismo. Pero ello no nos permite equiparar a estos partidos con los partidos socialdemócratas de hoy y considerar sus programas similares. Podemos decir que estos partidos comunistas adoptan la misma posición que adoptó Kautsky frente a Lenin en la Segunda Internacional durante los años veinte.

*P: ¿Esa evolución de los partidos comunistas occidentales se debe exclusivamente a la presión de la burguesía o por el contrario intervienen en ella otros factores?*

*R:* Esta evolución de los partidos comunistas no puede ser atribuida exclusivamente a la presión de la burguesía; esa evolución responde también de alguna manera a la presión de los trabajadores. Cuando esos partidos abandonan la referencia a la dictadura del proletariado no

es, como dice el secretario general del PCF Marchais, porque a los obreros la palabra dictadura les recuerde las dictaduras fascistas. Eso es una estupidez. No hay ningún obrero que identifique al PCF con Hitler o Mussolini. Lo que aún no se atreve a reconocer Marchais es que los obreros franceses, incluidos los obreros comunistas, no desean una dictadura de tipo estalinista y es con ese tipo de dictadura con la que identifican al PCF. Es decir, los partidos comunistas que adoptan la vía eurocomunista no hacen simplemente concesiones a la burguesía sino también a la clase obrera, a la potente corriente antiburocrática que en el seno de la clase obrera se está desarrollando en Europa Occidental. No es por simple casualidad que Nicolás Sartorius\* haga referencia a los delegados de fábrica elegidos en Italia en 1969. Es una muestra de la presión que el ascenso de las luchas obreras ejerce sobre los partidos comunistas. Lo que no impide que, al mismo tiempo, tengan esos dirigentes una actitud burocrática y manipuladora en las centrales sindicales que ellos controlan.

*P: ¿Qué consecuencias pueden tener estas contradicciones internas en el seno de esos partidos?*

*R:* El sistema estalinista era profundamente coherente, pero estas nuevas tendencias que se desarrollan en los partidos comunistas son contradictorias y sus contradicciones se agudizarán a medida que se profundicen las luchas de clases. No se puede pedir la libertad y la democracia, incluso para los partidos burgueses, y rechazarla para las tendencias revolucionarias. Por ello, las corrientes marxistas revolucionarias tienen hoy un arma mucho más potente que en el pasado para dialogar con los obreros y los cuadros comunistas, para aplicar una política de acercamiento y de unidad de acción. Todo ello facilitará la construcción del partido revolucionario y sobre todo permitirá generalizar las experiencias de autorganización de la clase obrera que son decisivas para la victoria futura de la revolución socialista.

*P: De acuerdo con lo dicho anteriormente, ¿cómo caracterizaría la situación española?*

*R:* Yo diría que España es hoy un país capitalista industrializado de tipo clásico. Hablar de España como país subdesarrollado, como un país semicolonial es una aberración. España es una potencia imperialista de tipo medio. El capital extranjero tiene importancia creciente en la economía española, pero ello no nos permite afirmar que ésta tenga una estructura económica de tipo neocolonial.

Evidentemente, el fenómeno de la internacionalización del capital ha creado en el

seno de los países imperialistas interrelaciones de nuevo tipo. Pero no hay ningún elemento que permita afirmar que la influencia del capital extranjero sea tal como para que el estado español defienda sus intereses en contra de los intereses de la burguesía nacional. No lo hizo ni tan siquiera en los más críticos años de la posguerra.

*P: ¿Cómo ve la relación de fuerzas entre las clases en España?*

*R:* El desarrollo industrial español ha creado las condiciones sociales y políticas favorables para un cambio de las relaciones de fuerza en favor de la clase obrera. El desarrollo industrial ha hecho que el número de obreros y su proporción dentro de la sociedad sea mucho mayor, y ha permitido al mismo tiempo el surgimiento de una nueva clase obrera que no se halla traumatizada por la guerra civil, llena de combatividad y con un creciente nivel organizativo.

*P: ¿Qué perspectivas se le abren a la burguesía española?*

*R:* De acuerdo con los intereses de la propia burguesía, el régimen autoritario debe desaparecer porque ¿para qué le sirve a la burguesía la represión si engendra nuevas luchas?

La burguesía buscará por todos los medios el pacto social porque hoy, con el descenso de la tasa de crecimiento económico, con la agravación del déficit de la balanza de pagos y de la inflación, no tiene otra salida. En estos momentos la burguesía quiere frenar la lucha reivindicativa de los obreros porque no les puede conceder lo que piden. Por ello busca el acercamiento, el pacto social, con las fuerzas capaces de frenar o paralizar las luchas obreras.

Pero ese pacto social sólo podrá conse-

guirlo la burguesía entregando a cabo las libertades democrático burguesas. Y es evidente que el Partido Comunista no se arriesgará a perder su influencia en la clase obrera sin obtener a cambio esas libertades. Es aberrante pensar que podrá conseguirse la participación del PCE [Partido Comunista Español] en la consecución del pacto social sin concederle la libertad de acción, la participación en las elecciones y, quizás, su participación en el gobierno.

*P: Si son tan evidentes las necesidades de la burguesía, ¿por qué no se instauran ya esas libertades democrático burguesas?*

*R:* Hay que tener en cuenta que la burguesía española es muy heterogénea. En primer lugar, no toda la burguesía cree al PCE capaz de garantizar el pacto social, pues piensa que la clase obrera desbordará a ese y a otros partidos. Por otro lado, el aparato estatal heredado de la época de Franco no quiere dejar las riendas del poder y, jugando con esa indecisión de la burguesía, está frenando las reformas democráticas. Indiscutiblemente que esta situación es insostenible y que el pacto social es la opción que más atractivo presenta para la burguesía. Tanto más cuanto coincide con los intereses de la burguesía internacional que necesita ampliar su espacio de maniobra y frenar las crisis sociales en el seno de los países que forman parte del bloque más desarrollado.

En todo caso, es incomprensible para un observador extranjero la indecisión actual de la burguesía española y su incapacidad para salir de la crisis sobre todo en un momento en que sus intereses económicos se hallan en peligro y que todas las condiciones le permiten dar ese paso hacia adelante. □

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\*Un dirigente de Comisiones Obreras.